***Japan ECS Aff: Compiled 9-30-20****

1AC
 Inherency:
US acknowledges Senkakus fall under Article 5 of Defense Treaty while
maintaining ambiguity on whether they consider them to be under Japan’s
sovereignty.
Panda, 2017 (Ankit, editor-at-large of The Diplomat, "Mattis: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security Treaty,"
https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/mattis-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/, DoA 7/30/2020, DVOG)
On Saturday, U.S. President Donald Trump’s defense secretary, James Mattis, reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to
defend Japanese territory from attack.
Mattis specifically mentioned that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security  would cover the
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, which Japan administers, but China claims.
In a press conference following consultation between Mattis and his Japanese counterpart Tomomi Inada, Mattis offered the
affirmation: “I made clear that our long-standing policy on the Senkaku Islands stands — the U.S. will continue to recognize
Japanese administration of the islands and as such Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies.”
Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan treaty commits the United States to defend aggression against territories under Japanese
administration.
With his statement on the Senkaku Islands, Mattis became the highest-level U.S. official to affirm that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
treaty covered the islands since former U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2014 visit to Japan.
Obama was the first U.S. president to explicitly mention that the alliance extended to the Senkakus: “The policy of the
United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of
the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s
administration of these islands,” Obama had stated in 2014, in an interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun.
 Plan:
The United States Federal Government should amend the Mutual Defense Treaty
with Japan to explicitly exclude mutual defense of the Senkaku Islands.
 Advantage 1:
The era of US unipolarity is over—COVID accelerated the decline
Cooley, Political Science Professor at Barnard, and Nexon, Government Professor at
Georgetown, August 2020 ("How Hegemony Ends," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
Great-power contestation, the end of the West’s monopoly on patronage, and the emergence of movements that oppose
the liberal international system have all altered the global order over which Washington has presided since the end of the
Cold War. In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be further accelerating the erosion of U.S. hegemony. China
has increased its influence in the World Health Organization and other global institutions in the wake of the Trump
administration’s attempts to defund and scapegoat the public health body. Beijing and Moscow are portraying themselves as
providers of emergency goods and medical supplies, including to European countries such as Italy, Serbia, and Spain, and even to
the United States. Illiberal governments worldwide are using the pandemic as cover for restricting media freedom and cracking
down on political opposition and civil society. Although the United States still enjoys military supremacy, that dimension of
U.S. dominance is especially ill suited to deal with this global crisis and its ripple effects.
Even if the core of the U.S. hegemonic system—which consists mostly of long-standing Asian and European allies and rests on
norms and institutions developed during the Cold War—remains robust, and even if, as many champions of the liberal order suggest
will happen, the United States and the European Union can leverage their combined economic and military might to their advantage,
the fact is that Washington will have to get used to an increasingly contested and complex international order. There is no
easy fix for this. No amount of military spending can reverse the processes driving the unraveling of U.S. hegemony. Even
if Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, knocks out Trump in the presidential election later this year, or if the Republican
Party repudiates Trumpism, the disintegration will continue. 
The key questions now concern how far the unraveling will spread. Will core allies decouple from the U.S. hegemonic system? How
long, and to what extent, can the United States maintain financial and monetary dominance? The most favorable outcome will
require a clear repudiation of Trumpism in the United States and a commitment to rebuild liberal democratic institutions in the core.
At both the domestic and the international level, such efforts will necessitate alliances among center-right, center-left, and
progressive political parties and networks.
What U.S. policymakers can do is plan for the world after global hegemony. If they help preserve the core of the American
system, U.S. officials can ensure that the United States leads the strongest military and economic coalition in a world of
multiple centers of power, rather than finding itself on the losing side of most contests over the shape of the new
international order. To this end, the United States should reinvigorate the beleaguered and understaffed State Department,
rebuilding and more effectively using its diplomatic resources. Smart statecraft will allow a great power to navigate a world defined
by competing interests and shifting alliances. 
The United States lacks both the will and the resources to consistently outbid China and other emerging powers for the
allegiance of governments. It will be impossible to secure the commitment of some countries to U.S. visions of
international order. Many of those governments have come to view the U.S.-led order as a threat to their autonomy, if not
their survival. And some governments that still welcome a U.S.-led liberal order now contend with populist and other
illiberal movements that oppose it.
Even at the peak of the unipolar moment, Washington did not always get its way. Now, for the U.S. political and economic
model to retain considerable appeal, the United States has to first get its own house in order. China will face its own obstacles in
producing an alternative system; Beijing may irk partners and clients with its pressure tactics and its opaque and often corrupt deals.
A reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy apparatus should be able to exercise significant influence on international order even in the
absence of global hegemony. But to succeed, Washington must recognize that the world no longer resembles the historically
anomalous period of the 1990s and the first decade of this century. The unipolar moment has passed, and it isn’t coming
back.

Plan is key to deescalate tensions between US and China

Council on Foreign Relations, August 13, 2020 (“Tensions in the East China Sea”, https://www.cfr.org/global-
conflict-tracker/conflict/tensions-east-china-sea, DoA 8/16/2020, DVOG)
Tensions between China and Japan over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands continue to increase as both countries
improve their military capabilities, particularly their radar and missile systems, in the region. To avoid accidental clashes at
air and sea, China and Japan announced a new crisis communication hotline in June 2018. However, although Japan's Ministry of
Defense reported that the number of times Japan's military had to scramble jets in response to Chinese air incursions went down 41
percent in 2017, that number increased in 2018 and is on trend to continue increasing in 2019 [PDF]. Recently, Japan has built new
military bases on nearby islands, allegedly to monitor the Miyako and Tokara Straits and prevent China from further developing its
military capabilities in the region.  
Background
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were formally claimed by Japan in 1895 and have been privately owned by a series of Japanese
citizens for most of the past 120 years. Aside from a brief period after World War II when the United States controlled the territory,
Japan has exercised effective control over the islands since 1895.
China began to reassert claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the 1970s, citing historic rights to the area. Tensions resurfaced
in September 2012 when Japan purchased three of the disputed islands from a private owner. The economically significant islands,
which are northeast of Taiwan, have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded
by rich fishing areas. 
Each country claims to have economic rights in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two hundred nautical miles from its
coast, but that space overlaps because the sea separating China and Japan only spans three hundred and sixty nautical miles.
After China discovered natural gas near the overlapping EEZ-claimed area in 1995, Japan objected to any drilling in the area due to
the fact that the gas fields could extend into the disputed zone. 
In April 2014, President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to explicitly state that the disputed islands are
covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but the United States does not take a formal position on their ultimate
sovereignty. An accidental military incident or political miscalculation by China or Japan could embroil the United States
in armed hostilities with China.
Discussions between Japan and China to develop a crisis management mechanism tool began in 2012. Talks stalled when tensions
peaked in 2013 after China declared the establishment of an air defense identification zone, airspace over land in which the
identification, location, and control of civil aircraft is performed in the interest of national security. After Japan and China signed
a four-point consensus document laying out their differences concerning the disputed islands, bilateral discussions resumed in early
2015, aiming to implement the maritime and aerial communication mechanism. After nine rounds of high-level consultations,
the mechanism was launched in June 2018. 
Concerns
Rising nationalist sentiments and growing political mistrust heighten the potential for conflict and hinder the capacity for
peaceful resolution of the dispute. Though Chinese and Japanese leaders have refrained from forcibly establishing control
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, unauthorized action by local commanders could result in the unintended escalation of
hostilities. Through treaty commitments with Japan, a military confrontation could involve the United States. To preserve
relations with China and continue cooperation on various issues, the United States has an interest in de-escalating
tensions. 

Those tensions spiral out of control—the US struggles to maintain dominance

while China sees an opportunity and takes it.
Kaplan 19 --- Robert D. Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a senior advisor at the Eurasia
Group, "A New Cold War Has Begun," 1-7-2019, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/
The good news is that all this may not lead to a bloody war. The bad news is that it well might. I believe the chances of a
violent exchange are still nowhere near the 50 percent baseline, where warfare becomes probable rather than merely
possible. Nevertheless,
the chances have increased significantly . This has to do with more than
merely the famous Thucydidean paradigm of fear, honor, and interest. It has to do with just how
emotional the Chinese can get over an issue like Taiwan, for example, and how easy it is for air and naval
incidents (and accidents) to spiral out of control . The more the countries fight over trade, and the closer Chinese
and American warships get to each other in the South China Sea, over time the less control the two sides will actually have over
events. Aswe all know, many wars have begun even though neither side saw it in its interest to
start one. And a hot conflict in the South or East China Sea will affect the world financial system
much more than the collapse of Iraq, Syria, Libya, or Yemen. What kept the Cold War from going hot was the
fear of hydrogen bombs. That applies much less to this new cold war . The use of nuclear
weapons and the era of testing them in the atmosphere keeps receding from memory, making policymakers
on both sides less terrified of such weapons than their predecessors were in the 1950s and 1960s,
especially since nuclear arsenals have become smaller in terms of both size and yield, as well as
increasingly tactical . Moreover, in this new era of precision-guided weaponry and potentially
massive cyberattacks , the scope of nonnuclear warfare has widened considerably . Great-
power war is now thinkable in a way that it wasn’t during the first Cold War. What we
really have to fear is not a rising China but a declining one. A China whose economy is slowing, on the heels of the creation of a
sizable middle class with a whole new category of needs and demands, is a China that may experience more social and political
tensions in the following decade. A theme of the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s 1968 book, Political Order in
Changing Societies, is that as states develop large middle classes, the greater the possibility is for
political unrest . This will encourage China’s leadership to stoke nationalism even further as a
means of social cohesion . While skeptics, particularly in the world business community, see the South and East China
seas as constituting just a bunch of rocks jutting out into the water, the Chinese masses don’t see it that way. To them,
almost like Taiwan, the South China Sea is sacred territory . And the only fact that prevents China from becoming
even more aggressive in the East China Sea is the fear that Japan could defeat it in an open conflict—something that would so
humiliate Beijing’s leadership that it could call into question the stability of the Communist Party itself. So China will wait a number of
years until it surpasses Japan in naval and air power. Beijing’s rulers know how closely their strategy dovetails
with the feelings of the Chinese masses. Indeed, this new cold war is more susceptible to irrational passions fueled by
economic disruptions than the old Cold War. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union each
had internal economies-of-scale (however different from each other), that were far better protected from the destabilizing forces of
globalization than the American and Chinese economies are now. It is precisely the fusion of military, trade, economic, and
ideological tensions, combined with the destabilization wrought by the digital age—with its collapse of physical distance—that has
created an unvirtuous cycle for relations between the United States and China. The geopolitical challenge of the first half of
the 21st century is
stark: how to prevent the U.S.-China cold war from going hot. Preventing a hot war
means intensified diplomacy not only from the State Department but also from the Pentagon —
American generals talking and visiting with Chinese generals in order to create a network of relationships that are the equivalent of
the old Cold War hotline. This diplomacy must avoid the temptation of reducing the American-Chinese relationship to one
contentious theme, be it trade or the South China Sea. It can mean playing hard on trade but always keeping the public rhetoric cool
and reasoned. Passion becomes the real enemy in this competition, because in the megaphone world of global social media,
passion stirs the impulse to assert status, which has often been a principal source of wars. And it means most of all

stealing a concept from the American diplomat George Kennan’s playbook on containment : Be
vigilant , but be always willing to compromise on individual issues and in crises. Wait them out . Because, in a
very different way than the old Soviet system, the
Chinese system—the more authoritarian it gets—is over
time more prone to crack up than America’s.

Escalation results in nuclear war.

Graham T. Allison 17 . Professor and director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. “How America and China
Could Stumble to War.” The National Interest. 4/12/2017. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-stumble-war-
20150?page=0%2C6
In the years ahead, could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the S outh C hina S ea, a drive toward national
independence in Taiwan or jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live spark a war between
China and the U nited S tates that neither wants? It may seem hard to imagine—the consequences would be so obviously
disproportionate to any gains either side could hope to achieve. Even a non-nuclear war conducted mostly at sea and in the air
could kill thousands of combatants on both sides. Moreover, the economic impact of such a war would be massive . A 2016
RAND study found that, after just one year, American GDP could decline by up to 10 percent and Chinese GDP by as much as 35

percent —setbacks on par with the Great Depression. And if a war did go nuclear , both nations would be utterly
destroyed . Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let that happen. Unwise or undesirable, however, does not
mean impossible. Wars occur even when leaders are determined to avoid them. Events or actions of others narrow their options,
forcing them to make choices that risk war rather than acquiesce to unacceptable alternatives. Athens did not want war with Sparta.
Kaiser Wilhelm did not seek war with Britain. Mao initially opposed Kim Il-sung’s attack on South Korea in 1950 for fear of blowback.
But events often require leaders to choose between bad and worse risks. And once the military machines are in motion,
misunderstandings, miscalculations and entanglements can escalate to a conflict far beyond anyone’s original intent . To better
understand these dangers, Washington and Beijing have developed scenarios, simulations and war games. These often begin with
an unexpected incident or accident. Individuals assigned to play the hand of China or the United States take it from there.
Participants in these exercises are repeatedly surprised to find how often and easily small sparks lead to large wars. Today, there
are at least three plausible paths to war between the world’s two greatest powers. IN WAR scenarios, analysts use basic concepts
made familiar by the U.S. Forest Service. Arsonists cause only a small fraction of fires. Discarded cigarettes, smoldering campfires,
industrial accidents and bolts of lightning are much more common sources. Fortunately, in the forest as well as in relations among
nations, most sparks do not ignite a blaze. Background conditions often determine which sparks become fires. While Smokey the
Bear’s warning that “only you can prevent forest fires” teaches campers and hikers about sparks, the Forest Service posts additional
warnings after long dry spells or periods of extreme heat, occasionally closing high-risk areas. Moreover, it regulates the storage of
flammable chemicals, propane tanks and gas depots, becoming increasingly stringent as conditions worsen. In relations between
China and the United States today, relevant background conditions include geography, culture and history. “History,” Henry
Kissinger observed in his first book, “is the memory of states.” China’s memory is longer than most, with the century of humiliation
forming a core part of the country’s identity. Recent military engagements are also part of each state’s living memory. The Korea n
War and Sino-Soviet border conflict taught Chinese strategists not to back down from more powerful adversaries . Moreover,
both the American and Chinese militaries acknowledge that the United States has lost, or at least failed to win, four of the five major
wars it has entered since World War II. The most pertinent background conditions, however, are Thucydides’s Trap and the
syndromes of rising and ruling powers that China and the U nited S tates display in full. Thucydides’s Trap is the severe structural
stress caused when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly . Over
the past five hundred years, a major rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power sixteen times. In twelve of those, the
result was war . The rising power syndrome highlights the upstart’s enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to
recognition and respect. The ruling power syndrome is essentially the mirror image : the established power exhibiting an enlarged
sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of “decline.” As in sibling rivalries, so too in diplomacy one finds a predictable
progression reflected both at the dinner table and at the international conference table. A growing sense of self-importance (“my
voice counts”) leads to an expectation of recognition and respect (“listen to what I have to say”) and a demand for increased impact
(“I insist”). Understandably, the established power views the rising country’s assertiveness as disrespectful, ungrateful and even
provocative or dangerous. Exaggerated self-importance becomes hubris; unreasonable fear, paranoia. LIKE GASOLINE to a
match , accelerants can turn an accidental collision or third-party provocation into war . One cluster of accelerants is captured by
what Carl von Clausewitz called the “fog of war.” Extending Thucydides’s insight about war as “an affair of chances,” Clausewitz
observed that “war is the realm of uncertainty. Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of
greater or lesser uncertainty.” This profound uncertainty can lead a commander or policymaker to act aggressively when a fuller set
of facts would advise caution, and vice versa. The advent of disruptive weapons that promise “shock and awe” makes the fog and
uncertainty even worse. With attacks on command-and-control systems, enemies can paralyze a nation’s military command. In
Desert Storm, U.S. forces demonstrated version 1.0 of this option. They destroyed Saddam Hussein’s intelligence and cut
communication links to his commanders in the field. Isolated, his forces hunkered down; it was like “shooting fish in a barrel,” U.S.
pilots remarked. Antisatellite weapons are one accelerant that military planners expect to play a big role in any U.S.-China conflict.
Long a subject of science fiction, such weapons are today a fact of life, running the gamut from kinetic ones that physically destroy
their targets to quieter systems that use lasers to jam or “dazzle” satellites, rendering them inoperable. In 2007, China successfully
destroyed a weather satellite, and it regularly tests its antisatellite capabilities in less dramatic fashion. Satellites provide a crucial
link in almost every U.S. military endeavor, from early warning of ballistic-missile launches and providing imagery and weather
forecasts to planning operations. Global positioning satellites put the “precision” in almost all the military’s precision-guided
munitions and allow ships, planes and ground units to know where they are on the battlefield. The United States depends on this
technology more than any of its competitors, making it a perfect target for Chinese military planners. Cyberspace provides even
more opportunities for disruptive technological transformations that could provide a decisive advantage, on the one hand, but might
also risk uncontrolled escalation, on the other. The details of offensive cyberweapons remain heavily classified and are constantly
evolving. But the public has seen glimpses of them in some cases, such as America’s cyberattack against Iran’s nuclear program or
its “left-of-launch” attacks on North Korea’s missile tests. America’s primary cyberspace organizations, the National Security Agency
and U.S. Cyber Command, as well as their Chinese counterparts, can now use cyberweapons to silently shut down military
networks and critical civilian infrastructure like power grids. Moreover, by employing proxies and assembling an international web of
compromised computers, they can disguise the origins of a cyber-operation, slowing the victim’s ability to identify the attacker. Like
antisatellite measures, cyberweapons could create a decisive advantage in battle by disrupting the command-and-control and
targeting information on which modern militaries depend—and without bloodshed. This presents a dangerous paradox: the very
action that attackers believe will tamp down conflict can appear reckless and provocative to the victims. Similarly, cyberattacks that
disrupt communication would intensify the fog of war, creating confusion that multiplies the chances of miscalculation. While both
the U nited S tates and China now have nuc lear arsenals that could survive the other’s first strike and still allow for retaliation,
neither can be sure its cyber arsenals could withstand a serious cyber assault . For example, a large-scale Chinese cyberattack
against the U.S. military’s networks could temporarily cripple Washington’s ability to respond in kind, or even to operate some of its
critical command-and-control and surveillance systems. This creates a dangerous use-it-or-lose-it dynamic in which each side
has an incentive to attack key links in the other’s computer networks before their capabilities are disabled. Compared with the
bluntest instruments of war, especially nuclear bombs, cyberweapons seem to offer the promise of subtlety and precision. But this
promise is illusory. Increased connectivity among systems and devices creates a domino effect. Unable to determine how the
hacking of one system may affect others, attackers would find it difficult to narrowly tailor the effects of their operation and avoid
unintended escalation. In 2016, 180,000 Internet-connected industrial control systems were operating around the world. Along with
the proliferation of the “Internet of Things,” which encompasses some ten billion devices worldwide, the number of enticing targets is
growing rapidly. Another accelerant might involve compromising the confidentiality of sensitive networks. Some are obvious, such as
those that operate nuclear command and control. Each side, however, may perceive other actions quite differently. Take China’s
“Great Firewall,” a collection of hardware and software that enables Beijing to monitor and block vast segments of online content.
Washington could disable a system essential to the Great Firewall, intending it as a modest, private warning. But for Chinese
leaders who regard the ability to control citizens’ access to information as vital, the operation could be misconstrued as the tip of a
spear aimed at regime change. Given these background conditions, potential sparks can be frighteningly mundane. Escalation can
occur rapidly. The following three scenarios show just how easily the United States and China can stumble into a war that each side
hopes to avoid. CURRENTLY, AMERICAN and allied warships and aircraft are operating in greater proximity to their Chinese
counterparts than ever before. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers periodically conduct f reedom- o f- n avigation op eration s near
Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters of the S outh C hina S ea. Suppose that during routine operations an American destroyer passes near Mischief Reef, one of the newly constructed islands where China has built
runways for aircraft and installed air and missile defenses. As the ship nears the contested site, Chinese coast guard vessels harass the destroyer, just as they did during the USS Cowpens incident in 2013. Unlike that encounter, however, the U.S. destroyer is unable to swerve in time. It collides with a Chinese ship and sinks it, killing all on board. The
Chinese government now has three options. The dovish course would be to avoid escalation by allowing the American destroyer to leave the area and to protest its actions through diplomatic channels. At the other end of the spectrum, it could adopt an eye-for-an-eye approach and sink the destroyer using aircraft or missiles stationed on Mischief Reef.
By refusing to be the “chicken,” while also not wanting to escalate, Beijing could opt for what it believes is a middle course. As the U.S. destroyer attempts to leave the area, a PLA Navy cruiser blocks its way, insisting that the destroyer entered Chinese territorial waters and demanding that its crew surrender and face justice for the deaths of the coast-
guard personnel. China believes it is deescalating the situation by allowing for a diplomatic solution, akin to the deal that permitted an American crew to go free after a crash landing near Hainan Island sixteen years ago. The background conditions have changed since that incident. From a U.S. perspective, China’s reckless harassment of the destroyer
caused the collision in the first place. China’s attempt to arrest American sailors in international waters would undermine the principles of the law of the sea. Surrendering would have far-reaching repercussions: if the U.S. military will not stand up to China to defend operations conducted by its own navy, what message does that send to America’s allies,
including Japan and the Philippines? Not willing to undermine its credibility by surrendering, the destroyer could simply sink the Chinese cruiser blocking its path. Alternatively, to avoid further bloodshed and to show a degree of sensitivity to the nationalistic pressures Chinese leaders face at home, the United States could use a show of force to get the
cruiser to back down peacefully. U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, in consultation with leaders in Washington, could order nearby aircraft to fly to the area, send an aircraft carrier stationed in Japan toward the South China Sea, and forward-deploy B-2 bombers to Guam. American officials believe these actions will signal their seriousness without risking
any further escalation. Events look different to Beijing, especially amid the fog of war. As China sees it, the United States has already sunk a Chinese vessel. Now scores of American aircraft are aloft, threatening attacks on the Chinese cruiser, other naval vessels, or military installations on nearby islands. Mindful of public opinion, Chinese leaders are
especially conscious that any further bloodshed inflicted by the United States would force them to retaliate aggressively. But events are running beyond Beijing’s control. As U.S. fighter jets rush to the scene to assist the stranded destroyer, a Chinese antiaircraft battery panics and fires on the oncoming aircraft. The U.S. aircraft take desperate evasive
action, and the destroyer begins firing on Chinese antiaircraft sites on the island. Under attack, the Chinese commander on the island bombards the destroyer with antiship missiles. The missiles hit their intended target, killing hundreds of American sailors and sinking the ship. Those who escape are now stranded in small lifeboats. Chinese leaders are
desperate to avoid a full-scale war with the United States, but also cannot admit that their chain of command broke down. They claim their actions were a proportionate and defensive response because the American destroyer was the aggressor. Officials in Washington are stunned that China has sunk a $3 billion vessel and killed hundreds of American
sailors. Though wary of going to war with China, those in the Situation Room cannot back down: video of the ship’s wreckage and stranded U.S. sailors on cable news and social media has made that impossible. Many in Congress are calling on the administration to authorize war plans based on the doctrine formerly named Air-Sea Battle, which calls
for massive air strikes against missile and radar systems on the Chinese mainland. Realizing that attacks on China’s mainland would trigger war, the president authorizes Pacific Command to instead destroy China’s military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea. The president reasons that this is a proportionate response, since these
islands were directly responsible for the sinking of the destroyer. Furthermore, eliminating these military bases will allow U.S. ships to rescue the sailors stranded nearby. Most important, such an action would target only China’s artificial islands, leaving its mainland untouched. President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials do not make this distinction.
For years they have told the public that China has undisputed sovereignty over these islands. They are an integral part of China proper, and America has just attacked them. (Americans who scoff should recall that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor struck neither the mainland nor even a U.S. state, yet still rallied a nation to war.) Many in China are
demanding that Xi order the PLA to destroy U.S. military bases in Guam, Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. Some want China to attack the United States itself. No one is calling for China to exercise restraint. As millions of its citizens’ social-media postings are reminding the government, after its century of humiliation at the hands of sovereign powers,
the ruling Communist Party has promised: “never again.” Still, President Xi clings to the hope that war can be avoided, an impossibility if China begins attacking U.S. military bases in Guam or Japan, killing soldiers and civilians and triggering retaliatory attacks on the Chinese mainland. Seeking a proportionate response to the U.S. attack on China’s
island bases, Xi instead approves an alternative plan: using lasers, electronic and kinetic weapons to destroy or disable all U.S. military satellites in orbit above the crisis area, and using cyberattacks to cripple American command-and-control systems throughout the Asia-Pacific. The goal is to deescalate: Xi hopes that the United States will be shocked
into backing down. But from the American perspective, these “blinding” attacks are indistinguishable from the first stage of a coordinated attack on the U.S. aircraft carrier and its strike group sailing from Japan—an event for which the PLA has spent decades developing its “carrier-killer” antiship ballistic missiles. The ninety-thousand-ton carrier, a
floating city of 5,500 sailors that the United States describes as sovereign American territory, is simply too big to lose. The president is not willing to take the risk. On the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president reluctantly approves the only plan ready on short notice that has a chance of saving the carrier: a war plan based on Air-Sea Battle.
Using those assets still operational after the Chinese attack, the United States military begins destroying China’s “kill chains,” the various satellite and surveillance systems that allow Beijing to accurately target American carriers with its antiship missiles. It also launches massive cruise missile and stealth bomber attacks on PLA missile sites and air
bases on the Chinese mainland, which could at any moment be used to sink U.S. vessels anywhere within the first island chain. The attacks provoke exactly what they intended to avoid. Its mainland now under attack, and the targeting systems needed to operate China’s antiship weapons about to be lost, China must use them or lose them. Xi
authorizes attacks on all U.S. warships within range, including the carrier group. American aircraft and naval escorts intercept Chinese bombers and fighter jets flying to the carrier, but a swarm of DF-21D ballistic missiles—the so-called carrier killers—prove too much to handle. Enough reach their target to sink the carrier, killing most of the 5,500 sailors
on board—far more than died during Pearl Harbor. The dynamics of playing chicken with cyber and space weapons over the South China Sea has transformed a tiny spark into a roaring fire. IF TAIWAN were an independent nation, it would be among the most successful countries in the world. Its hardworking population of twenty-three million has
developed a market economy twice the size of the Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam. Although many in Taiwan want independence, China views it as a province. Beijing is prepared to do whatever it takes to keep Taipei from asserting its sovereignty. No other country has been prepared to fight China over the matter. Suppose, however, that the Chinese
government were to substantially increase repression at home, including in Hong Kong, where China promised to maintain considerable autonomy and freedom when Britain returned control of the city in 1997. Enraged that the Chinese government is backtracking on its promises, residents of Hong Kong take to the streets to demand that Beijing uphold
its commitment to “One Country, Two Systems.” As the protests drag on for weeks with no resolution in sight, Xi orders the military to do what it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989: crush the protests. The ensuing violence shocks the Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. Pro-independence and anti-Beijing sentiment soars. In this atmosphere,
the Taiwanese president is emboldened to ramp up rhetoric emphasizing her people’s hard-won rights and democracy. Her political allies go further, insisting that what has occurred in Hong Kong proves that Taiwan can never guarantee its citizens’ freedom without becoming a sovereign, independent country. To signal disapproval of Chinese
regression in Hong Kong, the American president pointedly announces his respect for the Taiwanese president’s strong stance and declares that the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act fully commits the United States to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. This is a major break from the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the issue, and
the Taiwanese president interprets it as tacit endorsement of a move toward independence. In an interview with the New York Times , she announces that Taiwan will apply for full membership to the UN (a move that China has long opposed) and rejects the so-called 1992 Consensus, under which both parties had agreed to the One-China concept
while allowing for differing interpretations of what it actually meant. To punish Taiwan’s insubordination and scare it into backing down, China conducts an enhanced version of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis by barraging Taiwanese waters with “tests” of ballistic and cruise missiles, severely interrupting the commercial shipping that constitutes the island’s
lifeline to the world. When Taipei still refuses to withdraw its membership application, China uses other weapons, including mine-laying drones, to further disrupt shipping into and out of Taiwan. As a small island nation, Taiwan imports 70 percent of its food and most of its natural resources, including energy. A sustained blockade would grind its
economy to a halt and cause large-scale food shortages. Despite opposition to Taiwan’s application to join the United Nations, the United States feels obliged to prevent its strangulation. Many pro-Taiwan members of Congress are demanding that the White House send aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s aid, just as Bill Clinton did during the 1995–96 crisis.
But the administration knows that China’s antiship ballistic missiles would now pose a serious threat to any U.S. carriers moving into the area, and the American public has little stomach for another war. Instead, U.S. Pacific Command offers to escort commercial shipping through the affected seas, a gesture of support but not of willingness to fight. The
escort campaign puts U.S. warships at risk of being sunk by the Chinese missile barrage, either deliberately or accidentally—an event that could instantly kill more than one thousand Americans and spark calls for retaliation. In this scenario, a Chinese antiship missile—ostensibly fired as part of ongoing test barrages—sinks the USS John P. Murtha , an
amphibious transport dock ship acting as an escort to civilian shipping. All of the nearly eight hundred sailors and marines aboard are killed—more than the United States lost in the first year of the Iraq War. China insists that the sinking was accidental; the Murtha merely got in the way of a missile fired at a random patch of ocean. It reminds Washington
that America accidently bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999. But in Washington, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs urge the president not to be deceived by this explanation. Instead they urge him to authorize the Air-Sea Battle plan to strike PLA antiship missile-launch sites on the mainland. Confronted with the
sinking of the Murtha, the president accedes to pressure from military and political advisers, and agrees to preemptively strike antiship and other ballistic-missile systems on the Chinese mainland. Because China’s conventional and nuclear missiles are kept in the same locations, and their command-and-control systems are intertwined, Beijing
mistakenly believes the United States is trying to eliminate its nuclear arsenal in a surprise first strike. In a desperate attempt to “deescalate by escalating”—an Orwellian doctrine that is nevertheless a pillar of Russian military strategy—China fires one of its land-based, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles into an empty tract of ocean south of Okinawa. The
nuclear threshold has been crossed. And while no lives have been lost in the strike, it is but a short step from here to all-out nuclear war. THE SPARK to a Sino-American clash need not initially involve American or Chinese military forces. Instead, it might result from a confrontation with or between third-party allies. Such a scenario nearly became
reality in 2010, when North Korea sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors. China supported North Korea’s denial of involvement. Seoul, meanwhile, insisted that Pyongyang be held accountable. Ultimately, the two Koreas and their allies stepped back from the brink. But with a new set of background conditions and
accelerants today, it is not clear that it would be so easy to avoid war, especially if the third parties involved were less inured to the sort of slow, grinding tensions that the Korean Peninsula has endured for decades. Besides South Korea, the other major U.S. ally in China’s immediate vicinity is Japan, a country with a post–World War II history of
pacifism, but whose politics have become increasingly militaristic in recent years. Conservative Japanese politicians have spoken ever more stridently about revising the pacifist constitution imposed on their country by the United States. They have also been chafing against Chinese claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In a crisis
involving its historical rival Beijing, any steps Tokyo takes would certainly be shaped by these memories, and by the Japanese government’s shifting attitude toward military force. A likely flashpoint is the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), located near valuable fishing grounds, trade routes and potential oil reserves in the East
China Sea. The United States controlled the islands after World War II, before returning them to Japan in the early 1970s. That same decade, China began claiming sovereignty over the islands. Chinese ships regularly pass through these waters, raising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo and risking a collision that could set off a chain reaction.
Consider a scenario that provided the story line for a recent war game designed by the RAND Corporation. A group of Japanese ultranationalists set sail for the Senkakus in small civilian watercraft. On social media, they explain that they are headed for Kuba Jima, one of the smaller islands, which they intend to claim and occupy on behalf of Japan.
They land and begin building unidentified structures. Taking a page out of the Chinese playbook, they live stream their activities for the world to see. China reacts swiftly, its coast guard arriving within hours with officers who arrest the Japanese dissidents and take them back to the Chinese mainland for trial. Does Japan allow them to face justice in a
Chinese court? It could. Instead, rather than lose face, Japan dispatches some of its own coast-guard vessels to intercept the ship carrying the ultranationalists and prevent them from being taken to China. A pileup ensues as both the PLA Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deploy warships and fighter planes to the area. Neither side
backs down. To make matters worse, some of the Japanese vessels land amphibious troops to occupy Kuba Jima, doubling down on the nationalists’ actions. A skirmish has become a military confrontation. In an urgent call, the Japanese prime minister reminds the U.S. president that Tokyo expects Washington to uphold the seven-decade-old mutual
defense treaty, noting that senior officials have repeatedly confirmed that America’s commitment applies to the Senkakus. As the standoff enters its third day, the president and his National Security Council must decide: Does the United States wholeheartedly respond to Japan’s appeal, putting air power over the disputed island to protect the Japanese
troops now on the ground there? Or is there a more restrained course that will satisfy the Japanese without antagonizing China and further escalating the tense naval standoff? The president opts for the latter, directing the Japan-based carrier strike group to patrol outside the range of the PLA’s land-based carrier-killer missiles, but keeping aircraft and
submarines close enough to aid Japanese vessels and territory if things get ugly. They do. The next morning, a Chinese destroyer collides with a Japanese fishing boat in the crowded waters off the Senkakus, and soon fighter jets from both sides are provocatively buzzing their opponent’s warships. The standoff erupts into a brief, bloody naval battle as
a Japanese captain, fearing for his ship’s safety, downs one of the low-flying Chinese fighters, and the PLA Navy warships, in return, sink his vessel. Both sides are at the edge of war at this point, and so is the United States, which is in a position to sink Chinese vessels with its hidden attack submarines or to send its carrier’s air wing into action. At this
juncture, however, before the next decision has been made, something unexpected happens. All communications between Japanese forces on and around the Senkakus and their headquarters go dark. A cyberattack has severely disrupted one of the Japanese military’s command-and-control systems. The United States and Japan immediately blame
China. The attacker has even left the telltale signs of the PLA’s offensive hacking unit. There is little hesitation in Washington or at U.S. Pacific Command about what to do next. To prevent the Japanese naval force from being annihilated while it is incommunicado, U.S. submarines sink three PLA Navy warships off the Senkakus with torpedoes. China,
Japan and the United States have now fired their opening shots in a three-nation war. But what if it was not the PLA that launched the cyberattack after all? What if it was a carefully timed false-flag operation by Russia, seeking to draw the United States and China into a conflict in order to distract Washington from its wrestling match with Moscow over
Ukraine? By the time intelligence agencies around the world learn the truth, it will be too late. The Kremlin has played its hand brilliantly. From the Senkakus, the war zone spreads as China attacks more Japanese vessels elsewhere in the East China Sea. Tokyo is desperate for the United States to commit its carrier strike group to the fight. If
Washington makes that call, the same point of no return may well be crossed as in the collision-at-sea scenario: the destruction of one of the crown jewels of the U.S. Navy and the loss of life of all aboard could be the tragedy that the U.S. administration is forced to avenge with widening attacks on Chinese forces in a full-scale Pacific war.

WAR BETWEEN the U nited S tates and China is not inevitable, but it is certainly possible. Indeed, as these scenarios illustrate,
the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental , otherwise inconsequential

events could trigger a large-scale conflict . That outcome is not preordained: out of the sixteen cases of
Thucydides’s Trap over the last five hundred years, war was averted four times. But avoiding war will require statecraft as subtle
as that of the British in dealing with a rising America a century ago, or the wise men that crafted a Cold War strategy to meet the
Soviet Union’s surge without bombs or bullets. Whether Chinese and American leaders can rise to this challenge is an open
question. What is certain is that the fate of the world rests upon the answer.

The plan solves—excluding the Senkakus from US alliance obligations walks the
tightrope between neo-isolationism and neo-realism; it resists provoking China
while still reassuring Japan.
Glaser, Political Science Professor at George Washington University, 2011 (Charles, Professor
of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War”, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2011,
https://politics.virginia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Glaser-VISC.pdf, DoA 8/16/2020, DVOG)
What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should
enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear
weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were
to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces
that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China
against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast
expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large
enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to
China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force
that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially
threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is
to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security
now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly
strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby
facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its
nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security--and thus help
head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.
BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ALLIES? THE PRECEDING analysis, of course, overlooks a key feature of U.S. foreign policy--the
important security alliances the United States maintains with Japan and South Korea, as well as other U.S. security
commitments in Northeast Asia. Yet although adding U.S. allies yields a more complex picture, it does not undercut the
overall optimism about China's rise. Instead, it raises the question of just how essential regional alliances in the Pacific are
to U.S. security. The United States' alliance commitments have been remarkably stable since the beginning of the Cold
War, but China's rise should lead to renewed debate over their costs and benefits. Arguing along lines similar to those
mentioned above--that the United States can be secure simply by taking advantage of its power, geography, and nuclear arsenal--
so-called neo-isolationists conclude that the United States should end its alliances in Europe and Asia because they are
unnecessary and risky. If the United States can deter attacks against its homeland, they ask, why belong to alliances that promise to
engage the United States in large wars on distant continents? Protecting U.S. allies in Asia might require the United States to
engage in political skirmishes and military competition that will strain its political relations with China. According to neo-
isolationists, in short, China's rise will not jeopardize U.S. security, but maintaining current U.S. alliances could. Advocates of
selective engagement, in contrast--an approach similar to existing U.S. policy--claim that their chosen strategy is also consistent
with the broad outlines of structural realism. Whereas neo-isolationists want the United States to withdraw from forward
positions in order to avoid being sucked into a regional conflict, those favoring selective engagement argue that
preserving U.S. alliance commitments in Europe and Asia is the best way to prevent the eruption of a conflict in the first
place. Examining how existing U.S. alliance commitments are likely to interact with China's rise is thus a crucial issue,
with implications for both regional policy and U.S. grand strategy more generally. If the United States maintains its key
alliance commitments, as is likely, it will need to extend its deterrent to Japan and South Korea while facing significantly larger
and more capable Chinese conventional military forces. In many ways, this challenge will be analogous to the one the United States
faced in extending its deterrent to Western Europe during the Cold War. Both superpowers had robust nuclear retaliatory
capabilities, and the Soviet Union was widely believed to have superior conventional forces that were capable of invading Europe.
 Advantage 2:
Japan and China’s relationship is on the brink—they’re economically
interdependent but the Senkakus are breaking down their political détente
Min-Hua Chiang, November 16, 2019, is research fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of
Singapore. She obtained her PhD in economics from Université Pierre-Mendès-France, now part of Université
Grenoble Alpes, in 2008 (avec la mention: Très honorable avec félicitations du jury). Before joining EAI, she held
research positions at the Institute of International Relations, Chengchi University (2009), Taiwan External Trade
Development Council (2009–2010) and Commerce Development Research Institute (2010–2011) in Taipei.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12140-019-09321-x.pdf

Beyond the US-China reconciliation in the 1970s, the visible economic benefits were another incentive for realizing China-Japan diplomatic
normalization. However, the ever-increasing economic interdependence over the last 40 years has not prevented a
number of political disagreements from repeatedly affecting Sino-Japanese relations. This shows the limited effect of
economic ties on repairing political discrepancy. On the contrary, the political conflict seems to have impacted on the economic relations more
obviously .
Due to the widespread call to boycott Japanese goods after territorial disputes in 2012 ,
the sales of many Japanese-branded products in China, notably cars and electronic goods, were
impacted [48, 55]. The economic effect from long-term political antagonism goes beyond the short-term
market reactions. This explains the slowdown of Japanese investment in and trade with China in recent years. In short, the close
economic connections were based on the strong political commitment to maintain a good relationship . With
the changing geopolitical environment, the bilateral political ties are weakening. The Sino-Japanese economic relations
have been gradually waning as a result. The China-Japanese relations are worth studying as they are the two largest economies in Asia. The
GDP of the two countries combined is 65% of region’s total GDP [25].Footnote1
 As such, the development of Sino-
Japanese relations is critical to the regional economic stability . The amicable relations between China and
Japan would enhance the regional economic cooperation. On the other hand, the impact on the whole
region would be influential if the political tension turned out to be economic chaos. Although both sides have
restrained from furthering tensions so far, the sources of conflict, such as historical issues and territorial
disputes, have remained. In addition, with China’s economic rise and the strengthening military might, East Asia’s political economic
structure that relied on Japan’s advanced industrial inputs and the US for national defense may be changed. Hence, the changing China-
Japan relations not only have profound implications for the region but also for the global power structure. The
study on the development of China-Japan relations provides an important empirical case in advancing international relations theory. the
weakening Sino-Japanese economic ties after 2013 is a reflection of worsening political relations since the mid-
2000s. Despite the improving diplomatic relations in recent years, it is uncertain how the changing geopolitical environment, notably Sino-US
discrepancy, will proceed and affect China-Japan relations in the future. China-Japan economic relations can only be restored
and be prosperous with persistently strong political relations in the long run.

Sino Japan relations key to prevent Asian war.

CSIS, 2018 (lobal Go, 10-25-2018, "A Friend of a Friend: How Better China-Japan Relations Benefit the United States," No
Publication, https://www.csis.org/friend-friend-how-better-china-japan-relations-benefit-united-states, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
On October 25, 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a state visit to Beijing, a significant moment between the two
countries—he is the first Japanese prime minister to visit China in seven years. A historically contentious relationship
wrought by multiple wars, invasions, and periods of conflict escalation, China and Japan have struggled to forge mutual
understanding for generations. Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012 further complicated the
China-Japan dynamic and hindered the development of productive bilateral relations between the two countries in recent
years. Yet, this recent visit, alongside an ongoing series of bilateral meetings and a 2018 trip made by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
to Tokyo, marks an improvement in this crucial relationship. Not only did Prime Minister Abe’s visit mark an official thaw in Tokyo-
Beijing relations, but it could also serve as an important regional stabilizer, counteracting the U.S.-China trade disputes.

As the current U.S. administration has embarked on a crusade to renegotiate trade relations with all major trading partners, many
China watchers in the United States have feared that President Trump is unintentionally pushing traditional allies like
Japan closer to strategic competitors like China, which would undermine U.S. interests. However, this view exaggerates
the harm and downplays the benefits of the recent China-Japan rapprochement. The United States should not forget its
role as the security guarantor of Japan, and thus, Washington should be confident that Tokyo would never sacrifice its
security protection solely for economic development. Instead of seeing this change as counterproductive, the United States
should view improved China-Japan relations as beneficial to U.S. interests, specifically in three distinct ways: greater accountability
in global infrastructure development, improved strategic communications between the United States and China, and progress
towards regional stability.

Most directly, the China-Japan rapprochement benefits regional infrastructure and development, an area in which the
United States has shown increasing interests. The China-Japan thaw would lead to tangible progress in filling the $1
trillion gap in infrastructure spending each year in Asia. During a cooperative forum co-hosted by China and Japan in Beijing in
October 2018, the two sides signed 52 cooperative agreements worth $18 billion. Multiple projects in Thailand could be the first to
follow the cooperation initiative, as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the China Development Bank signed a
financing agreement targeting countries, like Thailand, whose bilateral relations with both Japan and China are friendly. Japanese
media have also reported collaborative projects in countries ranging from the United Arab Emirates to Kazakhstan. Through
cooperation, both countries will achieve better coordination and allocate resources more effectively in Asia, where $1.5
trillion of U.S. foreign trade took place in 2017.

Washington worries that Beijing could employ its infrastructure investments as a form of foreign policy leverage, leading to disputes
of the lack of competition in the Belt and Road Initiative projects, China’s trillion-dollar infrastructure development program. This
flagship Chinese foreign policy provides infrastructure investments across the Eurasian landmass and has faced accusations of
misconduct abroad. In contrast, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure—Tokyo’s infrastructure plan—has established a
reputation of high standards in the United States, promoting project transparency and debt sustainability. Bilateral cooperation
between Beijing and Tokyo will ensure that joint infrastructure projects will be held at a higher standard moving forward
and thus be more aligned to Washington’s standards. By fostering collaboration between the respective Japanese and
Chinese institutions, Washington could be reassured that shared standards and practices between the United States and
Japan—including environmental regulations, labor rights, and financial sustainability—will be upheld by Tokyo.

Better Sino-Japanese relations also necessitate deeper and more frequent communication that improves information
exchange between China and Japan. Ultimately, the flow of information and improved communication between the United States
and China could occur through Japan, as Japan and the United States continue to maintain their close relationship. This is
especially important given the current state of affairs; facing the uncertainty of trade conflicts, timely communication
between the United States and China does not always occur. Prior to a dinner between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping at the
G20 in Buenos Aires, direct high-level negotiations between the two countries on trade issues were paused for months. The most
significant high-level bilateral communication channels between the two nations, the four-pillar U.S.-China Comprehensive
Dialogues, have been canceled outright or languish on the sidelines. Established on the basis that increasing mutual understanding
could resolve major issues, the four dialogues are now in vain and desperately need supplements that could encourage information
exchange. In contrast, between Li’s visit to Tokyo in May 2018 and Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2018, China and Japan
have conducted at least seven high-level official meetings. The indirect communication between the United States and Chi-
na through Japan partially makes up for the lack of direct communication between the world’s two largest economies and
lowers the risk of misunderstanding and miscommunication. As the world economy, and particularly the United States and
China, face downward pressure, neither country could afford a strategic miscalculation that is solely due to inefficient
communication or erroneous information.

Finally, the China-Japan thaw could lower political and security risks in North-east Asia. The delicate balance between
China, Japan, and the Koreas is difficult to maintain. The improving relationship between China and Japan is a signpost
that both nations have decided to temporarily place aside other complex issues, such as territorial disputes. Instead, they
have elected to focus on constructive issues like third-party cooperation in which both countries help promote economic
development in other nations.
This could open more productive conversations between China and Japan regarding other sensitive issues in the region,
such as the denuclearization of North Korea, an issue that requires coordinated efforts between many countries, including
the United States, China, and Japan. China and Japan share a complicated history that neither can ignore, but a forward-
looking mindset could offset the historical grievances and produce a positive outcome. Given the uncertain future of the
Korean peninsula, improvement in Sino-Japanese relations could mitigate more complicated hostility in the region and
serve as an important security stabilizer.
 Inherency EXT:
The US says the Senkakus fall under the Mutual Defense Treaty
Japan Times, July 29, 2020 (7-29-2020, "U.S. forces chief pledges to help Japan with Chinese ships near Senkakus,"
Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/29/national/u-s-forces-chief-pledges-help-japan-chinese-ships-near-
senkakus/, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
The commander of U.S. Forces Japan vowed to help ally Japan deal with incursions by Chinese vessels in the East China
Sea, accusing Beijing of a maritime intimidation campaign against countries in the region.
Lt. Gen. Kevin Schneider told a news briefing Wednesday that pressure could soon mount for Japan and its sole military ally, the
U.S., with the end of a Chinese seasonal fishing ban in the middle of August. That could see the arrival of a contingent of trawlers,
supported by coastguard and People’s Liberation Army naval ships in the waters around the islands, which are located close to
Taiwan.
“The United States is 100 percent, absolutely steadfast in its commitment to help the government of Japan with the
situation in the Senkakus,” Schneider told reporters in a video briefing. He used the Japanese term for the group of disputed
islands that are called Diaoyu in China. “That is 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”
This comes as Australia has joined the U.S. in rejecting China’s expansive maritime claims in the resource-rich South China Sea.
Beijing has engaged in a campaign to build bases and other outposts on shoals, reefs and rock outcroppings as a way of deepening
its claims. China said it’s operating within its rights and accused the U.S. of trying to stir up trouble.
“Beijing through the PLA continues to take aggressive and malign actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea,”
Schneider said. “In the South China Sea, they continue to bully partners, neighbors and others who have legitimate claims to
territories, islands and features.”
In its dispute with Japan, China’s Foreign Ministry has said that having patrol vessels in the waters around the islands was
its legitimate right. “Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands have been China’s inherent territory since ancient times,”
Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin told a briefing in Beijing on Wednesday.
Tensions are already flaring in an area known for rich fishing opportunities, as Chinese government vessels spend
increasingly long periods of time inside what Japan sees as its territorial waters, prompting Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
government to protest. The change in patterns of activity has come as Japan steps up criticism of China over its clampdown on
Hong Kong.
In a white paper published earlier this month, Japan’s Defense Ministry expressed “grave concern” over Beijing’s actions in the East
China Sea.
U.S. support will take the form of “information, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to help the government of
Japan assess the situation,” Schneider told reporters. The U.S. has repeatedly said the islands fall under the 1960 treaty
that obliges it to defend territory administered by Japan.

Obama and Trump administrations both agree the Senkakus fall under the treaty.
Carpenter, senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute, 2020 (Ted Galen, 1-
9-2020, "Washington Needs to Jettison Its Commitment to Defend the Senkakus," Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-needs-jettison-its-commitment-defend-senkakus, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
Yet U.S. leaders insist that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty include the Senkakus . James Mattis, President Donald
Trump’s first secretary of defense, reiterated that position in February 2017, affirming the U.S. commitment to defend all Japanese
territory from attack. Mattis specifically asserted that Article 5 of the defense treaty covers the Senkaku/ Diaoyu
Islands. Trump himself subsequently reaffirmed that commitment in talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Such a bold stance was not always Washington’s official position, though. In fact, it is a rather recent interpretation. Barack Obama
was the first U.S. president to state explicitly that the alliance extended to the Senkakus: “The policy of the United States
is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” Obama stated in a 2014 interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun. “And we oppose
any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands,” he added.
Advantage 1 EXT: War
1AC Extensions (Original)
 Senkakus = US-China War
US-Sino Senkakus tensions trigger war
Carpenter, senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute, 2020 (Ted Galen, 1-
9-2020, "Washington Needs to Jettison Its Commitment to Defend the Senkakus," Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-needs-jettison-its-commitment-defend-senkakus, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
Washington is exposing the United States to an unnecessary security risk by adopting that stance. Beijing’s response to
Mattis’ unequivocal support for Tokyo’s claims was quite firm. “Diaoyu and its affiliated islands have been Chinese
territory since ancient times. These are historical facts that cannot be changed. The so‐called U.S.-Japan security treaty
was a product of the Cold War, and it should not harm China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights,” Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang insisted at a press conference. “We urge the U.S. side to adopt a responsible attitude
and stop making wrong remarks on the issue of the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands,” Lu added.
Washington needs to rescind any implied commitment to defend the Senkakus. The current U.S. position is based on
a strained, revisionist interpretation of the mutual security treaty text that only the last two U.S. administrations adopted.
Worse, it needlessly inserts the United States into an emotional territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing—one in which
it is unclear which party has the better case.
It is one thing to continue a security partnership with Japan to maintain stability in East Asia and balance China’s rising
power and influence. There are at least respectable arguments in favor of such a policy, despite the risk of exacerbating
existing tensions between Washington and Beijing. But inflicting damage on America’s relations with China—and perhaps
risking a war with it—over Japan’s murky claim to uninhabited rocks is a case of foreign policy folly. Such risks are
imprudent, even though there are valuable fishing grounds and possible energy deposits in the waters surrounding the Senkaku/
Diaoyu chain. The Obama administration’s expansion of the U.S. security obligations to Japan was profoundly unwise.
A continuation of the security relationship with Tokyo should be contingent upon the elimination of any U.S. commitment
to back Japan’s claim of the Senkakus.

Increased Chinese aggression coupled with increased Japanese monitoring

causes war
CSIS, July 29, 2020 (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7-29-2020, "Remote Control: Japan's Evolving Senkakus
Strategy," https://amti.csis.org/remote-control-japans-evolving-senkakus-strategy/, DOA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
The East China Sea disputes had settled into an uneasy status quo over the last few years, but tensions persist. Recent
events suggest that the risk of violence is again growing. China’s maritime forces deployed around the contested Senkaku
Islands have become more capable and more determined. In response, Japan is upgrading its ability to project power from
the nearby Ryukyus, or Southwest Islands.
The Japan Coast Guard reported on July 22 that Chinese patrol ships had navigated within the 24-nautical mile contiguous zone
around the Senkakus for 100 straight days, the longest streak since at least 2012, when the Japanese government nationalized
some of the islands. And China Coast Guard ships have pursued Japanese fishing vessels within the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea
around the islands twice in the past three months. That had only happened four other times over the past seven years, according to
the Japan Coast Guard. Though the size and frequency of Chinese patrols are unchanged, their duration and assertiveness
appear to have shifted in recent months.
Japan faces an uphill battle if it tries to maintain control over the waters around the Senkakus with ships alone. It cannot build them
as quickly as China is. Nor can its coast guard vessels compete with the latest Chinese models on size and armaments. Instead
Japan is looking to turn geography to its advantage. In recent years, Tokyo has invested in capabilities in its nearby Southwest
Islands to better monitor and defend the waters around the Senkakus from land. AMTI last examined Japan’s efforts in 2017. At that
time, most of the upgrades focused on better radar, signals intelligence, and patrol capabilities. Missile units were planned but not
yet established. Since then, Japan has made substantial progress on existing plans and launched new initiatives.
One of the primary measures Japan has taken to enhance its island defense capability has been the deployment of anti-
ship and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles throughout the island chain. In addition to a SAM unit deployed to Okinawa, Japan has
recently constructed facilities and activated new units to facilitate missile deployments to three other islands: Amami
Oshima, Miyako, and Ishigaki.
On March 26, 2019, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) activated two new camps on Amami Oshima that it had begun
constructing in 2016. Camp Amami (left, below) houses a 350-troop SAM unit equipped with Type 03 “Chu-SAM” missiles. Camp
Setouchi (right, below) is home to a 210-troop unit equipped with Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles.
The JGSDF also activated a new camp on Miyako in March 2019, deploying 380 troops as the Miyako Area Security Force. In
March 2020, anti-ship missile and SAM units were deployed to the camp, though the missiles themselves have yet to arrive.
Concerns have been raised over plans to store them at an ammunition depot six miles from their launchers.
On the island of Ishigaki, land clearing began in 2019 for a site to host SAM and anti-ship missile units. Construction is ongoing as
of summer 2020, with plans to deploy missile units before 2023. The Senkakus are nearly 200 nautical miles from the Chinese coast
but less than 100 nautical miles from Ishigaki and Miyako. That places them within range of anti-ship cruise missiles on those
islands.
Japan is also looking to upgrade the capabilities of these missile units. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is reportedly testing
an air-launched variant of the Type 12 anti-ship missile designed for P-1 maritime patrol aircraft which would extend the missile’s
range to 160 nautical miles. The Ministry of Defense is also developing a hypersonic anti-ship missile which it plans to deploy by
2026 for the defense of Japan’s “remote islands.”
Tokyo realizes that matching Chinese capabilities around the Senkakus ship for ship is a losing proposition. As the China
Coast Guard grows more confident, it is spending longer periods in the territorial sea around the islands ignoring
Japanese warnings to leave. And it appears to be more willing to assert authority over Japanese fishing vessels. These
trends will increase the likelihood of violence. Given China’s widening numerical advantage at sea, Japan’s best hope to restore
balance is by adding ground-based capabilities to the equation. And it appears committed to doing exactly that.
Senkaku conflict wouldn’t just be a skirmish—war games prove
Peck, defense analyst for Foreign Policy, 2020 (Michael Peck, 8-7-2020, "Slaughter in the East China Sea,"
Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/07/slaughter-in-the-east-china-sea/, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
The year is 2030. Chinese troops seize a Japanese island in the South China Sea. Japan dispatches an amphibious task
force to retake the island. Soon, U.S. warships and aircraft arrive, accompanying a Japanese flotilla. Their orders are to support
Japan while trying to avoid combat with Chinese forces.
That plan soon falls apart. According to a wargame run by the Washington-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS), it is
impossible for the U.S. military to step in without American and Chinese troops firing on each other.
The simulation, titled “A Deadly Game: East China Sea Crisis 2030,” was run on July 20 (you can watch the video here). And it
had an unusual twist: It was crowdsourced through Zoom, with CNAS staff presenting options to the public participants who would
then vote to decide which strategies the Chinese and U.S./Japanese teams would implement.
“The stakes are high,” said Susanna Blume, CNAS’s defense director, to about 400 members of the public who were participating,
mostly from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. “Whoever wins this standoff has the potential to shape the
Asia-Pacific region for the next decade.”
Almost like a Tom Clancy novel, the scenario ran as follows: In 2030, a Chinese flotilla lands 50 soldiers on Uotsuri Jima, an island
in the East China Sea that is part of the Senkakus, an island chain owned by Japan but also claimed by China. Declaring a 50-mile
exclusion zone around the Senkakus, Beijing deploys a ring of surface ships, submarines, warplanes, and drones—backed by
ballistic missiles based on the Chinese mainland.
The Japanese invasion force (or liberation force, depending on your team) consists of amphibious assault ships, surface escorts,
submarines, and special forces and marines, backed by aircraft in Okinawa. Steaming nearby are two U.S. carrier strike groups, as
well as submarines, stealth fighters, and bombers.
The initial rules of engagement are almost suffocating. The American rules are to support Japan—with which the United States has
a defense pact—while avoiding combat with Chinese forces. For Chinese commanders, the orders are to attack any Japanese
forces entering the exclusion zone without hitting American targets.
What ensued over several game turns—each simulating about four hours of real time—was a series of moves and countermoves
fought over a virtual game map, as both sides warily navigated the fine line between deterrence and belligerence. Both the Red
(China) and Blue (United States and Japan) sides staked out their goals: Red would send a forceful message that Blue should back
off, while Blue aimed to compel a Red withdrawal.
But how to balance goals and rules of engagement that are almost contradictory? The first choice for Blue was how to
prepare for a likely mass salvo of Chinese anti-ship missiles when the Japanese fleet enters the exclusion zone: Should U.S. Aegis
air defense ships hug the Japanese fleet to shield it from anti-ship missiles, or should the United States use cyberwarfare
and jamming to disrupt Chinese command and control links? By a 60-40 percent vote, the public opts to disrupt command
links.
China mirrors this cautious approach: Given a choice between a missile strike on the Japanese fleet and using cyberwarfare to
disrupt Japanese command links, 54 percent of the public vote for cyberwarfare. The umpire rules that Blue forces suffer more from
the gambit than their Red counterparts, because the multinational team is more dependent on smoothly functioning
communications.
In an all-too familiar pattern of history, escalation takes on a life of its own. When Japanese destroyers enter the exclusion
zone, Chinese warships begin hostilities by sinking many of them with cruise missiles. Japanese destroyers retaliate by
destroying a Chinese sub, while other subs play hide-and-seek. “The Chinese submarine is trying to find the Japanese submarine,
and the U.S. submarine is trying to find the Chinese submarine,” quipped umpire Ed McGrady.
Rather than closing for a surface battle with the Red fleet, Blue opts for airpower with U.S. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, joining
Japanese F-35s and F-15s, to destroy Chinese aircraft flying near the Senkakus, including Chinese drones relaying targeting data to
land-based “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles.
With their ships and aircraft taking heavy losses, Chinese leaders eventually opt to attack the two U.S. carriers with missiles, badly
damaging one of them. Then on the last turn, China makes a decisive move. Throughout the game, the airfields on Okinawa—an
island that is a part of the Japanese homeland—were packed with American and Japanese aircraft. Beijing could no longer resist
the temptation: Salvoes of missiles devastate the runways, severely damaging Blue airpower.
At that point, the game was called for time.
By end of the game, the situation seemed stalemated: China had sustained heavy losses, but still retained control of
Uotsori Jima. And at any rate, focusing on who won isn’t the main purpose of these Pentagon-esque defense planning games.
For one, there are too many subjective or arbitrary factors in these simulations to simply declare that Nation X using Strategy Y
would win in real life. For example, in the interests of simplicity and playability the CNAS wargame omitted factors such as logistics,
information operations to shape public opinion, and political tensions within the Chinese leadership and the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
Oddly absent were China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers, as well as Japanese pseudo-carriers armed with F-35 fighters. And, of
course, there is the fact that real-life leaders would be acutely aware of the possibility of nuclear involvement.
Instead, the value of these simulations is more about process and insight: How did events flow, why did players make the
decisions they did, and what weaknesses and capabilities were revealed?
In terms of weaponry, “both sides have aces in the hole,” Blue Team leader Chris Dougherty told me. “For China, it’s their
land-based bombers and missiles. For the United States, it’s their subs and bombers.” China enjoys the home field
advantage: It can fire massive salvoes of missiles, and then rearm its bombers and land-based missile launchers from bases
conveniently located on the mainland.
For U.S. aircraft operating from bases as distant as Guam—1,600 miles from the Senkakus—or flying from crowded and vulnerable
Okinawan airbases, when to expend their ordnance was a tricky decision: Once a B-52 or F-35 fired its missiles, it would take hours
to return to base, rearm, and get back to the combat zone. That’s one reason U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper advocates
building additional American bases in the Pacific.
“The United States can pulse striking power from its bombers, but without reliable airbases in the region, which would be under
threat from Chinese aircraft and missiles, timing becomes a big issue,” Dougherty noted. “You saw that in this game—pretty much
every big strike package for Blue was a one-shot deal.”
Further, a key aspect of modern combat is that what can be seen be destroyed, and what remains undetected can survive.
Even the most sophisticated anti-ship missiles can’t locate ships on the immense ocean without targeting data relayed
from satellites, drones, and surveillance aircraft. “This critical path creates an enormous incentive to conduct major counter-
C4ISRK [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] attacks as early as
possible in the conflict, which both teams did here,” Dougherty says. “In past run-throughs of this game, if one team doesn’t pick
‘attack command and information’ in their first move, things usually go quite poorly for them.”
What was most significant about the CNAS East China Sea wargame was how hostilities steadily escalated. China and the
United States entered the conflict intent on not attacking each other: By game’s end, they were destroying each other’s
ships and planes. Both sides started wanting to localize the conflict to a few barren rocks in the ocean. But after a few
turns, China felt compelled to lob missiles at Okinawa.
“We used the Rules of Engagement to control this in the game to some degree,” says Dougherty. “It’s questionable how well that
would hold when push comes to shove.”
This raises troubling questions for whoever occupies the White House next year. The Trump administration has pledged
U.S. support to Japan over the Senkaku Islands dispute, and it’s more than likely a new administration would also opt to
support one of America’s most important allies. Yet as the CNAS wargame illustrates, backing Japan in a Sino-Japanese
conflict risks the dangerous possibility of combat between American and Chinese forces. And once hostilities between the
United States and China begin, they may be difficult to stop.
 China war goes nuclear
East China Sea war goes nuclear.
Michael E. O’Hanlon, 5/2/2019 (Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy Director of Research @ Brookings Institution, “The Senkaku
paradox: Preparing for conflict with the great powers,” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-
paradox-preparing-for-conflict-with-the-great-powers/, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG )
The Obama administration’s “Third Offset” strategy and former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’s 2018 National Defense Strategy made deterrence of
great-power threats the nation’s top military planning priority for the first time since the Cold War ended 30 years ago. But over what issues might
war against Russia or China really erupt? While it is important to take many scenarios seriously, an outright Russian invasion and annexation of a
Baltic state or a Chinese enforcement of its claims to the entire South China Sea or attempted takeover of Taiwan, seem quite unlikely. Beijing and
Moscow probably understand that the United States and allies could never tolerate such brazen acts; war would almost surely follow. However, what
about smaller efforts to nibble away at the existing world order that Beijing and Moscow often find objectionable? What if China decided to land
forces on one of the eight Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea? These remote rocks are claimed by both Japan and China,
uninhabited and effectively worthless except for surrounding fishing waters, but they are covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as President
Obama and Secretary Mattis have both publicly reaffirmed in recent years. Or, what if Russia decided to fabricate a “threat” to native Russian speakers
in a small town in eastern Estonia or Latvia to create a pretext for “little green men” to swoop in (perhaps bloodlessly) to save the day? Scenarios
involving the Philippines or other countries can be imagined, too. Why would Moscow or Beijing consider such actions? China or Russia might like the
idea of sowing their hegemonic oats and getting back at neighbors they have not forgiven for past events. But Moscow’s or Beijing’s real purpose might
be to weaken American alliance systems, and with them the U.S.-led global order, so as to increase its own power and dominance, especially in
regions near its borders. For example, a Russian grab of just one small Baltic town could be expected to throw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) alliance into existential crisis. Some member nations would likely seek nonmilitary solutions to the threat, whereas others might favor a prompt
military response—with the ensuing debate casting into doubt the whole purpose of the alliance. The state of military technology and expected trends
in future innovation compound the problem. Deployment of large U.S.-led military force packages into the lion’s den near China’s coasts or into the
Baltic regions of Europe near Russia is becoming a harder proposition to entertain.T The spread of the type of precision technology that the United
States once effectively monopolized accounts for much of the reason why. The problem is exacerbated by other new or imminent weapons:
miniaturized robotics that function as sensors or even weapons, individually or in swarms; small satellites that could function as clandestine space
mines against larger satellites; homing anti-ship missiles and various types of superfast hypersonic missiles in general; and threats to computer
systems from both traditional human-generated hacking and artificial intelligence (AI)-generated algorithms. No mid-sized U.S. defense buildup can
likely reverse these dynamics. A scenario of the type sketched above would create a huge dilemma for the United States and allies—a situation I call
the “Senkaku Paradox.” Mutual-defense treaty commitments under Article V of both the NATO and U.S.-Japan treaties would appear to commit
Washington to defend or liberate such allied territory. Yet, that could lead to direct war with a nuclear-armed great power over rather
insignificant stakes. A large-scale U.S. and allied response could seem massively disproportionate. But a non-response would be unacceptable and
invite further aggression. Washington needs better, less escalatory, and, thus, more credible options for such limited but serious scenarios. They
should not formally displace existing policy, under which there is a strong implication of prompt U.S.-led military action to liberate any allied territory that
might be attacked or seized by an aggressor. This current policy may have deterrence benefits, as well as reassurance benefits for allies, so it should
not be formally scrapped. But such commitments may not be fully credible. They also may not give U.S. and allied policymakers sufficiently flexible and
smart options in the event of deterrence failure. The right kind of response would have four main elements: Reinforcement of U.S. and allied military
positions near the point of initial Russian or Chinese attack to deter any further aggression. A prompt buildup in the size (and cost) of overall U.S.
military forces so as to make such new deployments sustainable, unless the crisis were resolved quickly. A strategy for economic war that applied a
mix of sanctions tailored to the scale of the initial attack, including: a possible mix of broad-based tariffs; targeted sanctions against the assets and
movements of individuals and companies most involved in the attack; sectoral sanctions against high-tech industries to slow Russia’s or China’s future
economic growth; and possibly financial sanctions as well. If the aggression continued or intensified, consideration of asymmetric military attacks
against Chinese or Russian interests in other theaters such as the Persian Gulf where the United States and allies have enjoyed preeminence and
escalation dominance. Some would view such a strategy, which sought not to fire the first shot against Russia or China as long as possible, as
irresolute or weak. It would not be. It would, however, be patient — concerned less about promptly reversing an initial aggression than at ensuring it
was punished and that it did not metastasize. Adoption of this strategy requires a modest number of near-term actions as well. The U.S. and allies
need to be better prepared for possible economic war, particularly against China.They can do so by taking steps to bolster its national defense
stockpiles of key minerals and metals (many of which today come primarily from China) and ensuring that their dependence on China within global
supply chains for key technologies not exceed a specified percent. Europe also needs to continue to improve its infrastructure for importing liquefied
natural gas as a backup in case energy imports from Russia are interrupted in a future crisis. In military terms, the U.S. also needs to improve and
increase its capabilities in areas such as long-range strike and stealth, hypersonic weapons, missile defense and nonlethal weapons of the type that
might be used to incapacitate oil tankers bound for Chinese shores (for example). In the new age of great-power rivalry, it is time to get more creative,
and more granular, about how we prepare for war—so as to make deterrence more effective and prevent war in the first place. For the kinds of
scenarios considered here, insisting on prompt liberation of the notional small Estonian town or uninhabited Senkaku island after enemy
attack could, in effect, destroy the village to save it. Such a direct counterattack might also greatly increase the danger of escalation, including
to nuclear war.A Russia or China that found itself decisively losing a conventional conflict might choose to create nuclear risks or even utilize
nuclear weapons tactically, in the hope of changing the conflict’s course. But fortunately, we have good options that avoid the Catch-22 of risking either
nuclear war over small stakes on the one hand and appeasement and an ensuing weakening of the global order on the other.
Conflict in Asia risks nuclear war and extinction
Owen B. Toon et al, 2017 (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder, JOURNAL
OF ASIAN STUDIES, May 2017, http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonAsianStudies.pdf, Retrieved 8/17/2018)
OF THE NINE COUNTRIES known to have nuclear weapons, six are located in Asia and another , the United States, borders the
Pacific Ocean. Russia and China were the first Asian nations with nuclear weapons, followed by Israel, India, Pakistan, and North
Korea. Most of the world’s nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals or maintaining them at historic levels, but several of those in
Asia—India, Pakistan, and North Korea— continue to pursue relentless and expensive programs of nuclear weapons development
and production. Hopefully, the nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 between Iran, the European Union, and the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council will be a step toward eliminating nuclear weapons throughout Asia and the rest of
the world. As we will discuss below, any country possessing a nuclear arsenal is on a path leading toward self-assured destruction,
and is a threat to people everywhere on Earth. Nuclear-armed countries are a threat to people everywhere partly because of the
destructive power of single weapons—one weapon is enough to destroy a small city— and partly because of the growing ability of
nations to launch missiles across the globe. Nuclear powers such as India and North Korea, the latter of which is thought currently
to have a very small nuclear capability that is not in the form of useful weapons, are working on the means to deliver weapons
globally. Each has capabilities now to launch weapons from submarines, and both are working on intercontinental ballistic missiles.
India has already launched satellites to the moon and Mars, but these missiles are not thought to be suitable for India’s current
nuclear warheads. However, it is not just the brute force attack, which kills people in the geographically limited target zone, that
threatens people everywhere. Most people have forgotten nuclear winter. Many think that the theory was disproven, or that the end
of the nuclear arms race and the subsequent reduction of Russian and American nuclear arse¬nals eliminated the dangers of global
nuclear war. But they are wrong. Nuclear winter is an assault on the global climate system caused by smoke from fires ignited by
the bombs. As the smoke rapidly spreads globally in the stratosphere, it will reduce temperatures and rainfall and destroy the global
ozone layer, which shields us from harmful ultraviolet radi¬ation from the sun. Recently it has been shown that even the smoke
created by the use of 100 weapons of the size used on Hiroshima in the Second World War, comparable to the arsenals of India or
Pakistan, could cause environmental damage that would extend glob¬ally, threatening the world food supply and creating mass
starvation worldwide (Mills et al. 2014; Özdog˘an, Robock, and Kucharik 2013; Robock and Toon 2012; Xia and Robock 2013; Xia
et al. 2015). The effects of food loss would also be felt in the aggressor nation. Hence, being a nuclear aggressor is suicidal, and
destruction is self-assured. The deaths from these environmental changes would likely be a factor of ten or more larger than the
direct casualties from the explosions—potentially threatening the bulk of the human population—and would not be limited to the
combatants.

US-China tensions rising now – aggressive actions escalate to nuke war

Polina Tikhonova 17, Reporter, MA from Oxford University, citing Bruce G. Blair, the National Bureau of Asian Research, and
Union of Concerned Scientists, 7/27/2017, “If Trump Orders A Nuclear Strike On China, Here’s What Happens”,
https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/07/trump-orders-nuclear-strike-china/
The fact that Trump now has the obedience of the U.S. Pacific Fleet chief in the hypothetical, yet
possible, decision to launch nuclear strikes against Beijing makes the whole let’s-nuke-China
scenario even faster and easier to execute.¶ Less than five minutes. This is the approximate time
that would elapse from President Trump’s decision to launch a nuclear strike against China to
shooting intercontinental ballistic missiles out of their silos, according to Bloomberg estimations.
The publication, citing former Minuteman missile-launch officer Bruce G. Blair, also estimates that it would take
about 15 minutes to fire submarine missiles from their tubes.¶ While the expert predicts that there might be some minor
hiccups in the let’s-nuke-China scenario – like some of the top brass trying to talk Trump out of launching a nuclear strike – it
appears that it would be easier for the President to nuke an enemy than expected now that he has the
public support from the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet. ¶ US vs China Tensions Rising, But Is
Nuclear War Imminent?¶ The mere thought of a nuclear war between the U.S. and China – the world’s two biggest militaries –
sounds intimidating. Amid strained relations between Washington and Beijing, and with Trump recently
giving U.S. Navy more freedom in South China Sea, the territory that China considers vital to its
national and security interests, the possibility of the two nations going to a nuclear war cannot be
ruled out anymore.¶ With Trump pledging to rein in China’s aggressive territorial expansion in the South
China Sea during his presidential campaign, the Trump administration has made quite a few moves that could
be pushing the two nations to the point of no return . In May, Trump ordered the U.S. Navy to
conduct a f reedom- o f- n avigation op eration in the disputed area, which Beijing claims in its
entirety despite the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan also claiming parts of the
disputed region.¶ Earlier this month, the Trump administration sent an even scarier war message
to Beijing to challenge its military buildup on the artificial islands in the South China Sea . A U.S.
destroyer passed through the international flashpoint in the South China Sea, a move that prompted a furious response from
Chinese President Xi Jinping, who warned his American counterpart of “negative factors” in U.S.-China relations. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry lambasted the incident as a “serious political and military provocation.” ¶ US vs China War Would Be ‘Disastrous For
Both’¶ Just last week, Trump approved the Pentagon’s plan to challenge Chinese claims in the South China Sea, where Beijing has
been actively building reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military planes. Breitbart News’s Kristina Wong exclusively
reported that the President approved the plan to check China over its ongoing militarization of and actions in the South China Sea, a
move that will most likely further stain U.S.-China relations. ¶ The
latest heated exchange of hostile gestures
between Beijing and Washington cannot but make experts wonder: what would happen if the U.S.
and China went to war? That would be “disastrous for both sides – politically, economically, and
militarily,” according to VICE citing senior vice president for political and security affairs at the
National Bureau of Asian Research, Abraham Denmark.¶ While the two nations continue working
together to prevent a potential nuclear threat from China’s neighbor – North Korea – it seems like
an even bigger nuclear conflict is brewing between Washington and Beijing .¶ ‘Increased’ Possibility of
Nuclear War¶ In ValueWalk’s recent comparison of the U.S., Chinese and Russian militaries, it was concluded that the outcome of
any war involving the U.S. and China is quite impossible to predict, as there’s no telling what would be the scope and duration of the
military confrontation and if nuclear weapons would be used.¶ It’s also unclear if Russia would join forces with its arguably one of the
biggest allies – China. If it did, China’s chances of winning a war against Washington would considerably soar. After all, there are
plenty of potential flashpoints in the relations between Washington and Beijing, notably Taiwan and the South China Sea. The U.S.
has in its possession about 6,800 nuclear warheads – the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal after Russia – while China has
only 270 nukes, according to recent estimations by the Arms Control Association.¶ According
to a report by the U nion
o f C oncerned S cientists, published last year, the U.S. going to “nuclear war with China is not
inevitable – but the possibility that it could occur has increased .” However, with Washington and Beijing not
being able to find common ground on such a vital issue for China’s national and security interests as the South China Sea, and
with Trump ordering more actions that further strain U.S.-China relations, the risk of nuclear war
between the world’s two biggest militaries could skyrocket .
Size of arsenals guarantees extinction
Wittner 11 – Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany
Lawrence S. Wittner, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011 - 18:37 pg.
http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to
wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing
us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough.
Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South
China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region.
According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this
lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess
large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War
and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would
use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of
national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War,
when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling
persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t
been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should
convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign
secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan
did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At
the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for,
throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching
a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-ularmed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile
defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are
deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons
safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart.
Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has
a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United
States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by
China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying
horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be
reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the
sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, [and] creating worldwide famine, and generating
chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government
is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons
that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its
nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear
war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed
to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve
U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should
be working to encourage these policies.
 Transition war/Thucydides Trap
War is likely – empirical case studies confirm the Thucydides’ trap results in
conflict and Sino-US dynamics fit the conditions.
Fabian ’19 [Christopher; January 2019; B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for a M.S. from the University of North Dakota, approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee and in coordination
with Dr. Michael Dodge, David Kugler, and Brian Urlacher; University of North Dakota Scholarly Commons, “A Neoclassical Realist’s
Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy,” https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/; DoA 8/22/2020]
After examining models of international conflict and incorporating them within a theoretical
framework in order to set the foundation for this thesis methodology, structural dynamics underlying
the Sino-U.S. space policy relationship must be examined. Because context is essential to any niche policy
arena, the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance is the primary structural dynamic affecting Sino-U.S.
space policy. In Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Grahm Allison coins the term
Thucydides’s Trap to describe the friction caused by a state gaining comparative military ,
political, and economic power at the expense of an existing hegemon . He uses Thucydides examination
of this dynamic in History of the Peloponnesian War as the basis of his research and examines 15 additional
case studies in which a rising power has displaced a status quo power.38 By Allison’s own admission the
use of words like destined or predetermined are misleading. However, he reveals that, “…in all cases we
find heads of state confronting strategic dilemmas about rivals under conditions of uncertainty and chronic
stress,”39 and in 12 of 16 cases examined the result has been war between the two states.40 Additional to
the zero-sum hard power relationship strongly acting upon both actors to strengthen the security
dilemma, Allison proposes that psychological factors can modify the relationship and serve to either
dampen or exacerbate Thucydides’s Trap. Generally, a rising power’s recognized status in the
international community lags behind that state’s self-perceived importance whereas the status
quo power faces fear and anxiety in the face of potential decline .41 Management of these perceptions is
essential to avoiding conflict . Allison makes the case that the contemporary Sino-U.S. relationship
meets the conditions for Thucydides’s trap and analogizes it with the pre-WWI dynamic between
Britain and Germany. He argues that the rapid expansion (or reemergence) of China’s economy is
supporting a subsequent increase in military power and political influence in East Asia. This
threatens to upset the status quo of American hegemony in the region.42 Allison examines China’s national
motivations and internal decision making apparatus and proposes that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) mandate is to
return Chinese national prestige and recoup national sovereignty. This is supported primarily by a strong
nationalist sentiment and continued economic reform. 43 The analysis is useful in that it examines the
structural preconditions for conflict , but also conducts a layered neoclassical realist analysis by
identifying accompanying psychological factors and suggesting a way forward to help soften the
structural predilection for conflict. These actor-specific recommendations may be integrated into a
competitive strategy approach to increase its efficacy.
 Heg low
The era of American exceptionalism is over--COVID hastened the great power
transition from the US to China.
Davis, Professor at the University of British Columbia, August 6, 2020 (Wade, Leadership Chair in
Cultures and Ecosystems at Risk at the University of British Columbia, “The Unraveling of America”, Rolling Stone,
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/political-commentary/covid-19-end-of-american-era-wade-davis-1038206/, DoA 8/16/2020,
DVOG)
In a dark season of pestilence, COVID has reduced to tatters the illusion of American exceptionalism. At the height of the
crisis, with more than 2,000 dying each day, Americans found themselves members of a failed state, ruled by a dysfunctional
and incompetent government largely responsible for death rates that added a tragic coda to America’s claim to supremacy
in the world.
For the first time, the international community felt compelled to send disaster relief to Washington. For more than two centuries,
reported the Irish Times, “the United States has stirred a very wide range of feelings in the rest of the world: love and hatred, fear
and hope, envy and contempt, awe and anger. But there is one emotion that has never been directed towards the U.S. until now:
pity.” As American doctors and nurses eagerly awaited emergency airlifts of basic supplies from China, the hinge of history
opened to the Asian century.
No empire long endures, even if few anticipate their demise. Every kingdom is born to die. The 15th century belonged to the
Portuguese, the 16th to Spain, 17th to the Dutch. France dominated the 18th and Britain the 19th. Bled white and left bankrupt by
the Great War, the British maintained a pretense of domination as late as 1935, when the empire reached its greatest
geographical extent. By then, of course, the torch had long passed into the hands of America.
In 1940, with Europe already ablaze, the United States had a smaller army than either Portugal or Bulgaria. Within four years,
18 million men and women would serve in uniform, with millions more working double shifts in mines and factories that
made America, as President Roosevelt promised, the arsenal of democracy.
When the Japanese within six weeks of Pearl Harbor took control of 90 percent of the world’s rubber supply, the U.S. dropped the
speed limit to 35 mph to protect tires, and then, in three years, invented from scratch a synthetic-rubber industry that allowed Allied
armies to roll over the Nazis. At its peak, Henry Ford’s Willow Run Plant produced a B-24 Liberator every two hours, around the
clock. Shipyards in Long Beach and Sausalito spat out Liberty ships at a rate of two a day for four years; the record was a ship built
in four days, 15 hours and 29 minutes. A single American factory, Chrysler’s Detroit Arsenal, built more tanks than the whole of the
Third Reich.
In the wake of the war, with Europe and Japan in ashes, the United States with but 6 percent of the world’s population
accounted for half of the global economy, including the production of 93 percent of all automobiles. Such economic dominance
birthed a vibrant middle class, a trade union movement that allowed a single breadwinner with limited education to own a home and
a car, support a family, and send his kids to good schools. It was not by any means a perfect world but affluence allowed for a
truce between capital and labor, a reciprocity of opportunity in a time of rapid growth and declining income inequality,
marked by high tax rates for the wealthy, who were by no means the only beneficiaries of a golden age of American capitalism.
But freedom and affluence came with a price. The United States, virtually a demilitarized nation on the eve of the Second
World War, never stood down in the wake of victory. To this day, American troops are deployed in 150 countries. Since the
1970s, China has not once gone to war; the U.S. has not spent a day at peace. President Jimmy Carter recently noted that
in its 242-year history, America has enjoyed only 16 years of peace, making it, as he wrote, “the most warlike nation in the
history of the world.” Since 2001, the U.S. has spent over $6 trillion on military operations and war, money that might have
been invested in the infrastructure of home. China, meanwhile, built its nation, pouring more cement every three years
than America did in the entire 20th century.

US hegemonic decline is inevitable and China will rise to replace us.

Cooley, Political Science Professor at Barnard, and Nexon, Government Professor at
Georgetown, August 2020 ("How Hegemony Ends," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution.
Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced
no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its
accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States
and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists
and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.
Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced
the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal
projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek
alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing
transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so
implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but
permanent. 
THE VANISHING UNIPOLAR MOMENT
It may seem strange to talk of permanent decline when the United States spends more on its military than its next seven
rivals combined and maintains an unparalleled network of overseas military bases. Military power played an important role in
creating and maintaining U.S. preeminence in the 1990s and early years of this century; no other country could extend credible
security guarantees across the entire international system. But U.S. military dominance was less a function of defense budgets
—in real terms, U.S. military spending decreased during the 1990s and only ballooned after the September 11 attacks—than of
several other factors: the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a competitor, the growing technological advantage
enjoyed by the U.S. military, and the willingness of most of the world’s second-tier powers to rely on the United States
rather than build up their own military forces. If the emergence of the United States as a unipolar power was mostly contingent on
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then the continuation of that unipolarity through the subsequent decade stemmed from
the fact that Asian and European allies were content to subscribe to U.S. hegemony.
Talk of the unipolar moment obscures crucial features of world politics that formed the basis of U.S. dominance. The breakup of the
Soviet Union finally closed the door on the only project of global ordering that could rival capitalism. Marxism-Leninism (and its
offshoots) mostly disappeared as a source of ideological competition. Its associated transnational infrastructure—its institutions,
practices, and networks, including the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the Soviet Union itself—all
imploded. Without Soviet support, most Moscow-affiliated countries, insurgent groups, and political movements decided it was better
to either throw in the towel or get on the U.S. bandwagon. By the middle of the 1990s, there existed only one dominant framework
for international norms and rules: the liberal international system of alliances and institutions anchored in Washington.
The United States and its allies—referred to in breezy shorthand as “the West”—together enjoyed a de facto patronage
monopoly during the period of unipolarity. With some limited exceptions, they offered the only significant source of
security, economic goods, and political support and legitimacy. Developing countries could no longer exert leverage over
Washington by threatening to turn to Moscow or point to the risk of a communist takeover to shield themselves from having to
make domestic reforms. The sweep of Western power and influence was so untrammeled that many policymakers came to
believe in the permanent triumph of liberalism. Most governments saw no viable alternative. 
With no other source of support, countries were more likely to adhere to the conditions of the Western aid they received. Autocrats
faced severe international criticism and heavy demands from Western-controlled international organizations. Yes, democratic
powers continued to protect certain autocratic states (such as oil-rich Saudi Arabia) from such demands for strategic and economic
reasons. And leading democracies, including the United States, themselves violated international norms concerning human, civil,
and political rights, most dramatically in the form of torture and extraordinary renditions during the so-called war on terror. But even
these hypocritical exceptions reinforced the hegemony of the liberal order, because they sparked widespread condemnation that
reaffirmed liberal principles and because U.S. officials continued to voice commitment to liberal norms.
Meanwhile, an expanding number of transnational networks—often dubbed “international civil society”—propped up the emerging
architecture of the post–Cold War international order. These groups and individuals served as the foot soldiers of U.S. hegemony by
spreading broadly liberal norms and practices. The collapse of centrally planned economies in the postcommunist world invited
waves of Western consultants and contractors to help usher in market reforms—sometimes with disastrous consequences, as in
Russia and Ukraine, where Western-backed shock therapy impoverished tens of millions while creating a class of wealthy oligarchs
who turned former state assets into personal empires. International financial institutions, government regulators, central bankers,
and economists worked to build an elite consensus in favor of free trade and the movement of capital across borders.
Civil society groups also sought to steer postcommunist and developing countries toward Western models of liberal democracy.
Teams of Western experts advised governments on the design of new constitutions, legal reforms, and multiparty systems.
International observers, most of them from Western democracies, monitored elections in far-flung countries. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) advocating the expansion of human rights, gender equality, and environmental protections forged alliances
with sympathetic states and media outlets. The work of transnational activists, scholarly communities, and social movements helped
build an overarching liberal project of economic and political integration. Throughout the 1990s, these forces helped produce an
illusion of an unassailable liberal order resting on durable U.S. global hegemony. That illusion is now in tatters. 
THE GREAT-POWER COMEBACK
Today, other great powers offer rival conceptions of global order, often autocratic ones that appeal to many leaders of
weaker states. The West no longer presides over a monopoly of patronage. New regional organizations and illiberal
transnational networks contest U.S. influence. Long-term shifts in the global economy, particularly the rise of China,
account for many of these developments. These changes have transformed the geopolitical landscape.  
In April 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged “to promote the multipolarization of the
world and the establishment of a new international order.” For years, many Western scholars and policymakers downplayed or
dismissed such challenges as wishful rhetoric. Beijing remained committed to the rules and norms of the U.S.-led order, they
argued, pointing out that China continued to benefit from the current system. Even as Russia grew increasingly assertive in its
condemnation of the United States in the first decade of this century and called for a more multipolar world, observers didn’t think
that Moscow could muster support from any significant allies. Analysts in the West specifically doubted that Beijing and Moscow
could overcome decades of mistrust and rivalry to cooperate against U.S. efforts to maintain and shape the international order.
Such skepticism made sense at the height of U.S. global hegemony in the 1990s and even remained plausible through much of the
following decade. But the 1997 declaration now looks like a blueprint for how Beijing and Moscow have tried to reorder international
politics in the last 20 years. China and Russia now directly contest liberal aspects of the international order from within that
order’s institutions and forums; at the same time, they are building an alternative order through new institutions and
venues in which they wield greater influence and can de-emphasize human rights and civil liberties.
At the United Nations, for example, the two countries routinely consult on votes and initiatives. As permanent members of the UN
Security Council, they have coordinated their opposition to criticize Western interventions and calls for regime change; they have
vetoed Western-sponsored proposals on Syria and efforts to impose sanctions on Venezuela and Yemen. In the UN General
Assembly, between 2006 and 2018, China and Russia voted the same way 86 percent of the time, more frequently than during the
78 percent voting accord the two shared between 1991 and 2005. By contrast, since 2005, China and the United States have
agreed only 21 percent of the time. Beijing and Moscow have also led UN initiatives to promote new norms, most notably in the
arena of cyberspace, that privilege national sovereignty over individual rights, limit the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, and
curtail the power of Western-sponsored human rights resolutions.
China and Russia have also been at the forefront of creating new international institutions and regional forums that
exclude the United States and the West more broadly. Perhaps the most well known of these is the BRICS grouping, which
includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Since 2006, the group has presented itself as a dynamic setting for the
discussion of matters of international order and global leadership, including building alternatives to Western-controlled institutions in
the areas of Internet governance, international payment systems, and development assistance. In 2016, the BRICS countries
created the New Development Bank, which is dedicated to financing infrastructure projects in the developing world. 
China and Russia have each also pushed a plethora of new regional security organizations—including the Conference on
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Quadrilateral
Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism—and economic institutions, including the Chinese-run Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) and the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a security
organization that promotes cooperation among security services and oversees biennial military exercises—was founded in 2001 at
the initiative of both Beijing and Moscow. It added India and Pakistan as full members in 2017. The net result is the emergence of
parallel structures of global governance that are dominated by authoritarian states and that compete with older, more liberal
structures. 
Critics often dismiss the BRICS, the EAEU, and the SCO as “talk shops” in which member states do little to actually resolve
problems or otherwise engage in meaningful cooperation. But most other international institutions are no different. Even when they
prove unable to solve collective problems, regional organizations allow their members to affirm common values and boost the
stature of the powers that convene these forums. They generate denser diplomatic ties among their members, which, in turn, make
it easier for those members to build military and political coalitions. In short, these organizations constitute a critical part of the
infrastructure of international order, an infrastructure that was dominated by Western democracies after the end of the Cold War.
Indeed, this new array of non-Western organizations has brought transnational governance mechanisms into regions such as
Central Asia, which were previously disconnected from many institutions of global governance. Since 2001, most Central Asian
states have joined the SCO, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, the EAEU, the AIIB, and the Chinese
infrastructure investment project known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China and Russia are also now pushing into areas traditionally dominated by the United States and its allies; for example,
China convenes the 17+1 group with states in central and eastern Europe and the China-CELAC (Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States) Forum in Latin America. These groupings provide states in these regions with new arenas for
partnership and support while also challenging the cohesion of traditional Western blocs; just days before the 16+1 group expanded
to include the EU member Greece in April 2020, the European Commission moved to designate China a “systemic rival” amid
concerns that BRI deals in Europe were undercutting EU regulations and standards. 
Beijing and Moscow appear to be successfully managing their alliance of convenience, defying predictions that they would be
unable to tolerate each other’s international projects. This has even been the case in areas in which their divergent interests could
lead to significant tensions. Russia vocally supports China’s BRI, despite its inroads into Central Asia, which Moscow still considers
its backyard. In fact, since 2017, the Kremlin’s rhetoric has shifted from talking about a clearly demarcated Russian “sphere of
influence” in Eurasia to embracing a “Greater Eurasia” in which Chinese-led investment and integration dovetails with Russian
efforts to shut out Western influence. Moscow followed a similar pattern when Beijing first proposed the formation of the AIIB in
2015. The Russian Ministry of Finance initially refused to back the bank, but the Kremlin changed course after seeing which way the
wind was blowing; Russia formally joined the bank at the end of the year.
China has also proved willing to accommodate Russian concerns and sensitivities. China joined the other BRICS
countries in abstaining from condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, even though doing so clearly
contravened China’s long-standing opposition to separatism and violations of territorial integrity. Moreover, the Trump
administration’s trade war with China has given Beijing additional incentives to support Russian efforts to develop
alternatives to the Western-controlled SWIFT international payment system and dollar-denominated trade so as to
undermine the global reach of U.S. sanctions regimes.  

US is declining, China will rise to replace us

Monck, Head of communications at the World Economic Forum, 2018 (Adrian, “The Choice Facing
a Declining United States”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/americas-global-influence-is-
declining/568708/, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
In Nairobi National Park, a succession of concrete piers rises over the heads of rhinos and giraffes, part of a $13.8 billion rail
project that will link Kenya’s capital with the Indian Ocean. It’s a project with the ambition and scale of global leadership, and
the site safety posters are in the language of its engineers and builders: Chinese.
Four hundred miles further north, in one of Kenya’s city-sized refugee camps, there’s another sign of what global
leadership used to look like: sacks of split peas, stamped USAID; a handful of young, quiet Americans working on
idealistic development projects. I saw both this month, but one already looks like a relic of the past. The baton of global
leadership is being passed from the U.S. to China.
In Africa, the evidence is everywhere. China will put nearly $90 billion into the continent this year, the United States
nothing close. China is betting big on economic partnerships and dependencies along its new Silk Road, christened “One
Belt, One Road.” The U.S., meanwhile, spends many of its dollars on expensive wars, to the detriment of soft-power
projects like USAID, or domestic welfare programs like Medicaid.
America’s global influence is certain to decline relatively in the years ahead; it is the inevitable consequence of the return
of the Middle Kingdom. As that happens, the U.S. should be more deliberate about the policy choices it makes. It’s a lesson
I’ve seen my own country—which was once an empire, too—learn the hard way. On the way down from global hegemony, Britain
came around too slowly to investing in domestic welfare. The U.S. should apply those lessons sooner.
ECS Advantage: Entrapment Scenario
 Japan Escalation Now
U.S. backing in the Senkakus emboldens Japan and makes their initiation of a
crisis highly likely.
Narang and Mehta 19 – Narang; Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California,
Santa Barbara. Mehta; Ph.D. in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.
Narang, Neil, and Rupal N. Mehta. “The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client
State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 1 (January 2019): 218–50. doi:10.1177/0022002717729025. **NCC Packet 2020
*figures omitted but at link source
The ongoing dispute in the E ast C hina S ea over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has rekindled
tensions in United States–Japan–China relations. In particular, recent public affirmations of the US security
guarantee to protect Japan in the event of a war with China have raised the specter of conflict in
East Asia . Indeed, journalists in China have increasingly viewed the US alliance with Japan (and the
Philippines) as both threatening to regional stability and its own rise in East Asia. For example, one
recent editorial stated, “...it is increasingly obvious that Washington is taking Beijing as an opponent.”1 Another editorial
went one step further, suggesting that Japan may be using its relationship with the U nited S tates
to aggressively further its own objectives : “Japan is taking advantage of American greed to cause trouble with its
neighbors (i.e., China) in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s peaceful rise will not be constrained by any other country...” In
response to perceptions of Japanese revisionism , Chinese strategists have increasingly called
on the United States to “ publicly limit extended nuclear deterrence ” out of fear that such
commitments may embolden Washington’s allies (Li Bin and He Yun 2012). Similarly, Rapp Hooper (2015)
argues that the United States would be unwise in deepening its commitments to extended nuclear
deterrence, because:...doing so may create a moral hazard problem, encouraging allies to press
their claims with more confidence . Knowing that they have guaranteed backing, Tokyo or Manila
may grow more assertive in disputes with Beijing... This , in turn, could cause crisis escalation or
conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. (p. 139)
The crisis between China and its rivals in East Asia raises important questions about the US
nuclear security guarantees in the region and about the inadvertent consequences of extended
deterrence more generally. Has the US commitment to defend its allies in East Asia actually encouraged its clients to
press their claims where they wouldn’t otherwise in the absence of the US “nuclear umbrella”? More generally, is it possible
that commitments to extended deterrence create a moral hazard problem , whereby client states
protected under a nuclear umbrella are emboldened to become more revisionary —pressing their
demands in anticipation that a patron will intervene, and thereby perversely increasing the risk of
a crisis ? In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing
on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis
have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the
risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero,
assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible .
However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign , or that they pose no risk to
potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its
power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely
to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post
inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather
than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be
observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized
conflict.
We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella slightly increases the risk that a client state protected
under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. However, we find that this overall effect is
driven entirely by one-sided use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that never escalates to the
reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong
evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is positively associated with the likelihood that a crisis will include a
peaceful settlement attempt and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the
results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We begin by examining some of the extant research on alliances and entrapment
or moral hazard. We then develop our theory for why, despite the conventional wisdom that security guarantees increase the
likelihood of war, we should expect that—if a risk of moral hazard exists—the consequences should be observable in the terms of
negotiated settlements or concessions short of war. Next, we introduce the research design and data we use to test our hypotheses.
We then present our results and discuss our main findings. Following the large-n results, we examine an illustrative case of the
hypothesized mechanism in the United States-Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).Finally, we conclude
with a discussion of the policy implications.
Alliances, Entrapment, and the Risk of War
The existing literature on the causes and consequences of military alliances in international
relations makes a compelling case for the general risk of moral hazard in the behavior of states
protected under defensive security commitments . According to the conventional logic, alliances
can increase the combined bargaining power of allied states by augmenting the military
capabilities of each state with that of the other (Morrow 1994, 2000; Lake 2001; Leeds 2000, 2003). Two benefits are thought
to follow: first, assuming sides are unable to settle their disputes, the formation of an alliance shifts the likely outcome of war in favor of the allied
states; second, the prospect that a state will intervene on behalf of an alliance partner may deter a potential challenger from initiating a crisis in the first
place (Huth 1988, 1990; Leeds 2003; Johnson and Leeds 2011)
At the same time that alliances can deter
Along with these benefits, however, comes at least one important consequence.
potential challenges, states protected under the alliance may become emboldened to expand the
scope of their demands or to become intransigent in ongoing negotiations with other states . In this
way, a conventional wisdom holds that alliance commitments can actually increase the risk of war by

emboldening an alliance partner to demand more from other states and run a greater risk of war
in expectation of an ally coming to its aid (Snyder 1984; Jervis 1994; Smith 1995; Leeds 2003; Zagare and Kilgour 2003; Yuen
2009; Benson 2011, 2012; Kim 2011; Benson, Bentley, and Ray 2013; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay 2014). According to Snyder (1984), this
classic moral hazard problem is one reason why states attempt to leave their security
commitments purposely ambiguous to avoid the risk of “entrapment.” 2
Despite the large volume of research on alliances, this logic of moral hazard and entrapment has
yet to be investigated with respect to the specific case of nuclear umbrellas—a type of alliance in which
a state with nuclear weapons makes a commitment to defend a nonnuclear alliance partner in the
event of an attack.3 In particular, researchers have yet to systematically analyze whether nuclear
umbrellas, otherwise known as “ nuclear security assurances ” or “commitments to extended
deterrence” have the unintended side effect of increasing the risk of conflict .4 This is surprising, given
that such assurances have long been a centerpiece of defense policy for major powers like the United States and Soviet Union (Lay
1953). The lack of empirical evidence notwithstanding, the logic of moral hazard has led many scholars to warn against the
potentially perverse side effects of nuclear umbrellas (Knopf 2012). Although nuclear umbrellas vary in important ways
from conventional alliances—possibly including the requirement that a crisis escalate to the use of nonconventional
capabilities (V. Narang 2013) — nuclear
security guarantees are analogous to conventional alliances in
that they require a patron to defend nonnuclear alliance partners in the event of an attack . Thus,
nuclear umbrellas may inadvertently enhance the risk of war by dramatically shifting the likely
outcome of war in favor of a client state, thereby emboldening a client state to expand the scope of
its demands by targeting new states or to become intransigent in ongoing negotiations . In doing so,
client states may expect to entrap their nuclear patrons into undertaking costly actions —often
risking the initiation of militarized conflict —to defend them against aggressors (Snyder 1984, 1997; Christensen and
Snyder 1990; Yuen 2009; Fearon 1997; Crawford 2003, 2005).
This conventional logic—and its application to nuclear umbrellas by security strategists—leads
to the following
hypotheses about the relationship between nuclear umbrellas and crisis initiation and escalation
through moral hazard:
Hypothesis 1: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon state are
more likely than states that lack a nuclear patron to initiate a conventional militarized dispute
(MID).
Hypothesis 2: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon state are
more likely than states that lack a nuclear patron to escalate a conventional militarized dispute
(MID).
Nuclear Umbrellas, Moral Hazard, and Crisis Bargaining In contrast to the conventional expectations above, we argue that it is
unlikely that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will exhibit a greater propensity to engage in violent conflict. This is not
because nuclear weapons have no impact on crises, nor is it because the logic of moral hazard in alliance politics does not apply in
the specific domain of extended nuclear deterrence. Rather, we follow Gartzke and Jo (2009) in positing that the perverse
consequence of moral hazard from nuclear security assurances will be observable in the crisis bargaining and subsequent
distribution of benefits within negotiated settlements, if not the likelihood of violent conflict.
Consider the simplest model of crisis bargaining. Fearon (1995) suggests that coherent rationalist explanations for war will fall into
one of two categories: actors can fail to find a settlement because they have private information with incentives to misrepresent or
because they are unable to credibly commit to the agreement. According to the first explanation, sides have asymmetric information
about their own capabilities and resolve and they often have an incentive to misrepresent their ability on these dimensions to secure
a better settlement. As a result, while the costs of fighting open a range of settlements both sides should prefer to war, sides also
have the incentive to bluff in order to shift the bargaining range in their favor (N. Narang 2015). The second explanation is that sides
may prefer to fight now if their opponent is unlikely to honor a settlement in the future (Fearon 1998; Fortna 2003; Leeds 2000;
Narang 2014; Walter 1997). The bargaining logic of war has important observable implications for the impact of nuclear weapons
and—by extension—nuclear umbrellas on crisis outcomes. Historically, states that have acquired nuclear weapons have generally
been quick to reveal their newfound capability, so the risk of bargaining failure from private information about these capabilities is
relatively remote.5 Furthermore, doubts about the credibility of a nuclear rival’s commitment to a negotiated settlement are unlikely
to be sufficient to motivate a game-ending nuclear war. Together, the conditions under which crisis bargaining occurs between
nuclear states—or asymmetrically between nuclear states and nonnuclear states—highly incentivizes a negotiated settlement. As
Jervis (1976, 96) notes, “no country could win an all-out nuclear war, not only in the sense of coming out of the war better than it
went in, but in the sense of being better off fighting than making the concessions needed to avoid the conflict.”
However, it also follows that, even if nuclear weapons may reduce the danger of war in some
circumstances, they should nonetheless influence shared beliefs about the distribution of power
among states. A state whose power increases through the acquisition of nuclear weapons may be
emboldened to revise the status quo in its favor by threatening war to extract concessions —a
threat that would be credible if the status quo distribution of benefits falls outside of an expanded
and shifted range of mutually acceptable agreements. Thus, while nuclear weapons may have no effect on the observable
incidence of militarized conflict, they should increase the bargaining power of the nuclear capable state ,
which could in turn lead to substantial effects on other policy dimensions.
As Gartzke and Jo (2009, 209) explain, “Diplomatic bargains tend to dampen the observable impact of nuclear weapons... . To the
degree that nuclear weapons influence the concessions proliferators are likely to obtain in lieu of force, proliferation does much less
to account for behavioral conflict.” One clear source of evidence that leaders “err in equilibrium” toward negotiated settlements is
that war is rare (and nuclear war even more rare). Another source of evidence is a state’s level of diplomatic influence, which
Gartzke and Jo show to increase significantly for nuclear-capable states.
This same logic may extend beyond a state’s own nuclear capability to that of a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella.
Recall that the intended purpose of a nuclear security assurance is to reduce the utility of nuclear weapons in coercive bargaining by
deterring potential adversaries from threatening war, including nuclear war, against an ally (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014b).6
However, in joining the military capabilities of a nonnuclear state with the capabilities of a nuclear
state, the alliance increases the combined bargaining power of the allied states relative to a third
party. This may, in turn, embolden a nuclear client to spark a crisis and demand more policy
concessions from other states in expectation of an ally coming to its aid. When potential target
states believe the nuclear umbrella to be credible, they are likely to offer concessions sufficient to
deter the initiation and escalation of a crisis. Thus, we hypothesize that although nuclear umbrellas
may not create a moral hazard problem with respect to observable patterns in militarized conflict, they may nevertheless create a
moral hazard with respect to client states’ willingness and ability to either spark a crisis in order
to actively extract or passively receive, greater policy concessions from potential target states . We
investigate the following observable implications that uniquely follow from our argument.
Hypothesis 3: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclearweapon state are more likely to obtain preferred policies
peacefully compared to nonnuclear-weapon states without protection under a nuclear umbrella.
Gartzke and Jo (2009, 216) explain the straightforward logic behind this hypothesis clearly: the bargaining model of conflicts
suggests that “nuclear nations and competitors will benefit most if they adjust diplomatic bargains in response to evolving strategic
conditions rather than choosing to fight costly and unnecessary battles.” Consistent with this, Hypothesis 3 seeks to determine
whether Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) settlements flow in favor of the nuclear client. Importantly, the hypotheses above all
directly follow from an important ongoing policy debate in outlined above, wherein analysts specifically identify extended nuclear
deterrence as uniquely emboldening (Li Bin and He Yun 2012; Rapp Hooper 2015). However, these hypotheses imply an untreated
comparison group that includes both states that have a purely conventional defensive pact and states that have no military alliances.
Thus, popular claims leave ambiguous whether nuclear guarantees might uniquely cause moral hazard compared to conventional
military guarantees or whether nuclear guarantees only cause moral hazard compared to having no guarantee at all.7 Therefore, it
is instructive to explicitly theorize about the differential risk of moral hazard when client states have access to nuclear capabilities
versus when client states only have access to conventional capabilities through an alliance.
Existing theory remains ambiguous about what differences one should reasonably expect across the two types of alliances with
respect to the risk of moral hazard. On one hand, one might suppose that the nuclear element might amplify the risk of moral hazard
when compared to conventional alliances, since a client state might be even more emboldened to seek expanded objectives. After
all, if alliances facilitate capability aggregation, there is perhaps no greater military capability than nuclear weapons. On the other
hand, the opposite may also be true: nuclear umbrellas run little to no additional risk of moral hazard when compared to
conventional alliances. This is because threats to use nuclear may be inherently incredible (Paul 2009; Tannenwald 2007; V.
Narang 2015; Avey 2015). After all, there is compelling logic to suggest an emerging norm against the use of nuclear weapons
(Tannenwald 2007; Paul 2009) and to suggest that the use of nuclear weapons could undermine regional and global strategic
stability (Lee 2007), including by increasing the potential for a retaliatory strike against the nuclear patron state itself (Avey 2015;
Rapp Hooper 2015; Lanoszka 2014). These factors may combine to explain why nuclear weapons have not been used in combat
since World War II.
Since theory generates no strong priors about the differential effects of nuclear versus conventional alliances on the risk of moral
hazard, we investigate whether there is any significant difference—either positive or negative—between the risk of moral hazard
across client states that have access to nuclear weapons through an alliance versus client states that only have access
conventional capabilities through an alliance. Hypothesis 4: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon
state exhibit a different likelihood of obtaining preferred policies peacefully compared to states that have only a conventional
defensive pact.
Finally, for all hypotheses the logic implies that client states generally believe alliances to be
credible. However, uncertainty over the likelihood of compliance is ubiquitous to all international
agreements , including alliances (Morrow 1994, 2000; Fearon 1994, 1997; N. Narang and LeVeck 2011; LeVeck and N.
Narang 2016). Nevertheless, we make a more modest assumption that a formal alliance commitment—while certainly incomplete—
increases the probability that the patron will honor the commitment sometime in the future by some nonzero and positive amount.
Resolution of this uncertainty is perhaps the primary reason states sign formal alliance commitments at the outset: they seek to
influence the beliefs of their alliance partners and any prospective challengers by publically signaling their intention to intervene in
it is almost certainly the case that the
the event of a war (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995; Fearon 1997). Nonetheless,
impact of a nuclear umbrella and conventional alliance on the risk of moral hazard is partly
mediated by factors that make the agreement more or less credible . Based on a time-series
cross-sectional analysis of all nuclear umbrellas from 1950 to 2001, N. Narang (2017) provides
systematic evidence that there is not only a positive average treatment effect from nuclear
umbrellas on the assurance of client states, but that clients appear to behave in a way that is
increasingly assured as nuclear umbrellas become more institutionalized. The finding is ascribed to the costs
of negotiating and implementing more intricate and costly alliances , which serve as costly
signals of more reliable commitments.8
Research Design and Data
We employ a directed-dyad unit of analysis on a data set that includes all countries in the
international system from 1950 to 2000 to test our hypotheses . Specifically, we begin with data from V.
Narang (2013) to create a data set with an observation for each state as a potential initiator of a crisis
with every other relevant state in the international system.9 Directed dyads make it possible to
differentiate between the behavior of the challenger and the target state, which provides more
information with which to test the causal process implied by the moral hazard logic. Specifically, each
hypothesis links the protection provided under a nuclear security assurance, to the crisis
behavior of a client state as a potential initiator. A directed-dyad structure also allows us to investigate whether
settlements flow from targeted states without protection under a nuclear umbrella to client states protected under a nuclear
umbrella.
Following previous work (Gartzke and Jo 2009; Bell and Miller 2013), we use probit, rare events logit, and ordinal probit to analyze
the effect of our independent variables on the dependent variables, and we use Huber–White standard errors to correct for spatial
dependence. We also cluster on the dyad to address heteroskedastic error variance, in addition to correcting for temporal
dependence using “peace years” and splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).
Independent Variable: Nuclear Umbrellas In both the academic and policy literature, the term “nuclear umbrella” is used to refer to
the protection provided by a nuclear patron state to a nonnuclear client state generally under a formal defense pact (Knopf 2012, 2).
In all previous research, the consensus has been to operationalize a nuclear umbrella by observing whether a state has a defensive
alliance with a nuclear-weapon state (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Verdier 2008; Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009a,
2009b; Horowitz and Narang 2014; V. Narang 2015; Horowitz and N. Narang 2014; N. Narang, Gartzke and Kroenig 2015). This
measure is imperfect in many ways. It is possible that the nuclear-weapon state in the alliance has not made an explicit commitment
to use nuclear weapons. This ambiguity is oftentimes deliberate (Knopf 2012; Rapp Hooper 2015). However, it is important to note
that analysts can only observe the same public declarations of commitment—with all their attendant ambiguities—that leaders
observed when deciding whether to resist a challenge or offer concessions. In this way, public declarations influence the beliefs of
potential challengers similarly to the retrospective coding of analysts.10 To operationalize nuclear umbrellas, we used the Alliance
Treat Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set to identify observations in which states in a dyad received a defensive
commitment from a nuclear-weapon state (Leeds et al. 2002). The variable is coded dichotomously, where an observation coded “1”
has a defensive commitment from a nuclear-weapon state and “0” otherwise. According to this data, 67 of the 152 defensive pacts
active from 1950 to 2001 included an alliance member that was a nuclear-weapon state, protecting sixty-four different client
states.11 Directed dyads allow us to distinguish which states in a dyad are client states protected under a nuclear umbrella and
which states may have lacked this protection as both the challenger and the target. In total, 26,373 observations of 192,018 include
a potential challenger protected under a nuclear umbrella (13.7 percent).
Dependent Variables: Conflict Behavior and Crisis Bargaining Outcomes We use two categories of dependent variables to test the
expectations outlined above. In the first category, we measure conflict behavior in two ways. The first is the initiation of a MID by a
challenger as recorded in the Correlates of War (COW) data (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Ghosn,
Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Specifically, we use data on MID initiation coded “1” if the challenger initiates an MID against its
counterpart in a dyad in a given year and “0” otherwise. The second measure is the level of MID escalation coded ordinally from 0 to
4 for how high in intensity a dispute escalated (Bennett and Stam 2004, 63). In the second category, we use data from the ICOW
project on settlement attempts of contentious issues. The ICOW data codes information on settlement attempts and the distribution
of stakes in a conflict over issues on which nations disagree. We focus on whether any attempt is made to resolve an ICOW in a
given year (attone), whether the attempts are peaceful (attanyp), and which side obtains concessions (resolved).
Control Variables Our analyses also include several covariates that mirror Gartzke and Jo (2009) and Bell and Miller (2013). First, to
control for the security environment, we include a measure for enduring rivalries to identify dyads with security challenges (Bennett
1996; Diehl and Goertz 2000). We include a dyadic rivalry coded “1” if the members of the dyad have a rivalry with each other and
separate monadic rivalry status. Second, we measure military power of each county using the COW Composite Index of National
Capability. Third, we measure whether dyad members share an alliance, since states that share an alliance can be more (Morrow
2000; Kimball 2006) or less (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) dispute prone. Fourth, we control for the level of democracy, constructed by
Gartzke and Jo (2009) using the Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2002) to measure monadic regime type and joint democracy (Doyle
1997; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Finally, because neighboring states fight more (Boulding 1962; Bremer 1992;
Gleditsch 2003), we include an ordinal measure of contiguity based on the six-point COW variable and a continuous metric measure
of geographic distance based on the log-transformed distance between capital cities of countries.
Results
We present the results of our statistical tests in three parts, evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2 on conflict behavior, followed by
Hypothesis 3 on policy concessions, and then ending with Hypothesis 4 comparing nuclear umbrellas against conventional military
alliances. For each hypothesis, we display the main coefficients along with the 95 percent confidence intervals in box plots, and we
relegate the regression tables to the Appendix of the article.
Nuclear Umbrellas and Conflict Initiation and Escalation
Figure 1 shows the estimated relationship between protection under a nuclear umbrella and MID
initiation (Hypothesis 1) as well as MID escalation in ongoing militarized disputes (Hypothesis 2).12 The full regression results
with all covariates are shown in Appendix Table A1. In model 1, which estimates the impact on the likelihood that a state will initiate
an MID of any type, the coefficient estimate on nuclear umbrella A indicates some support for
Hypothesis 1: protection under a nuclear umbrella appears to be positively associated with the
likelihood that a client state will initiate an MID against a target state (substantively, a 2.5 percent increase
in the likelihood of any MID). At first glance, this finding appears to run counter to the logic of the bargaining model and our
expectation that—if a moral hazard exists as a result of a nuclear umbrella—the effect should not be observable with respect to
conflict initiation. However, following recent work by Bell and Miller (2013), which showed that nuclear dyads can be more prone to
low levels of conflict but not higher levels of war, we probed these results to determine at which levels in the MID escalation ladder
that nuclear umbrellas appear to have the strongest influence on the behavior of a client state.
Figure 1. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability client will initiate a militarized interstate
disputes (MID) (by MID type/MID escalation).
Models 2–4 estimate the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the likelihood a client state will initiate an MID against a target state that
escalates to war, the reciprocated use of force, and the one-sided use of force, respectively. Surveying the coefficient estimates on
nuclear umbrella A across the escalation ladder, we find no evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella causes a client state
to initiate an MID that leads to war (model 2) or even the reciprocated use of force (model 3) at a higher rate, compared to states
that lack a nuclear umbrella. However, we find strong evidence for a positive association between a nuclear umbrella and the
likelihood that a client state will initiate an MID through the one-sided use of force that is never reciprocated by the target state
(model 4). This finding is consistent with our initial expectation that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are likely to
expand the scope of their demands by challenging other states (substantively, a 15 percent increase in the likelihood of one-sided
use of force), but that leaders of targets are more likely to settle than reciprocate fighting. This interpretation mirrors that of Bell and
Miller (2013) who find that asymmetric nuclear dyads are more likely to experience low-level conflict that never escalates to war.
They interpret the finding that nuclear capable states are more likely to “initiate disputes against new opponents... ” to be “ ...
consistent with the idea that nuclear weapons lead states to expand their interests in world politics.” (p. 75) It is also consistent with
the bargaining model of war, which—in assuming war is costly and thus generally ex post inefficient—treats by definition any
credible threat or use of force as a rational attempt to alter the distribution of benefits to match a sufficiently changed distribution of
power to satisfy the expanded demands of the challenger (Powell 1999).
The results of model 5 provide additional support for this inference. It estimates the relationship between protection under a nuclear
umbrella and the likelihood that a client state will escalate an MID. This dependent variable has the added advantage of determining
whether a nuclear umbrella is associated with client states becoming more aggressive within ongoing MIDs. We find no evidence of
such an effect, as indicated by the lack of significance on nuclear umbrella A. However, in Appendix Table A2, we
demonstrate a separate finding with respect to escalation that is nevertheless consistent with our theory.
client states protected under a nuclear umbrella
Despite having no effect on the escalation of militarized conflict,
do appear more intransigent within the underlying negotiations of a crisis based on the
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set.13 Specifically, in models 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A2, we show
that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are less likely to end an underlying crisis
sooner by backing down in negotiations when facing a state that lacks protection under a nuclear
umbrella, and that a state is simultaneously more likely to back down within the underlying crisis negotiations sooner against an
opponent that benefits from protection under a nuclear umbrella. Our findings—that protection under a nuclear umbrella does not
increase the likelihood that a client state will initiate a war or two-sided violence, or that a client state will escalate an ongoing
military conflict—are also consistent with those of Fuhrmann and Sescher (2014). They find no evidence of moral hazard with
respect to militarized conflict using a monadic research design of all states from 1950 to 2000 and the COW Formal Alliance data
set. We also find little to no evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella influences the propensity for a client state to initiate
an MID that escalates to higher levels of conflict. Although—
consistent with our theory and results for
Hypothesis 3—our findings in Appendix Table A2 suggest that states do become more
intransigent within the underlying negotiations of a crisis.
The results of the other variables in Appendix Table A1 are also instructive. In contrast to the expectations of extended nuclear
deterrence, we find no evidence that a target state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella has any effect on the likelihood that a
challenger will initiate an MID, as indicated by the coefficient estimate for nuclear umbrella B. This result is similar to findings by
Gartzke and Jo (2009): there appears to be no significant dampening effect on the likelihood of a challenge against nuclear capable
actors.
Nuclear Umbrellas and Moral Hazard through Bargaining Concessions
If nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by the client state, it is reasonable to expect that this risk will be observable in
the results of crisis bargaining, if not the risk of militarized conflict. Figure 2 presents the results investigating the impact of a nuclear
umbrella on the bargaining behavior of client states and their target. The full regression results are shown in Appendix Table A3.
Model 1 evaluates whether protection under a nuclear umbrella is associated with any attempt to settle an ICOW in a given year.
Note that the variable is coded inversely, with “1” indicating no attempt to settle the issue in a given year, and “0” indicating a
settlement attempt was made. If our theory is correct, we expect that when state A targets state B, and state A is protected under a
nuclear umbrella, the coefficient on nuclear umbrella A will be positive (because “1” indicates no settlement attempt made by the
challenger) or insignificant, since the protection provided to state A should make it no more likely to offer a settlement. Consistent
with our expectations, we find that targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are significantly more likely to receive settlement
attempts initiated from challengers (negative coefficient on nuclear umbrella B). At the same time, we find that challengers are no
more likely to initiate settlements attempts when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella themselves compared to states that
lack protection under a nuclear umbrella, and—if anything— they are less likely to extend settlement attempts (positive but
insignificant coefficient on nuclear umbrella A). Figure 3 displays the results of model 2 in Appendix Table A3, which estimates the
relationship between a nuclear umbrella and peaceful settlement attempts. This variable is coded inversely to any settlement
attempt in Figure 2: “1” for peaceful settlement attempt made and “0” if no peaceful settlement attempt. We expect the nuclear
umbrella A to be negative and nuclear umbrella B to be positive. The results are as expected and similar to Figure 2: challengers
are no more likely to pursue peaceful settlements when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella themselves.
Figure 3. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability challenger will make a peaceful settlement attempt, comparing challenger versus
target covered under nuclear umbrella.
compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella, but targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are significantly
more likely to receive peaceful settlements (substantively, a 5 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving a peaceful settlement
offer).
The insignificant coefficients on nuclear umbrella A across models 1–4 in Appendix Table 3 are not inconsistent with our
expectations, since our theory primarily yields implications about whether states protected under a nuclear umbrella are likely to
receive settlement attempts, whereas nuclear umbrella A estimates the tendency for a client state protected under a nuclear
umbrella to initiate a settlement. It is plausible that states protected under a nuclear umbrella may be both more likely to receive
settlement offers and also more likely to initiate settlement offers in an ongoing bargaining exchange. However, our data
only allow us to observe the settlement offers initiated from challengers, which means the only
way we can observe whether states protected under a nuclear umbrella are recipients of
settlement attempts initiated by the other states is to reverse the positions of states as we do
using a directed-dyad structure. This is what we show in our estimation of nuclear client B. Furthermore, if states are
more likely to receive and initiate settlement offers in an ongoing bargaining exchange, it is not clear what the theoretically expected
Nevertheless, the coefficient on nuclear umbrella A
direction of the coefficient on nuclear client A should be.
suggests that—if anything—challengers protected under a nuclear umbrella may be less likely to
make settlement offers to targets.
Finally, in Figure 4, we explore whether nuclear umbrellas make target states easier to influence in
crisis bargaining. The full regression results are shown in Figure 4. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability challenger
renounces issue under dispute, comparing challenger versus target covered under nuclear umbrella. Appendix Table A4. We use
two different portions of the ICOW resolved variable. In model 1 of Appendix Table A4, the dependent variable is coded “1” if the
issue was renounced by the challenger, while in model 2 the dependent variable is coded “1” if the issue was renounced by the
target. The results are consistent with our expectations. Figure 4 shows the results of model 1, where the challenger’s status as a
client state protected under a nuclear umbrella does not appear to be a significant determinant of whether it concedes. The target’s
status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella does appear to be a significant determinant of whether a challenger
concedes.
While not shown in Figure 4, in model 2 in Appendix Table A4, the results for whether the issue was renounced by the target are
also supportive. When it is the target that concedes, the challenger’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella
predicts concessions perfectly and drops out of the regression. This result and the previous one are both in line
with our theoretical expectations: states with nuclear patrons appear systematically more likely
to gain concessions from their opponent compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear
umbrella.
Interestingly, however, we also find that the target’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella is also positively
associated with it conceding. While our theory only makes predictions about the settlement behavior of opponents of state protected
under a nuclear umbrella, this result is nevertheless puzzling. One plausible explanation for this finding follows from the work of
Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014a). While a target covered by a nuclear umbrella may be able to achieve some additional gains, it also
risks violating the patron’s trust and losing its security guarantees altogether. As a result, client states may actually adopt less
aggressive stances toward potential adversaries by pressing more modest/less difficult issues. A second explanation may be that
the observation of a challenge against a state protected under a nuclear umbrella is not random, and could potentially be the
product of sample selection bias based on unobserved differences in the dyadic ratio of conventional capabilities or resolve that
causes targets to renounce the issue despite their nominal protection under a nuclear umbrella. As one illustration, we investigated
the dyadic ratio of conventional capabilities between the challenger and target in cases where the target renounced the issue while
also being protected under a nuclear umbrella. We found that in these cases, the challenger benefits from a conventional capability
ratio that is on average 2.5 greater than that of the target, whereas the median capability ratio in the population is 1.0.
As with our tests of crisis escalation, we also probe the robustness of our findings on bargaining concessions using the ICB data in
models 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A2 (as a test of Hypothesis 3). The results confirm that client states protected under a nuclear
umbrella are more likely to achieve victory (i.e., a state realizing all of its goals) and less likely to experience defeat in a crisis
compared to states that lack a nuclear umbrella, while states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella are simultaneously less
likely to achieve victory and more likely to experience defeat when their opponent is asymmetrically protected under a nuclear
umbrella.
Comparing Nuclear Umbrellas versus Conventional Alliances Do nuclear umbrellas uniquely generate a risk of moral hazard
compared to conventional military alliances? In Appendix Table A3, we reestimate the models with ICOW settlements as the
dependent variable used to make Figures 2 and 3, but this time we include a measure for the number of conventional defensive
military alliances that each potential challenger has based on the ATOP data. In Appendix Table A4, we do the same for the models
with ICOW resolutions as the dependent variable used to make Figure 4. The tests allow us to compare the effects of nuclear
umbrellas with the effect of strictly conventional alliances to see whether the former is more emboldening than the latter.
When we estimate the effect of a conventional defensive alliance on the bargaining behavior of client states and their target while
nuclear umbrella is controlled for, we find no evidence that conventional alliances are more likely to result in concessions for the
client state. If anything, we actually find evidence in support of Beckley (2015): conventional alliances appear to have a constraining
effect for both ICOW settlement variables in models 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A3. Challengers appear slightly more likely to initiate
a settlement to a target as a function of conventional defensive alliances in model 3 and more likely to initiate a peaceful attempt in
model 4. Meanwhile, the effect of a nuclear umbrella remains the opposite and consistent with the expectations of our theory:
challengers are no more likely to extend settlements attempts of some kind when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella, but
targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are much more likely to receive settlement attempts of some kind. Similarly, and also
consistent with Beckley (2015), we find no evidence in model 3 of Appendix Table A4 that either nuclear or conventional alliances
are more likely to result in concessions for the client state. If anything, conventional alliances may have a slight constraining effect
for the ability of client states to gain concessions. In aggregate, since the average effect of conventional alliances is slightly negative
at the same time that the coefficient on nuclear umbrella is generally positive and significant as per our expectations, the combined
result suggests that—if anything—the “nuclear component” of the nuclear umbrella is so emboldening as to generate a positive
effect on client states despite the generally restraining effect of the concurrent conventional commitment, which is otherwise difficult
to control for in our models. It may be useful for future work to theorize about the why we observe different effects across the two
types of alliances.
The Taiwan Strait Crises and the United States–ROC MDT The large-n analyses provide a key piece of
the puzzle about the systematic impact of security assurances on the behavior of the client states .
Yet, they also suggest a need for closer examination within a case due to the potential for selection and endogeneity bias. Thus ,
we provide qualitative evidence of the hypothesized mechanism through the illustrative case of
the United States–Taiwan MDT, in which the United States formally committed to defending the
ROC from an armed attack, specifically by using nuclear weapons.
Before the MDT (i.e., pretreatment), Taiwan was the repeated target of provocations from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
beginning in 1949. These provocations reached a climax with the start of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in August 1954, when Zhou
Enlai, premier of the PRC, issued a declaration that Taiwan must be “liberated.” Soon after, the PRC began shelling ROC
installations on the Kinmen and Matsu Islands, triggering a crisis for the United States and Taiwan. On September 12, 1954, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Eisenhower that the US intervene militarily, including considering the use of nuclear
weapons (Chang 1988). However, in the absence of any formal treaty commitments to the ROC in Taiwan, Eisenhower famously
resisted pressure to deploy American troops to the conflict or to use nuclear weapons (Gordon 1988; Rushkoff 1981). In response,
the PRC quickly intensified its military actions by bombing other Islands in the Taiwan Strait, including the strategically important
Tachen Islands (Dachen Islands). Critically, the ROC—lacking formal military assistance from the United States—ultimately backed
down by surrendering its position on the Yijiangshan Islands, only eight miles from the Tachen group. On January 18, 1955, the
ROC fully abandoned the Tachen Islands, evacuating approximately 30,000 people in its retreat.
Recognizing that verbal warnings were insufficient to slow the advance of the People’s Liberation Army, the United States and
the ROC agreed to the Sino American MDT in December 1954, which promised military assistance to
defend 234 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1) the island of Taiwan (i.e., the treatment). On January 29 1955, only 11
days after the ROC abandoned the Tachen Islands, the US Congress then passed the Formosa Resolution establishing a US
commitment to defend Taiwan, offering an even greater dosage of assurance. On February 9, 1995, the US Senate had
overwhelmingly ratified the MDT.
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of these agreements on the parties to the crisis. As
Chang (1988) notes, prior to the ratification of the MDT and passage of the Formosa Resolution, “Eisenhower and Dulles left vague
whether the commitment to the Nationalists extended to the offshore islands under their control ... to keep Beijing guessing as to
U.S. intentions” (p. 100). However, the signing of the MDT “removed any doubt about Washington’s support for the Nationalists.” It
all but assured the security and continuity of the ROC government in Taiwan, as Eisenhower had
made clear for the first time that the United States was formally committed to defending Taiwan
from an attack. With the passage of the Formosa Resolution, the US Congress granted Eisenhower
the authority to use military force to defend Taiwan “as he deems necessary,” giving him “ a
 virtual blank check ” (Chang 1988, 103). And in perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of commitment to the ROC,
Eisenhower and Dulles reaffirmed their commitment to the defense of the islands through “the use of atomic missiles,” with Dulles
stating in a nationally televised speech that “the administration considered atomic weapons ‘interchangeable with the conventional
weapons’ in the American arsenal” (Chang 1988, 103).
This speech was among the first in a campaign of public statements in which “the administration deliberately introduced specific
comments about employing tactical nuclear weapons if war broke out in the Taiwan Strait” culminating in a news conference where
Eisenhower said he saw no reason “why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else” (Chang
1988, 108). Importantly, the ROC leader, Chiang Kai-shek, was well aware of these public affirmations, and certainty not averse to
the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese on the mainland. He told Admiral Felix Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Command, that he would accept the use of nuclear weapons against the mainland “as a war necessity” (Chang 1988, 107).
Immediately following the US commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of Taiwan under the
MDT, subsequent ROC behavior was consistent with a new sense of assurance (i.e., posttreatment).
Knowing that the United States did not want to be drawn into the conflict, but that it nevertheless
wanted the ROC to maintain control of the islands (State Department Report 1992), the ROC submitted a
request for the US approval to conduct escalatory offensive air strikes on mainland targets in the
Spring of 1955 (Chang 1988, 114). Within weeks, a newly emboldened and increasingly intransigent
Chiang Kai-shek refused to entertain any idea of drawing down forces deployed on the Jinmen
and Mazu Islands, despite repeated requests from the United States (Chang 1988, 116).
At the same time, PRC behavior clearly demonstrated a sudden concessionary shift. According to the US State Department, within
weeks of the passage of the Narang and Mehta 235 MDT and Formosa Resolution, “in April 1955 in Bandung PRC Foreign Minister
Zhou Enlai announced a desire to negotiate with the United States... to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area”
(https://history.state.gov/mile stones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises). State Department accounts suggest that “the PRC’s sudden
shift could have stemmed from ... the very real possibility of war with the United States.” According to Chang (1988, 11), “the
initiative that finally ended the crisis came not from Washington but unexpectedly from the Chinese Communists... On April 23, just
before Robertson and Radford talked with Jiang, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai dramatically announced at the Bandung Conference
that his government wanted no war with the United States.”
If the Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC forces were emboldened in the First Taiwan Straits Crisis , they
appeared only more emboldened in the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis that began in 1958 . Indeed,
even in the prelude to the crisis, as Secretary Dulles visited Taiwan in March 1958, Chiang Kai-shek urged
efforts to exploit the instability he perceived on the mainland (US Department of State 1992, 6). Once the 1958
Taiwan Crisis erupted over Kinmen, a newly assured ROC this time dug in and returned fire , in contrast to the
First Taiwan Straits Crisis where ROC forces conceded the Yijiangshan Islands relatively quickly.
Soon after the Second Taiwan Straits crisis began, the ROC publically evoked the US commitment under the MDT, whereby
Eisenhower ordered the reinforcement of the Seventh Fleet to aid the ROC in August 1958. At the same time, Dulles publically
reaffirmed that a US intervention might involve nuclear weapons. As Chiang Kai-shek demanded even bolder public statements
promising US support for the defense of the offshore islands, Eisenhower reportedly grew frustrated at increasing pressure from
Chiang to involve the United States in the conflict (US Department of State 1992, 60).
Primary speeches and memoirs suggest that the sudden emboldenment of Chiang Kai-shek
immediately was not coincidental . As Gordon (1985) notes, “ The M utual D efense T reaty ... clearly
encouraged the Nationalists to take bolder measures against the Communists, despite the
defensive character of the pact ” (p. 638). According to Gordon, “It was clear in 1956 that the U.S. and
Chinese Nationalist views diverged sharply. The U.S. objective was limited to defense of Taiwan
and the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands... whereas the Nationalist government sought a military
potential that would enable it to recover the mainland ” (p. 642). He continues that “ ... the divergent views
on retaliation further strained relations between the U.S. and the Nationalist Chinese” (p. 647). Gordon
notes that, as the conflict continued, “the State Department grew increasingly concerned that the Nationalists might exploit the
situation and bring the U.S. into a conflict” (p. 655). More recently, Popino (2016) draws on primary sources to explain that while,
“the U.S. conducted 145 nuclear test shots” between 1955 and 1957, Chiang not only refused “to at least reduce the number of
Nationalist forces stationed on the offshore islands... he increased the Nationalist presence on the island of Quemoy to 85,000
military personnel.”14 (pp. 68-69)
Equally important, the weight of the evidence suggests that it was specifically the nuclear
element of the US commitment and not the long-standing commitment to 236 Journal of Conflict
Resolution 63(1) use conventional forces that appears to have emboldened Chiang Kai-shek. According to Brown (1994), in a key
National Security Council meeting, Special Assistant Robert Cutler, recounted that if US intervention
became necessary, “it should not do so with conventional weapons,” because “such intervention
would not be decisive ... the U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons” (p. 70). Similarly,
Tannenwald (2007) notes that General MacArthur, commander in the field, “argued that the U.S. would be able to restore Chiang
Kai-shek to the mainland ... only with nuclear weapons” (p. 131). Paul (2009, 53–54) explains that Dulles proclaimed: “If we defend
Quemoy and Matsu, we’ll have to use atomic weapons. They alone will be effective ... ” However, Dulles also
acknowledged that “ ... it would probably lead to initiating the use of atomic weapons.” And indeed,
primary statements provide direct evidence in support of the resulting impact on ROC beliefs and
behavior. Eisenhower’s advisors openly worried that talk of nuclear weapons would “embolden the
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to engage in his own aggressive moves that could provoke the
outbreak of hostilities that Eisenhower was striving to deter” (p. 70).
Importantly, these same leaders joined Chiang Kai-shek in downplaying the conventional element of the alliance. Indeed, as the
pivotal nuclear element to the commitment was being repeatedly affirmed publically, evidence from Chang (1988, 116) and Clubb
(1959, 525) suggest that Chiang strongly doubted the credibility of the US conventional military commitment.
As expected by our theory, the conclusion of the Second Taiwan Straits crisis took place at the negotiating table.15 On September
4, Dulles issued a statement, in which he hinted that Eisenhower would authorize US action to protect the offshore islands under the
“Formosa Resolution.” Within two days, in a move that is consistent with our theoretical mechanism, then Chinese Premier Zhou
Enlai issued a statement on September 6 declaring the PRC government’s willingness to resume the ambassadorial talks with the
United States–ROC alliance, effectively increasing the level of diplomatic recognition. In exchange, China’s Defense Minister, P’eng
Te-huai announced that PRC forces would refrain from shelling the offshore islands on even-numbered days, provided that there
would continue to be no US escort (US Department of State 1992, 215, 227). These were concessions that the outmatched ROC
was unlikely to secure in the absence of the frequently reiterated nuclear threat provided through the MDT. However, even as
the talks ended the crisis for the United States on September 30—with Dulles declaring that the United
States favored the evacuation of ROC forces form the offshore islands—Taiwan persisted in the
crisis bargaining for more than a month (US Department of State 1992), in a move that is consistent with
our moral hazard mechanism .
Conclusion
In this article, we address a long-standing question in the academic and policy communities about the role of nuclear umbrellas in
broader interstate relations. Specifically, we examine how client states behave under the protection of a nuclear patron by
investigating two important dimensions of behavior: the initiation of militarized disputes and bargaining outcomes short of war. We
find that, although client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are no more likely to initiate MIDs against a
target state that escalate to war or the reciprocated use of force, these states, nevertheless, appear more emboldened to
initiate crises . However, these crises tend not to escalate to higher levels of militarized conflict because target states appear to
act in equilibrium: preferring to settle disputes peacefully rather than resist militarily through costly fighting. We find that client states
protected under a nuclear umbrella are more often the recipients of policy concessions from their targets compared to states that
lack protection under a nuclear umbrella. Together, these results provide comprehensive support for our
argument that there is some risk of moral hazard in a client state protected under a nuclear
umbrella, as clients appear more emboldened and more successful at revising the status quo in
expectation of a patron coming to their aid.
The urgency to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear umbrellas is perhaps most real
today, as the United States seeks to rebalance its overall security portfolio to the Asia-Pacific in
anticipation of a rising China and to provide additional assurances to its allies in the Middle East in light of potential proliferation
challenges. And yet, we have surprisingly little evidence that such commitments are effective at reducing
the risk of conflict on net, given the widely presumed, but still untested, risk for moral hazard in the client
state. Meanwhile, policymakers in the United States and abroad continue to propose expanding the US nuclear umbrella while
Our research suggests that the expansion of the nuclear umbrella
further reassuring allies covered within it.
may perversely exacerbate the concerns of potential targets and inadvertently destabilize the
status quo by increasing the risk of a crisis and the opportunity for bargaining to fail.
The alliance emboldens Japanese aggression and ensures US entrapment – that
ensures miscalc – only scaling back the alliance solves
Edelstein and Shifrinson 18 (David, Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and Associate Professor in the Department of
Government, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and
Joshua, Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, “Entrapment
Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics”, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-
Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf) **NCC Packet 2020
Recent events in East and Southeast Asia illustrate the second aspect of unipolar entrapment,
highlighting how the United States’ desire to sustain its unipolar moment is, ironically, prompting
its entrapment . There are two aspects to this dynamic. First, since the end of the Cold War, the United
States has been worried with China’s potential power and uncertain long-term tensions . This
concern has only grown over time, to the point where many policymakers and some analysts
worry China may be emerging as a regional hegemon.54 Though American policymakers offered lip service
throughout the 1990s to the notion of reassuring all states – including China – in the post-Cold War era, when forced to choose the
United States has long prioritized backing other countries and hedging against China. 55 Indeed, increasingly, existing
allies are seen as vital components of U.S. efforts to contain China’s rise by ensuring the U.S.
retains physical access to East Asia and is capable of assembling a potential counterbalancing
coalition.56 As importantly, countries like Japan , the Philippines, and Vietnam are aware of American
calculations . Towards the end of the 2000s and continuing afterwards, this knowledge afforded East Asian
leaders a powerful tool with which to pressure the United States to become “more involved” in
East Asia after seemingly ignoring the region amidst the Iraq and Afghanistan wars .57 In this, East
Asian policymakers were simply doing what was eminently reasonable from their perspective: seeking firmer U.S. security
The effect of this effort has been to entrap the
guarantees as the distribution of power moved against them.
United States into a simmering regional conflict once the United States announced its intent to
“remain a Pacific power” and began “the Pivot” to East Asia .58 Yet although The United States
may have an interest in East Asian stability, it does not have an interest in the particular
ownership of contested rocks and shoals in the East and South China seas . What the ongoing
shift to focus on East Asia has done, however, is inject the United States into these disputes not
just as an active participant, but also to signal American resolve vis-à-vis its clients and the PRC .
59 Indeed, since the Pivot was announced in 2010, policymakers in both Asia and the United States have increasingly treated
American backing for East Asian allies in the sea disputes as a litmus test of U.S. security commitments. This trend makes little
sense unless entrapment is at work. That is, the United States could readily provide security to its friends
in East Asia and maintain Asia’s status quo by, e.g., surging forces to the region as crises
developed, providing its clients additional military aid, or simply reinforcing infrastructure to
support American forces. That the United States is instead actively protesting Chinese moves (de facto placing the blame
entirely on China) and devoting its own military forces to monitor and respond to Chinese actions suggests the entrapment dynamic
at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other American friends in the region is in the United States’ interest, only
entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response. The second aspect of entrapment comes from the response by
East Asian countries. It will be some time before we have detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama
Administration to Pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the East Asian response since 2010 suggests allied emboldenment is
creating increased entrapment risks for the United States . As Iain Johnston suggests, one of the most
striking trends in East Asia since the Pivot is the renewed assertiveness of East Asian states
imperiled by the rise of China .60 This trend includes independent action by the Japanese ,
Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a forward leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at
minimum, help justify a symmetrical Chinese response . However, it is worth recalling that Japan, Korea, and
others lobbied for the Pivot for the purposes of having the United States help them manage the rise of China – the implication
being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in
increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war . As things stand, it is difficult to see what else
Japan , the Philippines, and others could be doing that would risk conflict with China : East Asia is
already witness to an arms race and militarized interstate disputes . Thus, unless the Pivot has
had no effect on allied behavior, then its main influence has been to 1) avoid bandwagoning, but 2)
allow the very assertiveness the United States presumably sought to avoid ! To put the issue differently,
the claims employed by East Asian allies to push what became the Pivot strongly suggest the
result of the Pivot has been East Asian over-assertiveness . This is emboldenment of the purest
sort: take away the United States’ post-Pivot policy, and the East Asian allies would almost
certainly not be tilting with China to the same extent . In sum, entrapment is alive and well in terms
of both the arguments employed and policies adopted by the United States and its allies since the
late 2000s. No war has occurred, but crises are ongoing and the intensity of American backing for
its East Asian clients is growing . This is a recipe for miscalculation . As American forces
continue to move into the region, as American diplomacy continues to take an anti-China flavor,
and as allies simultaneously spur and build upon these trends, entrapment dynamics are
drawing the United States into the wrong conflicts, at the wrong time, and in the wrong place . The
United States has an interest in maintaining Japan and other major states as independent actors friendly to the United States; it
does not have an interest in their particular island disputes with China . Entrapment is alive and
well as the United States mistakes the latter for the former . Conclusion The implications of this study
are stark. In contrast to a prominent argument that great powers like the United States need not
fear entrapment by their foreign allies, the results of this project suggest that entrapment may be
less obvious than recent critiques apply . As importantly, the risk of entrapment is not reducible to legal solutions – it
varies in important ways due to the structure of the international system and the nature of great power competition itself. In effect,
entrapment is the risk states run for seeking allies . These findings carry real implications for
American grand strategy and foreign policy. At a time when many analysts expect American
unipolarity is waning (and may already be over), the analysis here highlights that risks of
American entrapment are likely to grow over time, just as maintaining an expansive set of
American security commitments leaves the U.S. exposed to allied machinations and U.S.
miscalculation . In turn, managing these risks requires adjustments to how U.S. policymakers
understand and approach alliance commitments. First, and at the most basic level, a more realistic approach would
have U.S. policymakers recognize the dangers of entrapment – whether over the choice of confrontation, or the means, timing, and
goals chosen along the way – inherent in the United States’ current grand strategy. To say this is simply to call for acknowledging
that alliances are ultimately tools of realpolitik – they are ways for states to seek security, such that self-interested actors may
manipulate and ensnare even their allies when their interests dictate. Second, the results highlight that managing
entrapment is less an issue of shaping the terms of an alliance as it is accepting that entrapment
will remain a risk so long as the United States has allies . This places a premium on deciding which alliances – if
any – are truly necessary for U.S. national security and retaining a clear vision with regard to the United States’ own interests in the
alliance. This is no small issue. Over the last several decades, a foreign policy consensus calling for the United States to play an
outsized role in world affairs – pursuing not only its security interests, but providing an array of notionally public goods – has attained
dominance in the American halls of power. Accompanying this trend has been an ever-growing set of alliance commitments. The
rise of China and resurgence of Russia, meanwhile, have reinforced this dynamic, creating a sense of urgency in adding additional
partners with which to confront these new threats. The work here, however, challenges both the stability and logic of this behavior:
the more allies the United States has, and the more the U.S. believes these alliances are needed to
contain threats to U.S. dominance, the greater the likelihood it will be entrapped in some way,
shape, or form. Put differently, the costs of an expansive American grand strategy are not as
minimal as some analysts claim and are primed to grow as the distribution of power changes .
Instead – third – policymakers might need to consider casting off those alliances which no longer suit American interests while
taking steps to tie American hands in ways that minimize the risks of entrapment in those that are retained. In this, there is a logic to
what proponents of a more restrained grand strategy recommend. In brief, calling for the U.S. to retrench from areas
of the world in which American involvement is neither necessary nor effective, while altering U.S.
military options so other countries have must be the defenders of first resort against regional
security problems not only forecloses the avenues by which the United States might be
entrapped , but , in embracing strategic self-abnegation, creates a disciplining device for
American behavior ; along the way, it may also prompt U.S. policymakers to re-consider the
scope of the challenge to American unipolarity , the accompanying threat to U.S. national
security, and whether and how allies are useful in addressing these problems . Ultimately, a
realist foreign policy requires a more forthright appreciation for the risks that alliance
commitments pose to U.S. national security . These risks, as this study indicates, are never
minimal (though they can certainly vary). Present trends indicate that the United States has faced real
entrapment problems during its unipolar era, and there are good reasons to expect these
problems will increase in the years ahead. Adjusting to this situation thus requires not only an intellectual shift in how
analysts contemplate the alliance entrapment game, but how American grand strategy itself accommodates these dynamics.
Crises are unavoidable---maintaining our commitment fuels the nationalist fire
and means they escalate.
Taylor 18 – Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
Taylor, Brendan, Professor Taylor holds a PhD from The Australian National University, Previously Professor of Strategic Studies
and Deputy Director of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, 2018, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War, Kindle E-
book rental. **NCC Packet 2020
As these waters become more crowded and contested , however, the biggest danger is not a planned
military campaign, but a lower-level military clash occurring during a tense time in Sino-Japanese relations. Some might
disagree, pointing to the hundreds of Soviet-American maritime incidents that occurred during the Cold War without escalation.
What differentiates this situation from almost any other, though, is its strong nationalist
underpinnings . What would have happened in January 2013, for instance, if the skipper of that Japanese
destroyer had not held his nerve, believing in-stead that the Chinese frigate that had just locked its
weapons-targeting radar on his ship was being steered by a rogue captain about to send a couple of
missiles his way? And what if that Japanese skipper had fired first, sinking the Chinese vessel and
unleashing a sea of anti-Japanese protests across China ? In such a scenario, could China's
leaders have sat idle without risking that nationalist sentiment turning against them ?
Useful steps have been taken to head off this possibility with the recent breakthrough on a China Japan communication mechanism.
But the fact that it took a decade of negotiations to reach consensus doesn't auger well.
Moreover, the new measures do not go far enough. History tells us that mechanisms intended to avoid crises are
far from fail-safe . New dangers can also emerge in the midst of crisis and, as when a car goes into a skid,
different techniques and approaches are often needed to navigate through these and to prevent further escalation.
At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 1960s, both sides made mistakes that could have
ended in nuclear catastrophe . The commander of a damaged Soviet submarine momentarily
believed that war had erupted and ordered the launch of his craft's nuclear torpedo. At
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, an ICBM test-firing scheduled well in advance of the
crisis was conducted, which fortunately the Soviets did not detect. And as the crisis drew to a
close, American radar operators incorrectly reported that a missile had been launched from Cuba
due to a training error.
The defense pact creates a moral hazard – encourages Japanese escalation and
makes détente impossible
Bandow 17 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, “Are the
Senkaku Islands Worth War Between China, Japan and America?”, National Interest, 2/12, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-
the-senkaku-islands-worth-war-between-china-japan-19403?page=show) **NCC Packet 2020
Big wars sometimes start over small stakes . For instance, Germany’s “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck,
presciently warned that a European war would begin as a result of “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” Soon, a royal
assassination spawned World War I, which spread conflict around the globe. ¶ National insults, trade opportunities and territorial
claims also resulted in their share of stupid, counterproductive conflicts . The assertive young American
republic threatened Great Britain with war over the Canadian border and launched an invasion to vindicate its dubious territorial
claims against Mexico. A few decades later, the slightly more mature United States fought a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign
against independence-minded Filipinos to preserve its territorial booty from the Spanish-American War.¶ Alliances
sometimes accelerate the race to war . Assured of the support of Russia and Germany, respectively, Serbia and the
Greater flexibility might not have prevented
Austro-Hungarian Empire were recklessly intransigent in summer 1914.
the conflict, but alliance-backed inflexibility ensured war .¶ History illustrates the dangers posed
by the Asia-Pacific’s many territorial squabbles . None of the contested claims is worth a fight, let alone a great-
power conflict. Yet they could become a spark like that in Sarajevo a century ago. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis
increased the danger on his recent trip to Japan when he “reassured” the Abe government that Washington, DC was firmly in its
corner.¶ The Senkaku Islands—called the Diaoyus by China—are uninhabited rocks of limited
intrinsic value . However, they confer ocean and seabed control and corresponding fishing, navigation and hydrocarbon
benefits. Nationalist sentiments loom equally large . The islands are controlled by Tokyo but also
claimed by the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s case is serious —better, in my view, than its less
credible South China Sea claims—but Japan insists that there is no issue to discuss. ¶ That leaves the PRC
with little choice but to adopt more confrontational tactics to assert its “rights.” Tokyo took direct
control of the Senkaku Islands in 2012 to forestall their use by nationalists for protests, which heightened tensions. The following
year, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone over the islands, though so far the ADIZ has more symbolic than real. The
PRC also has engaged in fishing and oil exploration in nearby waters, sending in coast guard ships to defend Chinese operations. ¶
Japan felt secure in its intransigence after winning the Obama administration’s commitment that the “mutual” defense treaty
between the two nations covered territory administered by the central government, even if claimed by other states. Secretary
Mattis was equally explicit. He affirmed not only Washington’s support for Japan’s defense, but also
stated, “I made clear that our longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands. The United
States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands, and as such Article 5 of the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty applies.” In other words, America will defend Tokyo’s contested claim. ¶ The PRC
responded sharply. The United States should “avoid making the issue more complicated and bringing instability to the
regional situation,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said. Indeed, he explained, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is “a
product of the Cold War, which should not impair China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights.” ¶ Adding to the
combustible atmosphere is the apparent belief—of at least some officials on both sides—that war is
inevitable. For instance, less than a year ago Trump strategist Steve Bannon expressed “no doubt” that “we’re going to
war in the South China Sea in five to ten years.” He complained that the Chinese are “taking their sandbars and
making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those.” While the Senkaku Islands are not part of the South
China Sea, the same principles apply.¶ War sounded almost close at Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearing. He
insisted: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those
Using force to do so would be an act of war against any country,
islands also is not going to be allowed.”
including America.¶ Chinese responded accordingly. The People’s Liberation Army website quoted one
senior officer as stating: “A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not
just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality.” He called for increased military deployments in the region. ¶
The political leadership is less transparent about its views—the residents of Zhongnanhai don’t typically appear on radio shows.
However, Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group opined that “the Chinese government is quite concerned about the potential for direct
confrontation with the Trump administration.” Although President Xi Jinping appears reasonably pragmatic while ruthlessly
repressive, he isn’t likely to abandon what he sees as “core” Chinese interests. Moreover, nationalists
and unreconstructed leftists, though differing on economic policy, share a distrust of the United
States.¶ A mutual belief in inevitable conflict could become reality . Before World War I, a number of high-
ranking European officials believed that war was coming. For them, it made sense to accept, even embrace, the onset of the conflict
in August 1914 and strike while victory still remained possible. ¶ In the case of China versus the United States, such shared
sentiment may accelerate military spending . The Trump administration is demanding increased
outlays despite the lack of any serious threat to vital U.S. interests . Rather, the expanded force is to
enhance America’s ability to intervene against other nations, particularly China. ¶ This gives the PRC an
even greater incentive to respond, since the United States is challenging what it views (and America would
view, if the situation was reversed) as “core” national interests . As the United States increases military
deployments in the region, so will the PRC. After Mattis’ visit, China sent three warships near the Senkaku Islands. The risks of a
Washington officials might be tempted to advocate a more
violent clash will rise accordingly.¶ Some
aggressive approach today, while the PRC is weaker and America is wealthier, backed by
numerous allies and able to deploy a more powerful military . In this view, let the inevitable showdown come
sooner rather than later.¶ Alas, that could become a prescription for years if not decades of conflict. America has a vital interest in
protecting its own territory, population, and constitutional and economic systems. But China threatens none of them. The United
States has important interests in the independence of its allies and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region. So far, the PRC
has not challenged either of those things.¶ Washington understandably views its dominance of East Asia up to China’s borders as
an advantage. But it is far less important than protecting America’s own security. Such control is not even necessary for
preserving navigational freedom and allied security . More important, U.S. policy conflicts with what
Beijing views as its “core” interests. Imagine Washington’s reaction if China attempted to maintain a similar position
along the eastern seaboard and in the Caribbean. Nor does the presumption that America could defeat the PRC offer much comfort.
The price would be high. China can build missiles and submarines faster than the United States can construct aircraft carriers. The
Chinese people would be more committed to a fight if it is seen as protecting their homeland—more so than Americans would be
prone to getting involved in a faraway conflict that hampers Washington’s will.¶ Additionally, the United States count on support from
allies not directly affected. Would Australia and South Korea risk the long-term hostility of China, which will be in their next-door
neighbor forever? Indeed, Japan made clear that it would not join the United States’ “freedom of navigation operations” in the South
China Sea. Explained Japanese defense minister Tomomi Inada: “I told Secretary Mattis that Japan supports the U.S. military’s
freedom of navigation operation in the sea. But the [Self Defense Force] will not be sent to the area.” Inada clearly means “supports”
an American “victory” almost certainly would guarantee long-term hostility
in quotation marks.¶ Finally,
and future conflict . It took two world wars to determine Germany’s place in the global order . And it
took “only” two because, after the second one, Germany ended up divided and well behind the United States and Soviet Union.
While the PRC’s collapse as a country is possible, it is unlikely. In fact, military defeat might spur nationalist rage
and result in greater centralization.¶ The Communist regime could fall. But that probably would spawn an authoritarian
government rather than a democracy. And any democracy is more likely to be nationalist/populist than liberal. Whether the almost
inevitable “Second Sino-American War” likely would turn out in Washington’s favor is less clear. There could be a third one as well,
if China rebounded. The United States might find that just as battles can be pyrrhic, so can wars. It’s an experience America should
avoid.¶ U.S. officials have good reason to remind China of the costs of conflict and the importance of settling even contentious
territorial disputes peacefully. At the same time, however, the Trump administration should avoid issuing blank checks to allies
seeming to exempt them from having to deal with, and even discuss, those same territorial challenges. Sometimes blank checks get
cashed with disastrous consequences, like Imperial Germany’s support for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which sped Europe’s
plunge into the World War I abyss.¶ The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no
as the locus of a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken, they could spark
importance to America. But
another Sino-Japanese war, which would be disastrous . And if that turned into a Sino-American
conflict, the consequences would be incalculable . President Donald Trump should never forget these dangers as
he confronts China’s growing ambition and power.
The US-Japan alliance is key – it puts a backstop on peaceful transition and
enflames nationalism – that makes ECS disputes inevitable
Kim 18 (Jihyun, Assistant Professor, Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, USA, “The Clash of Power and
Nationalism: The Sino-Japan Territorial Dispute”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1) **NCC Packet
2020
Despite its relative weakening of status as a global hegemon, the USA is still the most influential
state in the world ‘when power is measured in terms of economic and military assets’ and will
remain so for some time to come (Art, 2010, p. 359). Nonetheless, the relative power and influence in
some parts of the world, most notably in Asia and even beyond, is gradually tipping towards
China and inevitably affecting the power dynamics between this rising Asian giant and its
neighbours, including Japan, one of America’s closest allies (Goldstein, 2007; Sutter, 2010; Tammen &
Kugler, 2006). In general, power transition theory (PTT) postulates that war is likely to occur against
the backdrop of altering power parity between nations caused by their differential growth rates,
especially when the relative power between a declining dominant state and a rising challenger
approaches parity (Gilpin, 1981; Lemke, 1995; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980). In addition, variant branches
of power transition theory look into ‘[T]he relationship between changes in relative power,
hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction’ in order to assess the probability of conflict or
integration (Efird, Kugler & Genna, 2003, p. 293). The theory suggests that the future of war and peace would be
determined by the interaction effect between ‘relative power and the degree of satisfaction with
the international order (or status quo)’ (DiCicco & Levy, 1999, p. 682). According to these theoretical assumptions,
catastrophic war is likely to be averted even after a rising China would eventually become the
world’s most powerful state if the country emerges as a satisfied dominant power with ‘no
substantial demands for change to the international system’s organizing principles’ or to the
regional order (Lemke & Tammen, 2003, p. 270). However, the probability of conflict would rise
dramatically if an increasingly powerful China with deep-seated grievances against the existing
order—previously established and maintained by the USA and its core allies like Japan—seeks to
challenge the status quo . During most of the Cold War when there was an ordered hierarchy,
Sino-Japan power relations were quite stable with neither side having enough capability to
emerge as a regional hegemon or to challenge the East Asian security order, established and led
by the superpowers. Whereas China was a weak country, marred by widespread poverty, Japan also fell short of becoming a
major power on its own. Notwithstanding Japan’s successful post-war recovery to the point where it
even became America’s economic rival, it remained under the US security umbrella while
enduring constraints on its military sovereignty in line with its Peace Constitution .
Simultaneously, China embraced the US-led regional order to counterbalance the Soviet Union
during the Sino-Soviet split and to encourage economically robust and militarily advanced Japan
to remain low key, thus constraining the former enemy from re-emerging as a threat to China’s
national security. Although the entire geostrategic context was hierarchical, dominated by the Cold War superpowers, neither
China nor Japan was in a position to assume a leadership role in East Asia. It was during this time of fairly straightforward and
unequivocal regional status quo when the Sino-Japan rapprochement was promoted along with the mutually beneficial economic
partnership between the two with neither side willing or able to undermine the interests of the other or to challenge the existing
order. Since the rise of China and the relative decline of US hegemonic outreach; however, there
has been a greater tension in Sino-Japan relations as each side more openly struggles to secure
its regional dominance and prevent the other from becoming a leading player in East Asia . While
Beijing and Tokyo continue to share a common interest in keeping regional stability as a
necessary condition for their lucrative economic cooperation, the shifting power dynamics have
encouraged both sides to redefine their status in East Asia as well as their relations to each other
(Jimbo, 2012). At the same time, the regional power shift has pushed nationalism on both sides,
simmering underneath for decades, to resurface in a more overt and precarious way . In addition, the
lingering mutual distrust, embedded in unresolved historical issues, has further complicated
Sino-Japan ties, increasing the chances that the changing regional hierarchy would clash with
rising nationalism . The politics of nationalism, intertwined with a heightened sense of insecurity
due to shifting regional power parity, could not only affect contemporary Sino-Japan relations but
also reshape the overall security order in East Asia . In effect, the rise of nationalism has emerged
as one of the most potent forces that could deteriorate the relationship between China and Japan
(Matthews, 2003; Zheng, 1999). Yet, nationalism is a constantly evolving and renovating phenomenon, characterized by ‘conflation,
multivocality, indeterminateness, confusion, and mysticism’ (McVeigh, 2004, p. 6). It is challenging to fully grasp the workings of
nationalism in addition to comprehending its role in Sino-Japan relations because nationalism could be quite ‘malleable
and vulnerable to manipulation and/or guidance by leaders and media, as well as driven to some
extent by events’ and even by the public (Moore, 2010, p. 298). Moreover, further analysis is needed to evaluate the
linkage between power shift and nationalism, in particular how and in what ways the changing power relations between China and
Japan have affected each other’s nationalism and created a regional order in which Sino-Japan tensions, rather than
rapprochement and cooperation, are more likely to dominate their bilateral ties. In what follows, a country-specific approach will be
taken to better explore the complex interactions between power shift and nationalism as well as their effects on the changes and
continuities in Sino-Japan relations and the overall security order in East Asia. The Fall and Rise of China: Its Evolving Power and
Nationalism The concept of nationalism was first adopted by Chinese elites even before the founding of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) to defend the country ‘from foreign invasion and to gain its independent status, and hence acquired strong negative
and reactive sense’ (Cui, 2012, p. 204). Since then, Chinese nationalism has revolved around a narrative of China’s century of
humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers, including Japan. Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) earliest years, the
theme of resisting Japan, embedded in the history of Japanese past atrocities against China, has been an important ‘source of
political capital’ to uphold the legitimacy of the party leadership (Hughes, 2008, pp. 247–248). China’s nationalism before its rise
served as an effective protective mechanism to keep Chinese national identity and bring the people together in times of weakness.
Nonetheless, this early nationalism did not generate any substantial measure to demonstrate China’s greatness or reclaim its
regional supremacy through assertive expansionist policies because the country was not fully capable of blatantly projecting its
strength while simultaneously withstanding negative repercussions, expected in so doing. Besides, China was preoccupied with its
internal struggles during the turbulent years of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Then, under Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership, the national focus shifted to preserving domestic and regional stability as a precondition for China’s economic growth. In
addition, China had to carefully consider its limited policy options and the overall regional power disparity in Japan’s favour
throughout the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split made Beijing lack any reliable Communist allies without getting diplomatic and
military support from another superpower, the USA, whereas the solidarity between Tokyo and Washington remained steadfast. The
Sino-Soviet split increased China’s needs to accept the US-led regional order along with Beijing’s conviction that rapprochement
with Washington would be strategically desirable to counter the threat posed by Moscow. Under the condition, Beijing largely
practiced ‘a pragmatic nationalism based on a sober assessment of China’s domestic and global challenges and tempered by
diplomatic prudence’ without recklessly exploiting nationalist sentiment to the extent that it could cause alarm even though
nationalism connected with the idea of resisting Japan was an indispensable theme in Chinese political discourse (S. Zhao, 2013, p.
536). Despite nationalism playing an important part in China’s relations with Japan, Chinese foreign policy was not exclusively
driven by ideological factors but by pragmatism supported by Beijing’s political, economic and strategic calculations derived from its
realistic assessment of the limits of its own power, which subsequently paved the way for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic
normalization in the 1970s. After acknowledging the regional order in favour of Japan and Tokyo’s strategic value within the realm of
trade, investment and aid, Beijing tried to cultivate its ties with the former enemy. As for the Chinese leaders, economic growth,
partly with support from Japan, was regarded as a major component of China’s regime stability and national development.
Additionally, Beijing’s fear of Japan reasserting its wartime disposition towards militarism was alleviated by ‘the fact that Japan was
safely ensconced within a security alliance with the United States’ (Smith, 2009, p. 232). This set-up further encouraged China to
accept the existing regional hierarchy with relative satisfaction. Under the circumstances, Beijing controlled popular nationalism
In recent years,
when it came to making Chinese foreign policy without resorting to emotional nationalistic rhetoric.
however, China has shown a greater degree of assertive nationalism in safeguarding what it
considers its core interests .2 This is not because China’s priorities for seeking economic growth
while maintaining regional stability have become less important but because it has amassed
considerable power and influence to express its past grievances and its desire to create a new
regional order in a more overt manner. This phenomenon has been facilitated by China’s rise as a
global economic behemoth with deep pockets even to enhance its military and diplomatic
posture . Concurrently, the Sino-Japan power dynamics have shifted in favour of China due to
Japan’s weakened status as a major economic engine in Asia and beyond in addition to the
relative decline of its indispensable ally, the USA, as the world’s sole superpower . Meanwhile,
China has started redressing its previous geostrategic vulnerability, originated from the Sino-
Soviet split, by mending its ties with Russia (Rozman, 1998). Despite Moscow’s carefully calculated hedging strategy
against Beijing to limit China’s growing influence in the region, their shared concern about America’s containment policy towards
Russia and China has brought the two countries together for mutual strategic utility. The warming ties between China and Russia
have granted Beijing greater diplomatic leverage when dealing with a list of controversial issues revolving around China’s more
forceful projection of its national interests in recent years (Duchâtel & Godement, 2016). China’s increasingly overt
nationalism, therefore, can be seen as a reflection of its outward confidence against the backdrop
of altering regional power dynamics to its advantage . At the same time, China’s more explicit
expression of national interests can also be seen as a manifestation of its inward sense of identity
crisis and internal complications, intensified during the course of its rapid rise . This is the peculiarity of
China’s new nationalism, which heightens Beijing’s dilemma to manage the discrepancy between the renewed national clout on the
one hand and the unprecedented uncertainty over the future of the Chinese system on the other. The rise of China—largely made
possible by its unique model of development through underplaying Communist tenets and embracing certain aspects of liberal
capitalism—has caused the unintended but inevitable challenge to its own identity by widening the gap between the country’s
outward confidence, especially regarding its global economic leverage, and its internal struggle to handle the increasingly complex
society. Despite an inflated sense of empowerment thanks to China’s new quotient of wealth, the Chinese national spirit began to
decline due to its ideological crisis by the end of the Cold War together with an uncertain future filled with growing economic, social
and political tensions at home. The tangible benefits of China’s successful economic reform, although enabling the country’s
splendid rise, have served as a double-edged sword by making China remain potentially vulnerable with internal developments that
could destabilize its domestic cohesiveness. Under the circumstances, the needs for the Chinese elites to use nationalism as a
means to maintain political legitimacy have increased as doing so could divert public discontents regarding domestic problems
towards external challenges. Notwithstanding Chinese leaders’ concern over the potential dangers of depending too extensively on
national sentiments that could eventually be unmanageable, Beijing has shown its growing inclination to incorporate nationalism in
shaping more assertive foreign policies in order to unite the Chinese public and divert their energies and frustrations outward
(Downs & Saunders, 1998/99; Fravel, 2010; Whiting, 1995). In this process, Chinese new nationalism has emerged as a potentially
powerful domestic source of its muscle-flexing foreign policy, reflected in its more overt push to redefine territorial boundaries in the
region. This trend has also been reinforced by China’s efforts to cope with its enduring historical recollection of outside forces’
infringement of its sovereignty and its growing aspirations/capabilities to reposition itself as the principal architect of regional order.
The political utility of nationalism has further increased with the Chinese leaders more actively embracing this force ‘to fill the
ideological vacuum left by the decline of Marxism and Maoism’ (Zheng, 1999, p. 90). As asserted by Yu, ‘the Chinese government is
under heavy pressure’ to restore China’s historical glory through facilitating the rise of nationalism against the backdrop of ‘the
declining appeal of communism, as well as the corruption and isolation of official academia’ (2014, p. 1174). With the decline of its
ideology-based legitimacy, the CCP has begun to intensify patriotic education, designed to promote ‘loyalty by direct evocation of
Chinese nationalism’ and to legitimize the continuation of one party rule as the best way to ensure political stability and continuing
economic growth (Cui, 2012, p. 208). There has also been an effort to remember and highlight collective memory of history on the
mass scale, focusing on the time of war against Japan so to facilitate national unity among the public. Promoted by Chinese state
nationalism, the Chinese collective memory of Japan’s wartime atrocities and numerous unresolved historical issues, including the
Nanjing Massacre, lack of apologies from Tokyo, and the territorial dispute, etc., have emerged ‘at the forefront of public perception
of the Japanese,’ triggering public anger and resentment against Japan (Qin, 2006, p. 32). Yet, the rise of popular nationalistic
sentiment has started constraining ‘Beijing’s control mechanisms and its ability to direct nationalist discourse in ways convenient to
itself’ (Cui, 2012, p. 199). In effect, Chinese nationalism at the popular level has emerged as a considerable force, led by
increasingly effective nationalist groups equipped with new communication technology that allows them to easily spread information,
mobilize the public and organize mass protests. The massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China’s major cities in the past few
years can be seen as the expression of Chinese bottom-up nationalism, led by societal forces that criticize not only the
‘unremorseful’ former enemy, Japan, but also the communist state that is not confident enough to protect China’s core national
interests. As such, Chinese nationalism ‘has changed from an essentially state-led ideology to an increasingly society-driven
phenomenon’ in the process of the CCP losing its monopoly of controlling this force with a growing tide of popular nationalist
sentiment (Lampton, 2014, p. 22). One might question whether China’s rising popular nationalism has become a significant enough
force, ‘compelling the Chinese leadership to take a tougher stand on a range of foreign policy issues, particularly maritime disputes
in East Asia’ (Johnston, 2016, p. 7). Indeed, it would be an exaggeration to treat the role of popular nationalism as the only factor to
determine China’s foreign policy because there are other elements that could also influence ‘China’s coercive diplomacy on
maritime issues, such as elite opinion, the personal preferences of top leaders, security dilemma dynamics, organizational interests,
or some combination thereof’ (ibid.). Moreover, the PRC as a party-state, which still remains in the driver’s seat, is not entirely
swayed by public opinion in making China’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the chances for the elite to respond to popular nationalism,
instead of simply utilizing and manipulating the public sentiment for their own politico-diplomatic purposes, have increased along
with the growing demands of nationalist legitimation as well as China’s increasing capabilities to accommodate such demands.
China’s exceptional economic development, made possible partly by successfully implementing
certain aspects of capitalism, has served as the engine behind its remarkable and much-
celebrated rise. Nonetheless, the rise of China itself has made its unique system of governance
potentially vulnerable by triggering a new state-society balance with individuals gaining greater
control over their lives than ever before in China’s modern history . This has created a dilemma
for Chinese leaders regarding the discrepancy between their externally projected strength and
internally perceived weakness when governing this idiosyncratic communist state in the twenty-
first century . Chinese popular nationalists share the dream with their government to make their
country powerful enough to stand up against the bullies of any outside forces . Suspicious of
foreign powers’ conspiracy to hamper China’s rise, popular nationalism has been vocal and
emotional in criticisms of not only other countries’ harmful intentions against China but also
Beijing’s failure to demonstrate stronger resolve to defend the national interests . Under this new
environment, Chinese leaders have become more reluctant to control the expression of popular
nationalism and willing to accept the popular nationalist’s demand to take a resolute position
against any hostile outside forces, including Japan . Inexorably, Beijing has less flexibility in
operating on sensitive issues, involving China’s vital interests vis-à-vis Japan such as history-
related controversies and territorial disputes (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2016). This is due to its concerns
about the possibility of popular anger targeting Japan turning against what the Chinese public
also sees as the incompetent and weak-willed Chinese authorities, causing social and political
instability . In this regard, the increasing responsiveness of the Chinese government to public
opinion is an important development of China’s internal affairs that reflects ‘the convergence of
Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism’ with implication for a more assertive and
confrontational Chinese foreign policy in the long run (S. Zhao, 2013, p. 536). All in all, Beijing’s efforts to
promote harmonious relations with Tokyo to further expedite China’s rise have been constrained by some contradictory elements
within its own definition of nationalism that revolves around the theme of resisting Japan and strengthening Chinese national unity
against its former enemy. It has proved difficult to even-handedly ‘promote social and political stability through sustained economic
growth—surely best achieved through good relations’ with its closest neighbours, including Japan, while reconciling with strident
nationalist discourse, based on a clear distinction between us versus them (Cui, 2012, p. 215). As China’s President Xi Jinping
(2017) has proclaimed during his nineteenth Congress speech on 18 October 2017, the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation is ‘a
dream about history, the present, and the future’, working tirelessly for ‘the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics
for a new era’; notwithstanding his emphasis on ‘preserving world peace and promoting common development’, Xi’s speech sheds
important light on the difficulties and intricacies of China’s approach to Japan. When dealing with delicate matters
associated with sovereignty, national pride, and historically unresolved tensions, it has become
more tempting and tactically convenient for Beijing to resort to assertive nationalism though
doing so could be a strategic liability in the long run (Chen-Weiss, 2014). This is the case even though
Beijing acknowledges the needs to facilitate diplomatic flexibility and mutually beneficial ties with
Tokyo as doing so would be more conducive to achieving the Chinese dream in the twenty-first
century, that is, as asserted by Xi Jinping, ‘to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation’
through promoting lasting peace, economic development and international security (quoted in Xinhua,
2012). Japan’s Power and Nationalism at a Crossroad By the early twentieth century, Japan was perceived as a considerable power
in Asia with the burgeoning sense of hierarchical nationalism that placed the Japanese nation on top. The present usage of
Japanese nationalism, embedded in the concept of minzoku (an ethnic nation), as opposed to kokumin (the constitutional sense of
national identity), emerged around World War I to call for ‘one nation, one state’, envisioning the superiority of the Japanese
minzoku (Doak, 2006). In effect, the political elite started connecting Japanese nationalism to the monarchy with its emperor being
portrayed as the key force to unify the people in the course of Japan’s imperial expansion. After the war, however, nationalism was
depoliticized (Sannosuke, 1971). During the early post-war period when Japan’s power was at its nadir, there was a widespread
sense of cultural nihilism, which downgraded the Japanese traditional values as responsible for the rise of devastating pre-war
nationalism. In fact, it was taboo to promote political nationalism during the early post-war period. Nonetheless, policies of economic
nationalism were gradually endorsed by the Japanese leaders as necessary measures to facilitate the economic rehabilitation in
post-war Japan. Subsequently, Japan experienced notable economic achievement that allowed its people to have a renewed sense
of pride in their country’s abilities and cultural values, previously suppressed due to Japan’s negative status as a major perpetrator
of the war. By the early 1980s, the regional economic order was in Japan’s favour as the country had become one of the world’s
leading economies with significant leverage over East Asia and beyond. Against this backdrop, ideas of Japanese national
distinctiveness were produced and disseminated again in the society (Yoshino, 1992). The result of this development was the
emergence of a ‘new nationalist mood’, encouraging the Japanese people to feel that their country should ‘play a more active
political role in international affairs commensurate with’ its global economic status (Rose, 2000, p. 171). Since the 1990s, however,
Japan was in the grip of a revisionist trend associated with the emergence of neo-nationalism. As discussed by Kersten (1999, p.
191), ‘[t]he tumultuous context of the 1990s, including the Gulf War, death of Hirohito and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 1945,
have provided a fertile environment’ for the rise of the so-called ‘liberal school of history’ with a core objective to promote a positive
view of the country through nationalistic education and correction of the so-called ‘dark history’. At the end of the twentieth century,
Japan has started losing its supremacy in the realm of economics without yet having acquired political goodwill and diplomatic
strength sufficient enough to dissipate its neighbours’ lingering antipathy towards the country, embedded in the memories of its
imperial expansion and atrocities in the past.3 Internally, a combination of Japan’s own political and economic malaise has
conflicted with its basic sense of superiority as the ‘lead goose’ in the course of the Asian economic miracle and ‘the only Asian
power able to beat the Westerners at their own game in the past’ (Moore, 2010, pp. 300–301). In addition, the growing economic
competition from its neighbours, including China and South Korea, has started challenging Japan’s distinctive identity as the most
economically powerful and technologically advanced country. Against this backdrop of shifting power parity in Asia, the nature of
Japan’s nationalism has been transformed from a reflection of its confidence into a critical mechanism to safeguard its identity as a
leading state in the region. In line with the so-called ‘healthy patriotism’, a positive view of Japanese history has been promoted in
order to ‘allow Japan to mobilize its energies for a variety of pressing tasks, including reviving the economy … and defending
against external threats’ (Berger, 2014). Simultaneously, there has been a revitalized discussion about constitutional revision to
boost its military strength and keep the regional order from shifting in favour of a rising China (Mito, 2008). The reinterpretation of
the peace constitution’s limits on military activities, which would allow Japanese forces to help defend its allies, most notably the
USA, can be seen as Japan’s efforts to maintain the regional order, defined as the US-led status quo rather than the new power
dynamics, moulded by China. Japan’s determination ‘to extricate itself from many of the military constraints’ also reflects and
reinforces heightened nationalism at home and across the region (Haass, 2013). Especially with regard to the role of nationalism in
Japan’s China policy, there has been a distinct evolution since the Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972 (Mochizuki, 2007). Tokyo
initially pursued a conciliatory policy towards Beijing during the era of friendship diplomacy (1972–1989), promoting bilateral
economic ties while taking an accommodating position regarding Japan’s past atrocities against China without concerning much
about security competition from its Chinese counterpart. The rapprochement was made possible partly due to Japan’s military
alliance with the USA, the insurmountable global superpower back then, as well as its economic superiority over China, the
combination of which kept the regional order in Japan’s favour, allowing Tokyo to take a malleable approach towards Beijing without
having to face the possibility of such a measure undermining Japan’s overall national interests. Before the emergence of
the so-called China threat discourse, China was not ‘a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-
wing Japanese nationalism’ or a target against which Japan should be more ‘resolute’ (Suzuki, 2015,
p. 96). Throughout these periods, tensions in Sino-Japanese relations did revolve around highly controversial issues including the
interpretation of history and the question of sovereignty over disputed islands. However, patriotic rhetoric in Japan was mostly aimed
at a domestic audience rather than being translated into a hostile policy towards China. However, China has gradually emerged as a
potentially domineering neighbour that could undermine the regional stability and Japan’s national interests. Herein, the Tiananmen
Square protest of 1989 became an important turning point in Sino-Japan relations as ‘the brutal repression of the Chinese
democracy movement soured the country’s image for the Japanese public’, making Japanese elites become more wary of engaging
with China (Mochizuki, 2007, p. 749). Japanese public opinion regarding China was further deteriorated by subsequent episodes,
including China’s assertion of sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 1992, nuclear testing in 1995, and
conducting military exercises (including missile launches) during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With the intensification of
China’s rise alongside the relative decline of America’s hegemonic influence—the backbone of Japan’s post-war security—Japan’s
China policy has incorporated a more active balancing strategy through expanding the scope and strength of its own military power
(Nakano, 2016). The regional power shift has been complicated by the clash of Sino-Japan nationalisms in conjunction with
historically rooted animosity on both sides, creating an environment more conducive to bilateral tensions rather than mutual trust
and cooperation. Mounting tensions between China and Japan challenge a widely held assumption that close economic relations
would lead to a more stable regional order. Liberal optimism emphasizes that inextricably related and mutually reinforcing
mechanisms, such as economic interdependence, generate substantial pacifying effects by extending the scope of shared interests
among countries involved while increasing the costs of security disputes (Brooks, 1999; Gartzke, 2007). Although it would be
imprudent to hastily dismiss the liberal view, the growing rivalry between China and Japan in recent years as well as their enduring
struggle to achieve ‘positive peace’ could shed light on the limits of such optimism. Despite their close economic interdependence
and shared understanding about devastating cost of war, the rise of China can be seen as a facilitating force for Japan’s greater
openness to talk about its needs to become a ‘normal country’ with stronger military capabilities, a discussion less imaginable a
decade or two ago. Japan’s nationalism has been heightened by its growing sense of vulnerability, attributable in large part to a
rising China with emerging military and economic capabilities. In Japanese political discourse, the China threat theory has been
ramped up as this country, which is determined to become a regional hegemon and alter the existing order, is increasingly being
described as a potential national-security threat. Against this backdrop, ‘politicians seen to be “tough” on China have been praised,
regardless of their party political affiliations’ whereas those seen to be more compromising have come under heavy fire for being
diplomatically weak (Suzuki, 2015, p. 96). Notwithstanding the existence of partisan divides in terms of Japanese attitudes towards
China, these developments allowed Japanese politicians from both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) little choice but to take a tougher stance towards China when the recent bickering between the two countries over the
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands plunged the bilateral ties into the lowest point.4 Such determinations to face China in a more
resolute manner have become noticeable in the Japanese political discourse, widely seen as a departure from Japan’s more
accommodating diplomacy vis-à-vis China in the past. All in all, the resurgence of Japan’s nationalism
combined with its efforts to strengthen security posture and more actively protect national
interests, including the control over the East China Sea islands, are the manifestations of its
unwavering resistance to the changing relative power in East Asia, which could lead to a new
regional order shaped by a rising China, irrespective of (if not against) Japan’s interests .
Simultaneously, Japan’s unfulfilled historical reconciliation with China has been feeding the spirit of
‘jingoism and xenophobia’ at home while hardening nationalist attitudes in its counterpart (Kingston,
2016). This has created an environment that many liberals describe as the ‘pacifying effects’ of
economic interactions could be easily offset by other competing factors, including the
intensifying security dilemma caused by the shifting regional power in China’s favour and the
enduring Sino-Japan strategic distrust, rooted in their unpleasantly shared past . The East China Sea
Dispute Beijing and Tokyo kept their precarious nationalism at bay throughout the Cold War. Furthermore, both sides managed to
build rapprochement thanks to their mutual interests in economic development as well as the relatively stable bilateral power
relations, anchored in the US-led regional order, with neither side feeling the urgency or having the capacity to aggressively claim
However, the chances for the clash of nationalism
one’s national interests at the expense of the other.5
between these two major players in East Asia have increased in recent years together with the
growing inclination on both sides to pursue their national interests in more assertive manners .
Against the backdrop of shifting power dynamics in Sino-Japan relations and the overall change
in the regional status quo, caused by the rise of China and the relative weakening of the US-
dominated regional order that guaranteed Japan’s security, ‘undercurrents of mutual
unfriendliness’ have become more pronounced (Roy, 2005, p. 201). Concurrently, the rise of
nationalism in both countries has further plagued Sino-Japan relations, creating politically
colder climate and even damaging their previously warm economics ties . Among a number of perennial
problems in Sino-Japanese relations, the East China Sea dispute has emerged as one of the most
dangerous flashpoints, posing intricate questions of legality, national pride and beyond . This is a
historically rooted issue of sovereignty that could be affected by the shifting relative power in
Sino-Japan relations together with intensifying Chinese and Japanese nationalisms and their
effects on both countries’ increasingly unyielding foreign policy vis-à-via each other . Beijing’s
official narrative is that the Diaoyu islands were taken away by the Japanese along with their
acquisition of Taiwan in 1895; thus Japan’s annexation of the islands is an intrinsic part of the
history of Japan’s imperialistic aggression against China . According to this view, the islands were stolen when
the regional order was in Japan’s favour while China was falling prey to the Western imperialist powers and not in a position to
counter Japan’s expansion. Conversely, Tokyo asserts that the islands were not Chinese sovereign territory but ‘terra nullius’
(nobody’s land) in time of Japan’s discovery; hence, Japan’s 1895 annexation was a lawful territorial consolidation, unrelated to the
war between Qing dynasty China and Meiji Japan in the nineteenth century (Smith, 2013, p. 29). In the aftermath of World
War II, the USA assumed administrative control of the islands as part of its greater governing
responsibilities over Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain. During those years, neither China nor Japan
was in a position to challenge the regional order designed by the rising superpower . In addition, the
relative power was in Japan’s favour not because Japan had a major military clout but because it
was firmly placed under the US security umbrella together with economic and diplomatic support
from Washington. On the other hand, Beijing was preoccupied with the task of building a communist state on the ruins left by
years of the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War while starting to face its diplomatic isolation at the dawn of the Sino-
Soviet split. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were not highly valued by either China or Japan until the discovery of potentially
substantial energy deposits around the area in late 1960s and the Okinawa Reversion in the early 1970s that granted Japan the
administrative control of the islands. Tokyo’s claims to the island chain were contested by Beijing (and Taipei) ‘particularly during the
time when the United States returned Okinawa to Japan’ (Q. Zhao, 2013, p. 47). This development led Washington to take a middle
way that was to return administrative rights to Japan while asserting its neutrality doctrine on the sovereignty question and
describing the Okinawa Reversion Treaty not affecting the islands’ legal status. It meant, according to then-Secretary of State
William Rogers, ‘whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into
effect’ (quoted in Susumu & Selden, 2014). Nevertheless, the US neutrality doctrine was insufficient to bring
about a diplomatic breakthrough and address the discontents among the parties involved .
Instead of ultimately solving the controversy, it placed the given issue at the centre of a
historically charged sovereignty dispute, which has been pushed to the forefront of Sino-Japan
relations more recently along with the regional power shift and the resurgence of nationalism on
both sides .6 Concurrently, mounting tensions over the islands have further activated the
collective memories inside both countries, raising the stakes for Beijing and Tokyo in shrewdly
connecting the East China Sea issue with the sense of national identity and pride . Especially with
an acceleration of the regional power shift in recent years, ‘there has been a vicious cycle’ of the
clash of nationalistic sentiments in both China and Japan , which has included, ‘on the Chinese
side, reviving and reinforcing memories of Japan’s wartime aggression and, on the Japanese
side, efforts to obscure or deny aspects of wartime history—which in turn provokes reactions
from Japan’s Asian neighbours’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in Johnson, 2016). Beyond the security, economic and
geopolitical challenges, therefore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has been ‘an identity-based conflict in
which the two nations’ divergent perceptions, attitudes and intentions interact intensely with one
another’; such an identity-based conflict combined with the growing shift in regional power parity
could further stimulate the opposing nations’ historical experiences to influence ‘the present
crisis, and activate their collective traumas and glories’ that keep bedeviling their ties (Arai & Wang,
2013, p. 99). Heightened anxiety on both sides and tougher rhetoric taken by Beijing and Tokyo
regarding this issue illustrate the growing complexity of politics of nationalism . This phenomenon
has been reflected in (and reinforced by) each country’s foreign policy against the backdrop of
shifting regional power dynamics and simmering potential for the emergence of new security
order . Thus, the given dispute is embedded in a much more substantial and intricate controversy than Sino-Japan competition for
geostrategic manoeuvres or expected energy deposits in the area. In the past, however, the dispute was not considered as a major
obstacle that could prevent Sino-Japan normalization due to higher political priorities and strategic considerations within both
countries as well as the relatively steady regional order, which kept potentially destabilizing nationalist passions at bay.
Notwithstanding their disagreement over the territoriality of the islands, both sides demonstrated restraint as neither was interested
After
in letting the given issue undermine the prospect of consolidating bilateral ties, the priorities shared by Beijing and Tokyo.
the revelation of Washington’s intention to normalize its diplomatic relations with Beijing, Tokyo
pushed further to seek rapprochement with its communist neighbour as a precaution for the
potential change in the post-war regional security order away from Japan’s unique advantage as
an exclusive partner of the USA . During the time of the Sino-Japan rapprochement, China, with
Japan’s concurrence, ‘demonstrated that, while the island controversy was important, it was
subsidiary to Beijing’s larger political goals vis-à-vis Japan’ (Smith, 2013, p. 37). Then, Japanese Prime
Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a ‘tacit’ agreement to shelve the islands dispute and leave the
Diaoyu/Senkaku issue to the ‘next generation’, which ‘would be wise enough to find good solutions satisfactory to all’ (Yang, 2013,
p. 25). According to the Chinese records on the conversation between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou in 1972, Zhou
indicated China’s preference to defer the East China Sea issue for the sake of more urgent task of normalizing Sino-Japan relations.
Tanaka did not challenge Zhou’s unwillingness to discuss the island dispute, concurring on the Chinese view to ‘talk about it
sometime in the future’ (Jiping, 2012).7 For decades thereafter, the Chinese government took a markedly restrained approach,
playing down the issue to maintain stable Sino-Japan ties as a necessary condition for China’s economic growth and prevent any
nationalistic pro-Diaoyu demonstrations from escalating into anti-Japanese protests. Likewise, the Japanese leadership was ‘mindful
of the effect a return to “old” nationalism would have on its relationship with China’, and remained ambivalent about the nationalistic
inclination on the islands issue (Rose, 2000, pp. 178–179). Despite their disagreements over a range of disputes including the
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, economic ties were taken as shared priorities. In addition, the lack of capacity
and willingness on both sides to revise the US-led regional order worked as a powerful force to
prevent Beijing and Tokyo from letting their nationalist passions spiralling out of control .
Although nationalism was an important political component in both countries, the development of
Chinese and Japanese nationalism was more about domestic debates with domestic claims, thus
not a powerful enough force that could adversely affect Sino-Japan relations . In retrospect, Beijing’s
pragmatic posture would work as one of the key contributing factors to the Sino-Japan power
shift by facilitating China’s rapid rise in the following decades . Inevitably, however, the politics of
nationalism regarding the East China Sea dispute would become more complicated in the
regional environment, created by China’s growing clout combined with Japan’s increasingly
overt resistance to the power shift and the emergence of new security order less favourable to its
interests . The changing regional security and economic power dynamics have drawn Beijing and
Tokyo further into the politics of nationalism at the cost of bringing both sides closer to the edge
of military confrontation . In effect, the power shift in East Asia has raised the stake in the
longstanding tension over the East China Sea as this is where the Sino-Japan clash of
nationalism and battle for supremacy are likely to occur during the course of China’s attempt to
revise the existing order and Japan’s resistance to the rise of China-led regional security system .
Especially for Beijing, the East China Sea (as well as the South China Sea where another row
over disputed islands is on-going) is not merely a stage where it tries to flex its muscles and
show-off its newly gained power but also an importance piece to complete the overall picture of
China’s re-emergence as a dominant player in the region after its century of humiliation . China’s
extraordinary growth over the past quarter century has not only led to a surge of national pride but also provided the country more
resources to invest in military modernization, through which to fulfil its growing strategic ambitions to reclaim its place in the sun.8
The East China Sea dispute is particularly complicated because it is an issue, deeply rooted in the lingering animosity and
unresolved historical grievances between China and Japan. China’s pursuit of national rejuvenation revolves around closely
interrelated objectives, including its re-emergence as the leading architect of the security order in East Asia as well as the shedding
the Chinese
of its national disgrace imposed by the imperial Japan and other Western powers over the past centuries. Herein,
aspiration to surpass Japan geo-strategically, economically and otherwise is a major part of their
vision of national rejuvenation given that the legacy of Chinese humiliation was closely
associated with Japan’s relative superiority over China in the past . This sheds important light on
‘why Beijing places significance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue’ and demonstrates greater
emotional and nationalistic attachments to this matter compared to ‘other territorial disputes , such
as the ones involving Vietnam, India, and the Philippines’ (Wu, 2013, p. 70). At the same time, Beijing has been more cautious in
dealing with the East China Sea dispute and demonstrating its assertiveness vis-à-vis Japan. Unlike the South China Sea disputes,
which have gained greater attention in recent years due to Beijing’s controversial land reclamation and militarization in contested
waters, the East China Sea has been quieter even with a few high-profile developments, including Japan’s nationalization of the
disputed islands and China’s declaration of air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the area. This is not only because Sino-Japan
power asymmetry has been less extreme compared to China’s relations with each individual claimant in the South China Sea
disputes but also because Japan’s alliance with the US has been more consolidated with greater strategic capacity to contain
China’s blatant expansionism in the East China Sea. However, this pattern of relative calmness may not last
given the on-going regional power shift combined with their mutual distrust and intensifying
nationalism, embedded in bitter memories of shared history between China and Japan . Although the
longstanding East China Sea impasse appears to have been better managed compared to the maritime disputes in the South China
Sea, the Sino-Japan territorial row could become even more volatile in the long run with the clash
of power and nationalism on both sides during their contest for supremacy in East Asia .
Furthermore, there remains a dangerous potential for the convergence of increasingly explosive
territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas . This could happen if what Japan sees as China’s blatant
expansionism into the South China Sea toughens Japanese policy towards China in general and the East China Sea issue in
particular, further hardening China’s dealing with Japan regarding the islands dispute and beyond. In fact, Japan has been more
vocal against China’s large-scale land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, implying that Beijing’s increasingly
assertive posture towards the South China Sea disputes could be replicated in the East China Sea (AFP, 2016). Japan’s growing
fear is that it might lose its regional leverage while having to deal with China’s rising military might and increasingly unyielding
territorial claims, reinforced by the surge of Chinese nationalistic fervour. Concurrently, Japan’s own nationalist impulses have
increased to the extent to enable conservative elements in Japanese politics to start pushing for a more resolute security posture
and bolstering its own military capabilities.9 In September 2015, for example, Japan enacted bills expanding the scope of its pacifist
constitution’s limits on military by allowing the country to deploy troops abroad to help allies fight in the name of collective self-
defence. Despite domestic and regional concerns over the potential end of Japan’s post-war
pacifism and the growing danger of Japan being ensnared in US-led conflicts, Prime Minister Abe
emphasized the need for his country’s defence policy shift to ‘meet new challenges such as from
a rising China’ (Sieg, 2015).10 In a larger sense, this measure could affect Sino-Japan tensions over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by further complicating the security dilemma between the two states and
their aggregated military might through alliance relations (or lack thereof) with other major
powers such as the USA . Also, it has become more likely to see an open clash between Japan’s
aspiration to maintain the status quo, including its de facto control over the islands, and China’s
effort to ‘correct’ past injustices such as the loss of sovereignty over what it considers its own
territory. There has always been a critical perception gap between the two sides over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and mutual
suspicion about the other side’s long-term objectives to alter the status quo by manipulating the given dispute. What’s
relatively unprecedented, however, is that the evolving economic and geostrategic power parity,
caused by China’s rise and Japan’s new defence policy, have raised the stake of the issue along
with the chances for overt confrontation between the two states . Pew Research Center’s 2016 survey,
‘Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan’, shows the continuing salience of historically rooted mutual distrust and scepticism about the
future of Sino-Japanese relations (Stokes, 2016). Viewing each other as violent and with disdain, majorities in Japan and China are
concerned about a prolonged dispute regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands with 80 per cent of Japanese and 59 per
cent Chinese fear military clash around the East China Sea. Herein, more Japanese (35%) than Chinese (18%) are ‘very concerned’
about a potential conflict over their territorial disputes. What accounts for this different degree of security concern over the same
issue is the major regional power shift with China becoming more formidable in various dimensions whereas Japan is becoming
relatively less dominant in East Asia.11 This change has created uncertainty, further reinforcing historically rooted tensions like the
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and ‘nationalist sentiments on both sides, as people in Japan feel anxiety at China’s rising power, and
people in China feel that the rest of the world does not sufficiently respect their country’s newfound status’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in
Johnson, 2016). Departing from their previous positions of playing down the question of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus
islands, both Beijing and Tokyo have begun to use military assets in recent years to reinforce their respective claims within the
disputed area (O’Rourke, 2014; Valencia, 2007). Although Beijing and Tokyo managed to reach an agreement in 2008 to co-
develop the East China Sea that could have facilitated joint resources explorations, this deal was scuttled by the 2010 fishing boat
collision incident, widely considered as a turning point of bilateral relations that sparked China-Japan diplomatic row. Eventually, a
series of retaliatory diplomatic paroxysm and economic pressure taken by China forced the Japanese government to end the crisis
in line with Beijing’s terms of resolution, including the release of the Chinese boat captain, but also fuelled Japan’s anti-Chinese
nationalist sentiment (Bradsher, 2010). Sino-Japanese relations have been further strained since 2012 when Tokyo decided to
nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Japanese government considered that nationalization was necessary to prevent the
then Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, known for his fiery nationalism, from purchasing the islands and making them a playground
for more dangerous moves, causing serious diplomatic fallout in Sino-Japan ties. However, Beijing took it as a severely provocative
and calculated measure designed to perpetuate Japanese occupation of Chinese territory by distorting the sovereign status of the
disputed islands. The Chinese saw Tokyo’s nationalization of the islands an unacceptable infringement of China’s sovereignty and
‘conspiracy between Ishihara and the Japanese government’ to justify the purchase so as to ‘move from de facto administrative
control to a more de jure exercise of sovereignty’ (Wang, 2013, p. 12). The tension over Japan’s nationalization of the islands has
forced Sino-Japan relations to hit a new low, adversely affecting bilateral trade and travel while demonstrators, sometimes violently,
staging protests in both countries. The economic impact caused by the demonstrations became so severe that Christine Lagarde,
the chief of the International Monetary Fund, warned against the negative consequences that deteriorating ties between China and
The US-Japan alliance,
Japan, ‘distracted by territorial division’, could make on the global economy (quoted in Chan, 2012).
under which Washington is committed to Japan’s security, has further complicated the matter .
This arrangement has placed the East China Sea dispute in a more complex and strategically
dangerous context given the potential for mounting friction between China and Japan escalating
into regional conflicts with global implications . Notwithstanding US declaration of neutrality on
the sovereignty issue regarding the East China Sea dispute, Washington has supported Japan’s
administrative rights over the islands and signalled the US willingness to defend the disputed
waters in case of military contingency in line with the US-Japan defence treaty . During the 1970s and
1980s, the US officials used intentionally ambiguous language, stating their ‘personal’ views that
the Mutual Security Treaty ‘could be interpreted’ to cover the disputed islands (Smith, 2013, p. 40).
This gave Beijing some breathing space when dealing with Tokyo (as well as the nationalistic
Chinese public) regarding the East China Sea controversy. Unlike the previously cautious use of
language, the US officials have been more unequivocal in recent years when it comes to
discussing whether the disputed islands would fall within the scope of the alliance . These
changes could be seen as a reflection of Washington’s aspiration to maintain American
hegemony by consolidating its alliance with Tokyo and countering Beijing’s growing ambitions
for regaining regional supremacy through attempting to revise the US-led order in East Asia . During
press conference at the US embassy in Tokyo in October 2010, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Kurt Campbell dispelled Washington’s long-held policy of strategic ambiguity by stating ‘very clearly about the applicability of
Article V’ of the Security Treaty to the islands (US Department of State, 2010). Likewise, the then President Barack Obama
acknowledged US treaty obligations to Japan in April 2014 by asserting that Washington would
come to Tokyo’s aid in case of conflict in the East China Sea . Even while emphasizing Sino-Japan diplomacy
for a peaceful resolution to the longstanding territorial row and Washington’s neutrality in the sovereignty dispute, Obama
emphasized that the US ‘commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five covers all
territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands’ (The White House, 2014). In a
similar vein, US Defense Secretary James Mattis under President Donald Trump has reaffirmed Washington’s continuing
recognition of Japan’s administrative control of ‘the Senkaku Islands … [which] fall within the scope of article five of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty’ (US Department of State, 2017). For decades, US leadership in East Asia facilitated a relatively stable regional
order, peace and prosperity. America’s uncontested primacy also allowed this superpower enough
wiggle room to embrace strategic ambiguity when dealing with many delicate and intractable
regional problems, including the East China Sea issue . As asserted by White (2015), however, this
era seems to have come to an end with China ‘resuming the challenge to US power in Asia’,
forcing Washington to take a more resolute stance to preserve its hegemonic influence .
Paradoxically, Washington’s policy shift from reserved strategic support towards greater clarity
has exacerbated the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue by nudging Tokyo towards implementing
controversial measures, including the nationalization of the disputed islands, so as to reinforce
Japan’s claims over the East China Sea . US security assurances to Japan have also aggravated
Sino-American tensions with the possibility of major power conflict by provoking increasingly
confident and nationalistic China to see the issue not merely as a Sino-Japan bilateral dispute
but also a part of America’s hegemonic strategy to constrain China’s rise by joining forces with
Japan’s anti-Chinese nationalists . From China’s perspective, the US involvement in the East
China Sea dispute is closely linked to the regional power shift caused by China’s rise and
America’s larger strategic objectives to prevent this emerging Asian giant from challenging the
post-war East Asian order, underpinned by the US-Japan alliance . Herein, Beijing has interpreted
Washington’s security affirmation of defending Tokyo’s administration of the East China Sea
islands ‘a carefully calculated scheme to cage the rapidly developing [China] by rallying U.S.
allies and reinforcing U.S. presence’ (Xinhua, 2014a).
 Crisis Escalation Impacts
Goes nuclear
Hallinan 16 (Conn M, PhD in Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley, independent journalist, “Dangerous
Seas: China & The U.S.”, 8/17, International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/17/dangerous-seas-china-u-s/) **NCC
Packet 2020
A combination of recent events underpinned by long-running historical strains reaching back more
than 60 years has turned the western Pacific into one of the most hazardous spots on the globe .
The tension between China and the U.S. “is one of the most striking and dangerous themes in
international politics,” says The Financial Times’ longtime commentator and China hand, Gideon Rachman.¶ In just the
past five months, warships from both countries—including Washington’s closest ally in the region,
Japan—have done everything but ram one another. And, as Beijing continues to build bases on scattered islands
in the South China Sea, the U.S. is deploying long-range nuclear capable strategic bombers in Australia
and Guam.¶ At times the rhetoric from both sides is chilling. When Washington sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the
area, Chinese defense ministry spokesman Yang Yujun cautioned the Americans to “be careful.” While one U.S. admiral suggested
drawing “the line” at the Spratly Islands close to the Philippines, an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times warned
that U.S. actions “raised the risk of physical confrontation with China.” The newspaper went on to warn that
“if the United States’ bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a U.S.-China war is
inevitable in the South China Sea.”¶ Earlier this month China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan said Beijing should
prepare for a “people’s war at sea.”¶ Add to this the appointment of an extreme right-wing nationalist as
Japan’s defense minister and the decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile interceptors in South
Korea and the term “volatile region” is a major understatement. ¶ Some of these tensions go back to the 1951
Treaty of San Francisco that officially ended WW II in Asia. That document, according to Canadian researcher Kimie Hara, was
drawn up to be deliberately ambiguous about the ownership of a scatter of islands and reefs in the East and South China seas. That
ambiguity set up tensions in the region that Washington could then exploit to keep potential rivals off balance. ¶ The current
standoff between China and Japan over the Senkakus/Diaoyu islands—the Japanese use the former name, the
Chinese the latter—is a direct outcome of the Treaty. While Washington has no official position on which country
owns the tiny uninhabited archipelago, it is committed to defend Japan in case of any military conflict with
China . On Aug. 2 the Japanese Defense Ministry accused China of engaging in “dangerous acts that could cause unintended
consequences.”¶ Tokyo’s new defense minister, Tomomi Inada, is a regular visitor to the Yasukuni shrine that honors Japan’s war
criminals, and she is a critic of the post-war Tokyo war crimes trials. She also has called for re-examining the 1937 Nanjing
massacre that saw Japanese troops murder as many as 300,000 Chinese. Her appointment by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems
almost calculated to anger Beijing.¶ Abe is also pushing hard to overturn a part of the Japanese
constitution that bars Tokyo from using its military forces for anything but defending itself. Japan
has one of the largest and most sophisticated navies in the world. ¶ Over the past several weeks, Chinese
Coast Guard vessels and fishing boats have challenged Japan’s territorial claims on the islands, and Chinese and Japanese
warplanes have been playing chicken. In one particularly worrisome incident, a Japanese fighter locked its combat
radar on a Chinese fighter-bomber. ¶ Behind the bellicose behavior on the China and U.S. sides is
underlying insecurity, a dangerous condition when two nuclear-armed powers are at
loggerheads.¶ From Beijing’s perspective, Washington is trying to “contain” China by ringing it
with American allies, much as the U.S. did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War . Given recent moves
in the region, it is hard to argue with Beijing’s conclusion. ¶ After a 20-year absence, the U.S. military is back in the
Philippines. Washington is deploying anti-missile systems in South Korea and Japan and
deepening its military relations with Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and India. The Obama
administration’s “Asia pivot” has shifted the bulk of U.S. armed forces from the Atlantic and the
Middle East to Asia. Washington’s Air Sea Battle strategy—just renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons”—envisions neutralizing China’s ability to defend its home waters. ¶ China is in the process of
modernizing much of its military, in large part because Beijing was spooked by two American
operations . First, the Chinese were stunned by how quickly the U.S. military annihilated the Iraqi
army in the first Gulf War, with virtually no casualties on the American side. Then there was having to back down in 1996,
when the Clinton administration deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups in the Taiwan Straits during a period of sharp tension
between Beijing and Taipei.¶ In spite of all its upgrades, however, China’s military is a long ways from being able to challenge the
U.S. The Chinese navy has one small aircraft carrier, the U.S. has 10 enormous ones, plus a nuclear arsenal vastly bigger than
Beijing’s modest force. China’s last war was its disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and the general U.S. view of the Chinese
military is that it is a paper dragon. ¶ That thinking is paralleled in Japan, which is worrisome. Japan’s aggressive
nationalist government is more likely to initiate something with China than is the U.S. For instance,
the crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyus was started by Japan. First, Tokyo violated an agreement with Beijing by
arresting some Chinese fishermen and then unilaterally annexed the islands. The Japanese military has always had
an over-inflated opinion of itself and traditionally underestimated Chinese capabilities. ¶ In short, the
U.S. and Japan are not intimidated by China’s New Model Army, nor do they see it as a serious
threat. That is dangerous thinking if it leads to the conclusion that China will always back down
when a confrontation turns ugly. Belligerence and illusion are perilous companions in the current
tense atmosphere.¶ The scheduled deployment of the U.S. Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems
has convinced Beijing that the U.S. is attempting to neutralize China’s nuclear missile force, a not irrational conclusion. While anti-
missile systems are billed as “defensive,” they can just as easily be considered part of the U.S.’s basic “counterforce” strategy. The
latter calls for a first strike on an opponent’s missiles, backstopped by an anti-ballistic missile system that would destroy any enemy
missiles the first strike missed. ¶ China is pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, but, given the growing
ring of U.S. bases and deployment of anti-missile systems, that may change . China is
considering moving to a “launch on warning” strategy, which would greatly increase the
possibility of an accidental nuclear war.¶ The AirSea Battle strategy calls for conventional missile strikes aimed at
knocking out command centers and radar facilities deep into Chinese territory. But given the U.S.’s “counterforce” strategy,
Chinese commanders might assume those conventional missiles are nuclear tipped and aimed at
decapitating China’s nuclear deterrent.¶ According to Amitai Etzioni of Washington University, a former senior advisor
to President Jimmy Carter, “ China is likely to respond to what is effectively a major attack on its
mainland with all the military means at its disposal—including its stockpile of nuclear arms .”¶ A
report by the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that if China moves to “launch on warning,” such a
change “would dramatically increase the risk of a nuclear exchange by accident—a dangerous
shift that the U.S. could help to avert.”¶ President Obama is said to be considering adopting a “no first use” pledge, but
he has come up against stiff opposition from his military and the Republicans. “I would be concerned about such a policy,” says U.S.
Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James. “Having a certain degree of ambiguity is not necessarily a bad thing.” ¶ But given the
possibility of accidents—or panic by military commanders—“ ambiguity ”
increases the risk that someone could
misinterpret an action. Once a nuclear exchange begins it may be impossible to stop, particularly
knowing that the U.S. “counterforce” strategy targets an opponent’s missiles . “Use them, or lose
them” is an old saying among nuclear warriors.
Sino-Japanese tensions escalate to ECS war.
Lendon 6/21 – Senior producer for CNN Digital Worldwide in Hong Kong.
Brad Lendon, Writer and Reporter for over 20 years on Southeast Asia, Cnn, 6-21-2020, "Tiny East China Sea islands could be the
next military flashpoint in Asia," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/20/asia/china-japan-islands-dispute-hnk-intl/index.html **NCC
Packet 2020
Both Tokyo and Beijing claim the uninhabited islands, known as the Senkakus in Japan and the
Diaoyus in China, as their own, but Japan has administered them since 1972.
Tensions over the rocky chain, 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers) southwest of Tokyo, have simmered for years, and with claims over
them dating back hundreds of years, neither Japan nor China is likely to back down over territory considered a national birthright in
both capitals.
In that respect, the islands are not unlike the rocky heights of the Himalayas, where decades of tension on an ill-defined border
between the territories of China and India erupted Monday night, precipitating a clash that cost the lives of at least 20 Indian troops.
The fighting, though deadly, was relatively confined -- and the two sides have talked down the tensions in the days since.
But anunexpected flare-up in the Senkaku/Diaoyus could trigger a military confrontation between
China and the United States.
That's because the United States has a mutual defense treaty with Japan. If Japanese territory is
attacked by a foreign power, the United States is obligated to defend it.
Fears of a possible confrontation were heightened last week with the announcement from the Japanese coastguard that Chinese
government ships had been spotted in the waters close to Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands every day since mid-April, setting a new record
for the number of consecutive days.
By Friday, those sightings had reached 67 days in a row.
Taking unyielding stances
In response to the increased Chinese presence , Yoshihide Suga, Japan's chief cabinet secretary,
reasserted Tokyo's resolve at a news conference last Wednesday.
"The Senkaku Islands are under our control and are unquestionably our territory historically and
under international law. It is extremely serious that these activities continue. We will respond to the Chinese
side firmly and calmly," Suga said.
In a statement Friday, China's Foreign Ministry echoed that Japanese government's sentiments, from the reverse perspective.
"The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are an inherent part of China's territory, and it is our inherent right to carry out patrols
and law enforcement activities in these waters."
Similar comments were recently published in China's state-run Global Times newspaper. The
report, titled "Japanese conservatives disrupt recovering China-Japan ties by hyping Diaoyu
Islands dispute," criticized attempts underway in Japan's Okinawa prefecture to change the
administration of the islands, noting it could do serious harm to Japan-China relations .
On its surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous.
According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to
streamline administrative practices.
But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of Japanese territory."
It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing.
"Changing the administrative designation at this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis,"
Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times.
The vote in Ishigaki is expected at Monday's council meeting.
Before the past week, the most recent "crisis" over the islands occurred in 2012.
That year, Japan nationalized the then-privately owned islands to ward off a planned sale to Tokyo's then-governor, a hardline
nationalist who was reportedly hoping to develop the islands.On its surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of
Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous.
According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to
streamline administrative practices.
But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of Japanese territory."
It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing.
"Changing the administrative designation at this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis,"
Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times.
People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest against Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also
known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the Chinese city of Xi'an, on September 15, 2012.
The plan sparked massive and highly unusual street protests across China, amid a groundswell of nationalist sentiment.
Demonstrations turned violent as protesters hurled debris at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, ransacked Japanese stores and
restaurants and overturned Japanese cars.
In a stark illustration of how the islands are seared into the Chinese consciousness, one Chinese man was beaten into a coma by
his fellow countrymen simply because he was driving a Toyota Corolla.
A history of contention
China says its claim to the islands extend back to 1400s, when they were used as a staging point for Chinese fisherman.
However, Japan says it saw no trace of Chinese control of the islands in an 1885 survey, so it formally recognized them as
Japanese sovereign territory in 1895.
A group of settlers manufactured dried fish and collected feathers, with the islands having more than 200 inhabitants at one point,
according to Japan's Foreign Ministry.
Japan then sold the islands in 1932 to descendants of the original settlers, but the factory failed around 1940 and the islands were
eventually deserted. The Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945 only served to further cloud the issue.
The islands were administered by the US occupation force after the war. But in 1972, Washington returned them to Japan as part of
its withdrawal from Okinawa.
Self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a Chinese province, also claims ownership of the chain.
And objections to the administrative reclassification of the islands in Taiwan shows the depths to which the islands hook their
respective claimants.
Tsai Wen-yi, a city councilman in Taiwan's Yilan County, said if the Japanese change goes through, he'll organize a flotilla of fishing
boats from the area to "defend" the islands from Japan, according to a report from the Taipei Times.
Defense of the Senkaku/Diaoyus has been a priority of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in the past few years. The Council on
Foreign Relations notes Tokyo has established new military bases nearby to protect the islands. The JSDF has also been building
up its marines and drilling them on island warfare.
Although the islands are uninhabited, there are economic interests involved, according to the CFR.
The islands "have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing
areas," it says.
What could trigger a clash
It all adds up to potential trouble, says William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore
"Compared to other flashpoints in the region -- the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea's weapons programs
-- the E ast C hina S ea combines a unique and combustible mix of history , honor and territory,"
Choong wrote this month on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute in Australia.
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) paints a scenario where something easily
imaged -- the crew of a disabled ship or plane landing on one of the islands -- could turn into a
serious international incident.
"IfChinese fishing crews, coast guardsmen, or military members landed on the Senkakus , then the
J apan C oast G uard would no doubt seek to remove them in a law enforcement action. But given that
China does not recognize Japan's claims, it is certainly possible that Beijing could see this as an
escalation , which might result in a substantial military response from China ," the AMTI website
says.
Accidents of this sort are unavoidable, especially in the heat of crisis . Beijing and Tokyo need, with much
greater urgency and ambition than they have shown, to agree in advance upon ways to manage such episodes when they inevitably
occur during a major Sino—Japanese crisis.
No defense—current postures make US draw-in inevitable
William Morris 17, Upcoming MS.c student at Oxford University (“Easing A Flashpoint for War in the East China Sea”, Defense
One, August 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/08/flashpoint-war-china-deserves-more-attention/140067/) **NCC
Packet 2020
A war between the United States and China, should one occur, is less likely to start like World War II, with a belligerent
invading other sovereign nations, and more likely like W orld War I, when a regional incident involving an allied third

party triggered a descent into global catastrophe . The most likely scenario — tensions surrounding North Korea and the South China Sea
notwithstanding — is a conflict between China and Japan. Since 1951, the bilateral Security Treaty Between The

United States And Japan has obliged Washington to defend Tokyo should it go to war with, say, China. Japan and China’s
historical animosity , which stretches back centuries and reached a head in World War II, is
reflected today in each country’s overwhelmingly negative views of the other. In 2012, for example, protesters rioted in the streets of
several Chinese cities over Japanese efforts to tighten their grip on the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. These small, uninhabited islands, called the

Diaoyu chain by the Chinese, constitute one of the most significant flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region, in
part because of their vast amounts of offshore natural resources — gas, oil, fish — but even more because of their
symbolic aspects . Peter Dutton, who directs China Maritime Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, calls the Senkakus “a focal point for the challenge of power between China and Japan.”
Dutton argues that influence in the East China Sea and East Asia will be among this century’s defining issues: can Japan stem the erosion of its influence, or will the region be dominated solely by an increasingly

assertive China? Dutton also says the islands “serve as a political metaphor for domestic audiences .” In authoritarian
systems such as China, he says, “legitimacy is not automatic” and governments “have to make sure to deliver on security and nationalistic promises.” In democratic Japan, public pressure is more direct. If the

Both nations are thus

dominant Liberal Democratic Party acquiesces to Chinese expansion, it risks alienating a base that vehemently values Japanese sovereignty.

pressured by their citizens at home, while simultaneously being influenced by the geopolitical
situation in the East China Sea. Neither China nor Japan is likely to declare war outright over the Senkaku
Islands. Both nations have far too much to lose, as does the United States, which would be obliged to come to Tokyo’s defense. What is more probable is a series of

miscalculations sparked by an incident such as the seizure of an island by China, or a collision of military ships
operating in nearby waters. Popular outcry in both countries would press Tokyo and Bejing to
escalate the situation, which in turn could lead to conflict on a larger scale . Would the United States honor its agreement to
Japan in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict? Despite President Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, his administration has

offered reassurances to U.S. allies in East Asia. “The United States will maintain our close coordination and cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Japan, two democracies whose
people want peace,” Defense Secretary James Mattis said at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. “Our

commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan, to include the employment of our
most advanced capabilities, is ironclad .” Largely because of such statements, Dutton says he expects an “expanding and deepening” of the U.S.-Japan alliance in
coming years. Peter W. Singer, strategist at New America and author of Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, compares the current

climate in the East China Sea to the alliance commitments and heightened popular nationalism
that swirled in the runup to World War I. Just as the tumultuous politics of Austria-Hungary’s eastern domain did not directly concern pre-WWI Great Britain, the
Senkaku Islands have no material or symbolic significance for most Americans. Yet just as a regional incident ultimately forced London to

defend its continental allies , Washington would have to side with Japan or risk a collapse of its
own global network of alliances .
That causes US-China nuclear confrontation
Michael O’Hanlon & Gregory B. Poling 20. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the
Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy.
He is the author of The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes. Gregory B. Poling is senior fellow for
Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. He oversees research on U.S. foreign policy in the
Asia Pacific, with a focus on the maritime domain and the countries of Southeast Asia. His research interests include the South
China Sea disputes, democratization in Southeast Asia, and Asian multilateralism. “Rocks, Reefs, and Nuclear War”, written 1-14-
2020, published on CSIS, https://amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/. **NCC Packet 2020
As the 2020s begin, the world can breathe a collective sigh of relief that the U nited States has so far
avoided a major military crisis with China. Over the past decade, China challenged the lawful rights of
U.S. partners and allies in the western Pacific, built massive artificial island bases in the disputed
Spratly Islands, and actively sought control over all the waters, seabed, and airspace of the S outh
China Sea. Yet the United States has maintained its access to those waters, deterred any major Chinese use of force against its
neighbors, and helped support the efforts of Japan to maintain administrative control over the
disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. U.S. strategy has been notably less successful in preventing China
from robbing Southeast Asian partners, including U.S. ally the Philippines, of their resources and rights in the South China Sea. But
the United States has at least slowed China’s advance while avoiding war. It would be unwise, however, to assume that
the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully
denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea, attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally
sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to probe and test U.S. and allied resolve ,
provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate . Current U.S. strategic thinking could
trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to spiral out of control. That is
the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen again. War games seem to confirm
these historic lessons. One of us has taken part in numerous simulations over the last five years asking
seasoned experts and officials to role-play how Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and American
leaders might respond to crises in the South and East China Seas. The results are typically sobering. Some
end in a rapid Chinese fait accompli, such as the seizure of a disputed island with minimal cost, while U.S. and allied
leaders dither. This type of scenario would lead to considerable damage to international norms, U.S.
alliances, and American national security. Even more simulations rapidly escalate into full-scale
conflict, bringing China and the United States to the doorstep of nuclear war over stakes that no
rational observer would consider worth it. The U.S. national security community tends to view the
ability to defeat China (or Russia) in combat wherever an ally might be attacked as an essential
goal. Direct defense or prompt reversal of any aggression, no matter how small, are the
foundational principles of current strategy. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and similar mutual defense
commitments to Japan and the Philippines treat all aggression as an equally existential threat . So
in a scenario involving a Chinese landing on the Japanese-administered Senkakus or a threat to the
Sierra Madre—a derelict Philippine navy ship intentionally ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys and now housing a
dozen soldiers—American strategic culture most often leads to the conclusion that kinetic action to
retake a seized feature or outpost is justified to avoid abandoning an ally and damaging U.S.
credibility. But such an escalation, while it should be kept as an option, would be fraught. It might end
quickly, amounting to little more than a skirmish, or large-scale conflict between nuclear-armed
superpowers could ensue. Both sides would have powerful political incentives to escalate further.
Military warning and communications systems might be targeted through cyberattack or other
means in a way that sowed confusion. Escalation control could not be guaranteed—history and
military scholarship strongly suggest as much, and many war games corroborate it. Instead of relying
exclusively on such escalatory, kinetic military responses, the United States and allies should develop strategies of asymmetric
defense and counterattack. An asymmetric defense would weave the economic and diplomatic instruments of statecraft into combat
plans. The goal should be to punish Chinese aggression and strengthen the position of U.S. allies, thereby deterring further
adventurism, but without leaping several rungs up the escalation ladder as a U.S. counterstrike would. The active elements of the
strategy would center on economic warfare and diplomatic cost-imposition. For most scenarios in the East and South China Seas, it
would not be crucial for the United States to immediately reverse an act of aggression. Rather, the most important goals should be
to force China to pay an unacceptable price for such action, and at the same time keep the situation from snowballing out of control.
Those twin goals could best be achieved via economic and diplomatic rather than military punishment. The United States would
need to levy economic sanctions on Chinese entities that supported its actions. These might include construction, shipping,
telecommunications, and aviation companies supporting China’s military outposts in the South China Sea, oil and gas enterprises
violating its neighbor’s sovereign rights, and well-connected fishing and shipbuilding companies involved with its large paramilitary
force. Such responses should also involve a campaign of diplomatic isolation and public naming and shaming. U.S. military assets
should help identify, document, and disseminate evidence of Chinese aggression to the international community. This would support
the efforts of U.S. diplomats to convince partners, especially in Asia and Europe, to back a campaign to condemn and isolate China
in international forums, exclude it from prominent decision-making bodies, and explore broader international economic sanctions.
Much of this would mirror U.S. and allied responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for paramilitaries in eastern
Ukraine. As in that case, military responses would still be important but would function in a support role. For instance, it would be
crucial to strengthen U.S. and allied force posture near the site of aggression, creating a defensive line against further enemy
advance. In the case of a South China Sea incident, for instance, U.S. combat aircraft and fire bases might be rapidly deployed to
agreed-upon Philippine military bases under the United States’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with that ally. This would
bolster U.S. rapid response capabilities and hold Chinese surface vessels and military outposts at risk while giving the United States
greater control over the escalation risk. U.S. military action might also be used to support the enforcement of economic sanctions
levied in retaliation for the initial escalation. Of course, China should be expected to respond to such a strategy of asymmetric
defense with economic retaliation of its own. The United States should therefore work to strengthen economic resiliency and
deterrence before a crisis occurs and encourage allies to do the same. The White House should direct the Department of Defense
to reach out to nonmilitary agencies like Treasury and Energy to develop integrated economic-military contingency plans. These
agencies should also be directed to monitor the potential vulnerabilities of the economies of the United States and its allies to
reprisals from China or other adversaries. The U.S. National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals and metals should be restored
to Cold War levels, roughly ten times greater than is the case today ($15 billion versus $1.5 billion) to ensure U.S. resilience in any
economic war. And the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, should have its mandate broadened to
incentivize, or even mandate, supply-chain diversification for key products with national security significance to avoid excessive
reliance on China. Most of all, policymakers need to be sensitized to the risks of escalation in the types of military incidents most
likely to occur between China and the United States . In most scenarios we have seen modeled, the U nited States
has either underreacted to a crisis in the South or East China Seas, at great cost to U.S. and allied
national security, or has overreacted, leading to a conflict neither side wanted. It would be
nonsensical to risk nuclear war over remote rocks and reefs, but that does not make it impossible.
It's a tinderbox—historical and political tensions overcome deterrence
Brad Lendon et al. 20, Senior producer for CNN Digital Worldwide in Hong Kong, Junko Ogura, Kaori Enjoji, Shawn Deng and
Katie Hunt, “Why this Japan-China island dispute could be Asia's next military flashpoint”
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/20/asia/china-japan-islands-dispute-hnk-intl/index.html, **NCC Packet 2020
While China is engaged in a tense border standoff with India high in the Himalayas, a small group of islands thousands
of miles away could be another military tinderbox waiting to explode. Both Tokyo and Beijing
claim the uninhabited islands, known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyus in China, as their
own, but Japan has administered them since 1972. Tensions over the rocky chain, 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers)
southwest of Tokyo, have simmered for years, and with claims over them dating back hundreds of
years, neither Japan nor China is likely to back down over territory considered a national
birthright in both capitals. In that respect, the islands are not unlike the rocky heights of the Himalayas, where decades of
tension on an ill-defined border between the territories of China and India erupted Monday night, precipitating a clash that cost the
lives of at least 20 Indian troops. The fighting, though deadly, was relatively confined -- and the two sides have talked down the
tensions in the days since. But an unexpected flare-up in the Senkaku/Diaoyus could trigger a military
confrontation between China and the United States. That's because the United States has a mutual
defense treaty with Japan. If Japanese territory is attacked by a foreign power, the U nited States is
obligated to defend it. Fears of a possible confrontation were heightened last week with the announcement
from the Japanese coastguard that Chinese government ships had been spotted in the waters close to
Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands every day since mid-April, setting a new record for the number of consecutive
days. By Friday, those sightings had reached 67 days in a row. Taking unyielding stances In response to the increased
Chinese presence, Yoshihide Suga, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, reasserted Tokyo's resolve at a news conference last
Wednesday. "The Senkaku Islands are under our control and are unquestionably our territory
historically and under international law. It is extremely serious that these activities continue. We will respond to
the Chinese side firmly and calmly," Suga said. In a statement Friday, China's Foreign Ministry echoed
that Japanese government's sentiments, from the reverse perspective . "The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated
islands are an inherent part of China's territory, and it is our inherent right to carry out patrols and law enforcement activities in these
waters." Similar comments were recently published in China's state-run Global Times newspaper. The report, titled "Japanese
conservatives disrupt recovering China-Japan ties by hyping Diaoyu Islands dispute," criticized attempts underway in Japan's
Okinawa prefecture to change the administration of the islands, noting it could do serious harm to Japan-China relations. On its
surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous.
According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to
streamline administrative practices. But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of
Japanese territory." It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing. "Changing the administrative designation at
this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis ," Li Haidong,
a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times. The vote in
Ishigaki is expected at Monday's council meeting. Before the past week, the most recent "crisis" over the islands occurred in 2012.
That year, Japan nationalized the then-privately owned islands to ward off a planned sale to Tokyo's then-governor, a hardline
nationalist who was reportedly hoping to develop the islands. People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest
against Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the
Chinese city of Xi'an, on September 15, 2012. People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest against
Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the Chinese city of Xi'an, on
September 15, 2012. The plan sparked massive and highly unusual street protests across China, amid a groundswell of nationalist
sentiment. Demonstrations turned violent as protesters hurled debris at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, ransacked Japanese
stores and restaurants and overturned Japanese cars. In a stark illustration of how the islands are seared into the Chinese
consciousness, one Chinese man was beaten into a coma by his fellow countrymen simply because he was driving a Toyota
Corolla. A history of contention China says its claim to the islands extend back to 1400s, when they were used as a staging point for
Chinese fisherman. However, Japan says it saw no trace of Chinese control of the islands in an 1885 survey, so it formally
recognized them as Japanese sovereign territory in 1895. A group of settlers manufactured dried fish and collected feathers, with
the islands having more than 200 inhabitants at one point, according to Japan's Foreign Ministry. Japan then sold the islands in
1932 to descendants of the original settlers, but the factory failed around 1940 and the islands were eventually deserted. The
Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945 only served to further cloud the issue. The islands were administered by the
US occupation force after the war. But in 1972, Washington returned them to Japan as part of its withdrawal from Okinawa. A torn
apart Japanese 'Rising Sun' flag is placed on dead fish during a demonstration in Taipei on September 14, 2010, over
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. A torn apart Japanese 'Rising Sun' flag is placed on dead fish during a demonstration in
Taipei on September 14, 2010, over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. Self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a
Chinese province, also claims ownership of the chain. And objections to the administrative reclassification of the islands in Taiwan
shows the depths to which the islands hook their respective claimants. Tsai Wen-yi, a city councilman in Taiwan's Yilan County, said
if the Japanese change goes through, he'll organize a flotilla of fishing boats from the area to "defend" the islands from Japan,
according to a report from the Taipei Times. Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces' amphibious assault vehicles hit the beach
during an amphibious landing exercise in the Philippines in 2018. Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces' amphibious assault
Defense of the
vehicles hit the beach during an amphibious landing exercise in the Philippines in 2018.
Senkaku/Diaoyus has been a priority of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in the past few years. The
Council on Foreign Relations notes Tokyo has established new military bases nearby to protect
the islands. The JSDF has also been building up its marines and drilling them on island warfare.
Although the islands are uninhabited, there are economic interests involved , according to the CFR. The islands
"have potential oil and natural gas reserves , are near prominent shipping routes , and are
surrounded by rich fishing areas ," it says. What could trigger a clash It all adds up to potential trouble, says
William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore "Compared to other flashpoints in the
region -- the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea's weapons programs -- the East China
Sea combines a unique and combustible mix of history, honor and territory ," Choong wrote this month
on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute in Australia. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative ( AMTI)
paints a scenario where something easily imaged -- the crew of a disabled ship or plane landing
on one of the islands -- could turn into a serious international incident. "If Chinese fishing crews,
coast guardsmen, or military members landed on the Senkakus, then the Japan Coast Guard
would no doubt seek to remove them in a law enforcement action. But given that China does not
recognize Japan's claims, it is certainly possible that Beijing could see this as an escalation,
which might result in a substantial military response from China," the AMTI website says. In the current
climate in the Indo-Pacific, China is indicating it's ready to push its claims. For example, in the South China Sea, China has moved
aircraft onto the man-made islands it has built up; it has sunk one Vietnamese fishing boat and and rammed another; it has
harassed a Malaysian-chartered survey ship and sent one of its own into waters claimed by Indonesia; in the past few weeks alone,
Chinese warplanes have been warned off by Taiwanese fighters at least five times. And in a ironic nod to what's going
on in the East China Sea, Beijing reclassified its island claims in the South China Sea, giving the
Spratly/Nansha and Paracel/Xisha islands more prominent status in the country's governmental
hierarchy. Then there's the India-China border in the Himalayas. Before and after last Monday's deadly clash, state-run Chinese
media was heavy with stories and images of the the new military hardware Beijing could bring to bear in the mountains. Choong
argues it would be unwise to think the Senkakus/Diaoyus aren't marked for similar attention at some point. "The question is not
whether China, now the target of a full-court press by America, would want to challenge Japan over the islands. The question is
when, and how? This is what keeps Japanese (and American) policymakers awake at night," Choong wrote. CNN's Junko Ogura,
Kaori Enjoji, Shawn Deng and Katie Hunt contributed to this report.
No alt causes—alliance commitments are the most likely internal link for war AND
outweighs other Asia conflicts
Ryan Hass 17, Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings
Institution (“Risk of U.S.-China confrontation in the East China Sea”, Brookings, December 2017,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/risk-of-u-s-china-confrontation-in-the-east-china-sea/) **NCC Packet 2020
Recent press reporting of continuing Chinese construction activities at its reclaimed islands in
the South China Sea has revived focus on maritime issues. These latest stories layer on top of a large body of
commentary in recent years about the risk of a great power clash between the United States and China in the South China Sea. During this same
period, the maritime dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea garnered less
attention . Unlike the South China Sea, there were no new islands being constructed out of sand, no high-stakes arbitral rulings, and no sharp
policy debates in Washington that spilled out into the press. Despite the lower profile, the dispute in the East China

Sea may carry greater risk of drawing the United States into conflict with China than the various
disputes in the South China Sea. Here’s why: First, the situation in the South China Sea is and will
remain at a stalemate. As Singaporean official Bilahari Kausikan has observed, Washington cannot force Beijing to
abandon the artificial islands it has constructed or stop China from deploying military assets on
them without risking a military conflict. By the same standard, China cannot stop the United States from operating in the area
without risking a major conflict that would expose Chinese forces to significant risk of defeat and potentially result in the rapid destruction of its artificial
islands. In other words, neither roll-back nor exclusion are policy options that attract serious consideration by governments in Beijing or Washington.
Second, the geopolitical temperature on the South China Sea has gone down considerably over
the past year. Reasons for this include: President Trump’s de-emphasis of the issue as an element of the U.S.-China relationship; Beijing’s
prioritization of regional economic integration via the Belt and Road Initiative; and Southeast Asian countries’ growing wariness of poking China on the
South China Sea and preference instead for focusing on regional connectivity and negotiations toward a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct. Third, risk-
Whereas the United States and China
mitigation measures are more mature in the South China Sea than the East China Sea.
have implemented protocols to prevent unsafe and unprofessional encounters at sea or in the air
and gained experience managing incidents when they arise, the same types of risk management
mechanisms are not in place between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Fourth, and relatedly, the
frequency of close-in encounters between Chinese and Japanese ships and aircraft in the East China Sea is intensifying. This trend likely will
accelerate as China and Japan each follow through on plans to introduce more air and maritime capabilities to defend their contested claims in the
East China Sea. Fifth, China and Japan have a hardened view of each other as strategic competitors .
Events in the East China Sea take on heightened significance because the dispute is perceived in
both countries as a proxy for how they will relate to each other as Asian powers . On top of that, recent
history has demonstrated that incidents in the East China Sea can activate public emotions
rapidly and, in so doing, limit political space for leaders in Beijing and Tokyo to de-escalate . Against
this backdrop, the United States has three top national interests in the South and East China Sea s that it
must protect: (1) uphold the global credibility of U.S. alliance commitments; (2) preserve
unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight for civilian and military assets; and (3) maintain
sufficient stability to enable constructive relations with China. As a matter of global policy, the United States does not
take a position on various claims, does not have a preferred outcome to the disputes, and typically does not seek to mediate. Rather, U.S.
strategy concentrates on protecting allies, keeping the sea and air space open, and creating
conditions that are conducive for claimants to manage and peacefully resolve disputes over time.
Based on these narrow national interests, the two most likely U.S.-China conflict-precipitating
scenarios in the South and East China Seas would be a Chinese clash with a U.S. ally that triggered a U.S.
alliance commitment, or a Chinese attempt to deny access to aircraft or vessels operating in accordance with customary international law.
Any attempt by China to close down waterways or airspace from lawful civilian or military activities would risk triggering a sharp international response,
Under present conditions, Beijing likely would not assume such risk . The
potentially leading to military conflict.

other scenario, which is the most proximate risk, would be an event that implicates U.S. alliance
commitments . Among the various claimants with whom China has a maritime dispute, the United States maintains alliance relationships with
the Philippines and Japan. Manila and Beijing currently enjoy warm relations, which mitigates risk of a
clash. The Philippines also has limited operational presence in waters and airspace in the South China Sea, which reduces the potential of
inadvertent incidents. And Washington has signaled clearly and credibly to Beijing that any Chinese attempt to forcibly seize features claimed by
Manila could risk implicating U.S. alliance commitments. None of this precludes the possibility that Beijing could attempt to forcibly seize Philippines-
There is greater risk of an unintended incident between
claimed features, but it limits the likelihood of such a scenario.

Chinese and Japanese forces operating in the East China Sea . This is due to the frequency of close-in operations
involving Chinese and Japanese assets, the absence of mature risk-reduction mechanisms, and the lack of consensus between Beijing and Tokyo on
Given these factors, there is non-
lines of demarcation and acceptable behaviors in areas around the Senkaku Islands.
negligible risk of an unintended collision in air or at sea that could trigger rapid escalation and
quickly implicate U.S. alliance commitments.
 Solvency
The entrapment dilemma is the controlling dynamic for escalation---undermines
crisis signaling and aggrandizes Japan, but the plan’s signal on this particular
issue solves.
Rapp-Hopper 12 – PhD, Fellow in the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Director of
CSIS’s Maritime Transparency Initiative
Mira, “An Ominous Pledge,” September 26, https://thediplomat.com/2012/09/uncharted-waters-for-extended-deterrence-in-east-
china-sea/ **NCC Packet 2020
The Senkakus are different however. Because the islands are uninhabited , the question of what
would constitute an unprovoked attack on Japan is less clear . There are no citizens , either Japanese or
American, who are at risk, and there are certainly no military bases or “trip wire” forces . And despite
the U.S. position that the treaty covers the Senkakus , one could not blame the Japanese for
worrying that their alliance partner may not see the same vested interest in defending the islands as they
would in defending Tokyo. Behind closed doors, U.S. officials have presumably reiterated and explicated their commitment to
defending the islands. But American
officials may not have an incentive to doggedly insist that the U.S.
military will defend the Senkakus as though they were the American homeland.
The reason for this is the problem of moral hazard . An ironclad alliance promise for joint defense
of the islands could theoretically create some perverse incentives when the next row with China occurs.
An unflappable belief in U.S. support on this particular issue could lead the Japanese take a
harder line than they would if they were slightly less sure about how the security guarantee
applied to the islands . There is no reason to believe that the Japanese would escalate a crisis
irresponsibly, and crisis communication between the allies has historically been excellent. But a further complication
is this: In both the recent row and the 2010 standoff , both China and Japan engaged in very low-
level provocations . One hopes that the conflict will not rise above this threshold at any point in the
future. But if a Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute were to involve a serious use of force in the future, it could be
very difficult to decide “who started it.” Was the Chinese movement of maritime vessels the first
move, or was the Japanese purchase of the islands a provocation? In the first case the U.S.
security guarantee is triggered ; in the second case it is not. These alliance problems are
extremely difficult , but make it is easy to see why the Senkakus are their own extended
deterrence dilemma for both Tokyo and Washington .
The second problem is one of deterrence . During the Cold War, lines of amity and enmity were
reasonably clear, especially for the first two decades of that standoff. The United States had allies in NATO, its bilateral
alliances in East Asia, and pacts like ANZUS and SEATO. They were all more or less constructed in opposition to the Soviet (and
Chinese) communist threat. These lines got blurrier during Détente, and following Nixon’s opening to the PRC, but the basic point
still stood: It was reasonably obvious who was to be deterred and who was to be reassured. When a crisis erupted (say, the various
standoffs over Berlin), the United States could send clear signals that it intended to defend its allies
unequivocally. These signals included things like public statements of support and enhanced military
cooperation (e.g. symbols of commitment like joint exercises). But in this particular conflict, this kind of signaling
is not desirable.
The reason for this is that China is not an adversary , and the Obama administration has been
careful not to treat it as such. The U.S. has taken pains to stay publicly neutral on this iteration of the
territorial dispute, despite its obvious treaty commitments . Just last week, Secretary Panetta announced the decision
to place new missile defense radar in Japan—an important, but fairly routine sort of signal of military interest in an ally during a time
of crisis. The next day, however, Panetta was in China, with the primary goal of building better military-to-military ties with Beijing.
The U.S. has long exhorted the Chinese to be more forthcoming about the nature of its growing
military capabilities, and enhanced military-to-military ties are crucial. Panetta’s visit to a Chinese naval base was an
important step towards defense transparency between the two great powers. The United States’ interest in mitigating
military uncertainty with China will not and should not be a passing one . But this brings with it
its own set of challenges . The Chinese have long worried that U.S. security commitments are an
effort to contain the PRC . U.S. goals vis-à-vis China will have a major effect on the way that the
U.S. can signal to the Japanese in times of difficulty.
Contrast this , if you will, to the kinds of signals that are appropriate to send to the ROK. Following
North Korean nuclear and missile tests or acts of serious provocation like the sinking of the Cheonon or shelling of
Yeonpeon, the U.S. routinely reiterates its unequivocal commitment to stand by South Korea. The two countries
hold very public joint military exercises, and have decided to retain their longstanding joint force structure for a few more years. The
U.S.-ROK-DPRK military dynamic is by no means a desirable one, but it involves a very different type of communication than the
Sino-Japanese-American relationship, especially where deterrence and reassurance are concerned.
Reducing Japan’s intransigence over the Senkakus is key to avert a crisis, and
even if one arises, plan prevents escalation. Absent that, nuclear escalation is
inevitable.
Bandow 17 – Senior Fellow at Cato
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, Are the Senkaku
Islands worth War between China, Japan and America?, 2017, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/are-senkaku-islands-
worth-war-between-china-japan-america **NCC Packet 2020
Big wars sometimes start over small stakes . For instance, Germany’s “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von
Bismarck, presciently warned that a European war would begin as a result of “some damned
foolish thing in the Balkans.” Soon, a royal assassination spawned World War I , which spread
conflict around the globe.
National insults, trade opportunities and territorial claims also resulted in their share of stupid, counterproductive conflicts. The
assertive young American republic threatened Great Britain with war over the Canadian border and launched an invasion to
vindicate its dubious territorial claims against Mexico. A few decades later, the slightly more mature United States fought a lengthy
counterinsurgency campaign against independence‐minded Filipinos to preserve its territorial booty from the Spanish‐American
War.
Alliances sometimes accelerate the race to war . Assured of the support of Russia and Germany,
respectively, Serbia and the Austro‐Hungarian Empire were recklessly intransigent in summer
1914. Greater flexibility might not have prevented the conflict, but alliance‐backed inflexibility
ensured war.
History illustrates the dangers posed by the Asia-Pacific’s many territorial squabbles. None of the
contested claims is worth a fight , let alone a great‐power conflict. Yet they could become a
spark like that in Sarajevo a century ago. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis increased the danger on
his recent trip to Japan when he “reassured” the Abe government that Washington, DC was firmly
in its corner.
The Senkaku Islands—called the Diaoyus by China—are uninhabited rocks of limited intrinsic
value . However, they confer ocean and seabed control and corresponding fishing, navigation and hydrocarbon benefits.
Nationalist sentiments loom equally large. The islands are controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by
the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s case is serious—better, in my view, than its less credible South China Sea
claims—but Japan insists that there is no issue to discuss.
That leaves the PRC with little choice but to adopt more confrontational tactics to assert its
“rights.” Tokyo took direct control of the Senkaku Islands in 2012 to forestall their use by
nationalists for protests, which heightened tensions. The following year, China declared an A ir
D efense I dentification Z one over the islands, though so far the ADIZ has more symbolic than
real . The PRC also has engaged in fishing and oil exploration in nearby waters, sending in coast guard ships to defend Chinese
operations.
The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no
importance to America.
Japan felt secure in its intransigence after winning the Obama administration’s commitment that
the “mutual” defense treaty between the two nations covered territory administered by the central
government, even if claimed by other states . Secretary Mattis was equally explicit . He affirmed
not only Washington’s support for Japan ’s defense, but also stated, “I made clear that our
longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands. The United States will continue to recognize
Japanese administration of the islands, and as such Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
applies.” In other words, America will defend Tokyo’s contested claim.
The PRC responded sharply . The United States should “avoid making the issue more complicated
and bringing instability to the regional situation,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang
said. Indeed, he explained , the U.S.-Japan security treaty is “a product of the Cold War, which
should not impair China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights.”
Adding to the combustible atmosphere is the apparent belief—of at least some officials on both sides—that war
is inevitable . For instance, less than a year ago Trump strategist Steve Bannon expressed “no doubt”
that “we’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to ten years.” He complained that the Chinese are
“taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those.” While the Senkaku
Islands are not part of the South China Sea, the same principles apply.
War sounded almost close at Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearing. He insisted:
“We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that , first, the island‐building stops and,
second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Using force to do so
would be an act of war against any country, including America.
The Chinese responded accordingly. The P eople’s L iberation A rmy website quoted one senior
officer as stating: “A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just
slogans, they are becoming a practical reality.” He called for increased military deployments in
the region.
The political leadership is less transparent about its views—the residents of Zhongnanhai don’t typically appear on radio shows.
However, Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group opined that “the Chinese government is quite concerned about the potential for direct
President Xi Jinping appears reasonably pragmatic while ruthlessly
confrontation with the Trump administration.” Although
repressive, he isn’t likely to abandon what he sees as “core” Chinese interests . Moreover,
nationalists and unreconstructed leftists, though differing on economic policy, share a distrust of the United
States.
A mutual belief in inevitable conflict could become reality . Before World War I , a number of high‐
ranking European officials believed that war was coming . For them, it made sense to accept,
even embrace, the onset of the conflict in August 1914 and strike while victory still remained
possible.
In the case of China versus the United States, such shared sentiment may accelerate military spending. The Trump administration is
demanding increased outlays despite the lack of any serious threat to vital U.S. interests. Rather, the expanded force is to enhance
America’s ability to intervene against other nations, particularly China.
This gives the PRC an even greater incentive to respond , since the U nited S tates is challenging
what it views (and America would view, if the situation was reversed) as “core” national interests . As the United
States increases military deployments in the region, so will the PRC. After Mattis’ visit, China sent
three warships near the Senkaku Islands. The risks of a violent clash will rise accordingly.
Some Washington officials might be tempted to advocate a more aggressive approach today, while
the PRC is weaker and America is wealthier, backed by numerous allies and able to deploy a more powerful military. In this view, let
the inevitable showdown come sooner rather than later.
Alas, that could become a prescription for years if not decades of conflict . America has a vital
interest in protecting its own territory, population, and constitutional and economic systems. But
China threatens none of them. The United States has important interests in the independence of its
allies and freedom of navigation in the Asia‐Pacific region. So far, the PRC has not challenged
either of those things.
Washington understandably views its dominance of East Asia up to China’s borders as an
advantage. But it is far less important than protecting America’s own security. Such control is
not even necessary for preserving navigational freedom and allied security . More important, U.S.
policy conflicts with what Beijing views as its “core” interests. Imagine Washington’s reaction if China
attempted to maintain a similar position along the eastern seaboard and in the Caribbean. Nor does the presumption that
America could defeat the PRC offer much comfort. The price would be high. China can build
missiles and submarines faster than the United States can construct aircraft carriers. The
Chinese people would be more committed to a fight if it is seen as protecting their homeland—
more so than Americans would be prone to getting involved in a faraway conflict that hampers
Washington’s will.
Additionally, the United States count on support from allies not directly affected . Would Australia and
South Korea risk the long‐term hostility of China, which will be in their next‐door neighbor
forever? Indeed, Japan made clear that it would not join the U nited S tates’ “freedom of navigation
operations” in the South China Sea. Explained Japanese defense minister Tomomi Inada: “I told Secretary Mattis that
Japan supports the U.S. military’s freedom of navigation operation in the sea. But the [Self Defense Force] will not be sent to the
area.” Inada clearly means “supports” in quotation marks.
an American “victory” almost certainly would guarantee long‐term hostility and future
Finally,
conflict . It took two world wars to determine Germany’s place in the global order. And it took
“only” two because, after the second one, Germany ended up divided and well behind the United
States and Soviet Union. While the PRC’s collapse as a country is possible, it is unlikely. In fact,
military defeat might spur nationalist rage and result in greater centralization.
The Communist regime could fall. But that probably would spawn an authoritarian government
rather than a democracy. And any democracy is more likely to be nationalist/populist than liberal. Whether the almost
inevitable “Second Sino‐American War” likely would turn out in Washington’s favor is less clear .
There could be a third one as well, if China rebounded. The United States might find that just as battles can be
pyrrhic, so can wars. It’s an experience America should avoid.
U.S. officials have good reason to remind China of the costs of conflict and the importance of
settling even contentious territorial disputes peacefully. At the same time, however, the Trump
administration should avoid issuing blank checks to allies seeming to exempt them from having
to deal with, and even discuss, those same territorial challenges . Sometimes blank checks get
cashed with disastrous consequences , like Imperial Germany’s support for the Austro‐
Hungarian Empire , which sped Europe’s plunge into the World War I abyss.
The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no
importance to America. But as the locus of a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken, they could
spark another Sino‐Japanese war , which would be disastrous . And if that turned into a Sino‐
American conflict, the consequences would be incalculable . President Donald Trump should never forget
these dangers as he confronts China’s growing ambition and power.
A number of specific activities initiated by China or Japan could escalate---our
Article V commitment is the central ingredient.
Chanlett-Avery et al., specialist in Asian affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of the Congressional
Research Service, ‘19
(Emma, Caitlin Campbell, and Joshua A. Williams, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” June 13, 2019,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf) **NCC Packet 2020
Since 2010, mutual suspicion has solidified into muted hostility over the set of uninhabited
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets , located between Taiwan and Okinawa in the East China Sea. Japanese security officials have
been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing capabilities for years, but the Senkakus dispute appears to have
convinced politicians and the broader public that Japan needs to adjust its defense posture to counter China. The long-
standing but largely quiet dispute suddenly came to the fore in 2010, when the Japan Coast Guard
arrested and detained the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel after it collided with two Japan Coast Guard
ships near the Senkakus. The incident resulted in a diplomatic standoff, with Beijing suspending high-level exchanges and
restricting exports of rare earth elements to Japan.43 In August 2012, in a move that drew sharp objections from the Chinese
government, the Japanese government purchased three of the eight land features from a private landowner in order to preempt their
sale to the Tokyo Metropolitan government under the direction of its nationalist governor at the time, Shintaro Ishihara.44
China began regularly deploying maritime law enforcement vessels near the islets
Starting in fall 2012,
and stepped up what it called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in what it called “China’s territorial
waters.” Chinese military surveillance planes reportedly entered airspace that Japan considers its
own , in what Japan’s Defense Ministry called the first such incursion in 50 years. In 2013, near-daily encounters
escalated : both countries scrambled fighter jets , Japan drafted plans to shoot down unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) that do not respond to warnings, and, according to the Japanese government, a Chinese
navy ship locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two separate
occasions.45 Chinese aircraft activity in the area contributed to an eightfold increase in the number
of scramble takeoffs by Japan Air SelfDefense Forces aircraft between Japan Fiscal Year 2010 (96 scrambles) and
calendar year 2016 (842 scrambles). The number of scrambles decreased to 602 in 2017 and 581 in 2018; there were 162 in the
first quarter of 2019.46
In November 2013, China announced an air defense identification zone ( ADIZ ) in the East China Sea that includes
airspace over the islets, a move that Japan and the United States condemned as a destabilizing step that
alters the already delicate status-quo.47 Experts argued that the ADIZ represented a new attempt by China to pressure Japan over
the dispute, and that the ADIZ— which overlaps with three other regional ADIZs—could lead to accidents or unintended clashes.
Although Chinese air forces have conducted patrols in the ADIZ, public reporting does not suggest China regularly enforces the
ADIZ against foreign military or civilian aircraft.48
Rising tensions between Japan and China have direct implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance .
The intermingling of fishing vessels , military assets , and maritime law-enforcement patrols
creates a crowded and potentially combustible situation . With limited crisis management tools,
China and Japan are at risk of escalating into direct conflict , which in turn could involve the U.S.
commitment to defend Japan . As the Senkaku dispute has resurfaced multiple times since 2010 ,
the United States reasserted its position that it would not take a position on sovereignty but that the islets
are subject to Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which stipulates that the United States
is bound to protect “the territories under the administration of Japan ” (emphasis added). Congress inserted
in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) a resolution that would appear to bolster the U.S. commitment by
stating that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over
the Senkaku Islands.” Then-President Obama used similar language when describing the U.S. alliance commitment in April 2014,
saying “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope
of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine
Japan’s administration of these islands.” 49 China’s military modernization, more assertive approach to its territorial claims, and
increased military activities around the Senkaku Islands and other southwest Japanese islands have led Japan to bolster its defense
posture in the East China Sea (see “Evolution of Japanese Defense Policy” section below.)50
Excluding senkakus from the defense pact solves
Carpenter 20 (Ted Galen-senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to the National Interest,
is the author of 12 books and more than 850 articles on international affairs, 1-9-2020, "Washington Needs to Jettison Its
Commitment to Defend the Senkakus," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-needs-jettison-its-
commitment-defend-senkakus) **NCC Packet 2020
the United States has an array of defense commitments to allies of which the costs and risks
greatly outweigh any potential benefits. Washington’s obligation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to consider
an attack on one member as an attack on all is a graphic example of such imprudence. Adding the three Baltic republics to NATO
means that the United States now is obligated to defend small, vulnerable Alliance members located directly on Russia’s border.
Such a perilous (and probably unachievable) mission does not serve America’s best interests and should
be rescinded. U.S. leaders even need to re‐evaluate some aspects of Washington’s bilateral
mutual defense treaty with Japan. There is a credible case for maintaining that alliance for at least another decade or so.
North Korea remains a disruptive factor in the region, and unlike the situation in Europe, there is no multilateral entity
comparable to the European Union to which the United States could transfer significant security
responsibilities in East Asia. China’s meteoric economic and military rise also provides an
important reason as to why the U.S.-Japan alliance remains important for regional stability and a
balance of power. However, the U.S. security pledge to Tokyo should not be a blank check. It is especially
important that a continuing defense relationship with Japan does not include backing Tokyo’s
dubious territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands—a chain of small, uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea.
Beijing emphatically disputes Tokyo’s claim to those islets (which China calls the Diaoyus), and some
nasty maritime incidents concerning the islands have occurred over the past decade. Worse, the
balance of air and naval power in the immediate area appears to be shifting in China’s favor, making U.S.
involvement in the dispute increasingly perilous. Yet U.S. leaders insist that the U.S.-Japan mutual
defense treaty include the Senkakus. James Mattis, President Donald Trump’s first secretary of defense,
reiterated that position in February 2017, affirming the U.S. commitment to defend all Japanese territory from attack.
Mattis specifically asserted that Article 5 of the defense treaty covers the Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands.
Trump himself subsequently reaffirmed that commitment in talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe. Such a bold stance was not always Washington’s official position, though. In fact, it is a rather recent
interpretation. Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to state explicitly that the alliance extended to the Senkakus: “The
policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall
within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” Obama
stated in a 2014 interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun. “And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine
Japan’s administration of these islands,” he added. Washington is exposing the United States to an
unnecessary security risk by adopting that stance. Beijing’s response to Mattis’ unequivocal support for
Tokyo’s claims was quite firm. “Diaoyu and its affiliated islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times. These are
historical facts that cannot be changed. The so‐called U.S.-Japan security treaty was a product of the Cold
War, and it should not harm China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights, ” Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Lu Kang insisted at a press conference. “We urge the U.S. side to adopt a responsible
attitude and stop making wrong remarks on the issue of the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands,” Lu
added. Washington needs to rescind any implied commitment to defend the Senkaku s. The current U.S.
position is based on a strained, revisionist interpretation of the mutual security treaty text that only the
last two U.S. administrations adopted. Worse, it needlessly inserts the United States into an
emotional territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing—one in which it is unclear which party has the better
case. It is one thing to continue a security partnership with Japan to maintain stability in East Asia
and balance China’s rising power and influence. There are at least respectable arguments in favor of such a policy,
despite the risk of exacerbating existing tensions between Washington and Beijing. But inflicting damage on America’s
relations with China—and perhaps risking a war with it—over Japan’s murky claim to uninhabited rocks is
a case of foreign policy folly. Such risks are imprudent, even though there are valuable fishing grounds and
possible energy deposits in the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. The Obama administration’s expansion
of the U.S. security obligations to Japan was profoundly unwise. A continuation of the security
relationship with Tokyo should be contingent upon the elimination of any U.S. commitment to
back Japan’s claim of the Senkakus.
 Relations Uniqueness
China-Japan relations are at a tipping point – nationalism makes ECS flashpoints
inevitable
Cho 19 (Daniel, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, “DANGEROUS ROCKS: FROM STRATEGIC MODERATION TO
STRATEGIC COMPETITION”, Thesis, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/64121/19Dec_Cho_Daniel.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y) **NCC Packet 2020
Structural changes had a strong domestic impact on both China and Japan but manifested in
uniquely different ways that nonetheless mutually reinforced the trend toward more escalatory
behavior . Specifically, structural changes produced challenges and opportunities, that
influenced, and arguably, dictated, how Chinese and Japanese leaders viewed, responded, and
reacted to the territorial dispute. The 2010-2013 escalation period was the culmination of the stresses that structural
transitions produced on the domestic audience, which eventually elevated the territorial dispute into a new level of competitive
normality. For China, the turn of the century was a decade of significant economic achievements and
social transformation. These milestone achievements translated into a renewed sense of
confidence within the CCP leadership and a more vocal and active citizenry, creating strong
pressure that would push Beijing, intentionally and unintentionally, toward a more emboldened
foreign policy posture and a stronger commitment toward reclaiming Chinese sovereignty . These
internal changes would also incentivize a more willing and militarily capable China to respond
more aggressively to the misunderstood and misinterpreted DPJ-led Japan, paving the way for
2nd stage escalation that strengthened support for a more assertive China under a more
nationalistic leader, Xi Jinping . In Japan, two decades of economic stagnation and overall
security anxiety led to increased electorate frustration toward the incumbent leadership, resulting
in the 2009 landslide victory of the DPJ over the LDP. However, the ambitious political agenda of
the inexperienced DPJ would be faced by similar domestic pressures of a more attentive
electorate coupled with a resistant political opposition, challenging the DPJ’s legitimacy and
competency in various issues, like the effective management of the S/D territorial dispute . The
DPJ’s cluttered response to domestically driven issues pertaining to the S/D territorial dispute
exacerbated the tenuous Sino-Japanese relations at the time, providing an opportunity for more
nationalistic elements in China and Japan to capitalize on the failed diplomacy . The experience
during the 2010–2013 period would not only reinforce threat perceptions, but also create
opportunities for nationalist leaders in Japan to leverage the anxiety in Japanese society for their
political agenda, paving the way for a return to Abe-led governance, committed to its long-term
vision of realizing Japan’s security normalization amidst a changing and uncertain regional
environment . The escalations that occurred at the end of the first decade of the 21st century was
significant not only because the territorial dispute has evolved into a more competitive form of
Sino-Japanese regional rivalry but also because it created an opportunity that strengthened the
legitimacy and popularity of nationalistic leaders in both countries . When placing the structural
trends, and the domestic changes that followed, within the context of the 21st century, it
highlights the increasing risk of misunderstandings that further reinforce the threat perceptions
that, in the absence of conflict-resolution mechanisms and dialogue-promoting mediums, help
facilitate an environment that is unconducive to de-escalation but instead, toward more assertive
competition with the potential for rapid escalation . Therefore, assessing the strategic implications, in particular the
risks, of the S/D territorial dispute also requires an understanding of the domestic politics driving the issue in order to avoid engaging
in armed conflict for all the wrong reasons.
Specifically – organizational changes in Chinese posture show they’re gearing up
for conflict
Patalano 20 (Alessio Patalano—Senior Lecturer In War Studies at the Department of War Studies at Kings College, 8-1-2020,
"A Gathering Storm? The Chinese ‘Attrition’ Strategy for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands," RUSI, https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-
newsbrief/chinese-attrition-strategy-senkaku) **NCC Packet 2020
A closer examination of data from the last five years would find that growing Japanese concerns
are not without foundation. Since 2015, there have been two changes in Chinese operational patterns
which appear consistent with a long-term – and largely unchanged – aim of eroding Japanese administrative control.
First, whilst the period from January to June 2020 witnessed a decrease in the number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters, the
average of eight vessels per month, indicative of a two-vessel deployment ‘routine’, is consistent
with prior patterns of four incursions per month, as experienced on average in 2019 (with peaks of groups
of four vessels per incursion). Weather conditions and fishing patterns seem to be contributing to modulate the number of vessels deployed, with the
this year’s relative
highest numbers of incursions reasonably taking place during the summer season (May to September). Second,
slowdown in the number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters has occurred against a
background of a stark climb in number of vessels spotted in the contiguous zone. Such an increase in
activities here suggests a shift in operational focus. The numbers of vessels spotted in the contiguous
zone in 2019 was much higher, and their deployments were designed to last longer and offer greater continuity. The
operational pattern indicated an intent to emphasise the continuous nature of Chinese presence –
with the possibility of promptly intervening inside the territorial waters, rather than just presence.
Thus, taken altogether, Chinese operational behaviour has changed in a fashion that would reinforce the
tactical objective of increasing the exercise of control . Higher continuity in presence in the contiguous zone allows for
more prompt deployments inside the territorial waters to ‘engage’ with foreign fishing boats, as was the case in May and July. Within this context, there
Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies
are two additional considerations worth highlighting. On the one hand,
underwent a considerable transformation, with a partial fusion of five organisations beginning in 2013, and the additional not
insignificant organisational change that led to the integration of the new Chinese Coast Guard under the command of the People’s Armed Police in
2018. These
developments meant a considerable increase in the overall tonnage available to
conduct patrols, with the Chinese Coast Guard now boasting more than 500,000 tonnes of aggregated tonnage, as opposed to the Japanese
Coast Guard’s overall 150,000 tonnes. Whilst the Chinese have to divide the force over three different theatres to cover the entire extended Chinese
This larger fleet has also been taking delivery of much improved
coastline, this remains a considerable fleet.
ocean-going capabilities over the past five years, with a considerable number of them deployed in
the East China Sea. On the other hand, the relative lack of regular media attention to events in the East
China Sea – especially when compared to the South China Sea – is understandable, given the overall decrease in numbers of spotted
vessels between the second half of 2017 and the end of 2018. One way to explain the relative reductions during this period of time is the significance of
the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship to bilateral relations. In 2018, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to visit
China in seven years, signing 52 memoranda of cooperation in a wide range of areas. In May of the same year, ahead of Abe’s visit, Tokyo and Beijing
agreed to a maritime and air communication mechanism aimed at enhancing crisis prevention in the East China Sea. The mechanism, however, did
it is
not extend to the respective coast guards, leaving what today counts for the majority of frontline encounters unaddressed. By the same token,
difficult to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the political acts taken by China and
Japan to emphasise sovereign ownership and operational behaviour . In June, the Ishigaki municipality, in the
Okinawa Prefecture, passed a bill to rename an administrative area including the Senkaku islands from ‘Tonoshiro’ to ‘Tonoshiro Senkaku’. The bill
was nominally aimed at avoiding confusion with a locale in downtown Ishigaki, but the timing seems to relate directly to the growing intrusiveness of
Chinese activities vis-à-vis local fishermen operating around the islands. In response to this, the following day the Chinese Natural Resources Ministry
revealed a list of names for 50 seabed areas which included the Senkaku islets. Whilst these actions are the latest irritants in
how Beijing and Tokyo manage the dispute, it seems fair to suggest that the broader political
picture over the past two years has had a limited impact on the broader direction of operational
behaviour. In all, it is difficult to support the notion that the pandemic created the conditions for a form of tactical opportunism in how China has
sought to advance its positions in regard to the Senkaku islands. Yet, what is certain is that neither coronavirus nor
warmer political ties have affected a Chinese pattern of behaviour that is clearly aimed at
challenging Japanese administrative control of the islands . Indeed, as the Chinese law enforcement
fleet has grown larger and more capable, the length and tactical conduct of its vessels has
changed too. In an attempt at exercising law enforcement rights on a continuous and regular fashion, Chinese Coast Guard
vessels have opted for longer deployments in the contiguous zone to develop the capacity to
intervene when Japanese fishing boats appear at the horizon . This attritional behaviour added to the already
routinised patrols inside the territorial waters to produce the long-term effect of undermining Japan’s ability to exert
effective administrative control. CONCLUSIONS: THE QUEST FOR CONTROL THAT MIGHT DAMAGE STABILITY Matthew
Goodman has recently summarised the Abe government’s economic approach to China as a three-pronged strategy: engage where possible; hedge
Political
when necessary; lead on regional and global rulemaking. Such a description certainly holds value in the maritime context too.
engagement with Beijing on the management of the dispute has been complemented by tactical
pushbacks on intrusions in the waters around the Senkakus, a quest for closer support from the
US and a degree of renewed investment in enhancing capabilities and enhanced security
coordination with the Japan Self-Defence Forces. These initiatives have also been complemented by consistent positions on
the international stage on the importance of respecting the ‘rule of law’ in the management of maritime disputes, and actions in support of freedom of
this strategy may not suffice anymore. In July, China
navigation and the maritime order in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Yet,
stepped up its game, seeking not merely to showcase presence , but rather to exercise control and as a
result directly challenge the Japanese position. The question is not whether Beijing is planning to replace Tokyo in controlling
the islands – the issue is when.Challenging Japan’s effective control was not the result of a short-term
tactical opportunism. It was a step in a long-term plan that has, at times, slowed down based on specific political circumstances, but that
has not fundamentally changed. A combination of material factors – pertaining to organisational reforms and
capability improvements – have contributed to implement a new operational practice. As the high fishing
season begins, the extent to which this new pattern of behaviour will constitute a new normal is likely
to be fully revealed. One thing is certain. Chinese behaviour is heading towards a full challenge of
Japanese control of the islands, establishing it as a contested notion first, with no indication that
it will stop at that. This matters because it suggests that bilateral relations may literally be about to
enter more troubled and choppy waters. It matters because Japanese authorities may need to soon start
reviewing where the ‘red lines’ are on the Senkakus and what are the best ways to communicate them to their Chinese
counterparts. It matters because as constabulary encounters continue to increase, mechanisms to regulate
them may become an urgent requirement. It matters because as politics in Washington enters an
electoral period, the substance of US support to Japan might become a matter of debate . It matters
because if governments in Tokyo and Beijing fail to take action to manage this attritional situation,
the East China Sea might end up being the place to gain prominence in the headlines, and it
would not be a positive development if and when that happens.

China is ramping up escalatory tactics now as part of a long-term strategy to

undermine a threatening claim of Japanese administrative control.
Patalano, reader in East Asian warfare and security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, ‘9/10/20
(Alessio, “What is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands?” https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/what-is-chinas-strategy-in-the-
senkaku-islands/) **NCC Packet 2020
Chinese operational behavior in the waters around the small group of islands under Japanese
administrative controlknown as Senkaku, and claimed by Beijing under the name Diaoyu, has entered a
new, dangerous phase . In an unprecedented move , Chinese coast guard cutters in early July
started to operate inside the islands’ territorial waters in a fashion that would suggest Beijing is
there to exercise law-enforcement powers . It appears China no longer seeks to just showcase its
“presence” in the waters around the islands. It is now starting to actively challenge Japanese
control.
For Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s successor, reviewing Tokyo’s approach to the management of this contest with Beijing
will be a strategic priority. The stakes are high , as a war game recently indicated that escalatory behavior
around the Senkaku islands takes the risk of war between Asia’s two largest economies, and
America’s most consequential ally in the Indo-Pacific , one step closer.
China’s recent moves are destabilizing , and Japan clearly stated as much in a newly released defense white paper. In
the report, the Japanese government presents the nature of the Chinese challenge to its security —
especially to the Senkaku islands — in the strongest terms yet . Chinese authorities are in fact described as
“ relentlessly ” pressing their claims to the islands with ever-increasing levels of maritime
activities undermining the status quo . Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono made clear that further
intensification of activities might trigger the intervention of Japanese military assets . In response
to Japanese concerns, the commander of U.S. military forces in Japan has stated that the United
States would help monitor the situation. Every successful step Beijing takes in undermining the status quo
around the Senkakus through coercion and force is a direct challenge to the credibility of the
U.S.-Japanese alliance and, crucially, to the principles informing the maritime rules-based order centered on the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea. While the United States is not party to this treaty, both China and Japan are, and Abe has clearly
articulated why China’s actions around the Senkakus fundamentally undermine the principles enshrined in the convention.
What is new then about these recent events, and why do they matter to the stability of the East China Sea and, more broadly, to the wider Indo-Pacific? They matter because
they highlight a shift toward what I would argue is the second phase of Beijing’s three-pronged attrition strategy toward the Senkakus: normalizing Chinese presence; exercising
law-enforcement rights; and taking over exclusive control. China’s objective is to reverse the current situation — controlling the islands at Japan’s expense — while trying to
avoid, if possible at all, an armed conflict. This, in turn, matters because it sets a precedent on dispute management that undermines the law of the sea and the maritime order it
represents. Since the islands remain uninhabited, the main focus of Chinese action is the ability to exercise maritime law-enforcement rights inside the islands’ territorial waters,
especially in regards to the monitoring of fishing activities. By keeping this contest for control firmly within the realm of the exercise of law-enforcement rights, Beijing retains the
initiative to challenge the status quo, limit the risk of war, or at least put Japanese authorities in the difficult position of pacing responses that may invite more escalation.
Phase One: Normalizing China’s Presence
How did this all start? China’s plans to use maritime law-enforcement vessels to intrude into the territorial waters around the Senkaku islands date back to 2006 and were first
put into action in December 2008. A collision in June 2006 between a Japanese coast guard vessel and a Taiwanese fishing ship had prompted authorities in Beijing to decide
to step up China’s maritime activities around the islands. Subsequently, Chinese law-enforcement vessels entered the territorial waters only sporadically: in August 2011 and
again in March and July 2012. It is likely that another collision in September 2010 — this time involving a Chinese trawler and a Japanese coast guard cutter — contributed to
the decision to deploy assets again. Japanese authorities arrested the Chinese trawler’s captain, triggering a serious political stand-off between Tokyo and Beijing that lasted
months.
The Chinese captain was eventually released, but in September 2012, after the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the Senkaku’s islands, China changed its strategy.
Authorities in Beijing abandoned the logic of occasional incursions and started deploying assets inside the territorial waters on a regular basis. The goal of this new approach
was not just to challenge the Japanese position on the sovereignty of the islands as implied by the exercise of administrative control. It was to prove that such statements could
not possibly be true by normalizing the Chinese law-enforcement presence inside the islands’ territorial waters. As politicians in Tokyo continued to deny the existence of a
territorial dispute (a denial that continues to the present day), and U.S. President Barack Obama eventually reaffirmed that Japan held administrative control over the islands,
the presence of Chinese vessels was an indispensable first step to corroborate Beijing’s claims.
Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies underwent a considerable transformation in the last decade and are today more akin to a paramilitary organization than a coast
guard. In 2013, Beijing announced a partial fusion of five organizations, and in 2018 it set in motion the integration of the new Chinese coast guard under the command of the
People’s Armed Police. These developments were not merely aimed at addressing presence requirements in the East China Sea. They were part of the Chinese Communist
Party’s ambition to transform China into a maritime power, a key step to achieve the “China Dream.” China’s maritime reforms led to a considerable increase in hulls and
firepower to conduct patrols. The Chinese coast guard boasts today more than 500,000 tons of aggregated tonnage, as opposed to the Japanese coast guard’s overall 150,000
tons, and has been taking delivery of much improved oceangoing capabilities, with a considerable number of them deployed in the East China Sea. By 2019, China had a fleet
that could do more than just exert presence, which presents the added challenge of being fully integrated in China’s Eastern Theater military command on operations related to
the Senkakus.
Phase Two: Exercising Control
On July 5, 2020, Chinese strategy changed again. On that day, two Chinese coast guard vessels set a
new milestone . They exited the islands’ territorial waters after sailing for some 39 hours and 23
minutes. This marked the longest time Chinese surface assets had ever spent inside the waters’
12-nautical-mile limit. This was no mere “incursion .” It was, as Chinese officials would have it, a
“routine” law-enforcement patrol of sovereign waters. In particular, this deployment was not an
isolated event . It followed a similarly extended foray of more than 30 hours completed just two
days prior in the same area. Taken together, these two activities represented the longest time Chinese
vessels have ever spent continuously operating inside the Senkakus’ territorial waters since September 2012.
The exercise of sovereign law-enforcement rights in territorial waters was vital to sustain Beijing’s legal claims and advance its
political narrative. This is why the length of these incursions represents a potentially important novelty in operational behavior. If the
“routinization” of deployments distinguished the first step of China’s challenge to the status quo, these new extended deployments
marked the beginning of a genuine exercise of control. During the second extended stay, the ships reportedly operated at some 4–6
miles off the islands on average, coming as close as within 2.5 miles from the shoreline. The ships also sought to
approach Japanese fishing boats at least on one occasion — an act that is consistent with the attempt at
exercising law-enforcement rights — prompting the Japan Coast Guard to deploy its own assets to counter China’s actions.
How do we know that these two events are symptomatic of a new phase of Chinese strategy ? One
important indicator is the more continuous presence in the islands’ contiguous zone (which includes
the 12 nautical miles adjacent to the territorial waters). Since January 2020, Chinese vessels have in fact been spotted in waters
around the islands for more than 100 days without interruption. This represents the longest streak since the islands were acquired
by the Japanese government in 2012. Such a continuous presence reinforces China’s ability to patrol inside
the territorial waters when needed. It seems no coincidence that the relative reduction of the
number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters in the past months has occurred against a stark
expansion in the number of vessels spotted in the contiguous zone . Higher continuity in presence
in the contiguous zone allows for more prompt deployments inside the territorial waters to engage with
foreign boats . In fact, following a case that occurred early in May, Chinese spokespersons pointed
out that Chinese vessels “tracked and monitored” a Japanese boat illegally fishing inside the territorial
waters. Chinese vessels asked the Japanese fishing boat to leave the area, and eventually “resolutely responded to the illegal
interference of the Japanese Coast Guard.”
Official Japanese figures indicate that China’s pattern of deployments and operational conduct this year are
looking like the beginning of a new normal. Last year, Chinese vessels entered the contiguous zone
around the Senkakus some 1,097 times , spending a total of 282 days there, far exceeding the previous
record of 819 times for some 232 days collected in 2013 .
The sharp increase has not gone unnoticed among the leadership in Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic
Party. In December 2019, the Liberal Democratic Party’s General Council chair, Shunichi Suzuki, had specifically raised the party’s
concerns about Chinese maritime activities, something that it expected Abe to consider as the government prepared for Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s official visit the following spring. Eventually, Xi’s visit was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but
Japan’s concerns over Chinese behavior in the East China Sea have not eased. Reportedly, Chinese authorities have warned
Japanese counterparts that many Chinese fishing boats may enter the Senkakus from August to September. However, these
intrusions would only prompt a stronger Japanese coast guard presence — reinforcing the point about Japan’s control of the
islands, which is precisely what the Chinese strategy wishes to undermine.
ECS Advantage: Credibility Crisis Scenario
 Security Dilemma Now
US-lead deterrence is ineffective and leads to nuclear war – commitments create
a credibility dilemma – China doubts we intervene and will deter us via nuclear
escalation – we risk escalation to demonstrate we are willing
Gholz et al., PhD, associate professor, political science, University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, chair of the international security section of
the International Studies Association, ‘19
(Eugene, Benjamin Friedman & Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 32) **NCC Packet 2020
Planning to fight inside China’s A2/AD envelope entails significant costs , both in terms of money and
reduced military effectiveness. The US military is developing capabilities to jam or spoof radar that would
guide Chinese missiles and attack aircraft, to improve fleet missile defenses, and to build a more survivable long-range
bomber. These are all expensive projects. Moreover, even the best tactical defenses for ships have
limited capability . Multiple attacking missiles can overwhelm the number of defensive missiles on a
ship, and the ship’s limited size means it can only carry so many ship-defense munitions.33 Worse , every ship-defense
munition loaded onto a ship takes space away from other systems and munitions that the ship needs to
conduct its (potentially offensive) mission.
The other element of the US effort to maintain its offensive operational concept involves preparing
to directly attack China’s defenses—launching air strikes to destroy thousands of Chinese
military sites like missile launchers, communications systems, fixed radar and other sensors, and various other targets relevant
to the successful operation of China’s air defenses and anti-ship missiles.34 To Beijing, these plans may look like a US
capability to destroy China’s defenses with a US first strike , perhaps aimed at overthrowing
Communist party rule . Chinese leaders may reasonably fear that the United States has offensive
strategic intentions, despite US leaders’ claims to be only interested in defending US allies. In
response, China might well arm more heavily , especially with nuclear weapons , which would drive up US
spending without achieving relative gains for the United States.35 These are the fruits of exacerbating the security
dilemma by implementing an offensive operational concept.
To Beijing, existing plans may look like a US capability to destroy China’s defenses with a first strike.
Beyond the risk of an arms race, US plans for operations that include conventional strikes against the Chinese
mainland are downright dangerous . As Georgetown University political scientist Caitlin Talmadge points out, such
strikes might push the Chinese government to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level .36 Chinese
nuclear early warning and command-and-control systems may be intermixed with the A2/AD systems that
the United States plans to destroy or blind, putting Chinese leadership in a “use it or lose it”
situation regarding their nuclear deterrent: if they are not sure that they will be able to use their nuclear systems
later, because they fear that they may be disabled or destroyed in an American first strike, Chinese leaders may decide to
launch a first strike of their own, while they still control their weapons. It is also possible that Chinese
leaders, in the early chaos and high stress of a major conventional war, might mistake a US attack on A2/AD
systems for one on China’s nuclear arsenal, leading to nuclear escalation in response to what was
intended as only a conventional war.
Even if that scenario were avoided, China might consider any bomb exploding on its home
territory to be unacceptable , and such an attack might inflame Chinese nationalism, leading China to escalate
what the United States thought of as a limited conflict . It might seem reasonable to the Chinese to retaliate
against US territories or even the US mainland.
Fears and suppositions about these escalation scenarios also reduce the credibility of current US
guarantees to its allies and increase the risk of strategic miscalculation , making war more likely.
The Chinese government may see the danger of escalation as a reason that the United States
would back down from intervening to stop Chinese aggression. And as long as US allies’ primary
defense strategy is to rely on US forces , their relative defensive weakness could tempt China to
launch an attack based on the belief that the United States would self-deter .
 to counteract that potential Chinese line of thinking, the United States might itself
Furthermore,
engage in risky behavior trying to convince the world that it is willing to intervene despite
escalation risks . That strong US commitment to constantly reinforce the credibility of its alliance
guarantees could itself precipitate crises .37
U.S. commitments in East Asia create a fundamental paradox. Because our
commitments are not credible, China will probe to undermine our aggressive
strategy. BUT---those probes make the US double down and embolden our
allies---it is a recipe for unintended conflict.
Edelstein, PhD, Associate professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at
Georgetown University, and Shifrinson, PhD, assistant professor of international affairs at the Bush School of Government
and Public Service at Texas A&M University, ‘18
(David and Joshua, “It’s a Trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment,” in U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,
Routledge, Ch. 2) **NCC Packet 2020
Since its 2010– 2011 announcement, the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political
and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in
the South and East China Seas . Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface
around some of these locales, neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in
ownership of contested areas . Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies
for what they suggest about China’s territorial ambitions. They are therefore important to the United States for
the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its
allies in their disputes with the P.R.C. by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor ,
clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and –
above all – has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the “status quo” in contravention of
China’s own interests (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015; Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016).
Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle : the
more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally
more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act
aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct US– Chinese confrontation .
In other words, treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves
requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China .
This is entrapment of the purest sort . The United States could readily provide security to its friends in
East Asia, maintain Asia’s political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian
maritime disputes . To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate
directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China
from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as
crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That
these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional
partners is in the United States’ interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.3
The second driver of entrapment comes from the response by East Asian countries themselves. It will be some time before we have
detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama administration to pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the
East Asian response since 2010–2011 suggests that moral hazard is increasing risks for the
United States. One of the most striking trends in East Asia since the pivot is the renewed
assertiveness of East Asian states in dealing with China (Johnston 2013; Associated Press 2015). This
trend includes independent action by the Japanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a
forward-leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at minimum, helps to justify a Chinese
response . Japan, Korea, and others lobbied for the pivot for the express purpose of having the United States help them manage
the rise of China – the implication being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in
increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war.
As things stand, East Asia is already witness to an arms race and militarized interstate disputes: Japan is taking
increasing military measures to confront Chinese incursions into the disputed Senkakus,
including regularly confronting Chinese aircraft flying over the disputed region (Gady 2015; Reuters
2016a; Kazianis 2016; Reynolds 2015); Vietnam and the Philippines have grown increasingly willing to confront China in the South
China Sea while deepening military ties with other countries challenged by China (Torode 2015; Vietnam Right Now 2015; Bowcott
2015; Reuters 2016b); and even Australia – which has no maritime disputes with China – has taken to militarily challenging Chinese
maritime claims (Defense News 2015; News.com.au 2015). Independently, none of these countries (except perhaps Japan) has the
wherewithal to defeat China. These
actions are almost certainly born of the expectation that the United
States will come to their aid if a dispute escalates to war .4 Thus, unless the pivot has had no effect on allied
behavior, then its main influence has been to (1) avoid bandwagoning, but (2) allow the very assertiveness the United States
nominally sought to avoid in the first place! To put the issue differently, the claims employed by Asian allies and partners to push
what became the pivot strongly suggest that it encouraged their over- assertiveness. This is moral hazard: take away
the United States’ post-pivot policy , and the East Asian allies would almost certainly not be
tilting with China to the same extent . Some smaller allies, in fact, might bandwagon altogether. If
so, this suggests the extent to which entrapment dynamics are at play.
In sum, entrapment is alive and well in terms of both the arguments employed and the policies
adopted by the United States and its allies since the late 2000s. No war has occurred, but crises are ongoing ,
and the intensity of American backing for its East Asian clients is growing . This is a recipe for
miscalculation . As American forces continue to move into the region, as American diplomacy continues to take
an anti-China flavor, and as allies simultaneously spur and build upon these trends, the United
States is approaching active involvement in the wrong conflicts , at the wrong time, and in the
wrong place. The United States has an interest in maintaining Japan and other major states as independent
actors friendly to the United States, noting their particular island disputes with China. Entrapment is alive and
well as the United States mistakes the latter for the former . And, importantly, even if the United
States decides at some point that conflict with China is necessary to protect its national interests,
the US could still be entrapped by its allies into fighting that conflict at an unwelcome time with
unattractive goals and using extraordinary means . In short, the US need not be drawn into a wholly unwelcome
war for entrapment to nonetheless occur.
This dilemma is particularly true in the ECS---our commitment to defend a bunch
of rocks is not fully credible---that enables risk-taking behavior from China to
counter our threatening behavior.
Taffer, PhD, Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, ‘19
(Andrew, “Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute,” Asian Security, February) **NCC Packet 2020
China’s shift to a coercive wedging strategy in the ECS can be traced back to the 2010 trawler
incident. Before examining the incident in detail, however, it is necessary to provide the broader context in which it unfolded.
Between 2008–10, and particularly with the advent of the Obama administration, the United States became
increasingly active diplomatically in the region, tightening its regional alliances and deepening its
security partnerships .59 It was also over this period that China’s offshore disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) grew to
become a central issue of contention in US–China relations. Collectively, these trends were almost uniformly
viewed by Chinese analysts to be representative of hostile US intentions and, as discussed in the
following, an intensification of the containment dimension of American strategy.
With respect to the SCS disputes, Chinese analysts, almost without exception, viewed the conflicts in strategic terms associated
with Sino-American competition.60 Differences at the margins notwithstanding, a preponderance of analysts and publications
affiliated with state and party organizations held that Washington’s strategy in the SCS was aimed at “containing” China.61 For
example, a 2010 article in Red Flag Manuscript, a periodical affiliated with the CCP’s Central Committee, argued, “the specific
objectives of US policy in the South China Sea are: to ensure and strengthen its military presence in the region … and to use the
South China Sea issues to contain China’s development.”62
Most Chinese analysts nevertheless acknowledged that Washington’s disposition toward Beijing
in general was far from one of unalloyed hostility . Like many Western analysts, Chinese elites
characterized US policy and strategy toward the PRC as “ two-handed,” composed of both a
cooperative and a competitive dimension .63 That is, on the one hand, Washington engaged productively with
Beijing, maintaining that “we welcome China as a strong and prosperous … member of the community of nations,”64 while, on
the other hand, it furnished the foundation to balance against – if not contain – Beijing by
strengthening its existing alliances and building new political and military relationships across the region.65 In this
regard, elite opinion in China came increasingly to characterize US policy toward the PRC as
“ contradictory .”66
An article published in the People’s Daily under the byline “Zhong Sheng,” a moniker used to express official sentiments, argued:
“On one hand, the United States will strengthen the containment of China through the so-called security guarantee obligations; on
The self-contradictory strategy will
the other hand, it also tries to prevent conflicts and confrontation with China.
certainly aggravate the complexity of the Asia-Pacific security situation, and may even cause
division [emphasis added].”67 In 2010, as Washington was deepening its alliances and security partnerships in Asia while
simultaneously declaring its aim to build a salutary political relationship with China, Beijing’s Defense White Paper of the same year
While a contradictory American strategy in this regard no doubt
averred, “contradictions are intensifying.”68
posed challenges for Beijing , it was likely also perceived to present opportunities , as argued in the
following.
2010 Trawler Incident
When Hatayoma resigned in June 2010, Naoto Kan, also of the DPJ, took his place. And while China was eager to sustain positive
momentum in Sino-Japanese relations, it was also “sensitive to indications that Kan was more of a China hawk than his
predecessor.” 69
The effort to maintain positive ties however ended with the 2010 trawler incident ,
which plunged bilateral relations into a deep freeze , and which Chinese analysts viewed in
outsized strategic terms.
The incident began when the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) arrested a Chinese trawler captain after his vessel collided with a JCG ship. Tokyo then contemplated prosecuting
the captain under Japanese domestic law, a more punitive reaction relative to its previous handling of such cases. Beijing reacted with indignation, “suspend[ing] all relations
between provincial and central government officials and their Japanese counterparts,”70 “halting shipments to Japan of … rare earth elements,”71 and detaining “four Japanese
nationals employed by Fujita Construction.”72 Most importantly, and as illustraed in Figure 1, over the next year and a half, even before talk emerged in Tokyo of purchasing
three of the S/D islands, China undertook what was at the time an unprecedented series of incursion into the waters around them.73 Over this period there were more Chinese
incursions into the islands’ territorial sea (TS) than there had been over the history of the dispute stretching back to the 1970s.74 China’s conduct in this regard constituted the
first time it had undertaken a concerted, if still subtle, effort to contest control of the islands themselves. As noted below, Beijing’s incursions also applied pressure on the US-
Japan alliance and sowed the early seeds of intra-alliance discord.
Could China’s maritime incursions not be more simply explained with reference to Japan’s unusually punitive handling of the trawler captain? While Tokyo’s conduct in this
respect can certainly help explain why Beijing adopted such a combative posture during the incident itself, it cannot explain China’s continued assertiveness following the
captain’s release – i.e., following the incident’s resolution. To the extent that China’s conduct was informed by Japan’s threat to prosecute the trawler captain and was intended
to deter it from doing so, once Tokyo released him without prosecution, a concession characterized as “a humiliating retreat” and which effectively resolved the incident in
China’s favor, Beijing’s posture should have returned to the status quo ante.75 With respect to the other punitive measures China imposed during the incident, this is precisely
what occurred. Following the captain’s release, Beijing resumed high-level official intercourse with Tokyo,76 lifted its unannounced embargo on the export of rare earths,77 and
released the Japanese businessmen that had been detained.78 That China’s maritime incursions continued suggests that they were animated by something other than the
trawler incident itself.
Chinese analysts perceived the episode as a signal event in clarifying Japan’s post-Hatoyama strategic disposition. As the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a think
tank affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued:
The boat collision was just an opportunity and excuse [for Japan] to shift policy. After the Diaoyu
boat collision incident, Japan linked the territorial dispute to the security issues , exaggerating
the “China threat theory,” seizing the opportunity to adjust its security policy, and strengthening the US–Japan
alliance…. There was nothing left of the DPJ desire under Hatoyama for a foreign policy more independent from the United
States.79
Chinese officials at this time also appear to have believed that the United States was complicit in
Japan’s assertive conduct . Following the captain’s release, Hu Zhengyue, an Assistant Foreign Affairs Minister, remarked,
“Japanese diplomatic authorities have partnered with other nations [i.e., the United States] and stepped up the heat on the Diaoyu
island issue.”80 An article appearing in Qiushi, an influential periodical published by the CCP’s Central Committee, argued, “ The
US exploited … the Diaoyu island incident to tighten its alliance … with Japan.”81 For Beijing, the
trawler incident brought into focus in the ECS the same perceived threat that had by this time
grown pronounced in the SCS . An analyst at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences argued, the United States has
“sought to use problems in the SCS … ECS, and the Diaoyu Islands to enhance its ability to counter and to contain pressure
stemming from China[’s rise].82 Lu Yaodong, a Japan scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), wrote that the
United States was “unendingly causing trouble along China’s periphery.”83
Given such a view , and because China’s maritime incursions over the next 18 months cannot be
explained primarily with reference to territorial concerns, Beijing’s conduct, it stands to reason,
was likely intended to address – i.e., counter – precisely this broader strategic threat perceived to be
posed by the United States (and Japan) . Through its incursions, China was very subtly applying
pressure on the US–Japan alliance , probing for ways to expose and exploit cleavages between
the allies just as they were, in Beijing’s view, working eagerly to strengthen their alliance . Beijing’s
conduct increased Japanese concerns regarding the US commitment to the islands and
compelled Tokyo to seek and re-seek assurances from Washington .84 Chinese incursions also alarmed
the Obama administration, which made clear its desire to see “the temperature … go down on these issues.”85 To this end,
Washington encouraged Tokyo “to discuss”86 the conflict with China – a proposition antithetical to Japan’s longstanding policy of
refusing to acknowledge, much less discuss, its existence.87
By applying pressure on the contested territories, Beijing,
it appears, was beginning to use the S/D dispute to
flesh out the “contradictions” perceived to characterize US strategy – i.e., although Washington was eager
to tighten its alliances and support its allies vis-à-vis China, it was also eager to avoid the emergence of a potentially entangling
Sino-Japanese military conflict. To the extent that the maritime incursions were intended to expose cleavages in the alliance or
otherwise sow seeds of discord within it, Beijing’s conduct accords with the guidance contained in authoritative Chinese texts. A
2005 edition of Science of Military Strategy counsels to “mak[e] use of contradictions” in the
“enemy’s aggression alliance,” stating that doing so is a “key of political struggle.” 88 The CCP
and PRC, moreover, have a deep history of “ utilizing the contradictions” perceived to afflict their
adversaries in order to help advance wedging goals .89
Risk of conflict exists precisely because Chinese decisionmakers do not trust our
position---asymmetry of interest makes it likely that small mistakes and
provocations will escalate.
Chong, deputy director of the Institute of Security and Arms Control Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations, ‘16
(Liu, “The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts,”
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf) **NCC Packet 2020
Changes in U.S.-China structural interdependence and in international power politics have reduced the possibility of military conflict
between China and the United States. The risk of an arms race and military conflict does exist . Yet this
risk is caused not by a comparison of nuclear forces between the two parties but by the lack of
strategic mutual trust between them and by the nature of the Asia-Pacific security structure .
With respect to an arms race, China’s military spending has significantly increased, along with the rapid
development of its economic strength. However, the United States is still trying to maintain absolute military
superiority over China, which is why the United States launched its Defense Innovation Initiative , also
known as the Third Offset Strategy, in 2014 and is continuously strengthening its military-intervention capability. As national defense
spending in China approaches the level of U.S. spending, the risk of an arms race should not be overlooked. In the context of
the possibility of a conflict has significantly increased ,
increasingly intense U.S.-China military competition,
and the risk of a conflict escalating into a military crisis has increased concurrently . With growing
strategic distrust, a small incident could lead to a U.S.-China military crisis that could bring huge
losses . This scenario is possible particularly because the United States has long had a great
advantage over China’s conventional forces and has worked to maintain its conventional military dominance, as
demonstrated by its close surveillance of Chinese naval fleet formations. If U.S. troops ignore China’s security concerns and
continue to carry out high-intensity and high-frequency naval and aircraft surveillance in China’s exclusive economic zone,
confrontations between U.S. and Chinese forces like the 2001 Hainan Island incident and the 2009
USNS Impeccable incident could potentially trigger a U.S.-China military crisis. Moreover, both
countries have increased their investments in cyberspace and outer space; if no proper coordination is carried out in these fields,
conflicts could easily occur.
However , it is even more important , although China and the United States share the political desire
to stabilize security relations , that other factors inevitably interfere with and undermine this
process. The role of third parties in particular should not be overlooked. Japan and the Philippines have
attempted to drag the United States into their disputes with China , and the United States has
moderately aggravated the tensions between China and these countries with the ultimate intent
of containing China . U.S. soft and hard power has declined, and with it, the United States’ ability
and desire to intervene militarily in regional and global affairs have weakened. In general, one would think
that the United States would not easily get involved in conflicts that are not directly related to its
vital interests. However , due to global strategic needs, the U.S. military alliance system regards the
maintenance of U.S. credibility and its commitments to allies to be of the utmost importance .
Therefore , the United States is very likely to intervene in conflicts involving China to honor
commitments to the interests of its allies. As such , a third-party crisis is harder to manage and
prevent than a crisis directly between China and the United States .
And even though incidents have trended downwards, China will shift back to an
escalatory posture---this is part of the cycle of the dispute, recent US assurances
to Japan expose greater contradictions for China to probe.
Taffer, PhD, Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, ‘19
(Andrew, “Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute,” Asian Security, February) **NCC Packet 2020
Over the last several years, although China has maintained a robust presence around the S/D islands , it has
not undertaken any major escalations . Beijing has rather sought to consolidate the new status quo
consisting most notably of a regular Chinese presence around the islands. It might be suggested that the reason
Beijing has refrained from further escalation is that, based on subsequent events, it concluded that its
coercive wedging efforts failed and that it then abandoned the strategy. In 2014, President Obama became the
first sitting American president to explicitly affirm that the S/D islands are covered under Article
V of the MDT, and in 2015 Washington and Tokyo concluded revised bilateral defense guidelines, bolstering “cooperation
around the concept of gray-zone defense.” 132 In 2017, President Trump also affirmed the US commitment in a
joint communiqué with Prime Minister Abe.133
Such developments amount to a degree of strategic blowback and, from Beijing’s perceptive, are
certainty unfavorable. It is unconvincing , however , to suggest that on this basis the strategy has
failed or been abandoned . To the contrary , they indicate that the strategy has had some success .
Obama’s affirmation was clearly driven by an awareness of Tokyo’s growing unease regarding the US
commitment, and the allies moved to update the terms of their defense cooperation in part out of concern that the existing guidelines
may not have been up to the challenge China was posing.134After experiencing a period discord, moreover, it is
to be expected that allies – particularly those of great mutual importance – would try to reassure each other
and assuage their concerns. Furthermore, China’s strategy, as this article has contended, has
aimed not to facilitate the rapid collapse of the US–Japan alliance but to plant seeds of
uncertainty and disaffection and cultivate them over time. Chinese strategists appear to have fully
understood that its efforts in this regard would progress in a non-linear fashion . As the 2013 edition of
the Science of Military Strategy states, “The struggle between containment and counter-containment…between China and the
United States…is longterm and complicated . It will be difficult to avoid ‘ cycles of relaxation, stimulation and
relaxation .’”135
It should further be noted that in terms of how Beijing views US strategy , the blowback China’s
coercive conduct engendered likely had a silver lining . By tightening the US-Japan alliance (and others in the
region) while continuing to pursue engagement with China, Washington’s response was, from Beijing’s
perspective, not only more of the same but increasingly “contradictory.” For an actor aiming to
make use of just such contradictions, this cannot be considered entirely disadvantageous. If, as
argued in the following, China has scaled back the escalatory extent of its conduct in the ECS to manage
its risk profile, deepening contradictions in US strategy will nevertheless continue to be viewed
as a vulnerability to be exploited – particularly if Beijing has assessed that its coercive wedging
efforts had some success. Far from abandoning the strategy , then, China is very likely to continue
to employ it .
Why, then, has Beijing recently refrained from undertaking large escalations? First, China’s recent restraint has almost certainty been intended to help mitigate the risk of a US
intervention on Japan’s behalf, a possibility that Beijing must prevent if it is to successfully undermine the credibility of Washington’s commitments. It is of course to manage this
risk that China has adopted a modest form of wedging and that its coercive conduct has occurred at only a low level of escalation. More generally, after several years of
assertiveness in both the ECS and SCS, Beijing likely sought to manage its overall risk profile. And although it has maintained an assertive posture in the SCS, given the
ambiguous American commitment to the Philippines’s offshore claims and the different occupational status of the features it has since built into islands, Beijing was electing to
incur more substantial risk in the area with the lower likelihood of US intervention.
Second, since 2012 Japan has refrained from the kind of escalatory conduct that has in part driven Chinese assertiveness.136 Those provocations, as we have seen, have not
only been perceived by Beijing as representative of, and in part constituting, an allied containment effort, but they have also provided Beijing a plausible defensive pretext with
which to muddy Washington’s assessment of the escalatory extent of China’s conduct and the degree to which it ought to support its ally. In this regard, the absence of
Japanese provocations has not only limited opportunities for Beijing to combat the broader strategic threat thought to be emanating from the S/D conflict, but it has likely also
decreased the perceived severity of it. Third, despite again affirming that the islets fall under the MDT, President Trump has tended to treat US alliances transactionally,137 has
had public kerfuffles with allies in the region,138 and for much of his first year in office cultivated Beijing to a remarkable degree.139 Such developments almost certainty served
to decrease Beijing’s perception of strategic threat.
Why has Beijing not reverted back to employing another method of wedging? For one, a demonstrative wedging strategy of the kind it pursued in the early 2000s would accord
uneasily with the generally assertive posture Beijing has maintained in the SCS and, indeed, it would likely make the effective execution of such a strategy impossible. Further,
with Abe still at the helm, the notion that Beijing could adopt a conditioning strategy to incentivize him to abandon his long-held goal of constitutional revision or to prevent Tokyo
from tightening its alliance with Washington (to say nothing of weakening it), strains the imagination.
Although China has for now retrenched, assuming that, on the one hand, Washington continues to
deepen its alliances in East Asia and with Tokyo in particular and that, on the other, China continues to
grow in relative power such that it can increasingly afford the costs and risks associated with coercive wedging, Beijing
 is likely to again adopt an escalatory posture meant to sow discord between the allies. While this
is a challenge to which there are no easy answers , the United States should aim to combat
China’s perception of both strategic insecurity and opportunity . It should, to this end, redouble its
efforts to convince Beijing that neither it nor Japan are aiming to use the S/D dispute to contain it .
Washington should stress that its security commitments to Japan date to when the prospect of China’s rise was not visible on even
the furthest horizon and that its obligations would obtain irrespective of structural changes in the region. Given Washington’s dismal
record of reassuring Beijing of its intentions, however, this study should also add urgency to still incipient American efforts to
formulate effective measures to deter Chinese coercion in its maritime disputes. To this end, the United States will need to
demonstrate a greater willingness to incur risk vis-à-vis China and accept the possibility that bilateral relations with Beijing may be
adversely impacted. Because this latter dimension of US strategy will likely work at cross purposes with its reassurance efforts,
finding the right balance between the two will, as ever, remain the central task for US policymakers and strategists.
Current U.S. commitment to the Senkakus is structurally non-credible---interest
asymmetry dooms deterrence on all fronts and drives Chinese testing.
Taffer 19 – Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, PhD from
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Andrew Taffer, He is the author most recently of “Threat and Opportunity: Chinese Wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Conflict,”
formerly served as an analyst with the Long Term Strategy Group and as a research fellow with the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, He was an International Security Program postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard
University, 9-6-2019, "China’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ploy to undercut the US-Japan alliance," No Publication,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-senkakudiaoyu-islands-ploy-undercut-us-japan-alliance **NCC Packet 2020
Between April and June this year, Chinese Coast Guard ships entered the contiguous zone around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands in the East China Sea for a record 64 consecutive days. In this flashpoint area between China and Japan,
the number of Chinese incursions into the islands’ territorial sea so far this year already exceeds the total
number for all of 2018.
While these latest incursions have occurred in the context of improving bilateral ties between China and Japan, and do
not constitute or portend a major incident or crisis, it is only a matter of time until tensions spike
again . Because crises over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands may carry outsize consequences for
regional stability , the US-Japan alliance, and Sino-American competition, it is important to
understand Beijing’s strategy.
Research shows that Beijing has regularly sought to use this offshore conflict to drive a wedge
into the US-Japan alliance – particularly during the major incidents over the islands in 2010, 2012, and 2013. Yet
Beijing’s approach to wedging in the East China Sea has been unique.
Traditionally, a country aiming to divide an alliance focuses its efforts on the alliance’s junior
partner, generally the more susceptible party, as the divider seeks to induce or coerce it in ways that weaken its relationship with
its patron. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, however, China’s principal target has been the U nited
S tates – the senior partner. Beijing is aware of the dramatic asymmetry in interests between the
United States and Japan in the dispute, and that Washington, lacking inherent interests in the
islands , is eager to avoid a potentially cataclysmic conflict with China over them. In other words, in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, Washington has been targeted as the more susceptible party.
China has sowed discord within the US-Japan alliance and exacerbated abiding Japanese fears of US abandonment. By appealing
to US interests in conflict management, crisis stability, and healthy Sino-American relations, Beijing has sought to induce and coerce
the United States – and have Washington, in turn, compel Tokyo – to adopt policies inimical to the latter’s territorial interests. In so
doing, China has sowed discord within the US-Japan alliance and exacerbated abiding Japanese fears of US abandonment.
In this respect, far from seeking to ensure the United States does not interfere in the conflict – as
Beijing’s purportedly sacrosanct policy holds – a central aspect of China’s strategy has been to
involve Washington directly and robustly.
In 2012–13, after raising the risk of conflict in the E ast C hina S ea by sending unprecedented
numbers of ships and aircraft into the waters and airspace around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,
Beijing called on Washington to restrain Japan and to compel Tokyo to make concessions.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “We urge the US side to be responsible on the Diaoyu
Islands issue … and take concrete actions to safeguard regional peace and stability [emphasis added].”
But Beijing went further, requesting US mediation. In a high-profile speech organised by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, a senior retired Chinese official remarked: “If the US really intends to play a neutral
and constructive role, it should urge the parties to the dispute to the negotiating table and resolve
the difference by peaceful means.” Adding urgency to these exhortations (and hinting at the risk of entrapment), the
Chinese ambassador to the U nited S tates counselled Washington not to “lift the rock off Japan
only to let it drop on its own feet.”
Washington proved receptive to Beijing’s appeals . The White House urged Tokyo to offer
“concessions” to Beijing while then–US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon suggested that “the parties should seek to
have conversations about this through diplomatic channels,” a proposition antithetical to Tokyo’s policy of not acknowledging the
dispute.
It was around this time that China began to vigorously promote its concept of a “new type of
great-power relations,” a broad framework for the future of US-China relations to which the Obama administration, keen to
establish healthy long-term ties, was initially receptive. “Respect for core interests” was said to be the “crux” of
this new framework, and in April 2013, Beijing declared for the first time that the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands were among its “core interests.”
Beijing thus sought to link improved US-China ties to Washington’s willingness to attenuate its support for Japan’s territorial
interests.
The subsequent declaration of the A ir D efence I dentification Z one (ADIZ) by China in late 2013 over
a large swath of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, was designed to set US and
Japanese interests in opposition to each other . It a move only seldom noticed at the time, Beijing publicly offered to
implement a long-stalled crisis-management mechanism promptly after establishing the ADIZ. Appealing to American interests in
de-escalation, China’s offer was contingent on Japan de-conflicting its ADIZ with China’s, a condition Tokyo was unwilling to meet
for fear of legitimising China’s territorial claims. Washington, however, was quick to endorse Beijing’s call, with vice president Joe
Biden stating that the ADIZ “underscores the need for crisis-management mechanisms.”
This and other episodes have led to what can be described as a “growing constituency [in Japan] that doubts the US commitment to
the security guarantee”.
Although US-China relations are today far from where they were during the Obama administration, Beijing can be expected to
employ a broadly similar strategy against the Trump administration and others in the future. This is because no matter how
there is likely to be continuity – and sustained asymmetry – in
antagonistic US-China relations become,
US and Japanese interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.
It strains the imagination, for example, to see a future Japanese administration accommodating China in the East China Sea as,
even if Washington becomes more
say, the Philippine’s Rodrigo Duterte has done in the South China Sea. And
willing to incur risk vis-à-vis Beijing in maritime East Asia, it will remain highly motivated to
avoid being dragged into a conflict with China over eight uninhabited islets and rocks in the E ast
C hina S ea.
This asymmetry in US and Japanese interests is likely to continue to be exploitable and will
constitute a persistent weakness in what is otherwise a strong and resilient alliance.
 Escalation Impacts
Those incidents will escalate to nuclear use because of strategic misperception---
both sides think they have escalation dominance which means it is advantageous
to use nuclear weapons early, but neither has a way to limit escalation
Cunningham and Fravel 19 – Cunningham is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at
George Washington University., Fravel is Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies
Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Fiona S. and M. Taylor, “Dangerous Confidence?” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Fall 2019), pp. 61–109 **NCC Packet 2020
In this article, we have argued that China’s
strategic community is relatively confident about the ability of
China to avoid nuclear escalation in a conflict with the United States. The most important reason is that the
members of this community believe that once nuclear weapons are used, subsequent use by either
side cannot be controlled . Thus, they do not believe that a limited nuclear war would stay limited. Instead, it would likely
escalate into an unlimited one. Chinese experts expect that these features of nuclear war will lead U.S. and
Chinese decisionmakers to avoid any nuclear use and resolve any conflict at the conventional level. They also
believe that the United States will exercise sufficient control over a crisis involving a U.S. ally or
partner so that the use of nuclear weapons is not considered.
China’s operational doctrine for the use of its nuclear weapons and its nuclear force structure are consistent with
these views about the difficulty of controlling escalation. That is, China’s operational doctrine does not contain
plans to wage a limited nuclear war, which China might pursue if it believed nuclear escalation could be controlled. The
focus of China’s nuclear operations remains on how to retaliate after China is attacked with nuclear weapons to deter such attacks
in the first place. Similarly, although China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding, China is not developing
forces that would be optimized for use in a limited nuclear war, especially tactical nuclear weapons. The long-
standing decoupling of conventional and nuclear strategy, the availability of nonnuclear strategic
weapons such as cyberweapons, and the organizational biases of nuclear experts and the PLA’s missile commanders
explain this relative confidence about avoiding escalation. Chinese experts likely overestimate
their leaders’ ability to control escalation , because they underplay the pressures to escalate to a
nuclear war that their leaders could not control —for example, if an adversary overreacts or
misperceives Chinese signaling with nuclear or nonnuclear strategic weapons.
Several implications follow from our analysis, all of which raise concerns about crisis stability and the
ability of the United States and China to prevent nuclear escalation in a crisis between the two states. First, China’s approach
to deterrence may be suboptimal —at least from the perspective of deterring either U.S. conventional
strikes against its nuclear infrastructure or limited U.S. nuclear strikes against its nuclear arsenal.
Although China maintains some ambiguity over whether it would respond to a conventional strike on its nuclear forces
with nuclear weapons, China’s overall confidence that a U.S.- China conventional conflict would not escalate to
nuclear war may reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent against this kind of attack by persuading
an adversary that such strikes would not elicit nuclear retaliation . China’s confidence could even
embolden an adversary to gamble that a limited nuclear first strike against China would not elicit
nuclear retaliation . This, in turn, would increase the odds of such U.S. attacks and create strong
pressure for China to retaliate to deter further attacks on its nuclear forces, resulting in nuclear escalation .
Our research, however, does not indicate how the small size of China’s arsenal compared with that of the
United States would affect its response to U.S. limited nuclear strikes. China could respond with limited nuclear retaliatory
strikes; it could threaten or pursue unlimited nuclear retaliation; it could respond with nonnuclear forces; or it could respond in
another way, including terminating the conflict. More research is needed to explore the relationship between the size and
vulnerability of China’s arsenal and its views of nuclear escalation control. Second, the United States and China hold
opposing beliefs about escalation above and below the nuclear threshold that may also
contribute to instability . U.S. experts worry more than Chinese experts that the two countries might not
be able to control the escalation of a conventional war to high levels of intensity, which could
push a conflict over the nuclear threshold , but are more sanguine about (or at least are divided about the
possibility of) controlling nuclear escalation after nuclear weapons have been used.174 This likely reflects the
overwhelming superiority of U.S. nuclear forces (especially against a smaller nuclear power), decades of nuclear
planning for a range of scenarios (including limited nuclear warfighting), and an emphasis on achieving dominance in conventional
operations.
Chinese experts hold an opposing perspective . They are quite
As this article demonstrates, however,
pessimistic about controlling nuclear escalation once the threshold for the use of nuclear
weapons has been crossed. By contrast, however, they are quite confident (perhaps overly confident) about
controlling conventional escalation before the nuclear threshold is crossed. As noted earlier, almost all of the
available literature from Chinese military sources on escalation examines conventional escalation
and not nuclear escalation . At least in the post–Cold War era, U.S. conventional operations against other
militaries have emphasized seizing and exploiting air superiority , meaning that control of conventional
escalation was not a concern for the United States because it had the luxury of fighting adversaries with no plausible
means to escalate. Although China has not fought a war since 1979, it has engaged mostly in limited uses of force
in local conflicts or displays of force and has certainly not achieved conventional dominance over an
adversary to the same extent as the United States.
These contrasting beliefs about the feasibility of controlling conventional and nuclear escalation suggest that a
conventional conflict is more likely to escalate to high levels of intensity , increasing the chances of
nuclear escalation. China, for example, could take actions it believes will deter the U nited States at the
conventional level, only to be confronted with a U.S. desire to overmatch China in response and
establish the same extent of conventional dominance that the United States has enjoyed for several decades
against other adversaries.175 Yet, such actions could include steps to degrade China’s nuclear forces ,
either inadvertently by targeting China’s conventional missiles or intentionally to force China to
either surrender or escalate to nuclear war. Those U.S. attacks might create strong pressures on
China to engage in nuclear signaling or mobilization of its land-based nuclear missiles and ballistic missile submarines
to protect its deterrent or even threaten nuclear use to deter further attacks on its nuclear arsenal. In
response, the United States may attempt a large-scale nuclear strike to try to eliminate China’s
nuclear forces or at least limit damage from China’s use of nuclear weapons. If the two countries
have different views about when the natural firebreaks in a conflict will occur , they may focus on
negotiating an end to the conflict at different times in this escalatory spiral and therefore miss
opportunities to negotiate an end to the conflict altogether.176 In short, based on differing views about
controlling escalation, escalation at both the conventional and nuclear levels may be more likely .
The flip side, however, might be enhanced caution. China may anticipate U.S. efforts to escalate a conventional war to achieve
conventional dominance while the United States may anticipate a disproportionate Chinese nuclear response if it were to conduct
limited nuclear strikes in a conflict. Both countries may therefore be extremely cautious in a crisis or low-intensity conflict. Further,
despite the views outlined above, the two countries have not always acted on their confidence about controlling conventional or
nuclear escalation. Historically, China has exercised more caution (most of the time) when facing a superior adversary, based on
the imperative of conserving its forces. Despite models that show U.S. nuclear superiority and the ability to limit
damage using a nuclear first strike,177 U.S. leaders have appeared reluctant to accept significant nuclear
risk, especially in the post–Cold War era.178
Ironically, one factor that contributes to these opposing views is China’s no first-use policy . Many
U.S. analysts do not believe that it is a credible pledge , because China has not stated how it
plans to end a conventional war it is losing .179 China perhaps does not feel a need to reveal such
plans, either because of its experience in fighting and ending limited wars without achieving its initial ambitions (in Korea and
perhaps in Vietnam) or because it would not want to reveal such plans to a stronger adversary that could then exploit them. On
the other hand, Chinese experts view the pledge as the guiding principle for the role of Chinese nuclear
weapons in any future conflict with the United States. As they do not plan to use nuclear weapons first, even when
losing, they may not explore this point in their writings . Chinese experts may also discount the
likelihood that its actions in a crisis or conflict could be mistaken by the United States as
preparations to use nuclear weapons first.
Testing in the ECS ensures escalation is inevitable and corrodes deterrence credibility.
Liff 20 – Assistant professor in Indiana University's Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies
Adam P. Liff, also Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard University's
Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Proactive Stabilizer: Japan's Role in the Asia-
Pacific Security Order, chapter in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and
the World Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 39-78, February 2020, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/9780815737674_ch1.pdf **NCC Packet 2020
THE CORROSIVE EFFECT OF CHINA’S GRAY ZONE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES Over the past
decade, and with apparent impunity, China’s coercive rhetorical and physical assertion of its vast and
controversial sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas has had an indirect but deeply
corrosive effect on the rules-based security order , not to mention openly threatening the national security of
affected countries. Beijing has relied heavily on so-called gray zone operations, which are subthreshold
aggressive activities that are difficult to deter without significant escalation risks, since they
constitute neither a pure peacetime nor a traditional, armed attack situation. For Japan, most
provocative are the regular operations of the increasingly robust (and militarized) China Coast
Guard (CCG) near the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese; below, the Senkakus).27 Since September 2012, larger and
more capable CCG vessels frequently enter the Senkakus’ contiguous zone and conduct regular “presence” missions in the islands’
territorial sea to coercively challenge Japan’s decades-old effective administrative control.28 Beyond the gray zone,
China’s “maritime advance” and increasing scope of its naval and air force operations place
further pressure on Japan . For example, Japan’s annual scrambles of Japan Air SDF fighters against approaching
Chinese planes nearly tripled between 2012 and 2017, when the frequency reached a record high of 851.29 Accordingly, nearly
three dozen pages of Japan’s 2017 defense white paper discuss concerns about Beijing’s
capabilities and operations , such as its “attempts to change the status quo by coercion. ”30
Beijing’s East China Sea maritime gray zone operations appear intended to probe , or take
advantage of, a perceived “seam” in Article V of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty,
which refers only to an “armed attack” situation. In addition to asserting its sovereignty claim, China’s actions
also seem aimed at undermining Washington’s obligations by trying to establish a perception of
“shared administrative control.” They also may be intending to exploit political and legal constraints on Japan’s Coast
Guard (JCG) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as well as a general and longstanding reluctance on Japan’s part to use
kinetic force in situations outside of an armed attack against Japan.31 As these operations have been ongoing since late 2012,
China appears to have concluded it can assert its claim coercively through these subthreshold
operations with relative impunity.32 Beijing’s decision to limit its conspicuous coercion vis-à-vis
the Senkakus to gray zone operations reveals how its activities are corrosive to the security
order : not directly challenging it, but simultaneously undermining it in a manner that is also
difficult to deter —by staying below the level of armed attack (buryoku kōshi, use of orce) prohibited by the UN
Charter. It further highlights the severity of the challenge that these activities take place while the PLA operates over the horizon,
occasionally engages in provocative maneuvers and actions in international waters and Japan’s contiguous zone, and is set to grow
increasingly capable and active in the years ahead.
 Solvency
Plan shifts to a more credible and effective deterrent posture---strategy premised
on Chinese aggression leads to escalation---the aff reinforces core commitments
and existing capabilities solve.
Shifrinson 20 – PhD, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Fredrick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, BU
Joshua, “The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 43 **NCC Packet 2020
These results are especially important for ongoing debates surrounding American foreign policy and efforts to address China’s rise.
Over the last several years, a growing consensus in US strategic circles holds that China is a
‘revisionist’ power that can only be addressed through the firm application of American power and
resolve .126 Reflecting this calculation, and as noted, the United States is adding to its military presence in East
Asia, cultivating new allies and fostering intra-regional diplomatic ties, and working to limit Chinese access to
sensitive economic and technological markets.127 In contrast, the argument developed in this article proposes
that the United States would be better served adapting to China’s own incentives to cooperate or compete
as defined by trends in the distribution of power.
As noted earlier, there are two possible pathways – China as supporter of the United States, and China
pursuing a mixed strategy – that China may go down if and as power continues to shift in its favour. Just as the first
scenario represents the outcome most at odds with conventional thinking surrounding China’s rise, so too does it require the most
strategic adjustment by the United States. To catalyse and reinforce Chinese-American partnership , US
leaders would be well-advised to underscore the United States’ value to a rising China, especially its
ability to assist China against other threats. This requires the United States to minimise rather than reinforce its
challenge to China to avoid undercutting China’s incentives for support, while communicating its interest in
US-Chinese partnership. Key elements of existing US strategy in Asia might therefore have to change –
including efforts to commit additional US forces to the Asia-Pacific region and to foster a nascent anti-
China coalition – to avoid needlessly upsetting US-Chinese relations, courting insecurity spirals
and forestalling potential cooperative opportunities. Put differently, the United States’ current
approach is potentially valuable if the United States is interested in deterring or containing China, but would diminish
China’s incentive to pursue support by mitigating the United States’ geographic advantages and
reifying the image of a hostile United States .128
Instead, a less robust US security presence in Asia would simultaneously remind China’s leaders of the reasons the United States is
an attractive partner and signal that it might embrace deeper forms of US-Chinese cooperation. This drawdown could be coupled
with steps to distance the United States from other prospective threats to China. Not only would such
distancingrestore flexibility to US diplomacy , but it could reduce the threat posed to China by the
United States relative to other regional actors and so reinforce China’s incentive to see the United
States as a potential partner. Furthermore, it would undermine charges mooted in Chinese strategic
discussions that the United States is organising other Asian actors against China , thereby upping
the likelihood that China’s leaders see the United States as a potential partner.129 American diplomacy, meanwhile, could
use bilateral and multilateral forums to communicate the United States’ desire to engage the PRC on China’s own terms while
underlining the concessions the United States expects in exchange. American policy, in sum, would be oriented towards minimising
the US threat to China to catalyse and reinforce China’s incentives to cooperate. This might generate uncertainty and discontent
among other states (e.g., Japan, India) in the region, suggesting the United States was ganging up with China at others’ expense.
Nevertheless, the approach could create conditions for the United States to unilaterally extract strategic concessions from a rising
China.130
However, the second scenario – China pursuing a mixed strategy – argues strongly for the United States
to reinforce acquisition of military capabilities to deter or defeat Chinese aggrandisement. Prima facie , this
might seem to call for the assertive strategy aimed at containing China by creating a robust
coalition of allies backed with a large and forward-deployed military presence that many US policymakers appear to envision.
However , retaining the ability to militarily defeat or deter China and threatening to impose costs in
response to Chinese aggrandisement need not mean an expansive and open-ended arms build-up or
coalition-building exercise. Rather , such an effort could otherwise involve retaining the ability to
surge forces into Asia amid a crisis, moving offshore and imposing costs from afar (such as with a
blockade), or positioning tripwire forces around a security perimeter while preparing to mobilise
should China cross that theoretical line. The key , in other words, is that US leaders reinforce steps to
acquire military forces able to harm an increasingly potent China while cultivating only those
partnerships deemed necessary to operate these assets .131 Along the way, US leaders would
need to carefully delineate core American interests and underline American resolve; by extension,
efforts to conciliate China would be curtailed to make US deterrent efforts more credible. The goal, in sum, would be to
underscore the United States’ ability to penalise Chinese aggrandisement at the United States’
expense.
Yet irrespective of which scenario comes to pass, the United States should have significant latitude in its fate. Ultimately ,
China will remain constrained for the indefinite future in its ability to inaugurate a predatory
challenge to the United States . By playing to its military and security advantages, and considering
these advantages in light of what China’s own strategic landscape entails , the United States
should be able to forestall Chinese predation and may be able to facilitate Chinese support.
Though analysts understandably worry that a rising China will seek to push the United States into
the dustbin of history, balance of power logic suggests this outcome is less likely than many scholars
and policymakers expect . Facing the rise of China and concomitant decline of the United States,
American strategists should be cautiously optimistic : the United States is playing a strong hand and should
recognise as much.
Advantage 2 EXT: China-Japan Relations
 Interdependence
Senkakus create a security paradox which makes war inevitable, despite
economic ties.
Brito, Chair and researcher within the Conflict, Security and Crime Student Research
Committee at IAPSS, 2019 (Esther Brito, 7-17-2019, "The Sino-Japanese Security Paradox: Why Security Tensions Will
Remain Despite Cooperation," Geopolitics, https://thegeopolitics.com/the-sino-japanese-security-paradox-why-security-tensions-
will-remain-despite-cooperation/, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
The Asia-Pacific region is the world’s most dynamic center of economic activity, and a growingly unrestrainable political behemoth.
This economic and political significance is largely driven by its leading powers, Japan and China. The pattern of these
countries interaction has come to set the structure and pace of Asia-Pacific regional cooperation . Nevertheless, bilateral
relations between both powers have been tense despite economic interaction and the advance of globalization, and seem
to give way to almost routine periods of security tensions.
The strained relationship between both nations has been the subject of much reflection. A paradox is present in the antagonism
that has come to define China and Japan’s interaction, despite their increasing economic interdependence . This
antagonism has manifested in the form of nationalist ideals within both nations, and the escalation of political disagreements into
periodic crisis situations.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands confrontation is maybe the clearest example of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations; having
become a symbol of a wider geopolitical framework and unresolved historical tensions. Both Japanese and Chinese
responses in this crisis have been perceived as diplomatic confrontation, and have become highly contentious nationalistic issues in
domestic politics.
Many scholars have argued that, in the face of these increased security tensions, economic interdependence can soften
state interaction and reduce conflict. However, as globalization has integrated Sino-Japanese operations further, nationalist
backlash has arisen from both sides. Thus, it becomes important to consider the potential impact of nationalist ideology and
interstate tensions in international economic relations.
The phenomenon of “cold politics and hot economics” is now a seemingly fixed feature of China and Japan’s political and
economic relations. Nevertheless, these areas are not without overlap, and the economic relations between China and
Japan have fluctuated according to political tensions, with bilateral trade figures now providing a “barometric record of an
unpredictable political climate”; and incidents like the Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku Islands negatively affecting
trade between both nations. This threatens the notion of Sino-Japanese economic complementarity as a means for peace,
and reaffirms notions that politics still govern the nations bilateral relations, despite economic alignment . These conditions
also explain why politicized historical events like Nanking still reverberate so heavily in current state interaction.
Strategic implications: bilateral political approaches
Tokyo has seen a decrease of its strategic space and area of influence as China has become more dominant, and in turn has
sought to be more proactive and engaging in regional and global dynamics, fostering initiatives conducive to its national interests. In
this manner, Japan’s strategic response to the rise of China has seen the nation shift paradigms, from a “friendship
diplomacy” attempt to a mixed strategy approach combining realistic threat balancing and positive engagement with the
Asian giant.
Japan’s strategic shift and security policy reform, especially its redefinition of its military capacities, are considered to be
primarily a counterbalancing response to China. This reform is understood as an internal balancing measure, yet external
initiatives have also been undertaken by Abe’s government; increasing security cohesion with the United States, and enhancing
its security cooperation with other key allies such as Australia and India, as well as increasing its focus on other Asian nations
as potential allies.
China’s diplomacy and foreign policy efforts have been “working systematically towards a realignment of the international order
through establishing parallel structures to a wide range of international institutions”. This has entailed a more active role in regional
organizations like ASEAN, and the establishment of Asian-led organisms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Through this network of strategic organizations China seeks to target gaps within the current system of intergovernmental
structures, and compete within their areas of operation; building both supplementary and complementary structures to shape and
steer the regional sphere away from Western attempts at leadership. This conception capitalizes on China’s model of development,
highlighting the giant’s local influence and identification with “shared Asian values”. Through this strategic approach, China
leverages the comparative benefit it holds in forming regional partnerships as a result of Japan’s negative imperial heritage. In this
manner, Beijing has opted for a strategic understanding of the region with Japan as a key control focus, recognizing its influence in
the region’s security environment, and seeking to redefine the environment to suit its international rise.
Geopolitical significance
Stability or insecurity in the global order seems to have a ripple effect in regional dynamics. Thus, the US-Japan alliance and US-
China market dependence may influence regional dynamics further. Sino-Japanese security dynamics are inevitably linked to
the broader interactions of the four-power balance system in Asia, between the United States, the Russian Federation,
China, and Japan. Regarding the effect smaller actors may hold upon this larger geopolitical context, there is much debate
in the interpretation of secondary-state responses to changing regional dynamics and rising powers like China.
Nevertheless, it increasingly seems that minor actors will often not seek to balance this rise, but accommodate it.
Another important geopolitical element is the trilateral institutional relation among China, Japan and South Korea, that has been
developing over the last decade due to shared security concerns. At present, both China and Japan operate under a shared
objective of maintaining peace and stability in the region; which has a relatively stabilizing effect in terms of the non-escalation of
their bilateral tensions into regional strife, stabilize Sino-Japanese conflictual relations; or in turn, complicate them

However, both US influence and trilateralism seem insufficient to fully normalize Sino- Japanese political-diplomatic
cooperation, or dissipate periodically rising tensions. The historical legacy Japan and China share has imbued a mutual
sense of distrust and wariness between them. China remains cautious of Japanese security projection in the region, and
Japan in turn remains threatened by the possibility of a revisionist China reasserting its historical prevalence in the Asia-
Pacific. There is an ever-present emotional dimension to Sino-Japanese relations that transcends logical, economic, or
political interest.
To this end, China and Japan must seek to construct a more cohesive understanding of their common history as a
foundation for future foreign relations, and as a necessary condition to ease the strain between both nations in a transition
period within world politics. Both nations must now face their history in tandem, and choose to either be defined by it in, or be
take a softer approach to managing their increased competition in the world stage.

ECS conflict is the main obstacle to Sino-Japanese economic interdependence

and peace.
Beukel, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011 (Erik, "China and Japan between economic
interdependence and nationalist shadows of the past," DIIS, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/china-and-japan-between-economic-
interdependence-and-nationalist-shadows-of-the-past, DoA 8/19/2020, DVOG)
Chinese Janus-like positions in the four crises have been successful. Chinese leaders’ ability to meet challenges with expedient
‘two-heads-facing-opposite-directions’ policies has been impressive, even if supported by good luck as the complicated nature of
popular nationalism makes it difficult to predict the consequences (Zheng, 1999: 134). As concluded by Manicom and O’Neill (2009:
227), the Chinese leadership has shown considerable determination and dexterity in navigating away from potential
confrontation with Japan. China’s and Japan’s deep economic interdependence means that both sides have compelling
incentives to manage their relationship carefully; indeed, both countries have displayed a high degree of pragmatism in
avoiding being influenced by their respective nationalistic constituencies in actual crises and, at the same time, averting
any encroachment on their sovereignty claims. Yet, it has to be emphasised that Japanese governments have often been
reluctant to curb nationalist groups’ aggressive activities either because they seem to share nationalist persuasions or because they
cannot take strong measures against nationalists without violating basic civil rights. Activists and nationalists are also citizens with
civil rights and so Japan’s government has a limited freedom of action. Here lies an obvious asymmetry between the two countries.
But for all the crisis management capability of Beijing and Tokyo, it has to be noted that a long-term solution to the conflict is
difficult to envisage. Maybe the fragile attempts at functional cooperation in East China Sea matters hold a promise to a
slow downgrading of sovereignty issues; that would be in accordance with functional integration theories that have been
developed on the basis of European integration. The central problem is, of course, whether that theory is valid in Asia, or whether
state-directed high politics is more important as hinted at in the last part of section 5.
Focusing on China’s policy, three trends should be noted. First, China’s increasing willingness and ability to deploy military
forces in the East China Sea. Second, China’s growing capacity to exploit the resources in or close to the disputed area.
Third, the increasingly prominent role of anti-Japanese grassroots organisations, based on the use of the Internet and
personal mobile phones. The last point is especially important because it means that popular nationalism cannot be understood
within a ‘state-over- society’ view of Chinese politics. The party-state is clearly losing its control over the innumerable cyber-
nationalist manifestations – manifestations that often merge into criticism of the Chinese government for being soft on Japan. The
authorities clearly intend to impose the government’s will and policy on the netizens, but public opinion on the net cannot be
effectively silenced despite the persistence of state censorship (Liu, 2006: 148–9).
While the temptation to beat the anti-Japanese nationalist drum has become harder to resist, it has also become more
dangerous as the party-state may lose control when it feels that it has to respond to increasingly popular and strident anti-
Japanese groups (Chien-peng, 1998: 159 and 2007: 62). The central point is that fundamental goals of China as a country of
strongly growing prosperity and the ‘reform and opening’ project may be lost if the party-state cannot control nationalist demands for
more unilateral actions. To avoid that situation Chinese leaders are willing to apply all kinds of methods in combination with Janus-
like policies. Of course, they do not and cannot know for sure the most effective methods when challenges appear, but they are
predisposed to apply repressive measures to forbid any independent movements and clamp down on them if they become too
nationalistic and/or independent. Outbursts of anti-Japanese indignation in the media and especially on the Internet in new crisis
situations have given groups actively involved in online communities a role as pressure groups with a potential impact on Chinese
foreign policy. The central point is that, given the lack of democratic and parliamentary mechanisms for influencing the decision-
makers, the Internet is a useful outlet for nationalist groups to let off steam, notwithstanding that the authorities are often successful
in attempts to restrain their communications ( Jakobson and Knox, 2010: 43–6). A specific feature of the domestic situation is that
the PLA’s preference for firmness and strong anti-Japanese attitudes could play together with popular nationalism, ending up with
squeezing civilian leaders into a confrontation with Japan, even though the PLA’s loyalty to the party-state is beyond doubt (Bush,
2010).
Considered overall, however, there seems to be no immediate reason why the authorities’ performance in the earlier China–
Japan crises couldn’t be repeated, including the control of public protests and intellectuals, before any demand for
extensive Chinese military action to counter the ‘ugly’ Japanese were to become too excessive. In such a situation both the
basic interest in fruitful economic relations with Japan and the continuation of the long-term aspiration for the retrieval of the
disputed territory by China can still be assured. Obviously, a long-term irredentist aspiration entails no fixed time limit and Janus-like
positioning may continue indefinitely. But there are limits to the party-state’s freedom of action, limits that are becoming narrowed
down, increasing the tensions of holding such Janusian positions.
The critical problem lies in the socioeconomic sphere in China. If a new crisis were to take place in a situation of major failure and
collapse of the Chinese economy, especially if the failure is caused by corruption and economic mismanagement by party leaders, it
would clearly be more difficult to stifle public protests before they become a threat to the party-state, especially if nationalist
movements fuse various discontented groups under the banner of nationalism. However, even such a major crisis may not be
enough to trigger such a wave, as the censorship system could be used in an attempt to curb a broader dissemination of knowledge
about the causes of China’s domestic problems. Therefore the second critical factor besides major economic failure caused
by the incumbent leadership would be a breakdown of unity among leaders as happened in the spring of 1989. If factions
within the CCP use nationalism to challenge and attack (persons in) the current leadership for not defending China’s core
interests with sufficient vigour, a real threat may develop, and the party-state’s efforts to maintain legitimacy by stirring up
nationalism may backfire.
This study of popular nationalism in China’s East China Sea policy will finish with an observation on the role of history in Asian and
Western foreign policies. Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
and an incisive observer of contrasts between Asian and Western diplomatic styles, has noted that China’s leaders can ‘switch off ’
the past (Mahbubani, 2010). This study demonstrates the limits to Mahbubani’s observation when it comes to Sino-Japanese
relations. Even though China’s pragmatic leaders have displayed an impressive ability to implement Janus-like policies, they have
not been able wholly to switch off the past in the way Mao and his diplomatic master, Chou Enlai, could. Otherwise expressed, the
totalitarian Chinese system under Mao could switch off the past more easily than today’s leaders of a more democratic, but still
authoritarian, political system. Here Max Weber’s famous observation: “It is not true that good can follow only good and evil only
evil” – cited by Mahbubani (2010: 39) – is pertinent.

Senkakus drives wedge into Sino-Japan relations—overreaction by Japan or US

triggers escalation.
Japan Times, July 27, 2020 (Jesse Johnson, 7-27-2020, "China's 100-day push near Senkaku Islands comes at
unsettling time for Sino-Japanese ties," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/27/national/china-japan-senkaku-
islands/, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
China has passed a new and unsettling milestone in the East China Sea, sending government vessels to waters near the
Japan-administered Senkaku Islands for more than 100 straight days in what Tokyo has labeled a “relentless” campaign to
take control of the disputed islets.
But more disconcerting for Tokyo than the milestone itself is the timing.
It comes at a precarious time for Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. ties. Washington is undergoing a radical shift in its policy
toward Beijing, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo using a speech Thursday to evoke images of a new Cold War and stating
that the U.S. “can never go back to the status quo” in its dealings with China.
Japan, meanwhile, is being forced to rethink how it will approach an increasingly belligerent China after  years of work by
the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to repair Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing.
There are few better examples that underscore Japan’s complicated relationship with China than the uninhabited but
strategically positioned Senkakus, which are also claimed by China, which calls them Diaoyu, as well as Taiwan, which calls them
Tiaoyutai.
While the Senkakus themselves may not hold much value, the surrounding waters are strategically significant in terms of
sea lane control, fishing resources, untapped energy reserves and military imperatives.
Although the sovereignty row over the islands has long been a point of contention for Beijing, the issue was effectively put on the
backburner for many years as economic ties with Japan were prioritized. In 2010, however, it burst into the mainstream public
consciousness when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkakus, resulting in a major
diplomatic tussle.
But it was Japan’s effective nationalization of the islets in 2012 that truly set the stage for the full-throated attempt by
Beijing over the last eight years to assert its claim to the islets while wearing down Japan.
According to Narushige Michishita, director of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for
Policy Studies in Tokyo, Beijing has been actively working to create “a new reality in which Chinese vessels maintain a fairly
significant presence in the area so that maybe 10, 20 years later, China can claim it’s been controlling this area.”
U.S. and Japanese defense officials have even said that a scenario in the not-so-distant future where Beijing announces that it has
“administrative control” over the Senkakus — citing its continued presence there — is far from unthinkable.
The day-in, day-out appearance of Chinese government ships may also prove to be the death rattle for improving the Sino-
Japanese relationship.
“There is rising concern about the new records being set for China’s maritime presence around the Senkakus,” said Euan
Graham, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in Singapore. “I think this should counter any
mistaken impression that the Abe administration has reset relations with China in more positive terms.”
China’s approach, an incremental strategy known colloquially as “salami-slicing,” was rebuked by the Japanese Defense Ministry in
its annual defense white paper released on July 14.
Referring to the Senkakus, the document slammed China over its unyielding attempts to “unilaterally change the status
quo” in the East China Sea all while Beijing touts the need for global cooperation amid the coronavirus pandemic.
“Despite protests by our country, Chinese official ships repeatedly intruded into our territorial waters around the Senkaku
Islands,” the paper said — characterizing for the first time China’s actions around the islets as “relentless.”
A busy year
This year, in particular, has seen the Senkakus issue make headlines.
In May, China Coast Guard vessels attempted to chase a Japanese trawler from inside the waters, leading to a tense
standoff with JCG ships. Earlier this month, Chinese government vessels spent a record  39 hours and 23 minutes in
Japan’s territorial waters around the islets — the longest period since the islets’ effective nationalization. And last week, it
emerged that China had taken the rare step of complaining to Japan early this month about Japanese fishing
boats allegedly “trespassing” in the waters.
Chinese vessels have also entered Japan’s territorial waters for a total of 11 days since April 14, triggering a string of stern
diplomatic protests by Tokyo. Beijing has rejected these, claiming the islets as its “inherent territory since ancient times.”
Japan, for its part, has refused to acknowledge that a question over the sovereignty of the isles ever existed.
According to Alexander Neill, an Asia-Pacific security analyst and consultant, China is seeking to achieve several aims beyond
maintaining a sustained presence to demonstrate administrative control over the islands and waters. These include testing the
readiness, reaction times and force posture of the Self-Defense Forces and JCG.
“Reacting to Chinese incursions is expensive and draining on Japan’s resources,” Neill said. “Meanwhile, China is steadily
increasing the tonnage of its coast guard vessels, far outstripping that of the Japan Coast Guard.”
Since 2010, the CCG’s fleet of large patrol ships has more than doubled from approximately 60 to more than 130, according to the
U.S. Defense Department’s 2019 annual report on Chinese military power, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world
“and increasing its capacity to conduct simultaneous, extended offshore operations in multiple disputed areas.”
The newer ships — including one known as “the beast” due to its 12,000-ton displacement and 76 mm rapid-fire guns, an armament
typically mounted on naval destroyers or frigates — are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships.
Japan’s stance has typically been to respond in kind to Chinese maritime and air intrusions near the Senkakus, with the
SDF being mobilized only if the situation exceeds the capacity of the JCG to respond.
For now, the SDF has mainly been dispatched to the airspace above the East China Sea.
According to the Defense Ministry, Air Self-Defense Force fighters were scrambled 947 times in fiscal 2019 — the third-largest
number since 1958, when the SDF began scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese airspace. Nearly 71 percent of these
were against Chinese aircraft.
The ASDF has also been flying daily patrols over the East China Sea from sunrise to sunset to monitor Chinese military
aircraft in the area since last year, media reports citing government sources have said.
“The JSDF is gradually being overworked and overwhelmed,” said Grant Newsham, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and
researcher at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies. “Yes, it can go out and respond to Chinese air and sea incursions, but the
Chinese are showing (up) in more numbers, in more places, and more often than ever. And the SDF simply doesn’t have the
resources to match the Chinese.
“Play this out for a few more years and the mismatch will widen.”
South China Sea link
Much of the global focus, however, has not been on the East China Sea but rather a neighboring waterway that is more than just
physically connected: the flash-point South China Sea, home to key shipping lanes crucial to the Japanese economy.
Some 42 percent of Japan’s maritime trade passed through the South China Sea in 2016, according to the China Power project at
the Center for Strategic Studies think tank in Washington.
Beijing claims some 80 percent of the South China Sea under its “nine-dash line,” a vaguely delineated area based on maps from
the 1940s, and has spent several years building fortified military bases on man-made islands there. Some of these islands are home
to military-grade airfields and advanced weaponry, but all have been used to cement its claims.
Tokyo, Washington and others whose trade plies the routes have long feared effective Chinese control of the waterway would leave
them open to coercion, or worse.
“Japan has always made a direct connection between the South China Sea and its economic security, via the sea lanes that carry
Japan imports of strategic commodities, as well as its manufactured exports,” said IISS’s Graham, who has written a book on
Japanese sea lane security.
Even with the push by Japan to repair ties with China, the Abe administration has remained vocal on the subject of the South China
Sea. Tokyo has repeatedly urged Beijing to adhere to the rule of law and freedom of navigation, while also joining the U.S. and
others for military exercises in and near the waterway, sending some of its biggest warships through the waters, much to the chagrin
of China.
Newsham said that the Japanese views on both the South and East China seas “are interrelated.”
“But just based on geography alone, Chinese control of the South China Sea terrifies Tokyo. And it should,” he said, noting the huge
percentage of energy and trade that flows through the waterway.
“Give the PRC (People’s Republic of China) the ability to choke that off — or even threaten to do so — and Japan then comes under
all sorts of pressure to accommodate China in any number of areas,” Newsham said.
Tokyo also draws a more general connection between the South China Sea and Southeast Asia as a region to its own security.
Japan doesn’t want to see the region dominated by China, leading to its broader support for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy,” the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the rule of law, Graham said.
These fears have echoed the broader U.S. stance.
Just two weeks ago, Washington took the extraordinary step of declaring Beijing’s claims in the waterway “completely unlawful.” In a
separate speech this month, Pompeo decried Beijing’s “campaign of bullying” in the South China Sea and pledged that Washington
would “not allow” China to treat the waters “as its maritime empire.” The following day, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian
and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell asserted that the U.S. was “no longer going to say we are neutral on these maritime issues” and
warned that “nothing is off the table.”
What’s next
Ultimately, according to Newsham, what is happening in the South China Sea could prove to be a bad omen for Tokyo.
“It’s fair to say that whatever happens in the South China Sea is a preview of what is in store in the East China Sea,” he said. “It’s
not unthinkable things might happen simultaneously or even ‘first’ in the East China Sea.”
One particular area of great concern for Tokyo near the Senkakus is the so-called gray zone tactics employed by China
that exert pressure on Japan but fall below the threshold of conflict.
Presently, China holds its naval assets at a further distance than its paramilitary and law enforcement assets. But if Tokyo
responds to a law enforcement presence with MSDF assets “because it is unable to reciprocate, China can complain of
assertive or disproportionate responses by Japan,” Neill said.
Japanese defense officials fear such a scenario could even open the door to stronger actions such as an occupation of the islands.
“Retaliation will simply give China another ‘provocation’ that Beijing needs to retaliate against,” said June Teufel Dreyer, a
University of Miami professor and Asia expert.
This trepidation has left Japan effectively paralyzed in its response to the incursions around the Senkakus, she said.
“Scrambling jets, holding military drills, building missile sites on the (Nansei) Islands doesn’t scare the Chinese, since they know that
the Japanese government fears escalation more than it fears allowing the Chinese to gradually take what they want,” Dreyer said.
“They won’t be invaded, they’ll be ‘osmosed.’”
Still, although Japan has retained an on-alert security posture over the Senkakus for years now, a response that goes
beyond symmetrical could exacerbate tensions in favor of China, said Michishita.
“We are in a good position. We own those islands, unlike (the South Korean-controlled but Japanese-claimed) Takeshima Islands or
the (Russian-controlled, Japanese-claimed) Northern Territories,” he said, referring to what the Koreans call Dokdo and a four islets
Japan formerly held off Hokkaido.
Michishita said that because Japan continues to exercise administrative control over the Senkakus, “making a fuss is not in our
interests.”
“Keeping things as quiet as possible is the way to go,” he added, saying that Japan had “learned a lesson” after China began
sending scores of government vessels to the area in response to the 2012 nationalization.
“The lesson is, when we make a fuss … China is likely to exploit it and use it as an opportunity to further escalate the
situation.”
 Sino-Japan relations impacts
Sino-Japan relations key to solve every impact.
Tuosheng, member of the Academic Committee of Huazhi Institute for Global
Governance at Nanjing University, 2009 (Zhang, The Architecture of Security in the Asia-
Pacific,"Chapter 10. Changes in China-Japan Relations and East Asian Security," No Publication, http://press-
files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p124751/html/ch10.html, DoA 8/22/2020, DVOG)
Continued improvement and development of China-Japan relations will have a positive influence on East Asian security.
First of all, it facilitates cooperation on the Six-Party Talks. With the continuous escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis in
2006, people were worried about greater difficulty in coordination between China on the one hand and the United States
and Japan on the other due to poor China-Japan relations and the more intense situation on the Korean Peninsula once
North Korea carried out its first nuclear test. However, major changes in China-Japan relations exerted a positive influence
over the development of the North Korean nuclear issue. After North Korea’s nuclear test, the UNSC quickly adopted a
resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea and the Six-Party Talks resumed shortly thereafter to register important progress.
Admittedly, the positive developments on the North Korean nuclear issue had multiple causes, but improved China-Japan
relations and strengthened cooperation between China, South Korea and Japan were certainly among them. Some people
even believed that Japan sought to improve its relations with China partly out of its serious concern over the Korean
Peninsula. This analysis makes sense. In the future, with China and Japan giving priority to the Six-Party Talks in their effort to
develop regional and international cooperation, the positive effects of improved China-Japan relations will become more apparent.
Improved China-Japan relations have also helped to relax tensions over the East China Sea and to facilitate a peaceful resolution of
the outstanding territorial and maritime disputes that are still widespread in East Asia. When state-to-state relations worsen,
disputes over territory or maritime interests are not only difficult to resolve but may also trigger military conflict. In 2005, frictions over
rival claims in the East China Sea developed to a dangerous level, with a marked increase in military surveillance by both China and
Japan, more radical opinions in the confrontational national sentiments, and the appearance of the view that there would definitely
be a war between China and Japan. Later, following negotiations, the two sides reached initial understandings on the common
development of these disputed territories and the situation relaxed to some extent. Nonetheless, against the backdrop of a generally
tense bilateral relationship, registering further progress will be very difficult and the risk of reversal is ever-present. Improvement in
bilateral relations has created the necessary condition for common development of the East China Sea, allowing the two
governments to gradually dispel disruptive nationalistic sentiments and find practical ways forward through sustained and serious
dialogue and mutual compromise. After late 2006, the two sides increased their contact over the East China Sea issue. Their
common understanding grew and they agreed to strive for a specific scheme of common development to be reported to leaders of
the two countries in the fall of 2007.[19] If China and Japan are successful in jointly developing their claims in the East China Sea,
they will not only create conditions for the two sides to resolve their maritime boundary dispute and the Diaoyutai Islands dispute in
the future, but also set a positive example for other countries in the region in relaxing tension and resolving disputes over territory or
maritime interests.
Moreover, improved China-Japan relations are conducive to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,
which serves the interests of the Mainland, Taiwan and others in East Asia (including Japan), as well as those nations outside
the region (such as the United States). However, the development of pro-independence forces in Taiwan constitutes a huge
challenge to peace and stability in the region. In recent years, with the sustained stable development of China-US relations, their
cooperation to prevent Taiwan-independence sentiments disrupting the status quo has increased and their friction over the Taiwan
question has decreased. However, frictions between China and Japan over Taiwan have been on the rise due to the
worsening relationship. Pro-Taiwan forces in Japan have gained influence, official contacts with Taiwan have increased,
and Japan’s Taiwan policy has moved from one of ambiguity to more clarity. [20] This has been exploited by Taiwan’s
independence forces. They even publicly called for the establishment of a quasi-military alliance with Japan against China.
The worsening of China-Japan relations added complexity and risk to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Any improvement
and development in China-Japan relations may lead to increased cooperation between the two countries in maintaining
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, thus containing the expansion of the Taiwan independence force and leaving
China, the United States and Japan more space in which to manoeuvre in the event that the pro-independence forces
provoke a crisis. The May 2007 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2 plus 2) meeting did not again list the peace and
stability of the Taiwan Strait among its common strategic objectives, giving a positive signal [21] and helping to restrict the capacity of
the pro-independence forces to disrupt the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Further, improved China-Japan relations will facilitate the establishment and development of a regional multilateral security
cooperation mechanism. At present, East Asian security mechanisms are mainly composed of two parts: the US-led bilateral
military alliances; and the rapidly developing bilateral and multilateral security dialogues in which coordination and cooperation
among major powers play an important role. As time passes, the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the APT, the EAS and
the Six-Party Talks will increase and that of bilateral military alliances will gradually decrease. In this process, improvement and
development of China-Japan relations and strengthened military relations and defence dialogue will not only facilitate the
formation of a relatively stable and coordinated triangular relationship between China, the United States and Japan; it will
also create the conditions necessary for dialogue between China and the US-Japan alliance. Continued development of
China-Japan relations will inject vigour into, and lay down the foundation for, the development of multilateral security
mechanisms in East Asia. History will prove that only once China and Japan achieve a genuine reconciliation, and are able
to cooperate comprehensively, can East Asia establish an effective multilateral security cooperation mechanism.
Finally, the continued improvement and development of China-Japan relations will also greatly enhance their cooperation
in the fields of non-traditional security, such as counter-terrorism, guarding against financial and energy crises, treatment
of environmental pollution and ecological destruction, prevention and treatment of international infectious diseases,
combating transnational crime, and supplying international humanitarian assistance. Since the end of the Cold War, an
important trend in the international situation has been the rise of non-traditional security challenges. Strengthened
cooperation in this regard will be a necessary choice for China, Japan and other East Asian countries.
Japan Assurance DA Answers
***Non Unique***
 Thumpers---2AC
COVID, Korean peninsula, and Trump all thump assurance
Kathrin Hille 20, Edward White in Wellington, Primrose Riordan in Hong Kong and John Reed in Bangkok, Financial Times (“The
Trump factor: Asian allies question America’s reliability”, Financial Times, June 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/74576c3a-6303-
4ba0-bbe3-15b563ce6019 **NCC Packet 2020
Ever since Mr Trump was elected, Washington’s long-term allies in Asia have worried about whether
his transactional approach to foreign policy would lead to their interests being sidelined . But incidents
such as the president’s stand-off with South Korea have only magnified those concerns.
At a time when Washington’s response to coronavirus has been heavily criticised and American society is engulfed in a debate
the dispute with Seoul reflects widening cracks in the entire US-built security
about racial injustice,
order which has kept the peace in the region for the past 70 years — cracks that have been
opened by the rapid rise of China, but which have been exacerbated by a lack of US leadership .
Although South Korea is where Mr Trump’s “America First” worldview has had the biggest impact, Washington’s other Asia-Pacific
Japan and Australia worry that the US, the regional hegemon for most of the past century, is less
allies such as
committed to and less capable of protecting them than in the past. With China using its economic and
military clout in increasingly aggressive ways against its neighbours, that concern is turning into alarm.
“Several countries in Asia have concerns about aligning themselves with a US that seems less predictable and not reliable,” says
Bonnie Glaser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the US think-tank. “If Trump is voted out in [presidential
elections in] November, there will be a sigh of relief across the region.”
But Washington’s allies have doubts about US support that go well beyond the
Trump[marked] administration . “The reasons are our diplomatic attention span and our
military capabilities,” she says.
While Washington’s ties with Europe and Nato have also frayed, including the potential withdrawal of many of the troops in
Germany, the risks are greater in Asia, where global trade routes thread through dangerous flashpoints including North Korea, the
Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, in addition to India’s tensions with both China and Pakistan.
At the same time as allies are questioning Washington’s reliability , there are new signs that the
US is losing its long-held military supremacy. Beijing’s growing number of intermediate-range missiles
means that America’s traditional way of projecting power in the region — through aircraft and ships deployed in
big bases — has in some cases become too risky.
The US military demonstrated as much in April when it ended 16 years of continuous bomber
presence in Guam. Since 2004, it had been sending heavy and stealth bombers from the island through the US Pacific
territory, from where they could be in the East China Sea, in Taiwan or in the South China Sea within four hours.
Now, they will operate from home bases in the mainland US — a change the US Strategic Command says
would make the force more resilient and unpredictable.
“It is an answer to the ‘Guam killer’, and it is the right decision,” says a military official from a US ally in the region, referring to
China’s DF-26 intermediate-range missile which can hit Guam from bases in the country. He added that spreading out forces and
weapons and moving them around irregularly would make it more difficult and expensive for China to target them. “But of course
the immediate political signal people here will pick up is that the US is weakened .”
The same applies to aircraft carriers , which have been a key tool of US power projection. “ They could become
a dinosaur ,” says Yoichi Funabashi, chairman of the Asia Pacific Initiative, a Tokyo think-tank which organises exchanges
between US and Japanese military officials. “ Covid-19 has demonstrated how vulnerable US aircraft carriers
are,” he adds, stressing that when the outbreak of the virus forced all four carriers in the region to
stay in port, no US carrier was available in the western Pacific.
Washington’s difficulties in handling coronavirus have shaken confidence more broadly . The US is
not addressing the pandemic as effectively or as strongly as expected from an economic, military and
technological power, says Jay Batongbacal, director of the University of the Philippines’ Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the
Sea. “ You can say that the armour has been tarnished, and everyone can see that .”
 Laundry List: 2AC
Alliance is weak now due to Japan’s cancellation of the Aegis system, lack of
cooperation on fighter aircraft and 5G, and Japanese elites don’t think US
security guarantees are credible
Green and Hornung, CSIS Senior Vice President and RAND Corporation Political Scientist, 7-17 -20
(Michael and Jeffrey, “Are US-Japan relations on the rocks?,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/507880-are-us-japanese-relations-on-the-rocks) JFN NCC Packet
2020

But suddenly, in the span of only a few months, the alliance appears weaker in ways that no one
anticipated. In June, Japan suspended, then cancelled, its planned deployment of two Aegis
Ashore systems, a ballistic missile defense system. The surprise cancellation rocked an alliance
used to close coordination, particularly one that carries operational benefits to both American and
Japanese national security interests alike. Then, the Japanese Defense Ministry announced that it
would produce its next jet fighter indigenously, rejecting plans by U.S. firms in order to benefit
Japanese industry, ensuring higher costs and longer production times. In the economic domain, reports
surfaced that Japanese firms have been helping China build out its 5G network in China with
Japanese equipment, despite years of close U.S. and Japanese government cooperation designed to
stop Huawei’s predatory policies. And most recently, a respected Japanese scholar and pro-alliance
national security analyst who is close to Abe, Yuichi Hosoya, said in an interview that the time had
come for Japan to reassess its overreliance on the United States and build its own defense
capabilities, questioning whether the U.S. would remain committed to Japan’s defense. Hosoya’s
comments struck a nerve because he vocalized what many Japan watchers have been increasingly
hearing in private about Japan’s concerns with the United States. By themselves, these events would not
be worrying; collectively, they may form a problematic trend. We can at best speculate on the reasons
why. One factor may be both Abe’s and Trump’s falling political polls in the wake of COVID-19,
leading Japan to consider hedging strategies. Another factor could be a growing concern in Tokyo
that the more reliable checks on Trump’s excesses were lost when Secretary of Defense James Mattis
and National Security Adviser John Bolton left their jobs. We suspect that the Trump administration’s
poor performance in responding to the pandemic is also a factor in how Japanese leaders judge
American reliability. And in private, some officials speak of fatigue at managing a disruptive president
who shows no signs of steadying or becoming more reliable. There is not cause for concern about Japan
abandoning the alliance with the United States. Abe came back to power promising a stronger U.S.-Japan
alliance and has given no indication that he is abandoning that promise. Nor are any of the major political
figures trying to replace him challenging the alliance relationship. Moreover, the growing threat from
China means that Washington and Tokyo need each other more than ever. But the growing points of
friction and uncertainty in the relationship carry negative consequences, particularly given that even
though polls show that the Japanese public supports the alliance, they also reveal that trust in the
United States and President Trump has dropped precipitously. And it sends the wrong message to
Tokyo that the next U.S. envoy is cooling his heels waiting for confirmation.
 COVID-19: 2AC
COVID-19 greatly weakens the US-Japan alliance and security cooperation
Tatsumi and Sato, Stimson Center Senior Fellow and Nonresident Fellow, 5-29 -20
(Yuki and Yoshimitsu, “What COVID-19 Means for the US-Japan Alliance,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/what-covid-19-means-for-the-us-japan-alliance/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

In case of the U.S. military, this challenge is particularly pressing. The U.S. military, by its expeditionary
nature, requires a large part of its personnel to be deployed overseas for an extended period for a wide
variety of missions, with its forces often living in close quarters. Training, done in groups, is critical in
maintaining the readiness of the force. Also, in-person engagements with counterparts in the militaries of
U.S. allies and partners through joint trainings and other cooperative activities are an integral part of
demonstrating U.S. military presence and thereby the U.S. commitment to continue to play a leading role
in maintaining peace and stability. The COVID-19 outbreak on the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the
resulting limitation on its activities in the Indo-Pacific are a reminder that the spread of pandemic
within the U.S. military can hamstring the country’s ability to sustain its presence and thus exert
effective deterrence vis-à-vis the disruptive behavior of potential adversaries. The Japan Self-Defense
Force (JSDF) faces a similar challenge in containing the pandemic from spreading within the
force. Moreover, unlike the U.S. military which is primarily tasked with expeditionary missions, JSDF
takes on both national defense operations (such as warning and surveillance activities in Japan’s water
and airspace) and international missions while still expected to carry on with its disaster relief (such as
responding to large-scale disasters in Japan, including the triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and
nuclear meltdown in March 2011). For instance, the JSDF Central Hospital was among the primary
facilities that admitted COVID-19 patients from the cruise ship Diamond Princess, and they also provided
transportation support for those who came off from the ship. With JGSDF Medical School in its immediate
neighborhood, the JSDF Central Hospital is also designated as the treatment facility in the event of
emergencies involving chemical and biological weapons in Japan. Already facing the increasing tempo of
Chinese vessels and aircraft’s incursion into Japanese airspace and in and near its territorial waters, the
diversity of JSDF missions coupled with its small size — the entire JSDF is approximately the size of
the U.S. Marine Corps — makes it especially challenging for the JSDF to conduct these operations
while maintaining the readiness that is required for homeland defense. Beyond the immediate
impact on the JSDF, COVID-19 will potentially have a long-term impact on U.S.-Japan defense
cooperation both bilaterally and beyond. For examples, the restrictions on meetings and other large-
group activities driven by health precautions could reduce the number of bilateral joint trainings
and joint exercises and other face-to-face engagements that can take place between the two militaries.
That will limit the opportunities for both militaries to familiarize themselves with each other, which is
essential for continuing to enhance personal ties. In addition, the U.S. military and JSDF often have
served as the nucleus of trilateral and multilateral military-to-military interactions. These include the
trilateral military-to-military engagements among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea; U.S., Japan, and
Australia; and U.S., Japan, and India, among others. Similar to bilateral engagements, restrictions on
meetings and other activities could also limit opportunities to deepen these trilateral defense relations.
Second, public health precautions could hamper the U.S. and Japanese defense authorities in
their continuing effort to improve relations between U.S. and JSDF bases and their surrounding
local host communities. Concerns over large gatherings can restrict public access to popular events
such as the Independence Day and Halloween celebrations on U.S. bases and Air Shows on JSDF
bases. Health precautions could also limit other social activities outside the base, such as community
clean-ups, and other engagements that have been instrumental in efforts to facilitate the interaction
between local communities and the military personnel on these bases. Finally, the COVID-19 outbreak
on the USS Theodore Roosevelt reveals the real possibility that the pandemic might impact the
operational capacities of forward-deployed U.S. forces. That risk requires Japan to think through the
ways in which its alliance with the United States can maintain effective deterrence when both militaries
are simultaneous battling COVID-19 at home while having to meet their national security requirements.
Does that mean Japan needs to pursue capabilities that it can operate autonomously when necessary to
meet its defense requirements? Or does that mean the United States and Japan need to begin to take a
more holistic look at what each force can bring to their relationship to jointly maintain effective deterrence,
even if one or both suffers reduced operational capacity?
 COVID-19: Extensions
Japanese trust in the alliance is on the brink of collapse now due to COVID-19
Inagaki and Lewis, Financial Times Reporters, 8-21-20
(Kana and Leo, “Okinawa’s anger over U.S. military bases stoked by coronavirus surge,” accessed 9-10-
20, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-08-21/okinawas-anger-over-u-s-military-bases-
stoked-by-coronavirus-surge) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Shortly after July 4, a video emerged online showing crowds of revelers dancing at a party on one
of Okinawa’s beaches. The event to celebrate American Independence Day was hosted by a former
U.S. Marine, and not one person in the video was wearing a face mask. To ordinary Japanese
watching on social media — who had spent four months in self-restrained voluntary lockdown — it was a
stunning snub to the nation’s efforts to keep the coronavirus under control. “We’re all being extra
cautious not to allow any infection so to see that video made me so angry and disappointed,” said Chieko
Oshiro, who heads a residents’ group in Okinawa, Japan’s southernmost island. The virus outbreaks
since, which have made Okinawa the hot spot of Japan’s second wave of COVID-19, may not have
been directly linked to the party — or the others like it held on the island that evening — but in the court
of public opinion, it was the smoking gun. It has stoked anger within Okinawa, where the heavy
presence of U.S. military bases and the behavior of the 20,000 Marines and other military personnel
stationed there have been a long-standing source of tension. “Trust in the [Japan-U.S.] security
alliance is on the brink of collapse,” Denny Tamaki, Okinawa governor and a former leader of the anti-
U.S.-base movement, warned in a recent television program.
 Host Nation Support: 2AC
Imminent negotiations over host nation support ensure a downturn in alliance
cohesion
Cooper and Hornung, AEI Research Fellow and RAND Corporation Political Scientist 9-8 -20
(Zack and Jeffrey, “The US-Japan alliance after Abe,” accessed 9-10-20, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-
u-s-japan-alliance-after-abe/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Unfortunately, Japan’s leadership transition comes at a critical time for the alliance. The two allies are
about to engage in a potentially nasty — and, some would argue, unnecessary — fight over host-
nation support, an important component of Japanese financial support for American military forces
stationed in Japan. Given Abe’s personal involvement in the alliance, Japan has had the luxury of
knowing he could step in and manage these issues directly with Trump if needed. Without Abe,
there is a real risk that the talks could devolve into fractious disputes.
 Host Nation Support: Extensions
Imminent negotiations on cost sharing will tank the alliance
Klingner, Pak, and Terry,
12-18-19
(Bruce, Jung, and Sue Mi, “Trump shakedowns are threatening two key US alliances in Asia,” accessed
9-10-20, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/18/trump-shakedowns-are-
threatening-two-key-u-s-alliances-in-asia/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

The U.S. is moving toward a rupture with two important allies, South Korea and Japan. Already,
President Trump has reportedly demanded a five-fold increase in the amount South Korea pays
toward the cost of stationing U.S. forces there, raising the amount to $5 billion a year. Reports
suggest that Washington is likely to seek a similar increase from Tokyo to support the cost of U.S.
troops based there in next year’s negotiations. For decades, Trump has derided America’s allies as
“free-riders” who don’t pull their own weight. That is an inaccurate depiction of the large contributions
provided to the U.S. by South Korea and Japan over the decades.
***No Link***
 Alliance Resilient---2AC
US-Japan alliance is resilient—nonmilitary aspects and empirics show the
alliance has made it over hurdles
Daniel Russel 19, Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). Previously
he served as a Diplomat in Residence and Senior Fellow with ASPI for a one year term. A career member of the Senior Foreign
Service at the U.S. Department of State, he most recently served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (“The U.S.-Japan Alliance and America First: Coping with Change in the Indo-Pacific”, Asia Society Policy Institute,
https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/us-japan-alliance-and-america-first-coping-change-indo-pacific) **NCC Packet 2020
These measures have incalculably improved and expanded our ability to work together on security and on other strategic issues. But it’s not just security : it would be a
mistake to overlook the fact that the U.S. and Japan have much more than a military alliance. Broadly
speaking, we have a political and an economic alliance as well . On the economic front , it is true that the

current administration’s threat (and use) of tariffs against Japan has created considerable resentment.
But despite that, the two governments did ultimately manage to resurrect many of the
agricultural provisions of TPP in their recent bilateral trade deal and, more significantly, they reached agreement on a digital trade agreement that marks an important step in
setting high-standard open internet rules. That’s a good thing. Trump became the first head of state to meet with the new Emperor in the Reiwa era. That’s a good thing. Today, there is still

strong public support in the two countries for the Alliance , and continued positive public attitudes
towards the other nation – that’s a good thing – even though the annual Pew survey shows that Japanese
confidence in the U.S. president plummeted from 78% in 2016 to 30% in the most recent poll. And of
course, it’s widely perceived that Prime Minister Abe has pretty deftly avoided many of the pitfalls of dealing with Donald Trump,
and deflected a number of potential threats to Japan’s interests…albeit not without some cost to his dignity. Of course, it remains to be seen how Abe’s skill in damage control will fare in the upcoming
negotiations over Host Nation Support. Judging by recent press reports that Trump’s opening bid is a five-fold increase, I guess the Tokyo Olympics aren’t the only games we’re going to be watching closely next

an objective assessment of the Alliance Partnership shows that while there are
year. Overall, though, I think that

tensions and clearly some high hurdles ahead, it remains multifaceted and it retains deep roots;
it has a number of attributes that gives it resilience and enhances its effectiveness ; it has become
steadily stronger and more balanced in many key respects ; and lastly, that there are powerful geostrategic imperatives – such as the behavior
of a rising China – that increase our reliance on one another.
 Generic: 2AC
Plan doesn’t affect the alliance because Japanese elites have no actual interest in
defending the Senkaku Islands
Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies,
8-12-20
(Grant, “Why Japan may cede the Senkakus to China,” Asia Times, accessed 9-10-20,
https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-japan-may-cede-the-senkakus-to-china/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

It could be that in Japan – or, better said, in those parts of its ruling political and business classes
that make such decisions – there is no intention of “going kinetic” to defend the Senkakus. If the
Chinese presence becomes overwhelming, Tokyo may simply cede the area to the PRC. It would
complain of course, but would it shoot? Or would it reckon that the cost of military confrontation with
China would far exceed the value of “some rocks”? Far-fetched? Maybe not. A recently retired JSDF
officer, unprompted, recently confided his belief that, even if the Senkaku Islands are invaded by
China, the “Japanese government will not choose war.” He expained: “I’m very sorry but Japanese
statesmen think these affairs” – in this case he was referring both to the Senkakus and the South
Korean-controlled Takeshima Islands – “are not military matters but political matters.” I take his point.
The Japanese would sort of resist but my own guess is that, if the only way to remove the Chinese
were to shoot, Japan wouldn’t do it. This assumes the Chinese don’t start shooting first. If China just
comes in and parks itself and even lands some people on the Senkakus and says,
“wuddyugonnadoaboutit?,” the government of Japan just might do nothing much. Recall that the Barack
Obama administration allowed the PRC to take de facto control of the South China Sea without putting up
a fight – or much of an argument. And back then the US military still had the advantage over the People’s
Liberation Army. There are of course Japanese – including factions in the ruling LDP and most members
of the JSDF – who think Japan should defend all of the territories it claims. But there were also Americans
who thought Obama should forcefully defend US partners and interests in East Asia in the 2010s. If letting
go is what Japan’s leaders are thinking of doing, they can’t exactly publicly declare it. For one thing,
Japan’s public might be outraged – if public opinion polls, overwhelmingly negative toward China, are
anything to go by. But the citizenry doesn’t always matter much in Japan and the government can
always simply say, after the fact, “Shoganai” – it couldn’t be helped. One suspects that Japan Inc
might be in the “Senkakus aren’t worth a war” camp. The Abe administration recently allotted US$2
billion to help Japanese companies move operations out of China. However, a Japanese friend whom I
trust told me the other day that Keidanren – Japan’s powerful business federation – is soon to issue
a call for deeper economic ties with China, while citing the PRC’s post-Corona V-shaped recovery.
Toyota, Japan’s leading company, is planning to go all-in on electric vehicle production in China. There is
a precedent for Japanese business interests shaping defense policy. In 2012 anti-Japanese riots
broke out in China – over the Senkakus – and targeted a Japanese supermarket chain’s stores in the
PRC. Around the same time, a prominent official close to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
convinced the leader to cancel an upcoming amphibious exercise near Okinawa that I was directly
involved with after the Chinese complained. The official’s family owned the stores being targeted in
China. No doubt this isn’t unique to Japan. Wall Street and the American business community have
pressured successive US administrations to accommodate the PRC for decades.
 Generic: Ext
The threshold is either so low it’s inevitable or won’t happen – they’re rational
and the plan is way too small
Sposato 19 [William Tokyo-based writer @ Foreign Policy who has been following Japan's economy and financial markets for
more than 15 years. 1-28-2019. "In Trump’s World, Nukes Are Self-Defense." Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/28/in-trumps-world-nukes-are-self-defense/] NCC Packet 2020

Facing the reality of a nuclear No rth Ko rea, worsening relations with ostensible ally So uth Ko rea, and
an unpredictable partner in Washington, Japan’s government is ramping up its military defenses,
shedding many of its postwar taboos. Could the ban on nuclear weapons also be sent to the scrap heap at
the same time as the country gets a real army? The idea seems far-fetched, but Japan is increasingly alone in a fast-
changing Asian security environment.
Since the advent of the atomic age, Japan has sat comfortably under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a key element in a defense alliance
that is often touted by both U.S. and Japanese officials as the strongest in the world. The treaty, first signed in 1951, provides U.S.
security guarantees for a country that had renounced the use of force in its post-World War II constitution, which was largely drafted
by Japan’s U.S. occupiers. In exchange, Japan is home to extensive U.S. military bases that have helped to project power into the
center of East Asia. The alliance seemed unbreakable. But that was before Donald Trump became U.S. president—a leader
ostensibly willing to put everything on the table, with a view of Japan seemingly stuck in the 1980s.
Trump’s statements have Japanese officials privately
From the cost of military bases to the chronic trade deficit,
worried that the United States might take rash action that would have been unthinkable in previous administrations—such as
a deal with North Korea that leaves Japan exposed .
Cementing the warming personal relations between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Trump were recent comments from Kim
ahead of their planned February summit. “Kim Jong Un said that we will believe in President Trump’s positive way of thinking, wait
with patience and in good faith and, together with the U.S., advance step by step toward the goal to be reached by the two
countries,” North Korea’s official KCNA news agency said last Thursday. The problem for Japan is what that might mean for its
security. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Fox News last week that “Chairman Kim continues to assure the president of the
United States he is intent on denuclearization”—but promises of denuclearization on one side of the Sea of Japan are prompting
backroom talk of going the opposite way on the other. That would be a huge step. The only country to have seen firsthand the
devastation of atomic weapons, Japan has long held a no-nukes policy based on three principles: nonpossession, nonproduction,
and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons. It has been a leading force at the United Nations for nonproliferation and the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons.
Trump has railed against Japan on numerous occasions, even as he seems to retain some fondness for
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But he has even kinder words for Kim . Trump’s much-heralded North Korean
deal is still up in the air, but he famously declared when he returned to Washington from the pomp of the Singapore summit that the
United States was now safe. The choice of words was not lost on the Japanese government, which rushed to ensure that it was not
being left out in the cold (or the rain).
The concern in Tokyo is that Trump, badly in need of a clear victory in his North Korea negotiations, may settle for
a ban on intercontinental weapons, leaving nearby Asian countries to sort out what to do about all the
short-range missiles that Pyongyang has deployed.
As many experts have noted, what the U.S.-North Korea commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula means is in the eye of the beholder. For Kim, it appears to mean
that the United States drops its strategic military alliance with South Korea. Given the proximity to Japan and the fact that defense of South Korea is a cornerstone of the U.S.-
Japan military alliance, North Korea would likely insist that the same goes for Japan. South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who took office in May 2017, has moved at a
breakneck pace to reduce the threat posed by Pyongyang. His administration has taken the lead in dealing with his unpredictable neighbor (and an unpredictable U.S. leader).
He has held three summit meetings with Kim, with the two leaders agreeing to reduce the military capabilities along the border and Demilitarized Zone. Moon has also said the
South would provide financial and economic aid as soon as U.S. sanctions are lifted. While a more relaxed Korean Peninsula should appear to be good news, the
rapprochement scenario poses its own risks to Japan. While South Korea is seeing a steady improvement in relations with Pyongyang, the Koreas’ ties to Japan have been
worsening steadily. Some have been more point scoring than policy disputes, such as Japan’s withdrawal from naval maneuvers after South Korea demanded it not use the
Rising Sun flag for its naval ships. Others are more serious, however, and play into a long-held Korean narrative that all would be well if only Japan weren’t around. A long-
running dispute over wartime forced prostitution has come back despite a 2015 agreement with the previous South Korean government. This has now been joined by lawsuits
over forced labor for Japan’s wartime industries. Japan says any legal action was settled in the 1965 peace treaty between the two countries. South Korea’s Supreme Court has
ruled that the treaty does not cover actions by individuals, paving the way for seizure of Japanese assets. Kim has taken the opportunity to pile on the abuse, warning this month
that Japan’s pressure over the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s would mean that Pyongyang would raise its own complaints over wartime
laborers. Can this seemingly common cause run deeper? The idea of a single Korea has been a long-standing dream of both countries and reiterated in their summit meetings.
From Japan’s perspective, it is important for South Korea to pledge today that any combined Korea would swear off the idea of having nuclear weapons. “Unless the South
Koreans do so now, it would become difficult for them to say the same thing when the unification becomes more realistic. In the worst-case scenario in which a unified Korea
inherits nuclear weapons from North Korea, Japan would become the only major country in the region not to have nuclear weapons, creating a significant reputational issue,”
said Narushige Michishita, a professor at Tokyo’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. “If it happens, Japan might be almost forced to acquire nuclear weapons,
wasting a lot of money and other precious resources.”

All this uncertainty plays into the hands of Japanese hawks , who have long complained that
Japan should turn its back on the postwar pacifist constitution and get to work on a proper military force.
The 1947 U.S.-drafted constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.” The wording is quite direct, but the government has shown itself willing to stretch a point. While the document goes on to say that “land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” this has not stopped the country from amassing formidable armed forces in everything but name. The Japanese
armed forces are considered one of the most advanced in the world and rated among the top 10 by strategic groups. Abe, who in his previous 2006-2007 term was the first
Japanese prime minister not to have lived through World War II, is leading this charge. He has pushed up defense spending by more than 10 percent since taking office in 2012.
For the new fiscal year starting in April, the defense spending will rise to a record $48 billion, a 2.1 percent increase. This has been done with little opposition, even though the
government’s continuing budget deficits have put public debt at around 225 percent of annual GDP, making it among the most indebted countries in the world by most
measures. The most significant step is to refit Japan’s two helicopter carriers to be able to deploy the F-35B fighter jet, the U.S. Marine Corps version of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter. Pressed on why a purely defensive military force needs aircraft carriers, Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya said, “The planned modification to the Izumo-class carriers is
to increase their applications.” Given the sensitivities, the ships are also not called aircraft carriers but are instead officially listed as “multipurpose escort destroyers.” The budget
will include the purchase of U.S.-made weapon systems, which will conveniently help to reduce Japan’s trade surplus with the United States, another recent source of irritation
between the two countries. Aside from the F-35 planes, totaling more than 80 overall, $2.1 billion will be spent for a ground-based version of the Aegis missile tracking system.
In doing so, Japan has weathered criticism from not only North Korea but also China and Russia, which view the system as a way to block their missiles as well. There has also
been a flurry of courtesy calls and maneuvers with various Japanese allies, taking the country’s forces into areas that pretty clearly stretch the definition of self-defense. The
helicopter carrier Kaga last year sailed through the contentious South China Sea, which is claimed by China, and the Indian Ocean to meet up with ally India and stop in Sri
Lanka. The Air Self-Defense Force held joint drills with Australia and the U.K. Royal Navy, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force held its first joint amphibious exercise in
Japanese waters. All of this is what one security expert at a defense think tank called “securing the U.S. presence while improving [Japan’s] own capability within the alliance.” A
long-running question for Japan has been whether the U.S. security guarantee is actually a firm one. This is sometimes referred to as the “de Gaulle doctrine,” named after
French President Charles de Gaulle, in which he questioned whether the United States would ever risk an attack on a major American city to protect Europe. At the same time,
a U.S. abandonment of Japan would face harsh opposition on both sides of the Pacific. In the words of one security expert in Tokyo, a U.S. pullback from South Korea or Japan
would mean that Washington is in effect saying, “China, we don’t care about Asia. Please take it.” Yet from a technical standpoint, experts agree that acquiring nuclear weapons
would be fairly easy for Japan, taking anywhere from six months to a few years. It has stockpiles from its nuclear power plants of 47 tons of plutonium, enough for around 6,000
nuclear warheads, and the rockets developed for its civilian space program could be rebadged for military purposes. Experts say, however, that developing a full-fledged
operational deterrent would be much more complex and much more expensive.

Japan defense scholars also stress that a decision to go nuclear would face a number of political
and geopolitical issues , chief among them domestic public opinion . “While there has been a
modest increase in support for an enhanced conventional defense force, there is no sign of public support for
acquiring nuclear weapons and is in fact at its lowest level ever ,” said Corey Wallace, an Asia-Pacific security
expert and fellow in the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. He also notes that China would
be firmly opposed, with fairly serious repercussions on relations that have been improving in
recent years.
Changing public sentiment would likely be prompted only by a fundamental shift in Japan’s
perceived safety, such as direct threats by an emboldened North Korea (or a unified Korea). “The Japanese
public is skeptical about the utility of the use of power projection and nuclear weapons in
particular, but it is not blindly irrational or idealistic,” Wallace said.
 Relations Not Zero-Sum
Japan doesn’t view US-Sino relations as zero sum and trading off with US-
Japanese relations  
Pugliese, lecturer in war studies at King's College, 5-29-19 
(Giulio, “Four Scenarios for U.S.-China Relations and What They Mean for Japan,” Tokyo Review,
accessed 8-13-19, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/05/four-scenarios-us-china-relations/, ADA Packet)
JFN NCC Packet 2020
 
The second scenario, and the optimum scenario for Japan, would be sustained U.S. regional
engagement, with renewed American commitments to the global commons, including preservation of the multilateral free trade
system. In this scenario, the United States would maintain its forward military presence and deter a more assertive China with the
help of its allies. In addition, the United States would join the revived Trans-Pacific Partnership and coordinate with Japan, the
European Union, and like-minded parties to shape the rules of twenty-first century economic practice, and work together towards the
realization of connectivity projects through government financing (rather than rhetoric and MoUs). The aim would not be a
zero-sum containment of China, but rather the preservation of a favorable regional balance
coupled by joint efforts towards shaping Chinese political and economic behavior in a
constructive direction through sticks, carrots, and international norms. One concrete example of such an
attitude is Japan’s constructive ambivalence towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as Tokyo aims at shaping Chinese
government financing towards international standards gearing up to the G-20 Summit.
***No Impact***
 Alliances Defense
No impact to alliances—they’re bogged down and can’t credibly deter
adversaries.
Shearer, 16 - Senior Adviser on Asia Pacific Security and Director, Alliances and American Leadership Project, master’s
degree in international relations from the University of Cambridge and honors degrees in law and arts from the University of
Melbourne (Andrew, "Can America still rely on its allies?," Center for Strategic & International Studies, 12-15-2016,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-america-still-rely-its-allies) NCC Packet 2020

Many of theUnited States’ oldest and most important alliances are under strain . The implications of Brexit
for NATO are not yet clear, but disintegrative forces within Europe and Russian probing in Eastern
Europe are already testing alliance solidarity . Relations with Turkey, a vital ally at the crossroads
between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, are fraught following an attempted military coup in July. Frictions
with Israel and America’s traditional Arab allies in the Middle East over the nuclear deal with Iran have barely
been papered over. In the Philippines—geographically key to expanded U.S. military access in Southeast Asia—recently
elected President Rodrigo Duterte announced his country’s “separation” from the United States and is tilting toward China; defense
ties with Thailand, America’s other longstanding treaty ally in the region, remain frozen following that country’s most recent military
takeover. The leadership of South Korea, another vital Asian ally, is roiled by political scandal.
Like the United States, many allies are grappling with weak economic growth, populism, and political
gridlock. Preoccupied at home, they are psychologically and materially ill-prepared to confront growing
threats and challenges abroad—whether Russian adventurism in Eastern Europe and the Middle
East, Chinese assertiveness in the Western Pacific, North Korea’s march toward a credible
intercontinental nuclear strike capability, Iranian designs in the Middle East, or the metastasizing threat
posed by ISIL and other Islamist terror networks. The outcome of the recent U.S. election has injected a new element of
uncertainty.
It’s a bleak picture, and there is little doubt that the United States and the international system in which it has
invested so much are at a tipping point because of this toxic brew of external threats and domestic problems. Yet there are
good reasons for the United States to keep the faith when it comes to alliances, and to invest in the laborious and time-consuming
task of what former Secretary of State George Schultz called “tending the alliance garden.”

Allies just free-ride

Friedman 18 [Benjamin H. Friedman; Senior Fellow and Defense Scholar at Defense Priorities; Bad Idea: Permanent
Alliances; Defense360; 12-13-2018; https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/] NCC Packet 2020

The trouble is making defense

When making wars or deterring imminent aggression, allies are mostly good to have.
commitments permanent. Open-ended security obligations encourage free-riding and moral
hazard among those protected. They also require the maintenance of excessive U.S. force
structure, which wastes money, encourages needless war, and perpetuates the myth that our
security demands global dominance.
Free-riding is the most obvious problem . President Trump’s treatment of NATO allies has created much Beltway
consternation, but the United States has complained about its NATO allies’ defense spending since the midst of the Cold War, albeit
more politely. The reason these complaints are not heeded, besides limited threats, is that U.S. defenses undercut
European incentives to heighten their own. Washington’s rhetoric insisting that U.S. alliances are
sacrosanct, regardless of conditions, tells allied leaders that they can safely genuflect to, but
essentially ignore, U.S. demands for bigger military investment.
 Alliance is Resilient: 2AC
US-Japan alliance is resilient
Sracic, Political Scientist, 8-30-20
(Paul, “How Shinzo Abe's exit could threaten regional stability and Japan's alliance with the US,”
accessed 9-10-20, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/30/opinions/japan-us-relations-shinzo-abe-
sracic/index.html) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Fortunately, the alliance between the US and Japan has been strong enough that ties between the
countries have become somewhat institutionalized. For example, the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (Quad or Quad 2.0 -- referring to its revival in 2017) has resulted in regular meetings
between the US, Japan, Australia and India to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
 Alliance is Resilient: Ext
Japan alliance is resilient—survived the Nixon shocks in the 1970s and other
evolutions—mutual trust in support is more important than the document itself
Russel, June 17, 2020 (Daniel, vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
He served as the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs under President Barack Obama, Kyodo News, 6-17-
2020, "OPINION: Reflections on the U.S.-Japan security treaty at 60," Kyodo News+,
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/c723c40e631b-opinion-reflections-on-the-us-japan-security-treaty-at-60.html) NCC
Packet 2020

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is a
powerful contract that has stood the test of time. It underpins the stability that has enabled the
extraordinary prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It is the foundational document of a strong
alliance rooted in shared values, democratic ideals, and respect for human rights, the rule of law, and open markets. These deep
roots and common interests have generated strong and enduring bipartisan support for the alliance in both countries.
But ultimately, the foundation of the alliance is not a document; it is the trust between the two nations
and their citizens. Such trust was in short supply in 1960. The revised security treaty had a baptism by fire --
challenged at the outset by fears among Japanese that Japan would be dragged into conflicts by the United States -- fears that
forced then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Shinzo Abe's grandfather, to resign.
Trust was badly shaken again in the next decade. The alliance underwent a trial by fire when the "Nixon
Shock" shook the foundations of what former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had called the
"unshakable" alliance relationship. In a trio of blows to Japan's expectations for its ally, the
United States abandoned Taiwan for the PRC (People's Republic of China) without notice, took the dollar
off the gold standard, and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports from Japan.
But the alliance not only survived, it flourished -- resilience and flexibility have proven to be
among its important features. It has adapted to important geostrategic developments like the end of
the Cold War and the rise of transnational threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
It has also evolved. Important alliance landmarks include the historic shifts
in 2014 and 2015, first
through the reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution and then with the passage of national
security legislation and the adoption of new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines . These steps had the net effect
of allowing the limited exercise of collective defense, permitting Japanese troops to deploy overseas and participate in military
operations with foreign forces, and giving important authorities to the new National Security Council. And this period has also seen a
steady increase in Japan's defense spending after years of decline.
As a result of these trends, the United States and Japan have developed new models of cooperation that
strengthened the alliance's ability to operate in a changing environment. The alliance is expanding into
new non-geographic domains like cyber, outer space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. At the same time , it is increasingly
integrated into broader areas of U.S.-Japan cooperation beyond the security partnership to
include the economy, technology, regional development and infrastructure, and global
governance.
 Alliance Fails: 2AC
Alliance is not structured to successfully meet future security threats
Hiyashi, 10-14-17
(Miki, “The Future Prospects of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: A Two-Handed Strategy,” accessed 9-
11-20, https://www.e-ir.info/2017/10/14/the-future-prospects-of-the-u-s-japan-security-alliance-a-two-
handed-strategy/#_ftnref39) JFN NCC Packet 2020

For example, The U.S.-Japan Alliance—Anchoring Stability in Asia, which is also known as the Armitage
Report III, clearly represents the U.S. cooperative stance on the alliance as well as demanding more
burden-sharing from Japan in order to achieve a balanced alliance.[36] Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye
state in the introduction that “together, [the United States and Japan] face the re-rise of China and its
attendant uncertainties, North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile intentions, and the promise of
Asia’s dynamism. Elsewhere, there are the many challenges of a globalized world and an increasingly
complex security environment. A stronger and more equal alliance is required to adequately address
these and other great issues of the day.”[37] Armitage and Nye express their frustration with Japan’s
defense dependency on the United States and cast the acerbic question: “does Japan desire to continue
to be a tier-one nation, or is she content to drift into tier-two status?”[38] Kyle Mizokami also
admonishes the status-quo of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in that “[it] freezes the relationship
in time, forcing both to adhere to antiquated policies. It views the regional security environment
through a Cold War lens, distorting how other countries are perceived. Perhaps most importantly, it
prevents Japan from evolving into a modern state and accepting the responsibilities that come
with it.”[39] In order to upgrade the alliance that effectively handles the current situation, he encourages
Japan to share the burden with the United States as a modern state, “responsible for all aspects of its
own defense, including defense of its allies and interests abroad.”[40]
 Cooperation Answers
Even if the alliance is weakened, it doesn’t matter --- the main mechanisms for
US-Japan cooperation in the region are NOT bilateral, but rather multilateral. 
Campbell et al. 19 (Caitlin Campbell, analyst in Asian Affairs, Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asian Affairs, and Joshua
A. Williams, Research Associate, 6-13-2019, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Congressional Research
Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf,) NCC Packet 2020

Changes in the East Asian security landscape have shaped Japan’s defense approach and apparatus,
and informed U.S. and Japanese efforts to  reshape  the  alliance  for the 21st century. For the past two
decades, North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and repeated ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests have heightened the sense
of threat in Japan. China’s military advances and increasingly bold maritime activities also have exacerbated Japan’s sense of
vulnerability, particularly since tensions over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets began to escalate in 2010. As its perceived
threats have grown, Japan has developed defense partnerships in the region, sometimes working
through the U.S.-Japan alliance, and other times  independently . The strong ties and habits of cooperation
between the American and Japanese defense
establishments  complement  existing  and  emerging regional security partnerships. The April
2015 and April 2019 joint statements released by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Japanese
counterparts (the so-called 2+2 meeting) praised progress in developing trilateral and multilateral
cooperation, specifically with Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.41 The United States and Japan have cooperated on security capacity-building in
Southeast Asia, especially since maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas began to intensify in the late 2000s.
Some analysts see these bilateral and multilateral links among U.S. allies and partners
as beneficial to U.S. security interests by both enhancing deterrence and  perhaps lessening the sense
of direct rivalry with China.42 The two main  mechanisms  for U.S.-Japan regional
security cooperation  are  high-level  trilateral  dialogues  and multilateral  military exercises. There is
no comprehensive multilateral institution for managing security problems in the Asia-Pacific, although forums such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit
have shown potential in this regard. Training exercises that allow the militaries of Asia-Pacific nations to interact and
cooperate are another means to improve trust and transparency. The United States and Japan have participated in
multilateral exercises with Australia, India, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, Vietnam, and several other countries in recent years, indicating the  breadth of these
activities.  
 No Japanese Proliferation: High Threshold: 2AC
Only the US COMPLETELY abandoning Japan sparks Japanese proliferation
Bosack, special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies ,
11-28-19
(Michael MacArthur, “Revisiting Japan's nuclear arms debate,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/28/commentary/japan-commentary/revisiting-japans-
nuclear-arms-debate/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Is there a threshold where Japan eschews political costs and pursues nuclear technology? In all
things politics, it is foolish to answer “never” to anything, but the threshold here is extremely high. In
short, there would have to be a complete abandonment by the U.S. as an ally. Many observers will
argue that uncertainty about the U.S. position toward North Korea or the debates over cost-sharing
may be enough for Japan to consider it, but that is not the case. As long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella
exists, the Japanese government will not have the political impetus to change its course.
 No Japanese Proliferation: Domestic Politics: 2AC
Japan developing nuclear weapons is politically impossible
Bosack, special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies ,
11-28-19
(Michael MacArthur, “Revisiting Japan's nuclear arms debate,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/28/commentary/japan-commentary/revisiting-japans-
nuclear-arms-debate/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Besides this practical strategic impact, the political costs are too great for politicians to weather. The
Japanese public is traditionally wary of offensive military capabilities as it is, and the historical,
cultural and social constructs since 1945 reinforce the country’s “nuclear allergy.” Formally
raising the issue of producing nuclear weapons would throw the political landscape into disarray,
and decisively pursuing development would be the move that breaks up the ruling coalition and
fuels the opposition parties to topple the LDP. To put this into context: We are currently seeing the
Abe administration being targeted in the Diet and the media for how he selected guests to attend a
cherry-blossom viewing party — imagine what would happen if Abe announced his intent to produce
nuclear weapons. The reaction would be, well, atomic. Because of this, no party has wished to tie its
identity to this issue, and none will. Even within the LDP, nuclear weapons present an issue that is far
different from other controversial security agenda items. Constitutional amendment, the other “third rail”
policy objective, is written into the LDP charter while the non-nuclear principles have been the law of the
land since 1967. As such, there are LDP heavyweights who strongly oppose even broaching the idea of
an independent nuclear arsenal, let alone putting it to the Diet for discussion for changing the non-nuclear
principles. For those that may be on the fence, when presented with the option of retaining control
of the government or producing nuclear weapons, it is safe to assume that those lawmakers
would prefer to keep their jobs, no matter what their individual beliefs may be.
 No Japanese Proliferation: Domestic Politics: Extensions
Japanese public will never approve the building of nuclear weapons
Winn, PRI Reporter, 3-14-19
(Patrick, “Japan has plutonium, rockets and rivals. Will it ever build a nuke?,” accessed 9-11-20,
https://interactive.pri.org/2019/03/japan-nuclear/index.html) JFN NCC Packet 2020

For foreign inspectors, Japan’s plutonium storage units are “like 7-Eleven convenience stores,”
Taniguchi says. “They’re open at 11 o’clock in the evening, and you can see everything from outside.”
“So, even if there may be some who’d wish to build those weapons in just a couple of months — even
if Japanese technology is capable of doing so — there’s a process.” Clearing that process, Taniguchi
says, would require the Japanese public allowing elected leaders to build nukes in full view of a
disapproving world. No one sees that happening anytime soon, he says. “The parliamentary
process, plus our budgetary process, media checks and balances — they all make it impossible
for Japan to do anything like that.” Or next to impossible, at least. Only 1 in 10 Japanese people
want their government to acquire nuclear weapons. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still
resonate. Conventional wisdom says that disdain for nuclear weapons is baked into the Japanese
psyche.
 No Japanese Prolif: Extensions
Japan will never develop nuclear weapons
Mike Mochizuki 17 holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University. He is co-editor of “Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic
Processes.”, 11/6/17, “Three reasons why Japan will likely continue to reject nuclear weapons”,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/06/japan-is-likely-to-retain-its-non-nuclear-principles-heres-why/?
utm_term=.7891237c8ec1 NCC Packet 2020

Although Japan has long had the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons — its “nuclear hedge” — it has refrained from
doing so. Japan instead remains firmly committed to its 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not
developing, not possessing and not introducing nuclear weapons. This is not the first time that Japan has
reexamined those principles. Similar debates transpired after China’s hydrogen bomb test in 1967, the Soviet Union’s deployment of
medium-range nuclear missiles in Siberia during the 1980s and North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. Is this time different?
Reacting to North Korea’s threatening behavior, former Japanese defense minister Shigeru Ishiba stated in September that Japan
should at least debate the decision not to permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Ishiba implied that
Tokyo should consider asking Washington to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Japan. This latest debate is likely to end
in the same way as previous debates, however. Japan will continue to adhere to its Three Non-
Nuclear Principles and forswear nuclear weapons . Here are three reasons for that: 1) Staying non-
nuclear is part of Japan’s national identity The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are a clear part of
Japan’s national identity, not simply a policy preference. Repeated polls indicate overwhelming
popular support for the three principles in Japan. A 2014 Asahi newspaper poll revealed that support for the
principles had risen to 82 percent, compared with 78 percent in a 1988 poll. Despite growing concerns about
North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s military power during this period, Japanese support for
remaining non-nuclear actually increased.Even after the provocative North Korean missile launches
over Japan in August and September, a Fuji News Network poll showed that nearly 80 percent of the
Japanese population remained opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state . And nearly 69
percent opposed having the United States bring nuclear weapons into Japan. The legacy of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings leave many Japanese convinced that their country has a
moral responsibility to promote global nuclear disarmament — as well as to forgo nuclear weapons
of its own. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster has reinforced this view. In fact, increasing numbers of
Japanese believe that the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” is unnecessary for Japanese security. A June 2010 NHK survey revealed that
20.8 percent felt that U.S. nuclear deterrence is necessary for Japan’s security in both the present and future, while 34.8 percent
believed it unnecessary. The June 2015 NHK poll showed that only 10.3 percent thought the U.S. nuclear umbrella is necessary for
both the present and the future — 48.9 percent responded that it is unnecessary now and later. 2) Powerful players in
Japanese politics can block nuclear acquisition In addition to public opposition to nuclear weapons, Japan has
significant “veto players” — crucial political or economic actors that are likely to block efforts to
develop nuclear weapons. Japan has a robust nuclear energy industry. But public acceptance of nuclear energy in the
1950s resulted from a fundamental political bargain: nuclear energy, but no nuclear weapons.

No Japan prolif – geography, alliances, cost, and politics – they’re bluffing.

Kulacki 16 - Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Maryland, College Park [Gregory, 7/31/16, Union of Concerned
Scientists, “Japan Can Accept No First Use”, https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/japan-can-accept-no-first-use] NCC Packet
2020

Most Japanese security professionals currently prefer the United States maintain the option to use
nuclear weapons first. But should President Obama declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use
of nuclear weapons by another country, extensive interviews with those same Japanese security professionals

indicate they would accept the change. No first use is already de facto U.S. policy. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where a first use of nuclear
weapons would make the United States or our allies more secure. The last nuclear bomb ever dropped, by any nation, anywhere, was seventy-one years ago in Nagasaki.
While using nuclear weapons is sometimes discussed as a way to end a conflict or control escalation, the fact is that no one knows what would happen in such a case. The risk
of escalation and things getting out of control may be why, despite threatening to use nuclear weapons, U.S. presidents never authorized another nuclear attack. Japanese
security professionals should recall that U.S. attempts to use the threat of nuclear first use to prevent or halt non-nuclear attacks have an especially poor track record in Asia.
U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons against the communist governments in North Korea and Vietnam did not deter either of them from pursuing their war aims, or the People’s
Republic of China from supporting them. The questionable deterrent benefits of threatening nuclear first use come with a clearer cost. Intentions to use nuclear weapons for any
purpose other than deterring or responding to a nuclear attack invites proliferation. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is a very basic deal where nations without nuclear
weapons agree not to develop them in exchange for a commitment by nations with nuclear weapons to reduce and eventually eliminate theirs. Plans for first use are acts of bad
faith that could be justifiably interpreted as a violation of the NPT. As the only nation to have suffered a nuclear attack, Japan is an especially strong supporter of the NPT and its
aim of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. No Good Nuclear Options for Japan Japan’s commitment to nuclear disarmament is based on more than history and morality. It’s
Japanese government debated signing the permanent extension of the NPT in 1995 it commissioned a study
based on hard realities as well. When the
assessing the security threats Japan would most likely encounter in the future and whether Japan
might need to develop nuclear weapons to cope with them. A nuclear-armed North Korea and
rising Chinese nationalism were both identified as long-term security challenges for Japan. Sadly,
both threats materialized as anticipated by the Japanese security professionals who conducted the study more than twenty years ago. Those
same professionals found that despite the emergence of these threats there were no imaginable
circumstances where possessing nuclear weapons would be in Japan’s national security interests,
including a “worst case” scenario where there was a complete collapse of the NPT and Japan’s
military alliance with the U nited S tates. “Even in such a case, it is questionable whether there is any
value for a trading nation that depends on the stability of the international society to try to secure
its survival and protect its interests with its own nuclear weapons. It would more likely undermine
the basis of its own survival. Only in a case where destitution reaches a stage where the exchange of damage with an opponent is not a concern
anymore, would the geopolitical vulnerability of Japan make the nuclear option a possibility. This, however, is a case where a condition becomes its own goal, and is not worthy
The geographic vulnerabilities identified in the 1995 study are Japan’s limited area and
of consideration.”
its dense population, which is concentrated in urban centers. The political vulnerabilities are
severe damage to Japan’s international prestige, increased tensions with neighbor ing countries and
the fermentation of domestic political unrest. The study concluded a Japanese decision to develop
nuclear weapons would hurt Japan’s national security interests by undermining Japan’s security
alliance with the U nited S tates as well as international efforts to advance nuclear disarmament.
And Japan would face enormous economic costs if it were to attempt to develop a credible
nuclear force . Although it has been more than twenty years since Japanese security professionals seriously considered a nuclear option, none of the
hard realities identified in the 1995 study have changed. Despite the recent rise in tensions with China and the worsening situation
in North Korea, any reassessment of Japan’s nuclear options is highly likely to produce the same result.

Legal and cultural barriers

Mark Fitzpatrick, 10/3/19, Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies How Japan Could Go Nuclear It
Has the Smarts and the Resources, but Does Tokyo Have the Will? https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-
japan-could-go-nuclear accessed NCC Packet 2020

The biggest obstacles to a Japanese nuclear weapons program aren’t technical or logistic; they
are political, legal, and cultural. Since 1972, following the return of Okinawa from the United States and the removal of
nuclear weapons stationed there, Japan’s p rime m inister s have embraced “three non-nuclear principles” as
a morally and politically binding norm: no manufacture, no possession, and no entry of nuclear
weapons controlled by other nations (in practice, that third principle has been breached to allow nuclear-armed U.S.
warships to make port calls). In addition, Japan’s championing of the Treaty on the N on- P rolifera t ion of
Nuclear Weapons, the C omprehensive Nuclear- T est- B an T reaty, and other nonproliferation
instruments reinforces the political constraints on going nuclear, as does the collective memory
of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe shows no sign of
seeking to challenge this deeply rooted antipathy.
Opposition to nuclear weapons is particularly strong in the academic and scientific communities,
including in the nuclear technology field. Combined with the robust International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring
presence in Japan, this culture of ingrained hostility to nuclear weapons would make it nearly
impossible for Japan to pursue a clandestine path to the bomb .
Japanese diplomats would also fret about the security costs of going nuclear. An indigenous
nuclear program would be intensely provocative to China , sparking a further acceleration in Beijing’s buildup of
nuclear and conventional weapons. Pursuing nuclear weapons would also increase the risk of a preemptive
nuclear strike from North Korea and provoke South Korea to seek its own nuclear arsenal,
inflaming regional tensions.

Prolif is unlikely and Trump already thumps

Mark Fitzpatrick 19, Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/3/19, “How Japan Could Go
Nuclear,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear NCC Packet 2020

Opposition to nuc lear weapon s is particularly strong in the academic and scientific communities,
including in the nuclear technology field. Combined with the robust I nternational A tomic E nergy A gency
monitoring presence in Japan, this culture of ingrained hostility to nuc lear weapon s would make it
nearly impossible for Japan to pursue a clandestine path to the bomb.
Japanese diplomats would also fret about the security costs of going nuclear. A n indigenous nuclear
program would be intensely provocative to China , sparking a further acceleration in Beijing’s buildup of nuclear
and conventional weapons. Pursuing nuclear weapons would also increase the risk of a preemptive nuclear strike from North Korea
and provoke South Korea to seek its own nuclear arsenal, inflaming regional tensions.
WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT
The scientific establishment would likely comply with a directive to produce nuclear weapons only
in the event of a sharp deterioration in Japan’s security situation . In the imaginings of Japanese
policymakers, the most likely scenarios would be if South Korea goes nuclear or if the Koreas unify and keep
Pyongyang’s existing arsenal . Japanese officials watched with interest when South Korean President Moon Jae-in
extolled the benefits of unification with North Korea in an August 15 speech commemorating liberation from Japan.
While Moon has insisted that a unified Korea would not retain nuclear arms, Japan remains wary in light of the pro-nuclear
sentiments on both halves of the Korean peninsula. Unlike in South Korea, where mainstream politicians and newspaper columnists
advocate for an indigenous nuclear weapons program, in Japan advocates for nuclear weapons remain largely on the far-right
fringe. It is, however, increasingly acceptable to discuss nuclear arms as a future policy option. After North Korea’s first nuclear test
in 2006, for example, then Foreign Minister Taro Aso called for a public debate about the circumstances that would warrant a
serious reconsideration of Japan’s non-nuclear policy.
Of course, Tokyo’s stance on nuclear weapons is shaped most fundamentally by its faith in the
credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence . Over the years, that credibility came into question when the
U nited S tates lost the Vietnam War, withdrew from the Philippines, failed to prevent China and then North Korea from acquiring
nuclear weapons, and reduced its own nuclear arsenal .
But Trump has done more than any of his predecessors to undermine the cred ibility of U.S. nuclear
deterrence. In what was perhaps his most flagrant public display of disregard for Japan’s security interests, he argued with
Abe at the G-7 summit in April this year over whether North Korea’s missile launches broke UN resolutions .
(They clearly did.) Although the presence of U.S. troops in Japan provides a measure of reassurance,
Trump’s “America first” mentality is further reason for Japan to keep nuclear options in reserve .
 Prolif Defense: 2AC
No prolif impact
Mueller 16 [John Mueller, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies; Adjunct
Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. Embracing Threatlessness: US Military Spending, Newt Gingrich,
and the Costa Rica Option. June 5, 2016. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/CNArestraintCato16.pdf] NCC Packet
2020

For decades there has been almost wall-to-wall alarm about the dangers supposedly inherent in nuclear
proliferation.
However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted
over the decades primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their
possessor.
And, more importantly, the effect of the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially benign :
those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real
or imagined threats.67 The holds even for the proliferation of the weapons to large, important
countries run by unchallenged monsters who at the time they acquired the bombs were certifiably deranged: Josef
Stalin who in 1949 was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong who in
1964 had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that had resulted in artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese
perished.68
 Offensive Strike Answers
Offensive strike wouldn’t escalate
Alex Ward 19. Staff writer @ Vox. 4-30-2019. "Japan: the rise of its new militarism could change the world." Vox.
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18100066/japan-shinzo-abe-sdf-emperor-china NCC Packet 2020
**edited for offensive language

Trump promotes a less engaged America .

Three main trends likely worry him the most. First, President Donald
That’s led experts
and officials I spoke to in Japan to wonder about the long-term health of the US-
Japan alliance and may partly animate Tokyo’s desire to ensure it can take care of itself in the event
the US doesn’t come to its defense. Second, Japan is unhappy about North Korea’s ability to attack Japan. Pyongyang hasn’t tested
a missile or nuke since 2017, mainly because it doesn’t want to end diplomatic talks with the US and keep Trump happy. Still,
Japan wants to ensure it can defend against an improving arsenal pointing its way. Third, and most
importantly, China looms largest in the minds of Japanese officials as the long-term threat. That’s
mostly due to its efforts to claim territory in disputed waters, its economic prowess, and military
largesse. Having new and upgraded weaponry will help defend against and deter a possible
attack. But with an eye to the future, it may also allow Japan to ably protect itself should a war
with Beijing break out . Japanese officials balk at any suggestion that the country would ever get
into a shooting war with China . “China has been our neighbor for thousands of years, and it’s going to be for thousands
more,” the top diplomat said, reassuring me that Tokyo has no designs to use force against its regional foe despite Japan’s “more
and more active” military. A top Japanese defense official made the same point in starker terms: “We
can’t provoke China. That would be suicide a mistake for us.” But convincing China of Japan’s harmless
intentions is proving to be a bit harder. “Such [a] move by the Japanese side is not conducive to the improvement and development
of China-Japan ties or the peace and stability in the region,” Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said at a
news conference in December. “We urge Japan to keep its commitment to the ‘purely defensive defense’ strategy, stay committed
to the path of peaceful development and act cautiously in the area of military security,” she continued. It again highlights the problem
Japan has breaking out of its postwar hangover without angering China. Should Tokyo develop too slowly, it could fall further behind
Beijing in military strength. But if it arms too quickly, China and other adversaries may miscalculate and believe it’s laying the
foundations for war. That, of course, would be the worst outcome. A war between China and Japan would almost certainly be the
Beijing doesn’t seem overly worried about Japan’s
catalyst for a third world war, some experts say. Luckily,
moves right now. “China is biting its lip because it knows it can defeat Japan” in a fight , Green, who led
the Japan portfolio in George W. Bush’s National Security Council, told me. That may be why, last October, Chinese President
Xi Jinping agreed to meet Abe , the first bilateral meeting between the two countries in more than seven years. Neither
leader is happy with the other, partly over the islands dispute, but opening a dialogue could help
both sides curb the rising tensions .

No Japanese autonomy impact

Celine Pajon 19, Head of Japan Research at the Center for Asian Studies of the French Institute of International Relations,
12/18/19, “JAPAN’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: SHAPING A HYBRID REGIONAL ORDER,”
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/japans-indo-pacific-strategy-shaping-a-hybrid-regional-order/ NCC Packet 2020

Hedging against China and keeping the U nited S tates engaged in Asia are the key tenets of Japanese
strategy. Coping with the rise of China has been the strategic priority of Japan at least since the 2000s. This priority structures
Tokyo’s diplomacy and defense policy. Indeed, China’s maritime expansion directly threatens Japanese interests in the East China
Sea, with repeated intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, claimed by China under the name “Diaoyu
Islands.” In the South China Sea, Beijing’s extensive claims and militarization of islets are perceived as dangerously undermining
the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Finally, China is considered as a revisionist power, challenging the post-1945 world order
to impose its own standards (through its Belt and Road Initiative, among other schemes).
In response, Japan is implementing a strategy of hedging , with important counterbalancing elements. Internal
counterbalancing is achieved through the strengthening of its defense capabilities . External
counterbalancing centers on deepening of its alliance with the U nited S tates and the expansion of
its strategic partnerships. The diversification of its strategic partners first allows Japan to strengthen
its hand vis-à-vis China. It also aims to support the maintenance of a multipolar Asia and the balance of power in order to
prevent Chinese hegemony. Promoting coordination between partners like Australia and India , and helping
Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their maritime capabilities, should help to build up resilience in front of
Beijing. Tokyo also strives to ensure functional cooperation with China through a focus on economic cooperation and a
commitment to the region’s multilateral institutions.
A second key strategic Japanese objective is to keep the United States engaged in Asia. Indeed, the strengthening of the alliance
(to dissuade China) and the maintenance of an international order based on rule of law, free trade, and multilateralism (to shape or
constrain China’s attitude) are considered in Tokyo as the only option to ensure its strategic autonomy. President Donald
Trump’s chaotic style has only reinforced Japanese concerns about the credibility of the U.S.
military commitment to Asian stability and to Japan’s defense. Tokyo is thus seeking to build a network of U.S.
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, both to strengthen the current alliance system but also to prevent a U.S.
diversification of its security partners thus allows Japan to guard against a possible
withdrawal. The
U.S. strategic retreat and provides it with a means to eventually influence U.S. decisions. Indeed, Tokyo has been more
proactive in defending its own interests and shaping America’s views and deeds in the region. In the longer term, these partnerships
may also offer an option for Tokyo to become more autonomous from the United States.
***Turns***
 A2AD Turn---2AC
The aff solves by incentivizing a shift to Japanese A2/AD –increases stability and
is a more effective deterrent to Chinese territorial expansion – Japan has
sufficient investment it just needs the plans incentive
Gholz et al., PhD, associate professor, political science, University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, chair of the international security section of
the International Studies Association, ‘19
(Eugene, Benjamin Friedman & Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 32) **NCC Packet 2020
China’s capability has vastly increased, but its ability to conquer states across water remains
limited. If the United States and its allies invest in their own A2/AD capabilities —counterparts to the
Chinese capabilities that the US military itself says are extremely effective against US sophisticated weapons— China’s
offensive potential will remain limited for many years to come .41
Japan , Korea, and Taiwan are wealthy and technologically proficient states perfectly placed to
capitalize on A2/AD technology to defend against any attempted Chinese conquest . As islands or
peninsulas that must defend coastlines, East Asian states get special utility out of defensive military
technology. These states do not need forces and weapons that mimic the US military. Their
forces simply have to make the cost of aggression prohibitive for China and other potential rivals.
Japan already maintains a qualitatively superior force that far outstrips China in submarine, anti-
submarine, mining, and missile capabilities, backed up by a sophisticated network of sensors and a
geographical position that allows it to straddle major chokepoints for the Chinese navy.42 It has long invested heavily in
naval assets to defend its coast. And its GDP per capita remains about four times larger than China’s ,
providing it considerable capacity to ramp up spending in the event of a massive emergency, like a Chinese
campaign of territorial aggression.43
Japan has recently increased its investment in mobile missile systems deployed in the Ryukyu Islands in the East China Sea, a
nascent modern A2/AD capability.44 Unfortunately, as MIT experts Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels explain, much of
Japan’s defense budget is still devoted to a “forward defense strategy” built on fighter aircraft, destroyers, and ground forces.45
Japan has also begun exploring a greater long-range missile strike capability as a means of preemptively threatening North Korea’s
ability to launch ballistic missiles or retaliating against China—an investment that potentially looks like offensive defense.46 Finally,
Japan has not fully stocked the munitions needed to use its anti-ship, anti-missile, and anti-aircraft systems in an extended
campaign.47
Taiwan is more vulnerable.48 As an island, Taiwan has defensive advantages that make conquest difficult, but if China attacked
Taiwan, its nearness to the island would enable China’s weapons to enjoy the benefit of home—larger ammunition stores, protection
from strikes, better coordination, and short flight times.49 China’s missiles could destroy most fixed targets in Taiwan, including
search radars, and seriously impede the operation of Taiwan’s air force.
On the other hand, Taiwan is large enough to drive mobile missile systems around and rugged enough to hide weapons from enemy
surveillance and strike systems.50 Taiwan also produces a modern anti-ship missile deployable on trucks or small ships that can
likely evade Chinese attacks on fixed targets.
Even while its defense budget has remained flat in recent years, Taiwan has developed, with some US encouragement, a sea-
control strategy centered on expensive ships and aircraft meant to win battles with China off and above Taiwan’s shores—mirroring
the United States’ offensive-defense posture rather than emphasizing a more prudent defensive defense.51 This strategy is not an
efficient way to spend a limited defense budget. Instead, Taiwan could spend its money on relatively inexpensive, high-quality
A2/AD capabilities, including ones of indigenous design and manufacture. Taiwan could also significantly expand its deployments of
radar decoys and other inexpensive equipment to make it harder for Chinese stand-off weapons to weaken Taiwan's contested
zone.
The US military could contribute to Taiwan’s wartime defense through a more operationally defensive posture that would limit
exposure to China’s A2/AD systems. In a potential war, seaborne American anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems could cover Taiwan
from locations east of the island—and out of China’s A2/AD envelope. More important, in peacetime, the Unites States’ backstop
would help ensure that Taiwan, which is much smaller economically than China, would not be overwhelmed in a conventional arms
race.
The US military could contribute to Taiwan’s defense through a more operationally defensive posture.
The United States can use its weapons export policies and diplomatic sway over allies to push them to
accelerate their adoption of A2/AD technologies . That push would involve shifting money out of programs focused
on developing expeditionary or offensive military capability. Instead, the emphasis, which is most pressing for Taiwan, should be on
having the allies buy redundant sensor capability that fully exploits decoys and other concealment techniques, robust data fusion
capabilities that can maintain the ability to find and target Chinese attackers even when operating under wartime duress, plentiful
mobile anti-ship cruise missile and surface-to-air missile systems, and hardened communications systems.
We are not the only defense analysts to push the idea that the United States should encourage Asian allies to
improve their A2/AD capabilities. But few have advanced that goal as a way to shift US force posture in
Asia, as we do here. One reason to insist on that second step is that it provides a major — perhaps
even necessary — incentive for allies to overcome their bureaucratic resistance and make the
needed shift in their defense procurement. Moreover, without a major change in its own defense
posture , the United States would miss the opportunity to enjoy cost savings and to reduce tensions
with China . Indeed, encouraging allied A2/AD investments without changing the way the US military operates could increase
US defense spending, as a recent report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments advocates.52
Restoring a Traditional Alliance Posture
To encourage US allies to transition to a more defensive defense posture in Asia, the United States should first convey its plans and
reasoning to them. US diplomats should explain US interests in the region and the US desire to limit the cost of defending Asian
states and to avoid conflict with China. Diplomats should press allies to invest in A2/AD technologies at the expense of force-
projection capability. The United States can incentivize allies to make the transition by paying for some of their acquisition of A2/AD-
compliant defensive capabilities. The dollars for this will come by reducing funding for US offensive capabilities in East Asia, whose
utility will diminish as allies become better able to resist Chinese aggression.
US partners must step up to have a sustainable defense against a potential Chinese threat over
the coming decades. This means restoring a more traditional alliance , where the burden is
balanced: US power should back up junior partners that have the wealth and capability to hold
their own front line, while allies develop operational concepts that do not simply delay until more
US troops arrive, but instead try to defend without them.53 To spur change in the actions of Asian partners, the US military
should shift away from a forward-defense doctrine that requires spending more and more to operate safely in the teeth of China’s
defenses. The goal should be to create a fortified A2/AD zone on both sides of the seas inside Asia’s first island chain—what would
be a “no man’s sea” in wartime. To contribute, the US military could develop advanced mobile anti-air and anti-ship missiles, which
have not been emphasized in US acquisition planning for decades. These new weapons would be mostly aimed for export to Asian
allies.
The goal should be to create a fortified A2/AD zone inside Asia’s first island chain.
Concurrently, the defensive defense approach would reduce the need to invest so much in speculative technologies like hypersonic
weapons that are intended to be able to strike targets—notably mobile Chinese A2/AD systems—before they can move out of the
way. It would also alleviate some of the burden of developing high-end ship defense systems, freeing up funds to support the allies’
A2/AD defenses.
A Safer World
The great power advantages that the United States enjoyed against all rivals in the post-Cold War world were
always bound to erode as other states grew wealthier and sought the ability to avoid being coerced. That is no great
tragedy for US security, but the scramble to preserve dominance at all costs could be . By seeking
total dominance over all states, even in the skies above them and in their territorial waters, the United States makes
needless trouble for itself.
The quest for dominance surrenders the blessings that geography and status quo interests bestow on the United States . It
makes the United States pay the growing cost of maintaining an offensive edge as the relative
advantages of defense grow. The offensively-oriented dominance approach comes with a growing price
tag, diminishing effectiveness, and rising tension with China.
Those ills are avoidable . The United States can secure its allies , partners, and interests in East
Asia, even if no one dominates the contested zones between China and its island neighbors.
Letting other states bear the cost of being their own first line of defense will not only lower US
costs, it will limit tensions in East Asia . Washington should remember that its strategic goals are
defensive, and the United States should adjust its military posture to match that reality .
The aff produces precisely this change – leverages Japanese fears to increase
burden sharing – results in greater Japanese responsibility but reduces
entrapment
Atanassova-Cornelis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations of East Asia at the Department of Politics, University of
Antwerp, and Sato, Dean of International Cooperation and Research and Professor in the College of Asia Pacific Studies,
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan, ‘19
(Elena and Yoichiro, “The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope,” Italian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol 54) **NCC Packet 2020
This article has examined US and Japanese responses to the alliance dilemma, notably the
dynamics of abandonment and entrapment , and the impact of these responses on the evolution
of the alliance’s rationales and scope. The changes in the alliance are taking place in times of a global power shift – a
transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and China’s regional challenge to the US’ security dominance in the Asia-Pacific.
The PRC’s economic growth and military modernisation have presented the alliance with a complex
challenge . On one hand, the economic interdependence among the US, China, and Japan has reached a level at which a trade
war would significantly hurt them all. On the other hand, the PRC’s military modernisation has threatened the
present US dominance in the Western Pacific , under which Japan has enjoyed its security and
economic growth. Although US accommodation of China’s security interests, especially in the maritime domain,
may be possible, such prospects, including the role of Japan in such an arrangement, remain
unclear.
To some extent, Washington benefits from this uncertainty , which it has sought to maintain . A US
fully committed to Japanese security would encourage Japanese free-riding or possible US
entrapment in a Sino-Japanese conflict . A fully accommodating US , allowing the PRC to play a regional
leadership role in Asia, would end up pitting China against Japan , inviting instability and a possible
weakening of Tokyo’s alliance commitments. In the short to medium term , neither outcome would
be in US interests. In the foreseeable future, Washington will continue to welcome Tokyo’s upgraded
defence cooperation and move towards a more mutual alliance, extending, in return, its security
guarantees to Japan, albeit in a sufficiently ambiguous way so as to avoid undesirable
consequences in its relations with either Tokyo or Beijing.
For Japan, as its threat perceptions have increasingly converged with those of the US (on China and North Korea),
abandonment concerns have become more dominant over entrapment concerns. Tokyo’s abandonment
anxieties remain subtle and increasingly tied to policies that enhance the alliance in the short
term. Japan seeks to prevent abandonment through gains-maximisation , namely, increased
burden-sharing, by strengthening the SDF’s defence responsibilities in the framework of the
bilateral alliance , and extending support for various regional minilateral configurations that include
the US and other like-minded nations.
From a US perspective, the alliance’s ‘globalisation’ in scope and missions is in line with America’s broader concerns associated
with the changing global order. In this regard, Washington sees Tokyo’s alliance efforts as supporting the US
global position. At the same time, Japan is steadily preparing for abandonment by the US through risk-
reduction measures, which include increased defence self-reliance, and pursuit of alignments
with America’s allies or partners in the Asia-Pacific. In this sense, while Tokyo’s hedging has contributed to
the expansion of the alliance’s scope and enhancement of bilateral operational coordination with the US, it has
contemporaneously paved the way for Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the long term.
That produces the most stable and responsible posture
Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and a specialist in Asian security issues, and Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political
Science and director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018, Active Denial,
International Security, Vol. 42, No. 4 **NCC Packet 2020
Alliances and commitments carry costs and risks as well as benefits . To a significant extent,
those risks vary with the choice of military strategy . A Japanese denial strategy would lessen the
potential for moral hazard — risky actions by Tokyo that exploit the sharing of potential costs .
Given the limited nature of power projection in the approach we have outlined, an active denial strategy will
signal Japan’s status quo objectives and should reassure its adversaries , the United States, and
its own public that Tokyo will not initiate aggressive conflict . Indeed, public understanding of ( and
open insistence on) the defensive nature of strategy might render a larger Japanese defense effort
more palatable . A less brittle (or more resilient) force posture that is primarily defensively oriented also
increases crisis stability and reduces first-mover advantages and crisis instability.
Japanese denial works with a range of U.S. military strategies , but works better with some than others. Given
the evolving balance of power, the most effective U.S. military strategy would include a phased approach
to military operations, under which the United States would pursue a denial strategy similar to Japan’s during the initial period of
conflict before transitioning to more traditional operations as reinforcements arrive and Chinese inventories of long-range missiles
are exhausted. Collectively, thealliance must maintain a counterattack capability that can recapture lost
territory, but it does not necessarily require the ability to penetrate Chinese airspace on a grand
scale to attack targets on the mainland. Nor does it require that offensive capability be available in Asia for
immediate use. Maintaining counterattack capability farther offshore will also work to keep it
secure from preemptive attack. Hence, this phased approach not only is efficacious for deterrence, but also diminishes
first-strike incentives.
ONLY the plan can get Japan to strike the right balance. BUT, it absolutely WILL
NOT spur Japan to be aggressive.
Klingner 9/11 – Senior Research Fellow for NEA, Heritage
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, U.S.–Japan Alliance Remains Insufficient Against
Growing Chinese Military Threat, 11 September 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/us-japan-alliance-remains-insufficient-
against-growing-chinese-military-threat **NCC Packet 2020
The U.S. and Japan need to bring the full potential of their alliance on the China challenge. Right
now it is underperforming. It is not that Japan lacks defense capabilities , but that Japan lacks
the political willingness to employ them , even in the encompassing framework of its security
alliance with the United States. Japan’s security posture evolves in fits and starts and often only
in response to a shock such as a strong U.S. criticism or a catalytic event that brings about a
belated response to a growing threat.
Despite Prime Minister Abe’s prodigious efforts to advance his country’s security posture, Japan
remains tightly restricted to security operations that are strictly defensive in nature and based on a
core national principle of pacifism. Much of the populace remains deeply suspicious of the use of
the military as a policy instrument and fearful that any easing of the innumerable constraints will
let slip the dogs of war.
Japan is very risk and casualty averse , which will prevent Japanese involvement in kinetic
military operations outside its own defense such as U.N. or international peacekeeping operations. It will remain
a middle security power that relies on a strong alliance with the U.S. while increasing its
networking with regional democracies.
The challenge for U.S. policymakers and alliance managers will be to find the delicate balance of
continually pushing Tokyo past its comfort zone while understanding the many constitutional,
legal, budgetary, and societal restrictions that hinder Japan’s ability to become a stronger
alliance partner.
The plan allows the US to leverage Japanese abandonment fears---fosters burden
sharing on our terms and restrains provocative behavior.
Jerdén 18 – PhD, Head of the Asia Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. has been a visiting fellow at
National Chengchi University, National Taiwan University and Harvard University
(Björn, “Misperceptions of Abandonment in the U.S.–Japan Alliance,” in Assessing the U.S. Commitment to Allies in Asia and
Beyond, The German Marshall Fund, Asia Program, No. 11) **NCC Packet 2020
Abandonment fears matter a lot to the U.S.–Japan alliance. Due to worries about U.S.
abandonment, Japanese attempts at greater autonomy are discouraged , while security reforms supported
by Washington are encouraged. This is not a story about American winners and Japanese losers, however, as growing numbers of
Japan’s political elites share this agenda, and thus also benefits from Japanese abandonment fears. Because of the critical
importance that the alliance has for the United States, worries about abandonment seem overstated. The alliance is
asymmetrical in military capabilities — but not in the value that the partners receive from it.
Despite being the militarily much stronger partner, the United States, in other words, needs Japan as much as
Japan needs the United States. We should therefore perhaps hesitate to fully see Japan’s fear of
abandonment as a rational response to objective alliance dynamics. Rather, it could be understood
as a factor that allows the United States — and certain factions in Japanese politics — to gain the upper
hand in alliance bargaining.
Experienced alliance managers are unexpectedly fully aware of the crucial role played in the alliance by not only the balance of
power, but also the balance of expectations. Richard Armitage, for example, says, “…the fact of the matter is we cannot want this
security relationship with Japan more than they want it. We can’t. We can’t sustain that.” 17
One U.S. objective thus
becomes to convince the Japanese that the Americans want the security relationship less than
the Japanese want it. This can be done two ways, either by increasing the Japanese desire for the
alliance, or alternatively, by making them believe that the Americans want the alliance less than they
actually do.
Implications for the Future of the Alliance
If the risk of U.S. abandonment of Japan is smaller than commonly believed a number of policy
implications result.
First, the alliance appears even more robust than what many people seem to believe. Policymakers on
both sides of the Pacific evidently confirm the strength of the alliance on a regular basis. If abandonment is less likely
than professed by many observers, then this political rhetoric seems more credible yet. For
instance, warnings in recent years that Japan needs to step up its international profile in order to save the
health of the relationship seem exaggerated .18 Nevertheless, doubts about the strength of U.S.
commitments make the alliance even stronger, as they contribute to policies that tie Japan even
closer to the United States. So those who wish for an even deeper alliance would actually be
wise to continue downplaying its durability.
Second, Asian doubts about U.S. credibility are sometimes portrayed as a problem for Washington.
If regional states were to start preparing for a U.S. withdrawal from the region, it could indeed generate
substantial difficulties for U.S. strategy. At least in the case of Japan, however, such concerns are mostly
positive for the United States since they feed into abandonment fears that work to the benefit of
Washington in alliance bargaining . Therefore, it is not impossible that Trump’s loud criticism of Japan
during last year’s campaign might have strengthened U.S. influence in the alliance. Though one should not take this
approach too far or Japan might decide that a strategy of self-reliance is the safest bet for its future security.
Third, Japan could likely get away with more behavior at odds with U.S. interests than what many
Japanese believe. During the now dissolved Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) Hatoyama Yukio’s
turbulent time as prime minster (2009–2010), for example, it was suggested that a failure of Japan to fall
in line would lead the United States to reconsider the strategic role of the alliance .19 The argument
of this paper, by implication, instead suggests that even if the DPJ government had pushed through with more of
its independence-seeking campaign promises, the U.S. government would not have scaled down on its
commitments. The same logic could be applied to other issues as well, such as disagreements about how to remember the
wartime past of Imperial Japan. Policymakers in Japan who value the alliance, but at the same advocate
more autonomous policies, could thus probably be bolder in pushing their agenda without
hurting U.S. commitments .
 Wedge Issue: 2AC
China uses the Senkaku issue to drive a wedge in the US-Japan alliance
Taffer, Center for Naval Analyses Research Analyst ,
9-6-19
(Andrew, “China’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Ploy to Undercut the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/09/06/chinas_senkakudiaoyu_islands_ploy_to_undercut_
the_us-japan_alliance_114725.html) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Research shows that Beijing has regularly sought to use this offshore conflict to drive a wedge into
the U.S.-Japan alliance – particularly during the major incidents over the islands in 2010, 2012, and
2013. Yet Beijing’s approach to wedging in the East China Sea has been unique. Traditionally, a country
aiming to divide an alliance focuses its efforts on the alliance’s junior partner, generally the more
susceptible party, as the divider seeks to induce or coerce it in ways that weaken its relationship with its
patron. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, however, China’s principal target has been the United States –
the senior partner. Beijing is aware of the dramatic asymmetry in interests between the United
States and Japan in the dispute, and that Washington, lacking inherent interests in the islands, is
eager to avoid a potentially cataclysmic conflict with China over them. In other words, in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, Washington has been targeted as the more susceptible party. By appealing to
U.S. interests in conflict management, crisis stability, and healthy Sino-American relations, Beijing has
sought to induce and coerce the United States – and have Washington, in turn, compel Tokyo – to
adopt policies inimical to the latter’s territorial interests. In so doing, China has sowed discord
within the U.S.-Japan alliance and exacerbated abiding Japanese fears of U.S. abandonment. In this
respect, far from seeking to ensure the United States does not interfere in the conflict – as Beijing’s
purportedly sacrosanct policy holds – a central aspect of China’s strategy has been to involve
Washington directly and robustly. In 2012–13, after raising the risk of conflict in the East China Sea by
sending unprecedented numbers of ships and aircraft into the waters and airspace around the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Beijing called on Washington to restrain Japan and to compel Tokyo to make
concessions. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “We urge the U.S. side to be responsible on the
Diaoyu Islands issue … and take concrete actions to safeguard regional peace and stability [emphasis
added].” But Beijing went further, requesting U.S. mediation. In a high-profile speech organised by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a senior retired Chinese official remarked: “If the U.S. really intends to play a
neutral and constructive role, it should urge the parties to the dispute to the negotiating table and resolve
the difference by peaceful means.” Adding urgency to these exhortations (and hinting at the risk of
entrapment), the Chinese ambassador to the United States counselled Washington not to “lift the rock off
Japan only to let it drop on its own feet.” Washington proved receptive to Beijing’s appeals. The White
House urged Tokyo to offer “concessions” to Beijing while then–U.S. National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon suggested that “the parties should seek to have conversations about this through diplomatic
channels,” a proposition antithetical to Tokyo’s policy of not acknowledging the dispute. It was around this
time that China began to vigorously promote its concept of a “new type of great-power relations,” a broad
framework for the future of U.S.-China relations to which the Obama administration, keen to establish
healthy long-term ties, was initially receptive. “Respect for core interests” was said to be the “crux” of this
new framework, and in April 2013, Beijing declared for the first time that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were
among its “core interests.” Beijing thus sought to link improved U.S.-China ties to Washington’s
willingness to attenuate its support for Japan’s territorial interests. The subsequent declaration of
the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China in late 2013 over a large swath of the East China
Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, was designed to set U.S. and Japanese interests in
opposition to each other. It a move only seldom noticed at the time, Beijing publicly offered to implement a
long-stalled crisis-management mechanism promptly after establishing the ADIZ. Appealing to American
interests in de-escalation, China’s offer was contingent on Japan de-conflicting its ADIZ with China’s, a
condition Tokyo was unwilling to meet for fear of legitimising China’s territorial claims. Washington,
however, was quick to endorse Beijing’s call, with vice president Joe Biden stating that the ADIZ
“underscores the need for crisis-management mechanisms.” This and other episodes have led to what
can be described as a “growing constituency [in Japan] that doubts the U.S. commitment to the
security guarantee”. Although U.S.-China relations are today far from where they were during the
Obama administration, Beijing can be expected to employ a broadly similar strategy against the
Trump administration and others in the future. This is because no matter how antagonistic U.S.-China
relations become, there is likely to be continuity – and sustained asymmetry – in U.S. and Japanese
interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. It strains the imagination, for example, to see a future
Japanese administration accommodating China in the East China Sea as, say, the Philippine’s Rodrigo
Duterte has done in the South China Sea. And even if Washington becomes more willing to incur risk
vis-à-vis Beijing in maritime East Asia, it will remain highly motivated to avoid being dragged into
a conflict with China over eight uninhabited islets and rocks in the East China Sea. This
asymmetry in U.S. and Japanese interests is likely to continue to be exploitable and will constitute
a persistent weakness in what is otherwise a strong and resilient alliance.
 Entrapment / Moral Hazard: 2AC
Alliance entrapment ensures war with China and Russia
Edelstein 18 – Prof in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Dept. of Government @ Georgetown
David M and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “It’s a trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment” in US Grand Strategy in
the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint, Routledge Press, p. 32 NCC Packet 2020

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity
constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky
behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and
states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing . As long as the US continues to make
commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be
tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their
rescue should they get into trouble.
Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke
China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the U nited S tates is opposed to the
emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by
those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security
commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the
U nited S tates by provoking conflicts and expecting the U nited S tates - whose interests are clear - to
ride to their defense. In the next section, we take a preliminary look at some evidence to test these claims. We focus on
events in East and Southeast Asia over the last few years. Some have characterized Chinese aggression in recent years as
reactionary. That is, China has felt compelled to respond to perceived provocations from smaller Asian
nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Even though the US does not have formal security commitments to
either country, Washington subsequently feels compelled to signal to these countries that it will stand
up to Chinese aggression.
 Entrapment / Moral Hazard: Ext
Alliances just spur allied aggression
Friedman 18 [Benjamin H. Friedman; Senior Fellow and Defense Scholar at Defense Priorities; Bad Idea: Permanent
Alliances; Defense360; 12-13-2018; https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances] NCC Packet 2020

U.S. security guarantees also encourage moral hazard—where a person takes greater risk
because someone else bears the cost . The protection of the world’s preeminent military can make allies incautious in
dealing with rivals. Even non-allies fall prey to the phenomenon if they think they have something
approaching a U.S. security guarantee, as occurred with Georgia and Russia in 2008. Using NATO
to aid Ukraine could produce similar results today. Saudi Arabia’s recent adventurism is another
example. Alliances can cause instability among neighbors, via moral hazard, pulling the United
States into wars it unintentionally encouraged. Were allies more concerned about losing U.S.
protection, this problem would be reduced.
A related phenomenon occurs when states that the United States protects abuse their citizens. Turkey, Hungary, Poland—all
NATO allies that have recently backslid away from liberal values —are examples, along with various Middle-
Eastern states. No doubt, these countries’ rulers would still abuse civil liberties if U.S. protection were less assured, but the
assurance removes an incentive for better behavior.
 Fear of Abandonment: 2AC
Fear of abandonment strengthens the alliance---allows the US to gain the upper
hand in alliance bargaining
Bell et. al, German Marshall Fund, 2018
(Mark S. Bell, Joshua D. Kertzer, Björn Jerdén, Hemal Shah, edited by Sharon Stirling. Mark S. Bell is an
assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. Joshua D. Kertzer is an assistant
professor of government at Harvard University. Dr. Björn Jerdén is head of the Asia Program at The
Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Hemal Shah is director for India and Regional Markets at the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Innovation Policy Center, Sharon Stirling is deputy director of the
Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States., March 23, 2018, “Assessing the U.S.
Commitment to Allies in Asia and Beyond”, accessed 7/26/2019,
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/assessing-us-commitment-allies-asia-and-beyond) IL NCC Packet
2020

Conclusions Abandonment
fears matter a lot to the U.S.–Japan alliance. Due to worries about U.S.
abandonment, Japanese attempts at greater autonomy are discouraged, while security reforms
supported by Washington are encouraged. This is not a story about American winners and Japanese losers,
however, as growing numbers of Japan’s political elites share this agenda, and thus also benefits from Japanese abandonment
fears. Because of the critical importance that the alliance has for the United States, worries about
abandonment seem overstated. The alliance is asymmetrical in military capabilities — but not in
the value that the partners receive from it. Despite being the militarily much stronger partner, the
United States, in other words, needs Japan as much as Japan needs the United States. We should
therefore perhaps hesitate to fully see Japan’s fear of abandonment as a rational response to
objective alliance dynamics. Rather, it could be understood as a factor that allows the United States
— and certain factions in Japanese politics — to gain the upper hand in alliance bargaining.
Experienced alliance managers are unexpectedly fully aware of the crucial role played in the
alliance by not only the balance of power, but also the balance of expectations. Richard Armitage, for
example, says, “…the fact of the matter is we cannot want this security relationship with Japan more
than they want it. We can’t. We can’t sustain that.”17 One U.S. objective thus becomes to
convince the Japanese that the Americans want the security relationship less than the Japanese
want it. This can be done two ways , either by increasing the Japanese desire for the alliance, or
alternatively, by making them believe that the Americans want the alliance less than they actually
do. Implications for the Future of the Alliance If the risk of U.S. abandonment of Japan is smaller than
commonly believed a number of policy implications result . First, the alliance appears even more
robust than what many people seem to believe . Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific
evidently confirm the strength of the alliance on a regular basis. If abandonment is less likely than
professed by many observers, then this political rhetoric seems more credible yet. For instance,
warnings in recent years that Japan needs to step up its international profile in order to save the
health of the relationship seem exaggerated.18 Nevertheless, doubts about the strength of U.S.
commitments make the alliance even stronger , as they contribute to policies that tie Japan even
closer to the United States. So those who wish for an even deeper alliance would actually be wise
to continue downplaying its durability.
 Free Riding: 2AC
Complete allied reassurance causes free-riding
Blankenship, PhD in Political Science, 18
(Brian Dylan, from Columbia University and Professor of Political Science and Foreign Policy, March 9th, “Promises under Pressure:
Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances”, Columbia University, accessed 06/21/20,
https://doi.org/10.7916/D8281QPF) RES NCC Packet 2020

reassurance can have undesirable consequences. Theories on

Other stands of literature similarly suggest that
defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s protection
is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions (Olson and
Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them, the patron effectively
encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the risk of moral hazard. Allies
confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as confronting their
adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increasing the probability
that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Fearon,
1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov
cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s support too strongly, lest the Serbian
government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with
Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials –
including the ambassador to Serbia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging
Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250). The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric
alliances. In his seminal book, Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers,
where each ally is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances
weak states are comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence
the course of a war. Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and
withhold support from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a;
Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major
costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,”
as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security . This asymmetry becomes even more
pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the superpowers and other states is even
wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that
Walt (2005: 242) would conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”;
rather, it is “a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help

Free-riding causes overextension, economic decline, and alliance failure

Blankenship, PhD in Political Science, 18
(Brian Dylan, from Columbia University and Professor of Political Science and Foreign Policy, March 9th, “Promises under Pressure:
Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances”, Columbia University, accessed 06/21/20,
https://doi.org/10.7916/D8281QPF) RES NCC Packet 2020

2.4 Burden-Sharing in Alliances In much the same way that allies will seek to ensure that their patron remains invested in their
defense, the patron will seek to ensure that its allies invest in their own defense, as well as in the
alliance’s common goals. Failing this, the patron runs the risk of having to over-invest in the
alliance in order to maintain the alliance’s capability for adequate deterrence and defense . Walter
Lippmann famously argued that foreign policy “consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the
nation’s commitments and the nation’s power” (Lippmann, 1943: 9). Yet the path to this balance is not straightforward. The
resources necessary for filling the “gap” between capabilities are not always available, whether because commitments have
outpaced capabilities or because domestic conditions have sapped the state’s ability to invest in its capabilities. One means by
which the gap can be bridged is through forming alliances. When compared to building up one’s own armaments,
relying on the capabilities of other countries represents an inexpensive means of strengthening
deterrence and defense (Morrow, 1993). The utility of alliances, however, depends on the extent to
which allies actually contribute to the common defense . This points to both the importance and the challenges of
“burden-sharing.” Every member of an alliance reaps some reward from its partners’ contributions to
the common defense, but investments into the alliance are costly. Allies have incentives to free-ride, insofar
as they can devote those resources toward domestic consumption and other priorities. A lack of
burden-sharing can carry risks for the patron. These include the potential of overextension and
economic decline if the patron is forced to overspend in order to make up for the shortfall (Gilpin,
1981; Kennedy, 1987). Free-riding
can even cause the alliance to fail to achieve its objective(s) if the
patron is unable to contribute enough by itself (Christensen, 2011: 11). Thus, partners engage in frequent
negotiation over who pays for the alliance.
 Crisis Escalation: 2AC
US commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands ensures crisis escalation and
nuclear war
O’Hanlon and Poling, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and CSIS Senior Fellow ,
1-14-20
(Michael and Gregory, “ROCKS, REEFS, AND NUCLEAR WAR,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/) JFN NCC Packet 2020

Even more simulations rapidly escalate into full-scale conflict, bringing China and the United
States to the doorstep of nuclear war over stakes that no rational observer would consider worth it. The
U.S. national security community tends to view the ability to defeat China (or Russia) in combat wherever
an ally might be attacked as an essential goal. Direct defense or prompt reversal of any aggression, no
matter how small, are the foundational principles of current strategy. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and
similar mutual defense commitments to Japan and the Philippines treat all aggression as an equally
existential threat. So in a scenario involving a Chinese landing on the Japanese-administered
Senkakus or a threat to the Sierra Madre—a derelict Philippine navy ship intentionally ran aground at
Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys and now housing a dozen soldiers—American strategic culture
most often leads to the conclusion that kinetic action to retake a seized feature or outpost is
justified to avoid abandoning an ally and damaging U.S. credibility. But such an escalation, while it
should be kept as an option, would be fraught. It might end quickly, amounting to little more than a
skirmish, or large-scale conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers could ensue. Both sides
would have powerful political incentives to escalate further. Military warning and communications
systems might be targeted through cyberattack or other means in a way that sowed confusion.
Escalation control could not be guaranteed—history and military scholarship strongly suggest as
much, and many war games corroborate it.
 Crisis Escalation: Extensions
Contradictory US positions on the Senkaku Islands ensures miscalculation and
conflict
Watts, US Navy Executive Officer, 19
(Robert C, “Origins of a “Ragged Edge”—U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty,” Naval War
College Review, accessed 9-11-20, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=8045&context=nwc-review) JFN NCC Packet 2020

To this day, Japan administers the Senkakus, China and Taiwan claim them, and the United States
ostensibly maintains its neutral position with regard to their sovereignty. 4 U.S. leaders across recent
administrations have stated publicly, however, that treaty obligations to defend Japan include the
Senkakus. 5 So, although the United States takes no explicit position on the Senkakus’
sovereignty, it has committed to defending them. Washington’s seemingly contradictory stance
on the Senkakus contributes to the risk of misunderstanding and conflict over these islands,
which some analysts describe as the “most likely flash point” in Sino Japanese relations.

US defense of the Senkaku Islands risks nuclear escalation

O’Hanlon, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow,
5-2-19
(Michael, “The Senkaku paradox: Preparing for conflict with the great powers,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-paradox-preparing-for-conflict-
with-the-great-powers/) JFN

For the kinds of scenarios considered here, insisting on prompt liberation of the notional small
Estonian town or uninhabited Senkaku island after enemy attack could, in effect, destroy the village
to save it. Such a direct counterattack might also greatly increase the danger of escalation,
including to nuclear war. A Russia or China that found itself decisively losing a conventional
conflict might choose to create nuclear risks or even utilize nuclear weapons tactically, in the
hope of changing the conflict’s course.
 US-China Relations: 2AC
US defense of the Senkaku Islands hurts relations with China
Carpenter, CATO Institute Senior Fellow,
1-9-20
(Ted Galen, “Washington Needs to Jettison Its Commitment to Defend the Senkakus,” accessed 9-10-20,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-needs-jettison-its-commitment-defend-
senkakus) NCC Packet 2020

It is one thing to continue a security partnership with Japan to maintain stability in East Asia and balance
China’s rising power and influence. There are at least respectable arguments in favor of such a policy,
despite the risk of exacerbating existing tensions between Washington and Beijing. But inflicting
damage on America’s relations with China—and perhaps risking a war with it—over Japan’s
murky claim to uninhabited rocks is a case of foreign policy folly. Such risks are imprudent, even
though there are valuable fishing grounds and possible energy deposits in the waters surrounding the
Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. The Obama administration’s expansion of the U.S. security obligations to Japan
was profoundly unwise. A continuation of the security relationship with Tokyo should be contingent
upon the elimination of any U.S. commitment to back Japan’s claim of the Senkakus.

Strong US-China relations are key to ensure North Korean stability and prevent great power conflict
Jong Un, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 4-29-20
(Jung, “Trump Isn’t Ready for Kim Jong Un’s Death,” accessed 4-29-20,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/29/north-korea-kim-jong-un-death-217467) JFN NCC
Packet 2020

Further, dealing successfully with North Korea will require China’s help. And yet Trump has been
waging a war of words with the Chinese government over who’s more at fault in the coronavirus
pandemic. There are plenty of reasons to be critical of Beijing’s suppression of information to hide the
scale of the health crisis, but Trump might want to look more to the future: If Kim’s absence leads to a
destabilizing power struggle or even internal collapse, China’s early cooperation will be necessary
to stem a potential humanitarian crisis, secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons and avoid
conditions that might spark armed conflict among the U.S., China and South Korea as the three
sides move to protect their interests.