The Evolution of Chiefdoms

Author(s): Timothy Earle

Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 84-88
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2743311
Accessed: 13-08-2015 03:47 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 84 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

thecentenary ofhis birth.EditedbyW. Goldschmidt, pp. 4-28. The seminarparticipantsaccepted two importantpo-
San Francisco:HowardChandler. sitions to guide theirconsiderationof the evolution of
KROEBER, A. L. I923. Anthropology. New York:Harcourt, Brace.
. I948. Anthropology. New York: Harcourt,Brace.
chiefdoms:that research must focus on sequences of
LESSER, A. I968. "FranzBoas,"in International encyclopediaof long-termchange documentedarchaeologicallyand his-
thesocial sciences,vol. 2, pp. 99-I IO. I982) and thatchief-
torically(KirchI984, Kristiansen
MAYR, E. I980. "Prologue:Some thoughts on thehistoryofthe doms varyin complexity/scaleof development(simple
evolutionarysynthesis," in The evolutionary synthesis.
Edited vs. complex [SteponaitisI978]), mode of financing(sta-
by E. Mayr and W. Provine,pp. I-48. Cambridge: HarvardUni-
versityPress. ple vs. wealth [D'Altroy and Earle I985]), structure
MAYR, E., AND W. PROVINE. I980. The evolutionary
synthesis. (group-oriented vs. individualizing[RenfrewI974]), and
Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press. specifichistory.With this accord,participantsconcen-
MONTAGU, M. F. A. I944. Ales Hrdlicka,I869-I943. American tratedon understandingthe dynamicsof chiefdomsas
Anthropologist 46: I I 2-I 7.
NORDENSKIOLD, E. I928. Thehistory ofbiology.New York: political institutions.This requiredoutliningthe vari-
Tudor. ous strategiesby which rulerstriedto extendand main-
PROVINE, W. B. I97I. Theoriginsoftheoretical populationgenet- tainpoliticalcontroland the conditionsthataffected the
ics. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. success of these strategies.The unstable and cyclical
. I986. Sewall Wright and evolutionary biology.Chicago: characterof most chiefdomswas apparentin the cases
Universityof Chicago Press.
RIPLEY, W. Z. I9IO (i899). Theraces ofEurope:A sociological discussed.
study.New York: Appleton. Discussions of power relationships frequentlyre-
SHAPIRO, H. L. I939. Migration and environment. New York: turnedto followers'evaluationofthe cost ofcompliance
OxfordUniversityPress. with a leader's demands relative to the cost of refusal
S P E N C E R, F. I 98 I. The riseofacademicphysicalanthropology in
the United States (i880-i980): A historical overview. Ameri- (Haas i982). Constructinga complex polity requires a
can JournalofPhysicalAnthropology 56:35 3-64. leader to bind a followingto himself.Simply,he must
STOCKING, G. I968. Race, culture, and evolution.Chicago: Uni- control people's labor (Feinman and Nicholas I987).
versityof Chicago Press. What keeps them from"votingwith theirfeet"-mov-
TANNER, j. M. I959. "Boas' contributionto knowledge of human
growthand form,"in The anthropology
ing away from the centers of power and extraction?
ofFranzBoas: Essays
on thecentenary ofhis birth.EditedbyW. Goldschmidt, pp. Larger groupsdo not formnaturally;technologicaland
76-I I I. San Francisco: Chandler. social adjustments are necessary to concentrate and
TOPINARD, P. I890. Anthropology. London: Chapman and Hall. coordinateincreasingnumbersofpeople (Johnsoni982).
The traditionalanswerto thisquestionhas been to point
to the management functions that leaders perform.
Much of neo-evolutionarythoughtsince the I950S (see
The Evolution of Chiefdomsl StewardI955, Servicei962) has emphasizedthe func-
tion of leaders in maintainingtheirgroups.To under-
standthe evolutionof chiefdomsis thus simplyto iden-
TIMOTHY EARLE tify the new conditions created by technology or
DepartmentofAnthropology,Universityof California, populationgrowththat requirecentralmanagementfor
Los Angeles, Calif. 90024, U.S.A. 22 v 88 theireffectiveand efficientoperation.
Populationgrowthhas receivedconsiderableattention
The principalgoal of the seminaron chiefdomsheld at since Boserup's(i965) workand servesas a motorin the
the School of AmericanResearch Januaryi8-22, I988, most recent general synthesis of cultural evolution
was to understandthe dynamicsof chiefdoms.A chief- (Johnsonand Earle i987). In the seminar discussions,
dom was ratherloosely definedas a centralizedpolity however, it received little supportas a prime mover.
that organizes a regional population in the thousands Drennan,Feinman,and Steponaitisemphasizedthevery
(Carneiro 198I, Earle I987). Some degree of heritable low populationdensitiesthathave been documentedby
social rankingand economic stratification was consid- intensivesurveysforthe chiefdomsin the Oaxaca Valley
ered characteristic.The focus of discussion was on the ofhighlandMesoamerica,fortheBlack WarriorValley of
origin of these polities, their development,and their Alabama, and forthe Valle de la Plata in Colombia. Pop-
eventual collapse, stasis, or transformation into states. ulation densityappears also to have been low forthe
early chiefdomsof southernEngland (Bradley).Popula-
i. ? I989 by The Wenner-Gren FoundationforAnthropological tion increase was certainlyassociated, however,with
Research.All rightsreservedOOII-3204/89/300i-ooo6$i.oo. This the evolution of political systems in the Marquesas,
papersummarizesthediscussionsand conclusionsofan advanced Greece, and medieval Italy. On the Marquesas, popula-
seminarwhoseparticipants wereas follows:RichardBradley(Ar-
chaeology,Reading),RobertDrennan(Anthropology, Pittsburgh), ton growthand resultingenvironmentaldeterioration
TimothyEarle (Anthropology, UCLA), GaryFeinman(Anthropol- created a susceptibilityto droughtthat bound a local
ogy,Wisconsin-Madison), Yale Ferguson(PoliticalScience,Rut- populationto its leader and his breadfruit stores(Kirch).
gers),Antonio Gilman (Anthropology, CaliforniaState-North- In Greece, population growthaccompanied Mycenean
ridge),JonathanHaas (ex officio,School of AmericanResearch), state formationand, followingthe precipitous "Dark
PatrickKirch(BurkeMuseum,Washington), KristianKristiansen
(CenterforResearchin theHumanities,Copenhagen), Candelario Age" decline, contributedto the emergenceof the polis
Saenz (Anthropology,Texas-Austin),and VincasSteponaitis(An- (Ferguson).
NorthCarolina-ChapelHill).
thropology, Generallyseminarparticipantswere willingto accept

This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Volume30, Numberi, February
I989 | 85

thatdemographicpressurewas a cause of social change, throughconquest and alliances. Warfarehas been recog-
especially where, as in the Marquesan case, resulting nized as a commoncharacteristicofchiefdoms(Carneiro
pressure could be demonstratedto intensifycircum- I98i), with warriorsbeing used to conquer new com-
scription.The largely unspoken consensus, however, munities(and theirtributebase) and to intimidatecom-
favoredCowgill's (I975) argumentagainstpopulationas munitiesreluctantto giveup theirfullshareto the over-
a primemover.As Feinmanand othersemphasized,pop- lord. At the end of the Greek Dark Age, forexample,
ulation growthrates are highlyvariable in prehistory, Sparta expanded through conquest (Ferguson). Inter-
and changingrates must themselvesbe explained. Re- estingly,the potentialforcontrolbased on militaryforce
ferringto the basic Darwinian model of natural selec- seems quite limited and unstable. In the Iron Age of
tion, Gilman remindedthe seminar that as far as the Europe (Bradley,Kristiansen),the ArgaricBronzeAge of
family was concerned, population pressure was con- southeasternSpain (Gilman), and the pre-Columbian
stant,the size of the familyalways pressingagainstits Mantaro Valley in Peru (Earle), warfarewas prevalent
abilityto feed itself.Any suggestionof an ecological or but local chiefdomswere apparentlyunable to expand
economic primemover seemed to meet with discredit- spatially to incorporatesizable regional populations.
ing counterexamples("But among the "). Many of the small Greek poleis remainedpoliticallyin-
Instead,participantsfocused on the political process dependentof the expandingstatesfora long time. Local
responsibleforthe creationand maintenanceofregional groupsseem to have been able to retainpolitical auton-
polities-as Gilman put it, what the bosses do to gain omy by defendingthemselvesin fortified locations vir-
and extend power. Steponaitis offereda listing of ten tually unassailable with the tactics that characterize
political strategies: chiefdoms.
debt); feastingand prestations.
i. Giving (inflicting Strategies7-IO depend primarilyon an ideologythat
2. Improvingthe infrastructure of subsistence pro- legitimizesthe positionofleadersas necessaryformain-
duction. tainingthe "natural" orderof the world.In many cases
3. Encouragingcircumscription. this involves the leaders' securely connecting them-
4. Applyingforce. selves to the past. The English Neolithic and early
5. Forgingexternalties. BronzeAge burialmounds seem to planta community's
6. Expandingthe dependentpopulation. leadershipline on an eminencethatdominatesthe land-
7. Seizing controlofexistingprinciplesoflegitimacy scape (BradleyI984). Equally importantis competition
(supernaturaland natural). forties to a new ideologyfromoutside,oftenassociated
8. Creatingor appropriating new principlesof legiti- with an "internationalstyle,"thatis used to set offthe
macy. rulingelite as a separateorder(cf.FlanneryI968, Helms
9. Seizing controlof internalwealth productionand I979). For example,the warriorelite ofnorthernEurope
distribution. used such symbolsas war chariotsand stools fromthe
io. Seizing controlof externalwealth procurement. distantMediterraneanstates to defineits status (Kris-
How these strategiesare viewed by the populationof tiansen I987). The increasingcontrol of long-distance
courseradicallyaffectstheirsuccess (Drennan).In Strat- wealth exchangeand the use ofexoticwealth to attract/
egies i and 2 leaders attemptto seize the power that controllocal laborappearto be importantfacetsofchief-
comes fromcontroloverthemeans ofproductionand/or dom developmentin highlandMesoamerica (Feinman);
distribution.To the degreethata people's subsistenceis a similarpatternwould appearto existfortheMississip-
controlled,its capacityto rejectcentraldecisionsis lim- pian chiefdoms(Steponaitis).Elites justifiedtheirposi-
ited. Such control may result in a system of staple tions with referenceto externalsources of power inac-
financein which the surplusgeneratedas rentis used to cessible to others.The special wealth objectswere often
supporta nonproducingsector of the population. The associatedwithpowersthatbothsymbolizedand encap-
ownership of the irrigationsystems in southeastern sulated the elites' divinityor at least nonlocal legiti-
Spain (Gilman) is such a circumstance.The develop- macy.
ment of field systemsin the EuropeanIron Age (Earle) The importance of ideology as a source of chiefly
may well representan attemptto control subsistence power has several historicalexamples. State ideologies
productionthroughlandownership.In pastoral chief- derivedfromthe Roman textsheld bythe churchfollow-
doms such as those of the AfricanTwareg (Saenz) and ing the collapse of Rome were used to "civilize" the
the EuropeanNeolithic and BronzeAge societies (Brad- invadingbarbariansand thento legitimizethe emerging
ley, Kristiansen),ownershipof animals offeredanother ruling system of small Italian city-states(Ferguson).
basis for control. Alternatively,chiefs' domination of Again, in the emergence of the polis, the myth of a
long-distanceexchange with external urban markets Golden Age servedas a rulingideology;each polis had
may offercontroloverproductivetechnologyand staple mythsof heroes and patrongods importantin creating
foods (Saenz). Such exchange relationshipswere cer- its political identity.The Saharan nomadic chiefssimi-
tainlyimportantin the Aegean, where an exportecon- larly used the externalIslamic state ideology in their
omy directedat the EasternMediterraneancivilizations political maneuverings(Saenz).
contributedsignificantly to Minoan and Myceneanstate Exoticwealth,withassociated externalideologies,can
formation(Gilman). serve as a status-defining markerand as political cur-
Strategies3-6 may involve the extensionof control rencyformaterializingpolitical relationships.Control

This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
86 1 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
ofthe distributionofforeignobjectscan be used to draw
in a local population and rewardits participation.An
ideology derived from external relations is, however,
vulnerableto changinginternationalconditionsof trade
and exchangeand therefore inherentlyless stable thana
staple-financesystem.The characterof the financesys-
tem may thus give distinctdynamicsto the chiefdomin
terms of scale of integrationand stabilityof control.
Some stabilitymaybe gainedbylinkingexoticobjectsto
local ceremonies,as in theirassociation with ceremo-
nial architecturein the Formativeculturesof highland
Mesoamerica (Feinman)and in theMississippianculture
(Steponaitis).Here, as in the Wessex case (Earle),cere-
monial places mayhave been tied to landownership.It is
probablynot coincidental that the firstceremonialar-
chitectureseems to have been foractivitiescreatingand
reinforcingcommunity bonds rather than stressing
status differences(Drennan).Many earlychiefdomsap-
pear to fitcomfortablywithin Renfrew'smodel of the
group-oriented chiefdom.
Perhaps the most heated discussion in the seminar
focused on the bases of power. Drennan, Feinman,and
Steponaitisheld that in the Mesoamerican and Missis-
sippian chiefdoms no convincing argumentcould be
made forsuch stricteconomic controlas would be seen
in ownershipof land or centralstorage.Rather,popula-
tions seem to have been drawn into sociopolitical sys-
tems in part by "smoke and mirrors"-an ideologyof
religiouslysanctionedcentralitysymbolizedby ceremo-
nial constructionsand exchangesofforeignobjectswith
probable sacred significance.The argumenthere was
thatin simple chiefdomsthe amount of labor and goods
being extractedfroma dependentpopulationwas small
enoughto presenta low cost ofcompliance;the question
ofeconomic coercionbecame moot,as the cost ofrefusal
could be minimal and ideologicallybased. On the other
side, Gilman and I insisted that power, even though
ceremoniallysanctioned,depends on controlover sub-
sistence.At least in some circumstances,as in the Poly-
nesian cases and those fromsoutheasternSpain, control
throughownershipof land, productivetechnology,and
storageis evident.
I argued that the developmentof complex political
systemsreliesnot simplyon access to a sourceofpower
but on the abilityto controlit. Althoughideologyand
militarymight are potent forces(cf. Mann I986), sys-
tems based on them cannot be expectedto become sta-
ble and regionallyorganized;theywill continuallyfrag-
ment in the course of the competition for central
positions that characterizes any hierarchicallystruc-
turedsociety. The maintenanceof power relationships
would seem to involve economic controlover people's
everydaylives. This position was eventuallysomewhat
grudginglyaccepted, but the question remainedwhat,
afterall, constituted"economic control."Kristiansenar-
gued that,priorto true class formation,ideologypene-
tratedsocial life as a cosmology of natural orderand
therefore was a necessaryelementin the controloflabor
and production.Forexample,in Mesoamerica,economic
power seems to have derivedfroma complex systemof
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ceremony,exotic wealth obtained fromlong distances,
craftproduction,and local markets(Drennan,Feinman).
Several felt that the stricteconomic controlsthat Gil-
man and I discussed became importantforunderstand-
ing the originsof chiefdomsonly with more complex
ones in which a virtualclass systemalreadyexisted.
The resolutionof this debate was based on a recogni-
tion by all participantsthat the three componentsof
power (control over the economy, militaryforce,and
ideology)are to some degreealternativesthatcan set up
opposing factions within a chiefdom.The Marquesan
case (Kirch)illustrateshow chiefs,warriors,and inspira-
tional priests,with their differentpower bases, com-
peted with each otherwithoutbeing able to dominate.
Domination would seem to depend on interlockingthe
different strategiesto concentratepower. For example,
in the EuropeanNeolithic and BronzeAges,thebasis for
economic controlwas probablyanimal herds,and the
ideological element involved the use of the animals as
foodforfeasts(Bradley).Ceremonialconstructionsasso-
ciated with both funeraryand cosmic ritualdefinedthe
productiveterritoriescontrolledby chiefs (Earle),who
could retainleadershipby affirming theirroles in main-
tainingthe subsistenceeconomythroughthatritual.Es-
sentiallythemonumentsmaterializeda social and ritual
landscapethatcould be owned bythosemaintainingand
defendingrights to them. Through long-distanceex-
change, elites entered into an internationalstyle and
ideologythat both legitimizedtheirstatus and, in the
case of metals, createda technologyof warriordomina-
tion through force (Kristiansen).Thus the different
sourcesofpowerfittogether.Wheretheydo not,compe-
tition will be resolved in the long run by a test of
strength.In the Wessex case, an apparentoppositionex-
istedbetweentheideologyrepresentedbythe traditional
ceremoniesat the henge monumentsand the military
forceof emergingwarriorelites identifiedwith the bell
beakers;eventuallythe successfulwarriorsappropriated
the earlierceremonialplaces (Bradley).
The success or failureof the various political strate-
gies (and ultimatelyof the chieflyinstitutionsthat em-
ploy them) would appear to be in part determinedby
ecological and social conditions.The nine "environmen-
tal" conditionsmost responsiblefordifferences in tra-
jectories are (i) natural productivityand potential for
intensification, (2) regionalpopulationdensity,(3) exis-
tence of externalmarkets,(4) natural circumscription,
(S) concentrationof productiveresources,(6) proximity
to needed nonfoodresources,(7) proximityto avenues
of trade and communication, (8) social circumscrip-
tion, and (g) structuralpreconditionsof hierarchy.As
Steponaitisemphasizedin offering thislist,these condi-
tions are certainlynot sufficientcauses.
It is convenientto recognizetwo aspectsoftheseenvi-
ronmentalconditionsthat especiallyaffectthe develop-
ment of chiefdoms.Firstare the conditionsthatpermit
the generationand extractionofa surplus.This surplus,
on which the new institutionsof chiefdomsdepend,is
the productofthe productivepotentialofthe land (Con-
dition I), the human laborto make it fruitful (Condition
 Volume30, Numberi, February
I989 | 87

2), and externalmarkets(Condition3) thatofferalterna- portunitiesforcontroland finance,and these differences

tive sources of energy.Second are the conditionsthat createdifferent trajectoriesfordevelopment.The poten-
limit a people's options and thus permita surplusto be tial forintense irrigation,as in Hawaii or southeastern
channeledtowarda center.Circumscription, as Cameiro Spain, permitsstronglocal controlover staple resource
(I970) has describedit, essentiallylimits the opportuni- production,but in the absence of movable wealth the
ties available to a human population.Environmentsdif- systemtends to remain limited in scale. The develop-
fer in degree of circumscription(Condition 4), as of ment of a wealth-financesystemlinked with an exotic
course is evident in the contrastbetween the isolated ideologyand/ormilitarysuperioritycan overcomethis
islands of the Pacificand the broad continentalareas of localism,but it makes the systemdependenton external
Europe or Mesoamerica. To some extent this circum- relationsthat can disruptlocal patternsof domination.
scriptionis locally a productof the concentrationand Althoughwe are only beginningto understandthe de-
thusease ofcontrolofthemost productivelands (Condi- velopmentaldynamicsof stateless societies,the poten-
tion 5), necessarynonfoodresources(Condition6), and tial forunderstandingsocial process fromthis perspec-
tradingopportunities(Condition7). Beyondtheseare the tive is exciting.
externalpolitical environment(Condition 8), including In studyingthe dynamics of chiefdoms,researchers
antagonisticgroupswhose controlof land in effectso- have focused almost exclusively on the polity. An
cially circumscribesthe group. understandingof theiroperationshould considermulti-
Internal sociopolitical structure(Condition 9) may ple levels of analysis-the household, the community,
also exclude much of the populationfrompolitical ac- the polity,and the region(Johnsonand Earle I987). The
tion, as in the case of the Polynesian chiefdoms.The household and the communitymust be understoodas
inherentand acceptedbasis forsocial stratification con- semiautonomous units that may compete with each
tinued to structureand constrainpolitical behaviorin otherand with the polity.The chiefdommust therefore
Europe well afterthe fall of the Roman empire (Fergu- be viewed as a fragile,negotiatedinstitutionheld to-
son). gether by economic interdependence,ideology, and
The discussionsmade clear thatenvironmentalcondi- force.Centersofpowerin a regionshift,and integration
tions are not somethingsimply presentedto a human increases only to collapse. Sustaining integrationre-
population. Rather,they are both cultural and natural quires the leadershipto maintain the balance between
and are constantlybeing modifiedby human interven- the costs of compliance and ofrefusal.Given constantly
tion (BargatzkyI984). For example,in the Valley of Oa- changinglocal and regional conditions,this will be a
xaca, the earlyconcentrationof social and economic ac- continuingstruggle.Further,chiefdoms,with theirfew
tivities including ceremonies,craftspecialization,and high-statuspositions, are inherentlycompetitive in
the like attractedpopulation to the center and made theirpolitical dynamics.A centralizingtendencyas in-
labor controlpossible (Feinman).Althoughthe concen- dividuals seek to concentratepower and eliminate the
trationof natural productivityis initiallyderivedfrom opportunitiesforrebellionis opposed by a fragmenting
soil, rainfall,vegetativecover,and the like, the resource tendencyas local leadersseek to establishtheirindepen-
base is quickly altered by human intervention-im- dent authority.It is perhapsmore surprisingthat some
proved by irrigation,terracing,and drainage,degraded chiefdoms are able to sustain themselves than that
by overuse and induced erosion. In Hawaii and in others disintegrate,and here economic control would
Europe,the two processestogetherhad the effectofcon- seem of paramountimportance.
centratingproductiveresources in limited zones that As Kristiansenkept remindingthe group,however,
came to be owned by the elites. Some of this interven- chiefdomscan onlybe understoodas broadlyinteracting
tion may have been part of a strategyto increase eco- polities linked into regional interactionspheres (peer
nomic control,as in the Hawaii case (Earle);some is the polityinteraction[RenfrewI982]) and world economic
unforeseen consequence of the effortsof individual systems (core-peripheryrelations [Rowlands, Larsen,
households and communitiesto improvetheirlot, as in and KristiansenI987]). Thus systemevolutionand col-
the Danish case (Kristiansen). lapse must often be interpretedin terms of political
Other examples of changing conditions have to do competition,long-distanceexchange,and international
with circumscription.In a continental area such as ideologiesthatbind elites moreto each otherthanto the
Europe,natural circumscriptionmay originallybe low local groupstheydominate.
but increaseas the landscape is filledin and dividedinto Our discussions were at once excitingand discourag-
owned territories. Fergusonmade the interestingsugges- ing. It was apparentthat much progresshad been made
tion that warfarebetween polities in the Aegean Dark in understandingchiefdomdevelopment,but each at-
Age may have been encouragedat times as a strategyto temptat simple synthesiswas met withcriticism.Dren-
increasesocial circumscription. Thus regionalextension nan, cast in the role of spoiler,was especiallycriticalof
could actuallyweaken a chiefdomby eliminatingan ex- theformulationsoffered. Drawingevidencefromsix pre-
temal threat.Similarly,it was suggestedthatthe fortifi- historic sequences in Mesoamerica, Panama, and Co-
cations of a European hillfortor a medieval city-state lombia, he arguedconvincinglythat the differences be-
could act as much to enclose (circumscribe)a population tweenthemhad not been adequatelyexplained.Some of
as to protectit froman enemy. these differencesappeared early in the respective se-
Differentenvironmentsprobablypresentdifferent op- quences and conditionedlater developments.This led

This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 88 | CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

him to stressdifferencesas opposedto similarities.Prob- amptonConference. EditedbyC. Renfrew, M. Rowlands,andB.

lems in identifyingthe economic basis of social com- Seagrave,pp. 24i-80. New York:AcademicPress.
plexityin thewell-documentedarchaeologicalrecordfor . I987. "FromStoneto Bronze:The evolutionofsocial
complexity in northern Europe,2300-I200 B.C.," in Specializa-
Oaxaca and the Black WarriorValley keptbeingreferred tion,exchange,and complex society.EditedbyE. Brumfiel and
to, and Kristiansenpointed to the need to identifythe T. Earle,pp. 30-5 I. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
structuralprinciplesgeneratingthe apparentlycontrast- MANN, MICHAEL. I986. Thesourcesofsocialpower:A history
ing archaeologicalsequences. ofpowerfromthebeginning toA.D. 1760. Cambridge:Cam-
bridgeUniversity
The synthesisthat emergedfromthe seminardiscus- RENFREW, Press.
COLIN. I974. "Beyonda subsistence economy:The
sions is ultimatelymore powerfulbecause it recognizes evolutionofsocial organization in prehistoricEurope,"in Re-
the extreme complexity and interdependenceof the constructing complexsociety.EditedbyC. B. Moore,pp. 69-95.
sources of power in societyand the forcesof instability BulletinoftheAmericanSchoolofOrientalResearch2o.
and divisionthatconstantlythreatento tearit apart.Of . i982. "Socio-economic changein rankedsociety,"in
Ranking,resources,and exchange.EditedbyC. Renfrew and S.
particularinterestare long-termlocal and regionalpat- Shennan,pp. i-9. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
terns of expansion and collapse. All accepted that to ROWLANDS, MICHAEL, MOGENS LARSEN, AND KRISTIAN KRIS-
understandthe developmentof chiefdomswe must ex- TIANSEN. I987. Centreand periphery in theancientworld.
amine the ways in which finance,control,and ideology Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
ELMAN. i962. Primitive social organization. New
empower an emergingruling class. While the linear SERVICE,
York:RandomHouse.
causality that we once felt comfortablewith has cer- S T E P O N A I T I S, V I N C A S. I 978. "Locationaltheoryand complex
tainly been outgrown,the new synthesisoffersa rich chiefdoms: A Mississippianexample,"in Mississippiansettle-
and varied interpretationof sociopoliticalprocess. mentpatterns.EditedbyB. Smith,pp.4I7-5 3. New York:Aca-
demicPress.
S T E WARD, ofculturechange.Urbana:
JUL IAN. I 9 55. Theory
ReferencesCited ofIllinoisPress.
University
BAR GATZ KY, THOMAS. I984. Culture,
environment, and theills
ofadaptationism.
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 25:399-4I5.
ESTER. I966. The conditionsofagricultural
growth.
The Epi-PalaeolithicSouthern
BOSERUP,
Chicago:Aldine.
Thesocial foundations
ofprehistoric
Levantand the Originsof
BRADLEY, RICHARD. I984.
Britain.London:Harlow.
I970. A theoryoftheoriginofthestate.
Cultivation'
CARNEIRO, ROBERT.
ScienceI69:733-38.
. I98I. "The chiefdom as precursorofthestate,"in The
transition to statehoodin theNew World.EditedbyG. Jones
and R. Krautz,pp. 37-79. Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press. ROMANA UNGER-HAMILTON
COWGILL, GEORGE. I975. On causesand consequences ofan- InstituteofArchaeology,UniversityCollege London,
cientandmodempopulationchanges.AmericanAnthropolo- 31-34 GordonSquare, London WCi oPY, England.
gist77:505-25. 22 IV 88
D ALTROY, TERENCE, AND TIMOTHY EARLE. I985. Staple
finance,wealthfinance,and storagein theIncapoliticalecon-
omy.CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 26: I 87-2o6. It has for some time been generallyaccepted that the
E A RL E, TIMT H Y. I 987. Chiefdoms in archaeological originsof Old Worldcereal agricultureare to be sought
andeth-
nohistorical perspective. AnnualReviewsin Anthropology somewhere in the Fertile Crescent (Gill and Vear
I6: 279-308.
FEINMAN, GARY, AND LINDA NICHOLAS. I987. "Labor,surplus,
i980:46) sometime towards the end of the Epi-Palaeo-
andproduction: A regionalanalysisofFormative Oaxaca socio- lithic,2 ca. I7,000-8000 B.C. (here and throughout,
see
economicorganization," in Anthropological researchpapers.
EditedbyG. A. Clark.Tempe:ArizonaStateUniversity Press.
FLANNERY, KENT. I968. "The Olmec and theValleyofOaxaca: i. ? I989 by The Wenner-Gren
FoundationforAnthropological
A modelforinterregional interactionin Formative times,"in Research. All rights reserved OOII-3204/89/300I-0005$I.00. I
DumbartonOaks conference on theOlmec.EditedbyE. Ben- thankGordonC. Hillman.D. R. Harris,M. H. Newcomer,F. R.
son,pp. 79-IIO. Washington, D.C.: DumbartonOaks. Hodson,C. Orton,and Kathryn Ataman(Institute ofArchaeology,
HAAS, JONATHAN. i982. The evolutionoftheprehistoric state. London),D. Zohary,0. Bar-Yosef, P. Goldberg,A. Belfer-Cohen,
N.
New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press. Goren,N. Goring-Morris, and Y. Garfinkel(HebrewUniversity,
HELMS, MARY. I979. AncientPanama. Austin:University of Jerusalem), M. Kislev(Bar-IlanUniversity),A. Ronenand E. Nevo
Texas Press. (Haifa University),D. Joel (Ministryof AgricultureResearch
JOHNSON, ALLEN, AND TIMOTHY EARLE. I987. The evolution Centre,Neve Yaar),Z. Naveh and M. Blumler(Technion,Haifa),
ofhumansociety:Fromforager groupto agrarianstate.Stan- F. Valla (CNRS, Jerusalem), G. de G. Sieveking(BritishMuseum),
ford:Stanford University Press. P. Carter(MuseumofAnthropology andArchaeology, Cambridge),
JOHNSON, GREGORY. I982. "Organizational structureandscalar J. Crowfoot-Payne (AshmoleanMuseum), J. Zias (Rockefeller
stress,"in Theoryand explanationin archaeology:The South- Museum),T. Noy and staff(IsraelMuseum),the Harpers(British
amptonConference. EditedbyC. Renfrew, M. Rowlands,andB. School of Archaeology in Jerusalem),and JohnHope Mason. The
Seagrave,pp. 389-42i. New York:AcademicPress. researchwas fundedby the Science and Engineering Research
KIRCH, PATRICK. I984. The evolutionofthePolynesianchief- Council of Great Britainand by travelgrantsfromthe British
doms.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Academyand theBritishSchoolofArchaeology in Jerusalem.
KRISTIANSEN, KRISTIAN. i982. "The formation oftribalsys- 2. The Epi-Palaeolithic
in thesouthern Levantis dividedintoKeba-
tems in later European prehistory:NorthernEurope 4000-500 ran(fromca. I7,000 B.C.) and Natufian(io,ooo-8000 B.C.) techno-
B.C.," in Theoryand explanationin archaeology:TheSouth- complexes.

This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 13 Aug 2015 03:47:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions