Unethical attitudes that caused a catastrophe at NASA program with

Shuttle Challenger STS – 51L - for engineers and general public.

Challenger STS-51L was NASA´s third space shuttle that was going on the tenth
mission on a Tuesday morning on January 28, 1986. The shuttle was completely on fire after
the solid rocket booster, seventy-three seconds after lift-off, started leaking hot gases, leading
to the explosion of the whole conjunct (shuttle orbiter, rocket booster and external cryogenic
propellant tank) resulting in the death of seven crews, being five astronauts and two payload
specialists.
In order to understand the reasons and identify the culprits behind this catastrophe from
a moral and ethical point of view, it is important to arouse and analyse some of the events that
happened since NASA´s first launch, up until that Tuesday. This essay will examine the
unethical attitudes of both NASA and its outsourced contractor Morton Thiokol, towards
launching the shuttle under inappropriate conditions. At first, this essay will describe the origin
events and elements that were the main factors for causing the accident, that is human
behaviour, unethical management and technical deficiency. Secondly, it will bring the
consequences and discussion about why the seniors involved in this project took a decision that
led to the death of seven lives. Finally, it will discuss the impacts that this accident had on
NASA´s operation nowadays.
Economic feasibility studies to launch more and more space shuttles started to grow
after the success of Apollo´s mission - responsible for taking the first man in human history to
set foot on the moon. The cold war between Russia and the United States and consequently the
so-called “space race” between them was a significant stimulant for sending more men to space
in the late twentieth century. The success of other NASA missions had built confidence and
patriotism over time amongst astronauts and American citizens respectively. From then on,
engineers started looking for an alternative solution for spacecraft manufacturing, since the
model used in Apollo´s mission for instance could be only used once, making spaceflights
economically impracticable. The idea of reusable shuttles had two advantages: reduce the cost
drastically and put forward more launches. Increasing the number of launches meant at that
time more satellites, thus more communication development in GPS, internet, radio, television
and so on.
As success grew over NASA´s missions, so did arrogance and greed. Their projects
became more ambitious. They wanted to deliver two launches per month. The investors were
jubilant. However, people were losing interest in new launches. It became boring for them to
constantly watch a shuttle take off safely (not that they wanted to see from time to time an
explosion in the air but it was not as exciting as before). That is when NASA decided to select
and bring a non-astronaut onboard. An ordinary citizen. A teacher to be more precise. It was a
huge selection process with more than eleven thousand applications and one woman was
selected to participate in one of the missions, Christa McAuliffe. People were excited again by
the fact that a woman and teacher was representing the whole country. She became a symbol.
Although the whole country was interested again in spaceflights, the teams responsible
for the Challenger mission were under constant pressure since they had to adhere to a new
schedule, thereby having to launch an average of two shuttles per month. This is when Morton
Thiokol, an outsourced company responsible for manufacturing the solid rocket boosters, has
a crucial role in the whole mission. They were having problems for years with the O-ring and
joints in this kind of mission using shuttle orbiters, responsible for sealing the connections
against hot gas leaks and connecting the parts of the rocket structure respectively. Despite
having the best engineers in their teams, time was running out and they were not able to identify
the cause and fix it. The problem was reported to NASA´s management. However, Lawrence
Mulloy, manager of the shuttle program, signed a waiver instead - a document signed by an
official when there is a problem that is not critical but there is no time to fix it and the mission
can be carried out. The word “critical” can sound relative in this context. From Lawrence
perspective, it did not seem to be critical because he was not the one responsible for the solid
rockets but for adhering to the schedule and in case of an accident, he would be covered
(although the word “accident” was out of everybody´s mind at that time as they had not had
any casualties bringing men to space so far). However, from Thiokol´s team perspective it was
a huge concern because an erosion in those seals could mean a leak of hot gases causing an
explosion and killing the whole crew. Moreover, they would face legal charges in case of an
accident of this amplitude.
Thiokol´s vice-president, Joe Kilminster, then set up a task force in order to solve the
problem rapidly. They found out that there is a correlation between the integrity of the seals
and joints with the external temperature. Every time the day was very cold, the seals and joints
were failing during the tests. So they started to collect as much data as possible and emitted a
report stating that the equipment should not operate under temperatures of fifty-three degrees
Fahrenheit or approximately twelve degrees Celsius, otherwise the seals would be too stiff and
it would compromise the safeness of the structure.
 The launch day was supposed to take place on January 22, but it was postponed three
times due to bad weather. The pressure was being accrued as it would compromise once more
NASA´s schedule. The senior managers were apprehensive with whether or not the rocket
boosters would perform well. Finally, the date is set on January 28 but on the night before,
Florida faces one of the coldest days in its history (below zero) and the structure was completely
covered in icicles. That is the crucial moment. The final decision of whether or not the launch
should be carried out. At this stage NASA was already late on their schedules, there could be
no more delays. They had promised the public two launches a month and were doing less than
eight in a year. Thus they decide to make a teleconference between the senior managers,
officials and Thiokol´s team to assess the feasibility of the launch on that Tuesday morning.
At the teleconference, Mulloy asks Thiokol’s senior engineer, Roger Boisjoly, for
recommendation. He advised Mulloy not to launch due to the temperature be below fifty-three
degrees Fahrenheit but then he is pressured by Mulloy and the assistant director of NASA for
having inconclusive data that does not prove the shutter capability for launching. Joe and
Mulloy asks to have a private conversation for approximately thirty minutes and one sentence
said by Mulloy is what summarize what happens later in a few words. He said after a long and
intense discussion: “It is time for you to take the engineer hat off and put on your manager hat”
(Mulloy, 28 Jan. 1986). then suddenly Joe come out of the room convinced that the data was
indeed inconclusive. Mulloy then call the director, make a statement in writing giving the
permission for the launch and asks Joe to sign it.
Christa was a high school teacher and all of her students were watching at the launch
location, many of which had their first experience with death. The accident happens seventy
three seconds after the launch. Seven crews killed by human failure. At the end, from a total of
$7.7 million destined to support the families of the crew members, Morton Thiokol agreed to
pay sixty per cent and the government forty per cent. Negligence, arrogance and greed were
the three words that resulted in this accident. The technical issues with the O-ring and joints
were not the main cause of the accident. Technical problems will always exist in the
engineering field but from the moment that one knows the risk of occurring a potential
catastrophe, have the power and responsibility to stop it and yet refuse to do so, should face
the consequences of their acts. Although Roger was considered brave in standing up against
NASA in that final reunion, he could not move on with his life for almost thirty years, feeling
guilty and responsible for the death of the crews until NASA made a statement highlighting
the courage of him in stopping that launch on that day. Roger died in January of 2012 in peace.
 Since then NASA has shown that learned from the past and changed. In spite of what
happened, they resumed activities almost three years later with a new way of doing business
and came up with a new management model. “Plans to fly civilians in space (such as teachers
or journalists) were shelved for the next 22 years, until Barbara Morgan, who was McAuliffe's
backup, flew aboard Endeavour in 2007. Additionally, astronauts were pulled off duties such
as repairing satellites, and the Manned Manoeuvring Unit was not flown again, to better
preserve astronaut safety.” (Elizabeth Howell. “Challenger: the shuttle disaster that changed
NASA”, 1 May 2019).
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