8/25/61 58 POSSIBILITIES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY A. ‘There are certain steps the allles could take in European security fled, in retura for an acceptable Berlin settlement, which would not cost them very much but might have some attraction for the Soviets; e attempted: reaction of Germans, reaction of Soviets, sad effect on U. 5. interests. 1. Declaration recognising Oder-Neiase froutier. The Germans would not like this except in connection with German ualty; but might accept {t without too much pain If they got something in retara re Berlin, ‘The Soviets have probably discounted the Western position on this ienue sufficiently 0 that they would aot give much {a reture. From purely U. 8. standpoint, recognition of the Oter-Nelsse line would be @ good thing: It would deprive the Soviets of a useful propaganda weapon snd might somewhat calm the fears which help to bind Poland, in particular, to the USSR. 2. Declaration by the Federal Republic indicating ite intent not to preduce or acquire national ownership or custody of nuclear warheads. The Federal Republic has already renounced production of warheads ander the WEU Protocol, but has mever renounced national ownership oF custody. At present, GFR forces heave nuclear delivery systems in their national possession, but the warbeads for these systems remain under U.S, custody. ™ DECLASSIFIED SECRET. E.0. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLK-47-180 }oy_Dma_ nana vate ZulaSECRET es 52 Renouncing any chance of getting eventual possession or ewnership of these werkeade would not please the Germans, but probebly would not be indigestible siace desires for national ownership and custody are still muted. ‘The Soviets would probably not take this declaration very seriously unless the Western powers associated themselves with it, This might be done: The Western powers could take note of the Fed Rep declaration, and indicate that they would be bound by It, This Western action might cut some ice with the Soviets, It is inthe U. S. laterest not to facilitate German national ownership or custody of nuclear warheads, since there (s no military reason for changing present errangements and strong political reasons against It. Both the Weet German and the Western declarations might be rendered contingent on continuing fulfillment of an acceptable Berlin agreement. 3. A tacit agrees to deploy in West Germany balllstic missiles that can reach USSR. that con reach USSe: ‘The Germans would object strongly to any explicit discrimination agetast them in this respect; a tacit understanding would be less objectionable, particularly Lf it bad a time limit, e.g.» for the next five years,Se .3- ‘The Soviets might find some attraction here. From a military ra MRBM's standpoint it would not help them much, since the could be deployed elsewhere (notably at sea), but there might be so:ne reaseurance to them in knowing that the Germans would not get thelr hands on missiles capable of striking the USSR. Present U. S. polley (approved by the President April 21) preclodes deployment of land-based MRBM'e on the continent; the Secretary of Defense is now reviewing this question. If the tacit agreement had aterm, and were limited to missiles of over 1,000 miles racge, our freedom of action would not be greatly limited. The tacit agreement could be broken whenever the Berlin settlement was violated, Some such arrangement was discussed by Secretary Herter with Couve de Murville at Geneva in 1959, 4, A.noa-aggression pact of declaration of peacefal purpores by the Four Powers, with which other members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be permitted to associate themselves. The declaration of peaceful purposes could be along the lines proposed inthe Western Peace Plan, but not tied to German unity: this would probably not cause our allies too much strain. It might be worth something to the Soviets, An eutright non- ion pect, as proposed by Mr, Acheson, would be worth even more, ager but would be more difficult for the Wast -- although ite disadvantagesmight be somewnet mitigated if It were tled to the continued fulfillment of any agreement reached regarding Berlin. 5. Creation of a Standing Four Power Commission (possibly with German advisers) to negotiate about arrangements to maintain security and to sefeguard against surprise attack in Europe. ‘The French and Germans would object to this proposal; they would a portent of “disengagement” in negotiations about purely rogional arrangements, unless these negotiations were tied in to continuing negotiations about German unity. The Soviets might be Attracted, aince they are interested in negotiations in this field. From the U, 5, standpolat, some regional arrangements might have merit (e.g., the none of inspection against surprise attack proposed by General Norstad), and the continuing negotiations would be harmless. ‘The question to resolve would be whether the creation of this Commission would buy enough from the Soviets re Berlin to warrant the peta it would caese our allies; « first estimate ts that this would not be worth it. B. ‘There ts another category to consider, which would involve actual Iimftstions oa military forces in Europe. 1, The most limited such measure would be the sone of Inspection against eurprise attack la Europe that General Norstad has suggested, ‘The Soviet attitude toward this proposal is unclear: they like regional measures, but they don't like inspection, The German attitude Is wholly SECRET 5 oy GSECRET 52 clear: They are very strongly opposed. General Norstad beltevee that this regional inspection against surprise attack would have substantial value for NATO. 2. A more ambitious measure would be one limiting deployment of forces in Central Europe (Germany, Poland and Ceechosiovakia). There everal problems here, however. The Soviets would probably not aceept any substantial reduction in the forces they now maintatn in on substantial East Germany, since their control of that country Fr and evident force. For our part, it would be hard to secept # reduction below the MC-70 goal of roughly 30 divisions on the Central Front withost jeopardising our goel of an effective Eurcpean non-nuclear defense, Thos, the only acceptable and negotiable agreement would be one that {rose present Soviet and MC-70 force levels. But would this heve enough attraction for the Soviets to warrant the frictions this proposal would cause inthe alliance? From purely U. S. standpelat, such a fr might be all to the good -- elace the Soviets could ctherwise build up thelr strength on the Central Front more readily than we could go above the MC-70 levels. 3. An even more ambitious measure would be one limiting deployment of nuclear warheads. It would not be politically or militarily feasible to ban that deployment in all of Germany. Query: Could ve SECRETpropose s more limited nuclear-free sone, e.g., 25 miles, on both jome advantage sides of the demarcation line? The Soviets might in ensuring that any froatier clash did not quickly involve the use of muclear weapons; they would probably insist on some such nuclear Limitation, at a minimum, in retura for the above conventional freese. The Germans, however, would be profoundly disturbed by the implications of aay nuclear-free sone in their country. The U. S. military would probably not be too much incommoded by not being able to have warhead storage sites within 25 miles of the demarcation line. ‘There te no effective means of inspecting for nuclear warheads; the best thing would be to bave unilateral declarations, rather than & formal agreement -- 90 a6 to avoid the precedent of uninspected disarmament agreements. ‘The difficulties aad problems involved in proposing any regional Msattation of ferces tn Central Europe are formidable. it seems unlikely they could be everceme in time to enable us to meke useful proposals in early negotiations. The mest that would seem feasible wauld be to propose a Four Power Commission to negotiate further oa this matter. And even thie would probably have to be tied in with continuing negotiations about Germas unity to be acceptable to the Germans.