JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

FACULTY OF LAW

TOPIC​- Role of Ijma and Qiyas in the development of Islamic law

SUBJECT​– ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE

SUBMITTED BY​-

Mohd Fras Abbas

Roll No: 30

STUDENT ID- 201902574

BA.LLB(H).( Self)- 3rd Semester

BATCH: 2019-2024

​ SUBMITTED TO-
Dr. Ghulam Yazdani, Associate Professor
(Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi)

Date of Submission :23/10/2020

ABSTRACT

I​slamic legal system is one of the major legal systems in the world. It is a time tested system
based on over centuries of evolution. There are two sources from which Islamic jurisprudence
emerged . These sources are categorized as primary and secondary sources . The primary
source comprises the Holy book Quran and the Sunnah (Hadith). In this article we are
focused on the secondary sources of Islamic law which are Ijma and Qiyas . The concept of
Ijma and Qiyas proved to be adjunct while deciding issues which were not discussed in
Quran or Sunnah.The Islamic Jurisprudence as we see today is based on the understanding
and opinion of the islamic jurists along with Quran and Sunnah. Though the secondary
sources acted as a reform tool they are severely criticised on certain grounds.

Keywords : ​Islamic Jurisprudence, Quran, Sunnah, Hadith, Ijma, Qiyas,

 1. INTRODUCTION

The religion of Islam carries significant characteristics of an elaborate legal system seeking to
regulate broad areas of human conduct in accordance with its ideal paradigm of what
constitutes right and wrong. Islamic precepts, which Muslims believe to have been inspired
by God, should be followed by believers by means of thought and deed. Classical Islamic
jurisprudence rests on a monotheistic outlook that regards God as the ultimate source of law,
for He alone is taken to be the ultimate sovereign whose omnipotence over human affairs
stems from His status as the creator of the universe. Humankind accordingly needs no further
justification to be subordinate to His will. Unsurprisingly, in relation to Lord (rabb), Islam
characterises humans as servants (‘abd).​1 The word ‘Islam’, likewise, derives from the Arabic
term salám, which has a two-fold meaning: peace and submission (to God).​2 A Muslim, then,
is a person who submits to God’s will to the exclusion of any other revered entity.

Islamic law is often referred to as the ​Sharia.​ The concept of ​Sharia, however is not
confined to legal norms, but conveys a more holistic picture; the Arabic translation of ​Sharia
is ‘the road to the watering place’.​3 Furthermore the ​Sharia,​ unlike Canon law or
Kirchenrecht (Church law)​, does not simply represent religious laws, but covers a wide range
of secular laws and ordinances.​4 These include areas as diverse as international commercial
law, criminal law, constitutional and administrative law, humanitarian and human rights law.
The primary sources of Islamic Law includes The Quran(Holy Book) and the Sunnah
(teachings of the prophet). The main secondary sources, namely ijtihád (independent critical
reasoning) and ijma (consensus of commentators on a controversial point of law).

In this article we will focus on the role of Ijma and Qiyas in the development of Islamic Law.
For this we will first look into the idea of Islamic jurisprudence and discuss all the four

1
​Montgomery W. Watt,​ Islam and Christianity Today​,p. 125( Routledge, London, 1983)
2
Bernard Lewis, “The Political Language of Islam”, p. 78. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1988)
3
​ R Landau, ​Islam and the Arabs​ (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1958) 141; AA Oba, ‘Islamic Law as
Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria’ (2002) 51 ​ICLQ​ 817 at 819
4
​ H Moinuddin, ​The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Cooperation Among
its Member States: A Study of the Charter, the General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Commercial
Co-operation and the Agreement for Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member
States of the OIC​ (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987)
major sources of Islamic Law . In the second part we will discuss the concept of Ijma in
complete depth.The next section will deal with how the theory of Qiyas was developed and
its role in the formation Islamic jurisprudence.The last part will try to sum up the discussion
with showing the importance of Ijma and Qiyas in the field of Islamic law .
 2. DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE

Islamic jurisprudence {fiqh) is an important branch of Islamic learning. The word fiqh
literally means "intelligence or understanding". The fiqh in the legal terminology signifies a
study of the details of Islamic law as derived from its sources. It is also sometimes defined as
knowledge of one's rights and obligations in the light of the sources of the Shariat.​5​ It deals
with the issues relating to all aspects of human life. Ilm-i-fiqh helps us to understand the
Shariat's rules with regard to the problems relating to the different aspects of human life. The
the origin of Ilm-i-fiqh may be traced back to the very early period of Islamic history. With
the passage of time it continued to develop till it reached its zenith after the formation of the
four well-known schools of fiqh in the second century of the Hijra era.

The sources of Islamic law are divided into primary and secondary . These primary sources
where the Quran and Hadiths were the basic sources of guidance for the Muslims in their day
to day life. They formed the body of the Islamic law as well as the main sources for
deduction of the legal points. It is necessary to understand these two in brief before moving
on to the secondary sources of Islamic Law .

The Quran: ​It is the primary and most authoritative source of Islamic law. Since the Quran
is believed to contain the literal words of God, it is deemed the most authentic record of
Islamic law,​6 incarnating the final, inimitable and infallible injunctions of everlasting validity.
The Quran is deemed to embody an authentic record of God’s eternal and unalterable word.​7
Incorporating an amalgamation of legal and ethical principles, as well as ritualistic and moral
exhortations, the Qur’án provides the fundamental substance of the Islamic law (Sharí‘ah)
and imposes a clear set of legal and moral obligations on Muslims. The Qur’án covers the
basic aspects of mundane and spiritual existence, envisaging guidelines for legitimate and
ideal human conduct.​8 Lessons of right behaviour in daily matters, and wisdom in spiritual
matters, may thus be sought from the Qur’án. In view of the fact that God’s ordinance is

5
​Ai-Maharri Subhi Mahmasani, Falsafah al-Tashri fil-lslam,, pp. 13-14, Beirut, (1952)
6
​Farooq A. Hassan, “The Sources of Islamic Law”, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
(American Society of International Law), vol. 76, p. 66 (1982)
7
​The Quran, 10:37 (translation by Arthur J. Arberry)
8
​Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ​Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society,​ , p. 18 Cambridge,
(1989)
contained in the Qur’án, the ideal life for Muslims is one that is lived in line with the relevant
Islamic precepts and injunctions, whether ritualistic, moral or legal in character.​9

The Sunnah ( Hadith) : is a narration containing a report of what the Prophet said or did in a
certain form as transmitted by one of his companions, who in his turn would relate it to
someone belonging to the following generation.​10 A Hadith is a report that communicates
what the Prophet had reportedly said or done.​11 The report’s main function is to shed light on
a wide array of important matters in Islam.​12 Roughly since the second century of Islam,
Muḥammad’s wellattested manner of behaviour has been considered to constitute a normative
rule of conduct for Muslims. The phenomenon of precedent or normative custom, however, is
not entirely foreign to the pre-Islamic period; Arabs have felt bound by tradition or precedent
since time immemorial. The conventional wisdom dictated that the precedent of ancestors
was to be revered and imitated. Adherence to ancient traditions often left no noteworthy room
for new experiments and innovations that could alter the status quo. Entrenched customs thus
presented a significant obstacle to innovation, so much so that in order to discredit an idea, it
was generally sufficient to label it an ‘innovation’.​13

The secondary source emerged from the times of the pious Caliphs upto the Umayyads, it is
known as the period of collection and interpretation of basic sources. The Holy Quran and
Hadith, being the basic sources of the Shariat, were interpreted by the jurists to deal with the
new problems or to extend the application of original rulings to the subsidiary issues under
the guidelines given in the Quran and Hadith. This further stepped up the process of
analogical deduction (Qiyas) and use of Ijma for solving the new problems. These two
secondary sources will be discussed in complete detail in the following chapters.

9
Joseph Schacht, ​An Introduction to Islamic Law,​ 11 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982​ )
10
​Annemarie Schimmel,​ And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet
in Islamic Piety,​ p. 26. (University of North Carolina Press, London, 1985)
11
Israr A. Khan, “Authentication of Hadith: Redefining the Criteria”, International Institute of
Islamic Thought, London,p. 28 (2010.)
12
​John Burton, ​An Introduction to the Hadith Tradition, ​p. 19.( Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,
1994, )
13
​Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny,​ Law in the Middle East,,​ p. 34( The Lawbook Exchange,
New Jersey, 2008)
 3. THE ROLE OF IJMA IN ISLAMIC LAW

3.1 Concept of Ijma

The third source of lslamic law after Quran and Sunnah is 'ijma' which etymologically
stands for 'consensus'. The technical term 'ijma' comes from a root jama'a, signifying "the
totality", "everybody". The verb jama'a means "to bring together" . Thus ijma means literally
'unanimous agreement" or "total consensus". Ijma also means consensus on rules of law
claimed to be derived from either the Quran or the Sunnah.Ijma may take one or two forms
which are analytically distinct.​14 The concept of juristic consensus (ijmá‘) as an authoritative,
binding source of Islamic law was originally conceived through the exercise of ijtihád
undertaken by the Prophet’s companions and learned scholars of the classical period,​15 a
phenomenon that highlights the dialectical relationship between these two secondary sources.
While a theological basis of ijmá‘ may not be found in the Qur’ánic text, it is said to have
been based on a tradition attributed to the Prophet: “My community will not agree on error”.​16
This is generally read to mean that after the Prophet, the Muslim community could concur
with man-formulated doctrines and practices that were not expressed in the Qur’án and
Sunnah. Absent prophetic guidance, Muḥammad’s companions (ṣaḥábah) hence invoked the
method of general consensus (ijmá‘) to enrich the Islamic law. New norms extracted through
this method formed a substantial portion of Islamic law, supplementing the primary sources.

3.2 Types of Ijma

The first connotation of ijma is ​ijma al ummah​, "consensus of the people". This refers to
cases where a customary rule is adopted by common consent, even though the rule is not to
be found either in the Quran or in the Sunnah as transmitted in the Hadith reports. The second
type of ijma (of far greater practical importance once a systematic Islamic jurisprudence
began to develop) is ​ijma--ulama​, "consensus of the scholars". This type of consensus is
rarely unanimous in practice; it really consists of an agreement to abide by the majority view.

14
​Wegner, Judith Romney, "Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: The four Roots of Islamic law
and Their Talmudic Counterparts", The American Journal of legal History, Vol.xxvi,
Pp.39 (1982)
15
​Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ​Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human
Rights, and International Law​ p.27 (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1996)
16
Iysa A. Bello, “The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijma and Tawil in the
Conflict between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd,” p. 35, Brill, Leiden,( 1989)
3.3 Views of Islamic Scholars on Ijma
Al-Shafii defines ijma as the view held by the majority of the Muslims and uses it as a
secondary source of elucidation on questions which cannot be decided from the Quran and
the Sunnah of the Prophet.​17 The eminent philosopher and jurist Imam Al-Ghazálí argued
that critical thinking based on wider analogy, as opposed to narrow syllogism, and on the
general purposes of law was permissible.​18​ ​Ibn Taymiyya​ likewise advocated the
indispensability of ijma so that Islamic thought could be saved from stagnation.​19
Nonetheless, the tide of relying on orthodox interpretation of extant sources progressively
rose, and over the centuries far fewer jurists claimed to possess the required qualifications to
formulate novel ideas. Hence, with the tool of Ijma the Muslim jurists tried to resolve new
problems. As Hashmi observes, the fact that some of the most canonical source books on
Islamic law, like ​Al-Shaybání’s work on Islamic law of nations (Kitáb Al-Siyar Al-Kabír),
remain centuries old demonstrates the extent to which Islamic thought stagnated.​20 A mental
straightjacket of this sort indeed stunted the Muslim law for nearly a millennium. Be that as it
may, there is no hard and fast rule in Islam to prevent contemporary scholars from resorting
to ijma to invigorate the law and make it more responsive to current realities.

After some time, ijma was defined as the agreement of the mujtahids of the people (i.e. those
who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgement of their own) after the death of
the Prophet, in any age, on any matter of faith. Ijma thus did not signify the opinion of the
masses. As a result of the agreement the points in dispute got settled and each settled point
became the essential part of the faith; and disbelief in it came to be regarded as an act of
unbelief (kufr).

17
​Shorter Encyclopedia of lslam, p.613.( Cornell University Press 1957)
18
​Imran A. K. Nyazee,​ Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihád, p​ . 195 ( The Other Press,
Islamabad, 1994)
19
​Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Roel Meijer (ed.),
Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, Columbia University Press, New York,2009, p. 43​.
20
​Sohail H. Hashmi, “Islamic Ethics in International Society”, in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), Islamic Political
Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, Princeton University Press,Princeton, 2002, p. 151.
3.4The use of Ijma in Islamic Law
Ijma was regarded as a major source of law and helped in overcoming the difficulties arising
from the disputes among Muslim jurists about the rulings and methods of interpretations. "By
means of ijma what was at first an innovation, and as such heretical, has been accepted and
has overridden the earlier sunnah. IJma has not simply fixed unsettled points, but has changed
earlier doctrines, of the greatest importance. It is thus regarded by many, within and without
Islam, a powerful instrument of reform. Reformers saw the restrictions on innovative thinking
as hampering the progress of Muslims, positing that each generation of Muslims must be
permitted to resolve the particular problems of their age through critical deliberation. For
only in this way would the deleterious effects of unquestioned emulation be averted and the
richness of Islamic thinking be saved from rigid dogmas. Reformist thinking hence
highlighted the imperative for substantial reinterpretation and reconstruction of many basic
concepts and principles via free discussion, open-mindedness, and rigorous scholarship.​21

3.5 Critical analysis of Concept of Ijma

The deduction of laws through ijmá‘ enabled jurists to formulate widely shared principles.
But as the creation of new norms had been a collective effort drawing upon the sacred
sources, the prevailing assumption was that novel principles forged through consensus could
not be deemed ordinary in nature; rather, they formed part and parcel of the sacred law. This
conclusion was borne out by the aforesaid tradition that the Muslim community was
safeguarded against error. Accordingly, the process of ijmá‘ came to assume an “aura of
holiness”, the repudiation of whose outputs “became sinful in the eyes of some”,​22 even
though the law obtained via consensus remained derivative in character. Over time, ijmá‘ had
not only reinforced the authority of learned jurists (‘ulama’), but also largely standardised the
legal position on thorny issues. Arguably, the most damaging consequence of
consensus-based doctrines was that disagreeing jurists had effectively been deterred from
re-examining established judgements. What is more, particularly from the tenth century
onwards, Sunní scholars came to think that since classical jurists of the calibre of Imam
Hanifah, Imam Malikk,Imam Ḥanbal and Imam Sháfei had ceased to thrive, jurists of
established schools would henceforth dominate the intellectual scene of the Muslim

21
Olivier Roy,​ Secularism Confronts Islam, ​p.45(​ C
​ olumbia University Press, New York, 2009)
22
Ali Khan, “The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad”, in University of St. Thomas Law
Journal, 2003, vol. 1, p. 365.
jurisprudence.​23 Over time, Muslim jurists had been urged against challenging entrenched
doctrines, a stance which paved the way to orthodoxy where more liberal thinking was
replaced by analogical reasoning and crude modelling on precedents.

4. THE ROLE OF QIYAS IN ISLAMIC LAW

4.1 The concept of Qiyas

‘Qiyas’ literally means ‘measuring’ or ‘ascertaining’ the length, weight, or quality of
something. Qiyas also means comparison in order to suggest similarity or equality between
two things. Legally, qiyas is the extension of Sharia value from an original (asl) case to a
new case because the latter has the same effective cause (illah) as the former. The original
case is regulated by a given text and qiyas seek to extend the same ruling to a new but similar
case. The commonality of effective cause between the two cases justifies qiyas. Jurists resort
to qiyas only if a solution to the new case is not found in the Quran and Sunnah or a definite
ijma. The law may be deduced from any of these three sources through qiyas. Qiyas is
different from interpretation as it is concerned with the extension of the rationale of a given
text to cases which may not fall within the terms of its language. It is in this sense that qiyas
is considered to be discovering and extending the law.
As defined by Abdur Rahim, “a process of deduction, by which the law of a text is applied to
cases which, though not covered by the language, are governed by the reason of text”​24​. Qiyas
is said to “base on the use of reason to conclude that an existing rule applies to a new
situation because it is similar to the situation regulated by that rule, or to abstain from
applying the existing rule from the applying to the new situation that is proven dissimilar”​25​.

4.2 Views of Scholars on Qiyas

But, later on, analogies became more sophisticated and the art of Qiyas developed into an
elaborate system which included many other kinds of rhetorical argument besides analogy.
AI-Shafii says in his Risala that Qiyas is used in the cases which are not dealt with in the

23
Bernard Lewis, ​The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day, ​p.
225.( Phoenix Press, London, 2000)
24
​Abdur Rahman, ​Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali schools, ​p.
​ .L.D. Publisher, Lahore, Pakistan)
44(​ P
25
W. Montgomery. Watt,​ Introduction to the Qur'an,​ (Edinburgh University Press; New Ed edition (May 15,
2001)
Quran, Sunna or ijma. He regards Qiyas as of two kinds, Qiyas-i-Jali or evident and
Qiyas-i-Khafi or hidden.​26 J However, the use of Qiyas. was permissible only when it was
impossible to use these sources or "roots". "If traditions require to be verified by the sacred
text, Qiyas does still more so. The Quran is the word of Allah, while Qiyas is the work of
feeble intelligence.

Imam Abu Hanifa was the first who introduced this legal principle into the Islamic law. It is
reported that Malik used qiyas in his legal decision-making. Shafii, in his Risala, was asked
about qiyas where he clearly explained the concept of qiyas.​27 Particularly, to the question
about the difference between qiyas and ijtihad, he responded that there are several types of
legal rulings: (i) legal rulings from Qur’an and Sunnah, which make clear what is forbidden
and permitted; (ii) legal rulings of special character, which consists of Traditions, transmitted
to the limited number of scholars and only known to scholars, which are not compulsory to
study; (iii) legal rulings derived from ijma; (iv) ultimately, the legal rulings derived from
ijtihad with the help of qiyas. Then when he was asked about the different opinions between
the scholars who used qiyas in reaching the decisions, he responded that in the event, when
considered case is like the precedent in its initial meaning, then the discrepancy is not
allowed.

Moreover, Islamic jurists have established the rules according to which the qiyas can be
adopted: (a) qiyas should be used only then when the solution of specific issues is not found
either in Qur’an, or hadiths; (b) qiyas should not contradict the principles of Islam; (c) qiyas
should not contradict the contents of Quran as well as the Traditions of Prophet; (d) it should
be strict qiyas, based either on Quran, or hadiths, or ijma.

4.3 Critical Analysis of concept of Qiyas

There were serious differences among the exponents of qiyas about its rules and this aroused
suspicions about its validity. The jurists had no solid foundation to prove its sanctity like that
of the prophetic traditions. It was indeed a developed form of ra'y (opinion) used in a
systematic manner. The extreme formalism and frequent use of qiyas in law made many
people averse to this principle. There was a widespread disagreement among the jurists,
26
​Wegner, Judith Romney, "Islamic Talmudic jurisprudence; The Four Roots of Islamic Law and Their
Tamudic Counterparts", The American Journal of Legal History, Vol.xxvi, 1982, p.44
27
Translated by Maged Hadduri, ​Al-Shafiei​: Risala,pp. 285-287 (Baltimore, 1961)
especially among the Iraqis, on account of the use of ra'y and qiyas. The opponents Qiyas
exploited this situation and portrayed it in a contemptuous manner. The trenchant criticism of
Ibn al-Miuqaffa' and al-Sh'abi are justifiable in view of the increasing disagreement. The
moderate legal schools began to lay great emphasis on acquiring knowledge directly from the
Quran and the Sunnah, and acting upon their teaching. Consequently they started to warn the
people against the dangers of the use of qiyas with a view to obey the teachings of the Qur'an
and the Sunnah and to protect the community from widespread disagreement.
 5. CONCLUSION

Secondary sources have thus provided a degree of flexibility to the development of law. In
fact, although Islamic law owes its origins to the primary sources, it has overwhelmingly
flourished due to juridical activity, which was particularly intense during the classical period
of Islamic civilisation. Classical jurists were keen to harmonise non-peremptory and
derivative principles with socio-political dynamics. Al-Qarafi, in this context, wrote that
“holding to rulings that have been deduced on the basis of custom, even after this custom has
changed, is a violation of unanimous consensus and an open display of ignorance of the
religion”.​28 When deriving secondary rulings, however, Muslim jurists have been restricted
relative to their secular counterparts. Non-religious jurists are certainly restrained with such
concerns as the hierarchy of the norms and principles of equity, but they may rely on their
own resources while making law. The Muslim jurist, on the other hand, must lay bare the will
of God reflected in the Qur’án and credible traditions, rather than proclaim the dictates of his
own judgement. But this hardly prevented Muslim scholars from expanding on positive law
without being cramped in blind literalism, though they were much more cautious about
immutable principles.​29

There is little doubt that blind adherence to orthodox doctrines up until modern times has, in
large measure, been responsible for the decline of Muslim thought in almost all intellectual
realms. The artificial shackles placed on Islam’s inherent dynamism further paved the way
for Western domination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations over large parts of
the Muslim-majority world. This eventually sparked considerable debate over the ways in
which such hegemony could be countered and the once-glorious Islamic culture could be
resurrected. By the end of the eighteenth century, it became unmistakably clear that the key
institutions of the Muslim world were in steep decline, as judged against Western standards
and progress in most areas that were defining the socio-political and economic contours of
the modern period Ijma and Qiyas at that time wwere used as tools to bring reforms in the
Ummah.

28
​Al-Qarafi, cited in Sherman A. Jackson, “Jihad and the Modern World”, in Journal of Islamic Law and
Culture, 2002, vol. 7, p. 9.
29
​Bernard G. Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad”, in American Journal of
Comparative Law, 1978, vol. 26, p. 201.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Cited :

● Montgomery W. Watt,​ Islam and Christianity Today​,p. 125( Routledge, London,

1983)

● Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ​Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts

Society​, , p. 18 Cambridge, (1989)

● Joseph Schacht, ​An Introduction to Islamic Law​, 11 (Oxford University Press,

Oxford, 1982 )

● Annemarie Schimmel,​ And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the

Prophet in Islamic Piety,​ p. 26. (University of North Carolina Press, London, 1985)

● John Burton, ​An Introduction to the Hadith Tradition, ​p. 19.( Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh, 1994,)

● Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny,​ Law in the Middle East,,​ p. 34( The
Lawbook Exchange,New Jersey, 2008.

● Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ​Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties,

Human Rights, and International Law​ p.27 (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse,
1996)

● Imran A. K. Nyazee,​ Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihád, ​p. 195 (
The Other Press, Islamabad, 1994)

● Olivier Roy,​ Secularism Confronts Islam, p​ .45(​ C

​ olumbia University Press, New
York, 2009)

● Abdur Rahman, ​Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi

and Hanbali schools, ​p. 44(​ ​P.L.D. Publisher, Lahore, Pakistan)

● W. Montgomery. Watt,​ Introduction to the Qur'an,​ (Edinburgh University Press; New

Ed edition (May 15, 2001)

● R Landau, ​Islam and the Arabs​ (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1958) 141;
AA Oba, ‘Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria’
(2002) 51 ​ICLQ

Journals Cited :

● Farooq A. Hassan, “The Sources of Islamic Law”, in Proceedings of the Annual

Meeting (American Society of International Law), vol. 76, p. 66 (1982)

● Israr A. Khan, “Authentication of Hadith: Redefining the Criteria”, International

Institute of Islamic Thought, London,p. 28 (2010.)
● Wegner, Judith Romney, "Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: The four Roots of
Islamic law and Their Talmudic Counterparts", The American Journal of legal
History, Vol.xxvi, Pp.39 (1982)

● Iysa A. Bello, “The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and

Orthodoxy: Ijma and Tawil in the Conflict between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd,” p.
35, Brill, Leiden,( 1989)

● Sohail H. Hashmi, “Islamic Ethics in International Society”, in Sohail H. Hashmi

(ed.), Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, Princeton
University Press,Princeton, 2002, p. 151

● Ali Khan, “The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad”, in
University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 2003, vol. 1, p. 365.

● Wegner, Judith Romney, "Islamic Talmudic jurisprudence; The Four Roots of Islamic
Law and Their Tamudic Counterparts", The American Journal of Legal History,
Vol.xxvi, 1982, p.44

● Al-Qarafi, cited in Sherman A. Jackson, “Jihad and the Modern World”, in Journal of
Islamic Law and Culture, 2002, vol. 7, p. 9.

● Bernard G. Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad”, in

American Journal of Comparative Law, 1978, vol. 26, p. 201.