How Democratic Is Governance Lessons Fro

How Democratic Is “Governance”?
Lessons from
Swiss Drug Policy
SONJA WÄLTI*, DANIEL KÜBLER**, and
YANNIS PAPADOPOULOS***
Public action increasingly takes place in self-organizing networks that are

remote from direct governmental control. While these transformations have
been subject to scrutiny in regard to their efficiency, less attention has been
paid to their democratic quality. This article discusses governance-induced
problems of democracy by isolating two major criticisms. Deliberative crit-
icism argues that governance, rather than allowing for true deliberation in
the public space, may lead to a loss of accountability. Participatory criti-
cism stresses that governance impinges on participatory venues. The article
discusses these criticisms theoretically and empirically, drawing from
research on drug policy in Switzerland. The findings show that the criti-
cisms are relevant, albeit not entirely justified.
INTRODUCTION
“Governance,” “networks,” and “partnerships” are widely used concepts

to denote changes in the way public policies are managed. They capture
transformations in the nature of coordination among agencies and in their
relationship with society (Pierre, 3; Kooiman, 1). They imply that public
action takes place in self-organizing networks that govern without
recourse to hierarchy, or at least with a significant degree of autonomy
from the state, and that public and private organizations cooperate and
compete in a socio-cybernetic, horizontal, and interorganizational system
of actors (Agranoff and McGuire; Gaudin 1996, 13; Le Galès and Thatcher;
Mandell; O’Toole; Rhodes, 660). Along these lines, Osborne and Gaebler
advocated a “reinvented” government for the United States, which is to
be driven by an “entrepreneurial spirit.” Similarly, in the European
context, governance was initiated in the 1980s by conservative govern-
ments to introduce market elements in public service delivery (Stoker).
The encouragement of “governance”—a term that we will use through-
out the article as a shorthand for efforts aimed at creating networks and
partnerships to enhance both interagency and public–private coordina-
*Georgetown University
**University of Zürich
***University of Lausanne
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 1,
January 2004 (pp. 83–113). © 2004 Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148,
USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. ISSN 0952-1895
84 SONJA WÄLTI ET AL.
tion—by the center-left governments elected in the 1990s in both Europe

and the United States is marked by a revived call for community empow-
erment and grassroots action (e.g., Susskind and Elliott; Fischer;
Giddens). They embraced “governance” not only to increase efficiency,
but also to empower citizens and enhance the democratic quality of
public action (Burns, Hambleton, and Hoggett). Yet, how democratic is
governance? Does it indeed foster broader deliberation and citizen
involvement?
The aim of this article is to examine the democratic quality of gover-
nance and to address some of the concerns that have been addressed
intermittently in the recent literature (see Mayntz; Peters; Pierre; Pierre
and Peters). In particular, Rhodes remarks that governance poses a con-
siderable “challenge for democratic accountability,” and King stresses
that lines of accountability between voters and private organizations have
become murky. Critics also point out that, as governance is most con-
cerned with increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of policy
outputs, it may do so at the expense of democratic legitimization on the
input side (Scharpf 1999).
While neocorporatist arrangements have been well examined from the
viewpoint of democratic theory, governance has been less subject to such
scrutiny (Papadopoulos 2000), and so far, little empirical evidence has
been provided in support of the expressed concerns. Hence, when we set
out to examine the democratic quality of governance, we can rely on little
guidance regarding both indicators and methods to be used to address
these concerns. One of the prime objectives of this article, therefore, is to
provide a set of measures to assess democratic legitimacy concerns empir-
ically. To do so, we organize our discussion along what we believe to be
two distinctive lines of possible objections arising from deliberative
criticism and participatory criticism. These two strands of arguments
capture the main legitimacy concerns expressed in the literature. They are
also most relevant in practical terms in that they provide a reasoned
assessment of such claims as “governance is beneficial to the exchange of
ideas and know-how” or “governance is good because more people get
to take part in public action.” The latter of these claims is of special inter-
est in the case of Switzerland, whose direct democratic avenues via exten-
sive referendum processes are often referred to by participationists as a
centerpiece of democratic legitimatization.
Deliberative criticism argues that governance extracts policy issues from
the public space and confines them into spheres of technocratic decision-
making in which the participants are no longer accountable, neither to the
public nor to their representatives (in particular Hunold; Duran; Gaudin
1999; Scharpf 1999; Bovens; Benz 1998). Therefore, decisions tend to rep-
resent partial agreements among (nonelected) members of specific policy
networks. Participatory criticism stresses that governance may limit citizen
participation1 and, in effect, impinge on mechanisms of community-
building and solidarity (in particular Duran and Thoenig; Rose). We
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS “GOVERNANCE”? 85
examine these issues based on empirical findings from urban drug policy
in Switzerland, of which we give a brief account before fleshing out
the two criticisms in more detail and confronting them with empirical
findings.
Drug policy, as it has been practiced in the nine major Swiss cities since
the early 1990s, provides excellent grounds for studying governance,
because it has been subject to the above-mentioned transformations of
public action in almost ideal-typical manner. Moreover, Switzerland pro-
vides a particularly interesting backdrop for this discussion due to the
strong emphasis its institutions place on the legitimization of public
action through deliberation and direct citizen participation. We find that
governance does not call into question representative institutions, as long
as it is tied to traditional routines of legitimization, as it is—with
some caveats—in the Swiss case. By mediating particularistic interests,
governance may enhance solidarity and community-building and
provide additional forums of exchange and mutual learning. It should be
kept in mind, however, that the conditions under which governance
mechanisms can operate legitimately are likely to depend on the democ-
ratic institutions of a country. The particularly deliberative and partici-
patory setting of Swiss direct democracy may simply provide sufficient
safeguards against the potential democratic drawbacks of governance
mechanisms.
GOVERNANCE IN DRUG POLICY IN SWITZERLAND
When drug use became a public concern in the 1970s, the Swiss govern-
ment, as in other fields of social policy, relied on nongovernmental orga-
nizations (see Bütschi and Cattacin). This reliance on the third sector was
pursued in the 1980s, when due to AIDS and its implications for drug
users, government involvement increased. When, in the beginning of the
1990s, the federal government needed to respond to public outrage
against internationally publicized open drug scenes in several cities, it
drew again heavily on the private sector for assistance. It provided funds
and logistic support to existing private organizations while integrating
them more closely into the activities of the police force, health care
facilities, and social services, thus deliberately enhancing self-governing
networks (Kübler 2000).
This evolution is intimately linked with the emergence of the so-called
“harm reduction approach” to drug policy, whose aim is to reduce drug-
related externalities and to reintegrate drug addicts into society (O’Hare
et al.). In order to implement the new paradigm, a holistic approach
to drug addiction—addressing repressive, motivational, therapeutic,
medical, and social aspects—was developed, for which encompassing
networks needed to be formed. Throughout the 1990s, these networks
supplemented and sometimes replaced the earlier bilateral (and more cor-
poratist) partnerships between public agencies and a limited number of
charity organizations. Cooperation was also needed to legitimize an inno-

vative, and in the international comparison at the time quite daring,
approach to drug addiction. The federal government proposed a series of
alternative treatment methods, one of which allowed long-term drug
addicts to get a medically monitored heroin prescription. These measures
were highly contested, but the federal government could make use of its
preemptive powers in research matters to combat epidemics. However,
once the research trial period was over, the program was exposed to the
traditional channels of legitimization and thus needed the support of sub-
national actors, political parties, and interest groups. The federal govern-
ment’s pragmatic and comparatively liberal approach to drug policy was
endorsed in three subsequent national referenda in 1997, 1998, and 1999
in which both more radically liberal and repressive approaches were
rejected.
By the late 1990s, all major cities had set up some form of intersectoral
and public–private coordination structure to deal with drug-related
issues. Depending on the type of problems to be addressed, the size of
the urban context, and local political factors, roughly three types of struc-
tures emerged (Kübler and Wälti) (see Table 1):
1. Drug commissions are appointed by the government and composed

of designated representatives from both the public and the private
sector. Public representatives are delegated by social services, health
care, the police, and more rarely by the courts. Representatives from
the private sector defend charity organizations and private service
providers dealing with drug addicts. In some cases, the composi-
tion is half private and half public, whereas in others, public sector
representatives form a majority. In most cases, both local and can-
tonal (regional) actors are present, while in some only cantonal or
local representatives are present. Their functions range from con-
sultation to policy-making.
2. Interagency working parties are smaller in their representative scope,
involving only the various (local or cantonal) agencies that deal
with drug-related matters. Their purpose is to coordinate the imple-
mentation of drug policy programs.
3. Drug forums are accessible to the general public and serve as citizen
panels, where residents can express concerns and make suggestions.
Political representatives as well as public servants from the various
agencies involved in drug policy are present to respond to the con-
cerns and to discuss solutions.
In all major cities, some or all of these three types of governance struc-
tures exist. One should say that in comparison to the usual variance in
local government structures in Switzerland, the composition and func-
tioning of these coordination structures look surprisingly similar across
TABLE 1
Governance Mechanisms
Name of Governance Level Composition Head Function and Authority

Mechanism
Basle
Basler Drogenstammtisch City Elected officials, private Elected representative of Public forum
(Roundtable on Drug Policy) organizations, inhabitants inhabitants
Kantonaler Drogenstab Canton Justice, health care, police Network manager (public Planning, coordination
(Cantonal Drug Steering servant at the cantonal
Committee) department of justice)
Fachkommission für Canton Elected officials, justice, Elected official (head of the Consultation of the
Suchtfragen (Expert health care, cantonal department of cantonal government
Commission on Dependency police, social justice)
Issues) services, private and
professional organizations
Bern
Task Force Drogenpolitik City Elected officials, social Mayor of the City of Bern Ad hoc coordination and
(Drug Policy Task Force: services, health care, project management
Executive Committee) police, finances, education,
private organizations
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS “GOVERNANCE”?
Task Force Drogenpolitik City Top-level bureaucrats from Private contractor Ad hoc coordination and
(Drug Policy Task Force: social services, health care, project management,
Project Team) police, one representative prepares decisions for
of private organizations Executive Committee
Fachkommission City Social services, health care, Head of the office for youth Consultation of the city
Drogenpolitik (Expert youth matters, education matters government
Commission on Drug Policy)
87
TABLE 1 (Continued) 88
Name of Governance Level Composition Head Function and Authority

Mechanism
Fribourg
Commission cantonale des Canton Social services, education, Network manager (public Consultation of the
toxicodépendances (Cantonal health care, justice, private servant at the cantonal cantonal government
Dependencies Commission) organizations health department)
Geneva
Commission mixte en matière Canton Social services, health care, Medical doctor and Consultation of the
de toxicomanies (Mixed education, justice, police, network manager (top-level cantonal government
Dependencies Commission) private organizations bureaucrats of the cantonal
health department)
Lausanne
Commission cantonale pour Canton Elected officials, health Top-level bureaucrat of the Consultation of the
la prévention (Cantonal care, police, justice, social cantonal department health cantonal government,
Commission for Prevention) services, private and human services project evaluation
organizations, communes
Conseil consultatif (Advisory Canton Health care, police, justice, Cantonal minister of the Meeting once or twice a
SONJA WÄLTI ET AL.
Committee) social services, numerous department of health and year to advise the Cantonal
private organizations, and human services, assisted by Commission for Prevention
representatives from top-level bureaucrat
communes
Groupe St-Laurent City Elected officials, private Pastor Public forum
(St-Laurent Group) organizations, inhabitants
Lucerne
Drogenkonferenz (Drug Canton Elected officials, police, Elected official (head of Conceptualization of drug
Conference) justice, social services, cantonal department of policy
health care, private health)
organizations, communes
Betäubungsmittelkommission Canton Health care, social services, Network manager (civil Consultation of the
(Commission for Mind- police, education servant at the cantonal cantonal government
altering Substances) health department)
Arbeitsgruppe Repression- City Health care, social services, Mayor of the City of Coordination
Überlebenshilfe (Working police, private Lucerne
Party on Repression and Harm organizations
Reduction)
Lugano
Gruppo operativo droga Canton Health care, social services, Judge of cantonal tribunal Consultation of the
(Drug Policy Working Party) police, private cantonal government
organizations
Saint Gall
Kantonale Kommission für Canton Health care, social services, Medical doctor (civil Consultation of the
Drogen- und Aidsfragen police, education servant at the cantonal cantonal government,
(Cantonal Drug and Aids department of health) conceptualization
Commission)
Working Parties Housing City Elected officials, social Elected official (head of the Project coordination
Projects and Hidden Scenes services, housing, police, police and social services)
and Schelle 3 private organizations
Arbeitsgruppe Drogenfragen City Public sector, private Network manager (civil Consultation, exchange of
(Working Party on Drug- canton organizations servant at the city know-how
related Issues) department of social
services)
Zurich
Drogendelegation des City Heads of departments Elected official (head of Political coordination
Stadtrats (Drug Delegation of (elected): social services, city police department)
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS “GOVERNANCE”?
the Mayor’s Office) health care, police

Drogenkommission Canton Social services, health care, Chief civil servant Consultation of the
(Drug Commission) police (department of city police) cantonal government
Lagebeurteilung Drogen City Social services, health care, Commander in chief of city Monitoring
(Drug Policy Assessment Group) canton police police
Drogenkolloquium (Drug Canton Social services, health care, Expert (private contractor) Exchange of know-how
Colloquium) police, private
89
organizations
cases. Indeed, similar patterns can also be observed in other European

cities. We compared these structures with those in Frankfurt, Amsterdam,
and Glasgow, which all turn out to be similar, despite significant institu-
tional differences across countries. In Frankfurt, the Monday Round was
set up in 1988 to define a common strategy between the police and social
services to come to grips with the open drug scene. Based on similar con-
cerns, the city of Amsterdam founded the Coordination Bureau in 1989,
which was dissolved in 1994 giving way to self-coordination among agen-
cies and organizations. Glasgow’s efforts are more recent: In 1994, the city
responded to the Scottish Office’s efforts to improve drug-related action
in Scotland by setting up the Greater Glasgow Drug Action Team, which
is composed of senior representatives from public services and private
organizations.
STRATEGY OF INQUIRY
The questions discussed in this article are based on research on drug

policy conducted between October 1997 and December 1999.2 We inves-
tigated interagency and interorganizational networks that started to
emerge in the early 1990s in response to growing and highly publicized
drug abuse problems in cities. We concentrated our analysis on issues of
harm reduction and so-called low threshold treatments involving mainly
social services, health care, and the police, thus leaving aside prosecution
and prevention. The bulk of the investigation was conducted in the nine
largest Swiss cities: Bern, Basle, Zurich, Saint Gall, Geneva, Lausanne,
Fribourg, Lucerne, and Lugano (Table 2). In order to gain a comparative
understanding, we also undertook a more limited investigation in
TABLE 2
Research Data
Case Number of Participation Territorial Level

Interviews
Canton City Agglomeration
Basle 5 0 5
Bern 9 4 2 7
Fribourg 5 1 3 2
Geneva 6 0 6
Lausanne 9 2 4 3 2
Lucerne 5 1 1 3 1
Lugano 6 1 1 4 1
Saint Gall 7 2 1 4 2
Zurich 7 1 1 3 3
Total 59 15 24 26 9
a
One actor is an external contractor.
Amsterdam, Glasgow, and Frankfurt. The core analysis is based on a sys-

tematic (code-based) analysis of eighty-nine semi-directive and fully tran-
scribed stakeholder interviews, sixty-one in Switzerland and twenty-eight
in Amsterdam, Glasgow, and Frankfurt. Secondary material such as offi-
cial documents and newspaper articles was used to retrace the history of
the different coordination schemes in the cities under study and to iden-
tify the major stakeholders.
The interviewees were selected based on their reputation to play an
important role in decisions on drug-related matters. In each city, we
started out by interviewing one or two central stakeholders and by asking
them, based on selective snowballing, who else we needed to talk to.
Where such functions exist, we interviewed the so-called “network man-
agers” first. To limit the number of interviews, especially in large cities
where extensive networks exist, we cross-checked listings and compared
them with newspaper reports in order to focus on the main stakeholders.
We made sure to interview actors from all relevant policy sectors.
To the extent that we were (made) aware of such actors, we also inter-
viewed organizations that had a say but were not part of consolidated
networks.
The interview guide revolved around coordination, which, as we had
come to understand based on preliminary exploratory interviews with
federal civil servants, was the closest practical term for our purpose
with which the interviewees could relate. Some might have been familiar
with the term network. However, “governance,” which may be directly
translated into French by gouvernance, is still an unfamiliar term in the
Swiss policy practice and known mainly to academics. Moreover, there is
no direct German translation.3 The standard interview guide contained
Sector Type of Actor
Health Social Police Network Administration Non- Politician

Works Manager government
1 1 1 2 4 1
1 4 1 3 6a 3
1 2 1 1 4 1
2 2 1 1 3 2 1
1 3 1 4 5 3 1
1 2 1 1 3 2
0 2 1 3 3 1 2
0 3 1 3 4 2 1
1 1 1 4 5 1 1
8 20 9 22 37 16 6
an introductory statement about the scope of our research, which we

stated as being concerned with “issues of coordination in the field of drug
policy.” We did not want to be more specific, since an explicit statement
of the research aim discussed here could have prompted some of the
answers. In this way, issues of legitimacy could initially be brought up by
the interviewee. More explicit questions were asked in the course of the
interview.
We first asked what coordination mechanisms existed, and when, how,
and why they had come about. The aim of this set of questions was to get
the facts as well as to encourage the interviewee to talk about the momen-
tum leading to increased coordination in networks and the function of
these networks. We then asked the interviewee to explain the role of their
agency or organization within the different coordination schemes. The
next set of questions invited the interviewee to discuss positive and neg-
ative aspects of these schemes. Where necessary, we further inquired why
they thought actors participated, whether the interactions had an effect
on the way decisions were made and conflicts were handled, whether
there were actors that remained excluded, and whether the effort to coor-
dinate imposed constraints on the participating agencies or organizations.
Finally, another set of questions addressed issues of democratic legiti-
macy more explicitly, by asking the interviewees to whom they felt
accountable, what institutional mechanisms of sanctions they were
subject to, and whether they had ever been subject to internal or external
criticism of actions decided around the table.
The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, then uniformly
coded using Atlas.ti® for Windows code and retrieve software.4 For the
purpose of this article, only the sixty-one interviews pertaining to the
Swiss cases were scrutinized systematically. For the empirical analysis,
we used three types of procedures. Statements about the governance
structure(s) in each city are based on the factual data collected from the
interviews. The assessment of these structures is based on the analysis of
the interviews, which is reported in the form of response ratios and,
where useful, by reproducing quotes. In both cases, we nested relevant
codes to retrieve interview segments. Unless otherwise stated, we judged
the reproduced statements to be both explicit and representative of the
entire data. The quotes (originally in German, French, and Italian) were
translated into English. For the purpose of anonymity, the interviewees
are referred to by generic categories.
Note that our investigation was not designed to operate probabilistic
tests by comparing the different cases (i.e., cities). Rather, its aim was to
develop an empirically relevant set of measures based on legitimacy con-
cerns brought up by the stakeholders. Their concerns are tied into a
broader theoretical discussion of legitimacy issues related to governance
before being systematically confronted with the testimonies contained in
the interviews.
THE DEMOCRATIC CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE: TWO MAIN CRITICISMS
The Deliberative Criticism of Governance

The liberal theory of democracy primarily refers to representation as a
legitimizing element of public action. The representatives of civil society
can be held accountable by means of elections. Along the same line of
argument, any “agent” belonging to a chain of delegation ought to be
accountable to the “principals.” This holds not only for the accountabil-
ity of members of parliament to their constituencies or the executive
branch of government to the legislative branch, but also for the account-
ability of civil servants to senior officials and top ministers. Indeed, the
Weberian model of a plebiscitary leadership not only restrains unscrupu-
lous politicians, but also limits the arbitrary use of bureaucratic power
(see Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 170–174; Colliot-Thélène, 198,
227–228). In sum, a state founded on the rule of law requires that any
agent entitled to make collectively binding decisions be held accountable
(Mulgan, 555).
Critics of the liberal theory of democracy emphasize open and public
deliberation as an additional ingredient of legitimate decision-making.
Thus, Habermas argues that in a democratic polity, decisions are con-
sidered legitimate only when made by processes that make them appear
as a result of public deliberation. The theory of deliberative democracy
presumes that legitimacy is produced by the justification of decisions
“through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens” (Cohen,
72). Such deliberation makes sure that political as well as bureaucratic
institutions are directly answerable to the public (Bohman, 54).
From a functionalist point of view, deliberation also assures public
acceptance of governmental programs. The theory of deliberative democ-
racy suggests that when citizens fail to feel that policy-relevant decisions
are the result of democratic deliberation, they are less inclined to accept
them. If political issues are extracted from democratic arenas, decisions
will be contested, eventually calling into question the very rules of deci-
sion-making (Habermas, 389). In other words, the more citizens regard
public policies as products of a deliberative process among equals rather
than as outcomes of sheer power relations, the more likely they accept
them. Citizens will tend to regard institutions as legitimate if “they estab-
lish the framework for free public deliberation” (Cohen, 72). Eder (5)
argues along similar lines by stressing the “expressive function” of delib-
erative modes of decision-making: they give citizens a feeling of well-
balanced and well-reflected decisions.
Deliberative theorists are obviously not so naïve as to consider that the
mere maximization of direct citizen involvement is sufficient for optimal
decision-making (Bohman, 242). Traditional accountability mechanisms
such as elections, by obliging rulers to provide reasons and plausible
justification for their policy choices to the public, contribute to fostering
deliberation between the rulers and the governed. These mechanisms also
induce citizens to deliberate among each other in order to judge the
responsiveness of the rulers. Debate among experts, too, can fulfill
the conditions of deliberation, provided these experts are accountable to
the bodies they represent and in effect to the public (Benz 1999, 10–11).
In light of these requirements, what is wrong with governance? In
short, we suggest that decision-making in self-governing networks of
governmental and nongovernmental actors may reduce deliberative legit-
imacy by fostering a technocratic and secluded style of decision-making,
which operates according to tacit and informal rules unfamiliar to out-
siders (see Bovens).5 By extracting decisions from traditional representa-
tive as well as deliberative arenas, governance may impede public debate.
These issues are to be understood in the broader context of expert
accountability, which was raised decades ago in work on technocratic
power, and which gained renewed interest as it appeared that experts
play a prominent role in “epistemic communities” (Haas) and “advocacy
coalitions” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith).
To be sure, policy networks can endow the rulers with resources and
connections to make reasoned judgments in the interest of the many
(Papadopoulos 2000). Indeed, this argument supports the quality of neo-
corporatist arrangements. However, even if members of policy networks
have the best of deliberative intentions, their decisions are usually
deemed to be made during secluded negotiations. This is the first premise
we set out to examine.
The existence of a public sphere and of public deliberation cannot be
measured and accounted for as directly as empirical policy analysis tends
to require. Instead, manifestations of a lack of public acceptance could be
used as an indicator for the loss of democratic accountability. Yet, high
public protest might on the contrary be an indicator that there is deliber-
ation and debate in the public sphere. Moreover, one should keep in mind
that sharp and clear disagreements often promote deliberation better than
premature attempts at reaching a consensus (Bohman, 56). This is why
we concentrate our empirical discussion on the first part of the delibera-
tive criticism, according to which decisions tend to be made behind closed
doors away from traditional representative arenas and public debate. To
do so we look at the composition of the governance schemes and their
link to political control and at the way in which the participants view
public debate in general and elected officials in particular.
Is There Evidence of a Loss of Deliberative Legitimacy?

One way to assess the accountability of governance structures is to
examine the composition of the coordination schemes under study, as the
most common way to ensure public debate and accountability is to have
elected officials participate. Elected officials are likely to bring contested
and politicized issues to the public’s attention, thus enhancing public
accountability of decisions. Table 1 shows that half of the coordination

schemes involve elected officials, mostly the head(s) of the municipal
and/or cantonal department(s)6 dealing with drug policy, who often chair
the coordination schemes. In three cases, they are officially represented
by chief staff members. It is also not unusual for chief staff members to
fill in if the department head is unavailable. In either case, elected offi-
cials play a central role. The other half of the coordination schemes are
restricted to professionals and civil servants, although elected officials
may participate occasionally. If we consider that all cities but one have at
least one coordination scheme that involves elected officials,7 there does
not seem to be a lack of deliberative legitimacy in drug matters.
However, while the presence of elected officials certainly increases the
likelihood that potentially contested issues may be subject to public delib-
eration, it does not ensure such deliberation, nor does their absence pre-
clude it. A second complementary indication of the deliberative quality
of governance structures can be obtained by evaluating how the partici-
pants in these structures view public debate. Do they acknowledge that
their decisions are subject to public debate, or do they contest that public
debate is one of their functions? Twelve of the sixty-one interviewees
questioned in Switzerland8 explicitly voice doubts about public debate,
most often arguing that public debate is a media- and party politics-
driven phenomenon. These interviewees consider public debate to be
detrimental to rational policy-making in the field of drug policy and view
the coordination schemes under examination as a means to prevent emo-
tional public conflicts. As one network manager puts it:
The problem with drug addiction—just as with other [value-driven] issues
of society—is how to organize public debate. Public debate is noisy. People
insult each other. This is not a debate that fosters civic instruction. (Network
manager)
Indeed, one of the objectives the federal government had in mind when
offering support to network-building and improved coordination in the
early 1990s was to limit public dispute by putting forward a pragmatic
approach based on trial and error where various pilot projects were sci-
entifically evaluated (Kübler 2000, 91–103). Administrators and experts
were called to debate the issues rationally, thereby acquiring the skills and
leadership necessary to tackle the situation at the time, which was char-
acterized by growing open drug scenes and increasing health hazards and
crime rates among addicts. By coordinating their actions, the stake-
holders hoped to perform better and thus convince the public of their
handling of the situation. The implicit assumption here is that efficiency
of public action would make public debate superfluous.
We regularly informed the public and the politicians. And we firmly claimed
leadership [in setting up harm-reduction facilities]. We were the bosses. We also
had the responsibility, and we would have been the ones in trouble if there had
been problems. We said, now we are the ones assigned to this and we are the
leaders. And we did not allow parties, nor anyone else, to tell us what to do.
We had the know-how that no one else had. We thought that if we did a rea-
sonably good job at solving the problems, we would also have public opinion
on our side. (Representative of a harm-reduction organization)
This view is prevalent among almost half of the stakeholders who talk
about the function of the coordination schemes, which thirty of the sixty-
one interviewees do. Thirteen of them state as the central purpose
increased efficiency, decreased politicization, or improved public rela-
tions. However, the fact that sixteen of them mention goals like conflict
resolution, mutual learning and understanding, and the development of
a common approach to drug issues shows that deliberation is at least as
important to them.
A third point of interest in assessing the deliberative legitimacy of the
described coordination schemes is their link with political control, which
we can assess based on objective information about the various coordi-
nation schemes gathered from documents and interviews (see Table 1).
Formally, none of the coordination schemes has a budget they can decide
upon, but eight of them, one way or the other, help the government decide
on the allocation of funds. They provide advice in that respect, which is
then submitted to the (cantonal or municipal) executive or to the parlia-
ment, and in some cases to a public referendum. Although the coordina-
tion schemes certainly play a significant role in setting funding priorities
and hence in orienting drug policy, the interviews provide little evidence
that representative bodies are bypassed. In accordance with this obser-
vation, all of the interviewees who mention political control—and forty-
seven do—state that their scope for action is limited either by the
executive or by the parliament.
We are not a counterpower. We have the power to suggest and the government
has the power to decide. And the government can choose to believe us or not
to believe us. (Network manager)
At the same time, one of the interviewees candidly suggests that, if the
participants did not feel that they could have a significant impact on the
policy, they would not participate:
Sensible people wouldn’t want to participate in such a commission if it were
just a debating club. . . . If the government were to systematically refuse our
suggestions and disregard our decisions, I think quite a few would already
have resigned. (Network manager)
This statement is supported by five other interviewees who speak of the
difficulty to sustain coordination if participants are motivated solely by
their devotion to the cause. Eventually, they will think of coordination as
a waste of time, they suggest, unless the participants draw some tangible
benefit from it.
A closer look at the way in which the stakeholders view their rela-
tionship with elected officials also reveals some legitimacy concerns. A
notable amount of participants in the coordination schemes are deeply
critical and suspicious of politicians, especially at the municipal level,
whom they consider to have little expertise on drug-related issues and to

be motivated primarily by electoral rationales. Twelve of the sixty-one
interviews contain at least one such reference. The following statement is
one of twenty-eight altogether along similar lines:
Politicians always look for simple solutions. Politicians are horrified by
complex problems such as drug policy, because it cannot be solved in the elec-
toral term of four years. I must say, I am quite happy that there are now these
various coordination schemes where things can be debated without politicians.
In the last eight years, drug policy has been misused by many politicians to
further their reelection. They all made statements on drug policy, whether they
understood something about it or not. (Member of the police force)
To assess the degree to which governance is subject to political control

in Switzerland, it also has to be put in perspective with the venues of
direct democratic participation, which is a crucial means to solicit public
debate over policy issues. Direct democratic participation is particularly
elaborate at the local level, where issues are often decided by so-called
financial referenda, which allow citizens to vote on expenditures exceed-
ing certain amounts (Linder). We received one indication from a stake-
holder that negotiations within governance structures helped them
design financial decisions such that a referendum could be prevented.
This was accomplished by subdividing the approval of a drug-related
project into several decisions such that none of them reached the refer-
endum threshold. However, Table 3 shows that referenda related to
drug policy continued to take place in the various cities. The fact that,
alongside the emerging governance structures, referenda on drug-
related matters were held throughout the 1990s (while none took place
TABLE 3
Local Referenda on Drug Policy Matters
Year Place Contested Project Implemented by Result
1990 City of Injection rooms Public administration Rejected

Zurich
1991 City of Injection rooms Nongovernmental Rejected
Saint Gall organization
1992 City of Injection rooms Nongovernmental Rejected
Lucerne organization
1994 Canton of Heroin maintenance Nongovernmental Accepted
Basle treatments organization
1996 City of Heroin maintenance Public administration Accepted
Zurich treatments
1997 City of Methadone Nongovernmental Accepted
Saint Gall maintenance organization
treatments
1998 City of Heroin maintenance Public administration Accepted
Zurich treatments
throughout the 1980s) is further evidence that public debate remained

unobstructed.
In cities where referenda on highly controversial issues were called for,
public debate on drug policy measures was intense. Not only political
parties and advocacy groups but also drug policy experts and agencies
were asked to justify their policy in public. Without our asking, five of
the interviewed civil servants, members of the police force, and service
providers mention quite naturally their involvement in public appear-
ances. This supports Bohman’s presumption that anyone with policy-
making power can be called to defend decisions in public. The Swiss
referendum process creates strong incentives even for administrative
decision-makers to justify their actions and to anticipate objections from
actors powerful enough to call for a referendum (Papadopoulos 2001b).
By doing so, the referendum process enhances the deliberative quality of
the decision and implementation process thus counterbalancing the
potential secludedness of governance structures.
In sum, although the interviews raise some doubts about the deliber-
ative quality of governance, we find little evidence that the governance
schemes under study systematically undermine the deliberative legiti-
macy of decisions. First of all, the mechanisms regularly involve decision-
makers who are accountable to the public. Second, the decisions made
within these schemes are consistently subject to political control, be it by
the executive or the legislative branch of the government. Third, the par-
ticipants seem to be devoted to coordination per se and do not explicitly
seek to influence politics.
The Participatory Criticism of Governance

Participation in itself is another crucial legitimizing element in democra-
tic political systems. Participation may enhance the legitimacy of deci-
sions by increasing democratic self-determination and by making an
output more “authentic” (Scharpf 1993). It prevents citizens from being
left out and imposed an unwanted decision. Rational choice proponents
stress that the more encompassing participation is, the lower the poten-
tial external costs inflicted on those who do not get to participate, and the
lower the risk of rent-seeking by a small number of insiders (Buchanan
and Tullock). From this point of view, participation is simply an efficient
way to reproduce as closely as possible the preferences of the citizens and
to avoid principal-agent problems.
The participatory theory of democracy also stresses the socio-
integrative function of participation, arguing that, by exercising political
rights, citizens develop their sense of community and fraternity (see
Pateman; Barber 1990). Political involvement educates citizens and pro-
motes their identification with the community, thus fostering their sense
of solidarity and building social capital (Putnam). It encourages citizens
to develop a feeling of “sameness” and prepares them to make sacrifices
for the whole of society. Direct democratic institutions in Switzerland,

which provide citizens with extensive rights to vote on issues at all levels
of government, are often advocated in these terms (Delley; Elazar).
There is also widespread concern, however, that unmediated citizen
participation might favor individualistic and particularistic requests
(Offe; Scharpf 1993, 26; 1999, 7–10). The call for direct forms of popular
participation and the norm of majority rule can inhibit either rational
deliberation (Fishkin) or the achievement of redistributive goals
(Majone). As well, the protection of minorities often depends on counter-
majoritarian devices and is not per se furthered by participatory means
such as initiatives and referenda (Gamble; Papadopoulos 2001a). In our
case, it has been argued that solidarity with marginalized groups such as
drug users has been attained precisely not by participatory (i.e., direct
democratic) means, but by bypassing the traditional democratic channels
(Papadopoulos 2001b). In fact, the most contested measures—setting up
injection rooms and prescribing heroin to drug users unwilling or unable
to quit—have been introduced on the basis of ad hoc legal expert
appraisals that allowed to avoid direct democratic obstacles.9 Once these
services had proven to be effective and beneficial for drug users, public
acceptance was easier to obtain. Minorities may be prejudiced by moral
rigorists, who tend to achieve their aims better by direct democratic
means than through traditional representative channels (see Kitschelt).
The siting of locally unwanted facilities like highways, railroads, nuclear
power plants, or waste disposals is also challenged by local “Nimbyists”
who do not accept a decrease in their quality of life, no matter how great
the collective (i.e., diffused) benefits of such facilities are (Mazmanian and
Morell). In sum, in line with a classic liberal interpretation of democracy,
participation becomes problematic if “factionalism” (to quote the related
Madisonian concept), narrow utilitarianism, or community-wide biases
and shared unreflective assumptions prevail (Bohman, 243), and if
decision-makers do not have the “moral resources” to look out for others
(Offe and Preuss).
Another objection against participatory democracy is that there are
inequalities in the capacities of citizens to voice their preferences. In her
study on town meetings, Mansbridge (1983) demonstrates that decisions
are primarily determined by the best integrated members of the commu-
nity, and that individuals undergo considerable social pressure when
asked to express their views. Sanders (1997) maintains that less-educated
groups lack the cultural resources to engage in deliberations and are as a
result unable to voice claims. Especially marginalized groups such as
drug addicts are likely to be left out of the decision process. This is why
even prominent participationist thinkers like Barber (1999) are not uncrit-
ically in favor of facilitators for participation such as Internet voting
systems, arguing that they are subject to voter manipulation. Budge (44)
argues that such concerns should be qualified given that parties act as
mediators in the participatory process. According to him, direct democ-
ratic institutions, as they exist in Switzerland, remain mediated by the

prevalent role of parties (Budge, 97–100, 119–124). Although this conclu-
sion is controversial in light of other research on Swiss voting behavior,10
mediating devices have to be taken into account when assessing partici-
patory quality of institutions.
How does governance fit into these participatory ideals and criticisms?
From a radical participationist point of view, governance is questionable
because it mainly relies on (often ad hoc) networks composed of leading
members of agencies and organizations rather than direct citizen partici-
pation. By limiting participation, mechanisms of governance may
decrease the socio-integrative potential of political institutions, thus
threatening social cohesion (Duran and Thoenig). Rose, for example,
points out that policy-making by mechanisms of governance, which tend
to conceive citizens as mere taxpayers and as (to be satisfied) consumers
of public services, diminishes the role of citizens as political subjects,
thereby undermining the identity of the community as a “collective
being.” In the name of increased output performance, governance does
not only limit direct citizen participation, but also runs the risk of banning
critical actors from the policy process, as one way to reduce decisional
transaction costs is obviously to diminish the number of participating
agencies and organizations. In doing so, the authenticity of decisions is
called into question.
The concerns voiced against participatory democracy shed a more dif-
ferentiated light on governance. Critics of radical participatory mecha-
nisms might indeed welcome the reflective and mediating function of
governance structures, by emphasizing its potential to build common
knowledge and to foster regard for those unwilling or unable to speak
up. By bringing together a wide range of agencies and organizations on
equal footage, the disparities between various groups in their ability to
voice requests can be equalized. Also, critics of participatory mechanisms
might welcome the exclusion of actors who seek rents and pursue par-
ticularistic goals. Yet, participationists might rebut by saying that gover-
nance mechanisms actually encourage rent-seeking: the more policy
networks are consolidated, the more they are subject to collusion among
their members and to the formation of distributive coalitions. These ten-
dencies are likely to encourage the capture of networks by particularistic
interests and the transfer of costs to actors and groups excluded from
them (Benz 1998, 206; Pierre and Peters, 20).
While it is not our goal here to argue one case or the other, we are able
to provide empirical evidence related to some of the basic assumptions
used in the argument. Namely, we can examine what strategies are
observed among relevant actors who are excluded from the various gov-
ernance schemes, and how their strategies affect the functioning of these
schemes. Vice versa, we can look for evidence of community-building
within the framework of such schemes.
Is There Evidence of a Loss of Participatory Legitimacy?
The participatory criticism of governance has to be examined in two

stages. First, it has to be established whether governance indeed entails a
loss of participation. Second, the question is to what extent this potential
loss actually reduces the democratic legitimacy of decisions in matters
of drug policy. In particular, does governance jeopardize community-
building and solidarity by limiting participatory access?
A closer look at the first question suggests that governance mecha-
nisms may indeed entail a loss of participatory legitimacy, at least when
considered from a radical participationist viewpoint. By favoring, as we
have argued above, the emergence of secluded spheres of decision-
making, governance potentially entails a decrease in direct citizen partic-
ipation. The fact that some stakeholders cherish governance precisely
because they believe them to reduce opposition from parties, voters, and
neighbors and to prevent referenda, which are particularly common in
Switzerland, is not a good omen for participatory citizen involvement
either. That they are not particularly successful in eluding public debates
over drug policy issues is no implicit guarantee that participatory princi-
ples are upheld. To draw more meaningful conclusions, we have to take
a closer look at the participatory dimension of the governance schemes
under study. We do so by examining the openness of the different coor-
dination schemes to individual and group participation and by evaluat-
ing the pluralistic quality of their representational scope.
It is striking to find that only two of the coordination schemes—the
Roundtable on Drug Policy in Basle and the St-Laurent Group in Lau-
sanne—allow for unmediated citizen participation. Even the Advisory
Committee, set up in Lausanne to advise the Cantonal Commission for
Prevention by giving it the broadest possible scope of input and count-
ing up to sixty participants, is not meant to provide access to indi-
viduals. The mechanisms implicitly or explicitly limit participation to
corporate actors and agencies. This observation is confirmed by the
involved actors themselves. While nine of the sixty-one interviewees
mention that governance mechanisms help to voice requests and opin-
ions that would otherwise not be taken into account, none of them state
citizen participation, other than through means of information and public
relations, as a goal. Rather, in line with their composition, governance
mechanisms are meant to allow for a fruitful exchange among experts and
stakeholders. Democratic legitimacy, understood here as authenticity,
need not be in jeopardy as a result, provided that participation is repre-
sentative and equitable in other respects. Therefore, a first indicator of the
participatory quality of governance mechanisms is to what extent rele-
vant actors are given access to them.
Only two participants in the case of Bern report that relevant groups
are not part of the coordination mechanisms. To the best of our ability, we
inquired about potential groups that remain, or chose to remain, excluded

in other cases as well. Bern seems to be the only case in that respect. A
number of voluntary groups that advocate a more liberal course in drug
policy and that provide food and emergency medical services in the
streets do not participate in the Bernese Drug Policy Task Force, despite
the stated purpose of the task force to get everyone around the table. The
accounts as to the reasons for this exclusion are contradictory. It seems to
be a result of both the unwillingness of officials to make concessions to
get them to the table and the unwillingness of the groups to participate
in actions that run counter to their libertarian views.11 This case is excep-
tional and cannot be taken as a sign of a generalized decline of partici-
patory legitimacy, all the more that the excluded groups were hardly more
included in earlier stages of the policy. The exclusion simply became more
flagrant in the light of the expressed intention of the task force to involve
all relevant actors.
More of a concern in terms of participatory legitimacy is our finding
that governance mechanisms may be subject to systematic representa-
tional biases. They arise from the fact that—as theories of associative
democracy would point out (e.g., Hirst)—drug policy deals with cate-
gories of citizens that are ill equipped to organize themselves and thus
notoriously underrepresented in networks among corporate actors. Thus,
from a participatory point of view, two categories are surprisingly absent
from the coordination schemes: the drug users themselves (including
their relatives) and those directly affected by the strategies adopted
toward drug users, especially the inhabitants located near areas of
drug dealing as well as those living near counseling and rehabilitation
facilities.
Of the thirteen interviewees who refer to the participation of these cat-
egories, ten speak of the involvement of inhabitants affected by drug-
related facilities and externalities. While they praise the formation of
neighborhood committees to monitor facilities and report problems, none
of them thinks that they should be involved in more permanent gover-
nance mechanisms. The reason for this reluctance is that the interviewees
view citizens who seek participation because they are affected as being
emotional, poorly informed, and thus unable to pursue the common
good. The three interviewees who bring up the participation of drug users
deplore their absence, stressing, however, that it is not a result of exclu-
sion but rather of their inability to organize themselves. In fact, in Bern,
Basle, and Geneva, such groups turned out to be very volatile.
A further concern about the participatory quality of governance mech-
anisms is that they usually involve a finite list of organizations. The drug
commissions in each case, except for those in Fribourg, are typically com-
posed of a set of designated representatives from the different agencies
and organizations, usually by attributing each sector a fraction of the
seats. Even in cases where participation is more open to new actors, the
coordination schemes tend to favor established organizations that receive
significant public funds. From the viewpoint of participatory democracy,

and to the extent that relevant decisions are debated and made in these
restricted circles, this bias constitutes a threat to the legitimacy and
authenticity of decisions. The interviewees do not recognize this as a
problem. Rather, they emphasize the need for stability and continuity of
the networks and their capacity to follow through with decisions they
make.
The Commission should not be too big. It should be composed of decision-
makers. It’s true that all relevant interests should be represented in the Com-
mission, but at the same time its composition should be such that the
participants are capable to make decisions and to follow them through once the
executive has approved of them. (Network manager)
Although this clearly technocratic statement is exceptionally blunt, in
regard to both the type of interests to be taken into account (namely the
strongest ones) and the type of decision-makers to be involved (namely
the most senior ones), it stands for two dozen others along similar lines.
To allow nevertheless for as large a scope for participation as possible,
some cities (most notably Lausanne and Zurich) have set up comple-
mentary forums in which participation is broader, yet still “by invitation
only.”
A final concern for participatory legitimacy is the openness of gover-
nance mechanisms in ideational terms. One of the very goals of setting
up the governance mechanisms under study starting in the early 1990s
was to form a large coalition around a pragmatic moderate approach to
drug-related matters and to isolate advocates of both radically liberal and
radically abstinence-oriented approaches. As effective as this strategy
may have been in addressing the distress of drug addicts, it remains ques-
tionable from a strict participationist viewpoint. Of the twenty-four inter-
viewees who speak of ideational pluralism within governance networks,
eleven report exclusionary tendencies. Most of these mentions are related
to the way in which the network of providers can be streamlined based
on subsidies. In order to assure funding, providers need to comply with
the now dominant harm reduction approach and have to tolerate a certain
amount of repression when it comes to open drug scenes. Organizations
with a left libertarian approach, a lot of which were very present in vol-
unteer work before the federal government stepped in, as well as those
oriented toward abstinence no longer fit into the picture. Some organiza-
tions chose to adapt; for example, there are mentions of cases in which
social workers were replaced by more moderate personnel as a result of
pressure from the government. Others chose to stick to their orientations
and instead rely on nongovernmental funding. The risk of collusion
between public agencies and private organizations, as some interviewees
point out, is also diminished by the fact that most providers operate as
associations or foundations. They are therefore not at the sole mercy of
the government and its funding requirements, but they also need to
remain responsive to their oversight organs and their members.
In sum, the first part of our investigation on the participatory legiti-

macy of governance mechanisms shows few signs of explicit exclusion
but a number of significant biases that jeopardize the authenticity of gov-
ernance mechanisms from a participatory point of view. However, these
shortcomings are not mentioned and recognized as such by the partici-
pants. Neither did we observe nor were we given indications of protests
against the selectivity of governance mechanisms. This is where our
second question becomes relevant: In line with our theoretical discussion,
the question is whether the described exclusionary tendencies and biases
per se undermine participatory legitimacy. Do the type of biases we
observe weaken participatory aims in terms of solidarity and community-
building, or are they, on the contrary, as some interviewees implicitly
suggest, necessary to achieve these very goals? In other words, those who
are excluded or biased against, may they be so in the interest of solidar-
ity and community-building?
As we pointed out, the radical quest for participation may have to be
mitigated in order to protect minorities and marginalized segments of the
population against the “tyranny of the majority.” Neighbors of drug-
related facilities are likely to be motivated by Nimbyism in their request
that drug addicts stay as far away from their neighborhood as possible.
Their participation is therefore not prone to further solidarity toward the
very groups they are trying to banish. The regular protests surrounding
the siting of counseling and treatment facilities in different cities indicate
that, had the neighbors been called to participate directly in the decision-
making process, it would have been more difficult to implement much
needed services for drug users (Kübler 1999). The increased output-
oriented involvement of the citizen consumer in designing public action
and services can be subject to the same pitfalls. Thus, continued com-
plaints against the presence of drug users in the Swiss urban setting, in
spite of significant improvements since the early 1990s according to all
statistical accounts, are another indication of how self-interested residents
and local businesses can be:
Citizens complained when we had real [open] drug scenes, when we had a big
dealer scene. And today we can say, we have it under control; today it is
absolutely not bad. But now they still holler! Today they perceive it in smaller
terms and say, you still don’t have it under control. (Police official)
This quote suggests that the police’s responsiveness to citizens simply

diminished their threshold of tolerance. Although the quote is not repre-
sentative of a general concern expressed by the interviewees, it points to
a problem that is theoretically relevant. Output-oriented participation,
which tends to take citizens for consumers (see Aberbach and Rockman),
can lead to a customer complaint attitude toward social problems and
eventually undermine solidarity.
The exclusion of drug users from the governance mechanisms under
study can be justified in similar terms. Since drug users are directly
affected by the policy, they are likely to disregard the common good and
to pursue particularistic interests. Drug addicts tend to put their depen-
dency first and to discount the neighbors’ requests against their presence.
Rather than turning them into more loyal citizens, as radical parti-
cipationists would hope, participation may simply make them more
demanding.
However, these claims are based on a rather narrow conception of par-
ticipation. Indeed, participation may also provide room for exchange,
mutual learning, and understanding that are likely to further solidarity
and community-building. Although we do not have the material to make
quasi-experimental claims in that respect, the cases of Basle and
Lausanne, where the existence of participatory bodies coincides with a
particularly integrative approach to drug addicts, tend to confirm this
statement. In the case of Lausanne, drug addicts regularly gather in the
very center of the inner-city pedestrian area, under the watchful eyes of
the police. In the early 1990s, strong protest from neighboring inhabitants
and businesses arose against what they believed was developing into an
open drug scene. The fact that the city government participated in meet-
ings and encouraged the opponents to formulate and discuss their
requests in an orderly, debate-like argued manner forced the neighbors
into organizing themselves. This again led to their search for potential
allies and thus to a strengthening of a more “rational” argumentation.
Indeed, who would want to support a group whose only objective is to
evict an obviously distressed population? Governance mechanisms thus
seem to foster professional and other forums, which in turn favor learn-
ing processes. Moreover, the fact that the opinion leaders were called to
participate and negotiate their case in front of other stakeholders helped
them differentiate their view of the drug problem as well as the drug
addicts. Last but not least, participants learn to recognize and differenti-
ate their interests; they understand that help may be more effective than
intransigence to get drug addicts off their doorsteps.
I remember one of the residents, who runs a furniture manufacture in the neigh-
borhood [and who used to head a violent group against drug addicts]. He told
me, I’ve learned something about drug addiction and drug addicts. He became
one of the most active advocates of harm reduction facilities. (Network
manager)
These two examples indicate that governance mechanisms may channel
the particularistic requests and create the preconditions for reasoned
and informed decisions that call for common sacrifices in favor of stig-
matized groups. Provided that they are sufficiently inclusive, governance
mechanisms enhance deliberative reflection and prevent participants
from acting without sufficient consideration of the consequences for
others.
In contrast, if we look at the second shortcoming we have established,
that is the alienation of radical groups on both sides of the drug-policy
spectrum, the assessment must be more critical. From a participatory
viewpoint, it cannot be legitimate to exclude or discourage actors simply

because they do not adhere to the dominant policy paradigm; nor can it
be the goal of participatory procedures to encourage the formation of a
common way of thinking. To the extent that we find these phenomena to
occur, they are disturbing from the point of view of participatory legiti-
macy. They are somewhat less so if we consider governance mechanisms
in the broader context of other participatory means that assure the authen-
ticity of decisions. Keeping in mind the limitations mentioned earlier,
such mechanisms are plentiful in the Swiss direct democratic system.
Hence, while continuing protest from both liberal and abstinence-
oriented advocates reveals exclusion, it also signals that the traditional
participatory means are working properly.
CONCLUSION
We set out to define and operationalize governance-induced problems of

democratic legitimacy. Although such problems have been raised previ-
ously, they have so far not been subject to a systematic empirical exami-
nation. Our aim was to develop and apply a set of indicators that may
inform us about the democratic quality of governance mechanisms. To do
so, we broke the potential criticisms against governance down into those
related to the deliberative quality and those related to the participatory
quality of decisions made within governance structures. The deliberative
criticism suggests that governance favors spheres of technocratic deci-
sion-making, thus posing a threat to the public legitimization of decisions.
The participatory criticism predicts that governance reduces citizen
involvement and eventually jeopardizes community-building and
solidarity.
Based on our research on Swiss drug policy, besides isolated hints
expressed by the interviewees, we find little evidence that governance
tends to uncouple political issues from traditional arenas of democratic
legitimization and from public debate. While it is true that governance
mechanisms call for secluded bilateral and multilateral negotiations, they
regularly involve decision-makers who are accountable to the public and
subject to parliamentary and/or executive control. Cases where these
mechanisms were used to circumvent traditional democratic institutions
are isolated. Moreover, the actors seem to be conscious and critical of their
relationship with elected officials and the public. They generally deny
being motivated by a political quest. Rather, they express the desire to
find better ways of operating and coordinating public action in drug-
related matters.
With respect to the second criticism, it has to be kept in mind that truly
participatory forums, that is forums in which unmediated citizen partic-
ipation is possible, are very rare in Swiss drug policy. This result is hardly
surprising given that the Swiss political system provides ample direct
democratic access to the decision process. Besides, very few policies expe-
rience unmediated forms of citizen participation. The governance struc-

tures typical of drug policy are designed to be accessible to a wide range
of private organizations and voluntary associations. While we found little
evidence for the exclusion of actors, we did find some inherent biases in
governance structures that call into question the authenticity of decisions
from a participatory perspective. Thus, those directly concerned with
drug policies, such as the addicts themselves, their families, as well as the
neighbors affected by drug-related facilities are only occasionally present.
We argue that these shortcomings are of little concern from the standpoint
of participatory legitimacy because they are not likely to hamper soli-
darity toward marginalized groups; indeed, in some cases facilitating it.
In contrast, we find the tendency of governance structures to exclude or
drive away more radical groups on either side of the policy spectrum
more disturbing. This selectivity, which is usually meant to divert con-
flict, poses a threat to the authenticity of decisions made within gover-
nance structures. However, if we keep in mind that governance structures
usually remain under the control of traditional democratic venues, this
shortcoming should be qualified as well.
The major findings can be summarized as follows. Our study shows,
first of all, that governance does not necessarily call into question repre-
sentative institutions, so long as it is somehow tied to traditional routines
of legitimization, such as the definition of political priorities by the
government, the parliamentary approval of the budget, and in the con-
text of Switzerland’s direct democratic institutions, the organization of
public referenda on fundamental questions. Second, it shows that the
added value of governance is, on the one hand, its (potential) ability to
mediate and overcome particularistic interests and enhance solidarity
and community-building, and, on the other hand, to provide forums of
exchange and mutual learning. Both these elements turn out to be crucial
in drug policy, where not only the principles of solidarity vis-à-vis a mar-
ginalized population but also the appropriate responses to the social
reintegration of that population are contested. From this perspective, gov-
ernance could provide a deliberative way around the “tyranny” of a pos-
sibly selfish majority and thus offer an answer to the dilemma between
majoritarian decisions and concerns of solidarity. Hence, to the extent that
democratic shortcomings arise from governance structures, they should
be weighed against gains in terms of collective well-being as a result
of the tendency of governance structures to tame particularistic requests
by creating forums of exchange and mutual learning. However, these
gains depend on the ability of governance structures to reproduce
societal pluralism and to bring controversial policy issues to the public’s
attention. Crucial in that respect is that governance structures be
complementary to the traditional representative and participatory mech-
anisms. If that is the case, governance may help respond to shortcomings
of both representative and participatory democracy. It may also open
up standard administrative procedures, which are often just as prone to
the democratic pitfalls examined in this article (see Gaudin 1999, 79–80;
Hunold).
To be sure, these overall encouraging conclusions do not simply
dismiss the various criticisms formulated against governance structures.
Rather, they should be understood as providing conditions under which
governance structures can operate within the boundaries of deliberative
and participatory democracy, or even further it. The conditions under
which governance mechanisms can operate legitimately, although their
claims are to some extent universal across western societies, are likely to
be dependent on the democratic institutions of a country. The particularly
deliberative and participatory setting of Swiss direct democracy may
simply provide sufficient safeguards against the potential democratic
drawbacks of governance mechanisms. It remains to be shown to what
extent other institutional contexts provide similarly robust conditions.
Comparative cross-country research should be encouraged to investigate
this question.
In addition, further research should include other policy areas. We
believe that drug policy, as an area that is subject to a mix of value-driven
as well as operational decisions, provides ample room for governance
mechanisms to come into play without extracting fundamental questions
from the public sphere. Drug policy is likely to remain under the scrutiny
of popular and representative control when it comes to deciding on fun-
damental questions, no matter how decisions are made. Does the same
hold for other less value-driven policy areas? Our conclusions may not
apply to the same extent to policy areas such as tax and fiscal policy, in
which fundamental questions come disguised as operational decisions in
need of deliberation among experts. On the other side of the spectrum,
our results may also be of limited relevance in strongly value-laden areas
such as the pursuit of nuclear energy, the regulation of abortion, or the
administration of the death penalty. We demonstrated that governance
helps actors to overcome purely emotional and ideological arguments
(Drug addicts should all be locked up and forced into treatment!) by
teaching them to recognize their interests (Help and assistance may be
more effective in reducing drug-related crime and nuisances!). In the end,
it may not matter whether learning is due to increased solidarity or just
to an uncovering of interests. However, certain value-laden issues may
call for genuine solidarity and community-building. As work on media-
tion and negotiated agreements has shown, in some cases there may
simply be no room for “strategic learning.”
While much remains to be investigated about the consequences of gov-
ernance structures on the democratic quality of decisions, this article pro-
vides empirically grounded responses to a number of questions that have
been raised only as tentative conclusions or in footnotes. We hope that
the framework provided may prove to be useful in debating legitimacy
and accountability issues related to “governance,” “networks,” or “part-
nerships” and in accomplishing further research on the subject.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their critical
remarks and helpful suggestions. Special thanks go to Patrick Le Galès
and to the participants of the International Conference on Public Partici-
pation and Innovations in Community Governance held at the Univer-
sity of Luton, Great Britain, 24–26 June, 1999. The authors also thank the
Swiss National Science Foundation for having provided financial support
for this research.
NOTES
1. We focus in this article mainly on the limits of governance to direct citizen

involvement, which is not a criticism commonly addressed in the literature.
Another, but related, avenue of criticisms can be pursued based on theories
of associational democracy (see Wälti and Kübler).
2. The research was made possible thanks to the priority program Switzerland
towards the Future of the Swiss National Science Foundation (research title:
Conflits et gouvernance—nouvelles médiations politiques et territoriales dans les
agglomérations urbaines; grant number: 5004-047870).
3. The term “Steuerung” is sometimes used, but mainly among academics. It
has a different meaning, namely referring to “a conceptual or theoretical
representation of co-ordination of social systems” (Pierre, 3).
4. This program allows, among other features, to code text by attributing (in
our case predefined) codes to relevant text segments. The interviews may
be obtained from the authors for the purpose of cross-examination.
5. Scharpf (1993, 35–36; 1999) applies this argument also to interlocked rela-
tions and the decision-making process among governments or public
administrations of different (state as well as supranational) levels, which
may weaken the parliamentary arena at all levels and reduce the level of
public debate and democratic self-determination.
6. In Switzerland, executive bodies at the cantonal and local level are com-
posed of about five to nine “cabinet members” elected directly by the voters
in a first-past-the-pole system, usually for a four-year term.
7. In the case of Fribourg, the head of the health department does occasion-
ally participate but leaves the commission with a large leeway.
8. When ratios are provided hereafter, they are in reference to the sixty-one
interviews conducted in Switzerland.
9. Thus, the federal government made extensive use of its powers in matters
related to research and to combating epidemics. By declaring heroin and
other drug prescriptions a scientific experiment, it could circumvent parts
of the legislative process. Remaining decisions were achieved by a so-called
“urgent decree,” which allows the federal government to take action
without parliamentary approval, even if its decisions run counter to the
Constitution, so long as a referendum is held if the decree is to exceed one
year.
10. According to opinion polls regularly conducted following national refer-
enda (Vox Analysis by GfS), no more than half of the voters who identify
with a party, which less than 50 percent do, know their party’s voting
recommendations; and barely 12 percent of the interviewees consider these
recommendations to be the determinant of their vote (Kriesi, 67). It is also
worth noting that, between 1970 and 1995, populist and traditionalist
factions successfully vetoed 25 percent of the parliamentary legislation
subject to a referendum, despite its endorsement by the major governmen-

tal parties, which regularly receive about 75 percent of the vote in federal
elections (Papadopoulos 1997, 55).
11. The Drug Task Force was set up in 1997 in response to public requests to
combat loitering of neglected drug users in the shopping streets of the inner-
city. Police action that resulted from the joint discussions among the police,
social services, and some private service providers involved taking in drug
users for questioning and forcing them into counseling or treatment.
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How Democratic Is “Governance”?

Public action increasingly takes place in self-organizing networks that are

“Governance,” “networks,” and “partnerships” are widely used concepts

tion—by the center-left governments elected in the 1990s in both Europe

GOVERNANCE IN DRUG POLICY IN SWITZERLAND

charity organizations. Cooperation was also needed to legitimize an inno-

1. Drug commissions are appointed by the government and composed

Name of Governance Level Composition Head Function and Authority

Name of Governance Level Composition Head Function and Authority

the Mayor’s Office) health care, police

cases. Indeed, similar patterns can also be observed in other European

The questions discussed in this article are based on research on drug

Case Number of Participation Territorial Level

Amsterdam, Glasgow, and Frankfurt. The core analysis is based on a sys-

Sector Type of Actor

Health Social Police Network Administration Non- Politician

an introductory statement about the scope of our research, which we

THE DEMOCRATIC CONTENT OF GOVERNANCE: TWO MAIN CRITICISMS

The Deliberative Criticism of Governance

Is There Evidence of a Loss of Deliberative Legitimacy?

accountability of decisions. Table 1 shows that half of the coordination

whom they consider to have little expertise on drug-related issues and to

To assess the degree to which governance is subject to political control

Year Place Contested Project Implemented by Result

1990 City of Injection rooms Public administration Rejected

throughout the 1980s) is further evidence that public debate remained

The Participatory Criticism of Governance

for the whole of society. Direct democratic institutions in Switzerland,

ratic institutions, as they exist in Switzerland, remain mediated by the

Is There Evidence of a Loss of Participatory Legitimacy?

The participatory criticism of governance has to be examined in two

inquired about potential groups that remain, or chose to remain, excluded

significant public funds. From the viewpoint of participatory democracy,

In sum, the first part of our investigation on the participatory legiti-

This quote suggests that the police’s responsiveness to citizens simply

viewpoint, it cannot be legitimate to exclude or discourage actors simply

We set out to define and operationalize governance-induced problems of

rience unmediated forms of citizen participation. The governance struc-

1. We focus in this article mainly on the limits of governance to direct citizen

subject to a referendum, despite its endorsement by the major governmen-

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