THE CONTROL POWER

Art VII, Sec 17

Drilon v. Lim
GR 112497, 235 SCRA 135 [Aug 4, 1994]
 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. A supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not
lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.

Villena v. Secretary of the Interior

No. 46570, 67 Phil 451 [Apr 21, 1939]
 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency — The acts of the department
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the
acts of the President.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño

No. L-27811, 21 SCRA 895 [Nov 17, 1967]
 Implicit from the President’s control of all executive departments is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries.

City of Iligan v. Director of Lands

No. L-30852, 158 SCRA 158 [Feb 26, 1988]
 Since the President has control over all executive depts., he also has the
authority vested by law to his subordinates.

Ang-Angco v. Castillo
No. L-17169, 9 SCRA 619 [Nov 30, 1963]
 The President’s power of control may extend to the power to investigate,
suspend or remove officers and employees in the executive department if
they are presidential appointees, but NOT to those in the classified service.
It merely applies over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor
himself – limitation of President’s power of control.

National Marketing Corp. v. Arca

No. L-25743, 29 SCRA 648 [Sept 30, 1969]
 Govt-controlled owned or controlled corps. partake of the nature of govt
bureaus or offices, and therefore are also under the President’s power of
control.
THE MILITARY POWER
Art VII, Sec 18.

Guanzon v. De Villa 111

GR 80508, 181 SCRA 623 [Jan 30, 1990]
 The President may NOT order police actions violative of human rights under the pretext
of Art VII, Sec 18 .

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

No. L-533, 75 Phil 875 [Aug 20, 1946]
 Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief. Their only object: to aid the
President in commanding and enforcing discipline in the Armed Forces.

Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34

No. L-54558, 150 SCRA 144 [May 22, 1987]
 Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses
when the civil courts are open and functioning.

Quiloña v. General Court Martial

GR 96607, 206 SCRA 821 [Mar 4, 1992]
 Criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts (as the character of the PNP is civilian) .

Gudani v. Senga
GR 170165, 498 SCRA 670 [Aug 15, 2006]
 The President as Commander-in-Chief may prevent a member of the AFP from
appearing in legislative inquiries; however, Congress may seek recourse with the SC.

SANLAKAS v. Reyes
GR 159085 [Feb 3, 2004]
 An actual invasion or rebellion is not required in the exercise of the calling out power.
The only criterion is: “whenever it becomes necessary x x x to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
THE PARDONING POWER
Art VII, Sec 19.

Torres v. Gonzales
No. L-76872, 152 SCRA 272 [Jul 23, 1987]
 Conviction by final judgment is not necessary to recommit a conditional pardonee
alleged to have breached his condition. Due process of law would NOT be violated.

Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.

GR 78239, 170 SCRA 190 [Feb 9, 1989]
 Effects of Pardon – frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights, but, UNLESS grounded on innocence, does not wash
out the moral stain; cannot preempt the appointing power although it restores
eligibility.

People v. Salle, Jr.

GR 103567, 250 SCRA 581 [Dec 4, 1995]
 The “conviction by final judgment” limitation mandates that no pardon may be
extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. Where appeal is pending, it
must first be withdrawn to bring the conviction to finality.

Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit

GR 75025, 226 SCRA 356 [Sept 14, 1993]
 A public servant acquitted because of innocence is ipso facto reinstated with the grant
of executive clemency and is entitled to back wages.

Sabello v. DECS
GR 87687, 180 SCRA 623 [Dec 26, 1989]
 A lawfully convicted public servant later pardoned and reinstated is NOT entitled to
back wages.

Llamas v. Orbos
GR 99031, 202 SCRA 844 [Oct 15, 1991]
 Executive clemency may be extended to those convicted not only in criminal but also in
administrative cases in the Executive Dept.; administrative cases in the Judicial and
Legislative Depts. are not included.
THE BORROWING POWER
Art VII, Sec 20.

Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia

GR 106064, 472 SCRA 505 [Oct 13, 2005]
 The broad language of the Constitution on the President’s foreign borrowing power
makes no prohibition or distinction on the issuance of certain kinds of loans. The only
restrictions: (1) prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and (2) loans must be subject
to limitations provided by law.

THE DIPLOMATIC POWER

Art VII, Sec 21.

Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading

No. L-14279, 3 SCRA 351 [Oct 31, 1961]
 Concurrence by Senate is required in “treaties”, but NOT in “executive agreements”

Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary

GR 158088, 462 SCRA 622 [Jul 6, 2005]
 The President has the sole authority to negotiate and ratify treaties. The only role of the
Senate is giving or withholding its consent to the ratification.