SPE 82041
OPEC Oil Production Strategy and Its Implication on Global Oil Market Stability
Omowumi O. Iledare,SPE, Center for Energy Studies, Louisiana State University
Copyright 2003, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation
Symposium held in Dallas, Texas, U.S.A., 5–8 April 2003.
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Abstract
This paper applies statistical analysis to data describing the
trends in OPEC oil production ceiling allocations from 1982-
2001 The empirical analysis presupposes that a corporate
decision framework guides OPEC production ceiling
allocations subject to individual member characteristics and
objectives. On average, and with a highly significant
confidence interval, the empirical results indicate that the
responsiveness of production quota to capacity , crude oil
prices, reserves and other determinants are relatively small but
inelastic. The empirical results also show the
contemporaneous nature of each of OPEC’s allocation criteria.
This suggests that if OPEC really wants to accomplish a stable
oil market, then each member nation must accept some joint
responsibility and bear some equitable production reduction
based on these criteria as and when necessary. Such an
agreeable mechanism governing production ceiling allocations
on the basis of concrete factors/criteria can significantly
reduce the apparent lack of production discipline among
members that has hitherto plagued OPEC1.
OPEC and Global Oil Supply
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was formed in 1960 to promote effective management
of petroleum resource endowment in the member nations.
OPEC’s market influence was of global significance in the
1970s as oil prices quadrupled. The organization controlled
nearly 90 percent of oil export capacity at the peak of its
market power. The organization, within the context of the
current dynamics in the global petroleum economy, seems to
function more as an incremental oil producer than the
1 discipline, when there is excess oil supply in the market.
Tables and Figures at end of Paper
dominant primary global oil supplier it was in the 1970s.
Figure 1 shows the trends in OPEC’s share in global oil
production and crude oil price from 1970-2001. Paradoxically,
the organization has also changed the operational environment
of the global petroleum industry over the past four decades. Its
self-imposed or inherited market role to balance the global oil
supply and demand using its production capacity is more
evident now than ever before.
The global call on OPEC to manage the supply aspects of
global oil market is not at variant with the organization’s
original objectives. In fact, one of the original objectives of
OPEC has been to eliminate harmful and unnecessary
fluctuations in global oil prices. The organization stated
unambiguously in its statute, that it would put together
production strategy that ensured oil price stability in the global
oil market [1]. Thus, since early 1982, at its 63rd extraordinary
meeting, OPEC adopted fixing an overall production ceiling
with quota allocations to each member nations in its effort to
manage global oil supply in order to stabilize prices [2]. This
strategy can be aptly described in economic terms as a price
limiting production approach [3].
The price limiting strategy is intended to produce just
enough oil to achieve and maintain a balance between supply
and demand under a stable and reasonable crude oil price
profile. The stable price profile, however, must
characteristically be maintained to deter the entry of new
sources of oil as substitutes for OPEC oil. Table 1, for
example, shows OPEC and Non-OPEC estimated capacity
projections for the period, 1990-2020 at different price
scenarios. The U.S. EIA projects production capacity will be
about 50-50 for OPEC and non-OPEC producers by 2020
under a reference case price profile. However, under a high
price path scenario, OPEC’s productive capacity in 2020 is
projected to be about 41 percent of the projected global
capacity [4]. Thus, OPEC must frequently adjust production
ceiling allocations to members in a timely manner according
to the dictates of the global market conditions.
The “price limiting” production strategy, whereby just
enough oil is produced to sustain a preferred price floor set at
a $22-$28 per barrel range seems to have been some how
“helpful”, albeit with some caveat. This is especially true since
after the collapse of prices in late 1998 because cooperation
among OPEC members has increased. Nearly all the 10
member nations are in agreement and some major non-OPEC
members, Mexico, Norway, and to some extent Russia,
expressed willingness to cooperate and to exercise production
2 SPE 82041
Moreover, information on world demand schedule is now
guardedly monitored by OPEC. Also, it seems that supply
from many non-OPEC nations are repressed by reticent
leasing policies, unfavorable fiscal terms and taxation regimes,
maturity of basins and natural resource depletion. The more
limited the supply response from non-OPEC producers, the
higher the price and the more production discipline OPEC
must exercise to stabilize oil prices. Some experts may
disagree with this rather simplistic view on what has happened
since late 1999. Other experts may, however, agree that it is in
OPEC’s interest, being the dominant incremental or residual
supplier, to seek a stable market and to be prepared to exercise
production discipline in the face of excess oil supply and
falling oil prices.
Understanding OPEC Diversity
Economic and technical data from OPEC member
countries have been used to categorize members into
economic and political blocks [3, 5]. Such economic and
technical data that may affect production ceiling allocations to
member nations may include, production capacity, export
dependency, currently estimated proved reserves, and
measures of the economic performance of member nations,
such as per capita GDP, balance of payments, or foreign
exchange index. Figures 3-6 present a pictorial view of OPEC
member characteristics, which may form the basis for the
apparent alliances among members and their dispositions at
OPEC extraordinary meetings.
Three dissimilar groups in OPEC can be intuitively
identified from Figure 3. The OPEC core, which includes
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirate,
has sparsely populated desert areas with a relatively high per
capita GDP and per capita proved reserves. The core group
controls more than 60 percent of OPEC excess capacity
(excluding Iraq) and OPEC productive capacity (including
Iraq) between 1999 and 2001. It seems to be in the national
interest of this group to advocate higher production,
discourage any supply-driven increase in oil prices that can
subsequently encourage the entry of high cost oil into the
global oil market. Saudi Arabia, which accounts for nearly
one-third of OPEC proved reserves, has reasons to favor
keeping the price of oil low to minimize incentive to develop
alternative sources by non-OPEC producers. It must be noted,
however, that despite the fact that the OPEC core group
accounted, on average for over 60 percent of OPEC total
reserves from 1982-2001, the group accounted for just about
50 percent of OPEC production, on average, over the same
period. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the core group has
been very willing to keep in perspective the overall objectives
of OPEC, even as they pursue their national interest
within OPEC.
The second group within OPEC may be described as
“revenue maximizer” because they favor high oil prices. The
countries in this group include Iran, Iraq, and Algeria. The
countries have larger population than the core group and are
also characterized with small per capita reserves and a
relatively greater development potential than the OPEC core
group. The group characteristically prefers and advocates
high prices to generate high revenue with less output, with a
great understanding that excess production in the international
oil market can decrease prices. It has been suggested that the
member nations in this group constitutes the collusive core
in OPEC [3].
Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia are a heterogeneous set
of exporters as evident in Figure 4 in terms of their export
dependency on petroleum. Nigeria’s export dependency on oil,
on average, was 94 percent from 1982-2001. The oil export as
a fraction of total export, on average, for Venezuela and
Indonesia was the lowest and second lowest, respectively from
1999-2001. The group, however historically wants a high
output. The three countries in this group accounted for about
25 percent of production from a disproportionately low share,
15 percent, in reserves from 1982-2001. Because of their large
population, the group has pressing desires for high revenues to
feed their populations. It would therefore seem in their
national interest to wan to produce more than the allocated
production ceilings. However, as evident in Figure 6,
describing excess production from 1982-2001 by member
nation, this group within the last three years seems to have
disavowed production indiscipline in their ranks. In fact,
between 1999-2001, the level of production indiscipline was
very minimal in the group, contrary to expectations.
The perceptible political divergence in OPEC is
sufficiently complicated. Some members, at least five,
currently practice some form of democratic government. They
have elected public officials to run the affairs of the member
nation. A more foundational political grouping, however,
could be described as Arab and non-Arab members. The Arab
group can be subjectively classified as either conservative or
radical in orientations. The Arab members of OPEC include
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Algeria, UAE, Libya, and Iraq.
The Arab group controls more than 75 percent of OPEC
reserves and estimated capacity in 2001.
Perspectives on OPEC’s Future
That OPEC has survived for more than four decades is
incredible, considering the diversity of its members and the
enormity of its task to manage expediently the supply aspect
of the international oil markets. The difficulty of managing oil
supply is further convoluted because of data limitation and
imperfection as well as inadequate market instruments with
which OPEC can influence the international oil markets [5, 6].
According to Kohl, OPEC is an organization of governments.
Unlike firms who can form alliances and collude to control
supply and raise prices, most decisions from OPEC meetings
are by consensus. Political compromises and the formation of
a shifting coalition from time to time embody most decisions
by the OPEC Ministerial Conference, the highest governing
authority of the Organization [2,5,6]
These compromises and the shifting of alliances, not
withstanding, OPEC is very much aware of the significance of
other important economic and political factors. For example
price elasticity of demand (Eopec ) for OPEC oil , a measure
of the responsiveness of the demand for OPEC oil to a change
in price, determines must determine OPEC oil price (P) mark
up over the marginal costs (MC) such that:
P / MC = Eopec / (Eopec - 1) (1)
SPE 84021
That the short run price elasticity of oil is inelastic is not
conjectural, however, in the long run there are possible
substitutes for OPEC oil. Thus, a misjudgement of the
elasticity may send a wrong signal with respect to the
appropriate production adjustment that would balance supply
and demand to ensure stable and reasonable the international
oil market price. Such misjudgment, assuming OPEC price
determines world price, can definitely affect OPEC’s
influence in global oil supply as an incremental producer.
Another economic factor that OPEC must keep in
perspective in its adjustment of production ceilings to global
oil supply is non-OPEC supply response to a change in price.
According to the basic law of demand, a change in world price
(∆P) will lead to a change in global demand for oil (∆qworld).
However, if the global residual demand for OPEC oil
(∆qopec) is defined such that:
∆Qopec / ∆P = ∆Qworld / ∆P - ∆Qnopec / ∆P (2)
Then the market power of OPEC is equally dependent on
other factors such as the responsiveness of non-OPEC supply
to price change, non-OPEC productive capacity levels, and
world oil demand response to price change. Equation (3)
describes the relationship between the elasticity of demand for
OPEC (Eopec), world oil demand elasticity (Eworld) and non-
OPEC supply response (Enopec) as follows [3]:
Eopec = fworld Eworld + f nopecEnopec (3)
Where fw = Qworld / Qopec and fnopec = Qnopec / Qopec
Qworld represents world oil demand
Qopec represents residual demand for OPEC oil
Qnopec represents non-OPEC supply
The future role of OPEC in global oil supply and pricing
also may depend on the rate of economic growth in the major
oil consuming nations, the OECD. Economic growth in OECD
nation can significantly affect the rate of depletion of oil in
most OPEC member nations and subsequently increase high
cost of extraction. Under such circumstances, production
capacity would have to rise and more reserves discovered to
decrease rising cost of extraction. It is also expected that
favorable tax policies to promote restricted development and
production of domestic oil reserves in OECD countries as well
as consumption related taxes to encourage conservation has
potential implication on global oil supply and pricing and the
role of OPEC.
In fact, the U.S. energy policy objectives of optimal
energy efficiency, cheap and secure energy, and clean
environment, when fully developed and implemented, will
have significant impact on global oil supply and prices as
evident in the relationship described in equation (3).
Moreover, diversification of oil supply sources and energy
mixed for industrial production can be expected to reduce the
hitherto irresponsible response to any little political
disturbance in the Middle East.
Another factor that can significantly affect OPEC’s search
for an appropriate production approach which balances supply
3
and demand to ensure stability in international oil markets is
the changing structure of the global E&P structure and the
evolving operational strategy of E&P firms. It will certainly
be quite favorable to OPEC if multinationals continue to
engage in prospecting for petroleum all over the world
including OPEC countries, making it possible to develop
cheap oil first. And as E&P firms develop and use new
technology to lower finding and development costs, there will
be pressure on oil prices to adjust according to the dictates of
the global market environment. In addition, as the industry
becomes more efficient as a result of industry restructuring,
one expects the industry to be less susceptible to price
disruption. Thus, making the managing of the supply aspect
of the international market less difficult to OPEC.
In Adelman’s words, “OPEC has no power of its own. It
is an organization and forum, within which members must
from time to time (emphasis mine) assemble a coalition …”
[6]. In the future, OPEC will still not be able create its own
market power, except that which is given to it as a result of
high oil depletion patterns in almost every non-OPEC
countries, petroleum basin maturity in some of these countries,
and less than favorable petroleum development policy. OPEC
still has a lot to learn, however, from the global supply process
in late 1998. As stated by Adelman (2002), the success to
bring price to a reasonable level came as result of the level of
cooperation by nearly all OPEC members to exercise
production discipline.
Thus, OPEC can still have and wield significant weight on
the international oil markets if they continue to form and
reform alliances when needed using political compromises and
keeping in mind institutional developments in OPEC and
some important economic factors affecting the global oil
market. For example, conflict resolution approach may
become more relevant to OPEC stability as the relevance of
market shares become significantly less important. There may
also be need to put instruments in place to detect cheating
among members and enforce some retribution for cheating. An
agreeable mechanism governing production ceiling allocations
on the basis of concrete factors/criteria can also facilitate
production discipline among members thereby enhancing
equitable distribution of any new incremental call for OPEC
oil in order to minimize supply disruption and
price instability.
Modeling OPEC Production Ceiling Allocations
The underlying assumption for this modeling framework is
that OPEC is an incremental or swing oil producer with a
corporate desire to promote stability of the international oil
market and prices. In addition, we posit that OPEC is in
agreement to do what it takes to ensure stability in oil prices,
keeping in perspective the need to eliminate the burden of
price volatility on the global oil market. Furthermore, OPEC is
committed to expand its production capacity to balance the
global oil market, and when the need arises, it will exercise
production discipline to curb any excess oil supply in the
market. Thus, OPEC as an institution expects member nations
to be prepared to produce oil within the dictates of global
market demand for its oil.
4 SPE 82041
To facilitate equitable production ceiling allocations of
incremental demand for OPEC oil among its members, an
empirical model is developed in this paper. The model was
estimated and applied using individual OPEC member data on
capacity utilization, reserves, export dependency, indicator of
economic growth, and current and expected price. The model
specifies OPEC crude oil ceiling allocation as a function of oil
dependency, reserves, capacity, economic growth, and market
conditions. This model specification is empirical and it is
specified with some a priori expectations.
Symbolically, the general specification of OPEC
allocations of new incremental or reduced oil demand among
members can take this form:
qit = f ( Rit , Kit , Git , Dit , Pit )
An estimable form of the above functional specification,
assuming a log-linear relationship is such that2:
ln q ti = α oi + α 1iKit + α 2iRit + α 3iDit + α 4iPit + α 5iGit
(2)
Where: i represents member nation and t represents the time
period, in this case, quota-year, and αj for (j=0,1,2..5) are
parameters to be estimated using multiple regression. Other
model variables are defined as follows:
q represents crude oil production ceiling allocation. It
is the maximum volume of oil recommended by
OPEC to a member nation based on current estimated
call for OPEC oil by the global oil market.
R represents the currently estimated proved oil
reserves of each member nation. A positive
relationship between production allocation reserves is
anticipated suggesting that quota is an increasing
function of the number of bids, ceteris paribus.
K defines the annual productive capacity of each
member nation. A positive relationship is anticipated.
If an OPEC member expects to have a higher quota,
it must invest to develop more capacity. Capacity
development is considered an important ingredient
for price stability.
G serves as a proxy for the state of the economy in
member nation measured as per capita gross domestic
product, which is a ratio of gross domestic product
and population. We will expect nations with a slow
economic growth to be allocated more production
quota.
D represents the dependency of the total export of an
OPEC member nation on petroleum. It is defined as
the ratio of total petroleum export and total gross
export. One expects members with increased
2
The log-log functional specification of the relationship
between production allocation and its determinants allows us
to interpret parameter estimates as elasticities.
dependency on petroleum to be given a relatively
favored consideration than those with less
dependency on petroleum to develop their economy.
P is the nominal OPEC crude oil prices for individual
member nation divide by the three year moving
average OPEC price. As the relative nominal price of
oil increases OPEC quota is expected to increase for
price stabilization to be feasible. On the other hand if
the global oil market price increases, the call of
OPEC oil will decrease, and hence individual
member allocation may decrease.
To estimate equation (2), we assembled data on OPEC
(1) reserves, capacity, prices, dependency, quota, and per capita
domestic product. The database is limited to the 1982-2001
period. This period covers only the time when production
allocation strategy was instituted by OPEC. The seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) procedure in the QMS Eviews
program (version 3.0) was applied to the data to estimate
+ ε it
equation (2). SUR is employed in this study because
contemporaneous correlations among disturbances across
different individual observations are very plausible. The SUR
estimator is different from OLS (ordinary least squares). Using
SUR is advantageous because it is more efficient than OLS,
and the gain in efficiency is positively related to the extent of
correlation of the disturbances. This estimation techniques
allow for cross-sectional differences or inter-temporal
differences with restrictive assumptions that all of the slope
coefficients are equal and stochastic and that at least one of the
intercepts is different and stochastic.
Table 2 presents the results of the SUR estimation of a
linearized function underlying equation (1) as represented in
equation (2) using panel data. In general, nearly all the
independent variables are statistically significant and have the
expected signs. The only exception is the effect of per capita
GDP. We would have expected that if there is a decline in per
capital GDP of a member nation, then there would be an
increase in production allocation to the member. In an overall
sense, however, the estimated model explained more than 90
percent of the variation in production allocations from 1982-
2001. The ratio of standard error of regression to the mean of
the dependent variable over the period was less than 2.5
percent, an indication that the model fits the historical data
quite satisfactorily.
In general, the empirical results presented in Table 2 show
that if there is a need for a member to justify its desire for a
higher production ceiling allocation, it must show some
evidence of an increase in production capacity, other things
being equal. For example, a ten percent increase in reserves,
on the long run, can lead to a 1.6 percent increase in
production ceiling allocation to a member; but a ten percent
rise in capacity may lead to 1.8 percent and 4.8 percent rise in
allocations in the short run and long run, respectively. The
results also show that economic performance of member
nations, other unique characteristics of member nations, and
the extent of the dependency of export on petroleum do
positively influence quota allocations as well. Further, the
results support the a priori expectations that as the current
nominal price relative to the previous trend in nominal price
SPE 84021
increases, the relative change in (natural logarithm of)
production allocations also increases, even though
inelastically. Meaning a one percent change in the relative
price of oil will lead to less than one percent change in
production ceiling allocations, ceteris paribus.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper evaluated OPEC data on reserves, production
ceiling allocations, estimated production capacity, oil prices,
per capita GDP, and export dependency indicator. To
understand and analyze the impact of these factors, especially
prices on production allocation mechanism, an empirical
model was specified and estimated using a panel data in which
the cross section is represented by each OPEC member over
the time period 1982-2001.
The estimated model confirmed that as oil price increases
ceteris paribus, production ceiling allocation to OPEC
member is expected to increase. The responsiveness is,
however, inelastic. This means that a one percent price
increase will lead to less than a one percent increase in
individual quotas to member nations. The results also showed
that production allocations to member nations increase with
capacity expansion and reserves. However, the relative
change in allocation to each member is higher with respect to
a relative change in capacity than the change with respect to
reserves. Thus, member nations seeking a significant higher
allocation from incremental demand for OPEC oil must
demonstrate a substantial increase in capacity, bearing in mind
the contemporaneous nature of OPEC allocation criteria.
Finally, the results suggest that if OPEC really wants to
accomplish a stable oil market, then each member nation must
accept some joint responsibility and bear some equitable
production reduction based on these criteria as and when
necessary. Such an agreeable mechanism governing
production ceiling allocations can significantly reduce the
apparent lack of production discipline among members, which
has hitherto mired the organization in its effort to ensure
sustainable and realistic oil price levels.
Nomenclature
q = crude oil production ceiling allocations,
Mbbl/Day
R = Estimated proved reserves at year end, MMbbl.
K = estimated production capacity Mbbl/day
G = Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) a
measure of economic performance,
Thousand Dollars.
D = Total export dependency on oil, percent.
P = relative price of crude oil for individual member
nations with respect to moving average of OPEC
basket price lagged one year
αι (ι= 1,2..5,) are constant SUR parameters estimates
ε2 = the random error term
Eopec = elasticity of OPEC oil demand
Eworld = Wworld oil demand elasticity
Enopec = non-OPEC supply response as follows
5
Qworld = World oil demand
Qopec = residual demand for OPEC oil
Qnopec = non-OPEC supply
∆P = change in oil price
∆qworld = change in world oil demand.
∆qopec = change in OPEC supply
∆qnopec = change in non-OPEC supply
fw = Qworld / Qopec
fnopec = Qnopec / Qopec
Acknowledgment
The author acknowledges the research assistance provided
by Richard Pincomb. All conclusions and errors are the sole
responsibility of the authors.
References
1. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
1980. The Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, OPEC Secretariat, Vienna, Austria.
2. Dahmani, Atmane and Mahmoud H. Al-Osaimy. 2001. “OPEC
Oil Production and Market Fundamentals: a Causality
Relationship.” OPEC Review, Vienna, Austria: OPEC
Secretarial., December 2001, pp 315-337.
3. Griffin, James M. 1980. Energy Economics and Policy, New
York, NY: Academic Press
4. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
2002. International Energy Outlook, 2002. DOE/EIA-0484
(2002), Washington, D C.
5. Kohl, Wilfrid L. 2002. “OPEC Behavior, 1981-2001.” In Oil
and the Economy: Recent Experience in Historical Perspectives,
James L. Smith, ed., Quarterly Review of Economics and
Finance, vol. 42, no.4, pp.209-233.
6. Adelman, M.A. 2002. “World Oil Production and Prices, 1947-
2000.” In Oil and the Economy: Recent Experience in Historical
Perspectives, James L. Smith, ed., Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance, vol. 42, no.4, pp.169-191.
7. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2001.
6 SPE 82041

60.0 $40.00
Share Price

$35.00
50.0

$30.00

40.0
$25.00

30.0 $20.00

$15.00
20.0

$10.00

10.0
$5.00

0.0 $0.00
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998

Figure 1: OPEC’s Share in Global oil Production and Price Trend

14.00

12.00

10.00
MMBbls/day

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

Figure 2: Estimated OPEC's Spare Production Capacity [4]

SPE 84021 7

27.0 $Thousand
1979
24.0
1980s
21.0 1990s
18.0
15.0
12.0
9.0
6.0
3.0
0.0

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ia

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A

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Figure 3: Average Per Capita Gross Domestic Product for OPEC Members

'1982-1997 '1999-2001'
18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
Percent

10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
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8 SPE 82041

Table 1: Estimated Global Production Capacity [4}

Million Barrels Per Day

1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
REF
OPEC 27.2 31.4 38.4 44.8 52.0 60.2
NOPEC 42.2 46.0 49.6 53.6 57.8 61.1
WORLD 69.4 77.4 88.0 98.4 109.8 121.3
HOP
OPEC 27.2 31.4 33.8 36.5 41.5 48.0
NOPEC 42.2 46.0 51.7 58.1 63.7 68.2
WORLD 69.4 77.4 85.5 94.6 105.2 116.2
LOP
OPEC 27.2 31.4 41.3 50.1 59.5 69.6
NOPEC 42.2 46.0 48.9 52.2 55.7 58.7
WORLD 69.4 77.4 90.2 102.3 115.2 128.3

Table 2: Estimated Model Results

Dependent Variable: LO G (Q UO TA?)

M ethod: Seem ingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 02/03/03 Tim e: 19:38
Sam ple: 1986 2001
Included observations: 16
Total panel observations 155
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Previous Capacity 0.627779 0.030593 20.52027 0.0000
Reserves (Year end) 0.060068 0.009798 6.130795 0.0000
Capacity 0.179539 0.018957 9.470781 0.0000
Relative Price 0.140429 0.028478 4.931151 0.0000
Econom ic indicator 0.059897 0.004482 13.36271 0.0000
Export Dependency 0.066484 0.008382 7.931442 0.0000
Country Effects
Algeria 1.859431
Indonesia 2.193134
Iraq 1.870099
Iran 2.074247
Kuwait 1.802750
Saudi Arabia 2.043003
Nigeria 2.122157
Venezuela 1.987124
United Arab Em irates 1.830894
Libya 1.871011
W eighted Statistics
Log likelihood 351.1507
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.936303 M ean dependent var 7.455559
Adjusted R-squared 0.929429 S.D. dependent var 0.653064
S.E. of regression 0.173488 Sum squared resid 4.183619
Durbin-W atson stat 2.315022