Land Titles Synthesis Finals

LANDTITLES CASES l 1
CASE PRINCIPLE
VOLUNTARY DEALING WITH REGISTERED LANDS
1. (Primary) Entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a
voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of
him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty
DBP v. Register of incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
Deeds
2. The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present appellee) register of deeds about
making annotation of an entry effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than real.
He would only be making a memorandum of an instrument and of its entry based on
or reciting details which are already of indubitable record and, pursuant to the express
command of the law, giving said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part of
that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the time entry was made or is forbidden
to any of his successors.
Primary Entry
Book
The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant has ful lled all that is needed
of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the
register of deeds. The Court thus once held:
NHA v. Basa
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether
the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing
more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
Since there was still no compliance of "all that is required . . . for purposes of entry and annotation" of
the Deed of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule that the registration of the Notice
Durawood v. Bona of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004 should take precedence over the former.
Considering that the Notice of Levy on Attachment was deemed registered earlier than the Deed of
Sale, the TCT issued pursuant to the latter should contain the annotation of the Attachment.
1. The rules on double sale (Article 1544) does not apply to a case where there was a sale to
one party of the land itself while the other contract was a mere promise to sell the land
or at most an actual assignment of the right to repurchase the same land. Accordingly,
there was no double sale of the same land in this case. The agreement between Babasanta and
the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
2. The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater
significance in case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an
immovable, the one who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in
good faith, shall be deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with
good faith — that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his
vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had acquired knowledge
of Babasanta's claim.
San Lorenza
Double Sales Development Corp. 3. Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens obliterate the
v. CA effects of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDC's
knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta?
From the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer and delivery of possession
of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has
no effect at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property.
SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the records that it had
knowledge of the prior transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of the property to
SLDC, the vendors were still the registered owners of the property and were in fact in possession
of the lands. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a person dealing with the owner of registered
land is not bound to go beyond the certificate of title as he is charged with notice of burdens on
the property which are noted on the face of the register or on the certificate of title.
1. Registration contemplated in this provision (1544) refers to registration under the Torrens
System, which considers the act of registration as the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land. This rule precisely applies to cases involving conflicting
rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of
the properties. Thus, we held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind
the same.
In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject property was under the operation of the
Torrens System even before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan were made.
AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as fact. Yet, despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the
sale in its favor under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of sale, there was no title on
file. We are not persuaded by such a lame excuse. Act 3344 provides for the system of recording
of transactions or claims over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.
Melencion v. CA
2. For the law is clear: mere registration of title is not enough. Good faith must accompany
the registration.
3. Thus, to be able to enjoy priority status, the second purchaser must be in good faith, i.e., he must
have no knowledge of the previous alienation of the property by the vendor to another. Notably,
what is important for this purpose is not whether the second buyer is a buyer in good faith, but
whether he registers the second sale in good faith, meaning, he does so without knowledge of any
defect in the title over the property sold.
Before buying the subject property, Go Kim Chuan made verifications with the Office of the City
Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City and the Register of Deeds. He likewise visited the premises of the
subject property and found that nobody interposed any adverse claim against the Amodias. After
he decided to buy the subject property, he paid all taxes in arrears, caused the publication of the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in a newspaper of general circulation, caused
the reconstitution of the lost certificate of title and caused the issuance of the assailed TCT in his
name.
When two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part,
Antonio v. Santos the earlier in date must prevail; and in case of successive registrations where more than one
certificate is issued over the same land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.
Exception:
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller
while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein
also described as "single". However, there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which convince
us that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
Noblesa v. Nuega First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley's
house — the subject property — in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner been more
prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject
property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility — considering
that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa Village where the property is located — if there was any
Innocent person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject property.
Purchasers for
Value To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa
Village — including petitioner's sister — not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative to
the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed against Rogelio.
1. There are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One
such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of
the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon
what appeared in the certificate
Peralta v. Abalon We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens
system, "registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land. Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title
to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory.
2. General Rule:
Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any
suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the
seller appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
Exception:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered
land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the
vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the
law.
3. An innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and
fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the
belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the
property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard
and still claim that they are acting in good faith.
The transfers were valid and the successors of interest of Cabrera are innocent purchasers
of good faith. The successors relied on the clean title of the subject land that were presented
by the predecessors. The successive owners were each armed with their own indefeasible
titles which automatically brought them under the aegis of the Torrens System. In the case
at bar, it is not disputed that no notice of lis pendens was ever annotated on any of the titles
of the subsequent owners. And even if there were such a notice, it would not have created
a lien over the property because the main office of a lien is to warn prospective buyers that
the property they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation. Therefore, since
the property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no
longer be returned to its original owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself. Another
point to consider, though not raised as an issue in this case, is the fact that Cabrera was
impleaded as a party-respondent only on August 12, 1991, after the promulgation of the
Gancayco decision. The dispositive portion itself ordered Cathay, instead of Cabrera, to
reconvey the property to Legarda. Cabrera was never a party to this case, either as plaintiff-
appellee below or as respondent in the present action. Neither did he ever act as Cathay's
representative. As we held in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,
Legarda v. CA "(j)urisdiction over a party is acquired by his voluntary appearance or submission to the
court or by the coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by service of
summons." 10 In other words, until Cabrera was impleaded as party respondent and ordered
to file a comment in the August 12, 1991, resolution, the Court never obtained jurisdiction
over him, and to command his principal to reconvey a piece of property which used to be
HIS would not only be inappropriate but would also constitute a real deprivation of one's
property without due process of law.
The fact that Cabrera is an officer of Cathay does not make him a purchaser in bad faith.
His act in representing the company was never questioned nor disputed by Legarda. And
while it is true that he won in the bidding, it is likewise true that said bidding was conducted
by the book. There is no call to be alarmed in case an official of the company emerges as
the winning bidder since in some cases, the judgment creditor himself personally participates
in the bidding. Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence
of Legarda's counsel. If she may be said to be "innocent" because she was ignorant of the
acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are respondents truly "innocent." As
between two parties who may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the counsel of
one, the party who was responsible for making it happen should suffer the consequences.
This reflects the basis common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that
". . . Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done
should be the one to bear the resulting loss."
In the present case, the Chuas were dealing with Celestino, Soriano's attorney-in-fact, who presented
Soriano's duplicate title, a SPA dated March 9, 1989 with Soriano's purported signature, and tax
declaration.
An examination of the assailed SPA shows that it is valid and regular on its face. It contains a notarial
seal. A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary
Chua v. Soriano public has officially signed it. The long-standing rule is that documents acknowledged before
a notary public have the evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution and
regularity. The assailed SPA is a notarized document and therefore, presumed to be valid and duly
executed.
Thus, the reliance by the Chuas on the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized
SPA presented by Celestino is sufficient evidence of good faith. The Chuas need not prove
anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance
of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.
1. One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, in that one
does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it contains all the information about the
title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long complicated
documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a private conveyancing
system, and assures that all the necessary information regarding ownership is on the certificate of
title.
(Note: This should be Mirror Principle Right? Because the Curtain closes after one year.
Remember.)
2. The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property. It
was not enough for them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would
be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its possession, through illegal
occupation. Nor was it safe for them to simply rely on the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142 in view of
the fact that they were aware that her TCT was derived from a duplicate owner's copy
Cusi v. Domingo reissued by virtue of the loss of the original duplicate owner's copy. That circumstance
should have already alerted them to the need to inquire beyond the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142.
There were other circumstances, like the almost simultaneous transactions affecting the property
within a short span of time, as well as the gross undervaluation of the property in the deeds of
sale, ostensibly at the behest of Sy to minimize her liabilities for the capital gains tax, that also
excited suspicion, and required them to be extracautious in dealing with Sy on the property.
3. In Barstowe Philippines Corporation v. Republic, "the nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate
of Title of registered land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate of
Title," in that "both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of the registered
owner that the original of the said TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively,
was lost and could not be located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose;" and
that both were "subsequent copies of the originals thereof," a fact that a "cursory examination of
these subsequent copies would show" and "put on notice of such fact anyone dealing with
such copies who is thus warned to be extra-careful.
4. Another circumstance indicating that the Cusis and the De Veras were not innocent purchasers for
value was the gross undervaluation of the property in the deeds of sale at the measly price of
P1,000,000.00 for each half when the true market value was then in the aggregate of at least
P14,000,000.00 for the entire property. (“FOR VALUE”)
1. In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent purchaser for value of registered

land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title,
the moment he presents and les a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered
in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owners duplicate certificate of
title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies
not within his power to perform. The Register of Deeds is duty bound to perform it.
Saberon v. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
Ventanilla persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
Therefore, in the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the
like, the entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse
claim.
2. In the case at bench, the notice of levy covering the subject property was annotated in the entry
book of the ROD QC prior to the issuance of a TCT in the name of the Saberons. Clearly, the
Ventanillas' levy was placed on record prior to the sale. This shows the superiority and preference
in rights of the Ventanillas over the property as against the Saberons. In AFP, the Court upheld the
registration of the levy on attachment in the primary entry book as a senior encumbrance despite
the mistake of the ROD, the Court must, a fortiori, sustain the notice of levy registered by the
Ventanillas notwithstanding the nonfeasance of ROD Cleofe. Again, the prevailing rule is that there
is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of
entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.
Suffice it to say, no bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike. Nevertheless, the equal footing
of the parties necessarily tilts in favor of the superiority of the Ventanillas' notice of
levy.
1. Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 provides that the seller shall register the contracts to sell with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Thus, it is Garcia's responsibility as seller to register the
contracts and petitioner should not blame private respondents for not doing so. As we have said
earlier, considering petitioner's negligence in ascertaining the existence or absence of authority
from HLURB for Garcia/TransAmerican to mortgage the subject lots, petitioner cannot claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. Petitioner is bound by private respondents'
contracts to sell executed with Garcia/TransAmerican.
2. Last paragraph of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 provides that respondents who have not yet paid
in full have the option to pay their installment for the lot directly to the mortgagee
(petitioner) who is required to apply such payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness
secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain
title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. Thus, petitioner is obliged to
accept the payment of remaining unpaid amortizations, without prejudice to petitioner
bank's seeking relief against the subdivision developer.
3. Under Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, it is provided that no mortgage on any unit or lot shall be
made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the authority. Such
approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be
used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have
been provided to ensure such utilization. As in the Union Bank, the mortgage was constituted on
Home Bankers the subject lots in favor of petitioner without the prior written approval from the HLURB, thus
Savings v. CA HLURB has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the mortgage.
Since the lot was mortgaged in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, HLURB has jurisdiction to
declare the mortgage void insofar as private respondents are concerned and to annul the
Real Estate foreclosure sale.
Mortgage
4. While the cases cited by petitioner held that the mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond
the certificate of title when on its face, it was free from lien or encumbrances, the mortgagees
therein were considered in good faith as they were totally innocent and free from negligence or
wrongdoing in the transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it was extending to
Garcia/TransAmerican was for the purpose of the development of the eight-unit townhouses.
Petitioner's insistence that prior to the approval of the loan, it undertook a thorough check on the
property and found the titles free from liens and encumbrances would not suffice. It was incumbent
upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots which includes verification on whether Garcia
had secured the authority from the HLURB to mortgage the subject lots. Petitioner failed to do so.
We likewise find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain from Garcia if there are buyers of
the lots who turned out to be private respondents. Petitioner's want of knowledge due to its
negligence takes the place of registration, thus it is presumed to know the rights of respondents
over the lot. The conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-owner will not
lessen the importance of such knowledge. Neither will the conversion set aside the consequence
of its negligence as a mortgagee.
Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of banks to investigate, examine and assess
the real estate offered as security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize the fact
that the Bank cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security
were clean of any encumbrances or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to
verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.
1. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which
a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
De La Merced v. properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent
GSIS the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent
the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser,
bona de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the
court will promulgate subsequently.
This registration, therefore, gives the court clear authority to cancel the title, since the sale of the
subject property was made after the notice of lis pendens.
2. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of
the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be
subject to the outcome of the litigation. In other words, upon the termination of the litigation there
can be no risk of losing the property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the land
or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the ling of the notice of lis pendens.
3. An action is binding on the privies of the litigants even if such privies are not literally
parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the terms
of the judgment. In the same way, the inclusion of the "derivative titles" in the writ of execution
will not alter the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 ordering the cancellation of GSIS's title.
1. Sec. 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate. —

xxx xxx xxx
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition
or application; any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of
a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument,
shall be null and void.
2. One of the essential requisites of a mortgage contract is that the mortgagor must be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged. A mortgage is, thus, invalid if the mortgagor is not the property
owner.
3. In this case, the trial court and the CA are one in finding that based on the evidence on record the
owner of the property is respondent who was not the one who mortgaged the same to the
petitioner.
4. A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the
property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no
obligation to undertake further investigation.
Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is nonetheless entitled to protection.
Erena v. Querrer- This doctrine presupposes, however, that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the
Kaufman property, has already succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his name and
that, after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies
on what appears on the said title.
The innocent purchaser (mortgagee in this case) for value protected by law is one who purchases
a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged
deed, as the law expressly states.
Such is not the situation of petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors pretending to be the
registered owners but who are not said owners. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith
does not apply to a situation where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner
and the mortgagor is a different person pretending to be the owner. In such a case, the
mortgagee is not an innocent mortgagee for value and the registered owner will generally not lose
his title.
(IOW, The doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith" is based on the rule that persons dealing with
properties covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the
face of the title. But this is only in a situation where the mortgagor has a fraudulent or otherwise
defective title, but not when the mortgagor is an impostor and a forger.
In a forged mortgage, as in this case, the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith" cannot be applied and
will not benefit a mortgagee no matter how large is his or her reservoir of good faith and diligence.
Such mortgage is void and cannot prejudice the registered owner whose signature to the deed is
falsified. When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the registered owner does not lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. An innocent purchaser for value is one who
purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself not a forged deed.)
1. In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a
unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate
per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase
price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both
the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters, etc.).
2. In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and the price may
be reduced or increased depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than
the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the
contract or demand for the proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not possible.
If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to
accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for the
additional area at the contract rate.
In the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the contract based on an estimate, the
actual area delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. According
Esguerra v. to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the
Trinidad rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of
the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract.
Sale Involving
Real Estate Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within
the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas
and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is
not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but
the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in the
contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries.
It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with
mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision
to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation
of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof
that distinguishes the determinate object.
3. Under the Torrens System, an OCT enjoys a presumption of validity, which correlatively carries a
strong presumption that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land which led to
its issuance have been duly followed. Fraud being a serious charge, it must be supported by clear
and convincing proof.
Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception. A caveat is in order, however. The use
of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess
or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to
its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.
Del Prado v.
Caballero Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in
area. Courts must consider a host of other factors.
In this case, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. The
difference in the area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable
excess or deficiency that should be deemed included in the deed of sale.
A person who deals with registered land through someone who is not the registered owner is expected
to look beyond the certificate of title and examine all the factual circumstances thereof in
Sy v. Capistrano order to determine if the vendor has the capacity to transfer any interest in the land. He has
the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing and the latter's legal authority
to convey.
Hopefully this case will serve as a precaution to prospective parties to a contract involving titled lands
Caveat Emptor for them to exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent person by undertaking measures to ensure
Principle the legality of the title and the accurate metes and bounds of the lot embraced in the title.
Domingo Realty v. It is advisable that such parties (1) verify the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with
CA the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority; (2) engage the services of a
competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject
of said title based on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan in the Land
Management Bureau; (3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot; (4) inquire from the owners
and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question; (5)
put up signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and (6) undertake such other
measures to make the general public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or
encumbrance by the parties.
Respondent Acero, for all his woes, may have a legal recourse against lessor David Victorio who
inveigled him to lease the lot which turned out to be owned by another.
INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS
1. Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a
piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for
by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof.
Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates
pertinent thereto. The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of
P.D. No. 1529.
Sajonas v. CA 2. While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by
a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated
on the certificate of title previous to the sale.
3. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall
continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective
upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation
would be a useless ceremony.
4. Notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in
favor of the petitioners. This can be deduced from Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the law on registration of real property. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is clear:
Adverse Calims Sec. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no
Rodriguez v. CA other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement
in writing setting forth his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a
reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. . .
.
The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a
registrable instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must be registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds. It was not shown in this case that there was justifiable reason why the deed could not be
registered. Hence, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration.
1. The annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the claimant's interest in the
property. The notice is a warning to third parties dealing with the property that
someone claims an interest in it or asserts a better right than the registered owner.
Such notice constitutes, by operation of law, notice to the whole world.
Here, although the notice of adverse claim pertained to only one lot and Filinvest wanted to acquire
interest in some other lots under the same title, the notice served as warning to it that one of the
Golden Haven owners was engaged in double selling.
Memorial Park v.
Filinvest 2. Filinvest was on notice that GHM had caused to be annotated on TCT 67462 RT-1, the mother title,
as early as August 4, 1989 a notice of adverse claim covering Lot 6. This notwithstanding, Filinvest
still proceeded to buy Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12.
3. One who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation
cannot claim that he has acquired title to the property in good faith as against the true owner of
the land or of an interest in it. The Court upholds the validity of the contracts between GHM and
its sellers. As the trial court aptly observed, GHM entered into valid contracts with its sellers but
the latter simply and knowingly refused without just cause to honor their obligations. The sellers
apparently had a sudden change of heart when they found out that Filinvest was willing to pay
more.
1. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property, where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property
that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner
thereof.
Martinez v. Garcia Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A purchaser in good faith and for value
is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. Here,
petitioner admitted on cross-examination that when she registered her notice of attachment in
1981 and the levy on execution on July 11, 1988, she already saw respondent Garcia's adverse
claim inscribed on respondent Brua's title on June 23, 1980.
2. Levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied upon. He merely
obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and liens existing
against the property at the time the execution lien attached, such as real estate mortgages.
The proper course of action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance
Enforcement of of new titles.
Liens on
Registered Land Sec. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. —
and Application Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the registered
of New Padilla, Jr. v. Phil. land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of any
Certificate Producer’s description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming under
Coopertative him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him.
Upon Expiration
of Redemption Ratio: The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner
Period (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of
which may exceed the judgment obligation.
(Sec. 74 – 75)
Note: The petition can be filed in the same case to prevent multiplicity of suits.
1. A notice of lis pendens, which literally means "pending suit," may involve actions that deal not only
with the title or possession of a property, but even with the use or occupation thereof. Thus,
Section 76 of PD 1529 reads:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. — No action to recover possession of real estate,
or to quite title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition,
or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use
or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding
to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as
against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice
stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same
is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to
Lis Pendens Viewmaster the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected
Construction v. and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
(Sec. 76) Maulit
2. According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, a notice of lis pendens in the following cases, viz.:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quite title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use
or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
3. All suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only those which involve the question
of title, but also those which are brought to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right, in
specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it, there being in
some cases a lis pendens, although at the commencement of the suit there is no present vested
interest, claim, or lien in or on the property which it seeks to charge. It has also been held to apply
in the case of a proceeding to declare an absolute deed of mortgage, or to redeem from a
foreclosure sale, or to establish a trust, or to suits for the settlement and adjustment of partnership
interests.
4. The purposes of lis pendens is (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration
thereof and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject
property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation.
One who deals with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot acquire better rights than
those of his predecessors-in-interest.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose
of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court
until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations
pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of
execution. Purchasers pendente lite of the property subject of the litigation after the notice of lis
pendens is inscribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds are bound by the judgment against their
predecessors. . . . ." Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after
relying only on the Certificate of Title would be deemed a purchaser in good faith. Against such
third party, the supposed rights of petitioner cannot be enforced, because the former is not bound
by the property owner's undertakings not annotated in the TCT.
1. As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as
follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any
other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use
or the occupation thereof. Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not
necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation
also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific
real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.
2. By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to attachments, levies
of execution, or to proceedings for the probate of wills, or for administration of the
estate of deceased persons in the Court of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that the
doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought
is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected.
Atlantic Erectors, It is essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief sought in the action or suit
Inc. v. Herbal Cove includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between
Realty conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring
its transfer or sale"
Even if a party initially avails itself of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such
notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action.
Thus, when a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in personam, the rationale
for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to exist. To be sure, this Court has expressly and
categorically declared that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on titles to properties
is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in personam.
3. Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when the same specific
property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such property
of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of
preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid
ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien should
then only be enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the
preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.
A trial court has, however, the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the express
provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
St. Mary v. RD protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Makati
Considering that the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint by the RTC was appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which Complaint refers to the properties covered by TCTs No. 175209, No. 220977, and No.
220978 that bear the annotations of lis pendens, and such properties therefore are irrefragably still the
subject matter of litigation, the appellate court rightly saw the need for giving notice to the public of
such a fact. The necessity becomes even more compelling considering that petitioner SMWSI had
already entered into transactions with third parties involving the subject properties.
1. The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
2. An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition
Tan v. Binolirao of a decedent's real properties to warn third persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or
unpaid creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or
lien on the real property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the
real property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be
subject to the rights of excluded parties.
The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation clearly
appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with the rights
of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the two-year
period provided by law.
Before a purchaser of land causes the registration of the transfer of the subject property in
her favor, third persons cannot be bound thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what
validly transfers or conveys a person's interest in real property is the registration of the deed.
As the deed of sale was unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract between the parties, namely
Levies on Pineda v. Arcalas Victoria Tolentino as seller and Pineda as buyer, which may be enforceable against Victoria Tolentino
Execution through a separate and independent action. On the other hand, Arcalas's lien was registered and
annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and accordingly amounted to a constructive
notice thereof to all persons, whether or not party to the original case filed before the Quezon City RTC.
IOW, the doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale. A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration.
VIII. REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, PARTITION

[Chapter VI, (Sections 78-92)]
1. One who redeems in vain a property of another acquires notice that there could be a
controversy.
At the time of the sale, petitioner Tan was buying a property not registered in the seller's name.
This is clear from the deed of absolute sale which even mentioned that the Certificates of Title is
still in the name of private respondent. It is settled that a party dealing with a registered land need
not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect
her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate of Title. By looking at
the title, however, petitioner Tan cannot feign ignorance that the property is registered in private
respondent's name and not in the name of the person selling to her. Such fact alone should have
at least prompted, if not impelled her to investigate deeper into the title of her seller — petitioner
Banaga, more so when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship, and would have
been quite easy, as the titles still carried the two notices of lis pendens.
Toledo Banaga v. 2. A transferee pendente lite stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor and must respect any
CA judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor.
Surrender of
Owner’s Her interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and her Certificates of Title
Duplicate will, in that respect, afford her no special protection. To repeat, at the time of the sale, the person
from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is neither the registered owner nor was the former
authorized by the latter to sell the same. She knew she was not dealing with the registered owner
or a representative of the latter. One who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and
defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his bad faith and cannot claim that he acquired
title in good faith as against the owner or of an interest therein. When she nonetheless proceeded
to buy the lot, petitioner Tan gambled on the result of litigation. She is bound by the outcome of
her indifference with no one to blame except herself if she loses her claim as against one who has
a superior right or interest over the property. Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot
acquire a better right than her predecessor in interest, for she merely stepped into the shoes of
the latter.
3. Possession is a necessary incident of ownership. The adjudication of ownership to private

respondent includes the delivery of possession since the defeated parties in this case has not shown
by what right to retain possession of the land independently of their claim of ownership which was
rejected.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their
resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation.
There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City's
possession of the lots.
Abad, et. al. v. Respecting petitioners' claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance
Filhomes Realty authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. 13 Petitioners cannot thus
claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to
the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries
thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be considered to be
beneficiaries.
IX. ASSURANCE FUND
Recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund only upon a showing that there be no negligence on
DBP v. Bautista the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest
Claims against therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act.
the Assurance
Fund
The trial court also dismissed the Cues' third party complaint against the Treasurer of the Philippines as
(Sec. 95) Torres v. Court of custodian of the Assurance Fund after finding them negligent in protecting their interest. The trial court
Appeals recognized the principle that a person dealing with registered lands need not go beyond the certificate
of title but nevertheless pointed out that there are circumstances in this case which should have put
the Cues on guard and prompted them to investigate the property being mortgaged to them.
X. REGISTRATION OF PATENTS
The law expressly declares as valid "all existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted
Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering
any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate," and recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners.
To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a duly
issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title.
Although Lot 727-D-2 was earlier declared to be owned by the Government in G.R. No. 130876, R.A.
No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Club's registered ownership due to its holding of TCT No. RT-
1310 (T-11351) in its own name. As the OSG explained in its manifestation in lieu of comment (filed in
the RTC vis-à-vis the petitioners' motion for reconsideration against the RTC's denial of the OSG's motion
for issuance of a writ of execution), the enactment of R.A. No. 9443 had "mooted the final and executory
Decision of the Supreme Court in "Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.," docketed as G.R. No. 130876,
Alonzo v. CCC which declared the Government as the owner of Lot 727D-2 based on the absence of signature and
approval of the then Secretary of Interior;" and that the decision in G.R. No. 130876 had "ceased to
have any practical effect" as the result of the enactment of R.A. No. 9443, and had thereby become
"academic."
Capter VIII The petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443 because of their non-compliance with the
(Sec. 103) express condition of holding any Transfer Certificate of Title or Reconstituted Certificate of
Title respecting Lot 727-D-2 or any portion thereof.
Certificates of
Titles Pursuant The appropriate recourse for the petitioners, if they persist in the belief that the TCT of Cebu Country
to Patents Club should be nullified, is to compel the OSG through the special civil action for mandamus to
commence the action to annul on the ground that Cebu Country Club had obtained its title to Lot 7217-
D-2 through fraud. Yet, that recourse is no longer availing, for the decision in G.R. No. 130876 explicitly
found and declared that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club had not been obtained through
fraud.
Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are
superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law
P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant
to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat
the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Taguinod v. CA
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law
gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and
family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain
degree of comfort as . . . human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of
the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.
It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to identify substantial evidence on record to support the OP's
finding that their lots are excluded from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
XII. PETITIONS AND ACTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

[Chapter X, (Sections 107-110)]
1. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of
Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except
in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the
duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter
10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states.
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to

issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests
the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument
cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party-in-interest may file a petition in
Ligon v. CA court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court,
after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the
duplicate certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding
the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any
reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court
may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Surrender of 2. Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be led by one who wants to compel
Withheld another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a
Duplicate party to a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under Sec. 107,
Certificate especially if the subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected
with the subject matter of the principal action. This principle is based on expediency and in
(Sec. 107) accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Relate Sec. 71? 3. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or
carried over to the new transfer certificates of title.
Certificates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree 1529 cited by the Register of
Deeds, bears no merit. In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing
party has complied with the formality of surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention
borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal system.
The Supreme Court had already affirmed the CA's judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in private
respondent's name. To file another action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan,
Toledo Banaga v. to surrender her titles constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal.
CA Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the
entire proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be
(Exception to Sec. rendered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of
107) their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, or formality of surrender of the
duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since
petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a
ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and
register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality,
as in this case.
In addition, the enforcement of a final and executory judgment is likewise a ministerial function of the
courts and does not call for the exercise of discretion. Being a ministerial duty, a writ of mandamus lies
to compel its performance.
1. Lands of the public domain may be classified by the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, into: (1) alienable or disposable; (2) timber; and
(3) mineral lands. However, only alienable or disposable lands may be disposed of through any of
the forms of concession enumerated in the law. A free patent is one of such concessions and once
it is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases
Oliva v. Republic to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
2. The Water Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins,
are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than
what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind.
Hence,presently only three meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent

timberland.
Conformably with the foregoing considerations, the reduction of the legal easement of forty
meters on petitioner's property covered by TCT No. 5455 to three meters now is in order.
It is not the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to record a right or an interest that was not
duly noted in the reconstituted certi cate of title. As a matter of fact, this task is not even within the
ambit of the Register of Deed's job as the responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. The
foregoing quoted provisions of the law leave no question nor any doubt that it is indeed the duty of the
trial court to determine the merits of the petition and render judgment as justice and equity may require.
This conclusion is bolstered by Chapter X, 15 Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which provides:
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure, alteration, or

amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same
by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance.
A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or,
in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that
the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate , have terminated and ceased; or
that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been
created; or that an omission or error was made in entering the certificate or
any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate ; or that the name of
any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married,
Amendment & or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest
Alteration of Philippine Cotton of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which owned registered
Certificates Corp. v. Gagoomal land and has been dissolved has not yet conveyed the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
(Sec. 108) determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate , or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree
of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall
impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value
and in good faith , or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where
the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as
provided in the preceding section,
All petitions or motions led under this section as well as under any other provision of this
Decree after original registration shall be led and entitled in the original case in which the
decree or registration was entered. (Underscoring supplied)
The court's intervention in the amendment of the registration book after the entry of a certificate of
title or of a memorandum thereon is categorically stated in the Property Registration Decree and cannot
be denied by the mere allegations of petitioner. Hence, the contentions that the Register of Deeds may
"validly re-annotate the incumbrance/liens and annotate the Supreme Court decision on the
administratively reconstituted transfer certificates of titles (TCTs)" have no basis in law and
jurisprudence.
PAs correctly observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the registration of property,
while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title
that were lost or destroyed.
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates provides in categorical terms the instances upon
which alterations may be made:
a) When registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or
Paz v. Republic inchoate, have terminated and ceased;
b) When new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;
c) When any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate;
d) When the name of any person on the certificate has been changed;
e) When the registered owner has been married, or registered as married, the marriage has
been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected;
f) When a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed
the same within three years after its dissolution; and
g) When there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
In the case at bar, it was found by the court that in reality, the petitioner is seeking the reconveyance
of the property to him. This particular act does not fall within the permissible instances provided for the
cancellation and amendment of certificate of titles. Hence, the petition which was premised on the
applicability of Sec. 108, does not find application. Hence, the petition was rightfully denied.
When the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
Feliciano v. another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision
Zaldivar had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original
certificate.
When the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void because the court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter — the allegedly lost owner's duplicate. The correct remedy for the registered
owner against an uncooperative possessor is to compel the surrender of the owner's duplicate title
through an action for replevin.
Tan Po Chu v. CA
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It has been held to be a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
ugly head. It may be attacked at any time.
If Tan's allegation were true, then the RTC's judgment would be void and the CA would have been duty-
bound to strike it down.
Notice of the hearing of a petition for the issuance of an owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title
need not be published if the complete record of the original of the certificate of title is intact in the
Notice and Register of Deeds. Likewise, there is no need to first secure the appointment of a legal representative
Replacement of of the estate and the declaration of the lawful heirs of the decedent if the petition, which does not seek
Lost Duplicate the distribution of the estate comes under the provisions of Section 109 of Act No. 496.
SEC. 109. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a

grantee, heir, devisee, assignee, or other person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a suggestion of the fact of
such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest
and registered. The court may thereupon, upon the petition of the registered owner or
other person in interest, after notice and hearing direct the issue of a new duplicate
certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the
lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the
Gocheco v. Estacio original duplicate for all the purposes of this act."
In view of the existence of the complete record in the register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, of the
original of the certificate of title in question and of the fact that the present petition is not one for
reconstitution as provided by Republic Act No. 26, there is no necessity for publishing notice of the
hearing thereof. And the petition, coming as it does, under the provisions of Section 109, aforequoted,
there is likewise no need to first secure the appointment of a legal representative of the estate and the
declaration of the lawful heirs of the deceased Paulino P. Gocheco. The petition does not at all seek the
distribution of the decedent's estate. The owner's duplicate copy to be issued will be only an owner's
duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. O-1385 and the petitioner is a person in interest as he is a legal heir,
according to his uncontroverted verified petition.
The oppositors have no personality to intervene and their grounds of intervention, namely, that they
have been in public, continuous, peaceful, adverse and lawful possession of the property is immaterial,
impertinent and of no consequence, in the present proceeding. Their claim of ownership or possession
of the property can be properly instituted in a separate, independent and ordinary civil action.
Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial
reconstitution of an existing Torrens title, to wit:
Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available, in the following order:
a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant
to which the original certificate of title was issued;
e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
Saint Mary Crusade a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
v. Riel b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Petitioner had no factual and legal bases for reconstitution due to its failure to prove the existence and
validity of the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. No duplicate or certified copy of OCT No.
1609 was presented and thereby, it disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the
provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens
Reconstitution title.
of Lost or
Destroyed
Original Torrens In the instant case, the change in the number of the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted from
Title TI12/79 to TCT No. 42449 rendered at once the authenticity or genuineness of respondent's certificate
of title under suspicion or cloud of doubt. And since respondent alleges that the technical descriptions
(Sec. 110) under both certificates of title are identical and the same, x x x, We hold that the instant petition for
judicial reconstitution falls squarely under Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 26, because the Director of
Lands claims that the respondent's duplicate of the Certificate of Title No. TI12/79 or TCT No. 42449
are [sic] both fake and fictitious.
Consequently, we applied Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and held that for non-compliance with these
provisions, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
Republic v.
Sanchez Therefore, it is Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 which applies to LRC Case No. QI96I8296.
Hence, in addition to its posting and publication, the notice of hearing of LRC Case No. QI96I8296
should also have been served through mail on the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons
who may have any interest in the property.
Further, in the case at bar, the jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance is conferred upon
it by Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title lost or destroyed," approved on September 25, 1946. The Act specifically provides
the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can act on the
petition and grant to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These requirements and procedure are
mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing
must also be published and posted in particular places and the same sent to specified persons.
Specifically, the requirements and procedure are set forth in detail under Sections 12 and 13.
Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never
been within the operation of the Land Registration Act because of the irregularities attending the
issuance of the reconstituted title.
Heirs of Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of
Venturanza v. Mora's title over the property which has never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No.
Republic 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the Republic's action because there was no
identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.
A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in
whosever hand said title may be found. Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it
covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title
issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled.
The Supreme Court has applied the principle of ejusdem generis in interpreting Section 2 (f) of R.A. 26.
"Any other document" refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the preceding
enumerations.
Republic v. The Court is not convinced that the above documents of the Catarrojas fall in the same class as those
Cattaroja enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e). None of them proves that a certificate of title had in fact been
issued in the name of their parents. In Republic v. Tuastumban, the Court ruled that the documents
must come from official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his
predecessors-in-interest. None of the documents presented in this case fit such description.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz:
"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare
and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat
the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied
with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests
Barstowe Phils. v. of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
Republic dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a
shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . . the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals."
Though estoppel by laches may lie against the Republic when titles to the subdivision lots are already
in the names of the respective innocent purchasers for value from BPC, it may not be used by BPC to
defeat the titles of the Republic as regards the subdivision lots which remain unsold and the titles to
Estoppel in which are still in the name of BPC. It must be recalled that BPC is not a purchaser in good faith. Estoppel,
Action for being an equitable principle, may only be invoked by one who comes to court with clean hands.
Cancellation of
Title
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions.
Estoppel against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection
and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with
Republic v. CA and its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
Santos limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities
as well as against private individuals.
In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's titles in 1966 up to
the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the
land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to
laches, which means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
REGISTRATION OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES

[CHAPTER XIV, (Sec. 113)]
David Lu v. Ludo
THE CONDOMINIUM ACT
Warranties and BPI v. ALS The brochure that was disseminated indicated features that would be provided each condominium unit;
Representation Management Corp. and that, under Section 19 of PD No. 957, would form part of the sales warranties of petitioner.
Respondent relied on the brochure in its decision to purchase a unit. Since the former failed to deliver
certain items stated therein, then there was a clear violation of its warranties and representations.
1. Sec. 25 of PD 957 provides: Sec. 25. Issuance of Title — The owner or developer shall deliver
Redemption of the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except
Mortgaged De Vera v. CA those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected
Amortization for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the
time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage
or the corresponding portion thereof within six months from such issuance in order that the title
over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.
From the foregoing it is clear that upon full payment, the seller is duty-bound to deliver the title of
the unit to the buyer. Even with a valid mortgage over the lot, the seller is still bound to redeem
said mortgage without any cost to the buyer apart from the balance of the purchase price and
registration fees.
2. The act of mortgaging the condominium project without the knowledge and consent of the buyer
of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA (now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957,
is not only an unsound real estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer, (who)
has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage.
1. The private respondents are entitled to a copy of the contract to sell, otherwise they would not be
informed of their rights and obligations under the contract. When the Sadhwanis parted
with P878,366.35 or more than one third of the purchase price for the condominium unit, the
contract to sell, or what it represents is concrete proof of the purchase and sale of the
Suspension of Gold Loop condominium unit.
Monthly Properties Inc. v.
Amortization CA 2. Private respondents were indeed justified in suspending payment of their monthly amortizations.
The failure of petitioners to give them a copy of the Contract to Sell sued upon, despite repeated
demands therefor, and notwithstanding the private respondents' payment of P878,366.35 for the
subject condominium unit was a valid ground for private respondents to suspend their
payments.
1. As required by Sec. 22 of P.D. 957 which provides — Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans. — No owner or
developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use
and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written
conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence
of the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
The provision is clear. The written approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient.
It must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners
association or the majority of the lot buyers. Failing in this, the construction of the fifth floor is
violative of the decree invoked.
2. Upon full payment of the agreed price, petitioner is mandated by law to deliver the title
Alteration of of the lot or unit to the buyer.
Plans G.O.A.L Inc. v. CA
Sec. 25. P.D. 957 — "Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot
or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit . . . . In the event a mortgage over the lot
or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer
shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months from such
issuance in order that the title over any paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer
in accordance herewith."
Upon full payment of a unit, petitioner loses all its rights and interests to the unit in favor of the
buyer.
3. Common areas and facilities are "portions of the condominium property not included in the
units," whereas, a unit is "a part of the condominium property which is to be subject to
private ownership." Inversely, that which is not considered a unit should fall under common
areas and facilities. Hence, the parking spaces not being subject to private ownership form part of
the common area over which the condominium unit owners hold undivided interest.
SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM PROTECTIVE BUYER’S DECREE
1. According to P.D. No. 1344, 23 the National Housing Authority (now the HLURB) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a. Unsound real estate business practices;
b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
Jurisdiction of Dela Cruz v. Court buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
the HLURB of Appeals c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
2. P.D. No. 957 provides that a subdivision owner "shall refer to the registered owner of the land
subject of a subdivision or a condominium project." Also, a subdivision developer "shall mean
the person who develops or improves the subdivision project or condominium project for and in
behalf of the owner thereof."
The law clearly defines who is considered a subdivision owner or developer, and the petitioners
are neither. They are merely owners of a number of lots within the subdivision owned and
developed by Pasig Properties, Inc. But even if petitioners were subdivision owners or developers,
this would not bar them from seeking redress from the Courts.
(Note particularly pars. (b) and (c) as worded, where the HLURB's jurisdiction concerns
cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to par. (a), concerning
"unsound real estate practices," it would appear that the logical complainant would be the
buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or
condominium builders and realtors), and not vice versa.)

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LANDTITLES CASES l 1

1. In cases of voluntary registration of documents, an innocent purchaser for value of registered

1. Sec. 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate. —

VIII. REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, PARTITION

3. Possession is a necessary incident of ownership. The adjudication of ownership to private

IX. ASSURANCE FUND

XII. PETITIONS AND ACTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to

2. The Water Code of the Philippines provides:

Hence,presently only three meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent

Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure, alteration, or

SEC. 109. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a

REGISTRATION OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES

THE CONDOMINIUM ACT

SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM PROTECTIVE BUYER’S DECREE

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