CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION

CASE DIGEST

DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. and/or JAIME B. AQUINO, Petitioners, -versus-

BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA
BROKERAGE, INC. Respondents. G.R. No. 144268, SECOND DIVISION, August 30,
2006, GARCIA, J.

The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from
being questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of
possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee
relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia'stitle of better right of
possession as their lessor. FACTS: PNR owned a lot which it leased out to Sampaguita
Borkerage, Inc. Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister
company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corp. whereby Belgravia would put up on the
lot a warehouse for its own use. Belgarvia did put up a warehouse. However, instead of
using the said warehouse for its own use, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift
Movers for a period of 1 year.

By the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgraviaa monthly rental ofP40,000.00payable
on or before the 15thday of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2) months
is paid upon execution of the contract. After the expiration of the contract, Datalift
continued to occupy the property, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgraviaor by
verbal understanding of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the
monthly rental toP60,000.00. Monthly rental was again increased fromP60,000.00
toP130,000.00. Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped
paying its monthly rental for the warehouse. Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand
letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount
ofP4,120,000.00and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute.

Since Datalift failed to pay, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed a complaint for ejectment
with MeTC against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime Aquino. MeTC
ruled in favor of Belgravia. It also rejected the defendants challenge against Belgravia’s
title over the PNR lot occupied by the subject warehouse. In their appeal, Datalift and
Aquino questioned the MeTC’s finding that there was an implied new lease between
PNR and Sampaquita on the lot on which the warehouse in question stands, and
accordingly fault the same court for ordering them to vacate the same warehouse and to
pay rentals as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. RTC and CA affirmed
MeTCs ruling.

ISSUE: Whether Datalift can question Belgravias ownership over the property.

RULING: No. The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as
lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better
right of possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee
relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of
possession as their lessor. Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides: Conclusive
presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: xxx (b)The
tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Conclusive
presumptions have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. As long as
the lessorlessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case,
the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject
leased premises than they have. The Court found that it was superfluous on the part of
the MeTC to rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title or right of possession over
the leased premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at all, Belgravia's
title or right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case between
PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present case (which is between Belgravia and
Datalift).
JUANITA ERMITAÑO v. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, GR No. 174436, 2013-01-23
Facts:
Respondent and petitioner, through her representative, Isabelo R. Ermitaño, executed a
Contract of lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter
residential lot and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St. ,... Phase 1,
Doña Vicenta Village, Davao City.
respondent received information that... petitioner mortgaged the subject property in
favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap
as the purchaser of the disputed... lot in an extra- judicial foreclosure sale which was
registered on February 22, 2000. Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property
to respondent. Respondent entertained the said offer and negotiations ensued.
Respondent bought the subject property... from Yap for P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of
Real Property was executed by the parties
However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to
petitioner's right of redemption.
Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional
certificate of sale which was issued after the disputed house and lot were sold on...
foreclosure.
petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, a case of
unlawful detainer against respondent.
the MTCC... dismissed the case filed by petitioner
Petitioner filed an appeal with the
RTC) of Davao City.
the RTC
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.
In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second assigned
errors is that she remains the owner of the subject property. Based on her contract of
lease with respondent, petitioner insists that respondent is not permitted to deny her
title over the said property in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court.

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BY RULING THAT A SHERIFF'S FINAL CERTIFICATE
OF SALE WAS ALREADY ISSUED WHICH DECISION IS NOT BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

Ruling:

``The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:cralawlibrary

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive

presumptions:cralawlibrary

xxx

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis
supplied).

It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying
is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation.13 If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to
the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. 14 Hence, the tenant
may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself;
and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to
the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under
Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying

petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition
of ownership of the disputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from
refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner.

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner for the
declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and
the CA were unanimous in sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate
mortgage over the... subject property in favor of Yap as well as the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the duties of the public officers who subsequently
conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. Based on the
presumed validity of the mortgage and the... subsequent foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the
RTC and the CA also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of the disputed
property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rulings of the
MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as... to who between
petitioner and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this presumption
stands.
it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied.[11] In such... case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful
by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the
plaintiff's cause of action is the... termination of the defendant's right to continue in
possession.[... what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.[13] If the title asserted is
one that is alleged to have been acquired... subsequent to the commencement of that
relation, the presumption will not apply.[14] Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not
estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been... ousted or evicted by title paramount.
[15] In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject
property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the... presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying
petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition
of ownership of the disputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from
refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner.
Sps. Marcelian Tapayan and Alice Tapayan Vs. Ponceda M. Martinez
G.R. No. 207786
January 30, 2017

Facts

The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister of Clark
Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is Respondent's son.

Respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated along Pingol Street,
Ozamiz City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1223 (Pingol
Property).4 Based on the records, it appears that two (2) mortgages were constituted
over this property - the first in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB Mortgage ), and
the second in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP Mortgage).

The records further show  that Respondent agreed to constitute the DBP Mortgage upon
Clark's request,7 and that, in order to release the Pingol Property from the PNB
Mortgage, the Petitioners and Respondent agreed to utilize a portion of the proceeds of
the DBP Loan to settle the remaining balance of Respondent's PNB Loan, then
amounting to Sixty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Pesos and 55/100
(₱65,320.55).

Subsequently, the parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking dated August 29, 1998
(Deed of Undertaking) in reference to the DBP Mortgage. The DBP Loan was not paid
when it fell due

On September 14, 1999, Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages (Complaint) against Petitioners before the RTC. Respondent averred that
Petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP Loan exclusively for their own purposes, 13and
that since Petitioners failed to pay the DBP Loan, she and her children were constrained
to pay DBP the sum of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
and 10/100 (₱1,180,200.10) to save the Pingol Property from foreclosure.After trial, the
RTC rendered a decision dated September 28, 2009 in favor of Respondent.  CA
rendered the assailed Decision denying the Petitioners' appeal.

Notwithstanding the findings of the RTC and CA, Petitioners still assail the genuineness
and due execution of the Deed of Undertaking before this Court. Petitioners insist that
the Deed of Undertaking is a falsity and should not be given credence.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner is correct in its contention that the Deed of Undertaking is
a falsity and should not be given credence.

Ruling

It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a

public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive
presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this
presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In
addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one's signature appears has
the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before
the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in
the present case petitioners' denials without clear and convincing evidence
to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow
the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the
truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
NORMA B. DOMINGO, Petitioners, vs. YOLANDA ROBLES; and MICHAEL
MALABANAN ROBLES, MARICON MALABANAN ROBLES, MICHELLE
MALABANAN ROBLES, All Minors Represented by Their Mother, YOLANDA
ROBLES, Respondents
G.R. No. 153743. March 18, 2005

A notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due

execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal
presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to
prove it.

FACTS: Petitioner and her husband are the registered owners of a parcel of land.
Petitioner discontinued the construction of the house because her husband failed to
send the necessary financial support. They then decided to sell the land and Bacani
volunteered to sell the same. The title was sent to Bacani but it was lost. For the
reconstitution of title, petitioner sent bacani all the receipt for payment of real estate
taxes. They then waited patiently but bacani did not show up anymore. When Norma
visited the lot, she was surprised that a house was already being constructed and when
she went to the register of deeds, the reconstitution of title was already cancelled and a
deed of sale was already signed in favor of Robles. Petitioner claimed that she did not
meet with the Robles and she did not sign any deed of sale and she said that it was a
forgery. Robles however argued that they are buyer in good faith and for value. They
further alleged that bacani introduced them to supposed owners and respondents paid
the full price. Then sometime later, [Respondents] Robles contracted to sell the lot in
issue in favor of spouses Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for P250,000.00. [Respondent]
Yolanda Robles even had to secure a guardianship authority over the persons and
properties of her minor children from the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in JDRC No.
2614. When only P20,000.00 remained unpaid of the total purchase price under the
contract to sell, payment was stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda Robles
that [petitioner] intends to sue her. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA saying
that respondent is a PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE affirmed it.
Petitioner contends that their signature is forged, and that forged deed is void and
conveys no title.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent is a purchaser in good faith.

RULING: YES. The findings of the court are amply supported by evidence. A notarized
instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear
and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption.
Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove it. What
surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant Norma Domingo
in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and the signature in the
verification of the complaint manifest a striking similarity to the point that without any
contrary proof, it would be safe to conclude that said signatures were written by one and
the same person. Sadly, appellant left that matter that way without introducing
counteracting evidence. Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person
with whom Respondent Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino Domingo.
Except for her insistence that her husband was out of the country, petitioner failed to
present any other clear and convincing evidence that Valentino was not present at the
time of the sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof

PEOPLE v. AQUINO MINGOA +

DECISION
92 Phil. 856

REYES, J.:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer
of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938
upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted
for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon,
and having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on the ground
that it involved a constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and
accounts on September 1, 1949, defendant, as an accountable officer, was found short in
the sum above named and that, required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to
do so. He explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake,
put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it
on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in
court and presented no evidence in his favor.

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable
and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the
fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes, if the money was really lost
without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his
superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to
borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own
sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the
prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the
auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged
loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries,
there is good ground to believe that defendant had really malversed the fund in question
and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation

the trial court convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is, presumption of
criminal intent in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and presumption of
guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon demand, to produce the sum lacking. The
criticism as to the first presumption is irrelevant, for the fact is that the trial court did
not believe defendant's explanation that the money was lost, considering it a mere cloak
to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether or not he
(defendant) is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment * * *." And as to the
other presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:

"The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use."
The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The question of
the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the court below, it may not
be considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)

In any event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now
a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp.
639-641, says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence."  In line with this view, it is generally held in
the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been
proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and
shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the
others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two
in common experience.  (See annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances
making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A. L. R. 495-535;
also, State vs. Brown, 182 S. E., 838, with reference to embezzlement.)  The same view
has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court in the
U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G. R. No.
L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951.
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are
proved.  It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper
demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.  The ultimate fact
presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his
custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and
yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand.  Clearly, the fact
presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that
there is no rational connection between the two.  Furthermore, the statute establishes
only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present
evidence to rebut it.  The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity
laid down in the above citations.

There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

 
FERDINAND R. MARCOS v. REPUBLIC
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the
late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The
anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos
spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of
ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.

Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, reiterating the following
arguments:

1. That the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate
forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had
already terminated; and

2. That the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or

the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.

We agree with the view of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Opposition
filed on 16 August 2012, that the first issue has already been raised and exhaustively
discussed in our 25 April 2012 Decision. In fact, the discussion on the first issue is
merely a restatement of petitioners' original assertions that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction to render summary judgment over the assets of Arelma. According to
petitioners, the judgment in Civil Case No. 0141 applied only to the Swiss deposits
subject of our Decision in G.R. No. 152154, which were also listed in the Petition for
Forfeiture.

It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that this is a distorted reading of the facts.
The said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name
"Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York,
and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth. [1] The
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed the partial summary judgment only
over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as forfeited in favor of the
State.

This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other assets
and properties expressly sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent
Republic's success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does not
mean its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject
matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains
to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1) holding companies,
agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2) landholdings, buildings,
condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to Php
27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized
by the United States customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the
custody of the Central Bank in dollar-denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock,
private vehicles, and real estate in the United States, among others. [2]

The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as
to the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the
Arelma account. To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from
recovering the assets listed above, including the properties it had specifically identified
in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our Decision, the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules
of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:

Separate judgments. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the
court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and
all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment
shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall
proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court
by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or
judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit
thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.

Petitioners further insist that "Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account
because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture
petition concerning it." However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was
made, and never even substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive the
State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 1379 [3] or
in the Rules which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment only because of statements allegedly made by one party.
This Court cannot countenance the view advanced by petitioners defeating the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, [4] where
the laws themselves do not provide for such limitations.

Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the case (i.e.
the power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is
within the (Sandiganbayan's) jurisdiction."[5] However, he objects to the graft court's
purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem.
He argues that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the
Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.
At the outset, this theory fails to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment,
and its execution. It is basic that the execution of a Court's judgment is merely a
ministerial phase of adjudication.[6] The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the
character of these assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioner's concerns as to
how the ruling may be effectively enforced.

More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379
is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam,
not in rem.[7] We reiterate our observations in the Swiss Deposits case: "Petitioner
Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily be apparent
to a reasonable mind that respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to
every procedural device to delay the resolution hereof…The people and the State are
entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x
x."[8]

In any case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are
held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and
indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the
reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have
already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the
nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.
[9]

The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all
new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held:
"In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the
court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being
sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the
power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law." [10]

Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the
Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos
regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to
joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:
(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover
proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets
that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of
President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a
personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and
Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and,
perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that
Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account.
Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be
executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could
irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.

x x x x

The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to

recognition because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to
adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from its
public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the
Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and
Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that
wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system
would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.
[11]

These statements made by the foreign court, based on principles of comity and
reciprocity, are highlighted if only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective
enforcement of the Decision and this Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 April 2012

filed by petitioners Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.