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AFTERMATH: Australia's First Commandoes
AFTERMATH: Australia's First Commandoes
Photo 4: Sig. Keith Richards, Cpl. John Donovan, and Sgt. Frank Press using a radio on a
mountain top in Japanese-occupied Portuguese Timor, about November 1942.
(Photograph by Damien Parer.)
When Leggatt led the retreat east to fight a guerrilla campaign, he looked to
Australia’s first commandoes in Portuguese Timor as his secret weapon. Only 152
of the Dutch Timor branch of Sparrow Force formed up with the 2/2 Independent
Company, but over the following months the remnants of Sparrow Force would
achieve legendary status.
The Independent Company format was an unproven concept. The concept was an
Australian Army response to a British Government request in late 1940 to form
special forces, utilizing the hunting and tracking skills Australians were renowned.
A British military mission headed by Lieutenant Colonel J.C. Mawhood arrived
in Australia to investigate the possibility of establishing a number of special units
within the Australian Army.2 The British, including Mike Calvert3 and F. Spencer
Chapman,4 proposed the establishment of independent companies that would
receive special training in order to take part in combined operations and various
2
Horner, David. SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle — A History of the Australian Special Air Service.
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989. p.21.
3
Brigadier James Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert, DSO and Bar (6 March 1913 – 26 November
1998.) Later commander of the Chindits, alongside Orde Wingate.
4
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Spencer Chapman, DSO & Bar, ED (10 May 1907 – 8 August
1971.) A famous mountain climber and arctic explorer, he was most famous for his exploits
behind enemy lines in Japanese occupied Malaya. His medals include: The Arctic Medal, Gill
Memorial Medal, Mungo Park Medal, and the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal.
Sparrow After-math
5
Horner, op cit., n.2.
6
The titles were originally No. 1, 2, and 3 Independent Companies as Independent Companies did
not exist during the First Australian Imperial Force during the First World War. The adoption of
the “2/” was to maintain consistency with other unit titles in the Second Australian Imperial Force
of the Second World War.
7
Horner, op cit., p.23.
Sparrow After-math
Essential to achieving mystical status amongst their enemy were the criado who
not only sought and carried supplies but were also Sparrow Force’s eyes and ears
in Japanese-controlled territory. Most importantly, they carried away the dead and
wounded commandoes undetected.
The Independent Company not only honed their skills, they also passed them on.
Turton and Doig trained the escapees from Dutch Timor into a fourth platoon,
called D Platoon. During the August offensive, they held their own.
The Japanese saw Sparrow Force as a serious threat. In August, the Japanese 48th
Division arrived from the Philippines in an attempt to flush out the menacing
Sparrow Force into a corner on the south coast of the island.8 While three Japanese
columns moved south from Dili and Manatuto, another moved eastward from
Dutch Timor to attack Dutch positions in the central south of the island. The
offensive ended on 19 August when the main Japanese force was withdrawn and
deployed to Rabaul. Sparrow Force held out, only losing one commando whilst
inflicting many casualties.
8
White, Ken. Criado: A story of East Timor. Briar Hill: Indra Publishing, 2002. p.92.
9
Veale’s plan, op cit.
Sparrow After-math
What the Allied commanders and many historians have not grasped is the role
Sparrow Force had in the overall scheme of the war. Whether the Allied Command
realized it or not, Sparrow Force was an important pawn in the island-hopping
strategy.
The United States Navy had secretly devised the island-hopping strategy as early
as 1897 in response to fears of Japanese military expansion affecting American
trade routes.
10
MacArthur to Blamey, op cit.
Sparrow After-math
After World War I, the Versailles Treaty gave Japan a mandate over former
German colonies in the western Pacific, specifically, the Mariana, Marshall, and
Caroline Islands. If these islands were fortified, Japan could in principle deny the
U.S. access to its interests in the western Pacific.
Between the First and Second World Wars, the strategy was updated to include
modern weapons, such as submarines and aircraft. It was called War Plan Orange.
Shortly afterwards, a British-American naval correspondent for the London Daily
Telegraph, Hector C. Bywater, publicized the prospect of a Japanese-American war
in his books Seapower in the Pacific (1923) and The Great Pacific War (1925).
Amongst the predictions in The Great Pacific War were:
The war would begin with a Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Formosa,
and Korea;
Japan would then stage a surprise attack to greatly diminish U.S. Naval
power in the Pacific (Bywater predicted blowing up a freighter in the
Panama Canal);
A large role in the conflict for aircraft carrier-based aircraft;
Suicidal tactics by Japanese aviators; and
A detailed island-hopping strategy as the U.S. retook the Pacific.
The books were read not only by Americans but also by senior officers of the
Japanese Imperial Navy,11 including Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,12 who
meticulously studied the strategy of island-hopping in great detail.
Japan implemented their own island-hopping strategy during their advance
through South East Asia in early 1942. The troops that fought on Timor hopped
from Hong Kong to Ambon to Timor, capturing strategic airfields and ports in each
leap.
To the Japanese, they tried to show up the Americans. Why wouldn’t the
Americans try to retake each island the Japanese captured, especially Timor and
Rabaul? What they didn’t take into account was what was missing from Bywater’s
books.
11
Honan, W. H. Visions of Infamy: The untold story of how journalist Hector C. Bywater devised
the plans that led to Pearl Harbor. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
12
Toland, John Willard. Infamy: Pearl Harbor And Its Aftermath. Berkley, 1991.
Sparrow After-math
On Timor, the Japanese reinforced their defences with troops from the
Philippines. Some of those troops would reinforce Rabaul.
MacArthur devised Operation Cartwheel to bypass and starve Rabaul, which had
been defended by Lark Force. To some extent, if it weren’t for Lark Force
defending that port, the Japanese would not have tried to capture it. The Japanese
sent thousands of troops to fortify the port and airbase. When all those troops were
isolated, they were useless to the Japanese war effort and were left to “wither on
the vine.”
Leapfrogging had a number of advantages. It would allow the United States forces
to reach Japan more quickly and not expend the time, manpower, and supplies to
capture every Japanese-held island on the way. It would give the Allies the
advantage of surprise and keep the Japanese off balance.13
Some have suggested that, by the end of 1942, the chances of the Allies re-taking
Timor were remote.14 In reality, there was never any intention to retake Timor. The
more the Japanese thought that Timor would be the first step in the Allied leap-
frogging campaign to take back the Dutch East Indies, the less likely that the Allies
should want to retake Timor. If the Allies could coax as many Japanese to defend
the island from invasion, the Allies could bypass Timor and block its supply routes.
Instead of this mindset, the Allied Commanders were concerned with the
Australian Army fighting a number of costly battles against the Japanese
beachheads around Buna in New Guinea. They thought that there were insufficient
resources to continue operations in Timor.15 On 11–12 and 15-16 December, the
Dutch destroyer HNLMS Tjerk Hiddes evacuated the remainder of the original
Sparrow Force — except for a few officers — with several Portuguese civilians.16
By the time that Sparrow Force left Timor, there were plans to maintain a presence
on the island. Some of the commandoes would stay on the island as part of a
reconnaissance Special Z Unit, reporting back to Australia Japanese troop, air, and
ship movements.
The greatest problem that Sparrow Force faced on Timor was the Japanese
scorched earth tactic used to flush out the guerrillas. The Japanese targeted the
native population, killing as many as 70,000, to deprive the commandoes of
anywhere to hide and sustain itself. By the end of 1942, the Japanese had built a
native spy network to report the commandoes’ movements. While the massacre of
natives continued after Sparrow Force left the island, the Japanese were paranoid
of the commandoes’ presence.
13
Roehrs, Mark D., and William A. Renzi. World War II in the Pacific. 2nd ed. London: M.E.
Sharpe Inc., 2004. p.119.
14
Klemen. L. Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942. 2000.
15
Dennis, Peter et al. The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History. Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1995. p.530.
16
Wheeler, Tony. East Timor. Lonely Planet Publications, 2004. p.152.
17
Dennis, op cit., p.308.
Sparrow After-math
the presence of commandoes on the island and they maintained a large garrison on
the island, which eventually made them ineffective to the Japanese war effort.
More importantly, at the lowest point in the war, Sparrow Force proved that in
certain circumstances unconventional operations could be both versatile and more
economic than conventional operations at a time when resources were not available
to the Allies.18
Photo 8: The ‘Singapore Tiger.’ The Glasgow Herald, Saturday January 2, 1943.
18
Dennis, op cit., pp.529–530.