Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jeremy Paradise V Andrew Paradise
Jeremy Paradise V Andrew Paradise
Transaction ID 66546056
Case No. 2021-0354-
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Andrew Paradise Dynasty Trust (“Andrew’s Trust,” together, the “Trusts”), and
INTRODUCTION
1. This action seeks the reformation of The Jeremy Paradise Dynasty
was deceptively altered by Jeremy’s own attorneys during the drafting process to
remove the power to control Jeremy’s Trust from Jeremy and provide it to his
brother, Andrew Paradise (“Andrew”). This action also seeks an accounting of the
1
All terms that are capitalized but not defined herein shall have the meaning
ascribed to them in the Trust Agreements.
2
A copy of Jeremy’s Trust Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. A copy of
The Andrew Paradise Dynasty Trust Agreement (“Andrew’s Trust Agreement”) is
attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
assets of both Trusts, and the removal of conflicted Trust fiduciaries, including
direction to ensure that Andrew alone could control the Trusts and the considerable
company that Andrew founded following the vision of his brother, Jeremy.
monetize skill-based video games. With Jeremy’s consent, Andrew took the idea
and founded a company called Skillz, Inc. (“Skillz” or “the Company”), a mobile-
based eSports company that is now publicly traded and worth over $6 billion.
Over time, as the founder and CEO, Andrew has acquired more than 68 million
with his Skillz shares now worth an estimated $1 billion. Indeed, Andrew recently
cashed in approximately 8.4 million Skillz shares in exchange for more than $195
million.
satisfy his desire for control over his brother’s life and assets. In late 2018, while
the stock was privately traded, Andrew saw an opportunity to land a well-respected
global investment fund as a new investor and needed current investors to sell their
2
stock. Andrew approached Jeremy with a proposal to sell some of Jeremy’s Skillz
shares in a private placement to the fund. At the same time, Andrew also
expressed purported concerns that Jeremy had not engaged in estate planning with
Skillz stock if Jeremy agreed to put his remaining Skillz shares in a trust for
“protection.”
which Jeremy would put his remaining 3 million shares of Skillz stock into a trust
controlled by Jeremy for the benefit of the brothers’ future children and mother for
the purported purpose of creating a tax-efficient estate plan. At the same time,
Andrew agreed to create his own trust and fund it with an identical amount of stock
for Jeremy’s benefit, so that Jeremy could continue to maintain his standard of
living notwithstanding the transfer of a significant portion of his net worth into an
6. The brothers retained the law firm Mintz to prepare the necessary
documents, and agreed that the Trust Protector for both Trusts would be their
longtime friend, confidant and attorney, John Pomerance, also a partner at Mintz.
The Trust Protector occupies a critical position at the Trusts due to his significant
powers under the Trust Agreements, including the power, subject to certain
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restrictions, to remove and replace the Trust’s Trustee, Investment Direction
Adviser and Distribution Adviser, and the power to appoint additional or successor
Jeremy, Jeremy’s lawyers at Mintz instructed their Delaware counsel to switch the
order of language that provided that Jeremy, in the first instance, and then Andrew,
could remove and replace the Trust Protector for Jeremy’s Trust, to new language
providing that Andrew, in the first instance, and then Jeremy, could remove and
mentioned other modifications made to the prior draft (such as the addition of J.P.
Morgan as Trustee), Mintz said nothing about the change regarding Jeremy’s
power to remove the Trust Protector. Despite receiving the draft, and having
9. Worse, Mintz implied that Jeremy still retained power over the
Trust Protector, and removed Jeremy from later emails with Andrew in which the
4
lawyers subsequently discussed the change to Jeremy’s Trust Agreement that
the brothers’ lawyers at Mintz ensured that the erroneous language remained in the
draft until executed by Jeremy, who was unaware of the change. Had he been
aware of this material change, Jeremy never would have executed the Trust
Agreement.
Andrew’s and Mintz’s misconduct led Jeremy into a unilateral mistake as to his
own trust, stripping him of power over the tens of millions of dollars of stock that
he contributed for the benefit of his children and mother. Indeed, by the critical
appoint and remove the fiduciaries that control all of the operations of Jeremy’s
12. Andrew implemented the next step in his scheme following the
merger with a special purpose acquisition company (or “SPAC”) that greatly
Andrew’s employees to all of the fiduciary positions at the Trusts, including Casey
Chafkin, Skillz Chief Revenue Officer, and Charlotte Edelman, Skillz Vice
5
President of Legal, and also a former subordinate of Mr. Pomerance at Mintz. As
Advisers, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman, together with Mr. Pomerance, had full
14. Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are plainly unfit to serve as
fiduciaries for the Trusts. In addition to being Andrew’s employees, both hold
12,600,294 shares. As Investment Advisers, they are required to make – and have
made – investment decisions over the shares of Skillz held by the Trusts that may
undermine their ability to sell their own personal shares, or those held by their
Advisers. Mr. Pomerance never sought, let alone obtained, Jeremy’s consent. In
Pomerance’s appointments of Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman breach the Trust
6
16. In January 2021, Jeremy learned of the appointments and
discovered the grave mistake in his Trust Agreement. Jeremy objected to the
appointments, and reached out to Andrew, Mr. Pomerance and his attorneys at
Mintz, in the hope that they would correct the erroneous language in the Trust
17. Mr. Pomerance told Jeremy that he was unable to act without
Andrew’s direction, and that Andrew had threatened to sue him if he resigned from
his fiduciary positions at the Trusts. Mr. Pomerance’s flouting of his fiduciary and
willful misconduct.
18. Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman, too, have refused to resign,
their disabling conflicts of interest. Their refusal to honor the Trust Agreements
19. Moreover, Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman failed to
comply with their fiduciary duty of candor. Jeremy requested an accounting of the
Trusts. This request, too, was not complied with. Rather, on April 3, 2021,
counsel for Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman provided Jeremy with
bare bones statements dated as of March 23, 2021. However, even this simple
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request led to more deception, as Jeremy subsequently learned through his own
investigation that Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman caused the Trusts
to sell 169,087 shares of Skillz stock on or about March 24, 2021 in connection
statements dated one day before the March 24 stock sales. Indeed, the fiduciaries
still have not informed Jeremy of the Trusts’ sale of millions of dollars of shares,
or even the Trusts’ ability to sell shares (which were subject to a lockup that
20. At the same time, each of the fiduciaries engaged in their own
significant sales of stock, including 1,673,599 shares worth $39 million by Mr.
Chafkin, 32,745 shares worth $764,000 by Mr. Pomerance and 30,340 shares
worth $708,000 by Ms. Edelman. The fiduciaries engaged in these personal stock
sales notwithstanding the possibility that the Company and its underwriter could
have limited the total number of stock sales by all existing stockholders, including
the Trusts, in connection with the offering. Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin and Ms.
Edelman’s decision to sell their own stock as part of the same offering thus raises a
they put their own interests ahead of those of the Trusts to which they owe
8
21. For its part, Mintz has taken the risible position that Jeremy was
never its client, which is belied by hundreds of emails and text messages between
unequivocally refer to Jeremy as its “client.” It is apparent that Mintz put the
interests of the more “important” and wealthier client first, by carrying out the
company, Skillz, which also is a Mintz client – without regard for the wellbeing
and to the detriment of its other client, Jeremy. In the process, Mintz breached
Andrew now exercises total control over the Trusts, an untenable structure that
fiduciaries are beholden to Andrew and are serving his interests, and not the
reform his Trust Agreement to reflect Jeremy’s intent that he would have the
power to remove and replace the Trust Protector for Jeremy’s Trust, and to remove
all of the invalid and conflicted fiduciaries appointed to both Trusts. In addition,
9
Jeremy seeks an accounting for the Trusts, which he has requested and the
Jeremy’s children and their descendants, and Andrew’s children and their
descendants. Currently, Jeremy has one young child, Lucas, and his wife is
pregnant with their second child. Andrew does not have any children.
Andrew’s trust are Jeremy, Jeremy’s children and their descendants, and Andrew’s
26. Pursuant to Article 20 of both Trusts, both Jeremy and Andrew are
Delaware.
Article 12(a) appoints Mr. Pomerance as the initial Trust Protector of the Trusts.
Mr. Pomerance continues to serve as Trust Protector for each of the Trusts.
10
29. On January 22, 2021, Mr. Pomerance purported to appoint Mr.
Chafkin and Ms. Edelman as additional Trust Protectors for each of the Trusts.3
Adviser. Article 10(a) of the Trusts appoints Mr. Pomerance as the initial
Chafkin and Ms. Edelman as additional Investment Direction Advisers for each of
the Trusts.
Article 11(a) of the Trusts appoints Mr. Pomerance as the initial Distribution
the Trusts.
Chafkin and Ms. Edelman as additional Distribution Advisers for each of the
Trusts.
3
The Notices of Appointment, attached hereto as Exhibit 3 (regarding Jeremy’s
Trust) and Exhibit 4 (regarding Andrew’s Trust) do not clearly indicate that Mr.
Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are to be appointed to the position of Trust Protector
over the Trusts; however, the purported “acceptances” they signed indicate that
they intend to assume this position as well.
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SITUS, GOVERNING LAW, AND JURISDICTION
34. Article 21 of the Trusts provides that the Trusts are Delaware trusts
[Delaware] or a corporation or other entity having an office for the conduct of trust
business in [Delaware].”
[Delaware][.]”
38. Accordingly, the situs of the Trusts is Delaware and Delaware law
FACTS
A. Jeremy and Andrew Found Skillz
39. In or around 2009, Jeremy conceived of the idea of a company that
user experience.
40. Jeremy shared his idea with Andrew, who decided to move forward
with the venture. The two brothers frequently discussed many aspects of how to
12
build and run the business, and Andrew frequently sought Jeremy’s advice on
exchange for providing the concept of the business model to Andrew, Jeremy
received 5% of the founding equity in the company that ultimately became Skillz.
41. Armed with Jeremy’s vision, Andrew founded Skillz with Mr.
Chafkin in 2012.
Francisco, California, has become a leading mobile games platform that allows
merging with a SPAC. Skillz trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the
ticker symbol SKLZ and currently has a market capitalization over $6 billion.
million of Jeremy’s Skillz shares. Andrew wanted to facilitate the sale to allow an
13
45. As part of these discussions, Andrew expressed purported concerns
that Jeremy had not undertaken any estate planning with respect to his Skillz stock,
including concerns that Jeremy had not entered into a prenuptial agreement.
Andrew suggested that Jeremy put his Skillz stock in a trust for the benefit of his
then-unborn child and have the trust sell some of the Skillz stock and use the
the discussions, however, Jeremy made clear to Andrew that Jeremy would need to
have control over the investments made by his trust. This intent is reflected in a
December 12, 2018 email from Andrew to Jeremy outlining the terms of a trust for
47. In this December 12, 2018 email, with the subject line “Trust
Jeremy would put all of his Skillz stock into a trust, with his
4
A copy of the December 12, 2018 email re: Trust terms is attached hereto as
Exhibit 5.
14
The trust would sell $2 million of Skillz stock, with $1.6
48. Andrew confirmed that the brothers had this same understanding on
February 19, 2019, when Andrew forwarded the email to Jeremy and wrote that he
lined up.”5
Pomerance, for legal advice in connection with setting up Jeremy’s trust. Andrew
forwarded his “Trust terms” email to Mr. Pomerance, and made clear that the
5
A copy of the February 19, 2019 email re: Trust terms is attached hereto as
Exhibit 6.
15
50. Mr. Pomerance responded, “we will have to set up as a new client,”
and referred the brothers to Kurt Steinkrauss, a partner at Mintz who handles trusts
and estates matters.6 Mintz failed to send the brothers an engagement letter.
arrangement, at no point in the many communications that followed over the next
five months did Mintz indicate that it considered the attorney-client relationship to
reside solely with Andrew, and not Jeremy. Indeed, such a representation would
51. Mr. Steinkrauss reviewed the “Trust terms” that Andrew and
Jeremy had agreed to. However, Mr. Steinkrauss explained that it would not be
advisable for Jeremy to create a trust of which Jeremy was also a beneficiary.
Andrew then suggested that the brothers set up two trusts: one trust that would
hold Jeremy’s Skillz stock for the benefit of their mother and Jeremy’s children,
and another trust with an equal amount of Skillz stock that Andrew would provide
from his account for the benefit of Jeremy. As Jeremy understood the
arrangement, Jeremy would give up his Skillz stock for the benefit of their mother
6
A copy of this December 17, 2018 email correspondence with Andrew, Jeremy,
and Mr. Pomerance discussing the trusts is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
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and Jeremy’s son, in return for an equal amount of Skillz stock for Jeremy’s own
benefit.
sound estate planning, while still obtaining steady income from Skillz stock in
Andrew’s Trust. Andrew, in turn, would realize significant tax benefits to assist
his estate planning while providing for their mother and children.
to establish two trusts, with (1) Jeremy’s Trust holding the entirety of Jeremy’s
holdings in Skillz for the benefit of Jeremy’s and Andrew’s descendants and their
mother, and managed by Jeremy, and (2) Andrew’s Trust holding an equal amount
of Andrew’s stock, for the benefit of Jeremy, their descendants, and their mother,
54. Mr. Steinkrauss recommended that Jeremy and Andrew also engage
engagement letter with Gordon Fournaris copied Mr. Steinkrauss, and attorneys at
Gordon Fournaris routinely copied and looked to Mintz for direction with respect
17
D. Gordon Fournaris Outlines The Proposed Trusts,
Including Providing Jeremy With The Power Over His Trust
56. On March 6, 2019, Michael Gordon of Gordon Fournaris sent
57. The outlines explained that the Trusts would be “directed” trusts;
that is, they are trusts that, in addition to a Trustee, have fiduciaries with the power
would be provided with expansive and sole authority over investment decisions for
the Trusts. In this regard, Article 10 of the executed Trust Agreements provides
the Investment Direction Advisers with the “full power to direct the Trustee as to
the investments of the Trust.” The Trust Agreements further provide that the
Investment Direction Advisers have “the power to direct the Trustee to purchase,
sell and retain all of the Trust assets[.]” The Trustee is obligated to “follow the
direction of the Investment Direction Adviser with respect to all matters relating to
similarly provided with broad and sole authority over distribution decisions for the
7
A copy of the March 6, 2019 outline for Jeremy’s Trust is attached hereto as
Exhibit 8.
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Trusts. Article 11(b) of the executed Trust Agreements provides the Distribution
Advisers with “the full power to direct the Trustee to distribute income and
principal of the Trust[.]” Article 2(b)(2) further provides that the Distribution
Advisers have “sole and absolute discretion” to direct the Trustee to distribute “all,
some or none of the net income and principal of the Trust estate” to the
beneficiaries prior to a division of the Trust. Pursuant to Article 11(b), the Trustee
is obligated to “follow the direction of the Distribution Adviser with respect to all
60. The outlines further explained that the Trust Protector would be
endowed with the power to, subject to certain consent rights and other contractual
Advisers. The Trust Protector would also have the power to make certain
reasons.
61. Accordingly, the power to remove and replace the Trust Protector
provides the power to effectively control the Trust. It was critical to Jeremy that
he have the power to remove and replace the Trust Protector of his Trust, and thus
62. Notably, the outlines made clear that Mr. Gordon “typically
provides in [his] trusts that the grantor, while living and competent, followed by
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the beneficiaries of the trust have the authority to remove and replace the Trust
Protector.”
63. Gordon Fournaris discussed the concept and role of the Trust
point in time did Jeremy instruct Gordon Fournaris (or anyone else) to alter the
“typical” arrangement that Jeremy, as Grantor for his Trust, would have the power
Agreements.
dated March 11, 2019, confirm that Gordon Fournaris understood Jeremy’s intent
was to personally maintain control over his trust, including the power to remove
and replace the Trust Protector. The notes state, in relevant part, “R+R (1) Grantor
66. Gordon Fournaris circulated the first draft of the Trust Agreements
on March 14, 2019 to Jeremy and Andrew. This draft of Jeremy’s Trust
Agreement accurately reflected Jeremy’s intent that he would have the power to
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remove and replace the Trust Protector, followed by his brother in the event of his
death or incapacity.8
“Removal of Trust Protector,” provided the order of individuals with “the power to
remove any Trust Protector” as “1. The Grantor, while living and competent;
Andrew, and then Jeremy, with the power to remove and replace the Trust
Jeremy’s Trust Agreement, providing Andrew with the power to remove the Trust
Protector in the first instance, and critically, removing such power from Jeremy.
Mintz gave this instruction without any direction or prior discussion with Jeremy.
Indeed, it contradicted the arrangement Jeremy had made with Andrew, Jeremy’s
express instructions to Mintz and Gordon Fournaris, and the Gordon Fournaris
8
A copy of the March 14, 2019 Draft of Jeremy’s Trust Agreement is attached
hereto as Exhibit 9.
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70. Contemporaneous notes taken by the Gordon Fournaris attorney
confirm the instruction provided by Ms. Glover: “Both Trusts --> Andrew has
71. This instruction was the first time, to Jeremy’s knowledge (though
not at the time), that anyone had suggested that Andrew, and not Jeremy, would
73. Mintz delivered this instruction at the behest of Andrew, and not
Jeremy. But on the mistaken belief that Mintz was accurately conveying the
agreement, which now provided the order as “1. The Grantor’s Brother, while
living and competent; thereafter 2. The Grantor, while living and competent[.]”
74. On March 20, 2019, Ms. Glover sent an email to Jeremy and
Andrew attaching the updated draft and redline of Jeremy’s Trust. Notably, Ms.
Glover did not include Jeremy’s Delaware counsel on this email, notwithstanding
her knowledge that Jeremy was represented by Gordon Fournaris and Mintz’s
9
A copy of Ms. Glover’s March 20, 2019 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.
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75. In this email, Ms. Glover, while commenting on potential tax
inexplicably failed to note the key change to Jeremy’s Trust Agreement that
stripped Jeremy of his power to remove and replace the Trust Protector and gave
that power to Andrew. Though a recipient of the email, Andrew also did not
inform Jeremy of the material change to Jeremy’s Trust Agreement that was
76. Worse, despite the material change she had just implemented, Ms.
Glover implied that Jeremy had the power to remove and replace the Trust
Protector under the Agreement. In this regard, Ms. Glover wrote: “the trust
77. By their silence and misdirection, Andrew and the brothers’ agents
at Mintz ensured that the language would remain in the draft agreement, unnoticed
they exchanged with Jeremy over the next 34 days leading to the document’s
execution.
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79. During this period, Jeremy was preoccupied with the birth of his
first child. Jeremy’s wife’s due date was the first week of April 2019. More than
ever, Jeremy needed and relied on his brother, Andrew. On April 2, 2019, the
material change that the lawyers had made to Jeremy’s Trust Agreement.
81. Moreover, Mintz took steps to ensure that Jeremy was kept unaware
Fournaris, jointly sent Andrew and Jeremy copies of the Trust Agreements for
execution. Ms. Hutchinson also copied Mr. Steinkrauss and Ms. Glover on the
email. On April 22, 2019, Mr. Steinkrauss responded to Ms. Hutchinson’s email,
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removing Jeremy (but not Andrew) from the email chain. Mr. Steinkrauss asked
to “confirm a few items” – namely that Andrew was to have sole control of his
trust and that Andrew and Jeremy were to have “joint control” over Jeremy’s trust.
He further stated that “once those are confirmed or updated, the documents can be
executed.”
83. The following day, April 23, 2019, Daniel Hayward of Gordon
84. Mr. Steinkrauss responded a few hours later, stating that “Andrew
is fine the way it is. They are going to sign today. We will get the documents back
to you.” 10
85. Mintz did not undertake any steps to understand whether providing
Andrew with control over Jeremy’s Trust somehow accorded with Jeremy’s intent.
Mintz did not ask him. And because Jeremy had been removed from the email
chain by Mr. Steinkrauss, Jeremy never saw this critical exchange, and was
10
A copy of this April 22-23, 2019 email correspondence between Mintz and
Gordon Fournaris is attached as Exhibit 11.
25
deprived of the opportunity to respond to the Gordon Fournaris lawyer’s query to
Mr. Pomerance insisted that Jeremy come into Mintz’s office in Boston,
88. In or about late May 2019, Jeremy entered into a stock purchase
agreement with Andrew and three other Skillz stockholders to sell a total of 3
million shares to the global investment fund. Pursuant to this agreement, Jeremy
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H. Andrew Continues to Mislead Jeremy After the Trust Agreement
Are Executed
89. After Andrew and Jeremy executed the Trust Agreements, Andrew
continued to mislead Jeremy about how the trusts operated. In June 2019, Jeremy
texted Andrew seeking clarity about the assets in the trusts, asking the following:
90. In this exchange, Andrew falsely assured Jeremy that Jeremy is the
only beneficiary of Andrew’s Trust and promised him that Jeremy could rely on
Andrew to treat Jeremy fairly. Andrew did not inform Jeremy that, at his direction,
the brothers’ lawyers had altered Jeremy’s Trust Agreement so that Andrew, and
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91. As this exchange also reflects, Andrew initially led Jeremy to
believe that the Trusts would be funded equally, when in fact, Andrew’s Trust (of
which Jeremy is a beneficiary) was funded with fewer shares than the Trust Jeremy
had funded.
Trust, and Andrew’s Trust, entered into an Investors’ Rights Agreement dated
or transfer shares of common stock in the merged company for a period of two
years following the closing of the merger, subject to certain permitted transfers.11
11
A copy of the September 1, 2020 Investors’ Rights Agreement is attached hereto
as Exhibit 12.
28
95. The permitted transfers include several ways the Trusts can transfer
their Skillz stock within the two-year period. For example, there is a “piggyback
quarterly releases of 1.5 million shares held by the Trusts commencing 180 days
96. On December 16, 2020, Skillz and the Flying Eagle Acquisition
Corporation completed the merger. As part of the merger, Jeremy’s Trust received
approximately 0.7477 shares of the newly merged company (“New Skillz”) for
each share of the original company it held at the time – or 1,791,805 shares of New
appointment of fiduciaries that are intended to provide Jeremy with control and
regard, Article 10(k) provides, “while the Grantor is living and competent, the
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Trust Protector must obtain the prior written consent of the Grantor to appoint
Trust Protectors, that are “a related or subordinate party to the Grantor or any
beneficiary of this Trust under Section 672(c) of the [Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended] (the “Code”).” Section 672(c) of the Code, in turn, defines “a
grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control; a
appointed two Skillz insiders, Mr. Chafkin (Skillz Chief Revenue Officer and
member of the Board of Directors) and Ms. Edelman (Skillz Vice President of
Protectors, of both Trusts. Mr. Pomerance made these critical appointments at the
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102. Jeremy never consented, nor was asked to consent, and never
ratified the appointments of Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman as Investment Direction
including by sending a text to Mr. Pomerance on March 18, 2021: “[Ms. Edelman]
is not a valid trustee.” Mr. Pomerance had no defense for his misconduct,
2021, stating, “I never agreed or was asked to appoint these people to the trust.”
104. On January 25, 2021, Jeremy sent another text message to Andrew,
asking him to “[h]onor the deal” they had agreed to and “remove Charlotte and KC
Investment Direction Advisers for Jeremy’s Trust are invalid under Article 10(k)
106. What is more, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are employees of
Skillz, and thus constitute “related or subordinate parties” of Andrew under Rule
Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are barred from serving as Trust Protectors and
Agreement.
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K. Mr. Pomerance, Ms. Edelman, and Mr. Chafkin are
Unfit to Serve as Fiduciaries
107. Even notwithstanding the contractual prohibitions, Mr. Chafkin and
Ms. Edelman, as well as Mr. Pomerance, are plainly improper selections to occupy
fiduciary positions at the Trusts. They are beholden to and lack independence
108. Mr. Chafkin has worked with Andrew since at least 2010. Mr.
Chafkin was one of the first employees of Andrew’s prior company, AisleBuyer,
the maker of a virtual shopping assistant app that allows in-store customers pay for
items on their mobile phone. Intuit Inc. reportedly paid $80 to $100 million to
acquire AisleBuyer in 2012. Mr. Chafkin and Andrew continued to work together,
co-founding Skillz in 2012. In addition to his role as Chief Revenue Officer, Mr.
109. Ms. Edelman has also known Andrew for at least a decade. Before
joining Skillz as its Vice President of Legal in July 2020, Ms. Edelman was a
connection with its sale to Intuit Inc. She continued to work with Andrew as
outside counsel to Skillz during its formation and through its rounds of financing
as a private company.
Andrew and Skillz are significant, long-term clients of Mr. Pomerance’s firm,
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Mintz. Indeed, Mr. Pomerance serves as counsel for Skillz, and has assisted
Andrew with a number of both personal and professional matters over the years.
relationships, the independence of Mr. Pomerance, Ms. Edelman, and Mr. Chafkin
April 9, 2021, Mr. Chafkin owns 12,600,300 shares that are worth approximately
$190 million and is one of the largest Skillz stockholders. Ms. Edelman, in turn,
owns 130,413 shares that are worth approximately $2 million. Mr. Pomerance
112. Although Jeremy may have been comfortable with Mr. Pomerance
in a fiduciary role when the Trusts were created, he has completely lost confidence
in his ability to discharge his fiduciary obligations. Now that it is apparent that
resign. Mr. Pomerance, however, has chosen to service only Andrew’s interests.
Jeremy that when it came to the administration of the Trusts, Mr. Pomerance
would have to comply with Andrew’s wishes and directives until such time as Mr.
Pomerance was able to sell his own valuable shares of Skillz stock. Mr.
Pomerance told Jeremy that, due to Mr. Pomerance’s recent divorce and
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remarriage, Mr. Pomerance’s financial stability had become precarious and that he
was dependent upon the sale of his Skillz stock to fund his retirement.
wanted to resign from his positions at the Trusts, but that he was unable to do so
because Andrew had threatened to sue Mr. Pomerance. By his threat, Andrew
ensured his continued control over the Trusts. And by not resigning and adhering
to the wishes of one client over another, Mr. Pomerance willfully breached his
fiduciary duties, including as a fiduciary for the Trusts and to Jeremy personally.
115. Andrew has directed the Trust fiduciaries to limit Jeremy’s monthly
distributions from Andrew’s Trust to $10,000. Given the present value of the total
assets held by Andrew’s Trust and the income generated by these assets, this
refused to provide any basis for the amount of $10,000. In any event, it is
distributions.
116. Accordingly, all three of the fiduciaries charged with overseeing the
the sale of a significant amount of Skillz stock held by the Trusts may negatively
34
affect the price of their own considerable holdings of Skillz stock, or the amount of
ability to adequately make investment and other decisions for trusts whose assets
118. It is plainly untenable for Mr. Chafkin, Ms. Edelman and Mr.
millions of dollars of Skillz stock held in trusts affiliated with Andrew, and to have
appointments violated the terms of the Trusts, Mr. Pomerance refused to remove
120. Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin have also refused to resign. Instead,
Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin knowingly and willfully continue to occupy
fiduciary roles to which they were not properly appointed and that they are unfit to
hold.
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L. Skillz Stock Sales Cause Significant Volatility and
Raise Concerns about Conflicts of Interest
121. On December 16, 2020, the date the merger closed and Skillz
became a publicly traded company, the stock price closed at $17.68 per share.
Since that time, the market for New Skillz stock has been extremely volatile,
reaching a peak of $46.30 per share on February 5, 2021 and plummeting to a low
(the “Selling Stockholders”), were able to request that their stock be included in
the offering. The Company was required to give the Selling Stockholders 10 days’
Selling Stockholders had 5 days to notify the Company of the number of shares
they wanted to register. However, if the underwriter for the offering advised the
Company that including shares for the benefit of the Selling Stockholders would
of the Company’s offering, the Company could limit the total number of shares
offered by the Selling Stockholders and register their shares pro rata based on the
36
respective number of shares each Selling Stockholder requested to be included in
the offering.
registration provision, allowing both Trusts to sell New Skillz stock. On March
23, 2021, Andrew filed a Form 4 with the SEC disclosing that he sold 8,402,866
shares in the offering for $23.24 per share yielding gross proceeds of
approximately $195 million. This sale represented approximately 10% of his total
Skillz holdings.
125. On March 24, 2021, Jeremy’s Trust sold 169,087 shares in the
126. On March 24, 2021, Andrew’s Trust sold 100,659 shares in the
a Notice Recipient for both Trusts, the fiduciaries did not inform Jeremy of the
proposed offering and he was not told that stock from the Trusts would be
included.
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128. The Trusts fiduciaries also sold significant amounts of stock as part
of this offering. Mr. Chafkin sold approximately 10% of his Skillz holdings for
proceeds of more than $39 million. Ms. Edelman sold approximately 18.87% of
her Skillz holdings for proceeds of more than $708,000. Mr. Pomerance sold
approximately 9.22% of his Skillz holdings for proceeds of more than $764,000.
129. Given the possibility that the Company could limit the total number
of stock sales in the offering, the fiduciaries’ decision to sell their own stock as
part of the same offering raises at least a potential conflict of interest. There is a
possibility that the Trusts’ requests to register their stock could have caused the
determined the Company could include in the offering without adversely impacting
the price, the timing, the distribution method, or the probability of the offering’s
success. This would have had an adverse impact on Mr. Pomerance’s, Mr.
Chafkin’s and Ms. Edelman’s ability to register the desired amount of their own
shares. As decision makers for the Trusts, Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin and Ms.
Edelman were in a position to limit the number of shares the Trusts included in the
Trusts’ requests for registration, thereby ensuring that they were free to register an
shareholder value and may have created a perception that the selling stockholders,
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three of whom were Skillz insiders, had lost confidence in the Company. Between
March 17, 2021 and March 24, 2021, New Skillz stock price dropped $9.38, or
31.9%.
131. Instead of informing Jeremy of the sales of New Skillz stock, the
purported fiduciaries took further steps to keep Jeremy in the dark. On April 3,
lawyer for Mr. Pomerance, Mr. Chafkin, and Ms. Edelman sent Jeremy’s lawyer an
account statement for each trust. Although he sent the documents on April 3,
2021, when March month-end statements would have been available, both
statements were dated March 23, 2021 – one day before the Trusts sold their New
Skillz stock, leaving Jeremy unaware of the significant stock sale that had already
taken place.
132. On April 20, 2021, Skillz stock closed at $12.55 per share, the
133. The next opportunity for the Trusts to sell their New Skillz stock
will be on or about June 14, 2021. Pursuant to the Investors’ Rights Agreement,
1,500,000 shares will be released from the transfer restrictions each quarter
beginning on or about June 14, 2021 (180 days following the closing of the
merger).
39
134. Due to the high volatility and limited opportunities to sell New
Skillz stock, it is imperative that the Trusts are administered by new fiduciaries
that are truly independent and able to make investment decisions in the best
Pomerance had not been entirely forthcoming with him regarding the Trusts.
136. On September 22, 2020, Jeremy exchanged text messages with Mr.
Pomerance whether he sought approval from Andrew for his decisions, stating
“I’m assuming we aren’t checking with Andrew over every decision.” Mr.
Pomerance admitted that he was taking direction from Andrew, but claimed that it
only related to the money that Andrew contributed. As a fiduciary, Mr. Pomerance
should not have been taking directions from Andrew for either Trust.
worked. Rather than clarify the structure for Jeremy, Mr. Pomerance either dodged
Jeremy’s questions or lacked basic knowledge as to the Trusts for which he served
as a fiduciary. Mr. Pomerance even wrongly suggested that there was just one
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trust notwithstanding that he served as Trust Protector for both Trusts. Mr.
Pomerance suggested that they confer with other attorneys at Mintz, including Mr.
138. Further, Jeremy explained to Mr. Pomerance his belief that he was
supposed to receive the income from the property that was held by Andrew’s Trust
in cash every month. Again, Mr. Pomerance neither confirmed nor denied
Jeremy’s understanding and pushed to have a call with the other lawyers.
9/22/2020 17:13 Jeremy: The other point is that all the income from
Wellesley
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9/22/2020 17:13 Jeremy: And any other property is supposed to get paid
to me in cash every month
9/22/2020 17:13 Jeremy: That’s owned by the trust you control
...
9/22/2020 17:16 Jeremy: This was all agreed to when we set this up and I
signed the shares over
9/22/2020 17:16 Pomerance: Ok
...
9/22/2020 17:18 Pomerance: We need the call.
9/22/2020 17:18 Pomerance: Text is not gonna straighten this out.
9/22/2020 17:18 Jeremy: Ok I’ll let you organize it
and Mr. Pomerance, Jeremy retained independent counsel and demanded his files
140. Mintz refused to provide Jeremy’s file to him, and has now taken
the incredible and erroneous position that Jeremy was never a client of Mintz.
action to dispel what it now must contend was confusion. As just a few examples:
“[H]ave you been able to review the trusts given your role as
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need you to be more than just the administrative trustee on his
trust.”12
A May 13, 2019 email from Ms. Glover to The Bryn Mawr
Company and Mr. Hayward: “It will be easier for you to call
drafted two trusts for our m?utual [sic] clients – Andrew and
May 25, 2019 and the Jeremy Paradise Dynasty Trust dated
12
A copy of Mr. Steinkrauss’ March 19, 2019 email is attached hereto as Exhibit
13.
13
A copy of Mr. Hayward’s April 2, 2019 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 14.
14
A copy of Ms. Glover’s May 13, 2019 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 15.
15
A copy of Mr. Hetrick’s July 16, 2020 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 16.
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142. Gordon Fournaris, however, promptly complied with Jeremy’s
request for his file and provided it to him. Much to Jeremy’s surprise, the file
Jeremy’s Trust Agreement that removed his power over the Trust Protector.
distributions, expenses and other transactions of the Trusts. Jeremy never received
such statements.16
and Mr. Steinkrauss to provide an accounting of both Trusts. Over the course of
several weeks, Mr. Steinkrauss delayed providing any documents with shifting
stock made by the Trusts on March 24. Jeremy never received the full accounting
16
Indeed, Jeremy never even received executed copies of the final Trust Agreements
until February 2021, at which point he was able to retain them upon the request of
his counsel.
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145. As a result of these hostilities, Jeremy’s relationships with Mr.
Pomerance and the other fiduciaries have deteriorated to such an extent that at one
point, Mr. Pomerance refused to communicate with Jeremy directly, and instead
insisted that all communications go through their respective counsel. Indeed, all
parties have had to spend a significant amount of time and resources to facilitate
146. Despite Jeremy’s good faith efforts, including, but not limited to,
providing to the fiduciaries’ Delaware counsel a draft of this Petition (which was
which was rejected by the fiduciaries and Andrew, it is evident that Andrew and
his subordinates will not resolve the situation they have created without
COUNT ONE
REFORMATION BASED ON MISTAKE
147. Jeremy repeats and realleges the allegations set forth in the
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148. Prior to the drafting and execution of Jeremy’s Trust Agreement,
Jeremy agreed with his brother Andrew that, in forming two trusts, Jeremy would
149. Jeremy made his intent clear to his counsel, including his attorneys
draft trust agreement that provided Jeremy, in the first instance, with the power to
that power from him, and to provide it to Andrew, or any other individual or entity.
Jeremy with the power, in the first instance, to remove and replace the Trust
153. Jeremy executed his Trust Agreement on the mistaken belief that
the agreement did in fact provide him with such power over the Trust Protector.
He was unaware that, due to a mistake in the preparation of his Trust Agreement,
his counsel had altered, without Jeremy’s knowledge, the Trust Agreement and the
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COUNT TWO
REFORMATION BASED ON FRAUD
155. Jeremy repeats and realleges the allegations set forth in the
Andrew and his agents represented to Jeremy that Jeremy would have control over
Jeremy’s Trust, and that Jeremy would be the beneficiary of Andrew’s Trust, with
both Trusts to be funded with an equal amount of Skillz shares. Based on these
distributions from Andrew’s Trust such that Jeremy would be able to cover his
157. These representations were false. In fact, Andrew and the attorneys
at Mintz knew that Andrew would have control over both Trusts given Andrew’s
power to remove the Trust Protector, and that Andrew’s Trust (of which Jeremy
was to be the sole beneficiary) would be funded with significantly fewer shares of
Skillz stock. Jeremy was also unaware that any future children of his or of
158. Jeremy’s counsel and Andrew intentionally caused the error and
159. Through these false statements, Andrew and his agents intended to
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into an irrevocable trust that Andrew could then control. Through Andrew’s
command of both Trusts, Andrew would be able to influence the number of Skillz
shares placed on the market at a given time, and Andrew’s future children would
Jeremy has been irreparably harmed. Jeremy no longer has control over or
beneficial interest in the significant assets that he transferred to Trust, nor has he
COUNT THREE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
164. Jeremy repeats and realleges the allegations set forth in the
165. The Trust Protector purported to appoint Mr. Chafkin and Ms.
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166. Article 10(k) of Jeremy’s Trust Agreement requires the Trust
Direction Advisers.
167. The Trust Protector did not seek nor obtain Jeremy’s consent for the
168. The Trust Protector also purported to appoint Mr. Chafkin and Ms.
169. Articles 11(i) and 12(i) of Andrew’s Trust Agreement prohibits the
related or subordinate party to the Grantor or any beneficiary of this Trust under
any employee of a corporation in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the
trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control; a subordinate employee
170. Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are employees of Skillz, a company
for which Andrew is the controlling stockholder and serves as its CEO.
Accordingly, Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman are “related or subordinate” parties to
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171. The Trust Protector has refused to withdraw the appointments or
otherwise remove Mr. Chafkin and Ms. Edelman from their positions, and Mr.
of Jeremy’s Trust were valid and effective under the Trust Agreements.
Distribution Advisers of Andrew’s Trust were valid and effective under the Trust
Agreements.
Distribution Advisers of Andrew’s Trust and the appointment of Mr. Chafkin and
175. Jeremy repeats and realleges the allegations set forth in the
50
appointed invalid fiduciaries to the Trusts in violation of the clear terms of the
177. Mr. Pomerance also has openly acknowledged that, far from
serving solely the interests of the Trusts, he takes direction from Andrew and will
preventing Mr. Pomerance from complying with his fiduciary duties and acting in
179. Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin have engaged in willful misconduct
and shown themselves to be unfit fiduciaries. Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin
continue to willfully and wrongfully occupy fiduciary roles with respect to both
Trusts, knowing that their appointments were invalid and in breach of the Trusts’
express terms.
180. As Skillz employees, Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin are Andrew’s
181. Ms. Edelman’s and Mr. Chafkin’s loyalties to Andrew, coupled with
their own significant Skillz holdings, create impermissible conflicts of interest that
51
prevent them from complying with their fiduciary duties and acting in the best
182. As with Mr. Pomerance, Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin are following
Andrew’s instructions with respect to the administration of the Trusts, including with
Pomerance, Ms. Edelman, and Mr. Chafkin are unfit and unable to administer the
resulted in hostility between Mr. Pomerance, Ms. Edelman and Mr. Chafkin, on the
one hand; and the beneficiaries of both Trusts to whom they owe fiduciary duties,
185. As a result of the foregoing, Jeremy seeks an order for the immediate
removal of Mr. Pomerance, Ms. Edelman, and Mr. Chafkin from all fiduciary
positions they presently occupy at both Trusts, including the positions of Trust
186. Jeremy repeats and realleges the allegations set forth in the
52
187. Pursuant to Article 23(a) of the Trusts, Jeremy, as Notice Recipient,
is entitled to periodic statements of accounting of the Trust assets from the Trustee.
distributions, expenses, and other transactions of the Trust since the immediately
prior statement, and show all cash, securities, and other property held as part of
either Trust.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court award the
following relief:
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MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
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