The Twist in Security Policy of Pakistan after September 2001

The presence of the international forces in Afghanistan has vastly

changed the security dynamics for Pakistan. According to emerging

circumstances, the traditional factors which regulate Pakistan’s Afghan

policy have to be revised.

While the main factors of Pakistan security policy, animosity with India

and the suppression of Pashtun nationalism, have not been completely

changed but certain amendments were made and one new factor

emerged which will then regulate the security policy of Pakistan and that

is domestic instability.

Fundamentally, the Pakistani state has viewed Afghanistan since

September 2001 in terms of the US presence on its borders. 1 Pakistan’s

Afghan policy has been more affected due to divergence of interests

between the United States and Pakistan and less affected because of

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The Pakistani ruling elite consider the

USA’s post-2001 Afghan policy detrimental to its interests in the region

1
Moeed Yusuf, Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan’, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, May 2013.
because Pakistan has to deal with both an unfriendly regime in Kabul

and ever increasing regional disparity in favor of India.

In the aftermath of Twin towers attacks, the Pakistani security

establishment advised the USA to swiftly conduct the military operation

and thereafter negotiate with soft-liner Taliban in order to alienate Al-

Qaeda. The Pakistani President Musharraf advised the US President

George Bush to negotiate with the reconcilable Taliban groups and to

alienate them from the irreconcilable and Al-Qaeda.

Secondly, do not let the Northern Alliance to come to power in Kabul

because it will jeopardize the interests of Pakistani state. 2 Instead, the

US decided to prolong to its military campaign in Afghanistan and

secondly committed the original sin by making alliance with the

Northern Alliance and by giving them access to the power corridors in

Kabul. Furthermore, the security establishment deduced that there is

direct relation between US involvement in Afghanistan and growing

Indian influence. These steps on the behalf of the US were detrimental to

2
Hussain, Z, “Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam”, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008,
p. 40-50.
the interests of Pakistan and thereafter Pakistan became highly

suspicious of the US agenda in Afghanistan.

Ascendency in Domestic Terrorism

Since 2001, the rise in domestic terrorism has affected Pakistan’s

security calculus more than any other factor. Thereafter, internal security

situation has remarkably deteriorated in Pakistan with almost 47500

people killed in terrorist attacks which were largely carried out by Al-

Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.

The roots of the Pakistan Taliban can be traced back to the post-2001

insurgency against the U.S in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The Pakistani

Taliban merged with an umbrella organization, the Tehrik-i-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP), only in 2007. However, the TTP was formed because of

revival of violence in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

(FATA).3

This militancy was caused by the mobilization of thousands of Pakistani

tribal Pashtuns to fight against the international presence in Afghanistan

3
Qazi, S.H. ‘An extended profile of the Pakistani Taliban’, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding Policy
Brief no. 44, august 2011, <http:www.ispu.org/policy/34/publications.aspx>.
after 2001 and secondly by the alliance between Pakistani military and

the US. Thirdly, the Pakistani military started to conduct military

operation in FATA against the foreign militants that were operating

against the US.

Thus, the Pakistani Taliban launched terrorist attacks against Pakistani

state and justified their conduct by claiming that Pakistani military is

supporting the infidels. According to Eamon Murphy the Pakistan

Taliban claimed that the Pakistani military had become nothing other

than the servant of the US.4 This narrative was further reinforced by the

already widespread anti-US sentiments in Pakistan and this caused great

security threat to the state of Pakistan.5

The Taliban Sanctuaries as a Complicating Factor

The most renowned Afghan Taliban groups-the Haqqani network and

Mullah Umar’s Taliban faction (collectively known as the Afghan

Taliban) fighting against the international forces that were stationed in

Afghanistan have found sanctuary in Pakistan.

4
Murphy, E., the Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism, Rutledge, London,
2012, p. 146.
5
Yusuf, M., ‘Taliban have been fooling us all along’, Friday Times, 8 May 2009.
The Haqqani network in the North Waziristan agency of FATA and

Mullah Omar’s group in the city of Quetta in Baluchistan province- thus

the popularly used named as Quetta Shura. The Quetta Shura is the same

Taliban group that have ruled Afghanistan in the mid of 1990s and have

strong influence in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. The Haqqani

network is a former Mujahedeen group that fought against the Soviet

troops in the 1980s and has strongholds in the eastern provinces of

Afghanistan.

Both of these factions have fled to Pakistan after the USA invasion of

Afghanistan and sought sanctuaries here. Because of their presence in

Pakistan, the ruling establishment has been under tremendous

international pressure to fight against them militarily. The state of

Pakistan is not conducting military operation against these militant

organizations because of various reasons. The most obvious reason is

that these Afghan militant factions are not directly hitting the state of

Pakistan moreover they have sought distance from TTP.6

6
Basit, A., Militant landscape after Miranshah agreement,’ M.A Rana, S. Sial and A. Basit, Dynamics of Taliban
Insurgency in FATA, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, 2010, p. 100-110.
Nonetheless, there are several connections between the Afghan Taliban

and Pakistan Taliban besides the ideological allegiance. For example the

Pakistani Taliban provided save heavens to the Haqqani network and

even facilitated the group’s recruitment.7 Both groups have affiliations

with Al-Qaeda. Even the Pakistani Taliban formally pledge allegiance to

the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Umar.8

The Pakistani security officials allege the international and regional

players regarding its internal security mess. However, it was because of

nurturing of domestic militants since 1980s, the internal Pashtun tribal

uprising against the international presence in Afghanistan, and

afterwards the military operation in FATA, led towards domestic

instability in Pakistan.9 Even after the September attacks, Pakistan has

continued to pursue its policy of pick and choose regarding the Islamist

militant groups by targeting the selecting groups and sparing some of

them.

7
International Crisis Group (ICG), The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, Asia report no. 207, Brussels, June
2007, pp. 1-10.
8
Ibid
9
Rana, M. A., ‘Post-9/11 Developments and Insurgence of Local Taliban Groups’, pp. 68-100.
It has launched its military operations against Pakistani Taliban and Al-

Qaeda but it has let free anti-Indian militant groups and the Afghan

Taliban.10 The Pakistani establishment officially claims that it lacks the

institutional capacity to widen its counterterrorism operations whereas

the international community accuses Pakistan for playing double game

by adhering to the policy of pick and choose.

Operationally, the Pakistani security establishment is not in this position

to go after the Afghan Taliban in this phase of endgame because it can

lead towards alliance between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Taliban

that will have disastrous repercussions for the security of Pakistan.

However, the Afghan government and the international community see

these sanctuaries as one of the biggest contributors to Afghanistan’s

domestic instability.

While Pakistani security establishment still maintains cordial relations

with the Afghan Taliban but now it no longer wishes to see outright

Taliban victory after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan because it

10
Siddiqa, A., ‘Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies’, Washington Quarterly, vol.
34, no. 1 ,2011, pp. 145165.
now fears that the Taliban taking over power in Afghanistan would give

the Pakistani Taliban’s campaign a moral and psychological boost so the

power in Afghanistan should be distributed among various factions.11

Otherwise, Afghanistan can descent into chaos and Afghan civil war will

have many negative spillovers for Pakistan such as: Pakistani Taliban

can easily get refugee in Afghanistan and exploit the security vacuum,

secondly the connection between Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Taliban

can be further strengthened, thirdly there will be more influx Afghan

refugees and finally increasing of tensions between India and Pakistan

because of their support to opposite groups in Afghanistan.

Thus, the Pakistani ruling elite supports the Afghan reconciliation

process inclusive of the Afghan Taliban with reasonable share in power

as opposed to cosmetic Taliban presence. This can fulfill the Afghan

Taliban’s desire to be part of the political process, lead towards military

stalemate and domestic stability in Afghanistan.

11
Weinbaum, M., ‘What Pakistan seeks in Afghanistan,’ Foreign Policy Association blog, Middle East Institute,
2012, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/12/20>/.
Pakistani planners envision that this outcome can prompt the Afghan

Taliban to give up their sanctuaries in Pakistan without military having

to fight them; keep the Afghan Taliban from joining hands with the

Pakistani Taliban; end or at least reduce the violence in Afghanistan and

thereby prevent excessive spillover into Pakistan; give Pakistan a non-

hostile actor, if not a powerful partner in Afghan politics to buffer

against any troubling Indian ingress in Pakistan. An inclusive

reconciliation process is Pakistan’s silver bullet for satisfying all of its

three main policy drivers.

The National Action Plan

The NAP basically reasserted the goals and objectives of the NISP but

presented two additional points: implementation of the death penalty for

convicted terrorists and the establishment of special military courts.12

The security establishment conveyed its message through the Inter-

Services Public Relations (ISPR) regarding the creation of military

courts that “it is the need of the extraordinary times not the desire of the

Anup Kaphle, “Pakistan Announces a National Action Plan to Fight Terrorism, Says Terrorists Days are
12

Numbered,” Washington Post, December 24, 2014.

 army.”13 Consequently, the Army Act of 1952 was amended to try any

person on the offence of terrorism and sectarianism under the military

law in a military court.14 Even, the political leadership was asked to

make bold decisions and to build consensus in order to eliminate

terrorism.15

i. To ensure death penalty of terrorists.

ii. Establishment of the special military courts under the military

officers.

iii. To prohibit all armed organizations.

iv. To strengthen and activate NACTA.

v. To take strict measures against dissemination of hate literature.

vi. To cut financial support network of the militant organizations.

vii. To prevent the re-emergence of banned factions to operate with

other names.

viii. To establish special antiterrorism force.

ix. To guard religious minorities.

13
Asim Bajwa (@AsimBajwaISPR), “COAS: Spec courts not desire of the army but need of extraordinary times.
Will return to original system when normalcy returns,” January 2, 2015.
14
Muhammad Anis, “Two Bills Tabled in NA for changes to Constitution, Army Act, The News, January 4, 2015.
15
“Corps Commanders Conference, “Press release no. PR2/2015 ISPR, January 1, 2015.
 x. To register and regulate religious seminaries.

xi. To act against sectarianism.

xii. To perpetuate the Karachi Operation.

xiii. To give autonomy to the Baluch provincial government to dialogue

with Baluch separatists.

xiv. To bring reforms in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

(FATA) and settle of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

xv. To formulate comprehensive policy for Afghan Refugees.

xvi. To eradicate terrorist’s communication networks.

xvii. To bring reforms in criminal law for intelligence agencies.

xviii. To set up military courts by amending constitution.

xix. To ban airing of views of terrorists organizations from the print

and electronic media.

xx. To check the propagation of terrorism on the internet and social

media.