SECRETARY'S DELEGATION 0 THE WINETEENTH SESSION OF THE .- lb UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMELY © S3 ev York, Decenberl1964 DECLASSIFED YEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BO. 12356, Sec. 3.4 Date: Deceuber 2, 1964 ~ Np 25-155 trae INARA, Dare 06-95" Tine: Luncheon, 1:00 p.m Place: Soviet Mission Wew York U.8.8-R- foreign Minister Gromyko Ambassador Stevenson Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Mr. Cleveland Anbassador Dobrynin Abessador Yost Ambessador Kohler Me. Tyler Mr. Akalovely Distribution: s/s sip ¢ FUR-3 BIF #mEmbassy 30. —Lonmon In response to Mr. Groayko's raising the subject of reduction of foreign troops, the Secretary said be wanted to make a few remarks. However, be did not wish Mr. Grouyko to Secretary expressed the hope that the time sBlution could be found in Central Europe, « solution it possible to resolve the probleme of European security and disarmment. om COPY 139 LERARY|He hoped thet @ bold solution could be arrived at, but thought that perhaps the time was not yet ripe for it. The huge levels of armanents we on our part had to maintatn were in great part | consequence of the situation in Central Europe. The Soviet Union was aware of our views as to how the Central European problem should be resolved; it knew, for instance, that we believe in self-determination. But in any event, if the present confrontation in Central Europe were removed, bold steps conld be possible and the total pattern of relationship between the two sides would change. Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union was not afraid of bold jolutions. However, we should not exclude partial eteps while awaiting a broad settlement.’ If we did, no partial test ban and 20 no-boube- in-orbit resolution would have been possible. Those were small steps, but lead ng in the right direction. In other words, search for pertial’ jolutions should not impede search for a radical solution. Just today an understanding had been reached regarding reductions in military budgets. This was no formal agreement, no radical solution, but it created a favorable atuosphere. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss a bold, radical solution of the Central European problem. It was ready to discuss with the U.S. ell questions of interest to our two countries, including the European, the German, and other questions. Stressing thet he was not speaking for the U.S. Government but strictly personally, the Secretary expressed the view that there was @ great deal of history to these problems, and thet they were extreuely stubborn, complex, and difficult. He wondered whether there would be any point in having a quite informal, undrauatic discussion among the Four Powers, without any particular agenda, to review the Central guropean problem. He thought perhaps some alleviation of the humanitarian aspects of the Situation could be achieved in this way. We were interested in the pass arrangements, and similer humanitarian steps ought to be possible. However, as Mr. Gromyko knew, it was quite difficult for us to consider ell these questions without the others of the Four Powers. Mr. Gronyko thought it all depended on the nature of the specific questions. He recalled that last year in tripartite discussions including the UK, @ number of questions had been covered, but wondered about the attitude of the French. Since France did not wish to take pert in diearmazent negotiet ona would it be willing to participate in the talks the Secretary had in mind? ‘The Secretary said that he could not speak for France. While be believed that we could make progress on soue of these points, the question Of procedure was rather important, because without an procedure Bight be impossible to advance: Se thought that if tbe Gernans both the FRo and Sast Germany, were told thet the Four Fovers hea gertain ‘greed views on certain matters, they would act accordingly end that =3 would alleviate tensions. ‘The talks he bad in mind would be nothing dramatic and should be conducted in a way which would avoid confrontation. Me. Grouyko reiterated that all depended on the nature of the questions to be discussed. If anyone should raise the question of German reunification, the Soviet Union would state that reunification was up to the tvo German states to resolve. As the Soviet Union hed stated in Geneva, this did not uean that the Four overs should not say that they would do everything to facilitate reunification. The German problem was very complex and many of its aspects hed been discussed before. He believed that it would be logical to start from where Previous discussions had stopped. Indeed, there had been considerable rapprochement on some points at that time and we could continue from there. ‘The Secretary probably mew better whether others could help. ‘The Secretary pointed out that while Mr. Gromyko and he could discuss certain ideas or principles, the execution of those ideas or prinpiples would require participation by others. As Mr. Gromyko probably knew, France bad not wanted any part of what Mr. Gromyko and he had discussed before. Consequently, 1t might be helpful if others participated, but he wished to point out thet he had not consulted then. Mr. Gromyko said it had been clear et the time of previous @tscussions thet the talks were on a bilateral basis and that at a certain point others vould have to take part. But then, as he bad Seid earlier, cove of the others may not wish to participate in a Gfecuseion of certain points. oe The Secretary observed that he would be in touch with the others in the middle of Becesber and vould see whet their attitude vas. What he bad actually in ind was sonething like the representatives of the Four Powers going to a corner at a cocktail party and ask Eeaselves wast seeps to alleviate tensions tn Centra Europe could be taken; for example, it would ve useful if uovenent of people and reuntfiestion of families could be facilitated. Be stressed again that this vhole idea vas not proposal by the U.S. Goverment and he was simply exploring the possibility on a personal basis Mr. Gromyko inquired whether the U.S. was prepared to resume discussion of certain points which had been discussed earlier. Secretary said the situation had been explored quite fully tn 1961-82 ut we bad been constantiy: comiug Sack to one or two points which created difficulties on other matters. Mr. Grouyko bad said that if no bold, radical solution could be found, partial progres should be possible. The Secretary said he also believed such progress should be possible, but he did want to discuss thie with the other partners.We hed the impression that the Soviet Union took @ favorable view of the arrangements for Christmas and visit’ - passes. We also thought this was a constructive development and reduced tensions in ‘the area. ‘These were relatively small steps, but perhaps some more important actions could be possible. At this point, the group moved to another room and was Joined by Ambassador Stevenson, who had arrived late due to another engagement. Mr. Gromyko suggested that it would be useful to continue discussion of the German and European problem. ‘The Secretary observed that some aspects of the problem had auready been discussed at the table. As be ew tbe situation, there were two basic problems involved here. One was to find a permanent, final, and conclusive settlement of the German problem. Such a settle- went would include European sect arrangements and disarmamer and ‘would reusve the very heavy burden cow resting on both our Countoies. ie believed that for the past twenty years. the Central Buropean protien bad been the post difficult problen between our to countries. It represented the so-called confrontation in a most Girticult and dangerous form and imposed & besvy burden of ernanents we coul: do without. Indeed, as a result of ihis ettustion, we bad spent Giterally hundreds of billions of dollars on armaments. Tet bota of our countries bade greet Geel of unfinished business et howe which they could do if they did not have to divert their resources for arnanents. Joe Secretary hoped that at sone poiut such a final solution could be Found but, frankly speeking, be did not see ey prospect for it, except on’ the basis of self-determination of the people concerned. We dia not know ghat the result of euch self-deteratnation would be, but we were prepered to accept it regardiese of the outcome. If a final Solution of this Kind vere achieves, tt would remove the confrontation and great changes would result; there would po longer be any Fisk of involvenest and disarmament prospects would improve. However, the Secretary could not see at this point where the two sides would get together, in spite Of the fect that both of thea bad a lot of resources comitted aa a recult Of the existing situation. In the absence of such a final solution, the Secretary continued, be believed we should explore what steps, small or large, could be taken to alleviate the situation fron e humanitarian standpoint, but we were also prepared to explore the ways of lifting the burden resting on our peoples as a result of the general situation in that area. The Secretar: wished to add that in the largest historical term, he did not believe it $rue that 70 million Germans should have a decisive influence on the relationship between the large groups of peoples on the two dides. If the Germans should elect to be separate and independent, something which did not accord with ouf views, the security and the disarmament oebenefits should offest our point of view, Conversely, if the Germans elected reunification, security and disarmament should offset the Soviet point of view. Gbvicusly, all this was a very far-reaching problem to take up seriously at this tine. Perhaps lesser questions should be discussed now, but we hoped that at som point this general question would disappear from cur agenda and would renove the anxiety our governments and cur peoples now have. Mr. Gromyko said that of course there was « radical solution of ‘the German problem, but also ona could conceive of separate aspects being resolved before such a solutior. was found. Thus, there were two ways of attacking the problem. As to a radical solution, it appeared from the Secretary's remarks that he regarded such a solution as unification. Indeed, the Secretary had also used the tern "solf- determination", apparently in the sense it is used by the U.S. and by ‘the FRG. Mr. Grouyko said he wished to point out that with every passing day, let alone month or year, the chances of German reunifica- tion and of an understanding between the vo Germanies became smaller. The hostile line taken by the FAG vis-a-vis the ODR played not the least role in this situation, The Soviet estimate of the situation prevailing in Burope after World War II, and particularly during the past several years, was based on the fact that there were two German states in existence. There were profound differences between the makeup of those states and particularly in their social structures. Thus the watershed between the two German states was very pronounced and all that had ‘been done by the Western powers, and by the FRO in particular, vis-a-vis the GIR, had made that watershed even more difficult to overcome. Moreover, rapprochement between the two German states, let alone their unification, was inconceivable without disarmament of both of then. Yet the FAO was aiming at militarization and at gaining access to muclear weapons through the MUP. This situation did not facilitate reunification; on the contrary, it made it ever more difficult. The Soviet Union had also stated, and be wished to repeat it once again here, that unification of, oF even rapprochement between, the two German states was impossible to contemplate without agreement between the two German states thenselves. Realistically speaking, Mr. Grouyko went on, a radical solution of the German problem was conceivable on the basis of a Geram peace osttlonent, and of a ostélenent of all questions ressining as 4 legacy of World War II. ‘he U.S. and the U.S.S.2. had exchanged views on ; ‘this matter in the past, and on som points the views of the two sides had become rather close; indeed, on certain points the two sides hed arrived at practically identical views. All this did not mean that if these pointe vere resolved, unification should be left aside. ‘The Soviet Union had stated that the Four Powers could undertake to proacte Gorman unification. Qn the other band, on some of the points discussed by the two sides in the past there were differences of opinion. ‘here ———= 6 were some knots that had yet to be broken. Primarily, this related to the presence of Western forces West.Berlin and to access to those forces. Agreement on this question and, still better, formelization of such an agreement could only contribute to mitual understanding and to improved relations between the two Germanies. However, Mr. Grouyko said, this depended on the points he had raised earlier. In any event, whatever aspect of the problem was resolved and formalized, that would only further a detente and improve mutual understanding between the tvo German states. Among those aspects were such questions as boundaries, access, sovereignty, renunciation of nuclee~ armaments, and a non- aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Solution of each of these aspects and, better yet, of all of them would constitute a significant step forvard. Mr. Grouyko said he did not disagree that the humanitarian aspects were important as well. Indeed, it would be useful if the two German states continued along the lines of the understandings already reached in this area. However, the humanitarian aspects vere rather pale as compared to the more important questions he had mentioned. Mr. Gromyko continued thet the Soviet Union was not opposed to a radical solution of the Gernan problem. The question was, hovever, what such @ solution would be. Realistically, a German peace treaty would create better conditions for a rapprochenent between the tvo sides and between the two German states in particular. He said that if be vere asked with which of the points he had Listed we should start, although bis list was not an exhaustive one, he would say that we should start where we had stopped in our previous exchanges of views. The Secretary hed mentioned that perhaps others should be included. As fer as he hin- self was concerned, he didn't know what questions could be usefclly discussed with the others. Sone of the others might not wish to take part in discussions of certain points. He reiterated that, for example, France had been unwilling to discusa disarmament. If one took the question of unification, that quest.on could not be considered without a discussion of the trend of development of the two German states, of ‘the arms buildup in one of them, of disarmament, or of lessening tensions. He recalled that he had touched upon the MLF in the context of his reuarks on a German settlement, but be wished to stress that this matter was of an immediate and independent importance. The MLF had been discussed before, but he wished to state again that it was blocking @ non-proliferation agreement and disarmament and was complicating the relations in Europe as well as those between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. ‘The MLF vas contrary to the interests of Buropean security and to an improvenent in U.S.-Soviet relations, if of course one wanted such improvement. However, perhaps this matter should be discussed separately on another occasion. “Mr. Gromyko went on to say that at one point the U.S. bad said it would not alloy the FRG to involve the U.S. in any adventures in Europe. That statement bad been favorably received in the Soviet Union and by the Soviet Goverment. Yet if the FRG got access to nuclear weapons through the MLF, that would open up possibilities for FRG adventures. Mr. Groayko said he wished to draw the Secretary's, the U.S. Goverment's, and the President's attention to this point. == ‘COPY Bj LIBRARY‘The Secretary said it was possible and even desirable to have a further discussion about Germany and the MLF. At this point,he wished ‘to take advantage of Ambassador Stevenson's presence and discuss the UN eituation. However, as far as the MLF was concerned, he did wish to etress that apparently there was a basic misunderstanding of what this was all about. He would be prepared to give Mr. Gromyko more detaile than he bad been able to provide thus far, in the hope that this would help bim better to understand the situation. But even now, in these brief remarks, he wanted to emphasize that the U.S. had no inten- tion of giving nuclear weapons to the FRG or anyone else. U.S. actions in this regard substantiated this statement, and indeed sone of our difficulties with France stemmed from this policy. The problom in Western Europe was that nuclear weapons had become competitive; they existed on both sides and the Soviet Union had hundreds of missiles aimed at Europe. We belived that those in the bull's eye of Soviet missiles had a legitimate interest in nuclear defense matters and should have a voice in them. Discussion then turned to the UN problem. A.Akalovsky:hjh 12/7/6% =