DOCKET NO. Xo7 CV- 19-6137189-S: MEHDI BELGADA : SUPERIOR COU! Plaintiff : COMPLEX LITIGATION v. HY'S LIVERY SERVICE, INC. ETAL: AT HARTFORD FILED Defendants : APRIL 13, 2021 APR 12 2021 Memorandum of Decision HARTPORD J.D. Granting Defendants Summary Judgment (170.00) 1. Summary: Being ready to work isn’t work. A class of chauffeurs working for Hy’s Livery Service say that Hy’s must pay them for their presently unpaid one-hour meal breaks. The chauffeurs say they are really at work through these breaks so they should be paid during them. Both sides move fora summary judgment. The court will grant a summary judgment to Hy’s Livery. What the chauffeurs call work is really nothing more than being ready for work. Therefore, they are owed no pay. 2. The undisputed facts show the chauffeurs got real breaks. The facts are largely undisputed. Hy’s had a written policy about meal breaks. It allowed the chauffeurs a one-hour break. During it they had to stay dressed in their work clothes, monitor their phones in case they were called to duty and not leave their limos “unattended”. If they were called to duty during the break, they would be paid forthe time.’ Finally, the chauffeurs were financially responsible if they brought back a limo with unreported damage on it or left a limo damaged by their negligence. Company witnesses said no one expected the chauffeurs to “watch the vehicle 24/7." Plaintiff Daniel Dziekan said substantially the same thing. If the driver could see the car from where he was dining, fine, but he need not worry about it nor was he compelled to do it. Indeed, Dziekan used his breaks to go to restaurants, but also to malls, off-track betting, and other places. Despite this, the class certified in this case maintains that the chauffeurs were effectively chained to their vehicles. ‘They say they were required to work during their meal breaks and should have, under contract and wage-and-hour laws, be paid for this hour. The meal-break policy was not a contract. Let’s consider the contract theory first. Whether these employees had a contract of employment starts and ends with their employee handbook. It tells employees they don't have contracts of employment and may be terminated at any time. It tells them that the company policies in the handbook and any policies added on top of those in the handbook “are not intended to create a contract.” Thus, whatever bargain they may have had did not include the written company policy about meal breaks. The record consistently shows long stretches of time from which the employees might choose to prepare for and take a meal break.With it clear in writing that the employees had no contractual rights derived from company documents, no reasonable fact finder could say that an emailed memorandum about break procedures created a contractual right. The procedure at issue here was declared in an email announcing “a new meal break procedure” that Hy’s said was “pursuant” to 29 Code of Federal Regulations §785.19. As matter of law on the undisputed facts, this meal-break policy was not a contract. 4. There is no genuine issue of material fact: the employees were relieved of duty. It wouldn't matter if the meal-break policy was a contract. On its face, the regulation invoked says a break without pay requires that the employee must be “completely relieved of duty”. But doing no harm and being ready for duty isn’t duty. The record shows that the class had to be ready to answer their phones, stay in their uniforms, and not leave their vehicles unattended. So, at most, they are told they might get called to duty and must attend to their vehicles. The class makes much—too much—out of having been told not to leave their vehicles “unattended”. In the class's view this grapples these chauffeurs to their vehicles with hoops of steel. If we take the class’s claim literally, it means they may not leave their cars to fetch food, take a walk, or even visit a bathroom. To them “unattended” means out of sight for any length of time. There is no reason for the court to adopt a view that would lead to such an absurd a result. Instead, the court will do what our Supreme Court in 2106 did in Dattco v. DOTand other statutory and contract cases—it will apply the word's ordinary dictionary definition to the context.2 Ordinary dictionary definitions of “unattended” do include the obvious and narrow connotation the class wishes to apply. Yes, in context, it can mean as Merriam- Webster says “lacking a guard.”* But before Merriam- Webster reaches that definition, it defines “unattended” as meaning not just “not watched” but also not “looked after”. Others agree. The MacMillan dictionary for instance defines “unattended” as being “left without being taken care of or dealt with.” Similarly, the Cambridge dictionary includes along with “not watched” the alternative of “or taken care of.”5 If we were treating this language as a contractual guarantee, as a matter of law what we would look to is the ordinary meaning. Under it, all the chauffeurs have to do is look after their vehicles—take care of them—before they go on their breaks. No reasonable fact finder could conclude that this means they had to spend their breaks staring at their limos rather than simply seeing they are locked up in a safe spot. ‘Thus, if the policy memo were a contract and if it were read by simply lifting the words “completely relieved of duty” from the regulation the class claim would fail as a matter of law. . The policy incorporates the Federal “predominance” standard. 2324 Conn. 39, 46. s https:/wwww:merriam-webster.com/dictionary unattended. 4 tps /swwws.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/unattended. s https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/engiish unattended. "The class leans heavily on the testimony of one witness who said chauffeurs should “keep an eye” on their vehicles, but the same witness made clear that he did not mean a continuous physical watch. 4But it fails for another reason too. Hy’s could have used the words of the regulation by printing them verbatim into the document, but it didn't. Instead, the emailed memo said the break was “pursuant” to the regulation. It didn’t insert a single word from the regulation. So if a court were applying a rule “pursuant” to this regulation it would have to note that “pursuant to the regulation” the only thing it required was that breaks “predominantly” benefit the employee. And that’s because the courts have interpreted this regulation to require only that, the break predominantly benefit the employee. In 1997 in Reich v. SNET, the Second Circuit held that: “To be consistent with the FLSA's use of the term “work... §785.19 must be interpreted to require compensation for a meal break during which a worker performs activities predominantly for the benefit of the employer.”” Thus, to the extent Hy’s said its policy was the regulation’s policy, it meant the time must predominantly belong to the employee. ‘What the regulation requires is a matter of law. Therefore, the court isn’t bound by the logic trap class counsel sprang on a couple of Hy’s managers. At deposition, counsel for the class read the regulation to these witnesses. Counsel then asked if they were supposed to follow the regulation as they said they were. When they said “yes” they were snared. They could then only agree as they did with counsel's assertion that the language means an employee, to receive an unpaid break, must be “completely relieved of duty”. It would be wrong for the court to rely on the results of this approach or any other speculation from lay witnesses. Under Practice Book §17-46 evidence presented in 7121 F.gd 58, 64.sworn statements must be otherwise admissible at trial. Speculation is inadmissible under Code of Evidence §6-3 which requires witnesses to speak from personal knowledge. Lay opinion on questions of law is inadmissible under §7-1. Keep in mind that we have already found that the only reasonable view is that these workers were completely relieved of duty. Still, if the regulations were part of a contract, that contract, by its plain language, doesn't mean what the class says it means. It means what the regulation actually means, and that is determined by the courts. And it means something even more supportive of Hy’s—it means that the balance of the time need only tip enough toward the workers that we can say it was predominantly their own. ‘There is no rational way to avoid finding this was the case. We have been through the requirements. Before a break starts a chauffeur need only keep his uniform on, his, phone on, and his vehicle in a safe spot. Once that's done, the time may be spent as the worker sees fit. If the break gets interrupted and the employee is called to duty, the undisputed evidence shows the employee is paid for the time. No reasonable fact finder could see these mild conditions as putting the chauffeurs to work. This is so despite the class's reliance on Hy’s policy of holding employees responsible for their vehicles. There are two policies, and the class tries to say they combine to make a policy that forces chauffeurs to spend their meal breaks guarding their limos. But these policies can’t reasonably be seen to do this. Read together they amount to telling employees to record existing damage each time they pick up a vehicle and warning them that they will be held responsible for the company’s deductible if their negligence causes damage to a vehicle.The class argues that the damage reporting language is actually telling workers that they will be held liable without fault for all damage to the vehicles—they speculate that this would force them into a paranoid subservience to the vehicles’ safety. According to class counsel, this would either prevent them from ever leaving their vehicles or at least make their constant observation the main focus of their meal breaks. True, part of the policy language is inartful. It may be ambiguous. If it were, the parol evidence in the record doesn’t support the view that it was a policy of liability without fault. Only the class's speculative interpretation of one or two documents or events supports this view. The only evidence a reasonable jury could credit is the testimony of Hy’s officials that the language was aimed at encouraging accurate damage reports and careful driving. This policy is no extra support for the notion that the company was hijacking its employee's meal breaks. 6. The claims fail under the applicable Connecticut statutes as well. Putting everything else aside, it still remains that no reasonable fact finder would have to go down this contractual line of reasoning anyway. Hy's rule about meal breaks wasn't a contract. To the extent this claim seeks relief for a breach of contract, it has failed. Itfails under the Connecticut statute the class invokes too. General Statutes §31-68 requires workers to be paid for the hours worked. General Statutes §31-76b concerning overtime pay includes a definition of how to calculate “hours worked”. It says “time allowed for meals shall be excluded unless the employee is required or permitted to work.”“Work” in turn has been interpreted by the Connecticut Supreme Court. In 2014 in Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc., the Court said an employee is engaged in “work” when spending time “predominantly for the employer's benefit.”* ‘The class rightly points out that the case does not directly address meal breaks, but the case does address the thing that is supposed to matter here: whether the chauffeurs are given a genuine break or are really at “work”. With respect to that question, our Supreme Court sensibly adopted the predominance test. Under it, we already know Hy’s deserves a summary judgment. ‘Therefore, Hy’s is entitled to summary judgment on the class statutory claims. 7. Hy’sis entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As our Supreme Court held in 2007 in Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, whenever no reasonable fact finder could reach a different result, summary judgment is appropriate.» The class claims rested on slender reeds. ‘The things claimed as a contract weren't contracts, but the decisive factor in the court's decision was that no matter what measure applied, the workers at issue got legally sufficient breaks. Having thoroughly reviewed the lengthy record in the light most favorable to the class, the court is convinced that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ‘Summary judgment will enter in favor of all defendants. BY THE COURT 434447 Moukawsher, J. 8311 Conn. 581, 598. 9282 Conn. 722, 728.