NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY

BANGALORE

FAMILY LAW- II
(TRIMESTER–V)

CASE REVIEW
[OMPRAKASH & ORS. V RADHACHARAN &
ORS.]

SUBMITTED BY:

MILIND RAJ DIXIT (ID NO. 2391)

2ND Year B.A. LLB. (Hons.)

SUBMITTED ON: 8TH JANUARY 2019
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 2

INTRODUCTION 3

A CRITIQUE OF THE OMPRAKASH JUDGMENT 3

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS 9

SUGGESTIONS 9

CONCLUSION 11

BIBLIOGRAPHY 13

1
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

⮚ CASES
1. Ammini E. J. v Union of India AIR 1995 Ker 252.
2. Bhagat Ram (Dead) v Teja Singh (1999) 4 SCC 86. (Supreme Court of India)
3. Ganga Devi v District Judge (2008) 7 SCC 770.
4. HSIDC v Hari Om Enterprises (2009) 16 SCC 208.
5. Mamta Dinesh Vakil v Bansi S. Wadhwa & Nirmalaben @ Nivedita Desai v Nivedita
Dhimant Malwi, TS.86/2000-TP.917/2000 & TS.48/2005-P.104/2005.
6. N. Sarda Mani v G. Alexander AIR 1998 AP 157.
7. Omprakash and Ors. v Radhacharan and Ors [2009] 15 SCC 66.
8. R Srinivasa v S Padmavathamma [2010] (4) SCALE 245.
9. Saroja Chandrasekar and Ors. v The Union of India and Ors Writ Petition Nos. 19942
to 19944 of 2002.
10. Subha B. Nair v State of Kerala (2008) 7 SCC 210.
⮚ STATUTES
1. Hindu Succession Act 1956.
2. The Constitution of India 1950.
3. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005.
⮚ LAW COMMISSION REPORTS
1. Law Commission of India, Property Rights of Women: Proposed Reforms under the
Hindu Law (Report No 174, 2000).
2. Law Commission of India, Proposal to Amend Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 in Case a Female Dies Intestate Leaving Her Self-acquired Property With no
Heirs (Report No 207, 2008).
⮚ BILLS
1. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, Lok Sabha (2009-2014) 215, 15(2)(c).
2. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, Lok Sabha (2014-2019) 17, 15(2)(c).

2
 INTRODUCTION

The issue of succession of the self-acquired property of an intestate Hindu female has left a
penumbra in the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter, HSA), leading to ambiguity in the
devolution of her self-acquired property. This, in turn, has resulted in unfair and unjust
judicial interpretation against their interest. The researcher in this paper has analysed a
landmark case, Omprakash. v Radhacharan1 (hereinafter, Omprakash), which has interpreted
the penumbra, in question, against the interests of women. The arguments advanced by the
researcher is that in HSA, there should not be two different laws, with respect to
succession for males and females. Further, section 15 of HSA should be repealed, on the
grounds of being discriminatory, and efficacy of section 8 of HSA should be stretched to
bring the Hindu females as well, along with Hindu males, under its gamut.

The paper has been divided into three parts. The first part is a critique of the judgment, in
which the researcher has made an attempt to critique the judgment through positivist and
feminist jurisprudence. In the second part, the researcher has dealt with the contemporary
developments, after Omprakash judgment, and the change in the perspective of Indian
judiciary, especially High Courts. In the third part, the researcher has advanced suggestions to
effectively deal with the grey area in succession with respect to the self-acquired property of
intestate women.

A CRITIQUE OF THE OMPRAKASH JUDGMENT

The Omprakash case is a seminal judgment which proposes an answer to the question of
legislative inadequacy, in the nature of succession of the self-acquired property of women,
through application and interpretation of section 15 of HSA. 2 For analysing the judgment, the
facts of the case hold prime importance for understanding the issues involved in the impugned
matter and forming an unbiased opinion.

RELEVANT FACTS
The matter concerns itself with one Narayani Devi, whose husband died within three months
of their marriage and subsequently she was thrown away out of her matrimonial home by her
in-laws. She lived in her natal home where she received education and subsequently got
employed. Before dying intestate in 1996, she had earned a substantial amount which was

1 Omprakash [2009] 15 SCC 66. (Supreme Court of India)

2 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 15.
3
deposited in her several bank accounts and provident fund account. The contention regarding
succession to her self-acquired property was between her brother (petitioners) and the children
of the sister of her husband (respondents). The argument of the petitioners was that the
respondent family had not contributed anything to the accruing of the property as they
deserted her the moment when she became a widow. However, the court decreed in favour of
the respondent by applying sec 15 of HSA.

LAW IN QUESTION

Sec 15 posits the general principle with regard to the succession of the property of females
and is to be read in conjunction with sec 16 of HSA which lays down guidelines for
distribution and order of succession among the heirs of the Hindu female. The section defines
different classes of heirs for the purpose of inheritance. 3 Further, it rules down principles for
succession for the properties inherited from the paternal and matrimonial side. 4 This makes it
evident that, in the case of females, the mode of devolution is decided by the source of the
property.5 While in the case of males, there is no such case as the mode of devolution is
clearly specified.6 It will happen according to the schedule given in HSA. Hence, the law has
turned a blind eye in case of Hindu female’s self-acquired property. The SC interpreted sec 15
of HSA in a highly positivist sense, ignoring all other factors which could have been taken
into consideration for a just and fair decision. Its reasoning boils down to the fact that the
mode of succession of a Hindu female’s self-acquired property has not been specified clearly
and hence the general principle of succession posited in sec 15(1) of HSA should prevail in
such cases.7

ANALYSIS THROUGH POSITIVISM

How a positivist theorist looks into such a penumbral problem. Inclusive legal positivists,
such as HLA Hart, would say, if the law violates the purpose of the statute, it should be
invalidated.8 They also propose considering morality to some extent while reaching a decision
through interpretation of a posited law. A law is wrong and should be struck down if it does
not conform to the core of the legal system. By core of the legal system, the researcher means

3 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 15(1).

4 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 15(2).
5 R Srinivasa v S Padmavathamma [2010] (4) SCALE 245. (Supreme Court of India)
6 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 8.
7 Omprakash at ¶ 9.
8 Kenneth Einar Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules L Coleman, Kenneth E Himma, and Scott J
Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 105).
4
 the purpose, which the law as an institution pursues. In this case, it is the Hindu Succession
Act. The legislative intent behind HSA seeks to prevent the property from passing into the
hands of the person whom justice would require should not succeed to the property. 9
Therefore, it is unjust to allow succession rights to those people who did not make any
contribution in earning the property of the intestate. This would be against the will of the
deceased.

Secondly, the perspective of exclusive legal positivism focuses on the establishment of the
new social convention for bringing about a change. 10 They say to treat a penumbral problem,
we need to look for whether a new social convention demanding the striking down of the old
law is rising or not. The consciousness-raising approach of feminists also deals with a similar
approach. In words of Katherine Bartlett, a question becomes method if asked repeatedly and
such methods give rise to a new social convention which demands change in the existing
status quo.11 This problem in both the approaches fulfils the demand to bring about a change.
New social conventions are arising regarding the same as many human right agencies and
NGOs are raising voices to amend sec 15. Subsequently, the Law Commission also
recommended changing the legislation. However, the court did not take their stand into
account.

ANALYSIS THROUGH FEMINISM

1. ASKING THE WOMAN QUESTION

According to MacKinnon, “when seemingly ontological conditions are challenged from the
collective standpoint of a dissident reality, they become visible as epistemological.”12 The law
sometimes silently and unjustly submerges the perspective of women and other groups not
forming part of the majority. Asking the woman question, in this respect, exposes the unjust
nature of law and its gender implication and explains how the law has failed to take into
consideration the values and experiences that connect more with respect to women than men. 13

9 Satyajeet A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law (21st edn., LexisNexis, 2013).

10 Andrei Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules L Coleman, Kenneth E Himma, and Scott J Shapiro
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 105).
11 Katherine T Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 HLR 829, 837.
12 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (first published 1989, Harvard University
Press, 1991) 240.
13 Bartlett (n 11).
5
 therefore, while looking at the section, the court did not answer the woman question since it is
ignoring their reality and needs.

An objective standard of law, we know today, is nothing but, essentially, the male stance. It
is able to masquerade as the objective law because of its domination in the world. 14 Those
enjoying power in society make its norms and institution, they are the one who writes
Constitution which becomes the law’s highest standard and finally, they are the one to
impose and enforce it. In all such case, women have no major role to play. 15 The judges in
Omprakash case relied on the reasoning which stems from the thinking that a woman has no
family of her own and she is dependent, firstly, on her father, and secondly, on her husband.16
They did not consider that the idea of women being the absolute owner of her property can
linger in the scheme of devolution.17

Moreover, recognition of new rights is overshadowed by the legal precedents which seek to
protect the status quo.18 A judge has a wide range of choice of acceptable substantive results
consisting of deciding which facts are relevant, or which legal precedent or law holds
application or the way in which the applicable precedent can be applied. This indeterminacy
mostly lets the judges follow dominant social and cultural norms to reach the decision.
Argument preached by the supporters of section 15 of HSA is that upon marriage, a woman
goes into her matrimonial family and breaks all ties with her family by birth for assuming
marital ties, while the converse is not true. Therefore, this ground reality, according to them,
has been taken into account by the legislature for enacting intestate succession rules for a
woman. The judges adopted similar reasoning and followed the set precedents, coupled with
dominant social and cultural norms as discussed above, to reason out their judgment.19

2. FEMINIST PRACTICAL REASONING APPROACH

SC called Omprakash matter a hard case.20 It, then, shed its responsibility to interpret the law
in a broader sense to make it inclusive of new situations and circumstances. Amelie Rorty
states, “the Aristotelian model of practical reasoning holistically considers, actions, means
and ends in order to recognize and actualize whatever is best in the most ambiguous

14 MacKinnon (n 12) 238.

15 MacKinnon (n 12) 238.
16 Mulla (n 9).
17 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 14.
18 Bartlett (n 11) 845.
19 Bhagat Ram (Dead) v Teja Singh (1999) 4 SCC 86. (Supreme Court of India)
20 Omprakash at ¶ 10.
6
 situation”.21 They have adopted a positivist approach just to sound logical on paper.
However, their decision, in principle, is unsound. Judges stated that “sentiments and
sympathy cannot be a guiding principle to determine the interpretation of the law and it
should not be interpreted in a manner that is not envisaged by the legislature”.22 However,
the argument of the petitioner was not the one based on sympathy and sentiments but was a
logical one as psychologically speaking, no one would wish her property to devolve to those
who have never done well for them. For instance, where a Hindu widow lives with her sister
because she got mentally ill and her matrimonial house people threw her out of the house.
Because of the efforts of her sister, she became fit and started earning money. After 40 years,
she died intestate leaving a huge sum of money. However, the sister’s hope to succeed to
widow’s estate would receive an impediment from the detached relatives of the deceased
widow and distant relatives of her husband, even not known by her or anticipated by her to
be her competitors. She could have claimed precedence in case sec 8 was applied as she was
a Class II heir.23 Therefore, following Aristotelian model in this ambiguous situation would
have yielded positive results because such ambiguities do not call for the choice of one
principle over the other, but rather require imaginative interrogation and reconciliation to
attain a just outcome.

Admittedly, SC completely ignored the fact that some situations are unique and cannot be
anticipated in detail and generalised in advance. They themselves are generative as they give
rise to practical perceptions and inform judges about desired ends of law.24 SC should realise
that the succession laws are also about those who must be disentitled along with those who
ought to be entitled.25 Furthermore, there are some particular facts about a case which just not
present the issue to be solved but also guides the judges to the means and ends of law ought
to be.26 Facts in Omprakash have the same force. SC did not even deny the locus standi, to
the respondents, of claiming a share in the property of the one who they disregarded
completely for over 4 decades. HSA rules for denying the property rights to the murderers. 27
It sources from the fact that the intestate would never will away its property to the one

21 Bartlett (n 11) 850.

22 Omprakash at ¶ 11. Also see, HSIDC v Hari Om Enterprises (2009) 16 SCC 208 (Supreme Court of India),
Subha B. Nair v State of Kerala (2008) 7 SCC 210 (Supreme Court of India), Ganga Devi v District Judge
(2008) 7 SCC 770. (Supreme Court of India)
23 Hindu Succession Act 1956, The Schedule.
24Bartlett (n 11) 851.
25 Desai (n 9).
26 Bartlett (n 11) 860.
27 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 25.
7
 responsible for its death. The court could have applied a similar reasoning in the present
matter. Hence, the justification for the judgment, though reasonable in the eyes of law, was
not actually just and demanded modifications.

Justification is an important feature of practical reasoning.28 The rule for intestate succession
in the case of males in HSA gives precedence to blood relations over matrimonial relations
which is evidently ultra vires the Indian Constitution because the discrimination is based on
the basis of gender only.29 Whereas, when it comes to her parental relatives, they have to wait
till all her matrimonial heirs become non-existent which is a mere possibility with little or no
chance of coming into reality, at least in their lifetimes. Also, why with marriage, the pattern
of inheritance, in the case of a Hindu male, does not change, however, in the case of Hindu
females, such pattern changes as soon as she is married. The entire group of heirs of her
husband inherit from her and she, contrarily, she does not inherit from them. The court did
not delve deep into the law and hence, the analysis and judgment delivered by them were not
just. The court failed to into other personal laws such as Muslim, Christian and Parsi law,
which allow even parental side of the women to succeed to her property, in many cases,
regardless of it being self-acquired or source where it came from.30

Through feminist jurisprudence, we understand that there is not a single definition of

domination and there are innumerable ways in which domination and discrimination can be
experienced.31 Therefore, the law needs to recognize the same. According to Ann Scales,
“Where domination is concerned, by looking around, we have examples- we can grasp the
concept. Then we recognize other examples, not because they share any essence, but because of
their relational matrix.”32 Therefore, the lack of understanding on this front lead judges to give
extremely insensitive judgments. In Omprakash case, the court stated that the act does not put
an embargo on executing a will. However, practically speaking, not many people execute a will.
Basic legal education in India is very less. People generally, do not know about the law, until
they have a tryst with the same. Further, many people, do not wish to take the trouble to execute
a will because of intricacies involved in writing a will and executing it. One of the social
misconceptions is that people do not feel they have enough money to write a will. They think

28 Bartlett (n 11) 854.

29 The Constitution of India 1950, art 15(1).
30 Indian Succession Act 1925, s 33 & s 51. Also see, Asaf A A Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (5th
edn., Oxford University Press, 2008).
31 Ann C. Scales, ‘The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay’ (1986) YLJ 1386.
32 Scales (n 20) 1386.
8
only wealthy people need wills. So, the court did not take into account all such considerations
before arriving at the decision.

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

With new cases coming up, the court has started to broaden its perspective. In case of Mamta
Dinesh Vakil v Bansi S. Wadhwa, the Bombay High Court raised the substantial question with
regard to the constitutional validity of sec 15.33 HC stated that sec 15 and 8 of HSA express an
inherent bias and discrimination between Hindu females and males. This deprives Hindu
female of allowing her self-acquired property to succeed to her own heirs which include her
mother and father preferring over the heirs of her husband.34 Such legislation leads to watering
down of years of skill and toil. Bombay HC even went on to hold sec 15(1) as
unconstitutional. Once this magnum opus has been affirmed by the division bench, it will be a
great stride in strengthening the position of women and reducing one of the many inequalities
faced by the women today.

In another case of Saroja Chandrasekar and Ors. v The Union of India and Ors, the Madras
High Court looked into the legal validity of sec 15(1) as a moot question. 35 It stated that the
scheme of succession with respect to Hindu female property, even before the origin of HSA,
has been heavily tilted in favour of male species. Therefore, the possibility of females having
self-acquired property might have been overlooked, considering the legal position prevalent
before the enforcement of HSA. Also, the social outlook that husband is the real successor of
all the property of the wife, has a huge influence on HSA. However, the obiter dicta in the
judgment is the one which sheds light on the changing social convention on sec 15 of HSA.
HC pressed upon the need to re-consider sec 15 of HSA and recommended to bring the
necessary amendments advised by the Law Commission. Further, the case also mentions
another penumbral problem in HSA, which is that it is silent on the distinction between
devolution of property inherited from mother side and the property inherited from father side.

SUGGESTIONS

When the Hindu society is thriving towards equality of gender, section 15 of HSA is a
blemish. Many times, the question has arisen whether the judiciary should interfere in the

33 Mamta Dinesh Vakil v Bansi S. Wadhwa & Nirmalaben @ Nivedita Desai v Nivedita Dhimant Malwi ,
TS.86/2000-TP.917/2000 & TS.48/2005-P.104/2005 (Bombay HC). Decided on 06.11.2012.
34 Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 5(1)(b) & s 15(1)(c).
35 Writ Petition Nos. 19942 to 19944 of 2002 (Madras High Court). Decided on 15.07.2015.
9
personal laws. The simple answer is yes when it comes to keeping a check on the
discriminatory laws. Judiciary has done this time and again. In the case of the Indian Divorce
Act, the judiciary has amended sec 10 and 34 because it discriminated on the basis of
gender.36 Furthermore, progressive changes have been made, by the judiciary, in the Hindu
law itself. For example, amending sec 6 of HSA to bring daughters under the purview of
coparceners to create an interest for them in the coparcenary property, or deleting sec 23 of
the same act because it deprived women of their right to share the dwelling houses.37

Another suggestion can be to bring a change in the legislation itself. If the devolution of
property in case of a Hindu male is independent of its source of acquirement, then it is
inappreciable as to why it is in case of Hindu female. Section 8 which deals with the
devolution of intestate property of males considers mother as a class I heir and she inherits
equally with the children and the wife. However, in sec 15, the mother is not considered equal
and is discriminated from the children and the husband of the predeceased daughter. This rule
is outrightly discriminatory in favour of the intestate’s matrimonial home and this provision is
unjustified on the grounds of being prejudicial to the interest of the mothers. 38 Therefore, the
researcher suggests that sec 15 should be repealed in totality and an amendment should be
brought in sec 8 to include a succession of the property of Hindu females too. This is the ideal
solution to resolve the contention of discrimination as the same law will then apply to both
males and females.

Another suggestion can be to bring an amendment in section 15. As stated above, two bills
had been introduced in the Parliament in 2013 and 2015 respectively. However, both the bills
could not be passed. The first bill sought to create a mode of devolution of self-acquired
property wherein the first preference should be given to parental heirs of the intestate female
in the absence of her children and her husband. 39 Second bill sought to insert a new subclause
(c) in subsection 2 of sec 15 which reads as follows: “any property self-acquired by a female
Hindu during the time of desertion shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the
deceased (including the children of pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs
referred to in sub-section (1) in order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father and
the mother.”40
36 Ammini E. J. v Union of India AIR 1995 Ker 252 (Karnataka High Court). Also see, N. Sarda Mani v G.
Alexander AIR 1998 AP 157 (Andhra Pradesh High Court).
37 The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
38 A.M. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law and the Constitution (2nd edn, Easter Law House, 1994) 150.
39 The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, Lok Sabha (2009-2014) 215, 15(2)(c).
40 The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, Lok Sabha (2014-2019) 17, 15(2)(c).
10
In its 207th report, the 18th Law Commission of India recommended inserting a new subclause
(c) in subsection 2 of sec 15 to devolve the self-acquired property of the intestate Hindu
female upon the heirs of the husband and her mother and father simultaneously. 41 In the 174th
report also, the commission had suggested that the rules related to the succession of the
property of an intestate Hindu female reflected patriarchal assumptions.42 Further, Rule 1 and
3 of sec 16 can be amended to the effect to make an equal distribution of property in all the
cases of self-acquired property and no precedence should be given to any relative according to
relatives mentioned in subclause b, c, d and e of subsection 1 of section 15.

As already discussed above, the court referred to the option of executing a will in order to
devolve the property. However, many people, do not wish to take the trouble to execute a will
because of intricacies involved in writing a will and executing it. So, the state should develop
a hassle-free mechanism for preparing and executing a will. Attorneys, especially for this
purpose should be appointed. This will help in the devolution of property in an
uncontroversial way and the testator will be able to decide what happens with his property.
Further, in many western countries, there are many private agencies involved in the work of
providing wills to people at low costs or even for free. This can be done even through their
smartphones. This makes executing wills easier and encrypted which ensures no data is
leaked. Such systems can be adopted in India for the maximum benefit of people.43

CONCLUSION

The Omprakash case has become a precedent and the future judgments will mostly be based
on this precedent unless an order to the contrary is passed. The analysis of section 15 revealed
at its outset, its demerits and the various lacunae in it. Further, its analysis on the touchstone
of the constitution showed a blatant disregard and unjustified violation of its provisions.
Following Art. 13, it should have been struck down as unconstitutional. The formalistic
approach of the court proved disadvantageous for women as SC was their final resort. Under
HSA, a Hindu female’s property has been divided into three types; property inherited from
husband, property inherited from father and the third type is which does not fall into above

41 Law Commission of India, Proposal to Amend Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in Case a
Female Dies Intestate Leaving Her Self-acquired Property With no Heirs (Report No 207, 2008) 6.3.
42 Law Commission of India, Property Rights of Women: Proposed Reforms under the Hindu Law (Report No
174, 2000) 40.
43 Erik Nelson, ‘Top 5 Reasons People Don’t Complete Will’ (Trustworthy, 9 February 2018)
<https://tomorrow.me/trust-worthy/planning-ahead/top-5-reasons-people-dont-complete-will/> accessed 8
January 2019.
11
two categories. Such differentiation, depending upon the gender and source of property, is not
there in any other religion across the world.

Asking the woman question, in Omprakash case, exposes the institutional arrangement and
social structure contributing to women subordination. Without asking the woman question, the
nature of section 15, perpetuating women subordination, will remain unexamined and taken
for granted. This will aid to its justification even though it disadvantages women. Therefore,
the court should reconsider its decision as it has done in cases dealing with the issues of
homosexuality, adultery, etc. In my opinion, the social position of women should play a major
role in deciding the penumbra so that the idea of complete justice, worded in Article 143 of
the Indian Constitution, can be achieved.

12
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

⮚ BOOKS

1. Bhattacharjee A.M, Hindu Law and the Constitution (2nd edn, Easter Law House,
1994).

2. Fyzee A A A, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (5th edn., Oxford University Press,

2008).

3. MacKinnon C A, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (first published 1989, Harvard
University Press, 1991).

4. Satyajeet A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law (21st edn., LexisNexis, 2013).

 
⮚ ARTICLES (ONLINE/OFFLINE)
1. Himma K E, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules L Coleman, Kenneth E Himma, and
Scott J Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
(Oxford University Press, 2002).
2. Katherine T Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 HLR 829, 837.

3. Marmor A, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules L Coleman, Kenneth E Himma, and

Scott J Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
(Oxford University Press, 2002).

4. Nelson E, ‘Top 5 Reasons People Don’t Complete Will’ (Trustworthy, 9 February

2018) <https://tomorrow.me/trust-worthy/planning-ahead/top-5-reasons-people-dont-
complete-will/> accessed 8 January 2019.
5. Scales A C, ‘The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay’ (1986) YLJ 1386.

13