Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher citizen shall always be at a disadvantage.
This is not
GR. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961
DOCTRINE: “Reciprocity must be total. If any of the
two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any
character, the reciprocity does not work.”
FACTS:
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of
British parents, married in Manila to another British
subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where
he and his wife moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to
certain real and personal properties, among which are
210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines (Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary
administrator of his estate filed an estate and
inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to
secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the
Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests
in the estate to the spouses Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax
return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of
which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines’
shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the
NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially
paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed in
the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be
deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b) the
intangible personal property belonging to the estate of
Walter is exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the
reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting exemption
from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of
stock.
RULING:
NO. Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states
collects or imposes or does not exempt any transfer,
death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or
resident, or non-resident with properties, there are
imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an
inheritance tax.
But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is
imposed. Also, although the Federal Internal Revenue
Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino
what the legislators intended.
SPECIFICALLY:
Section122 of the NIRC provides that “No tax shall be
collected under this Title in respect of intangible
personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal
property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country, or
(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow
a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes
of every character in respect of intangible personal
property owned by citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country."
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California
Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible personal
property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the time
of his death was a resident of a territory or another
State of the United States or of a foreign state or
country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or
death tax in respect to intangible personal property of
its own residents, but either:
Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of
any character in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of this State, or Had in its laws a
reciprocal provision under which intangible personal
property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the
Territory or other State of the United States or foreign
state or country in which the nonresident resided
allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible
personal property of residents of the Territory or State
of the United States or foreign state or country of
residence of the decedent."
 Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and
resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980
in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss, but it was denied by the trial court in its order.
Pending decision, Wolfgang obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the
parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit
as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent.
Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with
a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between the Roehr and
Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged
by Roehr.
ISSUE:
W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court
since there are no conjugal properties alleged in the
annulment and the divorce decree provides for the
finality of the custody of children.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must be
determined by our courts. The Court held that before
our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended
by Executive Order 227)
Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that
the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
Since the proceedings in the German court were
summary, the wife was not given opportunity to
challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce
decree did not provide for the finality of the custody of
children.
1st Issue:
W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial
motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court
can modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable,
as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory
and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue:
W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child
custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule
39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to
the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their
two children. The proceedings in the German court
were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s
participation in the proceedings in the German court,
the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to

obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the
issue of parental custody, care, support and education
mindful of the best interests of the children.
 RECTO v. HARDEN
G.R. No. L-6897, November 29 1956
Facts
Sometime in July 1941, Mrs. Esperanza Harden (Mrs.
Harden) and Claro Recto executed a contract of
professional services (Contract of Service), the
contents of which are summarized below:
She engaged the services of Atty. Recto for the
purpose of securing an increase in the amount of her
support from her husband Mr. (James) Harden and for
the purpose of protecting and preserving her right in
the properties of the conjugal partnership, in
contemplation of a divorce suit which she intended to
file in the Court of California
Since she isn’t currently able to pay Recto’s retainer
fee she agrees to pay Atty. Recto
 25% of whatever increase in support she will
get from Mr. (James) Harden
 Attorney’s fees charged as expenses of
litigation
 20% of her share and participation which he
may receive in the funds and properties of the
conjugal partnership
In compliance with the contract, Atty. Recto
commenced a case in the CFI Manila entitled
“Esperanza Harden v Fred Harden and Jose
Salumbides” wherein he prayed that
 Mrs. Harden be given the exclusive
administration of all businesses and property
of the conjugal partnership OR that defendants
inform Mrs. Harden of everything pertaining to
the businesses and property of the conjugal
partnership
 That Mr. Harden account and return to the PH
sums of money he withdrew and sent to HK
 That transfers of shares of stock in the name
of 3rd persons and the administrator
Salumbides be cancelled and returned to the
conjugal partnership
 That a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
against the defendant to prevent them from
disposing of the property and businesses of
the conjugal partnership
A writ of preliminary injunction was thus issued by the
CFI. Such injunction was modified upon an agreement
of the parties to put up a separate bank account in the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. The
funds of the conjugal partnership, as well as those that
will be ordered returned to the conjugal partnership will
then be transferred to such bank account.
The Japs invaded the PH. After the liberation, records
of the case were destroyed. Atty. Recto then asked
that the records be reconstituted. On October 31 1949,
the CFI rendered a decision
 Declaring the value of the conjugal partnership
at around P4 Million.
 Ordering that a conjugal lien be annotated in
the TCT of a parcel of land in QC, of certain
shares of stock, which will say that any
alienation of Mr. Harden will be invalid for lack
of consent of Mrs. Harden
 Increasing the allowance of both Mr. and Mrs.
Harden to P2500 from the previous
P1500/month
 Ordering Mr. (James) Harden to inform Mrs.
Harden of all property and businesses
belonging to the conjugal partnership
 That a receiver be appointed to prevent Mr.
Harden and Salumbides from disposing of the
property despite the writ of preliminary
injunction
Of course Mr. Harden and Salumbides appealed the
case. While the appeal was pending, Atty. Recto filed
a manifestation and motion stating that Mrs. Harden
suddenly instructed him to discontinue all proceedings
relative to the case above as well as all judgment
obtained, since she executed certain instruments with
Mr. Harden:
 A settlement agreement between Mister and
Missus for the sum of P5,000
 That a trust fund was created by Mr. Harden
from which a monthly pension of P500/month
would be taken
According to Atty. Recto, such documents were
executed merely to defeat his claim as attorney’s fees.
Thus he prayed in his motion that:
 The receiver appointed continue his functions
 He be declared entitled to the sum of
P400,000 a his fees for services rendered
 That the cases above continue since the
receivership is based on these cases, and that
such cases are important to safeguard his
attorney’ fees
A commissioner was appointed who reported that Atty.
Recto was entitled to 20% of Mrs. Harden’s share of
the conjugal partnership considering the time and
effort the Attorney has given to her case. CFI adopted
the finding of the commissioner and found Atty. Recto
entitled to the sum of P384,110. Thus both Mr. and
Mrs. Harden appealed such order to the SC.
Their arguments are
 That Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal
partnership by the said Contract of Service
without Mr. Harden’s consent
 That Article 1491 of the CC prohibits
contingent fees
 [TOPIC FOR PRIL] That the Contract of
Service has for its purpose securing a decree
of divorce allegedly in violation of Articles
1305, 1352, and 1409 of CC.
 Terms of the said Contract of Service are
harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Recto was entitled to P386K. YES
Held:
1st Contention: The Contract of Service does not seek
to bind the conjugal partnership
 By virtue of the Contract of Service, Mrs.
Harden merely bound herself to pay, by way of
contingent fees, 20% of her share in said
partnership. The contract neither gives nor
purports to give to Atty. Recto any right
(personal or real) to her aforesaid share in the
partnership. The amount of her share is simply
made the basis of computation of Atty. Recto’s
fees
P386K since the amount of Mr. Harden’s
share can only be effected until the dissolution
of the marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
The SC countered that considering the
agreements entered into between Mr. and
Mrs. Harden after the judgment in the CFI
(which were made to defeat Atty. Recto’s
claim for attorney’s fees), Mrs. Harden cannot
now avail of such conditions.

2nd Contention: It has already been held that

contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines
and are impliedly sanctioned by the Philippines’
Cannon of Professional Ethics.
 Moreover, no proof was presented that Atty.
Recto wanted to take unfair or unreasonable
advantage of Mrs. Harden

3rd Contention: They are both US citizens, so divorce

is allowed
 1st off, the contract didn’t say that Atty. Recto
will procure a divorce or facilitate the
procurement of a divorce. The Contract of
Service merely sought to protect Mrs.
Harden’s interest in the conjugal partnership,
during the pendency of a divorce suit she
intends to file in the US.
 Moreover, since both Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
admittedly US citizens, their status and
dissolution of their marriage by the laws of the
US which sanctions divorce. [pursuant to
Article 9 of the civil code of Spain (which was
in force in the PH at the time the contract of
service was executed) and Article 15 CC)
 Thus the contract was not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public
policy

4th Contention: One who ask for equity must come

with clean hands as well
 In this case, Atty. Recto has won for Mr.
Harden P2Million since the conjugal
partnership was found to value around P4M
 After securing such a judgment, it was
inconceivable then for Mrs. Harden to waive
such judgment for only $5,000 and $20,000 to
be paid in installments. Records also show
that the situation between Mr. and Mrs.
Harden has worsened since Mr. Harden
already filed a divorce suit in Joysi (New
Jersey) allegedly for repeated acts of infidelity
by Mrs. Harden
 Considering the services rendered and
judgment obtained by Atty. Recto for Mrs.
Harden, it isn’t fair to award to him 20% of her
share in the conjugal partnership
 Appellants then argue that it was impossible
for the lower court to determine an amount of
 G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a
Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered
with the local civil registrar. However, the two were
unable to live together after the marriage and as of
June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left
for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez
in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of
divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court
by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived
with him in California, had several children with him
and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce is valid.
HELD:
NO.
RATIO:
Authority of the solemnizing officer
Nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
Authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary,
as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law,
not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (OCC) which was the marriage law in force
at the time expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent.
Actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus
only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects.
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements.
No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements
of this Act x x x
Validity of Escano-Tenchavez marriage
The very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for
divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.
Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage
she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel,
whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez.
Such a vice did not render her marriage ab initio void,
but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid
until annulled by a competent civil court.
This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in CFI, Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.
Validity of the divorce decree
Marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife obtained.
When it was issued, Escaño and Tenchavez were still
both Filipino citizens. Thus, Escano was then subject
to Philippine law, and Art. 15 NCC of the Philippines
(Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
NCC does not allow absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and does not even use that term, to further
emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in
contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the NCC only provides for legal separation
(Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds
shall not be severed"
The grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, whose means do not permit them to
sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside
the Philippines.
Escano and Escano Parent’s liability - denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for
which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity.
Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran
is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and
entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery"
Tenchavez claim that Escano Parents, alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible
evidence:

1.) He was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and

court Vicenta, - No records WON they would refuse if
courtship and marriage were done in the traditional
religious way; 2.) It was Escano’s decision. She is
acted independently, and being of age. They just
supported her.

Tenchavez, in falsely charged Escano parents with

racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, w/c caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
them to recover damages.
 Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier Jr. v. Alfredo
Javier | GR No L-6768 | July 31, 1954
Facts:
Salud and Alfredo got married in 1937, solemnized by
Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila.
At the time of marriage, Junior was already born.
Alfredo left for the US in 1938, and at the time of their
marriage Alfredo was already an enlisted Navy
armyman.
When Alfredo left, Salud moved in with the former’s
parents. Due to friction, Salud went back to her
hometown. Eventually the couple’s relations soured,
wherein Alfredo filed an action for divorce against
Salud before the Alabaman courts.
In response to the complaint, Arca alleged that Javier
was not a resident of Alabama, but of Naic, Cavite,
and that she alleged that the reason for their
separation was that Alfredo was in the US-Navy, thus
leaving her behind in the Philippines, and that he has
always supported them. Their separation was due to
physical impossibility (also, the Civil Code stated that
the wife is not bound to live her with her husband if the
latter has gone to marine colonies). Salud then prayed
for the complaint for divorce to be dismissed,
contesting the jurisdiction of the Mobile County courts.
Issue:
Whether the divorce decree is recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
Holding:
The divorce decree has no valid effect in Philippine
jurisdiction
Ratio:
In order to determine whether a country has
jurisdiction over valid decree of divorce, plaintiff must
have been domiciled in good faith in the State in which
it was granted. It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an
answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile
County in view of the summons served upon her in this
jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because
its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant
that his domicile or legal residence at that time was
Mobile County, and to show that the ground of
desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such
answer should be considered as a special appearance
the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the
court over the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses
is domiciled and to which one or both of them may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce
has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary
appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal
does not invest the court with jurisdiction. It follows
that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the
plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another
State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and
with no intention of remaining, his residence there is
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the
State. This is especially true where the cause of
divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State
of his own domicile. But even if his residence had been
taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the
decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the
appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses
being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having
been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by
publication, she not having entered an appearance in
the case, either personally or by counsel, did not
confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. At
all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has
been within the Philippine Islands and the residence
acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the
purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court
of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony.
It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County
Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the
case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines.
He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile
at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938
because at that time he was still in the service of the
U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to
stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty.
That he never intended to live there permanently is
shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma
Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he
bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from
Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy,
he returned to the Philippines and married Maria
Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It
may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile
County, not with the intention of permanently residing
there, or of considering that place as his permanent
abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce
from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.
It is a well-known principle of Private International Law
which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or
the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or
fundamental policy of the State of the forum. It is also
in keeping with our concept or moral value which has
always looked upon marriage as an institution. And
such concept has actually crystallized in a more
tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our
people, through Congress, decided to eliminate
altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such
concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt
to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in
consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON.
MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., et al, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Facts:
The Petitioner ALICE REYES VAN DORN is a Filipino
Citizen, while the private respondent RICHARD
UPTON is a citizen of the United States of America;
they got married and blessed 2 children, they lived in
the Philippines.

In 1982 that the parties divorce in Nevada, US and the

petitioner has re married also in Nevada to Theodore
Van Dorn.

On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against

petitioner in Civil Case, stating that petitioner’s
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
that business, and that private respondent be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by

the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not, the absolute divorce obtained abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines.

Held:
Yes

It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent

is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
 G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen
married private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic
of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of
marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in
Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in
Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since
April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal
separation before a trial court in Manila on January 23,
1983.
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law…..Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January

15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce

decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married
to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William
Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases

filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter,
petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary
Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery
charges against the petitioner is still valid given the
fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of
charges?

HELD:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Now,
the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of
power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
 G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondents.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. A decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen. Grace J. Garcia – a Filipina – married Rederick
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, Rederick was
declared as “Single” and “Filipino”.
Starting October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their
Statutory Declaration secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court on
the ground of bigamy – Grace alleged she had no
knowledge of the prior marriage of Rederick until
November 1997.
Rederick answered that Grace knew of his prior
marriage as far back as 1993 and its subsequent
dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989, thus he
was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving
the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Five years after the couples’ wedding and while the

suit for the declaration of nullity was pending –
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia. He prayed in his
Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for no cause
of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed
with respondent. The trial court declared the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. The trial court held that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:
Can the Australian divorce decree be admitted in
evidence with no further proof of its authenticity and
due execution?

HELD:
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
 ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SAMSON R.
PACASUM, SR., Respondents. (G.R. No. 193902;
June 1, 2011).
FACTS:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert,
in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a
Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam.
Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil
rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the
RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman
obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
marriage was confirmedly the Shari'a Circuit District
Court, which issued a Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As
she had previously done in her first nuptial to De
Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs
where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao
del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of
their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed
their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge
Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the
union between her and Pacasum was blessed with
progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam
Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between
Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two
were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle
for custody of their minor children. Eventually,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise
agreement which vested primary custody of the
children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial
rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum.
He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos including
a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for
bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the civil
service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of
the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor
Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie
evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.
Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed
against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a
Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor
of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims,
and were such at the time of their marriage, whose
marital relationship was governed by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum
bigamous?
HELD:
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made
by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to
Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case,
the decision of which is already final and executory,
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil
courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it
was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction
over the subject matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which
heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim,
whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman,
was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact,
the same court further declared that Zamoranos'
divorce from De Guzman validly severed their
marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in
authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is
evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married
another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents
of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in
criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the
charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De
Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously
far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on
the accused contracting a second marriage while a
prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be
dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, should have suspended the proceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and
De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court
and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the
Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the
advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests
in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the
regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book,

unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce,
refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one
to remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce

from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and
Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested
to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her
to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen
who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization.
Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent
(Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After
the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to
work commitments; however, when he came back he
was shocked to discover that the respondent is having
an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on
and found another woman that he wants to marry.
Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to
the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s
Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage
between him and the respondent still subsists under
the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his
petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
Ruling:
No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion
that the alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and
intent behind the enactment, and as such the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its
applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by
the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign
divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its
recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that
his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of
the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is
valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”
This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications
or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition

a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include
a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless
we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course

of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served

by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of
the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign

divorce decree.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO (G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
2018; En Banc)
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) was
previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national. She filed for divorce in Japan, and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree was rendered by the
Japanese Court. Manalo sought for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment and to have the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the
former Japanese husband’s marriage was previously
registered.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, denied the
petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
“does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the
RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him
to remarry.
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of
the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from
Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the
intent should be taken into consideration. According to
Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though
the latter is no longer married to the former. According
to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that
there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e.,
whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.
Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision
should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding
should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will
not follow such interpretation since doing so would be
contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil
Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo
should be bound by the nationality principle, blind
adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the
law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code
is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said
that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The
violation of the equal protection clause in this case is
shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos
who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign
spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their
circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
between them as regards to the validity of the divorce
decree obtained would give one undue favor and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only
to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but
also to defend, among others, the right of children to
special protection from all forms of neglect abuse,
cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the
application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated
by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient
evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven.
There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,
which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is
valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of
divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese
law on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
 G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent
FACTS:
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one of them later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ of
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter.
mischievous results or contravenes the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married an American citizen.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

Cipriano thereafter file with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was file. The court
granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, it
filed petition to the Supreme Court raising a pure
question of law.

ISSUE:
Should the respondent be allowed to remarry under
Article 26 of the Family Code?

HELD:
Yes.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

deliberations showed that according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Thus, taking into consideration this legislative intent

and applying this rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity

and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute

according to its exact and literal import leads to