CFJP - Canadian Forces Joint Publication B-GL-005-400-FP001

B-GL-005-400/FP001
Canadian Forces Joint Publication
Keystone
CFJP 4-0 - Support
CFJP 4-0
Support
1st Edition
Custodian: Canadian Joint Operations Command

Promulgated: 24 February 2014
Ca n a da
Cette publication est également disponible en français.
To ensure you are using the most current version of this publication, refer to the joint
doctrine DIN website at:
http://cfd.mil.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=3560
Joint Doctrine Branch

Canadian Forces Warfare Centre
Department of National Defence
Major-General G.R. Pearkes Building
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2
1st Edition, 2014

©Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2014
CFJP 4-0
Preface
01. Aim. The aim of this keystone Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) joint publication (CFJP) is
to set forth doctrine governing the planning and execution of support to operations at home or
abroad, within the framework of either a joint, multinational, or multinational joint task force.
02. Policy context. This publication has been harmonized with CAF joint doctrine and the
environmental support doctrine publications of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian
Army (CA), and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). As the CAF will often be working
alongside allies, this publication also incorporates support doctrine published by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and that of the United States,
United Kingdom, and Australia.
03. Scope. CFJP 4-0, Support comprises the basic reference on the manner in which support
will be provided, at the Strategic and Operational levels of command, and provides the
overarching doctrinal framework for other CAF joint support publications.
04. Content Overview. This publication is organized into the following chapters:
a. Chapter 1 – Fundamentals of Support. This chapter sets the stage for CAF
support doctrine by providing key terminology and a description of the principles of
support.
b. Chapter 2 – The CAF Support Framework. This chapter provides an overview of
the CAF support framework, and describes the roles and responsibilities of key
organizations associated with national support, the Strategic lines of
communication, and theatre support.
c. Chapter 3 – Command and Control. This chapter outlines the levels of command
used by the CAF, the types and theatres of operations, command and control
methodologies, and describes the nature of the relationships between key
operational-support organizations.
d. Chapter 4 – Planning. This chapter begins with an overview of the types of
military operations, the stages of joint operations, and the various levels of
planning. It then describes the conduct of support planning at the Strategic and
Operational levels within the framework of the operations planning process.
e. Chapter 5 – Preparing the Joint Task Force. This chapter describes the general
processes associated with preparing a joint task force for employment.
f. Chapter 6 – Buildup of the Joint Task Force. This chapter provides an overview
of the support-related activities and processes involved with building up a joint task
force within a theatre of operations. These processes and activities include:
activating the Strategic lines of communication; theatre opening; deployment; and
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
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g. Chapter 7 – The Execution Stage: Sustaining the Joint Task Force. This chapter
describes the manner in which a joint task force is sustained within a theatre of
operations. It includes sections on theatre support structure options, functional
support services commonly found within a theatre of operations, and a general
overview of the manner in which maritime, land, air, and special operations
components of a joint task force will be sustained.
h. Chapter 8 – The Termination and Reconstitution Stages. This chapter examines
the support-related activities involved during the termination and reconstitution
stages of a joint operation. It includes sections dealing with the processes of theatre
closing, redeployment, mission transition, drawdown, and reconstitution/operation
termination.
i. Chapter 9 – Support within Multinational Joint Operations. This chapter
describes the manner in which a CAF joint task force may be supported within the
context of NATO, coalition, or UN operations.
j. Chapter 10 – Support to Domestic Operations. This chapter provides an
overview of support to domestic operations.
05. Recommendations for amendments to this publication are welcomed and should be
forwarded to the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre.
06. The Commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command, is the approval authority for this
publication.
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Table of Contents
Preface..............................................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1 - Fundamentals of Support
General......................................................................................................................................... 1-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 1-1
Principles of Support.................................................................................................................... 1-3
Chapter 2 - The CAF Support Framework
Section I – General
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 2-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 2-1
Overview of the CAF Support Framework.................................................................................. 2-2
Levels of Conflict and Sustainment............................................................................................. 2-3
Lines of Support........................................................................................................................... 2-4
Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support............................................ 2-5
Support Networks ........................................................................................................................ 2-6
Comprehensive Approach............................................................................................................ 2-7
Whole-of-Government (WoG) Approach.................................................................................... 2-7
Section II – National Support
General......................................................................................................................................... 2-8
National Defence Headquarters ................................................................................................... 2-8
Environmental Commands......................................................................................................... 2-10
Force Employment Commands.................................................................................................. 2-10
Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) .......................................................................... 2-10
Fourth Line Support Units ......................................................................................................... 2-11
Other Government Departments and Agencies (OGDA) .......................................................... 2-12
National Infrastructure and Industry.......................................................................................... 2-12
International Agreements and Arrangements ............................................................................ 2-12
Section III – Strategic Lines of Communication
General....................................................................................................................................... 2-13
Operational Support Hubs (OS Hubs) ....................................................................................... 2-14
Intermediate Staging Terminal (IST)......................................................................................... 2-16
Casualty Support Team (CST)................................................................................................... 2-16
Third-Location Decompression (TLD) Facilities ...................................................................... 2-16
Section IV – Theatre Support
General....................................................................................................................................... 2-16
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) Staff .......................................................................... 2-17
Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC)......................................................................... 2-18
JTF Component Support Organizations..................................................................................... 2-19
Contracted Support .................................................................................................................... 2-19
Multinational Support ................................................................................................................ 2-21
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Intra-Theatre Lines of Communications.................................................................................... 2-21

Host-Nation Support (HNS) ...................................................................................................... 2-21
Chapter 3 - Command and Control
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 3-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 3-1
Levels of Command..................................................................................................................... 3-2
Types of Operations..................................................................................................................... 3-2
Theatres of Operations................................................................................................................. 3-3
Command Relationships .............................................................................................................. 3-3
Supported Commander/Supporting Commander......................................................................... 3-5
Section II – Command and Control Methodologies
General......................................................................................................................................... 3-5
Component Command Method.................................................................................................... 3-5
Direct Command Method ............................................................................................................ 3-7
Section III – Support Relationships
General......................................................................................................................................... 3-8
Relationship between CJOCHQ and the JTFHQ......................................................................... 3-8
Relationship between the JTFHQ Staff and the JTFSC............................................................... 3-9
Relationship between the JTFSC and JTF Component Support Organizations .......................... 3-9
Relationship between the JTF and Unit Rear Parties................................................................... 3-9
Relationship between the JTF, CFPM, and MP Services Group................................................. 3-9
Chapter 4 - Planning
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 4-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 4-1
Stages of Joint Operations ........................................................................................................... 4-2
Levels of Planning ....................................................................................................................... 4-2
The CAF Operational Planning Process ...................................................................................... 4-3
Section II – Conduct of Support Planning
General......................................................................................................................................... 4-4
Strategic Level Support Planning ................................................................................................ 4-5
Operational Level Support Planning............................................................................................ 4-5
Relationship between the Strategic and Operational Level Planning Processes ......................... 4-5
Synchronization of Planning Effort ............................................................................................. 4-7
Situational Awareness.................................................................................................................. 4-7
Reconnaissance ............................................................................................................................ 4-8
Staff Checks ................................................................................................................................. 4-8
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Section III – The Support Estimate

General......................................................................................................................................... 4-8
Mission Analysis.......................................................................................................................... 4-9
Evaluation of Factors ................................................................................................................. 4-10
Support Planning Factors........................................................................................................... 4-10
Development and Comparison of Support COAs...................................................................... 4-12
Section IV – Support Planning Tools
General....................................................................................................................................... 4-13
Staff Data ................................................................................................................................... 4-13
Conceptual Framework.............................................................................................................. 4-13
Map Overlays............................................................................................................................. 4-13
Synchronization Matrix ............................................................................................................. 4-13
Decision Support Template........................................................................................................ 4-14
Dependency Matrix.................................................................................................................... 4-14
CAF Information Systems ......................................................................................................... 4-14
NATO Information Systems ...................................................................................................... 4-14
Annex A – Sample Synchronization Matrix......................................................................... 4A-1
Chapter 5 - Preparing the Joint Task Force
General......................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 5-1
Responsibility for Preparation Stage Activities........................................................................... 5-2
Force Generating the JTF and JTFSC.......................................................................................... 5-2
Assembling and Training the JTF and JTFSC............................................................................. 5-2
Support to Individual and Collective Training ............................................................................ 5-2
Personnel, Vehicle, and Equipment Preparations ........................................................................ 5-3
Identifying, Requisitioning, and Assembling Materiel................................................................ 5-3
Transfer of Command Authority and Responsibility for Support ............................................... 5-3
Movement during the Preparation Stage...................................................................................... 5-3
Activities at the Port(s) of Embarkation ...................................................................................... 5-4
Chapter 6 - Buildup of the Joint Task Force
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 6-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 6-1
Responsibility for Buildup Stage Support Activities................................................................... 6-2
Processes ...................................................................................................................................... 6-3
Section II – Activating the Strategic Lines of Communication
General......................................................................................................................................... 6-4
Planning the Strategic Lines of Communication ......................................................................... 6-4
Resources Required for Activating the Strategic Lines of Communication................................ 6-4
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Section III – Theatre Opening

General......................................................................................................................................... 6-5
Planning Theatre Opening ........................................................................................................... 6-5
JTF Reconnaissance and Advance Parties................................................................................... 6-5
Role and Composition of the JTFSC during Theatre Opening.................................................... 6-6
Theatre Opening Tasks ................................................................................................................ 6-6
Section IV – Deployment
General......................................................................................................................................... 6-7
Deployment Concept ................................................................................................................... 6-7
Planning Deployment................................................................................................................... 6-8
Controlling the Deployment ........................................................................................................ 6-9
Section V – Reception, Staging and Onward Movement
General....................................................................................................................................... 6-10
The RSOM process .................................................................................................................... 6-10
RSOM Principles ....................................................................................................................... 6-11
RSOM Enablers ......................................................................................................................... 6-11
Planning RSOM ......................................................................................................................... 6-11
Reception ................................................................................................................................... 6-12
Staging ....................................................................................................................................... 6-13
Onward Movement .................................................................................................................... 6-13
Integration .................................................................................................................................. 6-14
Chapter 7 - The Execution Stage: Sustaining the Joint Task Force
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 7-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 7-1
Responsibility for Sustainment Activities ................................................................................... 7-1
Other Execution Stage Activities Requiring Operational Support .............................................. 7-2
Section II –Sustainment: Structure and Methods
General......................................................................................................................................... 7-2
Planning Sustainment................................................................................................................... 7-2
Theatre-Level Support Structure Options.................................................................................... 7-2
Layout af a Generic CAF Theatre Sustainment System .............................................................. 7-3
Methods of Sustainment .............................................................................................................. 7-4
Sources of Sustainment................................................................................................................ 7-4
Managing Strategic Sustainment Priorities.................................................................................. 7-5
Reachback and Forward Coordination......................................................................................... 7-6
Theatre-Level Contracted Support............................................................................................... 7-6
Section III – Functional Services Within the Theatre
General......................................................................................................................................... 7-8
Materiel Management .................................................................................................................. 7-8
Ammunition and Explosives........................................................................................................ 7-8
Materiel Distribution.................................................................................................................... 7-9
Transportation and Movement..................................................................................................... 7-9
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Postal Services ........................................................................................................................... 7-10

Food Services............................................................................................................................. 7-10
Financial Services ...................................................................................................................... 7-11
Personnel Support Services........................................................................................................ 7-11
Equipment Support .................................................................................................................... 7-12
Military Engineering.................................................................................................................. 7-12
Communication and Information Services ................................................................................ 7-12
Military Police ........................................................................................................................... 7-13
Health Services Support............................................................................................................. 7-13
Section IV – Component-Level Sustainment
General....................................................................................................................................... 7-14
Maritime-Component Sustainment............................................................................................ 7-14
Land-Component Sustainment................................................................................................... 7-16
Air-Component Sustainment ..................................................................................................... 7-16
Special Operations-Component Sustainment ............................................................................ 7-17
Chapter 8 - The Termination and Reconstitution Stages
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 8-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 8-1
Responsibilities for Termination and Reconstitution Stage Support Activities .......................... 8-2
Processes ...................................................................................................................................... 8-3
Section II – Theatre Closing
General......................................................................................................................................... 8-4
Planning Theatre Closing............................................................................................................. 8-4
Role and Composition of the JTFSC during Theatre Closing ..................................................... 8-5
Theatre Closing Tasks.................................................................................................................. 8-5
Materiel and Infrastructure Distribution Directive (MIDD)........................................................ 8-6
Section III – Redeployment
General......................................................................................................................................... 8-7
Planning Redeployment ............................................................................................................... 8-7
Conduct of Redeployment ........................................................................................................... 8-7
Section IV – Mission Transition/Drawdown
General......................................................................................................................................... 8-8
Mission Transition ....................................................................................................................... 8-8
Drawdown.................................................................................................................................... 8-8
Section V – Reconstitution/Operation Termination
General......................................................................................................................................... 8-9
Levels of Reconstitution Operations............................................................................................ 8-9
The Reconstitution Process.......................................................................................................... 8-9
Reconstitution within the Theatre of Operations ....................................................................... 8-10
Reconstitution in Canada after Redeployment .......................................................................... 8-11
Conduct of Operation Termination............................................................................................ 8-11
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Chapter 9 - Support within Multinational Joint Operations

Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 9-1
Key Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 9-1
Types of Multinational Operations .............................................................................................. 9-1
Section II – Support within NATO Operations
General......................................................................................................................................... 9-2
Responsibilities For Support........................................................................................................ 9-2
Overview of the NATO Theatre Support System........................................................................ 9-3
Joint Logistic Support Area (JLSA) ............................................................................................ 9-4
Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) .......................................................................................... 9-4
Multinational Support .................................................................................................................. 9-4
Canadian Interaction with NATO Support Organizations........................................................... 9-5
Section III – Support within Coalition Operations
General......................................................................................................................................... 9-6
Nature of Coalition Operations.................................................................................................... 9-6
Responsibilities for Support......................................................................................................... 9-7
Coalition Theatre Support............................................................................................................ 9-7
Canadian Interaction with Coalition Support Organizations ....................................................... 9-8
Section IV – Support within United Nations Operations
General......................................................................................................................................... 9-8
Nature of UN Operations ............................................................................................................. 9-8
Responsibilities for Support......................................................................................................... 9-9
UN Theatre Support................................................................................................................... 9-10
Canadian Interaction with UN Support Organizations .............................................................. 9-11
Chapter 10 - Support to Domestic Operations
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 10-1
Key Terminology ....................................................................................................................... 10-1
Canadian Area of Responsibility ............................................................................................... 10-2
Responsibility for Domestic Operations.................................................................................... 10-2
Types of Domestic Operations................................................................................................... 10-3
Scale of Domestic Operations.................................................................................................... 10-4
Conduct of Domestic Operations............................................................................................... 10-4
Section II – Support to Domestic Operations
Concept of Support to Domestic Operations ............................................................................. 10-5
Support to Limited Domestic Operations .................................................................................. 10-5
Support to Complex Domestic Operations ................................................................................ 10-5
Health Services Support to Domestic Operations...................................................................... 10-6
Sources of Support for Domestic Operations ............................................................................ 10-6
Support to Northern Operations................................................................................................. 10-7
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Glossary ...................................................................................................................................GL-1
List of Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................AL-1
List of References..................................................................................................................REF-1
List of Figures
Figure 2-1: The CAF Support Framework................................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-2: Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support......................... 2-5
Figure 2-3: National Support ....................................................................................................... 2-8
Figure 2-4: The Strategic Lines of Communication .................................................................. 2-13
Figure 2-5: OS Hub Employment Postures ............................................................................... 2-15
Figure 2-6: Theatre Support....................................................................................................... 2-17
Figure 2-7: Organization of a Generic Joint Task Force Headquarters ..................................... 2-18
Figure 2-8: Functional Organization of a Generic JTFSC......................................................... 2-19
Figure 3-1: Component Command Method in a Multinational Joint Operation ......................... 3-6
Figure 3-2: Direct Command Method in a Small Domestic Joint Operation .............................. 3-7
Figure 4-1: The Operational Planning Process ............................................................................ 3-3
Figure 4-2: The CAF Force Employment Planning Process ....................................................... 4-6
Figure 6-1: Support-Related Processes within the Buildup Stage ............................................... 6-3
Figure 6-2: Deployment Flow and Division of Responsibilities for Movement ......................... 6-7
Figure 6-3: Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement .......................................................... 6-10
Figure 7-1: Layout of a Generic Canadian Theatre Sustainment System.................................... 7-3
Figure 8-1: Support-Related Processes within the Termination and Reconstitution Stages ....... 8-3
Figure 8-2: The Reconstitution Process....................................................................................... 8-9
Figure 9-1: Layout of a Generic NATO Theatre Support System............................................... 9-3
List of Tables
Table 4-1: Support Planning and the Operational Planning Process ........................................... 4-4
Table 4A-1: Sample Synchronization Matrix ........................................................................... 4A-1
Table 7-1: Sources of Sustainment .............................................................................................. 7-4
Table 7-2: Contracted Support Functions .................................................................................... 7-7
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CFJP 4-0
Chapter 1
Fundamentals of Support
General
0101. The purpose of support is to sustain the operational readiness of the Canadian Armed
Forces (CAF) and to support the deployment and employment of military forces in achieving a
desired outcome. As such, support is fundamental to every military activity in all environments,
whether that activity is a part of war, a military operation other than war, or a training activity.
Operational commanders require a clear understanding of the support factors that affect
operations and must give adequate and timely direction to subordinate commanders and their
support staff for effective support planning to take place. Additionally, the commanders of
support formations and units, and their staff, must understand the nature of operations to plan
and provide timely and effective support.
Key Terminology
0102. Support. Support is “the administrative and logistic aid provided to a formation, to a
unit, or to an individual.” 1 It is conducted throughout the CAF and the Department of National
Defence (DND) and at all levels of command. Support involves the provision of the following
range of services:
a. logistics services, including transportation and movements, materiel 2 management
and distribution, ammunition and explosives, laundry and bath, financial, food, and
postal;
b. contracting services;
c. vehicle and equipment maintenance services;
d. military engineering services, including mobility, countermobility, survivability,
sustainment engineering, and geospatial engineering support;
e. communication and information services refers to an assembly of equipment,
methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish
information transfer and processing functions;
f. military police (MP) services, including law-enforcement operations, security
operations, custody operations, mobility-support operations, close protection, and
force-protection operations;
g. health services support (HSS), including medical, psychological, and dental
support;
1
Defence Terminology Bank (hereafter DTB), record 1361.
2
Materiel is “all equipment, stores, packaging and supplies used by the military forces.” DTB, record 43416 Note
that this includes aircraft, ships, and vehicles.
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h. personnel support services, including personnel management, administration,

mortuary services and the repatriation of human remains, honours and awards,
administrative investigations, historical reporting, morale and welfare support, and
chaplain services; and
i. specialist services, which may include legal, policy advice, and public affairs.
0103. Operational support. “The specialized and common support activities provided to aid or
sustain the operations of a force within a theatre of operations and along the Strategic lines of
communication. Operational support generally encompasses the support activities that are not
specific to a particular component or are beyond the capability of Tactical 3 -level support
organizations, including reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM); theatre opening and
closing; and theatre-level logistics, equipment maintenance, military engineering, CIS, personnel
support, military police, contracting, and health support services.” 4
0104. Sustainment. Sustainment is “the ability of a nation or a force to maintain effective
military power to achieve desired effects.” 5
0105. Sustainability. Sustainability denotes “the ability of a force to maintain the necessary
level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.” 6 It is measured in
terms of the personnel, equipment, facilities, and consumables necessary for the force to
complete its operational 7 tasks.
0106. Administration. Administration refers to “the provision and implementation of
regulations and procedures related to the management of an organization in support of the
accomplishment of its mission.” 8
0107. Logistics. Logistics is “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics is the aspects of military
operations that deal with: design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition,
construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing
of services.” 9
0108. Combat support. Combat support is “fire support and operational assistance provided to
combat elements.” 10
0109. Combat service support. Combat service support (CSS) is “the support provided to
combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.” 11
3
A distinction is made in this publication between Tactical, the level of operation/strategy/war and things related to
it, with a capital “T”, and tactical, in the sense of “of, relating to, or constituting tactics; done or for use in
immediate support of military or naval operations; adroitly planning or planned ” [Canadian Oxford Dictionary,
p. 1582], with a lower case “t”.
4
DTB, record 47813.
5
DTB, record 34949.
6
DTB, record 5474.
7
A distinction is made in this publication between Operational, the level of operation/strategy/war and things
related to it, with a capital “O”, and operational, in the sense of “of or used for operations; engaged or involved in
operation; able or ready to function” [Canadian Oxford Dictionary, p. 1089], with a lower case “o”.
8
DTB, record 34920.
9
DTB, record 815. The NATO definition of logistics also includes medical services.
10
DTB, record 3817.
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Principles of Support
0110. A knowledge and understanding of the key principles of support is the starting point for
the development of operational-support doctrine. They are not absolute, and seldom will all of
them exert equal influence in any given operation; in many cases, only one or two will dominate.
Identifying those principles that have priority for a specific situation is essential to establishing
effective support.
0111. Support must be focused on ensuring the success of the operation. This may be
accomplished through the principles of support, which are foresight, economy, flexibility,
simplicity, cooperation, self-sufficiency, visibility, responsiveness, and survivability. 12
0112. Foresight. Foresight is the ability to predict and manage critical support constraints to the
force commander’s freedom of action, and is essential in support planning and execution.
Support commanders and planners must assess the probable course of future operations and
forecast the likely requirement for personnel, materiel, equipment, and support services.
Foresight rests not only on the ability to anticipate future operations, but also to identify,
accumulate, and maintain support assets, capabilities, and information. Foresight can be
improved through:
a. Close liaison between operations and support staff. As support requirements will
often have a direct impact on Strategic- 13 , Operational-, or Tactical-level activities,
both operations and support staff should ensure that future support and operational
plans are fully integrated.
b. A detailed understanding, by the support staff, of available resources (logistics,
engineering, CIS, MP, HSS, and personnel-support services) and movement assets,
the intended location of deploying a joint task force (JTF), and anticipated
environmental conditions. This will assist in providing the right resources at the
right time, in the right place to meet operational requirements.
c. Access to J2 and J3 information to assist in predicting the outcome of an
adversary’s manoeuvres and engagements. During operations, foresight may
become increasingly dependent on predicting an opponent’s plans rather than
determining support requirements based solely on those of friendly forces.
0113. Economy. Economy of effort requires that minimum means and resources be expended
or employed in areas other than where the main effort is intended to take place. As support
resources are typically in short supply, commanders must always consider economy in their
allocation while ensuring that mission accomplishment is not jeopardized. The efficient
employment of support resources is often best accomplished by centralizing the control of these
resources; however, this must be balanced with the requirements of the operational plan. Staff at
all levels must continually monitor and take action against unnecessary redundancy.
11
DTB, record 409.
12
The principles of support are essentially the same as the principles of sustainment described in Sustainment of
Land Operations (Ref. N), pp. 2-2 – 2-3, and Canadian Aerospace Sustain Doctrine (Ref. M), 5-7.
13
A distinction is made in this publication between Strategic, the level of operation/strategy/war and things related
to it, with a capital “S”, and strategic, in the sense of “of or serving the ends of strategy; essential in fighting a war;
done or used against an enemy’s home territory as a long-term military objective” [Canadian Oxford Dictionary,
p. 1539], with a lower case “s”.
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0114. Flexibility. Flexibility refers to the ability to adapt structures, functions, and procedures
to changing situations. Flexibility may be achieved through foresight on the part of the support
staff, the establishment of reserve stocks of critical materiel, or through the use of all available
types of support resources such as contracting, host-nation support (HNS), or that which may be
provided through national or international governments and civilian organizations.
0115. Simplicity. To ensure that support arrangements are as robust and readily understood as
possible, they should be simple, both in their concept and execution. Simplicity of support
processes and procedures facilitates flexibility, and is enhanced by:
a. Establishing a robust command and control framework that provides delegated
authority and allows mission command, to enable commanders to resolve support
complexity.
b. Using common support processes among JTF components or component
commands, allies, and other organizations. Where systems are incompatible, liaison
and user-interfaces should be established.
c. Maintaining control along the Strategic lines of communication and in the theatre of
operations so as to ensure freedom of action.
d. Ensuring that future platform/system developments are consistent with the principle
of simplicity by the coherent development of support solutions.
0116. Cooperation. Cooperation among staff at all levels of command and with other
governmental and civilian agencies (both national and international) greatly enhances the
effectiveness of the support provided. Liaison officers are one way to develop mutual confidence
and, in turn, cooperation. Cooperation may also be enhanced through standardization of doctrine
(such as with NATO), international exchange programs, and participation in multinational
exercises. Force elements must be able to rely on their support staff and organizations. It is the
responsibility of commanders and staff at all levels to ensure this close cooperation is planned
and coordinated. Cooperation is particularly important in multinational and joint operations
where national or component interests have the potential to undermine relationships.
0117. Self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency means that a force initially has at its disposal all
essential resources to conduct operations for a predetermined period.
0118. Visibility. The ability of commanders to control, allocate, or coordinate support will be
significantly impaired if they lack visibility of force assets, inbound material, and the means to
allocate priorities. Visibility is a form of situational awareness that is attained when the
commander is provided timely and relevant information regarding emerging support
requirements and available support resources.
0119. Responsiveness. Staffs must provide the right support when and where it is needed.
Responsiveness is characterized by the speed of response to the needs of the military force.
0120. Survivability. Survivability refers to the ability of the support system to ensure the
continuity of specified functions during and after exposure to abnormal conditions. 14
Survivability and protection of assets are critical factors in creating a support plan. For this
reason, support plans must be integrated with force-protection plans.
14
DTB, record 13845.
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Chapter 2
The CAF Support Framework
Section I
General
Introduction
0201. The CAF must be capable to conduct operations ranging in scale from those that require
little additional support to those necessitating the full scale mobilization of the nation’s
resources. Supporting the needs of a versatile war-fighting force that can be rapidly organized
and configured for specific operations and environments requires a flexible and responsive
support framework that can assure the effective positioning of support capabilities throughout the
battlespace, thereby matching resources to demand, and facilitating freedom of manoeuvre.
Key Terminology
0202. Key terminology that will be introduced within this chapter include the following:
a. Comprehensive approach. “A philosophy according to which military and non-
military actors collaborate to enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring
outcomes within a particular situation.” 15
b. Whole-of-government (WoG) approach. “An integrated approach to a situation
that incorporates diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of national power
as required.” 16 It is a subset of the comprehensive approach.
c. Lines of communications (LOC). “All the land, water, and air routes that connect
an operating military force with one or more bases of operation, and along which
supplies and reinforcements move.” 17
d. Strategic lines of communication (SLOC). “All the land, water and air routes that
connect a deployed force with the home nation, and along which sustainment
activities occur, as well as the activities themselves.” 18
e. Hub-and-spoke. “A method of sustaining outlying locations, formations and units
from a central and secure position.” 19
f. Operational support hub (OS Hub). “Within a pre-established global hub-and-
spoke network, an operational support node situated along or at the terminus of
Strategic lines of communication.”20
15
DTB, record 34522.
16
DTB, record 35242.
17
DTB, record 814.
18
DTB, record 41456.
19
DTB, record 43593.
20
DTB, record 47834.
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CFJP 4-0
g. Caretaker operational support hub. “An operational support hub for which all
arrangements, agreements, and plans for activation have been completed, but that is
not manned.” 21
h. Cadre operational support hub. “A task-tailored operational support hub that
provides a limited range of operational support capabilities to CAF operations.” 22
i. Fully activated operational support hub. “A task-tailored operational support hub
that provides a broad range of operational support capabilities to CAF
operations.” 23
j. Terminal. “A military or commercial transportation facility used for the loading,
offloading, and in-transit services handling of cargo or personnel.” 24
k. Intermediate staging terminal (IST). “A terminal located along the Strategic lines
of communication that temporarily provides operational support to forces in
transit.” 25
l. Host nation (HN). “A nation that, by agreement, allows:
(1) another nation’s forces to operate on or from, be located on, or transit
through its territory; or
(2) another nation’s materiel to be located on or transported through its
territory.” 26
m. Host-nation support (HNS). “Civil and military assistance rendered by a nation, in
time of peace, crisis, or war, to a force that is located on, operating in/from, or is
transiting through that nation’s territory.” 27
Overview of the CAF Support Framework

0203. The CAF support framework consists of interrelated levels of sustainment and lines of
support, within which commanders and staffs operate and synchronize physical, information, and
control networks to deliver effective support. This military structure works with other entities
within the comprehensive approach and spans the support spectrum, from civilian service
providers to the end user.
0204. As depicted at Figure 2-1, the CAF support network comprises three main parts:
a. National support. The capabilities required to project and sustain a force.
b. Strategic lines of communication. The conduit through which forces are deployed
and sustained.
c. Theatre support. Capabilities that sustain forces within a theatre of operations.
21
DTB, record 47816.
22
DTB, record 47815.
23
DTB, record 47823.
24
DTB, record 15859.
25
DTB, record 2049.
26
DTB, record 4465.
27
DTB, record 4466.
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National
National Support Rear Link Theatre Support
Tactical Level/
First and Second Line
Operational Level
(Deployed)/ Maritime
Third and Second Line
Component
k
Strategic Level/ Operational Level/ hbac JTFHQ
Fourth Line Third and Fourth Line Reac
Land
Component
NDHQ CJOC
Intra-
Strategic Lines of JTFSC Theatre
Communication
Reachback LOCs Air
Component
Reachback
RCN CA RCAF CANSOFCOM
Special
Operations
Component
International
Fourth-line
Agreements/
Support Units
Arrangements
Host Nation
Support
National Other Govt
Infrastructure/ Departments Deployed Multinational
Industry and Agencies Contractors Support
Figure 2-1: The CAF Support Framework
Levels of Conflict and Sustainment

0205. Levels of conflict. Levels of conflict help commanders visualize a logical flow of
operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. 28 There are four levels of conflict:
a. National Strategic level of conflict. The National Strategic level is where the
nature and quantity of a country’s resources dedicated to achieving national policy
objectives are determined by the political leadership. It is at this level that the
coordination of all instruments of national power occurs and military-political aims
are established.
b. Military Strategic level of conflict. It is at the Military Strategic level that military
strategic goals consistent with the desired national policy end state of a conflict are
determined. At this level, military strategies are formulated, resources allocated,
and political constraints are applied.
c. Operational level of conflict. The Operational level links the Military Strategic
and Tactical levels. It is at this level that campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish military strategic goals.
d. Tactical level of conflict. It is at the Tactical level that battles and engagements are
planned and conducted. Activities are focused on integrating and applying the
operational functions (Command, Act, Sense, Shield, and Sustain) to achieve
specific objectives within an established timeframe.
28
CFJP 01 (Ref. C), pp. 2-10 – 2-12.
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0206. Levels of sustainment. A similar approach may be taken to conceptualize the major
divisions in the level of effort required for sustainment. Nevertheless, the delineation into levels
of sustainment has certain limitations. The key is not the level at which an activity takes place or
where the transition occurs, but to ensure that all activities are coordinated and focused on
achieving the strategic objective. Each level is thus defined by the outcome intended, and not by
the level of command or the size of the element involved. Although the levels of sustainment
form a hierarchy, there is a significant degree of overlap between them:
a. Strategic level of sustainment. The Strategic level of sustainment is primarily
concerned with mobilization, national acquisition, force posture and readiness,
force generation, force projection, and force sustainment.
b. Operational level of sustainment. This level of sustainment is concerned with
sustaining a military force within a theatre of operations, and thus links the
Strategic and Tactical levels of sustainment. It is primarily within this level that
operational support is provided.
c. Tactical level of sustainment. The Tactical level of sustainment is concerned with
providing the necessary materiel and services to combat forces. This task is
accomplished through the performance of a variety of sustainment tasks, including
replenishment, infrastructure construction and repair, HSS, materiel management,
and personnel administration.
Lines of Support
0207. The CAF support framework constitutes a continuum that stretches from national
resources such as infrastructure and industry to the individual warfighter at sea, on land, and in
the air. Support capabilities along this continuum are organized into layers that are commonly
referred to as lines of support. 29 Although this system is generally linear (i.e. one line of support
flows to the next), it is also flexible, allowing the bypassing of lines of support where and when
appropriate.
0208. The allocation of support capabilities within each line conforms to the level of need, the
threat, and the requirement for mobility and force protection. The grouping of capabilities into
lines of support ensures that each level of command is effectively supported without the burden
of holding capabilities better held elsewhere. A line of support may contain a number and variety
of support units.
0209. Elements assigned to a given line of support have the capabilities required to support the
needs of the operation. This is based on the premise of “centralized control and decentralized
execution,” which allows for flexibility in the distribution process and facilitates rapid
redistribution.
29
Sustainment of Land Operations (Ref. N), p. 2-5. The term “line” refers to the organizational distribution of
capabilities. Within the Canadian Army, the term “echelon” is also used to describe lines of support.
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CFJP 4-0
0210. There are four lines of support:

a. First line support. Support capabilities that are organic or allocated to a ship, unit
or squadron.
b. Second line support. Support capabilities that are organic or allocated to a
formation.
c. Third line support. Support capabilities provided to a military force within a
theatre of operations or at installations established along the Strategic lines of
communication.
d. Fourth line support. Support capabilities provided by Strategic-level resources,
such as national depots, contractors, or industry.
Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support

0211. There is a close relationship between levels of sustainment and lines of support. While
the former describes the level of support effort involved, the latter indicates where support assets
are grouped within the military command structure. Equally important is the fact that the levels
of sustainment and lines of support overlap each other:
a. A level of sustainment may encompass elements of more than one line of support.
An example of this is Tactical-level sustainment, which incorporates first-, second-,
and third-line support.
b. A line of support may correlate to more than one level of sustainment. For example,
third-line support may be found at both the Operational and Tactical levels of
sustainment.
0212. This relationship is depicted at Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2: Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support
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CFJP 4-0
TRANSITION ISSUE
In some support doctrine manuals, tactical-level sustainment has been divided into the
following three categories:
 Integral support (IS). The support of an immediate and organic nature required
to fulfill a unit’s primary function.
 Close support (CS). The support given to the supported component to meet its
unique requirements to deal with tasks of immediate concern to its commander’s
operations.
 General support (GS). Support given to the supported force as a whole rather
than to any particular subdivision of it. It includes activities such as movement
control, waste disposal, medical treatment and evacuation, and personnel support
services. GS may be provided through a combination of military, contracted, host
nation, or coalition support options.
These categories will not be used in CFJP 4-0, Support, as “lines of support” better
reflects the link between support capabilities and the level of command at which those
capabilities are found.
Support Networks
0213. Support to operations is based on operating and synchronising three networks – physical,
information, and control – that function at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of
sustainment. Each of these networks will be tailored to support the operational plan. The
integration of activities within these networks ensures that support efforts are synchronized to
deliver the necessary effects to support the commander’s operation.
0214. Physical network. The physical network within the CAF support framework is made up
of nodes, modes, and segments that physically operate the system:
a. Nodes. A node is a physical location for the provision of services, maintenance of
equipment, medical treatment of personnel, handling and evacuation of prisoners of
war, organization and redistribution of assets and/or the transition point from one
form of transport to another. It can also be a point where a change of control is
effected. A node’s configuration can be as simple as a cache, dump, or transhipment
point or as intricate as a major mounting base, and can be static or mobile.
b. Modes. Modes are the physical means of moving materiel and personnel and/or the
means of transmission of information.
c. Segments. Segments are the main supply routes or linking lateral routes that link
the nodes. Segment types will influence the type of mode used. For example, a
segment of unpaved road will be unsuitable for some wheeled transport. Similarly,
an inland waterway segment will dictate a waterborne mode.
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CFJP 4-0
0215. Information network. The information network, which includes communications

infrastructure, serves as the technological means of synchronizing both the physical and control
networks. It gives staff at all levels of command the visibility of support process transactional
data, resources, and requirements needed in controlling the provision of support services and the
management of support resources. Advances in information technology are increasingly
enhancing the capabilities of support information networks. 30
0216. Control network. The control network comprises the means through which staffs use
information to control the provision of support. This includes the military chain of command and
other decision makers, network managers, and governance, policy, and processes that enable the
shaping and coordination of support.
Comprehensive Approach
0217. Canada is committed to a comprehensive approach to international operations, which
involves the integration of diplomacy, defence, development efforts, and the efforts of other
government departments and agencies. Within this philosophy, actors may include CAF or
multinational military forces, other (federal) government departments and agencies (OGDA),
other governments (i.e. provincial, municipal, or foreign), international organizations
(e.g. NATO and UN), non-governmental organizations (e.g. CARE or OXFAM), private sector
entities, or individuals. 31
0218. The comprehensive approach infers a cooperative culture and collaborative working
environment in which the activities and range of actors within an operational area are aligned
and operate under an overarching strategic objective. Participants work proactively and share
their understanding of situations and conduct planning and activities on the basis of shared,
favourable outcomes in the short, medium, and long term. 32 Support commanders and their staffs
will need to exchange information and collaborate with military and non-military organizations
in developing and executing support plans.
Whole-of-Government (WoG) Approach

0219. A subset of the comprehensive approach is the Government of Canada’s whole-of-
government approach, which promotes a collaborative working environment between federal
government departments and agencies. Here, too, support commanders and their staffs will need
to work proactively and in harmony with other government organizations in developing support
plans in response to international and domestic crises. 33
30
One example is the Recognized Operational Support Picture Project, which will deliver a common representation
of relevant support information that will provide situational awareness to the commander and will be shared with
support organizations at all levels.
31
DTB, record 34522.
32
VCDS, “Command and Control Operating Concept,” (Ref. B), p. 18.
33
CFJP 01 (Ref. C), p. 6-4.
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CFJP 4-0
Section II
National Support
General
0220. National support comprises military and civilian organizations and capabilities. While
national support is focused at the Strategic level, it also involves certain elements of Operational-
level support, such as support campaign planning. National support primarily provides fourth-
line support capabilities, but also has some third-line capabilities.
0221. The main elements of national support are depicted at Figure 2-3.
National
Tactical Level/
Operational Level
Component
Strategic Level/ Operational Level/ hb ack JTFHQ
Land
Component
NDHQ CJOC
Intra-
Communication
Reachback LOCs Air
Component
Reachback
Special
Operations
Component
International
Fourth-line
Agreements/
Support Units
Arrangements
Host Nation
Support
National Other Govt
Figure 2-3: National Support
National Defence Headquarters

0222. National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is the conduit through which the Government of
Canada’s defence policy and direction is transmitted to the CAF for execution. This is done
through the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), who commands the CAF and is the Government
of Canada’s principal military advisor.
0223. The Strategic Joint Staff (SJS). The SJS provides military analysis and decision support
to the CDS. 34 It includes a small support staff, which works with the RCN, CA, and RCAF, force
employment commands, allied nations, NDHQ group principals, and OGDA. The SJS prepares
CDS strategic directives that provide CDS intent and tasks to operational commanders. The SJS
staff will work closely with CJOC staff to produce the support paragraphs contained within these
strategic directives.
34
Strategic Joint Staff (hereafter SJS) website, “Strategic Joint Staff Mission and Vision,” http://sjs.mil.ca.
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CFJP 4-0
0224. NDHQ group principals. Within NDHQ there are a number of major staff groups,
called here group principals, which provide departmental-wide support to enable the CAF to
conduct operations and also serve as the CAF’s conduit to civilian industry. The group principals
that are most commonly involved in supporting CAF operations are:
a. Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel (ADM(Mat)). ADM(Mat) is responsible for
the procurement of goods and services from industry, materiel life-cycle
management, and materiel-related support for the CAF. It is through ADM(Mat)
that the CAF obtains the ships, aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, food, clothing, and
supplies required to conduct operations.
b. Assistant Deputy Minister Infrastructure and Environment (ADM(IE)).
ADM(IE) is the DND/CAF functional authority for engineering, including
infrastructure realty services, architecture and engineering, the environment, nuclear
safety, and fire services. It provides functional leadership to enable effective,
efficient, and sustainable management of DND/CAF infrastructure in support of
CAF operations and departmental programs.
c. Assistant Deputy Minister Finance and Corporate Services (ADM(Fin CS)).
ADM(Fin CS) provides financial and corporate services, including financial advice
and support to operations, military pay and benefits, audit services, financial policy
development, and is responsible for comptrollership within DND/CAF.
d. Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management (ADM(IM)). ADM(IM) is
responsible for the coordinated delivery of information management and
information technology capabilities to DND/CAF.
e. Chief of Military Personnel (CMP). CMP is also the Commander of Military
Personnel Command, which provides health care, spiritual services, and individual
training. CMP provides situational awareness and assistance to the SJS,
environmental commands, and the force employment commands regarding
personnel capability. CMP also includes the Health Services Group, which
coordinates the provision of medical and dental services to the CAF. The Health
Services Group commands deployable medical elements such as field ambulance
units.
f. Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM). The CFPM is responsible for
developing policies and plans to guide the management of the security and MP
resources of the CAF. The CFPM also holds the appointment as Commander of the
CF MP Group, exercising command and control over all MP units involved in law
enforcement and criminal investigative duties.
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CFJP 4-0
Environmental Commands
0225. Command-level staff. The RCN, CA, and RCAF staffs are primarily concerned with the
force generation of naval, land, and air formations and units in support of operations. For this
reason, the environmental commands are also described as force generators. 35 Such
responsibilities include the definition and management of environment-specific support
requirements, the development and execution of environment-specific support policies and plans,
and the management of environment-specific equipment and infrastructure. The environmental
command staffs interact with several support organizations, including the SJS, the force
employment commands, and NDHQ group principals.
0226. CAF bases. CAF bases are controlled and administered by the RCN, CA, RCAF, or other
commands such as CMP. They provide second- and some third-line support to their integral and
lodger units for routine force generation activities and domestic operations.
Force Employment Commands

0227. Force employment commands (hereafter force employers) employ naval, land, air, and
special operations forces to execute CAF operations. 36 Within the CAF there are two such
commands, namely Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and Canadian Special
Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). 37 Their staffs deal with the SJS, the staff of the
RCN, CA, and RCAF, and the headquarters of task forces and/or JTFs placed under their
operational command.
Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)

0228. Role. CJOC conducts CAF operations, less those operations conducted solely by North
American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) or CANSOFCOM, and develops, generates,
and integrates joint force capabilities for domestic, continental, and international operations.
0229. Organization. CJOC comprises a headquarters; task forces, JTFs, and elements
employed on operations; six standing domestic regional joint task force headquarters (see
Chapter 10); a worldwide network of liaison officers and command and control, intelligence, and
support nodes (including operational support hubs); and the CF Joint Operational Support Group.
CJOC also exercises operational control of the RCAF Joint Forces Air Component Command,
the RCN Maritime Component Command, the CA’s 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, and
CANSOFCOM’s Special Operations Coordination Element.
35
Force generation is the process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for force employment.
DTB, record 32171
36
Force employment, at the Strategic level, is the application of military means in support of strategic objectives.
At the Operational level, it refers to the command, control, and sustainment of allocated forces.
DTB. record 32173
37
CJOC also force generates operational support capabilities through the CFJOSG.
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CFJP 4-0
0230. Support responsibilities. CJOC support responsibilities are divided as follows:

a. Commander CJOC. Supported by a headquarters and staff, Commander CJOC is
responsible for:
(1) planning and coordinating the provision of operational support with the SJS,
force generators (RCN, CA, RCAF, or CANSOFCOM), and the
headquarters of deployed forces;
(2) directing Operational-level sustainment to CAF operations. This will include
establishing and controlling national Strategic lines of communication and
managing operational funding accounts;
(3) developing and implementing international support agreements or
arrangements;
(4) monitoring the effectiveness of operational support; and
(5) managing and accounting for operations funding accounts for all CAF
operations.
b. CF Joint Operational Support Group (CFJOSG). A high-readiness formation,
the CFJOSG generates task-tailored operational-support capabilities for
employment in domestic, continental, and international theatres of operations and
across Strategic lines of communication. The CFJOSG provides:
(1) fourth-line materiel management services, including dedicated DND/CAF
customs support, through the Canadian Materiel Support Group (CMSG)
and its supply and ammunition depots;
(2) third-line movement control services through 4 Canadian Forces Movement
Control Unit (4 CFMCU);
(3) third-line supply support through 3 Canadian Support Unit;
(4) third-line postal services through the CF Postal Unit;
(5) third-line CIS through the CF Joint Signal Regiment;
(6) third-line military engineering, through 1 Engineer Support Unit; and
(7) third- and some fourth-line MP functions unrelated to law enforcement, such
as security, force-protection operations, and custody operations. This is done
through the CF MP Services Group which, although part of the CF MP
Group, is under the operational command of the CFJOSG.
Fourth-Line Support Units

0231. Fourth-line support units, such as 202 Workshop Depot and the Mapping and Charting
Establishment, play an important role in providing national support to operations.
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CFJP 4-0
Other Government Departments and Agencies (OGDA)

0232. OGDA, within the whole-of-government approach, play an important part in the CAF
support framework. For example, Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) is a
key player in the military procurement process, while the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade,
and Development (DFATD), through its embassies and consulates, can play an important role in
facilitating communication with HNS agencies. NDHQ Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
(ADM(Pol)) is the official conduit between the CAF and OGDA.
0233. In accordance with the comprehensive approach philosophy, the CAF will also cooperate
with provincial, territorial, and municipal governments.
National Infrastructure and Industry

0234. National infrastructure and industry play a crucial part in the CAF support framework.
Infrastructure such as ports, airports, railways, roads, telecommunications systems, and other
fixed installations may be used by military forces to facilitate strategic mobility and
sustainability, while industry’s principal role is the manufacture or provision of goods and
services required by the CAF to conduct operations.
International Agreements and Arrangements

0235. Types. Transactions for support between the CAF and foreign military organizations are
generally covered by government-to-government or military-to-military agreements and
arrangements. There are three types of international agreements or arrangements:
a. Agreement. An agreement generally has the status of a diplomatic treaty and is
governed by international law. Examples include the Canada-United States
Integrated Lines of Communications (ILOC) Agreement with the US and the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
b. Arrangement. An arrangement, more commonly referred to as a “memorandum of
understanding (MOU),” is a written, approved, non-contractual, non-legally binding
instrument that may be developed at any level within DND/CAF, whereby
DND/CAF and other participants agree to cooperate in a project, a program, or a
similar undertaking. A key type of support arrangement that is frequently used
during operations would be the mutual logistics support arrangements (MLSAs)
that Canada currently has in place with a number of nations including the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. MLSAs are highly flexible instruments
designed to facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistics support, supplies, and
services between cooperating defence forces.
c. Implementing arrangement. MLSAs may be implemented through subordinate
implementing arrangements. Implementing arrangements provide additional detail
not addressed in the overarching MOU such as the scope of support to be provided,
the authorized ordering and receiving officers, or the payment procedures.
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CFJP 4-0
0236. Authority and responsibility. The following should be noted:

a. MLSAs may be negotiated under the authority of the Minister of National Defence
(MND) with appropriate defence institutions of other nations. ADM(Mat), as the
responsible DND/CAF functional authority, must authorize the negotiation and may
delegate authority to negotiate specific new or amended MLSAs to another level
one advisor (such as the commanders of the RCN, CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM, or
CJOC, or an NDHQ group principal), with or without conditions.
b. Implementing arrangements under approved MLSAs may be negotiated and
implemented directly by the responsible commanders or their authorized delegate
with the counterpart authority in the cooperating force.
Section III
Strategic Lines of Communication
General
0237. As depicted at Figure 2-4, the Strategic lines of communication are the lifelines that link
a deployed task force within a theatre of operations and national support in Canada. The
Strategic lines of communication primarily provide third-line support capabilities.
National
Tactical Level/
Operational Level
Component
k
Land
Component
NDHQ CJOC
Intra-
Communication
Reachback LOCs Air
Component
Reachback
Special
Operations
Component
International
Fourth-line
Agreements/
Support Units
Arrangements
Host Nation
Support
National Other Govt
Figure 2-4: The Strategic Lines of Communication
0238. CJOC will command and control the following operational support facilities that may be
established along the Strategic lines of communication:
a. operational support hubs (OS Hubs);
b. intermediate staging terminals (ISTs);
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CFJP 4-0
c. casualty support teams (CSTs); and

d. third-location decompression facilities (TLDs).
Operational Support Hubs (OS Hubs)

0239. OS Hub concept. Canada has adopted a hub-and-spoke distribution model to enhance
the CAF’s ability to respond rapidly to crises worldwide, and enable more efficient, effective,
and economical support to integrated operations. 38 OS Hubs, from which a military force may be
launched into a theatre of operations, are established along the Strategic lines of
communications, and “spokes” are activated to support a specific operation. The network thus
created is under the command of Commander CJOC.
0240. The OS Hub concept involves a series of very specific, pre-negotiated arrangements that
allow the CAF access, rather than a permanent physical presence, to countries in key strategic
locations around the world. OS Hubs will be established with the agreement of a host nation, and
are ideally located near a major city served by an international airport, and in close proximity to
a sea port. As such, an OS Hub is not a “base” but rather a means of facilitating the projection
and sustainment of CAF task forces. The OS Hub’s size will be determined by the scale of
operations in a region. Likewise, OS Hubs may serve as the transition point where strategic
movement ends and tactical movement into an area of operations begins.
0241. OS Hub employment postures. As depicted at Figure 2-5, OS Hubs may be rapidly
expanded in terms of their size, staffing levels, and capabilities. This will depend on the current
or anticipated level of operational activity in the area, which may range from humanitarian-relief
operations to military operations. As such, an OS Hub will be in one of three distinct
employment postures:
a. Caretaker OS Hub. A caretaker OS Hub is “an OS Hub for which all
arrangements, agreements, and plans for activation have been completed, but that is
not manned.” 39 This is the lowest employment posture. Caretaker OS Hubs will not
normally be used for routing CAF materiel and personnel, but may be activated for
short periods to support operations.
b. Cadre OS Hub. A cadre OS Hub is “a task-tailored OS Hub that provides a limited
range of operational-support capabilities to CAF operations.” 40 In this heightened
level of readiness, an OS Hub will be manned with a small cadre of personnel.
c. Fully activated OS Hub. A fully activated OS Hub is “a task-tailored OS Hub that
provides a broad range of operational-support capabilities to CAF operations.” 41
CJOC will determine which theatre-level operational-support functions would be
conducted and generate the force elements necessary to conduct and control all
activities at the hub. As operations in a region come to an end, the hub will return to
either a cadre or caretaker employment posture.
38
An operation involving the coordinated and complementary efforts of military and non-military organizations to
achieve a common goal. DTB, record 37297
39
DTB, record 47816.
40
DTB, record 47815.
41
DTB, record 47823.
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CFJP 4-0
• Manned as required
• Large-scale operations
• 2-20 permanent staff

• Limited operations
• Contingency planning
• Not normally manned

• Transient staff in response
to operational requirements Fully
Activated
Cadre
Caretaker
(Instruments & Personnel and Capabilities
Contracts in Place)
Figure 2-5: OS Hub Employment Postures
0242. OS Hub functions. A fully activated OS Hub can provide a broad range of operational-
support functions. These may include:
a. movement of forces between the OS Hub and the theatre of operations, and
retrograde movement of materiel and personnel from the theatre to Canada;
b. materiel management, which may include prepositioning, storage, and materiel
consolidation/de-consolidation;
c. local procurement and contracting of a wide variety of services;
d. financial services pertaining to the management of public and non-public funds;
e. aircraft services such as fuelling, maintenance, and in-flight feeding;
f. strategic CIS support, including secure and non-secure communications;
g. engineering support, such as real property administration; environmental services;
and fire safety;
h. personnel services such as mortuary facilities, maintenance of personnel records,
and recreational amenities;
i. HSS, such as strategic aeromedical evacuation and access to hospital services to
stabilize critically ill or injured patients;
j. MP support, which may include police and investigative services; and
k. when employed to support the movement of military forces into a theatre of
operations, the OS Hub may also provide certain elements of reception, staging, and
onward movement (RSOM) support. The RSOM process is described in greater
detail in Chapter 6.
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CFJP 4-0
Intermediate Staging Terminal (IST)

0243. Depending on the distance between Canada and the theatre of operations, CJOC may
establish one or more IST along the Strategic lines of communication. 42 An IST may provide
many of the support functions available at an OS Hub. The establishment of an IST will require a
written agreement between Canada and the host nation. This staffing activity will be coordinated
by CJOC.
0244. For more on terminal operations, see CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H).
Casualty Support Team (CST)

0245. CSTs provide intermediate medical staging facilities for casualties being returned to
Canada. CJOC may establish a CST at an OS Hub or at another location, along the Strategic
lines of communication, equipped with suitable medical facilities. Canada may also use a
multinational CST.
Third-Location Decompression (TLD) Facilities

0246. TLD facilities provide a location at which troops redeploying to Canada may
“decompress” prior to rejoining their families. CJOC may establish a TLD facility at an OS Hub
or another location along the Strategic lines of communication.
Section IV
Theatre Support
General
0247. As is the case with national support, theatre support comprises military and civilian
organizations and capabilities. Theatre support is conducted at the Operational and Tactical
levels. Theatre support primarily provides third through first line support capabilities.
0248. The main elements that comprise theatre support are depicted at Figure 2-6.
42
NATO uses the term “intermediate staging base “(or ISB) to describe the same role as an IST. As the word
“base” connotes a degree of permanence that does not apply to such an installation’s intended purpose, Canada has
adopted the term “intermediate staging terminal.”
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National
Tactical Level/
Operational Level
Component
k
Land
Component
NDHQ CJOC
Intra-
Communication
Reachback LOCs Air
Component
Reachback
Special
Operations
Component
International
Fourth-line
Agreements/
Support Units
Arrangements
Host Nation
Support
National Other Govt
Figure 2-6: Theatre Support
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) Staff

0249. Organization. Elements from the environmental commands and CANSOFCOM
deployed to conduct operations will often be temporarily grouped under one commander within
the framework of a JTF. These elements may be organized as components or component
commands as described in Chapter 3.
0250. The JTFHQ will normally be organized using the continental joint staff system as
depicted at Figure 2-7.
0251. Functions. Support responsibilities are split between the J1 (Personnel), J4 (Logistics),
J6 (CIS), J8 (Finance), and J Engineer sections of the joint staff (highlighted in Figure 2-7).
Special staffs provide the JTF commander and coordinating staff with advice and assistance in
specific professional and technical areas, 43 such as the commander of the HSS group. The
JTFHQ staff responsibilities for support include:
a. providing specialist and technical advice to the JTF commander;
b. developing and implementing theatre-level operational support plans;
c. coordinating the provision of theatre-level operational support, in conjunction with
CJOC staff and the JTFSC; and
d. in conjunction with the JTFSC, coordinating the provision of shared support
resources with the host nation and other coalition partners.
43
DTB, record 21045.
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CFJP 4-0
Personal
Comd
Staff
Special
Staff
Liaison
COS
Staff
J1 J3 J5 J7 J
Pers Ops Plans Trg Engr
J2 J4 J6 J8 J9
Int Log CIS Fin CIMIC
Figure 2-7: Organization of a Generic Joint Task Force Headquarters
Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC)

0252. General. A deployed force will require certain elements of third-line, Operational-level
support, including: movements functions at ports of debarkation (PODs), receipt and dispatch of
inbound and outbound materiel and personnel, theatre level stockpiling, contract management,
financial services, equipment maintenance, military engineering, CIS, MP, postal, and HSS. To
provide this range of theatre-level support, a JTFSC will normally be formed.
0253. Role. The JTFSC provides or arranges theatre-level support to the components of a JTF.
It serves as the operational-support link between the JTF and national-level support organizations
in Canada, providing most third and, when required, some second line non-component specific
support. Additionally, the JTFSC will conduct the support-related aspects of theatre activation
and deactivation (known as theatre opening and theatre closing) as described in Chapters 6 and 8.
0254. Organization. The JTFSC is a task-tailored grouping of operational-support capabilities
under the command of a single commander, thus providing the JTF with an integrated support
structure. It is not a standing formation, but is force-generated for a specific operation and serves
under the operational command of the JTF commander. Depending on the situation, the JTFSC
may contain all or some of the functional organizations depicted at Figure 2-8. As such, the
JTFSC concept uses a building block approach, within which support functions are organized to
maximize the overall effectiveness of the theatre support system while realizing efficiencies and
economies of effort wherever possible.
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CFJP 4-0
JTFSC
JTFSC
HQ
Health Equipment Contract JTFSC First

Engineer CIS Military Services Logistics Maintenance Management Line CSS /
Police Support CIS Support
Movements Transport TranspoPostal Supply

Supply Food Ammunition Financial Personnel
rt Services Services Support
Services
Figure 2-8: Functional Organization of a Generic JTFSC
0255. Functions. The functions of the JTFSC include the following:

a. executing the JTF theatre-level support plan;
b. providing third-line and, when required, second-line logistics, equipment
maintenance, personnel support, contract management, military engineering, CIS,
MP, and HSS;
c. operating theatre-level support installations and facilities (including PODs once
deployment is completed);
d. coordinating, as directed by the JTFHQ staff, Canadian use of shared support
resources with the host nation and multinational partners; and
e. conducting theatre opening and theatre closing tasks.
JTF Component Support Organizations

0256. As described in Chapter 3, a Canadian JTF may comprise one or more environmental or
functional components or component commands. (i.e. maritime, land, or air, special operations,
and support). Each component will normally have first and, where a component comprises a
formation, second-line support organizations that will provide component-specific support.
Component-level support organizations are described in greater detail in Section IV of Chapter 7.
Contracted Support
0257. General. Contracted support is an economy-of-force measure that enables the longer-
term sustainment of operations. As a force multiplier, contracting can be an effective and
efficient means of expanding capacity, mitigating over-tasked CAF resources, and filling support
capability gaps. The support staff should always consider the use of contracting, while at the
same time recognizing that using contracted support may affect the host nation’s local economy.
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CFJP 4-0
0258. Sources of contracted support. Contracts may be established to provide goods or

services in a theatre of operations. There are several possible sources of contracted support:
a. Coalition contracting. Coalition contracting is used to leverage existing
arrangements and agreements between coalition nations, thereby allowing CAF
resources to be used elsewhere. Within the context of a NATO operation,
contracting may be coordinated by a logistic lead nation as described in Chapter 9.
Examples of coalition contracting include, but are not limited to, the use of NATO
arrangements, MOUs, and agreements, as well as the use of the NATO Support
Agency (NSPA) as a contracting agent. An example of an agreement is the
Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement with the US armed forces.
b. Standing offers and supply arrangements. Standing offers are an administrative
means of providing the supply of goods or services, at prearranged prices with set
terms and conditions, for specific periods of time on an as-requested basis. Supply
arrangements are non-binding agreements between the Government of Canada and
suppliers to provide a range of goods and, more commonly, services on an as-
required basis.
c. Host-nation support. Contracted support may be provided by individual host
nations. This may vary from a considerable level of support to none at all.
d. Pre-facilitated contracts. Pre-facilitated contracts are multi-year contracts that are
used to bundle procurement of related goods and services to support operations in a
more cost-effective manner (such as equipment systems) or for direct delivery from
industry on an as-required basis. Some examples include:
(1) In-service support contracting. This long-term, performance-based
contracting arrangement may be employed to support major CAF equipment
platforms, normally arranged concurrently with the acquisition of the new
platform.
(2) Foreign military sales (FMS). FMS is a US program established to allow
the US Department of Defense to sell defence articles and services to
authorized foreign countries and agencies (such as NATO). The DND FMS
program is part of the departmental procurement system wherein the US
Department of Defence is another source of supply.
(3) Task order contract. Task order contracts are established with a single
contractor to provide a wide range of support. The Canadian Forces
Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP), which provides services
such as equipment maintenance, food services, transportation, CIS,
engineering, accommodations support, and materiel management and
distribution, is an example of a task order contract.
e. Direct from trade/local procurement. This method is used to provide services that
cannot be provided by CAF resources or the contracting methods described above.
It is often used to provide life support services, construction materials,
miscellaneous general and technical stores, transportation services, and locally
engaged contractors such as cleaners, labourers, or interpreters.
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CFJP 4-0
0259. The areas of contracted support, along with the management and control of deployed
contractors, are dealt with in Chapter 7.
Multinational Support
0260. Multinational support is provided in cooperation with foreign military forces operating
together in a multinational force. It is often used as an economy of force measure and to mitigate
national support capability deficiencies. Multinational support may cover a broad range of
services, such as the authority for deploying forces to transit through certain countries, the
establishment of an IST, use of facilities or infrastructure, the sale of military equipment or
services, or mutual support arrangements. This subject is dealt with in Chapter 9.
Intra-Theatre Lines of Communications

0261. Intra-theatre lines of communications include all manner of routes (road and rail, air, or
inland waterway) and theatre terminal facilities. See CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H) for more
information.
Host-Nation Support (HNS)

0262. General. HNS may include contracted services, infrastructure such as air/seaports or
storage facilities, security, or other forms of support.
0263. Principles. A number of principles should be observed if HNS is to make an effective
contribution to the support of a deployed force. These principles are:
a. Resources. The provision of HNS must be based on the actual capabilities of the
host nation, which may vary considerably depending on the situation.
b. Cooperation and coordination. Cooperation between the CAF, the host nation,
and coalition partners in the provision and use of HNS is essential. HNS planning
and execution must be coordinated to maximize operational effectiveness,
efficiency, avoid competition for scarce support resources, and to minimize
negative impacts on the local economy. When appropriate, HNS may include that
provided by non-governmental organizations.
c. Efficiency. To best meet operational imperatives, host nation resources should be
used to achieve economies of scale in providing support.
0264. Procedures. HNS can be requested for a specific type of support or to assist in the
provision of support through the use of locally sourced contractors. Support related dealings with
the host nation prior to an operation should be conducted through CJOC with assistance from
ADM(Pol) and the local Canadian defence attaché, if HNS is being arranged on a purely bilateral
basis. In the case of multinational operations, HNS arrangements are typically negotiated by
NATO, the UN, or a coalition lead nation on behalf of troop-contributing nations. For further
information regarding HNS, see AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host-Nation Support Doctrine and
Procedures (Ref. AE).
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CFJP 4-0
Chapter 3
Command and Control
Section I
General
Introduction
0301. Command and control provides the basis of the CAF support framework. Its key elements
are the relationships that exist between headquarters and staff at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels that ensure the integration of support effects to achieve the desired outcomes.
0302. This chapter should be read in conjunction with CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine
(Ref. C); CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D); and “CDS Directive on Canadian Armed Forces
Command and Control and the Delegation of Authority for Force Employment” (Ref. A).
Key Terminology
a. Command. “The operational function that integrates all the operational functions
into a single comprehensive Strategic-, Operational-, or Tactical-level concept.” 44
b. Control. “The authority exercised by commanders over part of the activities of
subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under their
command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or
directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.” 45
c. Command and control. “The exercise of authority and direction by a commander
over assigned, allocated and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.” 46
d. Task force. “A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the
purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.” 47
e. Joint task force (JTF). “A temporary grouping of elements from more than one
component, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a
specific operation or mission.” 48
f. Component. “In joint operations, an organization subordinate to the joint task
force, responsible for the planning, integration and conduct of operations for a
specific environment or function. Typical components are maritime, land, air,
special operations and support.” 49
44
DTB, record 26166.
45
DTB, record 375.
46
DTB, record 5950.
47
DTB, record 1457.
48
DTB, record 31012.
49
DTB, record 44197.
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CFJP 4-0
g. Command support. “The integrated system of resources necessary to enable

command.” 50
h. Theatre of operations. “A geographical region in which one or more military
campaigns are conducted.” 51
i. Area of responsibility (AOR). “The geographical area assigned to an Operational-
level commander within which that commander has the authority to plan and
conduct military operations.” 52
j. Area of operations (AO). “A geographical area, within an area of responsibility,
assigned to a subordinate commander within which that commander has the
authority to plan and conduct tactical operations.” 53
Levels of Command
0304. As described in CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (Ref. C), the CAF recognizes three
levels of command:
a. Strategic command. The level of command through which overall direction is
provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and coordination
is provided at the national level. 54
b. Operational command. The level of command that employs sea, land, air, and
special forces as a single, concentrated effort to attain strategic objectives in a
theatre of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns
and major operations. 55
c. Tactical command. The level of command that directs the use of military forces in
battles to contribute to the Operational-level plan. 56
Types of Operations
0305. CAF operations may be conducted as one or a combination of the following four types:
a. Joint operation. “An operation executed by a temporary grouping of elements
from at least two components, in which the application of capabilities is coordinated
to achieve a common objective.” 57
b. Multinational operation. “An operation conducted by forces of two or more
nations acting together.” 58
50
DTB, record 20266.
51
DTB, record 1470.
52
DTB, record 34612.
53
DTB, record 3528.
54
CFJP 01 (Ref, C), para 0508.
55
ibid, para 0509.
56
ibid, para 0510.
57
DTB, record 35629.
58
DTB, record 3826. While the term “combined” has historically been used, this publication will follow the current
NATO convention of using the term “multinational.”
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CFJP 4-0
c. Single-component operation. Operations undertaken by the forces of an individual

component command (i.e. maritime, land, air, or special forces).59
d. Integrated operation. “An operation involving the coordinated and complementary
efforts of military and non-military organizations to achieve a common goal.” 60
0306. Military operations may also be categorized by the readiness level required for their
undertaking. Such categories are:
a. Routine operation. “A force-employment activity that is normally recurring in
nature, can usually be planned for, and can be programmed on an annual basis.” 61
b. Contingency operation. “A deliberate operation planned in advance of a known
event or an event that could reasonably be expected.” 62
c. Rapid-response operation. “An operation conducted in response to an unforeseen
event or emergency that requires urgent involvement to save lives, reduce human
suffering, or mitigate property damage.” 63
Theatres of Operations
0307. As stated in CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D), the CAF has been structured to operate in
three major theatres of operations: 64
a. Domestic operations. Operations conducted within Canada’s internal territory, its
territorial waters, and its approaches.
b. Continental operations. Operations carried out within the North American
continental area in support of shared Canada-US strategic objectives. These include:
the defence of North America, disaster-relief operations, counternarcotics
operations, and counterterrorism operations.
c. International operations. International operations may be conducted on a global
scale encompassing the full spectrum of military operations. This includes the
conduct of major combat operations, maritime-interdiction operations, counter-
insurgency operations, peace-support operations, humanitarian-assistance
operations, and training-assistance operations.
Command Relationships
0308. The CAF recognizes the following types of command relationships:
a. Full command. “The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue
orders to subordinates.” 65 “It covers every aspect of military operations and
administration and applies to all levels from the CDS down to the unit commander.
Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, this degree of command cannot
59
Single-component operations are thus conducted by a task force.
60
DTB, record 37297.
61
DTB, record 35679.
62
DTB, record 22309.
63
DTB, record 35680.
64
CFJP 3-0 (Ref. D), paras 0206-0210.
65
DTB, record 4340.
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be delegated outside of our national chain of command (e.g. delegated to a NATO

commander).” 66
b. Operational command (OPCOM). “The authority granted to a commander to
assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reallocate
forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the
commander deems necessary. It does not include responsibility for
administration.” 67
c. Operational control (OPCON). “The authority delegated to a commander to direct
allocated forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by
function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned, and to retain or delegate
tactical control of those units. Operational control does not include authority to
assign separate employment of components of the units concerned, neither does it,
of itself, include administrative or logistic control.” 68
d. Tactical command (TACOM). The authority delegated to commanders to assign
tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission
assigned by higher authority. 69
e. Tactical control (TACON). “The detailed and, usually, local direction and control
of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks
assigned.” 70
0309. In addition to the above, the following administrative relationships may be required:
a. Administrative control (ADCON). “Direction or exercise of authority over
subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as
personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the
operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.” 71
b. Technical control. The control applied to administrative or technical procedures
and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It works with
chains of command to ensure policy compliance within specialized areas such as
legal, engineering, procurement, medical, and communications.
c. Logistics control (LOGCON). A NATO term, LOGCON refers to the authority
granted to a NATO commander over assigned logistics units and organizations in
the area of responsibility, including national support elements (NSEs). 72 It
empowers that NATO commander to synchronize, prioritize, and integrate their
logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. LOGCON
does not confer authority over national resources held by an NSE, except as agreed
66
CFJP 3-0 (Ref. D), para 0304.a.
67
DTB, record 19477.
68
DTB, record 1056.
69
DTB, record 5491.
70
DTB, record 5493.
71
DTB, record 3289.
72
MC 324/2, “The NATO Military Command Structure (NCS),” (Ref. AG). The JTFSC performs the same role as
that of the NSE.
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CFJP 4-0
in a transfer of authority (TOA) or in accordance with NATO principles and

policies for logistics.
Supported Commander/Supporting Commander

0310. The execution of operations will often be guided by supported and supporting command
relationships, within which one organization will provide specific types of support to another.
0311. The supported commander. A supported commander “has the primary responsibility
for all aspects of an assigned military task and has the authority to give general direction for
supporting efforts.” 73 While supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as
much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their respective missions and tasks,
they will determine priorities, timings, and effects of operations (including those related to
support) conducted within the area of responsibility or area of operations.
0312. The supporting commander. A supporting commander “provides a supported
commander with forces, capabilities, or other support and/or develops a supporting plan.” 74
Supporting commanders respond to the task issued by the supported commander and must
employ the required forces, from those available, to provide augmentation or other support.
0313. Supported/supporting command coordination. The supported/supporting commander
relationship will vary with the operational requirements. In most international, continental, or
domestic joint operations Commander CJOC will be the supported commander. The
commanders of the RCN, CA, RCAF, and CANSOFCOM will typically be designated as
supporting commanders, and will provide force elements and capabilities as tasked by the CDS.
Section II
Command and Control Methodologies
General
0314. As described in CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D), the CAF recognizes the component
command and direct command methods for use within joint operations. This section briefly
describes these methodologies, with the aim of showing how support organizations fit within a
Canadian JTF.
Component Command Method

0315. Within this method, the JTF commander issues broad operational directives to component
commanders (maritime, land, air, special operations, or support), each of which will have their
own component command headquarters. The component commanders, in turn, plan and conduct
independent, supported, or supporting operations as part of the overall joint force mission. The
component command method is well-suited for large, complex, and joint multinational
operations requiring a robust command and control structure. An example of the component
command method is depicted at Figure 3-1.
73
DTB, record 37280.
74
DTB, record 37281.
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CFJP 4-0
Figure 3-1: Component Command Method in a Multinational Joint Operation
0316. In multinational operations, the Canadian JTF commander or another senior Canadian
officer in the theatre of operations will be designated the Canadian National Commander. That
officer will be supported by a staff, structured as a national command element (NCE), to exercise
national command functions. The JTFHQ may perform this additional function.
0317. The JTFSC will provide Canadian-unique theatre support to CAF elements in
multinational operations. As such, the JTFSC will also serve as Canada’s NSE. 75 For NATO
operations, the JTFSC may have a LOGCON relationship with the multinational Joint Logistic
Support Group, as described in Chapter 9. As described in Chapter 2, the JTFSC is a task-
tailored organization, and thus it may be organized as a component command when required.
75
An NSE is a “deployed organization that provides support to a nation’s contingent using lines of communications
between the home nation and the theatre of operations.” [DTB, record 41459]
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CFJP 4-0
Direct Command Method

0318. Within this method, the JTF commander issues detailed orders directly to subordinate
environmental or functional elements, which may comprise a single unit or a portion thereof. It is
usually used when the size, complexity, or time span of an operation are limited, such as
domestic operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, or disaster-relief operations. The
direct command method is depicted at Figure 3-2.
OGDAs CDS
supported supporting supporting supporting supporting

CJOC RCN CA RCAF CANSOFCOM
JTF
JTFHQ
(Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 1) (Note 2)
Support Maritime Land Air Special

Component Component Component Component Operations
(JTFSC) Component
Legend Notes
Full Command
1. Environmental components may be allocated OPCON to the
Operational Command JTF commander.
Operational Control 2. Special operations forces normally allocated OPCON or
TACON to the JTF commander.
Support
Coordination/Liaison
Figure 3-2: Direct Command Method in a Small Domestic Joint Operation
0319. The following points should be noted with regards to the direct command method as it
applies to domestic operations:
a. CAF formations/units deployed in support of domestic operations will normally be
allocated OPCOM to Commander CJOC.
b. Regional joint task force (RJTF) commanders will exercise control over all
allocated units within the following authorities:
(1) OPCON of forces allocated by Commander CJOC for the execution of
routine and contingency operations within a RJTF commander’s area of
operations.
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CFJP 4-0
(2) OPCON of forces residing outside a RJTF commander’s area of operations

that have been allocated by Commander CJOC for the execution of
contingency and rapid-response operations within a RJTF commander’s area
of operations.
(3) OPCON of forces within their area of operations, upon declaration of a
rapid-response or contingency operation.
(4) TACON of all CAF elements within their area of operations (less those
assigned or allocated to other force employers or to NORAD), for the
purposes of force protection, changing readiness levels, and readiness
reporting.
(5) The CF Health Services Group, as the force generator of HSS assets for all
CAF operations, retains full command of all CAF HSS resources. While
deployed on domestic operations, HSS personnel will be OPCON to the
RJTF commander, with daily employment and tasking authority delegated
to the commanding officer of the health services unit. That commanding
officer retains the responsibility and authority to employ and deploy HSS
personnel in support of the operation. In operations where the size of the
HSS element does not require the involvement of a health services unit’s
commanding officer, all HSS will remain under the tasking authority of the
senior medical authority.
Section III
Support Relationships
General
0320. This section describes the nature of support relationships between various Canadian
organizations. Support relationships with multinational organizations are described in Chapter 9.
Relationship between CJOCHQ and the JTFHQ

0321. Regardless of whether the direct or component command methodologies are used, CJOC
staff will deal with the JTFHQ within the framework of a staff-to-staff relationship, dealing with
technical matters pertaining to the provision of Canadian-based support to the JTF. CJOCHQ
will normally deal with the JTFHQ staff, rather than the command element of the JTFSC.
0322. Notwithstanding this principle, the JTFSC may be included as information addressees in
written or electronic correspondence, on matters that require its involvement. Similarly, there
may be occasions when CJOC elements may need to communicate directly with their JTFSC
counterparts, and vice versa, on specific technical matters. On small matters, such as the need for
supply technicians at a CAF supply depot to obtain clarification from their counterparts within
the JTFSC on a particular demand, such liaison may be conducted without informing the JTFHQ
staff. On support issues affecting the whole JTF, the JTFHQ staff must be consulted.
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CFJP 4-0
Relationship between the JTFHQ Staff and the JTFSC

0323. As described in Chapter 2, the JTFHQ support staff will develop theatre-level support
concepts and plans, whereas the JTFSC’s role is to execute the support tasks assigned to it by the
JTF commander. This relationship is analogous to the one in an army brigade group, wherein the
brigade headquarters staff will develop the formation support plan that is subsequently executed
by the service battalion. In actual practice, this “line and staff” relationship is not one-way in
nature. The JTFHQ staff will request the advice of the JTFSC staff, or that of the JTFSC’s
subordinate unit commanders, on the best means of tackling a specific support issue. Similarly,
this relationship does not prevent the establishment of technical relationships between the JTFSC
and the support organizations of the JTF components.
Relationship between the JTFSC and JTF Component Support Organizations

0324. As described in Chapter 2, the JTFSC sustains the components of a Canadian JTF
(i.e. maritime, army, air, or special operations) by serving as a “bridge” between the fourth-line
support capabilities provided by national support organizations and the second-/first-line support
capabilities found within each environmental or functional component. Coordination of support
will thus be necessary between the JTFSC and the component support organizations. In some
instances, such coordination will be based on a technical control relationship. For example, the
officer commanding a medical unit within the JTFSC may have certain aspects of technical
authority over medical officers serving within the JTF’s environmental and/or special operations
components as pre-established by the force employer and/or national authorities.
Relationship between the JTF and Unit Rear Parties

0325. Once the JTF has deployed, there will likely be communications on support-related
matters that pass between its elements and the unit rear parties in Canada. It must be stressed that
such communications should be of an unofficial nature only. In all cases, deployed units must
direct official communication through the JTFHQ to CJOC Headquarters, which in turn will deal
with the appropriate environmental command headquarters.
Relationship between the JTF, CFPM, and MP Services Group

0326. To maintain an independent police service, command and control relationships between
the JTF, CFPM, and MP Services Group will normally be as follows:
a. Domestic operations. The CFPM will retain full command of all MPs performing
policing functions (such as the conduct of investigations, MP reporting, etc.) while
participating in domestic operations. MPs performing theatre-level non-policing
activities (such as mobility, security, and custody operations) may be allocated
OPCOM or OPCON to the JTF.
b. International operations. MPs performing policing functions while participating
in international operations will be allocated OPCOM to the commander of the MP
Services Group (a subordinate unit of the CFJOSG). MPs performing non-policing
activities may be allocated OPCOM or OPCON to the JTF.
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CFJP 4-0
Chapter 4
Planning
Section I
General
Introduction
0401. Support planning efforts must be versatile, complementary to the mission’s aim, fully
integrated with all phases and aspects of the operations planning process, and able to be
conducted in a joint or multinational environment. Support planning demands a thorough
understanding of the operational concept and objectives, operational risks, common and
component-specific requirements, support planning factors, and support relationships.
0402. This chapter should be read in conjunction with CFJP 5-0, The Canadian Forces
Operational Planning Process (Ref. J).
Key Terminology
a. Deliberate planning. Formal planning for routine or deliberate contingency
operations for which the location and nature of the operation is known or
anticipated. Deliberate planning is typically driven top-down. The time to
commencement of the operation is not considered a significant factor. 76
b. Rapid-response planning. Mission planning, often abbreviated, in response to an
immediate or sudden crisis. While the CAF response may be drawn from an
existing contingency plan, there may be a requirement for considerable Strategic-
level coordination to ensure adequate authorities, resources, and support structures
are in place. 77
c. Estimate of the situation. “A logical process of reasoning by which a commander
considers the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision
as to the course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.” 78
d. Staff check. “A rudimentary assessment conducted to investigate one or more
aspects of a proposed military activity.” 79
76
CFJP 5-0, (Ref. J), p. 3-5.
77
Ibid.
78
DTB, record 3508.
79
DTB, record 47839.
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e. Concept of operations (CONOPS). A clear and concise statement of the line of

action chosen by a commander to accomplish an assigned mission. 80 It will
typically contain a situation overview, mission statement, the commander’s intent,
an outline concept of execution, force capability requirements, a concept of support,
and command and control arrangements. 81
f. Course of action (COA). “In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish
or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed
plan is developed.” 82
Stages of Joint Operations

0404. A joint operation consists of a number of stages that can occur both at the Strategic and
Operational levels, sequentially or concurrently.83 The stages of a joint operation are:
a. Planning. Developing the campaign, operations and support plans, and conducting
theatre reconnaissance (recce).
b. Preparation. Preparing, assembling, and training the JTF. This stage includes
moving the JTF and its materiel to the designated ports of embarkation (POEs).
c. Buildup. Putting the support system into place. As described in Chapter 6, key
support-related activities associated with the buildup stage include: the activation of
the Strategic lines of communication; theatre opening; deployment; and reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
d. Execution. Conducting operations. As described in Chapter 7, the key support
activity associated with the execution stage will be sustaining the JTF.
e. Termination. Ceasing operations and transitioning to a post-conflict environment.
As described in Chapter 8, the termination stage may encompass theatre closing,
redeployment, and mission transition/drawdown.
f. Reconstitution. Restoring the JTF elements to an acceptable level of combat
power, before or after redeployment.
g. Analysis. Reviewing the campaign and evaluating doctrine.
Levels of Planning
0405. As described in CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J), CAF planning is conducted at all levels of command:
a. Strategic level. Strategic-level planning involves determining how best to use the
full resources of DND/CAF to implement national policies and objectives.
b. Operational level. Operational-level planning translates strategic direction into
missions and tasks for Tactical-level commanders, and is typically joint in nature.
80
DTB, record 3862.
81
CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J), p. 3-8.
82
DTB, record 20891.
83
CFJP 3-0 (Ref. D), p. 2-1.
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c. Tactical level. Tactical-level plans or orders govern the deployment and

employment of formations and units and the conduct of specific tasks. This manual
does not address tactical-level planning.
The CAF Operations Planning Process

0406. The methodology used to prepare plans and orders for CAF operations is called the
operations planning process (OPP). The OPP is a logical and dynamic sequence of collective
reasoning that involves concurrent activity and interaction between the commander, the staff, and
superior and subordinate commanders. It integrates the capabilities inherent across the staff
functions, thereby facilitating the development of a plan that seeks synergies between functions.
Coordination between planning staffs at all levels is essential if a seamless transition of
responsibilities is to be made as the process develops.
0407. As depicted at Figure 4-1, the OPP consists of five steps, and is used for both deliberate
and rapid-response planning. The first three steps – initiation, orientation, and course of action
development – comprise the estimate process, the product of which is a CONOPS. Once
approved by the initiating authority (the commander initiating the planning cycle), the CONOPS
will be further developed into an operations or contingency plan with accompanying support
annexes, or a supporting plan. From these plans, an operation order with support annexes will be
produced, as well as, in some instances, a separate administrative order.
Figure 4-1: The Operational Planning Process

(Source: CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J), 4-1)
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CFJP 4-0
Section II
Conduct of Support Planning
General
0408. Table 4-1 shows how support planning activities fit within the steps of the OPP:
OPP STEP MAIN OPP SUPPORT FOCUS
ACTIVITIES
Initiation  Receive task  Key support staff will assist in the initial assessment of the directive
 Initial assessment initiating the planning process. The planning team is activated and
the gathering of planning tools and baseline information begins.
 Gather staff
 Where possible, essential support tasks are identified.
 Gather information
Orientation  Mission analysis  Key support considerations are identified and analyzed.
 Planning guidance  Major support limitations are identified as early as possible.
 Warning order  The support staff assists in mission analysis and in preparing the
support paragraph of the warning order.
 Task analysis is conducted to determine essential, assigned, and
implied support tasks. As the task analysis proceeds, staff checks
of the support implications are conducted.
COA  Develop COAs  Task analysis continues. Staff checks are completed to determine
development  Information brief the supportability of the COAs being considered. As the COAs
mature, concepts of support and outline plans are produced. Where
 Refine COAs COAs are markedly different, individual support concepts will be
 Compare COAs produced.
 COA war game  The outline concept of support for each COA, which will include an
 Decision brief estimation of the force elements and resources required for their
support, is developed as the amount and degree of confidence in
the available information increases. Risk is assessed for each COA.
 Support concepts are evaluated during COA comparison and war
gaming. Further staff checks and/or subordinate estimates are
completed as required to cater for changes.
 Key shortfalls and issues are identified.
 Synchronization with operations and other staff ensures that the
concept of support for each COA remains valid.
Plan  Plan development  After the decision brief, the selected COA’s concept of support is
development  War game refined into the support paragraph or annex of the operation order
(deliberate or is developed as a separate administrative order. Issues identified
planning) in the COA development step must now be resolved. The support
and dependency matrices linking support requirements to the
 Issue orders operational plan in terms of time, quantities, locations, and priorities
are confirmed.
 The support plan is completed, including synchronization with
support formations/units and resolution of outstanding issues.
Plan review Plans are continually reviewed and updated as required.
Table 4-1: Support Planning and the Operational Planning Process
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CFJP 4-0
0409. The support-related activities that take place during first three stages of the OPP (the
estimate process) are examined in greater detail in Section III of this chapter.
Strategic-Level Support Planning

0410. At the Strategic level, the SJS confirms and articulates government and CDS intent and
facilitates government support to the strategic planning effort. The SJS convenes strategic
operations planning groups (SOPGs) to coordinate the planning efforts of DND/CAF, including
the force employers, force generators, and NDHQ group principals, particularly ADM(Mat),
ADM(IM), ADM(Fin CS), CMP, and CFPM. The output of this process is CDS direction to the
CAF, which will include strategic objectives and limitations.
0411. Once the operations plan has been developed, the SJS staffs the plan, the operation’s
table of organization and equipment (TO&E), and the appointment of task force commanders for
CDS approval. Throughout the phases of the operation, the SJS provides strategic oversight of
force generation and strategic issues management within DND/CAF.
0412. For further information regarding Strategic-level planning, see CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J).
Operational-Level Support Planning

0413. Operational-level support planning occurs at the Operational level of command. For
many CAF operations, the Operational-level planning organization will be CJOC, which will use
the OPP described above. Input will be sought from the SJS, force generators, NDHQ group
principals, other supporting commands, and the activated JTFHQ. The CJOC staff will develop
the operational-support concept and produce an administration order, support annexes to an
operation order, or instructions as described above. Such orders, annexes, or instructions will
provide detailed direction to the deploying JTF regarding the full range of support activities,
including logistics, land equipment maintenance, military engineering, CIS, MP, HSS, and
personnel support services. Formats for orders and annexes to orders are found in CFJP 5-0
(Ref. J).
Relationship between the Strategic- and Operational-Level Planning Processes

0414. Planning activities at the Strategic and Operational levels of command will occur more or
less concurrently, and will be both interrelated and interdependent. Operational-level planning
will depend on the nature of strategic direction provided in the CDS initiating directive, while the
CDS’s military advice to the Government of Canada on how the CAF may implement strategic
direction will be based on analysis made at the Operational level. Once a military COA has
received governmental approval, Strategic-level orders will be passed in the form of a CDS
directive to operational-level commanders for implementation.
0415. The relationship between Strategic- and Operational-level planning is depicted at
Figure 4-2.
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CFJP 4-0
Legend: = Activity = Product
Initiation & Orientation COA Plan Development Plan

Development Review
Event, GoC/Cabinet/MND GoC/Cabinet/MND Direction
Contingency Guidance
NATIONAL
POLICY
Whole of Gov’t
Assessment
Strategic Assessment Strategic
Assessment
CDS Military Advice
STRATEGIC COA CONOPS Campaign Termination

LEVEL DM/CDS Advice Backbrief Backbrief Plan or Transition
to CDS to CDS Backbrief Directive
CDS Initiating Directives/

CDS Directive or
Tasking Orders
FE Strategy
CF Integrated Managed Readiness Force Apportionment FG Conf Force Allocation Sustained FG SUPLAN
JTF Comd Appointed

FE CONOPS
Termination
Comd’s Initial Mission or Op Order
Guidance Analysis
JSOR TO & E Campaign
COA Dev &
OPERATIONAL Assessment
Info Brief
LEVEL OPP Begins Comd’s
Campaign Plan, FRAG O
Planning
CONPLAN, OPLAN,
Guidance COA Selection or SUPPLAN, Op O Branch
Warning O Endorsement Sequel
Planning
JTF Planning Op Recce
Figure 4-2: The CAF Force Employment Planning Process

(Source: CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J), 1B-1)
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CFJP 4-0
Synchronization of Planning Effort

0416. The development of an effective support plan will largely depend on the degree to which
the support staffs have synchronized their efforts with other staff. Such synchronization will take
place within the planning headquarters and with external organizations.
0417. The operations staff. Operations and support planning activities are both interrelated and
interdependent. Operations staff must know what means of support are available to develop a
feasible concept of operations; likewise, the support staff must understand the operational
concept to determine the means with which it will be supported. When properly synchronized,
these activities allow for the transmission of plans downward from the Strategic level through the
force employer to a deployed JTF, and the simultaneous passage of recommendations and
requirements upward from the Tactical level through the force employer to strategic military
authority.
0418. The support staff. Coordination must also occur within and between the various
branches of the support staff. As such, it may be desirable to assemble a support planning team
with representation from each of the various functional areas: logistics (transportation and
movements, supply, finance, contracting, food services, postal, and ammunition), equipment
maintenance, military engineering, CIS, HSS, MP, and personnel support services.
0419. External staff synchronization. The external organizations with which staff
synchronization must be effected will depend on the level of headquarters at which support
planning is being conducted. For example, at the Operational level, CJOC headquarters staff
must synchronize their planning with the SJS, the JTFHQ staff, the CFJOSG, other supporting
commanders, and a wide variety of NDHQ group principals such as ADM(Mat), ADM(IM),
ADM(IE), and CMP. Similarly, force generators must coordinate their support-related efforts
with the force employer (usually CJOC) to assure a comprehensive and cohesive support plan
and avoid duplication of effort.
Situational Awareness
0420. Situational awareness is the result of information gathering about friendly and enemy
force capabilities, resources, and infrastructure, and is an input to support planning. It should be
gathered continuously, in parallel with the operational intelligence effort, and be given equal
priority. Once gathered, the data relative to an area of operations or a theatre needs to be
analyzed to identify the support impact on operations and any critical vulnerability.
0421. The support staff should identify information needs and work closely with the
intelligence (J2) organisation to ensure the systematic collection of appropriate data and avoid
duplication of effort. Data, and preferably the analysis to turn this into useful information, should
be shared between organizations to reduce effort and ensure all organizations are planning from
“the same sheet of music.” At the same time, the support staff must keep the intelligence
organization advised of changing information priorities and be aware that a significant period
may elapse between submission of an information request and its satisfaction. As data collection
and analysis takes time, assumption-based planning is usually undertaken to facilitate progress.
The assumptions should be documented, and be revisited whenever new information is obtained.
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CFJP 4-0
Reconnaissance
0422. One way of obtaining support intelligence is through the conduct of reconnaissance.
From a support planning perspective, the aim of reconnaissance is to gather first-hand knowledge
of the circumstances within the proposed theatre of operations and also at proposed locations of
Strategic lines of communication installations. Reconnaissance will often be conducted during
the planning stage, and may be conducted on three different levels:
a. Strategic-level reconnaissance. Strategic-level reconnaissance, coordinated by the
SJS, focuses on geo-political issues and very high-level discussions that will be
preliminary to the Operational-level reconnaissance. Strategic reconnaissance will
ideally take place during the initiation step or early in the COA development step of
the OPP.
b. Operational-level reconnaissance. Operational-level reconnaissance is initiated,
organized, and conducted by CJOC. They will ideally take place during the
initiation step or early in the COA development step of the OPP, and may be
conducted at the same time as the Strategic-level reconnaissance. The size and
composition of the Operational-level reconnaissance party will depend on the
operation’s requirements and logistic limitations, but it will include representation
from Operational-level organizations (e.g. CJOCHQ and the CFJOSG) and the
appropriate support subject matter experts.
c. Tactical-level reconnaissance. Tactical-level reconnaissance will be organized and
conducted by elements of the JTF and will take place prior to the deployment of
JTF advance parties, often during the preparation stage of a joint operation. It is
particularly important that Tactical-level reconnaissance teams include the
appropriate support subject matter experts.
Staff Checks
0423. The support staff at all levels of command will conduct staff checks on a wide variety of
issues. Staff checks are particularly useful in determining gross requirements, such as movement
calculations, or to calculate military engineering, CIS, or HSS needs for a deploying force. A
staff check is not a detailed estimate. It will often be necessary to trade accuracy and detail for
speed and timeliness in preparing staff checks so as not to delay the decision-making process.
Section III
The Support Estimate
General
0424. The support estimate is used to verify the viability of proposed COAs and to develop the
concept of support for the selected COA. Its development will be a cooperative endeavour,
conducted by the support staff, and will be fully integrated with the planning activities conducted
by the operations staff. The depth of detail and accuracy of analysis will often increase as the
planning process unfolds. It may be limited to a few staff checks, or it may be a more complex
process melding several individual estimates.
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CFJP 4-0
0425. There are three key activities associated with the production of a support estimate:
a. Mission analysis. Mission analysis must consider the end state, assigned and
implied tasks, constraints and restraints, and the intentions of the higher
commander.
b. Evaluation of factors. The evaluation of factors must be exhaustive and each
deduction thoroughly analyzed for both subsequent deductions and the impact on
the aim. This analysis leads to the development of different COAs.
c. Development and comparison of COAs. The supportability of each COA is
confirmed, and the support concept and plan is developed for the COA that will be
selected by the commander at the end of estimate process.
Mission Analysis
0426. Mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior
commander’s orders the tasks necessary to accomplish the operation’s objectives. During this
step, the support staff will obtain as much information as they can on the situation, and will
consider what is required and why. Four mission analysis questions must be addressed:
a. What is the support intent and what effects must the supporting organization
deliver? While the roles of supported and supporting commanders are fairly
straightforward, the fact that a clear mission statement is often delivered late in the
planning cycle may introduce difficulties. A preliminary support plan can usually
be developed and then gradually refined as the mission becomes clearer.
b. What assumptions, constraints, and restraints will affect support? The support
staff must identify assumptions that are being made or need to be made to develop
the support plan. Wherever possible, requests for information should be initiated to
turn each assumption into a fact. Similarly, the support staff must be aware of
planning constraints (what must be done) and restraints (what shall not be done)
that will affect the delivery of support effects.
c. What are the assigned and implied support tasks? It is essential that a list of
assigned tasks and implied tasks be produced as early as possible in the process.
Tasks should be linked to a support capability, and where possible, concurrent
planning should be initiated by those organizations most likely to carry out the task.
d. Against what risks must the operation’s support system be resilient? The
support staff should identify major risks associated with the operation’s support
system as early as possible in the planning process, so that they may be taken fully
into account while evaluating factors and considering possible COAs.
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CFJP 4-0
Evaluation of Factors
0427. The support staff must quantify requirements and determine the feasibility of support for
each phase of an operation. The estimate process provides an accurate assessment of how factors
might affect the COAs under consideration. To save time and effort, only those factors from
which deductions can be drawn should be examined. It should be noted that there is no template
identifying a complete list of factors to be considered within the support estimate process, as the
number of problems is infinite. The factors described below should be examined as a minimum.
Support Planning Factors

0428. Nature of the operation. The nature of the operation will determine the composition of
the JTF and, to a great extent, the manner in which it is supported. For example, a combat
operation will entail a risk of attack and a greater need for force protection of support assets,
routes, and facilities. On the other hand, a humanitarian-assistance operation conducted within a
permissive environment may require additional military engineering and HSS capabilities.
0429. Force structure and composition. The structure and composition of the deploying force,
particularly with regards to personnel, vehicles, and major equipment, will also have a direct
bearing on support planning. This information is found within the TO&E. Based on the TO&E,
support staffs will be able to deduce the Strategic transportation resources that will be required
for the JTF’s deployment, and estimate the quantities and types of materiel to support the force.
In conjunction with considerations of the nature of the operation, destination, forecasted demand,
and risk, support staff will be able to design the theatre support structure and develop support
planning tools such as equipment failure rates and casualty estimates.
0430. Destination. The area of operations will affect how support activities will be carried out.
It is essential that support staff have knowledge of the destination and surrounding area,
including: available infrastructure; the level of support to be provided by local contractors, the
host nation, and coalition partners; climate and terrain; and local culture.
a. Infrastructure. Critical factors for support operations include: the availability and
suitability of storage and warehousing for general supplies, fuel, and ammunition
and explosives; maintenance facilities; communications assets; engineering
materials and water sources; and local medical facilities.
b. HNS and coalition partners. For international operations, HNS and the support
that can be provided by coalition partners must be taken into account. The range
and reliability of HNS, available in terms of personnel, equipment, services, and
other resources, including that provided through local contracting or international
agreement, may allow the CAF to reduce its support structure. Careful
consideration must be made by support staff to identify, evaluate, and determine
host nation sources of supplies and services to be used during the operation, while
taking into account the respective reliability and compatibility of such resources.
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CFJP 4-0
c. Climate and terrain. Climate and physical geographical characteristics of the

destination may have significant impacts on the performance and safety of
personnel and functioning of the equipment. Similarly, the nature of the terrain
must be considered. For example, operations conducted in mountainous terrain may
necessitate the use of pack animals or rotary wing aircraft to effect sustainment of
military units. These sub-factors may affect resource consumption rates and the
conduct of military operations, as well as the support structure.
0431. Demand. Demand refers to the forecasted quantity and pattern of consumption or usage
of materiel or services, and will depend on the JTF commander’s concept of operations.
Demand, in conjunction with force structure and the nature of the operation, will drive support
requirements such as: the type of strategic lift assets used for sustainment, sustainment
schedules, theatre-level distribution policies and methodologies, and theatre-level stockpiling
policies and infrastructure. Demand is composed of three elements:
a. Steady state. The steady state demand reflects the continuous usage of
commodities, such as rations, which can be accurately predicted and change little
during various stages of operations. As the steady state demand can usually be
calculated from historic usage rates, it is generally the easiest to preplan.
b. Cyclical. Cyclical demand represents changes in consumption due to changing
climate, operational posture, or operational intensity. It is predictable with good
management and forward planning.
c. Surge. The rate of demand will continually fluctuate during the conduct of
operations with little or no warning time. Support staff must anticipate the
possibility of a surge in demand and put into place a highly flexible and responsive
support organization and system through immediate reserves, rapid and precise
delivery means, or the ability to switch priorities quickly. Surging demand cannot
be maintained indefinitely and time will be needed for the support force to rest and
be reconstituted, if required.
0432. Distance and accessibility. Distance, both to and within the theatre of operations, and
the accessibility of the area of operations (by sea, land, and air) are key factors in the
development of the support plan. Distance and accessibility will affect not only the length,
structure, and capacity of the Strategic and intra-theatre lines of communications, but also transit
times, demand cycle times, and the need for an OS Hub or IST to ensure an efficient and
sufficient flow of resources. Distance may vary as military operations develop; thus, there must
be sufficient support resources available to readjust and, when necessary, extend the lines of
communications to maintain operational capability.
0433. Duration. The anticipated duration of operations will also influence the overall volume
of materiel and type of services required to support the deployed force. This will in turn drive
other factors, such as transportation requirements for sustainment, for the stockpiling of certain
types of materiel within the theatre of operations, and the need to rotate or replace personnel and
equipment. If the operation is to be of short duration at a well established destination where local
support is reliable and easily available, then it may require a relatively small support structure.
Conversely, if the operation is likely to extend over several months or years, in a hostile and
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CFJP 4-0
austere destination, the requirement for support will likely include a wide range of services that
will result in a larger support structure.
0434. Risk. Risk must be continually assessed so that appropriate countermeasures can be put
in place. Hostile activities can impede movement, destroy logistic stockpiles, or impede
communications. In addition to being posed by an individual, organization, or nation, threats
may emanate from the operating environment. The latter, being passive in nature but still
potentially harmful, are better defined as operational hazards. They include, among other things:
weather and extreme environmental conditions; explosive ordnance (including, improvised
explosive devices, unexploded ordnance, and mines); infectious diseases; dangerous animals,
reptiles, insects, and plants; geography; civil disobedience; and criminal activities.
0435. Support commanders must therefore evaluate a number of support-related elements, such
as stock holdings, delivery means, and enemy’s capacity to interfere with the Strategic lines of
communication, to determine how to mitigate the risk associated with them. As the operation
unfolds, the risk may change requiring adjustments to the support. The support staff must be
flexible and innovative in developing solutions to counter the risks to the operation.
0436. Operational priorities. The commander’s operational priorities will affect the conduct
of support. These will affect activities such as deployment, sustainment, and redeployment.
0437. Financial factors. As funding envelopes are limited, planners must consider financial
factors, such as value for dollars expended, when developing support COAs.
0438. Protection of the environment. Military operations will have an impact on the
environment. Staff must consider and include measures to protect the environment during the
planning process.
Development and Comparison of Support COAs

0439. Development. The primary task within this step is to develop and validate potential
COAs. The diverse nature of support will usually necessitate individual analysis of requirements
by the functional members of the support staff and consolidation of these analyses into support
COAs. In many instances, the support staff will generate a single, flexible approach that
maximizes the use of resources and may be applied to any of the operational COAs under
consideration. The support staff must address four key questions for each potential COA:
a. What is the concept of operations and what are its pros and cons?
b. What are the risks and issues with regard to support?
c. What is the cost?
d. What are the potential support capability gaps?
0440. Comparison. If more than one support COA has been developed, each must be analyzed
to determine the optimal solution. When comparing COAs, the support staff must consider:
a. How effectively does each COA meet operational requirements?
b. How efficiently does each COA meet operational requirements?
c. How resilient are the COA(s) to potential risks?
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0441. Presentation. The support COA is best presented in short narrative form with supporting
graphics. This provides the basis for the support paragraph of the operations order, a support
annex, or a separate administration order.
Section IV
Support Planning Tools
General
0442. The support staff will have at its disposal a variety of planning tools that may be used to
facilitate support planning. Some of these are described below.
Staff data
0443. These tools include, but are not limited to:
a. staff data handbooks and staff tables;
b. tables of organization (personnel) and equipment (TO&E);
c. task force movement tables (TFMT). These are described in general in Chapter 6
and in detail in CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H);
d. CIS tools, such as sunspot forecasting, line of sight propagation prediction, satellite
look angle calculators, and radio frequency management tools;
e. estimated casualty rates;
f. materiel usage rates and scales of issue; and
g. military, economic, and geographic intelligence sources, including those available
through the Internet.
Conceptual Framework
0444. A graphic of the battlespace may be created to highlight potential requirements,
resources, and the support network by geographic area. This enables the planner to simplify
complex tasks into subordinate elements. The location of existing and potential support
installations should be shown along with the distribution network identifying major and alternate
routes and capacities. As the planning process unfolds, the graphical depiction will mature and
eventually reflect a possible solution.
Map Overlays
0445. Map overlays can provide a graphic depiction of both the concept of operations and the
concept of support, showing where and when support resources will be provided.
Synchronization Matrix
0446. A synchronization matrix may be used as a means of visualizing activities as they relate
to time and space. Through the use of this tool, planners will be able to see the interrelationship
of the various elements of the plan, identify peaks and valleys in activity, allowing them to
resolve scheduling issues that threaten to overload capabilities.
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CFJP 4-0
0447. In many instances, a synchronization matrix will be presented in a table format, within
which major tasks are listed down the side and phases or timings are depicted across the top.
Information such as start/end times, rates of activity (i.e. high, normal, or low), phases of tasks,
or key sub-tasks may be entered in the appropriate boxes. Similarly, colour-coding may be used
to indicate different types of activity, Thus, while the synchronization matrix resembles a Gantt
chart 84 used to graphically depict a project schedule, it is a considerably more flexible document
that may be tailored to requirements specific to the operation or activity being planned.
0448. An example of a synchronization matrix, which depicts sustainment activities in support
of a land force operation, is found at Annex A to this chapter.
Decision Support Template

0449. A graphical decision support template can be used to show what critical decisions are
required, when they are required, and what information is needed to support the decision.
Dependency Matrix
0450. The dependency matrix gives the support responsibilities assigned to the various
operational-support units.
CAF Information Systems

0451. DND corporate information management systems, which include both large departmental
enterprise resource-planning systems (e.g. the Defence Resource Management Information
System – DRMIS) as well as a variety of smaller, functional legacy systems, serve as DND
systems of record for logistic, equipment engineering and management, financial management,
personnel support, and HSS resource-base transactional data. This data is essential to operational
support planning and execution across all operational-support functions.
0452. Experience has demonstrated that timely and reliable access to information is an
important element of operational success. This is driving a trend to implement network-enabled
information management concepts such as the common operating picture. The support
component, known as the “recognized operational support picture,” is a common representation
of relevant support information that provides situational awareness to supported and supporting
commanders and their staffs and to support organizations at all levels of command. This
information is drawn from recognized, authoritative sources and sensors and provides temporal,
spatial, condition, readiness, vulnerability, and support process service delivery information.
NATO Information Systems

0453. NATO also has support planning systems, such as the Logistics Functional Area System
(LOGFAS), which is used for operational logistics planning and execution. LOGFAS comprises
an integrated suite of applications that couple information technology with operating processes to
support planning and execution through the full range of operational logistics activities,
including force generation, strategic deployment, RSOI, sustainment and redeployment. NATO
nations are required to develop interfaces between national operational logistics information
systems and LOGFAS to facilitate multinational interoperability.
84
A Gantt chart is a “bar chart of activities against a timeline showing how long each activity will take and
indicating start and end dates for each.” [DTB, record 46193]
4-14
CFJP 4-0
Annex A to Chapter 4
Sample Synchronization Matrix
COA: 1
MISSION: OP CONVERSION
CONCEPT OF OPS: Defend on line of Tweedsmuir
River to stop enemy advance and regain offensive
initiative.
D-DAY
OP TIMELINE D-3 D-2 D-1 D +1
0400 0800 1200 1600 2000 2400
ENEMY ACTIONS LRP & Air Recce Recce Elements Recce Elements Enemy Main Attack
Defensive Preps -Covering Force -Covering Force Main Defensive battle Counter Moves
FRIENDLY ACTIONS Deploys -Defensive Preps
-Defensive Preps Complete
Reserve
DECISION POINTS
Committed
Artillery Ammunition Begins 0001 hrs End at 1200 hrs
Dumping
Engineer Stores Dumping Begins 0400 hrs Ends 1800 hrs
Water Point #1 Closes 2400 hrs
Water Point #2 Opens 0600 hrs
Ration Commodity Point Opens 2000 hrs Closes 0600 hrs
DPs Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal
RP 1 Closes 0600 hrs
RP 2 Opens 2200 hrs
ECP #1 Closes 0200 hrs Cleared by
2030 hrs
ECP #2 Opens 1200 hrs
BLP #1 (Open Throughout)
FLG deploys 2000 hrs
Svc Bn Support Closes 1200 hrs
FLG Support Opens 1200 hrs
Svc Bn and B Echelons Recce & Advance 2000 hrs
deploy to new location Parties
Table 4A-1: Sample Synchronization Matrix
4A-1
CFJP 4-0

CFJP 4-0
Chapter 5
Preparing the Joint Task Force
General
0501. The purpose of the preparation stage is to ensure that the force elements comprising a
JTF are assembled and made ready to carry out the planned operation. In many instances,
preparation activities will be conducted concurrently with those of the planning stage, and at all
levels of command. The preparation stage begins with the issuance of warning orders. It ends
once the JTF has been declared ready to conduct operations, and the JTF main body has been
moved to the POEs in preparation for embarkation.
0502. The preparation stage may also be described as “mounting,” a movement term defined
below. For this reason, this chapter should be read in conjunction with CFJP 4-1, Movement
(Ref. H).
Key Terminology
a. Main operating base. “A base responsible for supporting the generation,
employment and sustainment of permanently assigned air, land, and/or maritime
forces.” 85
b. Assembly base. “The base, designated by the parent command, at which personnel
and materiel are initially assembled for training and administration prior to
deployment.” 86
c. Staging base. “A base located between the assembly and mounting bases where
fuel, lodging, feeding, and other services are provided to personnel and materiel in
transit.” 87
d. Mounting. “All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose in
anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area,
preparation, and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading
points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable.” 88
e. Mounting base. “A designated base that accommodates personnel and materiel
prior to loading at the ports of embarkation.” 89
f. Port of embarkation (POE). “A seaport, airport, or railhead where personnel,
equipment, and/or stocks are loaded onto a means of transport.” 90
85
DTB, record 41464.
86
DTB, record 15677.
87
DTB, record 47840.
88
DTB, record 4821.
89
DTB, record 15770.
90
DTB, record 31682.
5-1
CFJP 4-0
Responsibility for Preparation Stage Activities

0504. Support responsibilities for preparing a JTF are normally divided as follows:
a. SJS. The SJS will monitor preparation activities and resolve issues as required.
b. Primary force generator. The CDS directive will designate a subordinate
commander, typically the commander of an environmental command, to take the
lead for force generation and preparation stage activities. The primary force
generator will work in conjunction with CJOC and the SJS, and will declare the JTF
ready for operational employment.
c. NDHQ group principals. Various NDHQ group principals, such as ADM(Mat),
ADM(IM), CMP, and CFPM will support force generation activities by procuring
and delivering equipment and materiel for use by the JTF.
d. CJOC. The force employer, CJOC will support and monitor preparation activities
conducted by the primary force generator, and will undertake planning for the
buildup and sustainment of the JTF. Depending on the circumstances, CJOC will
coordinate the force generation of the JTFSC.
e. JTF. The JTF will execute the detailed preparation of the JTF elements.
Force Generating the JTF and JTFSC

0505. JTF. The JTF will be generated as described in CFJP 5-0 (Ref. J). The TO&E for the JTF
will be developed by the supported commander in conjunction with supporting commanders and
the SJS. It will describe the specific organization, personnel, and equipment identified for an
operation. Forces allocated to the JTF will be identified in the CDS directive.
0506. JTFSC. As the JTFSC is mission-tailored, the process for its generation will be more
complex than that of environmental or special forces components, which may be based on an
existing formation or unit. As tasked by the CDS, CJOC may be responsible for the force
generation of the JTFSC, including the development of the TO&E and sourcing of personnel. For
the first rotation, key JTFSC staff will typically be drawn from the CFJOSG, with the remaining
support elements being drawn from across the CAF as directed by the CDS. This will occur prior
to the JTFSC being assigned OPCOM to the JTF commander.
Assembling and Training the JTF and JTFSC

0507. The JTF, including the JTFSC, will be assembled at a designated assembly base, which
will typically be provided by the primary force generator. Ideally, the selection of the assembly
base will be based on proximity to the majority of the JTF’s force elements. For some force
elements, this may mean that their main operating base is also the assembly base. The movement
of outlying force elements to the assembly base will be coordinated by the primary force
generator, in conjunction with the JTFHQ. The JTF commander will be responsible for the
training of the JTF force elements at the assembly base.
Support to Individual and Collective Training

0508. A key activity conducted at the assembly base will be the conduct of JTF individual and
collective training, which will require varying degrees of support. As much as possible, such
support will be provided by organizations external to the JTF (e.g. the assembly base).
5-2
CFJP 4-0
Personnel, Vehicle, and Equipment Preparations

0509. Personnel preparations will often commence at the main operating bases and will
continue throughout the preparation stage at the assembly/mounting base. Such preparations will
typically include the conduct of personnel readiness verifications, medical screening and
inoculations, and training, both individual and collective. Vehicles and equipment will often
require servicing to be made ready for use within an operational theatre. This activity will
typically be conducted within the JTF’s first- and second-line capabilities, in conjunction with
the assembly/mounting base support organization.
Identifying, Requisitioning, and Assembling Materiel

0510. The JTF will typically deploy with a certain number of days of supply for a wide variety
of materiel as directed by CJOC. Such materiel (also known as operational stock91 ) will be
identified and requisitioned by the JTF’s first-, second-, and third-line capabilities, in
conjunction with the staff of the primary force generator and NDHQ group principals like
ADM(Mat) or ADM(IM). Operational stocks may be assembled and prepared for shipment at the
assembly base or at CAF supply or ammunition depots. JTF movement planners must remember
to include the nature and quantity of such materiel within the task force movement table for
shipment to the theatre of operations (see Chapter 6).
Transfer of Command Authority and Responsibility for Support

0511. Once the primary force generator has declared the JTF to be operationally ready, a
transfer of command authority (TOCA) 92 will place the JTF under OPCOM of the supported
commander (in most instances Commander CJOC) for employment. From this point forward,
and until the operation is terminated, CJOC will be responsible for the JTF’s support.
Movement during the Preparation Stage

0512. Movement to the mounting base. Depending on the proximity of the assembly base to
the POEs, the assembly base may also be designated as the mounting base. If this is not feasible,
a separate mounting base that is reasonably close to the POEs will be required. In the latter
instance, the primary force generator, in conjunction with the JTF, will plan and coordinate the
movement of the JTF elements from the assembly base to the mounting base.
0513. Movement to the port(s) of embarkation. Once the JTF is ready for deployment, its
personnel, vehicles, and equipment will be moved from the assembly/mounting base to the
designated POE(s) in accordance with the JTF commander’s movement priorities and under the
control of movement-control detachments (Mov Con Dets) provided by 4 CFMCU or other
organizations such as the RCN, CA, or RCAF. International operations will normally require air
and sea POEs (APOE and SPOE), while continental operations may also need railheads.
91
Operational stocks are the “level of stock necessary to meet possible operational requirements over and above
holdings/allowances.” DTB, record 1063
92
A transfer of command authority is “the formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces allocated to
an operation from a force or capability generator to a force employer, as well as from force employer to a force or
capability generator upon return from operations.” DTB, record 30432
5-3
CFJP 4-0
0514. Operational stocks (including ammunition) may be delivered directly from supply or
ammunition depots to the POE(s). This information will be indicated in materiel requisitions
initiated by the JTF as described above. Such movement will be coordinated between the CJOC
J4 Movements staff (or a 4 CFMCU Mov Con Det on CJOC J4 Mov’s behalf), the primary force
generator, the JTF movements staff, and the CMSG.
Activities at the Port(s) of Embarkation

0515. Upon the JTF’s arrival at the POE(s), vehicles and equipment will undergo final
maintenance inspections to ensure that they may be transported safely. Personnel may be
provided with temporary accommodation and feeding prior to departure. These tasks will
normally be carried out by an embarkation party provided by the primary force generator.
0516. Once the JTF vehicles, equipment, and personnel are ready for embarkation they will be
loaded into aircraft, ships, or unto trains, under the direction of the 4 CFMCU Mov Con Det, for
deployment. The loading of military aircraft will be conducted by an RCAF mobile air
movements section (MAMS). Contracted aircraft will normally be loaded by contracted support
personnel. Primary force generators will normally be tasked to provide loading parties. All
loading will be conducted in accordance with priorities established by the JTF Commander.
5-4
CFJP 4-0
Chapter 6
Buildup of the Joint Task Force
Section I
General
Introduction
0601. The purpose of the buildup stage is to establish the in-theatre support system that will be
required for the operation. Comprising several major support activities, parts of the buildup stage
will often be conducted concurrently with the preparation stage. These activities include:
a. activating the Strategic lines of communication;
b. theatre opening (part of the larger process of theatre activation);
c. deployment; and
d. reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM).
0602. Several buildup stage activities will often be conducted concurrently. For example,
theatre opening activities will likely continue while the JTF’s deployment is ongoing.
Key Terminology
a. Theatre activation. “The diplomatic, operational planning, and support activities
required to shape an operation and prepare the theatre for the conduct of conduct
operations. It includes intelligence gathering, liaison with multinational staff,
diplomatic engagement, arranging host-nation agreements, and theatre opening.” 93
b. Theatre opening. “In the context of theatre activation, the establishment of the
theatre support structure required for the deployment and sustainment of the force.
The theatre support structure consists of all materiel, infrastructure, services, and
arrangements.” 94
c. Deployment. “The relocation of forces to desired areas of operations.” 95
d. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). The process
that enables JTF elements, on arrival in a theatre of operations, to attain full
operating capability as part of a joint or multinational force. It encompasses both
the support staff-led activities of reception, staging, and onward movement and the
operations staff-led activity of integration.
e. Reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM). The support activities
within the RSOI process.
93
DTB, record 47841.
94
DTB, record 47844.
95
DTB, record 1203.
6-1
CFJP 4-0
f. Port of debarkation (POD). “A seaport, airport, or railhead where personnel,

equipment, and/or stocks are unloaded from a means of transport.”96
g. Marshalling area. “An area within which materiel, especially vehicles, is
assembled and organized for onward movement.” 97
h. Staging area. “A locality established for the concentration of personnel and
materiel between movements over lines of communications.” 98
i. Assembly area. “An area in which the elements of a force are assembled in
preparation for further action.” 99
j. Deployed operating base. “An expeditionary base that supports the employment
and sustainment of deployed forces.” 100 A deployed operating base may be used by
maritime, land, air, or special forces components. A deployed operating base used
by the JTFSC may also be called the theatre logistic base.
k. Forward operating base. “An expeditionary base located in the combat zone that
supports the employment and sustainment of deployed forces.” 101 Forward
operating bases may be established to support combat elements in areas distant
from the deployed operating base.
l. Reconnaissance party. A group composed of personnel that a commander assigns
to reconnoitre and prepare an area of operations such as a deployment area,
concentration area, or assembly area, for subsequent occupation. 102
m. Advance party. An element that precedes a unit to establish contact with on-site
units to facilitate the arrival of the main body of the troops.103
n. Main body. The major element of a force excluding reconnaissance, advance and
rear parties.
Responsibility for Buildup Stage Support Activities

0604. Support responsibilities during the buildup stage are normally divided as follows:
a. SJS. The SJS will provide strategic direction and monitor the buildup of the JTF
within the theatre of operations.
b. Environmental commands. The RCN, CA, and RCAF will provide resources to
CJOC to support buildup stage activities.
c. NDHQ group principals. Various NDHQ group principles, such as ADM(Mat)
and ADM(IM), will continue to provide procurement and technical support.
96
DTB, record 31681. Also known as a “port of disembarkation.”
97
DTB, record 7870.
98
DTB, record 15836.
99
DTB, record 14116.
100
DTB, record 30809.
101
DTB, record 28933.
102
DTB, record 24736.
103
DTB, record 19426.
6-2
CFJP 4-0
d. CJOC. CJOC will:

(1) issue warning and operations orders for buildup stage activities;
(2) activate, command, and control movement and operational-support facilities
established along the Strategic lines of communication;
(3) plan theatre opening, with input from the JTFHQ;
(4) plan, coordinate, and control the strategic deployment of the JTF; and
(5) in conjunction with ADM(Pol), establish and/or activate HNS, bilateral, and
multilateral agreements.
e. JTF. The JTF will be responsible for:
(1) executing theatre opening;
(2) planning and conducting RSOI within the theatre of operations; and
(3) planning and controlling movement within the theatre of operations.
Processes
0605. The support-related processes involved in the buildup stage are depicted at Figure 6-1.
e/ nd s to
f to
iv
ect s ce a rtie en ody t ady t
r
Di io
n ec Pa m B en Re uc s
S rat er oy n m ed F nd on
D F R nce loy epl Mai ins oy t JT Co rati
e
C Op rd T
J va ep D F eg pl ple
O
Ad JT B De om e
D
C Op
TIME
Activate Strategic Lines

of Communication
Deployment
THEATRE ACTIVATION
In-Theatre Operational and Diplomatic Tasks
Theatre Opening
RSOM of JTF Main Body
Figure 6-1: Support-Related Processes within the Buildup Stage
6-3
CFJP 4-0
Section II
Activating the Strategic Lines of Communication
General
0606. The Strategic lines of communication must be activated to enable the JTF’s deployment
to the theatre of operations, its subsequent sustainment, and eventual redeployment. This will
normally occur early during the preparation stage. This step will be considered complete when
all necessary operational support resources required to operate the Strategic lines of
communication are in place and ready to conduct sustainment operations.
Planning the Strategic Lines of Communication

0607. Planning related to the establishment of Strategic lines of communication is initially
directed by the SJS in consultation with CJOC, supporting commands (such as the RCAF), and
force generators, which may be tasked to provide resources. Using the general planning factors
described in Chapter 4, the support staff will:
a. deduce modes of transportation required to deploy and sustain the JTF (i.e. air, sea,
or ground transportation);
b. identify and select possible strategic routes;
c. determine the type and location of operational-support facilities that will be
required along the Strategic lines of communication (i.e. OS Hub, IST, CST, or
TLD facility) to enable the deployment and sustainment of the JTF;
d. estimate the volume of personnel and materiel traffic that will flow through the
selected routes and operational-support facilities that must be established along the
Strategic lines of communication; and
e. identify requirements for diplomatic clearance for the use of foreign airspace during
deployment, and international agreements for the use of ground facilities.
Resources Required for Activating the Strategic Lines of Communication

0608. The following types of operational-support resources will typically be deployed to
activate the Strategic lines of communication:
a. task-tailored operational support detachments, generated by CJOC and supported by
the environmental commands as tasked by the CDS, to operate OS Hubs or ISTs
being activated for the operation;
b. RCAF MAMS teams required for loading and/or offloading of strategic transport
aircraft at Canadian APOEs, theatre APODs, or at OS Hubs/ISTs. Command and
control of RCAF MAMS will depend on the circumstances of the operation; and
c. in instances involving long-distance deployments, the RCAF may deploy relief
flight crews at key points along the air route to facilitate efficient movement.
0609. As these assets will normally be deployed by air, the support staff must remember to
include such airlift requirements in developing their plans.
6-4
CFJP 4-0
Section III
Theatre Opening
General
0610. Theatre opening activities will typically begin early during the preparation stage of an
operation, and will often continue during (and in some instances after) the JTF’s deployment.
Theatre opening will normally be considered complete when the JTF has completed reception,
staging, and onward movement to its employment area(s) within the theatre of operations.
Planning Theatre Opening

0611. Planning theatre-opening activities must be integrated into the operation’s theatre-
activation and theatre-support plans. The CJOC staff, with input from that of the JTFHQ, will
lead these planning activities. Using the general planning factors described in Chapter 4, the
support staff will determine the following key theatre opening requirements:
a. The nature, type, and routes of intra-theatre lines of communications.
b. The infrastructure and support capabilities necessary to support the JTF, such as
camps, PODs, the selection of assembly and/or staging areas, the development of
strategic CIS networks, and the coordination of multinational or host-nation
support. This will include not only CAF capabilities, but also that which may be
obtained through the host nation (either through international agreements or local
contracting) or coalition partners.
c. The nature and type of required facilities for camps and fixed installations, such as
real property, utilities, and force-protection works.
d. The nature and extent of environmental studies and land clearances.
e. The nature and extent of supporting international agreements or arrangements.
f. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of the JTF (see Section V of
this chapter).
0612. The requirements for theatre opening will typically be confirmed during the Operational-
level reconnaissance and adjusted as required during the Tactical-level reconnaissance. As such,
a portion of the Tactical reconnaissance team will often remain in theatre to provide the lead
elements of the JTFSC to execute theatre opening. Those elements will typically deploy to the
theatre early in the JTF’s movement flow.
JTF Reconnaissance and Advance Parties

0613. JTF reconnaissance party. The JTF reconnaissance party will include key members of
the JTFHQ staff, components, and the JTFSC. Support subject matter experts will normally
participate. These elements will coordinate the establishment of the Canadian area of
responsibility and the CAF support structure.
6-5
CFJP 4-0
0614. JTF advance party. The JTF advance party will typically include additional JTFHQ
staff, elements of each of the components, and a sizeable proportion of the JTFSC. It will deploy
early in the deployment process to prepare the CAF theatre support framework prior to the
arrival of the JTF main body.
Role and Composition of the JTFSC during Theatre Opening

0615. Given the technical expertise required to execute theatre opening, CFJOSG will normally
fill many of the JTFSC’s key appointments for the initial deployment. This will be coordinated
during the force-generation process that occurs during the preparation stage.
0616. In many instances, additional military engineering and CIS resources will be deployed in
support of theatre opening to rapidly establish and construct theatre infrastructure. Such surge
capabilities will typically be provided by the environmental commands. Once their tasks have
been completed, these elements may be assigned other tasks or will be withdrawn.
Theatre Opening Tasks

0617. The JTFSC will conduct the following types of general tasks as part of theatre opening:
a. Establishing theatre support installations such as deployed/forward operating bases,
PODs, marshalling/staging/assembly areas. This will include, but will not be limited
to, the conduct of land clearances, the construction of accommodation,
maintenance, and storage facilities; the provision of utilities such as electric power,
water, waste water, and solid waste; and, where necessary, the construction of
force-protection works.
b. Establishing intra-theatre lines of communications.
c. Establishing theatre-level support systems, including logistic, engineer, CIS, HSS,
MP, and personnel services. This will typically include support provided by
coalition forces, the host nation, and civilian contracted support. Coordination of
some of the latter activities may be conducted in Canada.
d. Establishing and/or activating host nation, bilateral, and multilateral agreements.
e. Conducting environmental baseline studies in accordance with national and
international policies and regulations, such as DAOD 4003-0, Environmental
Protection and Stewardship (Ref. V) and MC 469/1, NATO Military Principles and
Policies for Environmental Protection (Ref. AK).
f. Executing the reception, staging, and onward movement plan as tasked by the
JTFHQ (see Section V of this chapter).
g. Providing support to JTF elements deployed within the theatre of operations, such
as reconnaissance and/or advance parties.
0618. International operations will normally require air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs
and SPODs), while continental operations may also need railheads. The location of the PODs
will normally be identified in the movement order issued by CJOC. POD operations will
normally be conducted by the JTFSC. During deployment, 4 CFMCU will normally provide
Mov Con Dets at PODs within the theatre of operations to control strategic movement.
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CFJP 4-0
0619. The location of theatre assembly areas will normally be arranged by the JTFHQ staff. In
some instances, theatre assembly areas may be co-located with the deployed operating base.
Depending on the distance between the PODs and assembly areas, there may be a requirement to
establish staging areas along the theatre lines of communications. The location of theatre
assembly and staging areas will normally be arranged by the JTFHQ staff with the theatre HQ.
Section IV
Deployment
General
0620. Although elements such as reconnaissance parties will likely be deployed during the
planning stage of an operation, the bulk of the force (i.e. the advance party and main body) will
move during the buildup stage. Deployment may be considered complete when the last elements
of the JTF’s main body have arrived in the theatre of operations.
0621. This section should be read in conjunction with CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H)
Deployment Concept
0622. As depicted at Figure 6-2, the JTF will move from the POEs along the Strategic lines of
communication to the designated PODs within the theatre of operations. JTF elements will
deploy in accordance with the JTF commander’s priorities. Upon arrival in the theatre, the JTF
will move from the PODs along intra-theatre lines of communications until it arrives at its final
destination. This movement occurs as part of the RSOM process described in Section V.
Force Generators (RCN, CJOC Joint Task Force

CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM)
Final
Destination
APOE APOD
Assembly
Area
Main Assembly Staging Mounting

Operating Base Base Base IST or OS Marshalling Staging
Base Hub Area Area
SPOE SPOD
Planning Dates: RLD ALD EAD LAD CRD

RLD – Ready to Load Date ALD – Available to Load Date CRD – Commander’s Required Date
EAD – Earliest Arrival Date LAD – Latest Arrival Date
Note: Assembly/staging bases, an IST/OS Hub, and/or staging/assembly areas in theatre may or may not be required.
Figure 6-2: Deployment Flow and Division of Responsibilities for Movement
6-7
CFJP 4-0
0623. A JTF will typically deploy within the following groupings:

a. Reconnaissance party. As described in Chapter 4, reconnaissance parties are
generally small and will be the first JTF element to deploy to the theatre of
operations. Each JTF component will typically deploy a reconnaissance party
(which includes support subject matter experts) that will move together as one
major grouping in the JTF movement flow. As speed of deployment is often
essential, the JTF reconnaissance party and its equipment will usually deploy by air.
For deliberate operations, there will likely be Strategic-, Operational-, and Tactical-
level reconnaissance parties. Given the nature of their respective tasks, Strategic-
and Operational-level reconnaissance parties may not remain in theatre.
b. Advance party. Advance parties are normally larger than reconnaissance parties,
which allow them to carry out their task of preparing to receive the main body.
Each major JTF element will provide its own advance party, which will deploy after
the reconnaissance party and before the main body. The JTF advance party, with its
equipment, will typically travel together as one major grouping in the JTF
movement flow, and will usually deploy by air.
c. Main body. The main body constitutes the largest of the three deployment
groupings. In most instances main body personnel will deploy to the theatre of
operations by air, while the vehicles, equipment, and freight will be moved using
sealift (or rail transport in some domestic or continental operations).
Planning Deployment
0624. General. The planning process described in Chapter 4 underpins all deployment planning
activity. Estimate outputs define Strategic lines of communication, initial support, and the
required level of sustainment for both initial and full operating capability of the JTF. While
deployment planning is conducted at all levels of command, the key organizations involved in
the process are CJOC and the JTFHQ.
0625. Key deployment planning factors. Key deployment planning factors include:
a. The size, composition, and priority of deployment of the JTF.
b. Destination and distance.
c. The strategic transport assets available to carry out the deployment.
d. Force protection, based on the threat posed to those transportation resources and to
support installations situated along the Strategic lines of communication.
e. Time and space.
0626. Planning tools. Movements staff base their plans on the TO&E and especially the task
force movement table (TFMT), which depicts the detailed composition (personnel, vehicles,
major equipment, and freight) of the JTF reconnaissance, advance party, and main body. This
allows planners to determine the types and quantities of strategic lift assets needed to deploy the
JTF. It is developed by the JTF’s task force movement officer (TFMO) and is passed upward
through the chain of command to CJOC. As operational requirements may change while a
deployment operation is underway, movement planners must continually liaise with the
operations staff and be prepared to adjust the TFMT to meet the JTF commander’s needs.
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CFJP 4-0
0627. Destination and distance. Destination and distance will often drive decisions regarding
the strategic transport assets used to deploy the force. International operations will typically
involve airlift and sealift. Road or rail movement may be used for continental operations.
0628. Strategic transport assets. Most operational deployments will involve the use of a
combination of military and commercial strategic transport assets. The CJOC movement staff
will maintain visibility of assets that may be provided by military sources (both CAF and those
of allied nations) and those that may be contracted through civilian transportation companies.
0629. Force protection. As forces in transition are highly vulnerable, deployment may require
a deliberate force-protection plan. Deployment protection must include the PODs to ensure that
the JTF is able to launch from a secure platform and be an integral part of the operational
security plan. Force protection along the Strategic lines of communication and at ISTs and/or OS
Hubs may also need to be considered.
0630. Time and space. The determination of time required for moving the JTF to its final
destination begins by identifying the commander’s required date (CRD) and working backwards
along the Strategic lines of communication. The time it will take to get from the PODs to the
final destination is determined by allowing sufficient time to enable units to reform in designated
marshalling areas and transit the intra-theatre lines of communications through any staging or
assembly areas. Since most JTF elements cannot arrive in their entirety on one day, window
timings based on an “earliest arrival date” and “latest arrival date” will be established within
which the element will arrive in theatre and still satisfy the commander’s required date.
Subtracting the amount of time required for strategic lift between the POEs and PODs from those
dates results in the deadline required to complete assembly at the mounting base. By working
backward from the mounting base, the departure date from the element’s main operating base
can be calculated.
0631. Deployment plan. Once CJOC has published the strategic movement order, the emphasis
shifts from deployment planning to deployment execution. This change in emphasis is important
because it is reflected by transfers of responsibility between organizations responsible for the
preparation stage of an operation (i.e. the primary force generator) to the force employer
responsible to execute the operation.
Controlling the Deployment

0632. The deployment will typically be controlled through the following organizations:
a. CJOC J4 Movement Coordination Centre (MCC). The J4 Movement staff
within CJOCHQ operates an MCC that coordinates CAF strategic movement in
support of operations. The J4 MCC maintains visibility on the deployment’s
progress and advises commanders on changes to the deployment flow.
b. Movement control detachments. Mov Con Dets are responsible for ensuring that
the movement priorities expressed within the TFMT are carefully followed. This
will include “calling forward” JTF elements to POEs, controlling embarkation and
debarkation at POEs, IST/OS Hubs, PODs, and dispatching JTF elements to
marshalling or assembly areas within the theatre.
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c. TFMO and JTF MCC. In most instances a TFMO will be appointed by the JTF
commander to coordinate JTF movement planning and execution. A JTF MCC may
also be established to coordinate movement within the theatre of operations.
Section V
Reception, Staging and Onward Movement
General
0633. RSOM activities are part of the RSOI process, which will normally be planned and
coordinated by the JTFHQ staff. The support staff will be responsible for the RSOM aspects,
while the operations staff will be concerned with the JTF’s integration. The JTFSC will execute
RSOM activities as directed by the JTFHQ, and will support the operations-led integration
function as required.
The RSOM Process

0634. The RSOM process includes three subordinate activities, namely reception, staging, and
onward movement. This is depicted at Figure 6-3, which also shows the operations-driven
activity of integration.
Secure Area
Task Force
Elements form up
RECEPTION STAGING Integration
SPOD
Marshalling Staging Assembly Final

Area Area(s) Area(s) Destination
APOD
Onward Movement
Figure 6-3: Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement
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RSOM Principles
0635. The support staff must consider the following four principles when planning and
conducting RSOM: 104
a. Unity of command. The competing requirements of units require central
coordination and direction over the RSOM process. The JTFHQ must be given
requisite authority over this process.
b. Flexibility. Flexibility is the key to successful RSOM. The order of entry of forces
or the priority of effort can change suddenly due to changes in the
operational/tactical situation. The RSOM process must be able to adjust quickly to
changing requirements.
c. Coordination. A communication and liaison network must be established to
coordinate the activities of RSOM. This will be particularly important in the case of
multinational operations, wherein the use of resources and facilities by national
forces conducting RSOM concurrently will have to be carefully managed.
d. Integration in the planning process. RSOM must be included in the planning
process from the outset.
RSOM Enablers
0636. Enablers for effective RSOM include:
a. Interoperable and automated information systems.
b. Visibility over personnel and materiel. The maintenance of information on the
location, status, and predicted movement of each unit’s command element,
personnel, unit-related supplies, and equipment while in transit to its specified
employment area will help the JTF commander to predict incremental increases in
combat power. The JTF elements must be tracked until they have completed the
onward movement and integration processes.
c. An effective joint theatre distribution system.
d. Contingency contracting for locally available supplies and services.
e. HNS. The composition of support elements needed to conduct RSOM operations
will depend on the type, quality, and extent of host nation infrastructure and the
degree of access granted for JTF use.
Planning RSOM
0637. RSOM planning must begin early in the planning stage to avoid duplication of effort and
to ensure the effective movement of personnel and materiel into the theatre of operations. When
opening a new theatre, the resources needed to manage and conduct RSOM must be included
early in the flow. In particular, the JTFHQ and JTFSC reconnaissance parties must make an
assessment of a number of issues before the RSOM process can commence. These include:
a. the prevailing tactical situation;
104
Sustainment of Land Operations (Ref. N), 8-1. These principles also apply to planning the JTF’s integration.
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b. the need for coordination and cooperation with other national contingents;
c. the location, capacity, and suitability of available PODs;
d. the suitability of real estate and the availability of support infrastructure,
particularly the capacity, diversity, and accessibility of the local transportation
network and resources;
e. access to support services such as electrical power, compatible equipment,
communications, fuel, water, food and waste disposal, and bed-down locations; and
f. the availability of HNS, in-country resources, and deployed contractors.
Reception
0638. Reception refers to the activities associated with receiving, offloading, marshalling,
recording, and transporting JTF personnel, equipment, and materiel from strategic or operational
lift through sea and air PODs and railheads.
0639. The RSOM process as a whole is affected by activities such as the building of camps,
medical facilities, and logistic compounds prior to the main body’s arrival. In particular, the
circumstances at the POD will clearly influence the reception activities. The use of a secure area
in the theatre will enable a more rapid buildup of combat power than one launched from an IST
or OS Hub. An opposed entry will almost certainly require the use of an IST/OS Hub or afloat
support as the means of sustaining entry forces until a secure support base can be captured or
built.
0640. Key aspects of reception activities are:
a. The activation of PODs, depending on the operational requirement, for air, sea, and
rail. The number and type of PODs will complicate reception activities; therefore,
the synchronization of activities at each POD is essential. Reception starts at the
point that deploying forces and materiel arrive at a POD.
b. The selection and operation of marshalling areas. In many instances, JTF personnel,
vehicles, and equipment will be moved from the PODs to a nearby marshalling area
in preparation for onward movement.
c. Reception activities continue until the point at which the onward movement of
forces and materiel into the employment area starts.
0641. The following should be considered when conducting reception activities:
a. Coordination. The theatre support structure needs to be carefully managed to
ensure that it is synchronized with the scheduled arrival of deploying forces. Factors
to be considered include the requirements of the theatre distribution system (i.e.
movement control, transport mode operations, materiel management, and service
support), the availability of HNS contractors and support organizations, and the
availability of staging and/or assembly areas.
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b. Conduct of POD operations. Reception centres receive, account, and provide

temporary logistic support and coordinate follow-on movement for deployment and
redeployment of personnel and materiel. This includes receiving and off-loading
personnel and cargo and updating units on their status, managing the movement
process, conducting the move to staging areas and conducting movement-control
operations. The CFJOSG will normally be tasked to provide Mov Con Dets to assist
the JTF’s strategic movement through the POD.
Staging
0642. Staging refers to the assembling, temporarily holding, and organizing of arriving
personnel and materiel into their units and preparing them for onward movement and tactical
operations. The major objective of staging is to assemble and prepare the force to perform its
mission. Staging should be conducted in a permissive environment.
0643. Staging areas must enable the JTF commander to concentrate forces entering the
employment area. Their location will be influenced by a number of factors, including: the
location of employment areas; geographic constraints; availability of organic, coalition, and host-
nation support; transportation infrastructure; distance to the ports; and force-protection
requirements. The size of the staging area will be largely dependent on the anticipated flow of
forces to and from the theatre of operations, the JTF commander’s intent, space available, and
the threat level.
0644. The amount and type of support required at staging areas will depend on the situation. A
deploying unit’s need for assistance from a staging area will be influenced by the operating
environment, the length of time they spend in the staging area, and the ability of the unit to use
their own resources to provide for some of their requirements. Support to staging operations may
include: personnel services; accommodation; feeding; laundry and bath; HSS; petrol, oils and
lubricants (POL); ammunition holding areas; material handling equipment; transportation; and
movement control.
0645. The JTF commander may declare staging to be complete once the JTFHQ operations
staff has confirmed that JTF elements are operationally ready to deploy into the operational
deployment area. Under ideal conditions, this means that the JTF elements have been fully
briefed and orientated to their respective roles, missions, and tasks; fully equipped, trained, and
acclimatized.
Onward Movement
0646. Onward movement refers to the movement of JTF elements and accompanying materiel
from theatre staging areas to tactical assembly areas, employment areas, or other theatre
destinations. This activity requires a balanced, integrated system of node operations, movement
control, mode operations, and cargo transfer operations. As with all RSOI activities, onward
movement is prioritized according to the JTF commander’s needs.
0647. Onward movement is affected by the capacity of the transportation system. This is
especially true in multinational operations where several nations will be seeking to utilize the
available road, rail, inland or coastal waterway, and/or air transport resources. Other factors
influencing the conduct of onward movement include road conditions, geography, and climate.
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0648. Onward movement is normally considered to be complete when the JTF’s force elements
have moved to their final destination.
Integration
0649. Integration refers to the synchronized transfer of operationally ready personnel and units
into the overall force in accordance with the operational plan. It is designed to orient personnel
and units to the employment area and includes further acclimatization, training, and situational
awareness. Integration may be conducted outside the area of operation or at any stage of the
RSOI process (e.g. as part of the reception process or at a staging area).
0650. The emphasis during integration is on command and control of personnel and materiel as
they enter the area of operations and prepare for integration. The JTFSC will support integration
activities as directed by the JTFHQ. Integration is considered to be complete when the receiving
commander establishes command and control over the arriving formation/unit and it is capable
of performing its assigned mission effectively.
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Chapter 7
The Execution Stage: Sustaining the Joint Task Force
Section I
General
Introduction
0701. The principal support activity that will be conducted during the execution stage will be
that of sustainment. Sustainment refers to the activity of providing personnel, logistic, and other
support required to maintain operations until the operation’s objectives have been achieved. It is
affected by a number of factors including the casualty rate, expenditure of materiel, equipment
and resource availability, and the ability of headquarters staff to monitor the flow of resources
through the system. Sustainment will begin when the first CAF force element arrives in the
theatre of operations, and will end when the last one leaves at the end of the operation.
Key Terminology
0702. Reachback. “The means by which a deployed force receives support from organizations
external to the area of responsibility.” 105
Responsibility for Sustainment Activities

0703. Support responsibilities for sustainment activities is normally divided as follows:
a. Environmental commands. As supporting commands, the RCN, CA, and RCAF
will continue to provide force generation support such as replacements for
personnel, vehicles, and equipment.
b. NDHQ group principals. NDHQ group principals, such as ADM(Mat), ADM(IM),
and CMP, will provide Strategic-level procurement, equipment management, and
personnel management support.
c. CJOC. CJOC will:
(1) plan and conduct Strategic-level sustainment of the JTF; and
(2) with the advice of the JTF, prioritize the movement of materiel and
personnel to the theatre of operations.
d. JTF. The JTF is responsible for:
(1) advising CJOC on the priorities of movement of materiel and personnel to
the theatre of operations; and
(2) planning and, through the JTFSC, conducting Operational-level
sustainment.
105
DTB, record 37303.
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Other Execution-Stage Activities Requiring Operational Support

0704. In addition to sustainment, there will often be two other types of execution-stage
activities that will require operational support. These include relief-in-place operations and
reconstitution within the theatre of operations.
0705. Relief in place. A relief in place is “an operation in which, by direction of higher
authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of
the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the
incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered.” 106 At the Operational
level, relief in place operations may be conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as the
temporary replacement of one element of the JTF with another, or a planned rotation of all or
part of the JTF involving the deployment of new CAF elements from Canada. 107 Such operations
will require a broad spectrum of operational support, including movement planning and
coordination, RSOM, and force beddown. The in-theatre JTFHQ staff will plan and coordinate
operational-support requirements for relief-in-place operations, which will be executed by the
JTFSC.
0706. Reconstitution conducted within the theatre of operations. Details concerning the
support aspects of reconstitution conducted within the theatre of operations are given in Chapter
8.
Section II
Sustainment: Structure and Methods
General
0707. Operational-level sustainment is planned by the JTFHQ staff, and is provided by the
JTFSC, leveraging support provided by coalition partners, the host nation, and contractors. This
section will describe the manner in which this level of sustainment is conducted.
Planning Sustainment
0708. The sustainment of a deployed JTF is influenced by the general support-planning factors
identified in Chapter 4. As sustainment is jointly planned by the JTFHQ and CJOC, close
coordination and synchronization of these organizations is required to ensure that the JTF is
adequately sustained throughout all phases of the operation.
Theatre-Level Support Structure Options

0709. Theatre-level support may be structured in various ways. These support options are:
a. Functionally based support. Support is aligned to a particular support function,
which may be managed at the component or joint level. For example, a joint
medical facility could be established in one area.
106
DTB, record 5241.
107
Note that relief-in-place operations are also conducted at the Tactical level.
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b. Geographically based support. A geographical system would group support

services at multiple locations. An example of this is the provision of food and POL
services, which in most instances would be based on proximity to the locations of
supported personnel.
c. Echeloned support. A support structure organized on the basis of echelons or lines
of support would provide different levels of service extending from the combat
forces to a deployed operating base. See Chapter 2 for a description of lines of
support.
d. Environmental-component or component-command support. This support
structure would see support services grouped in support of maritime, land, and air
forces. In the case of the component-command structure, the JTFSC would be
established to coordinate the provision of common operational support functions.
0710. The CAF theatre support structure can be designed using one or more of the above
options. Whatever the method, it must make effective use of the Strategic lines of
communication to establish an integrated network that will ensure the flow of goods and services
to and from tactical units.
Layout of a Generic CAF Theatre Sustainment System

0711. The layout of a generic CAF theatre sustainment system is depicted at Figure 7-1. 108
Maritime
Component
National Forward
Distribution to
Rear Link
Maritime Component Logistics
coordinated by FLS Site Unit
JTFHQ
Forward
JTFSC HQ Land Forward Distribution
Distribution
by JTFSC Component
d
w ar
For ution Unit
t rib
Dis JTFSC
by
JTFSC Deployed Operating
SPOD Deployed/Forward
(or theatre logistic)
Operating Base
Base
IST or
APOD Air Component
OS Hub
Deployed/Forward
Mission Support Operating Base
Strategic Lines of Element
Communication
Figure 7-1: Layout of a Generic Canadian Theatre Sustainment System
108
Depending on operational requirements, a forward logistics site may or may not be located within the JTF’s area
of responsibility.
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Methods of Sustainment
0712. There are two methods of operating a sustainment system:
a. Push system. Within a push system, sustainment is based on anticipated
requirements or standard consumption rates. Within such an approach, materiel is
generally shipped as close as possible to the ultimate user. To avoid the creation of
large stockpiles coordination between operations and support staff is required, as
well as the effective use of technology such as command, control, and information
systems as well as asset tracking systems. Ammunition, fuel, rations, and water are
examples of commodities that may be “pushed” to forward units. The basic
mechanism of “push” replenishment involves the development of an initial periodic
re-supply list among CJOC J4, CFJOSG/3 CSU and the supported JTF.
b. Pull system. A pull sustainment model is based on requisitions from formations or
units. Consumable supplies, spare parts, and general and technical stores are
examples of commodities that may be “pulled” from forward units.
0713. In many instances, circumstances will dictate that a combination of the two methods is
best. The imprecise nature of demand can be overcome by better analysis of the operation, good
synergy between operations and support staff, and through effective use of technology. While the
use of information systems can reduce the quantity of materiel held by substituting information
for excess inventory, there will usually be a need for a reserve.
Sources of Sustainment
0714. Initial sustainment will be provided from the support capabilities deployed with the JTF
and will be based on the Strategic-, Operational-, and Tactical-level sources of sustainment
depicted at Table 7-1.
Strategic Operational/Theatre Tactical

Canada-based support provided Theatre support, such as: Support integral to components
through the Strategic lines of  Third-line (theatre level) as follows:
communication, including: stocks  First-line (unit level)
 Supply and ammunition  HNS stocks
depots  Second-line (component
 Contracted support
 NDHQ principals and/or formation level)
(i.e. ADM(Mat), ADM(IM),  Multinational support stocks
etc.)
 Environmental commands
(RCN, CA, RCAF)
 OGDA
 National infrastructure
 Industry
Note: Directed and coordinated
Note: Directed and coordinated by the JTFHQ.
by CJOC.
Table 7-1: Sources of Sustainment
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0715. Strategic level. If sustainment requirements cannot be met from theatre support
elements, demands will be raised to obtain the desired items from national support organizations
in Canada. Once these items are available they will be passed to the appropriate CAF supply
depot or organization and shipped to the theatre of operations.
0716. Operational/theatre level. Under certain circumstances, the JTFSC may command a
Canadian support area providing for the receipt and storage of stocks and materiel. Security
permitting, support capabilities will be centralized to make the best use of limited supply and
distribution assets and to eliminate duplication or inefficiency. The JTFSC will be responsible
for ensuring that operational stocks are maintained in accordance with the national administrative
order and the JTF commander’s priorities. Good situational awareness will be required to
manage stocks, especially in cases where their reallocation between JTF components becomes
necessary. HNS and multinational support are described respectively in Chapters 2 and 9.
0717. Tactical level. Tactical-level support is provided from first- and second-line stocks held
by individual components or component commands.
Managing Strategic Sustainment Priorities

0718. The flow of materiel into a theatre of operations often begins prior to, or concurrent with,
the flow of tactical units, and must thus be synchronized. As Strategic transportation capacity
will typically be limited, a key aspect of this synchronization will involve the development of
Strategic sustainment priorities. The reconciliation of priorities is fundamentally a matter of
information rather than physical movement. The support staff will require accurate information
to ensure the effective loading of transportation assets.
0719. CJOC, with advice from the JTFHQ, is responsible to prioritize materiel and personnel
movements to the theatre of operations. All DND/CAF organizations or agencies that have a
requirement to send items to the JTF must coordinate those requirements with the CJOC staff.
Generally speaking, high-priority items and personnel will be sent to a theatre via the most
expedient means (such as military or contracted airlift), while lower priority items will be sent by
other modes of transportation. The CJOC MCC will monitor all shipments to ensure that this
general priority system is respected by all involved parties.
0720. High priority shipments will be of particular concern. Situations may develop wherein the
supply of airlift is inadequate to transport the amount of demanded materiel, thereby creating a
backlog. A similar problem can arise where more than one JTF has been deployed, the difference
being a question of which operation has the greater priority. In the former instance, the JTF
commander will decide which of the backlogged items are required immediately, and will
communicate revised priorities to CJOC. In the latter case, if both operations fall under the
auspices of CJOC, Commander CJOC will determine which theatre has priority. If two force
employers are involved, the SJS will provide national strategic direction.
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Reachback and Forward Coordination

0721. As stated in Chapter 2, the CJOC staff serves as the conduit between national
organizations such as the SJS, the environmental commands, and NDHQ group principals, and
the JTFHQ staff and other organizations within the theatre of operations. This staff coordination
function involves the related processes of reachback and forward coordination:
a. Reachback. The JTFHQ staff will channel theatre-level requirements through the
CJOC staff, who will then liaise with the appropriate national-level organizations,
most especially NDHQ group principals such as ADM(Mat), ADM(IE), CMP, and
ADM(IM), to obtain the desired support. Matters requiring reachback support may
involve questions relating to real property disposal, materiel write-off and disposal,
equipment replacement or upgrade, health services or personnel support policy,
agreements and legal support, OGDA support, and allocation of national CIS or
security resources.
b. Forward coordination. Forward coordination involves the reverse process. At the
Strategic and/or Operational levels, CJOC will coordinate the provision of support
with JTFs operating at the Tactical level. Such coordination may encompass matters
such as sustainment schedules and priorities, or the despatch of specialized teams
such as rotation staff assistance teams, technical assistance visits, or staff assistance
visits, to provide required assistance. 109
Theatre-Level Contracted Support

0722. Areas of contracted support. Contracted support may be either goods or services.
Support services contracts span the categories described in Table 7-2.
109
Staff assistance teams and visits may also be requested by a JTF through the reachback process.
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Category Functions
Logistics  Life support (food services and  Materiel management and distribution
rations, fuel, accommodations, or  Laundry services
utilities)  Equipment maintenance
 Transportation (rental buses,  Personnel support services
tractor-trailers, etc.)  Mortuary services
Engineering  Construction engineering  Maintenance of roads and grounds
 Engineering design  Real estate services
 Fire services  Facilities management
 Power generation and  Solid waste management
distribution  Waste water collection and treatment
 Water purification and distribution  Hazardous materiel management
 Environmental services  Geospatial engineering support
Health services  Role 1 medical  In-theatre and strategic medical
 Role 2 medical evacuation
 Dental  Medical personnel augmentation
Communications  Satellite communications  Cable
and information  Local area network  Local internet service provider (ISP)
services
Security and  Armed perimeter/point security  Explosive/Drug detection services
force protection and access control (including dogs)
 Armed convoy escort
Morale and  Morale voice and Internet services
welfare
Table 7-2: Contracted Support Functions
0723. Management of deployed contractors. Contractors are employees of companies that
have contracts with DND/CAF. They are managed, not commanded, through the CAF chain of
command to avoid creating an employer/employee relationship and to assure unity of effort. The
JTF commander has authority over deployed contractors within the area of operations, and a
contract management cell will normally be established to manage the various types of contracts
on the commander’s behalf. Since deployed contractors are considered to be “accompanying
forces” under the law of armed conflict, they are liable to be attacked. For this reason, the JTF
commander must provide deployed contractors with adequate force protection. Deployed
contractors providing an armed capability constitute a special consideration, requiring the
provision of appropriate rules of engagement.
0724. Discipline. Contractors, depending on their type (i.e. Canadian nationals, locally engaged
personnel, etc.) may or may not be subject to the Code of Service Discipline during their period
of employment. Military personnel should always consult with CAF legal officers to determine
the legal status of contractors.
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Section III
Functional Services Within the Theatre
General
0725. Operational-level sustainment involves the simultaneous operation of a broad number of
support systems that require interaction between Strategic-, Operational-, and Tactical-level
support organizations. This section will describe the functioning of these support systems.
Materiel Management
0726. General. Within the theatre of operations, material management involves the reception of
materiel into the theatre, its delivery to Tactical-level units, and any retrograde movement back
to Canada. Operational-level materiel management is the responsibility of the JTFHQ logistics
staff, and is exercised through the JTFSC’s subordinate supply organizations. In many instances,
the JTFSC will establish a materiel management centre (MMC) to manage materiel. The MMC
will coordinate its activities with the theatre MCC.
0727. Stockholding and warehousing. Theatre stockholding policy will be established by
CJOC. The dispersion of stocks within the theatre of operations will be determined by the JTF
commander, based on operational factors. The JTFSC will often be required to store theatre
stocks. Such facilities may be established using temporary storage structures or buildings
provided through agreements with the host nation.
0728. Procurement. CJOC, in accordance with policies set by ADM(Mat) and/or
ADM(Fin CS), will promulgate the theatre procurement policy. In many instances the JTFSC
will coordinate and conduct the majority of local procurement, although limited procurement
authority may be delegated to units or formations within the JTF’s components.
0729. Repair, overhaul, and disposal. Equipment and materiel that has been condemned or is
beyond the JTF’s ability to repair will be back loaded to the JTFSC, which will arrange for its
repair, overhaul, or disposal with national organizations in Canada. In the latter instance, the
authority for disposal is retained by the appropriate staff in NDHQ.
Ammunition and Explosives

0730. CAF ammunition and explosives (A&E) personnel will provide technical expertise and
support in the handling, storage, and accounting of A&E within the theatre of operations. A&E
management will normally be accomplished by means of a purpose-built ammunition storage
area, which may be operated on a national or multinational basis. A&E staff within the JTFHQ
will ensure that correct supply procedures are followed for accounting of stocks to confirm
visibility of available assets to support operations and to maintain safety.
0731. The dangerous nature of A&E poses inherent risk to CAF, coalition, and civilian
personnel, as well as to infrastructure, equipment, and the environment. For this reason, it is
essential that risk-management requirements related to A&E, as advised by CAF A&E
specialists, are integrated into theatre sustainment planning. Such considerations will influence
the identification of suitable locations for ammunition storage areas, force-protection measures
against possible A&E accidents, and the nature of bilateral or multilateral arrangements and
agreements regarding the supply and storage of A&E.
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Materiel Distribution
0732. General. The theatre distribution system deals with all assets entering, leaving, and
moving within the theatre’s sustainment system. The objective of the distribution system is the
provision of personnel, materiel, and services to units in the right quantities and at the right time
and place. The JTFSC will execute this function using CAF supply and transportation units,
HNS, contracted support, or a combination thereof.
0733. Distribution activities. Distribution activities within a theatre of operations include:
receiving and issuing materiel, bulk breaking and preparing loads in a configuration acceptable
to the user, holding materiel pending user requirements, and accounting for in-transit materiel.
0734. Distribution methods. There are three basic methods of materiel distribution:
a. Direct delivery. This involves the delivery of materiel from storage facilities direct
to tactical formations/units. It reduces handling and minimizes the resources
required to move materiel, but is dependent upon distance, the availability of
transportation resources, and the operational situation. This method will not
normally be used by the JTFSC to distribute materiel to the JTF’s subordinate
components, although it may be used within those components.
b. Sustainment points. Sustainment points are generally established to support land
operations. At the Operational level, sustainment points are normally permanent
installations, such as supply depots, ration depots, or fuel storage facilities. Such
facilities are operated by the JTFSC. Tactical-level sustainment points are
influenced by operations, and are thus temporary in nature. Tactical-level
sustainment points will be operated by the JTF’s subordinate components.
c. Direct pick-up. In this method, units pick up stocks from JTFSC facilities.
Transportation and Movement

0735. General. Transportation and movement provide for the mobility and sustainment of a
force. Transportation is the conveyance of personnel and materiel. Movement is the activity
involved in the change in location of personnel or materiel as part of a military operation. It
involves a range of functions including planning, coordination, movement control, and liaison,
and utilizes various capabilities including transport assets, terminals, and information systems.
0736. Modes of transport. During the sustainment stage, personnel, equipment, and stores will
be moved using one, or a combination of, the following modes of transport:
a. Air. Air transport may be provided by either fixed or rotary wing aircraft. It is
characterized by high speed and flexibility of routes, but its effectiveness may be
limited by the effects of weather, the range and carrying capacity of the aircraft type
being used, and the degree of air superiority attained by friendly forces.
b. Sea. Sea transport allows for the economic movement of large quantities of materiel
over long distances, but it is slow and its use may be restricted by the availability of
adequate port facilities and the threat of enemy interference.
c. Rail. Rail transport allows the movement of large quantities of materiel and
personnel over long distances, but is limited to fixed routes, restrictions on cargo
size and weight, and may be easily interdicted by hostile air or ground attack.
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d. Road. While road transport is the most flexible mode for mobility and distribution,
it lacks the carrying capacity of rail. The use of road transport may be limited by the
road network’s capacity and the threat of enemy interference.
e. Inland water. Inland waterways, such as canals, can be used where available. Its
effectiveness is limited by its lack of flexibility, and its vulnerability to attack.
f. Pipeline. Petroleum and water pipelines allow for the rapid movement of large
quantities of fluids over long distances, but must be protected against attack.
g. Animals/manpower. Pack animal transport can be useful in supporting lightly
equipped land forces in rugged terrain where vehicles cannot be operated. When
used, forage and veterinary services become factors.
0737. Movement operations. During sustainment, inbound materiel will flow through the
Strategic lines of communication to the PODs. Upon arrival in the theatre of operations, the
JTFHQ movements and transportation staff will plan and coordinate its delivery to the JTF’s
components by the JTFSC movements and transportation organizations. For further information,
see CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H).
Postal Services
0738. An effective mail distribution system is a key element in maintaining morale. In the case
of JTFs comprising a battle group or larger, a theatre-level CAF post office will normally be
established. If the JTF is widely dispersed, additional post offices or mail distribution centres
may be required. Smaller operations will normally be provided with contracted mail delivery
service. Close coordination with the transportation and movement organizations is necessary to
ensure that mail delivery is accorded a high priority. Commanders at all levels are responsible to
ensure that mail is protected against the threat of theft and environmental damage, especially
while in transit and/or in temporary holding facilities. For further information, see CF Postal
Service Manual (Ref. K).
Food Services
0739. The manner in which food services are provided in a theatre of operations will be highly
dependent on the tactical situation. As a general rule, fresh food will be served whenever
possible, using a system of decentralized production and delivery, whereby food will be prepared
in close proximity with diners. This approach reduces the risk of contamination, which may arise
when transporting and storing fresh food. When decentralized food services cannot be provided,
lower risk alternatives such as hard rations will normally be utilized. The JTF food services
officer/senior chief cook, who will come under the JTFSC, will coordinate such arrangements
with formation/unit chief cooks as well as civilian suppliers and contractors.
0740. Food services will typically be provided by CAF personnel with augmentation from
contracted personnel or HNS. They may also be contracted out in their entirety. In most
instances, food services will be implemented using a phased approach. At the outset of an
operation, the JTF will typically use combat rations. Once the capability to use fresh food has
been deployed, the JTF will typically transition from using combat rations to fresh feeding using
a mobile feeding platform (such as a mobile field kitchen) and/or a semi-permanent kitchen. For
longer operations, a permanent kitchen complex may be constructed. For further information, see
Food Services Manual (Ref. L).
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Financial Services
0741. General. A deployed JTF will require a variety of financial services to carry out its
assigned mission. Such services will depend on a variety of factors, including the JTF’s size, the
availability of financial facilities within the theatre, the expected duration of the operation, the
availability of multinational support, the customs of the region with respect to expenditures and
payment methods, and the nature of financial services required.
0742. Banking. In most operations, financial operations are supported by a standing advance,
with cash being replenished through a hand-carry system by personnel deploying to the theatre of
operations. The CAF’s use of local bank accounts will depend on a security assessment of
banking facilities. Obtaining approval for the use of local accounts is a formal process that
involves staff from ADM(Fin CS), PWGSC, and the Department of Finance.
0743. Payments. A significant proportion of CAF financial expenditures will be made on a
cash basis. For operations being conducted over a long duration, however, there will be a
requirement to pay invoices via the Defence Resource Management Information System or
through electronic funds transfers. This may be done within the theatre of operations by the JTF
financial section or, where connectivity to the automated system is not available, by CJOCHQ J8
staff. Similarly, individual claims may be paid in theatre or by CJOC administrative staff.
0744. Non-public funds (NPF). Depending on the operation, there may or may not be NPF
operations. Where provided, NPF may be managed by the CF Personnel Support Agency.
Financial services staff will account for NPF and/or morale and welfare activities.
Personnel Support Services

0745. General. Personnel support is a command responsibility. The following paragraphs
provide a general overview of theatre-level personnel support services. For further details, see
CJOC Directives for Deployed Operations (Ref. Q).
0746. Personnel management and administration. The JTF will perform a number of theatre-
level personnel management and administration tasks. These will include personnel strength
reporting, tracking the movement of personnel, both within the theatre of operations and those
arriving and departing the theatre, repatriation of personnel, maintenance of personnel records,
and management of JTF personnel establishments.
0747. Pay and allowances. Pay and allowances for large operations will be provided in theatre.
Small operations will be provided such support through CJOC.
0748. Mortuary services. The JTF is responsible for the coordination of in-theatre contingency
planning and arrangements for the repatriation of CAF human remains. Unless operational
circumstances preclude such, the remains of CAF personnel who perish during a deployed
operation will be repatriated using the most expeditious means of transportation as coordinated
by CJOC in conjunction with the JTFHQ. For larger operations, CAF, coalition, or contracted
mortuary resources and procedures will be in place to support the deployed force. For smaller
operations, UN, NATO, or coalition support will be coordinated.
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0749. Morale and welfare. Morale and Welfare staff may be deployed to provide, manage and
deliver fitness, sports, recreation, retail/canteen, amenities, travel assistance (including the Home
Leave Travel Assistance Program and Rest And Recreation Leave Centre Program), leisure
telephone and internet services, and other programs for the JTF. 110
Equipment Support
0750. At the Operational level, the equipment-support system will be designed to provide and
maintain equipment capabilities required to support a military campaign. This includes managing
and maintaining theatre stocks of equipment, managing the JTF’s link to national equipment
support capabilities in Canada, and reinforcing equipment support capabilities within the JTF’s
components. The JTFSC, in providing theatre-level equipment support, will conduct third- and,
in certain circumstances, second-line equipment support services. The division of specific
equipment support tasks will be determined during the planning process.
Military Engineering
0751. During the sustainment stage, theatre-level general engineer support will be provided by
the JTFSC engineer-support unit. This support will typically include:
a. planning, designing, and constructing infrastructure to sustain and protect forces;
b. managing real property management;
c. coordinating and implementing theatre-level engineering contracts;
d. providing environmental engineering services;
e. providing fire services;
f. providing power supply and distribution (when required);
g. providing water supply (when required);
h. providing waste water collection and treatment;
i. providing aerodrome and port services (when required);
j. providing geospatial engineering; and
k. acquiring, storing, and maintaining construction and field defence stores.
0752. For further information, see CFJP 3-12, Military Engineering Support (Ref. F).
Communication and Information Services

0753. During the sustainment stage, theatre-level CIS efforts focus on monitoring CIS service
levels and coordinating issues for resolution. This is normally planned by the JTFHQ J6 staff,
and executed by theatre-level CIS organizations. The CIS organization will:
a. identify the requirement for additional and/or new equipment for the JTF within the
theatre of operations;
b. request and assist in the planning for CIS technical assistance visit support;
110
Morale and welfare staff may be military, DND civilians, contractors, or a combination of all three.
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c. assist in coordinating the provision of CIS support to Canadian liaison officers

employed throughout the theatre; and
d. enforce CIS policies and liaise with NDHQ CIS staff.
0754. Special consideration should be given to maintaining multiple communications
mediums/systems in the event that the primary communications medium becomes unavailable
either due to technical difficulties, enemy action, or other factor beyond our positive control.
Military Police
0755. Theatre-level MP elements consist of task-tailored, modular staff planners and forces.
MP staff planners integrate and synchronize MP technical capabilities deployed across the area
of operations, having the additional benefit of eliminating the traditional requirement to “double-
hat” MP commanders with the staff function of provost marshal. During the sustainment stage
theatre-level MP forces are primarily employed in three separate lines of operation:
a. detention operations, through the operation of a theatre PW holding area;
b. traffic-control and security support to theatre movement operations; and
c. specialized security support to logistical, aerodrome, seaport, and rail facilities.
Health Services Support

0756. HSS organizations may be grouped as a unit within the JTFSC or outside of the JTFSC as
a separate JTF element. Regardless of the approach, the JTF surgeon will have direct access to
the JTF commander to provide advice on HSS matters.
0757. HSS capabilities are distributed into four tiers on a progressive basis to conduct
assessment, treatment, medical evacuation, health-services logistics, and other functions essential
to the maintenance of health. For most CAF operations, these tiers will be provided as follows:
a. Role 1 care. Role 1 care will be provided through organic, attached, or supporting
Canadian role 1 medical and dental elements at the unit level.
b. Role 2 care. Role 2 care will be provided through organic, attached, or supporting
Canadian role 2 medical and dental elements at the formation level, or on a
multinational basis (provided that health care meets Canadian levels of accessibility
and quality).
c. Role 3 care. Role 3 care will be provided through a Canadian composite
Operational-/Tactical-level HSS element or on a multinational basis provided HSS
meets Canadian levels of accessibility and quality of care.
d. Role 4 care. Role 4 care will normally be provided by military and civilian
treatment facilities in Canada. In exceptional circumstances, allied military and/or
host nation definitive care facilities in the theatre of operations may be used as a
supplement.
0758. For further information, see CFJP 4-10, Health Services Support (Ref. I).
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Section IV
Component-Level Sustainment
General
0759. This section describes the manner in which first- and second-line support will be
provided to the various JTF components by their integral-support organizations.
Maritime-Component Sustainment
0760. General. Maritime support has developed over the centuries in response to the
environment in which maritime forces operate and as a result it is structured quite differently
from those of the other environmental components. Within the RCN, the fundamental unit of
naval combat is the warship, which will typically be self-sustaining for a minimum of 30 days.
Commander RCN is responsible to generate Tactical-level maritime support. The RCN follows
NATO doctrine in providing that support through a combination of pooling afloat resources
within a naval task group. 111 The RCN will generate maritime-specific shore-based support
through the establishment of a forward logistic site (FLS). Theatre-level support for services not
found within the maritime component will be coordinated with the JTFSC.
0761. Afloat support. Afloat support consists of one or more support ships to provide
petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ammunition, provisions and supplies, repair parts, medical
facilities, and repair capabilities to operating forces either underway or at anchor. The concept
includes pooling of capabilities and resources among the ships of a task group to aid one another,
including spare parts for urgent repairs. The RCN task group commander will assign a group
logistic coordinator (GLC) to monitor the sustainability of the task group, coordinate afloat
logistic support within the task group, and interact with shore-based logistics units. The GLC
plans and executes task group logistics policy afloat, is the principal advisor to the task group
commander on afloat logistic matters, and is accountable for all afloat logistics activity.
0762. When the RCN task group joins a multinational naval task force, 112 that task force will
typically have a force logistics coordinator (FLC) assigned for the coordination of the overall
logistic support afloat. The duties and organization of the GLC are mirrored by the FLC for the
task force. The GLC may need to coordinate with the FLC for support external to the task group,
including helicopter delivery service and shore-based support, where a multinational
organization such as a NATO joint logistic support group (JLSG) is providing that support. The
FLC and GLC monitor logistic readiness at their respective level and control the movement of
POL, ammunition, provisions, or critical repair parts both within and outside the task force or
task group. Effective communication with each other and with shore-based logistics is critical.
111
A naval task group is a tactical grouping within a naval task force, comprising any combination of two or more
warships, submarines, maritime aircraft, and support vessels, which may be assigned a specific task or tasks.
112
A naval task force is a tactical grouping within a naval fleet, comprising two or more naval task groups, which
may be assigned a specific task or tasks.
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0763. Shore-based support. Shore-based support encompasses activities conducted ashore in

direct support of a naval task group. Supporting options range from solely national support to
bilateral or multilateral support arrangements, HNS agreements, and commercial contracts. The
scope and geographic location of shore-based logistics sites, facilities, and forces supporting
naval task force or task group operations will be determined by the operational needs and
geographical distribution of the maritime component.
0764. In the case of a multinational naval task force, a multinational logistics commander may
be designated. The latter controls and coordinates assigned shore-based logistic support
personnel and assets, including FLSs, intra-theatre airlift, vertical onboard delivery, and shuttle
tankers. The commander requires access to the recognized maritime picture. The MNLC will
typically include a Canadian logistics liaison representative to ensure that RCN requirements are
understood and met.
0765. Forward logistic site (FLS). As the forward-most transhipment point, the FLS
coordinates the provision of second- and/or third-line services such as ship spares, use of port
facilities, financial, contracting services, and personnel support services. An FLS normally will
be generated in support of a naval task group as opposed to single ship deployments, given the
inherent self-sufficiency of Canadian warships. Exceptions to this rule may be made in cases
where the ship’s deployment is considered more complex due to its mission, the anticipated
duration of the operation, or political/diplomatic considerations arising from the areas of transit
and operations. Where a deployment only requires support during transit, a small forward
logistics detachment may be dispatched to provide that support during port visits. Its scope and
size should be greatly reduced from that of an FLS.
0766. The FLS will be task-tailored to meet the support requirements of the naval task group
and will operate independently or within a broader coalition and/or CAF joint support construct.
It will require access Tactical and Strategic CIS capabilities for effective communications with
the task group, theatre, and national authorities.
0767. The FLS may include the following core capabilities:
a. Tactical-level command and control, communications (Strategic capabilities will
require support from the JTFSC);
b. corporate services (e.g. financial services, personnel administration);
c. cargo handling;
d. role 1 HSS;
e. maritime engineering support; and
f. force protection.
0768. Whether supporting a single ship or a naval task group, the FLS will require national
Strategic lines of communication. All materiel being shipped into and out of the theatre of
operations will be coordinated with the JTFSC and the JTFHQ to facilitate materiel control, in-
transit visibility, and to optimize the use of Strategic transportation resources. In addition, the
RCN task group may be supported by direct commercial shipping from RCN formations where
feasible. As the FLS will typically have no ground lift capability, the JTFSC will coordinate the
distribution of materiel to the FLS as required.
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0769. Method of sustainment. Ships will obtain support at either the main FLS location or
other ports in the theatre, depending on the threat level, operational requirements, and the
support required. They will detach for resupply at regular intervals commensurate with their
operational duties and replenishment or emerging support requirements.
Land-Component Sustainment
0770. General. The Army works from a sustainment continuum that stretches from national
resources to the individual soldier. Capabilities along the continuum are organized into layers,
most commonly referred to as lines of support. Although the flow is generally linear, one line of
support to the next, the system operates on the principle of flexibility. The allocation of
capabilities within each line conforms to the level of need, the threat as well as the requirement
for mobility and protection. The grouping of capabilities into lines of support ensures that each
level of command is effectively sustained, but without the burden of holding capabilities better
held elsewhere. A line of support may contain a number of sustainment units. Lines of support
may be regrouped to combine, reinforce, or otherwise augment sustainment elements to support
the operation as the tactical situation changes.
0771. Land-component support organizations. A land component comprising a single battle
group may have an augmented support subunit offering a combination of first- and second-line
support. In the case of a multi-unit or brigade-level deployment these support services may be
provided by separate task-tailored support units, such as a service battalion, engineer regiment,
field ambulance, signal squadron, and MP company/platoon.
0772. Tactical-level sustainment. Land component sustainment activities take place in the
combat zone. As such, sustainment units must be appropriately equipped and manned to operate
effectively in this high-threat environment. This may include provision of armed and/or
armoured vehicles, as well as dedicated force-protection personnel, to allow sustainment units to
carry out their mission in the face of attempted enemy interference.
0773. Method of sustainment. The Canadian Army uses the push and pull methods of
sustainment within the overarching framework of lines of support (i.e. first, second, third, and
fourth line) described in Chapter 2. For a detailed description of the manner in which Army
sustainment is planned and conducted, see Sustainment of Land Operations (Ref. N) and Combat
Service Support Units in Operations (Ref. O).
Air-Component Sustainment
0774. General. Air power is dependent on having secure aerodrome with appropriate
infrastructure from which to operate. These generally need to be large, hard-standing areas with
power, water, and aircraft approach aids. They should also have good command-and-control
systems and stocking facilities for fuel and aircraft spares. As a result, aerodromes are difficult to
secure and their high value makes them vulnerable to enemy intelligence gathering and direct
and indirect attack. An air expeditionary wing, however, will not always be situated at an
established base and will thus be prepared to operate in an austere location.
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0775. Air-component support organizations. The predominant method of employing RCAF

elements is an air task force, consisting of either an air component commander or an air
component coordination element with the Tactical formation of an air expeditionary wing. The
air expeditionary wing’s integral mission support element provides first- and second-line
support, less aerodrome security, which is provided by the wing’s operations support element.
0776. Method of sustainment. The RCAF also uses the push and pull methods of sustainment.
When an air expeditionary wing is deployed, sustainment will be conducted by the mission
support element. For more on how RCAF sustainment is planned and conducted, see Canadian
Forces Aerospace Sustain Doctrine (Ref. M).
Special Operations-Component Sustainment

0777. General. CANSOFCOM globally projects and sustains special operations forces (SOF)
and enablers to respond to Government of Canada and CAF strategic mandates. CANSOFCOM
exercises and operations demand a flexible, layered, agile, and balanced support structure
tailored to each specific deployment. This concept of support must evolve and integrate with the
operational plan at all levels. Just as each team or special operations task force (SOTF) is
scalable and designed to complete the task, each unique operation will require a tailored support
capability. This capability may evolve over time as the operation transitions through different
stages. The joint, integrated, multinational, and non-permissive environments add complexity to
the sustainment mechanism. CANSOFCOM may be required to complete operations using
support from outside the conventional CAF system.
0778. Supporting SOF operations. Self-sufficiency remains a central tenet of support to
operations. Teams deploy highly self-sufficient, with CANSOFCOM HQ functioning as the
coordinating body. For protracted or enduring operations, as lines of communication become
more established, CANSOFCOM and CJOC support to deployed SOF will likely increase.
However, a direct line of communication between deployed SOF and CANSOFCOM HQ will
remain due to the unique nature of the capabilities and tasks. For contingency operations,
deployed SOTFs seek to leverage in-theatre CAF, host nation, or coalition support for materiel
and services to gain efficiency and minimize strain on limited resources. CANSOFCOM will
utilize the CAF’s OS Hub framework to facilitate the deployment and sustainment of SOTFs.
0779. SOF support solutions. Timelines, priorities, and operational impacts are paramount
considerations throughout the development of the support plan. Support mechanisms are shaped
by three distinct types of SOF activities:
a. Rapid-response operations. Support to rapid-response operations requires
foresight, planning, preparation, exceptional agility, and an extremely high level of
readiness.
b. Contingency operations. Given lead time, support requirements can be forecasted,
planned, and coordinated in advance. Medical, ammunition, Strategic movement,
maintenance, Tactical transport, financial services, replenishment, RSOI, and
theatre closing are examples of support activities designed for deliberate operations.
c. Garrison support. Garrison support involves force generation requirements
required in the support and sustainment of SOF capabilities, institutional support,
and oversight.
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0780. Canadian Special Operations Enabling Unit (CSOEU). A key element of

CANSOFCOM’s long-term support concept, enabling support to joint operational effects
globally, is the planned creation of the CSOEU. This central support unit, a future capability,
will provide close and general support to CANSOFCOM units and SOTFs, both in garrison and
while on operations.
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Chapter 8
The Termination and Reconstitution Stages
Section I
General
Introduction
0801. The termination stage of a joint operation can involve many parallel activities that require
detailed deliberate planning by commanders and their staff to ensure success. In particular,
support activities will often become the main effort. The reconstitution stage, which is itself a
separate stage of a joint operation, will require similar close attention. This chapter will describe
the manner in which the support-related tasks associated with theatre closing, redeployment,
drawdown/operation transition, and reconstitution/operation termination will be conducted.
Key Terminology
a. Drawdown. “The graduated, orderly reduction of forces, services, arrangements,
and materiel in a theatre of operations.” 113
b. Operation termination. “The conclusion of the military, administrative, and other
activities related to an operation.” 114
c. Operation transition. “The implementation of a significant change in the role or
composition of a deployed force in response to a corresponding change in the nature
or scope of the operation.” 115
d. Reconstitution. “The measures taken to restore a formation or unit to an acceptable
level of readiness.” 116
e. Redeployment. “The relocation of forces to a new area of operations. This can
involve returning the forces to their main operating bases or deployment to a new
location to carry out a different operation.” 117
f. Theatre deactivation. “The diplomatic, operational planning, and support activities
required to conclude an operation. It includes liaison with multinational staff,
diplomatic engagement, concluding host-nation agreements, and theatre closing.” 118
g. Theatre closing. “In the context of theatre deactivation, the dismantling of the
theatre support structure. The theatre support structure consists of all materiel,
infrastructure, services, and arrangements.” 119
113
DTB, record 47921
114
DTB, record 47832.
115
DTB, record 47833.
116
DTB, record 35053.
117
DTB, record 36932.
118
DTB, record 47843.
119
DTB, record 47842.
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Responsibilities for Termination and Reconstitution Stage Support Activities

0803. Support responsibilities for termination and reconstitution stage support activities is
normally divided as follows:
a. SJS. The SJS will provide strategic direction and monitor termination stage
activities.
b. Environmental commands. The RCN, CA, and RCAF will:
(1) provide resources to CJOC to support termination stage activities;
(2) provide guidance on the priority of movement and final destination for their
returning personnel and materiel;
(3) plan, coordinate, and control the movement between the PODs in Canada
and the main operating bases for their respective force elements; and
(4) plan, coordinate, and control the reconstitution of their respective force
elements once they have returned to their main operating bases.
c. NDHQ group principals. NDHQ group principals, such as ADM(Mat), ADM(IM),
ADM(IE), ADM(Fin CS), ADM(Public Affairs), ADM(Pol), and CMP will provide
strategic direction and/or advice on a support-related matters, including:
(1) the disposal, write-off, repair and overhaul, or replacement of materiel;
(2) close-out of service contracts;
(3) close-out of theatre financial services;
(4) CIS matters such as retention, disposal, or redistribution of hardware and/or
software, and other information management issues;
(5) the retention and archiving of records;
(6) the disposal or transfer of real property;
(7) environmental remediation policy and procedures;
(8) public affairs policy and approach; and
(9) personnel matters (HSS, personnel management and personnel services, MP,
and historical records).
d. CJOC. CJOC will:
(1) issue Operational-level orders for termination stage activities;
(2) command and operate the Strategic lines of communication;
(3) plan theatre closing, with input from the JTFHQ;
(4) plan and control the strategic redeployment of the JTF; and
(5) close-out the Strategic lines of communication upon completion of
redeployment.
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e. JTF. The JTF will be responsible for:

(1) executing theatre closing; and
(2) planning and controlling movement within the theatre of operations.
Processes
0804. The support-related processes involved in the termination and reconstitution stages of an
operation are depicted at Figure 8-1. The termination stage will normally begin with the issuance
of a CDS directive ordering the end of the operation. It will overlap with the reconstitution stage,
which will begin during redeployment, and will normally end at some point in time after
redeployment has been concluded.
0805. Not every operation will necessarily follow this specific model. For example, there may
be no requirement for drawdown.
t t
en en n
e e o n ym ym d io ted
tiv as ns si e lo s lo te s s
re
c Ce atio Mis sur dep gin ep ple i
M in
a
Di er Cl
o Re Be d
Re Com r m
CD
S Op Te
TIME
THEATRE DEACTIVATION
In-Theatre Operational and Diplomatic Tasks
Theatre Closing
Drawdown
Redeployment
Mission Termination
Reconstitution
Figure 8-1: Support-Related Processes within the Termination and Reconstitution Stages
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Section II
Theatre Closing
General
0806. Theatre closing activities will typically begin early during the termination stage of an
operation. It will normally be considered complete once the theatre support structure has been
dismantled and the JTF force elements and materiel have been redeployed to Canada.
Planning Theatre Closing

0807. Theatre-closing activities must be integrated into the overarching theatre deactivation and
redeployment plans. The CJOC staff, with input from that of the JTFHQ, will lead these planning
activities. The support staff should consider the following key factors when planning theatre
closing:
a. Scale and scope. How many personnel are being returned? How much materiel
must be prepared?
b. Time and space. What is the cease operations date, and what other critical timings
must be accounted for? When can retrograde movement of personnel and materiel
to Canada commence? What are the distances between the locations of the JTF
components and the POEs?
c. Availability and quantity of theatre support resources. What support services,
including logistic, engineering, CIS, medical, personnel, and health, must be
prepared, reduced, or introduced into the theatre to conduct in-theatre tasks
associated with theatre closing? When, and for how long, will they be required?
d. Theatre infrastructure and facilities. What theatre-level infrastructure must be
prepared, removed, or handed over in preparation for closing the theatre? If
infrastructure is to be transferred to the host nation or coalition partners, what
negotiations must be made regarding training or material support to ensure that such
infrastructure remains functional? When, and for how long, will they be required?
e. Impact on ongoing military operations. Theatre closing must be balanced with
the possible impacts that such support activities may have on the conduct of
ongoing military operations.
f. Lines of communications. What type of theatre lines of communications and
Strategic lines of communication will be required? When, and for how long, will
they be required?
g. Environmental issues. What environmental issues must be considered? Will there
be a requirement to deploy engineering teams to conduct environmental close-out
studies?
h. National support. What resources (i.e. Mov Con Dets, OS Hub/ISTs, TLD
locations, etc.) are required? Where and when will they be needed? What support
will be required from OGDA (such as Agriculture Canada for the inspection of
vehicles and containers being redeployed to Canada from an overseas theatre)?
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i. Support and coordination with environmental commands. What support will be

required from the RCN, CA, and RCAF? What support details must be coordinated
with the environmental commands?
j. Priorities. What priorities for the return of personnel and materiel have been
identified by the involved environmental commands?
k. Reception of personnel and materiel in Canada. Are the involved environmental
commands ready to receive the personnel and materiel being returned to Canada?
What other national organizations (such as Agriculture Canada and Canada
Customs) must be brought into the planning process?
l. Security. What are the security implications regarding materiel that is being
redeployed? For example, CIS security issues include the handling of cryptographic
materiel, controlled equipment list items, and communications security materiel.
m. Financial factors. What are the costs associated with theatre closing? What tasks
must be done to close-out financial accounts? What organizations are involved with
such tasks?
0808. Coordination requirements. In planning theatre closing, the JTFHQ staff must consider
the requirement for additional coordination within the theatre of operations. This will almost
always include the host nation and, in the case of a multinational operation, the multinational
theatre headquarters. Matters that will typically require such coordination will include intra-
theatre movement; the need for shared facilities (such as staging areas and air or sea ports) and
resources (such as contractors); identifying infrastructure and equipment that will be disposed of
within the theatre; and providing national input to coordinate the reduction of demand for
common supplies such as fuel or rations. CIS material will normally remain a national
responsibility. Effective coordination of theatre closing will help reduce the likelihood of
competition for the use of scarce resources with other nations.
Role and Composition of the JTFSC during Theatre Closing

0809. In most instances the JTFSC will be augmented to execute the in-theatre support tasks
related to theatre closing. As was the case for theatre opening, such personnel will typically be
provided by the environmental commands. CJOC may provide some of the key leadership
positions to carry out the tasks associated with theatre closing.
Theatre Closing Tasks

0810. The JTFSC will conduct theatre closing, which will include the following tasks:
a. Reducing theatre-level support services (logistic, engineer, CIS, personnel,
financial, HSS, and MP) commensurate with the need to maintain and support an
appropriate level of operations.
b. Identifying, accounting, cleaning, refurbishing (if necessary), and shipping vehicles,
equipment, and stocks back to Canada.
c. Initiating materiel write-offs and closure of deployed supply accounts.
d. Demilitarizing and disposing of materiel that remains in-theatre, either through
donation or sale to a coalition nation or to the host nation.
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e. Disposing and remediating sites occupied by the JTF, to the condition as agreed
between the CAF and the host nation. This will include closing environmental
close-out studies and addressing known environmental concerns in accordance with
national and international policies and regulations such as DAOD 4003-0,
Environmental Protection and Stewardship (Ref. V) and MC 469/1, NATO Military
Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection (Ref. AK).
f. Preparing and moving personnel from the theatre of operations to their main
operating bases within Canada.
g. Closing of theatre contracts.
h. Preparing theatre financial accounts (public and non-public) for closure action by
CJOC staff.
i. Finalizing outstanding investigations, including MP and vehicle accidents.
j. Finalizing outstanding legal matters, including claims against the Crown.
0811. In cases where only RCN units have been deployed to a theatre of operations, the FLS
shall, as directed by CJOC, coordinate the cessation of operations and take appropriate action to
reconcile all administrative, financial, and procurement records.
Materiel and Infrastructure Distribution Directive (MIDD)

0812. An MIDD will be issued for each CAF operation once the CDS directive ordering the end
of the operation has been issued. As its title implies, this document covers a number of key
aspects pertaining to both materiel and infrastructure, including:
a. The manner in which CAF materiel will be redeployed, donated, sold, or disposed
of within the theatre. This will typically take the form of preparing a detailed list,
itemized by stock code (line item). For materiel being redeployed to Canada, this
list will indicated the organization to which the item is being returned, along with
that organization’s supply account code.
b. The manner in which infrastructure used by CAF elements within the theatre will be
disposed of. This will include environmental remediation and close-out
environmental baseline studies.
c. The identification/delegation of authorities and powers of write-off for materiel.
d. Any procedure, by materiel type, that is peculiar to the operation.
0813. Planning and executing the MIDD will require careful coordination between CJOC, the
JTFHQ staff, the JTFSC, the environmental commands, and NDHQ group principals such as
ADM(Mat), ADM(IM), and ADM(IE). The support staff should note that the MIDD will
normally stipulate that, as part of theatre closing, there will be a requirement to conduct a cost
benefit analysis to the maximum extent possible prior to making the decision to redeploy items
to Canada. For example, does it make sense to redeploy low-value spare parts?
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Section III
Redeployment
General
0814. Redeployment activities may be conducted as a discreet phase of theatre closing.
Alternatively, redeployment may be conducted as part of mission transition, drawdown, or in
support of a planned rotation whereby all or part of the JTF is replaced by new CAF elements
deploying from Canada. The principles and procedures in planning, executing, and controlling a
redeployment operation are essentially the same as those for deployment described in Chapter 6.
For this reason, the following paragraphs will primarily deal with those issues that are specific to
redeployment.
0815. This section should be read in conjunction with CFJP 4-1, Movement (Ref. H).
Planning Redeployment
0816. General. Planning for redeployment must be integrated with both the theatre-closing plan
and the overarching theatre-deactivation plan. This will require close coordination between the
JTFHQ, the JTFSC, CJOC, environmental commands, and NDHQ group principals.
0817. Planning tools. In-theatre JTF movement planners will develop a redeployment task
force movement table (TFMT) in the manner described in Chapter 6. In many instances, the
redeployment of the main body of personnel and equipment will be preceded by the movement
of high-priority elements.
0818. Redeployment plan. Once CJOC has published the Strategic movement order, the
emphasis shifts from redeployment planning to redeployment execution. This change in
emphasis is important because it is reflected by transfers of responsibility between organizations
responsible for the preparation stage of an operation (i.e. the primary force generator) to the
force employer responsible to execute the operation.
Conduct of Redeployment
0819. The following differences apply to the conduct of a redeployment operation:
a. Requirement for TLD. It may be deemed necessary to route returning personnel
through a TLD location to allow them to re-acclimate to life in a non-threatening
area prior to rejoining their families. This will add time to the redeployment
process, and will require resources to establish and operate the TLD location.
b. Reception and onward movement of personnel in Canada. As the redeployment
plan firms up, the environmental commands that provided elements for the JTF
must be kept informed so that they can ensure that transportation and administrative
arrangements are put in place to execute an efficient clearance of the PODs. This
will be of particular significance in instances where small detachments or individual
personnel are moving with a large group. For example, a returning aircraft with 170
personnel from an Army base and 10 personnel from an RCAF base would require
that the Army and RCAF staff be informed so that onward movement arrangements
could be made for their personnel.
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Section IV
Operation Transition/Drawdown
General
0820. The requirement to conduct operation transition and drawdown activities will normally
depend on the situation. Many of the planning factors described in Chapter 4, and especially
those pertaining to theatre closing described above, will apply to both operation transition and
drawdown. The support staff must be especially cognizant of the need to balance support-related
activities with operational requirements, especially when military operations are ongoing. Close
coordination with operations and other staffs will be required.
Operation Transition
0821. Operation transition refers to “the implementation of a significant change in the role or
composition of a JTF in response to a corresponding change in the nature or scope of the
operation.” 120 Operation transition could be conducted under the following general set of
circumstances:
a. A change from one type of operation to another, such as from a combat operation to
a humanitarian operation.
b. A relocation of the JTF to a different geographic area within the same theatre of
operations.
c. A significant change in the JTF’s composition.
Drawdown
0822. Drawdown varies in scope and scale and is conducted within a well-defined window or
over an extended period of time. Drawdown activities are conducted to:
a. adjust the JTF’s structure following a change in the operation;
b. reduce the JTF’s support structure by shipping back to Canada personnel or
materiel that exceeds the JTF’s operational requirements; or
c. reduce the JTF prior to the closure of the operation.
0823. In all instances, the support staff must continually ensure the sustainability of the JTF
while drawdown is in progress. Input from the JTFHQ operations staff will be critical to ensure
that the JTF’s operational posture is not adversely affected.
120
DTB, record 47833
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Section V
Reconstitution/Operation Termination
General
0824. Reconstitution is a separate stage of a joint operation. As described in Chapter 7,
reconstitution activities may be conducted within a theatre of operations. Similarly,
reconstitution will normally be required following the JTF’s redeployment to Canada.
Levels of Reconstitution Operations

0825. There are three levels of reconstitution operations:
a. Reorganization. During or soon after combat, a formation or unit reconstitutes by
reorganizing itself, following an assessment of personnel and equipment casualties
and of combat supplies levels. Reorganization is completed with the resources, both
in personnel and equipment, already assigned to the unit. Reorganization can be
completed while the unit or its elements remain in contact.
b. Rehabilitation. A unit requires rehabilitation when it has suffered significant
personnel and equipment casualties but remains capable of conducting combat
operations. Rehabilitation normally occurs when a unit has suffered between 20%
and 50% casualties in personnel or major fighting systems. Rehabilitation
operations are usually controlled by the next higher headquarters. In the context of a
deployed JTF, the JTFHQ would control rehabilitation operations, and will be
supported by the JTFSC.
c. Regeneration. The most severe reconstitution operation occurs when a unit has
sustained such heavy casualties that it is no longer capable of conducting combat
operations. A unit that has lost more than 50% of its personnel, key leadership or
major fighting systems will require regeneration. Such a unit will require a
significant effort to return it to a capable fighting element. Regeneration operations
are usually controlled by the headquarters two levels up.
The Reconstitution Process

0826. The reconstitution process is depicted at Figure 8-2.
Figure 8-2: The Reconstitution Process
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Reconstitution within the Theatre of Operations

0827. Reconstitution may be conducted as part of ongoing military operations. In such
instances, the JTFHQ will plan the reconstitution; however, the execution will be the
responsibility of the JTFSC. Reconstitution during active operations in-theatre will demand a
relatively secure area where the elements of the JTF can have their equipment replaced, repaired,
their stocks replenished and personnel replaced. Sufficient levels of materiel and personnel
resources as well as dedicated service providers must be in place and coordinated with the
multinational theatre commander who will make the appropriate arrangements with regards to
theatre operations and force protection as necessary.
0828. Conduct of rehabilitation/regeneration. When rehabilitation or regeneration is
required, a reception centre will be established by the responsible organization. Upon arrival, the
unit’s condition will be assessed. Personnel are given additional medical treatment, receive
replacement equipment, and are provided personnel support services including stress
management, religious services, and amenities. Equipment is inspected and, where possible,
repaired. Replacement personnel and equipment are then provided to return the unit to full
combat strength in preparation for future operations.
0829. Support considerations. The following support factors should be considered:
a. HSS. The immediate priority will be to provide medical treatment and evacuation to
injured personnel. There should be a medical element at the reception centre to
allow for the rapid evacuation of remaining casualties and allow the remainder of
the reconstitution operation to proceed as quickly as possible.
b. Personnel support services. Personnel support services such as access to amenities
or chaplain services should be provided at the reconstitution area to enhance unit
morale and cohesion.
c. Equipment inspection and repair. A maintenance element is necessary to assess
the state of the unit’s equipment, repair that which can be repaired, and backload
severely damaged equipment for refurbishment.
d. Personnel replacements. The commander of the reconstitution operation will
coordinate the movement of replacements. Unit representatives should meet and
start indoctrinating and familiarizing replacements as early as possible and should
accompany major replacement drafts to the reconstitution area.
e. Equipment and supplies replacement. This replacement includes all types of
equipment, including weapons, fighting vehicles, unit stores, spare parts, and
combat supplies.
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Reconstitution in Canada after Deployment

0830. General. The purpose of reconstitution after redeployment is to restore the JTF’s force
elements to their normal readiness levels in preparation for further operations.
0831. Planning considerations. Planning for reconstitution activities conducted at depots and
third-/fourth-line repair facilities, as well as at main operating bases in Canada, must encompass
all aspects of force generation and sustainability, specifically manpower, equipment, training,
and sustainability:
a. Manpower. The replacement of operational losses.
b. Equipment. The replacement, repair, and servicing of equipment.
c. Training. The rebuilding of individual and collective combat performance.
d. Sustainability. The replacement of unit support resources.
0832. Responsibility. The environmental commands (i.e. the RCN, the CA, and the RCAF)
bear primary responsibility for the conduct of reconstitution operations for their respective force
elements upon their redeployment to Canada. In many instances this will also involve CJOC
subordinate units, such as supply depots, and certain NDHQ group principals, such as
ADM(Mat), ADM(IM), and CMP.
Conduct of Operation Termination

0833. Operation termination tasks will generally be completed in Canada after the JTF has been
redeployed to Canada. While such activities will involve several organizations, they will be
directed by the responsible force employer. Tasks may include the finalization of outstanding
legal, financial, disciplinary, and materiel management matters, submission of war diaries, and
documentation of lessons learned. Operation termination will not include the redistribution of
equipment or replacement of personnel, as these are associated with reconstitution.
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CFJP 4-0
Chapter 9
Support within Multinational Joint Operations
Section I
General
Introduction
0901. Multinational operations are increasingly the norm for expeditionary operations involving
the CAF. They offer the advantage of sharing support resources within a multinational joint task
force, while at the same time posing challenges in developing a support system to satisfy national
and multinational requirements. Depending on the operation’s scope, the Canadian contingent
may be employed as a single entity or it may provide elements to multinational component
commands as depicted at Figure 3-2 in Chapter 3.
0902. This chapter examines the manner in which a Canadian JTF will be supported within the
framework of a multinational joint operation conducted by NATO, a coalition, or the UN. It
should be read in conjunction with CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D), Chapter 7 and specific
publications identified in the applicable sections of the chapter.
Key Terminology
a. National support element (NSE). “In multinational operations, a deployed
organization that provides support to a nation’s contingent using lines of
communications between the home nation and the theatre of operations. Command
and control of this organization will not normally be transferred to the multinational
headquarters.” 121 In most multinational operations, the JTFSC will act as the
Canadian NSE.
b. Logistics (NATO definition). The NATO definition for logistics is essentially the
same as the Canadian version provided in Chapter 1, but unlike the Canadian
version it includes medical and health service support. 122
Types of Multinational Operations

0904. Further to information in Chapter 3, there are two types of multinational operations:
a. Allied operation. “An allied operation is a multinational operation based on formal
agreements, standards, and procedures.” 123 NATO operations fall within this
category.
121
DTB, record 41459.
122
DTB, record 815.
123
DTB, record 35677.
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b. Coalition operation. “A coalition operation is a multinational operation based on

agreements, standards, and procedures specific to that operation.” 124 The first Gulf
War (1990-91) is an example of a coalition operation.
Section II
Support within NATO Operations
General
0905. As a member of the NATO alliance, Canada will participate in NATO operations. This
section should be read in conjunction with the following NATO publications:
a. AJP-3.12, Allied Doctrine for Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations
(Ref. Z).
b. AJP-3.2.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police (Ref. AB).
c. AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine (Ref. AC).
d. AJP-4.4, Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine (Ref. AD).
e. AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host-Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures (Ref. AE).
f. AJP-4.6, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group (Ref. AF).
g. AJP-4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support
(Ref. AG).
h. AJP-4.10, Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine (Ref. AH).
i. AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communications and Information Systems
(Ref. AI).
Responsibilities for Support

0906. Collective responsibility. Collective responsibility refers to NATO’s and member
nations’ individual and complementary obligations to cooperatively organize and deliver the
overall support of NATO operations, taking into account one another’s requirements and
constraints. 125 Standardization and cooperation are the basis for flexible and efficient support,
thereby contributing to operational success.
0907. NATO joint force commanders. Designated NATO joint force commanders are
responsible for establishing the requirements to sustain the force, and for coordinating, planning
and the provision of support within their area of responsibility. This will include, in close
cooperation with contributing nations, the implementation of an appropriate mix of the different
methods of multinational support. To carry out such responsibilities, commanders will normally
assume OPCON over support units that are assigned to the NATO joint force, such as
multinational integrated logistic units, and other specific support units provided by nations to the
NATO joint force commander through the force generation process.
124
DTB, record 35678.
125
AJP-4.9 (Ref. AC), 1-4.
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0908. Nations. Nations are responsible for ensuring the support of forces allocated to NATO.
This is normally done through a national support element (NSE), a role that in the Canadian
context will be performed by the JTFSC. National commanders are accountable to their national
authorities for the support of national forces, whether these requirements are met by national or
multinational means. This accountability cannot be shared between NATO and nations, or
between nations. It may be discharged in several ways, including agreements with other nations
or with NATO. Circumstances may arise where a NATO joint force commander may need to
mediate and coordinate such agreements to ensure effective support of the NATO force. Nations
retain control over their own resources until they are released to NATO through a transfer of
authority. 126
Overview of the NATO Theatre Support System

0909. As depicted at Figure 9-1, the NATO theatre support system will normally be based on
the establishment of a joint logistic support area and a theatre logistic base, from which a joint
logistic support group, comprised of nationally provided or multinational units and the NSEs of
troop-contributing nations, will provide theatre-level support.
Figure 9-1: Layout of a Generic NATO Theatre Support System

(Source: AJP 4.6(B), 17)
126
A transfer of authority is “the formal transfer, between commanders, of a specified degree of authority over
forces allocated to an operation.” [DTB, record 5558]
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Joint Logistic Support Area (JLSA)

0910. General. The JLSA is a geographic area within which theatre support units may be
grouped to provide effective support to the NATO operation. This will include the theatre
logistic base, the PODs used for the operation, and other support installations such as theatre
storage facilities. The JLSA will be situated as close as possible to the area of operations to
maximize the effective and efficient support to operations. It will generally be as small as
possible to minimize force protection requirements.
0911. Theatre logistic base. The JLSG will normally establish a theatre logistic base within the
JLSA. This will be the main location for assets belonging to the JLSG and the point from which
commodities are distributed to the NSEs. It may be a single contiguous site, or a number of
individual locations grouped together. NSEs, in whole or in part, may collocate within the theatre
logistic base to facilitate coordination with the joint logistic support group.
Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG)

0912. The JLSG is a task-tailored theatre-level logistic formation responsible to the NATO joint
force commander for the planning, coordination, and execution of theatre logistic support with
participating NSEs, multinational component commands, host nations, and non-military
organizations. It consists of three main elements, namely: the JLSG HQ Core Staff Element (a
small, rapidly deployable, initial manning element for the JLSG HQ), the JLSG headquarters,
and mission-tailored logistic enablers that enable movement and transportation, maintenance and
supplies, life support, infrastructure for logistics, and medical support. The JLSG’s purpose is to
promote greater versatility, agility, and unity of effort in supporting deployed forces by bringing
about increased multinational joint logistic cooperation. For more on the JLSG, see AJP-4.6,
Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group (Ref. AF).
Multinational Support
0913. General. The use of multinational support is a key element in NATO operations, and is
based on agreements between NATO and troop-contributing nations. It is intended to improve
efficiency and effectiveness by optimizing the support capabilities of each member of the
Alliance to reduce duplication and competition between nations. As described in AJP 4.9, Allied
Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support (Ref. AG), there are several types of
multinational support in NATO operations. These are described below.
0914. Pre-planned mutual support. Pre-planned mutual support includes HNS, contracted
support to operations, mutual support agreements, and cooperation between NSEs that are
arranged bilaterally or multilaterally by NATO and/or nations.
0915. Logistic lead nation (LLN). A nation acting as an LLN assumes the overall
responsibility for organizing and coordinating an agreed broad spectrum of logistic support for
all or part of the multinational force, including headquarters, within a defined geographical area
for a defined period. 127 An LLN can also provide capabilities as a logistic role specialist nation at
the same time. The LLN concept is based on a set of bilateral or multilateral arrangements in
which the LLN takes most of the burden for finances, contracts, property issues, and even legal
liability. Typically, the LLN will provide the command-and-control element and a significant
127
DTB, record 47828.
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part of the structure and coordinating function but can rely on other nations to provide assets as
necessary to complete the organization and deliver the required service. In most instances the
tasking authority will be the NATO joint force commander, but the support or services provided
will remain under national command.
0916. Logistic role specialist nation (LRSN). A nation acting as an LRSN assumes the
responsibility for providing or procuring a specific logistic capability and/or service for all or
part of the multinational force within a defined geographical area, for a defined period. 128 The
LRSN will provide the organization and assets required to deliver that service or commodity.
Units carrying out LRSN functions, while formally belonging to their NSE, will often be
considered as part of the multinational formation. The working relationship between supported
nations and the LRSN is that of customer to provider and can be based either on formal
arrangements or on cross-servicing agreements such as STANAG 2034, NATO Standard
Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance (Ref. AM). In most instances the tasking authority
will be the NATO joint force commander, but the support or services provided will remain under
national command.
0917. Multinational support with centralized command. Within this type of multinational
support, one or more nations formally undertake to serve all or part of the multinational force by
forming a multinational integrated logistic unit (MILU) or a multinational integrated medical
unit (MIMU). MILUs are utilized to reduce the logistic structure and, where possible, capitalize
on economies of scale. They are designed to provide specific logistic support that is unavailable
to national forces or could be better utilized to support the NATO commander’s overall plan.
One nation will typically provide the MILU command structure, CIS, and CSS, and will be
augmented by the resources of other nations. MILUs/MIMUs are normally integrated into the
NATO chain of command, for example being under OPCON of the NATO commander.
0918. Multinational support with decentralized command. Within this model, one or more
nations undertake to serve all or part of the multinational force by forming a multinational
logistic unit (MLU) or multinational medical unit (MMU). The tasking authority will be the
NATO joint force commander but the support or services provided remains under national
command. MLU/MMUs are designed to provide specific support that is unavailable to national
forces or could be better utilized to support the commander’s overall support plan. They can
fulfil the need of a flexible mode of multinational support, and should be utilized to reduce the
support structure and, where possible, capitalize on economies of scale. A major difference
between an MILU and an MLU are that an MLU normally remains under national control,
whereas an MILU will typically be under OPCON to the NATO joint force commander.
Canadian Interaction with NATO Support Organizations

0919. Within a NATO operation, the JTFSC will normally be assigned OPCOM to the
Canadian JTF commander. Depending on the situation, it may also be allocated LOGCON to the
NATO JLSG commander to facilitate the synchronization of support activities with the other
contributing nations. The LOGCON arrangement also allows the JTFSC to use the JLSG as a
means to look for additional means of support as required.
128
DTB, record 47829.
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0920. Generally speaking, CAF elements serving within the NATO joint force component
commands will be sustained in the manner described in Chapter 7. The Canadian JTFHQ staff
will coordinate support efforts with the NATO multinational JFHQ, while the JTFSC will
coordinate the physical provision of support with the JLSG.
Section III
Support within Coalition Operations
General
0921. Where commonality or interest exists, nations will enter political, economic, and military
partnerships, or coalitions. Coalitions can occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as
nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security
against real or perceived threats. As coalitions are normally created for limited purposes and for
a set time, they do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of
aim as alliances.
0922. This section will examine the nature of support within coalition operations.
Nature of Coalition Operations

0923. Coalition operations. Coalition operations may cross the entire range of military
operations, from war to operations other than war. In addition to multinational military forces,
coalition operations may include various non-military organizations and other services. A
coalition force may comprise a multinational single-environment task force or a multinational
joint task force.
0924. Command and control. Command and control within a coalition can be exercised in
three distinct ways:
a. Lead nation. The lead nation is “the nation that provides the essential political and
military leadership to plan and execute a multinational operation.” 129 The lead
nation provides a coalition military commander and determines the appropriate
command, control, communications, and intelligence procedures, working closely
with other national contingents. Other nations provide liaison and, under certain
circumstances, augmentation staff to the lead nation headquarters.
b. Parallel command structure. Under a parallel command structure, no single
coalition commander is named.
c. Combination lead nation/parallel command structure. The lead nation and
parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This
occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of
international forces, such as the Gulf War coalition.
129
DTB, record 31028.
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0925. Coalition commanders. Coalition commanders will normally be given the responsibility
to coordinate the overall support effort. In some instances, the coalition force may exercise
control over the national support units, in other cases it will act only as the coordinating
authority. The degree of authority will depend on existing agreements and arrangements
negotiated with contributing nations. The coalition force commander may also establish a
support coordination or control centre to coordinate common support requirements within the
area of operations.
0926. Nations. As with NATO operations, nations participating in a coalition operation are
normally responsible for preparing and equipping their contingents with the necessary support
capabilities, including the deployment of a national support element (in the case of the CAF, a
JTFSC). Within this context, each nation will also establish its own Strategic lines of
communication. Unlike NATO operations, which are underpinned by the NATO policy of
collective responsibility provided within doctrine, standards, and arrangements, coalition
operations are characterized by bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements made between
coalition members.
Coalition Theatre Support

0927. Structure. In a coalition, a theatre support command may be established to coordinate
Operational-level support, including RSOM, intra-theatre lift, theatre distribution, sustainment,
and/or reconstitution.
0928. Support options. There are four possible methods of executing cooperative support
within a coalition operation. These include:
a. National responsibility. As described above, each nation takes full responsibility
for providing its own support.
b. Lead nation. One nation, due to the size, scope, or nature of its force contributions,
takes the lead in coordinating and/or providing a broad scope of support with
reimbursement from other supported nations.
c. Role specialization. Support may be provided by a single nation or service
component within a key functional area, taking advantage of economies of scale
and national strengths. A nation providing role specialization will do so with its
own resources with reimbursement from other supported nations.
d. Multinational support. Normally established in a mature theatre of operations, the
main elements of multinational support would include multinational headquarters
and staffs (of which the theatre support command may be one) and MILUs.
0929. Support enablers. Just as is the case with a CAF or NATO operation, nations
participating in a coalition operation may be able to use mutual logistic support arrangements,
HNS, contracted local resources, and/or contracted support.
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Canadian Interaction with Coalition Support Organizations

0930. As with the case of a NATO operation, the sustainment of CAF elements serving within a
coalition operation will be conducted in the manner described in Chapter 7. Staff coordination
will be conducted between the Canadian JTFHQ staff and that of the coalition headquarters,
while the JTFSC will coordinate the physical provision of support with the theatre support
command (where established).
Section IV
Support within United Nations Operations
General
0931. This section examines the manner in which a Canadian contingent would be supported in
a UN-led operation that is planned, managed, directed, and supported by the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). It should be read
in conjunction with the following UN publications:
a. Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations
(Ref. AP).
b. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (Ref. AQ).
c. Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of
Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in
Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)(Ref. AR).
Nature of UN Operations
0932. The UN is an international body that is neither a political nor a military alliance. As such,
it does not possess standing military forces: it raises forces contributed by member nations, who
also contribute to the associated financial costs through their respective annual UN peacekeeping
assessment. UN operations are normally conducted under a formal, mission-specific mandate
contained in a UN Security Council resolution.
0933. In the past two decades, as conflicts have become more violent and complex, UN
peacekeeping has evolved beyond the traditional model to multidisciplinary operations. UN
forces may be deployed in a number of different roles, including:
a. Conflict resolution. Conflict resolution involves the application of structural or
diplomatic measures to keep intra-State or inter-State tensions and disputes from
escalating into violent conflict. Conflict resolution activities may include the use of
the UN Secretary-General’s “good offices,” preventative deployment of UN forces,
or confidence-building measures.
b. Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is designed to preserve the peace where fighting has
been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved through diplomatic
peacemaking efforts. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily
military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces, to incorporate
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a complex model of many elements – military, police, and civilian – working

together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.
c. Peace enforcement. Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of
coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized
to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council
has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act
of aggression.
d. Peacebuilding. Peacebuilding involves a range of measures aimed at reducing the
risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all
levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and
development. Peacebuilding activities include disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of combatants, mine action, security-sector reform, electoral
assistance, and support to the restoration of the State’s authority.

0934. UN. The UN is responsible for the support of its field missions mounted and conducted
under the terms and conditions provided by the mission-specific Security Council resolution.
Generally speaking, UN support responsibilities are divided as follows:
a. UN headquarters. At the UN headquarters level, DFS is responsible for arranging
dedicated support to UN field operations, including personnel services, finances,
field procurement, logistics, communications and information technology, and other
administrative and general management issues.
b. UN field mission headquarters. Delivering common support services is part of the
administrative functions of a UN peacekeeping operation and falls under the
responsibility of the Director of Mission Support or Chief of Mission Support, who
reports to the civilian Head of Mission or Special Representative of the Secretary
General.
0935. Nations. Member nations provide contingents for a UN operation based on prior
negotiations and published UN troop contributor guidelines and standards. Contingents may
include military units and/or individual personnel for the UN field mission headquarters. Prior to
deployment on a new peacekeeping operation, each troop-contributing nation will negotiate a
bilateral MOU with UN HQ to cover all aspects of support for the contingent. Notwithstanding
this MOU, troop-contributing nations retain the responsibility to provide national-level support
to their contingent.
0936. Contingent-owned equipment reimbursement system. The contingent-owned
equipment (COE) reimbursement system is based on bilateral MOUs negotiated prior to a new
operation by each troop-contributing nation with the UN, in accordance with procedures outlined
in the COE Manual (Ref. AR). National contingents are responsible to implement the terms and
conditions of the COE system while deployed, as well as for the verification and administration
of the COE MOU details. There are two main categories within the COE reimbursement system,
as well as guidance concerning strategic transportation:
a. Equipment leasing. Reimbursement to troop-contributing nations is made either on
the basis of a “wet lease” – whereby nations provide major equipment and
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maintenance – or a “dry lease”, whereby nations provide only major equipment and
the UN or a third party assumes responsibility for maintenance.
b. Self-sustainment. Reimbursement to troop-contributing nations is based on troop
strength for minor equipment and consumables not related to major equipment.
Reimbursement is subject to inspection and verification by the UN that the
contingent is sustaining its contingent in up to 15 specific sustainment categories in
accordance with agreed standards.
c. Strategic transportation. The UN is responsible for the transportation of personnel
and COE during deployment and redeployment, but may request the troop-
contributing nation to provide this service via a letter of assist, with subsequent
reimbursement. For movements into, within, and from a mission’s area of
operations, the UN is responsible for the coordination of all mission movement-
control operations, including obtaining the necessary permissions and
authorizations from the appropriate authorities of the host nation.
UN Theatre Support
0937. General. The UN theatre support concept is based on the anticipated requirements of
each mission as developed by DPKO in consultation with other UN departments, troop-
contributing nations and, in some cases, host-nation governments. Owing to the requirement to
support national contingents deploying with widely varying levels of self-sufficiency, and the
differing requirements of military contingents, civilian staff, police, and military observers. The
UN field-mission support system is typically more complex than many other support models.
0938. UN theatre support organization. Within the theatre of operations, UN peacekeeping
operations are typically supported through a mix of civilian-contracted materiel and services
procured by the UN, combined with military support capabilities provided by troop-contributing
nations through the COE reimbursement system. When formed military units are deployed to a
UN mission by troop-contributing nations, the support concept is based on the integration of UN-
provided support with resources provided by troop-contributing nations. This UN theatre support
structure is headed by the Director of Mission Support or Chief of Mission Support.
0939. UN Logistic Base. The UN has established a Strategic logistic and communications base
at Brindisi, Italy. This installation maintains stocks to support rapid deployment into new areas
of operation, and also provides ongoing support for all UN missions, particularly with regard to
the replacement of UN-owned major equipment and telecommunications equipment.
0940. UN-chartered Strategic transportation. The UN has a significant capacity to charter air
and cargo ship under time- and voyage-charter leasing arrangements. These capabilities are
employed to support troop-contributing nations that lack their own strategic lift capacity.
0941. Common UN theatre-level support. The UN is responsible to deliver common support
services for a UN operation. These include:
a. The provision of accommodation, buildings management, civil engineering, and
geographical information system services.
b. The assignment of transportation resources, fleet management, and major vehicle
repair-and-maintenance services.
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c. The provision of movement-control services.

d. The installation and maintenance of mission-wide CIS technology.
e. The provision of medical and dental services, along with emergency medical
evacuation capability.
f. The provision of general supply items, such as fuel, water, rations, and construction
and defence materials.
0942. Coordination of UN support. UN field missions have implemented an integrated
support services concept, whereby a joint logistics operations centre, staffed by military and
civilian personnel, performs the consolidation and integration of those services. This
organization provides a means of support information sharing, joint planning, and coordinating
the joint support to operations such as joint movement control, shared use of communications
networks and engineering initiatives.
0943. Limitations of the UN support system. While the UN support system provides adequate
support to the UN force at a reasonable cost, it is not able to sustain high intensity combat
operations. It lacks the appropriate military staff in DPKO to provide the necessary Strategic-
level intelligence, operations planning, and mission management capacity for higher intensity
missions. The UN also has limited support infrastructure to sustain high-intensity operations on a
systematic basis. Finally, the UN’s strategic- and field mission–level communications
capabilities are not sufficiently robust to support high-intensity operations. The CAF support
staff must be aware of such limitations in developing support plans for a UN peacekeeping
operation.
Canadian Interaction with UN Support Organizations

0944. Canada will typically provide a JTFSC, acting in the role of an NSE, in support of its
national contingent. The JTFSC will normally be integrated into the UN mission’s support
system in accordance with the integrated support services model. The Canadian support element
will, however, remain under national command, and will cooperate with the UN field mission
headquarters.
0945. Staff coordination will be conducted between the Canadian JTFHQ staff and that of the
UN field mission headquarters. The JTFSC will coordinate the physical provision of support
with the Joint Logistics Operations Centre. The Canadian contingent will use the applicable COE
MOU as the contractual basis for managing this support relationship with the UN field mission
headquarters. General support procedures for a specific mission will be outlined in the UN field
mission’s standing operating procedures as well as supporting references provided by the UN.
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Chapter 10
Support to Domestic Operations
Section I
General
Introduction
1001. The provision of support to domestic operations may, in certain respects, closely
resemble the manner in which international operations are supported. These will include the
necessity to establish and operate POEs and PODs, Strategic lines of communication, and a
JTFSC. Nonetheless, there are also unique support characteristics associated with domestic
operations that the support staff must take into account. These include the fact that, in the context
of domestic operations, CAF support organizations will utilize national transportation,
communications, infrastructure, and commercial resources.
1002. This Chapter should be read in conjunction with the following publications:
a. CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D);
b. CFJP 3-2, Domestic Operations (Ref. E);
c. CJOC, “Standing Operation Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)” (Ref. R);
and
d. CJOC, “Canadian Forces Northern Employment and Support Plan” (Ref. S).
Key Terminology
1003. The following key terminology will be introduced in this chapter: 130
a. The North. The North is defined as the area encompassing the Sub Arctic Region,
and the Arctic Region to include the Arctic Circle and High Arctic.
b. The Arctic Circle. The Arctic Circle is 66º30′ north latitude.
c. The Arctic Region. The Arctic Region is the area north of 60º north latitude. This
region consists of the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik (northern
Quebec), all of Labrador; extending from Alaska in the west to Davis Strait in the
east and from 60º north to over 83º north. It also includes the Arctic Archipelago,
and represents about 40% of the country’s landmass and two-thirds of its coastline.
d. The Sub Arctic Region. The Sub Arctic region is the area between 55º to 60º north
latitude encompassing what the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
identified as “Mid-North” and includes large areas of British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec that reflect northern conditions.
130
DM/CDS Directive for the DND/CF in Canada’s North (Ref. X), p. 2-3.
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Canadian Area of Responsibility

1004. The Canadian area of responsibility, which includes Canada, its territorial waters, and its
approaches, has been divided into six regions, each commanded by a regional JTF commander:
a. JTF Atlantic (JTFA). JTFA’s area of operations includes the provinces of Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward Island.
JTFA’s maritime region is the Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) area of
operations in the Maritimes and extends to 60º north latitude with JTFN and up to
the Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre Quebec’s boundary, which also acts as the
maritime boundary of Joint Task Force East (JTFE).
b. JTF East (JTFE). JTFE’s area of operations includes the Province of Quebec, less
the National Capital Region (NCR) delineated by the Gatineau Police region of
jurisdiction. The JTFE maritime region for operations uses the Maritime Rescue
Sub-Centre Quebec’s boundary. The western boundary is the Seaway International
Bridge, Highway 138, in Cornwall, Ontario.
c. JTF Central (JTFC). JTFC’s area of operations includes the Province of Ontario,
plus the NCR delineated by the Gatineau Police region of jurisdiction. The JTFC
maritime region is the Canadian portion of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence
River Valley up to and including Cornwall at the Seaway International Bridge,
Highway 138. It does not have a supporting role for maritime operations within
Hudson Bay.
e. JTF West (JTFW). JTFW’s area of operations includes the provinces of Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Although JTFW does not have a specific maritime
region, it does have a supporting role for maritime operations in Hudson Bay.
f. JTF Pacific (JTFP). JTFP’s area of operations includes the Province of British
Columbia and the Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) area of operations in the
Pacific Ocean.
g. JTF North (JTFN). JTFN’s area of operations includes North West Territories,
Yukon, and Nunavut. For maritime operations JTFN’s south-eastern boundary
begins at the 60º west longitude and extends to the north along the
Greenland/Canada territorial water boundary to the pole and in the west the border
of Yukon and Alaska 141º west latitude is extended to the North Pole. JTFN’s
maritime region also includes Hudson Bay, Ungava Bay, and James Bay including
all islands within those bodies of water.
Responsibility for Domestic Operations

1005. General. Provincial/territorial governments have primary responsibility for emergency
preparedness. As such, DND/CAF will primarily play a supporting role, and will become
involved based on a formal request by that level of government. The exception to this rule
pertains to the defence of Canada role, for which DND is the lead department.
1006. CDS. The authority to commit CAF personnel or resources in a domestic operation
resides with the CDS. Elements of that authority have been further delegated to Commander
CJOC and RJTF commanders as described below.
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1007. CJOC. Commander CJOC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and the operational
command of all domestic operations, with the exception of those conducted by NORAD and
some special operations where command and control is retained by the CDS. Commander CJOC
also has operational command of all search-and-rescue (SAR) operations in the Canadian SAR
region.
Types of Domestic Operations

1008. As described in CFJP 3-2 (Ref. E), domestic operations are generally delineated as
follows:
a. Provision-of-service operations. This category covers a wide gamut of civilian
requests for the use of CAF personnel and/or facilities. 131
b. Humanitarian-assistance operations. These include any action undertaken within
the Canadian territory to save lives, to prevent or alleviate human suffering, or to
mitigate property damage. The extent of the assistance will depend on the
circumstances and could range from the loan of small quantity of equipment to a
major deployment of CAF resources.
c. Assistance to law-enforcement agencies (ALEA) operations. Municipal,
provincial, or federal law-enforcement agencies, as well as federal departments
such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, may seek CAF assistance in
discharging law-enforcement duties. Normally, the assistance requested is for a
unique or special skill, capability, or equipment only available from the CAF. When
provided, CAF assistance is always in support of the law-enforcement agency of
jurisdiction.
d. Aid of the civil power (ACP) operations. The National Defence Act (Ref. T) gives
the attorney general of a province or territory the power to require the CAF to be
called out in aid of the civil power for a situation involving a riot or disturbance if,
in the opinion of the attorney general, the riot or disturbance is beyond the powers
of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, or deal with.
e. Defence of Canada (including sovereignty) operations. The CAF helps the
Government of Canada demonstrate its sovereignty by providing a military
presence throughout the country, including the Arctic, and by promoting CAF
capability and resolve to domestic and international audiences. This presence
enables the government to remain aware of activities taking place within Canadian
territory and the air and maritime approaches, and ensures that the CAF can assist,
when called upon, in responding to natural and man-made disasters.
131
See Provision of Services to Non-Defence Agencies (Ref. O).
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Scale of Domestic Operations

1009. The CAF response to domestic emergencies will vary according to the type and extent of
the emergency, the agency or level of government requesting assistance, and whether or not
DND is designated the lead department. For minor events for which assistance has been
requested by another federal department or a provincial or territorial government, the CAF will
provide assistance if resources are available and not committed to a higher priority task. In the
event of a major emergency, CAF priorities may be reordered to permit military assistance. 132
1010. The CJOC SOODO (Ref. R) describes two levels of domestic operations:
a. Limited operation. A limited operation is an operation that takes place within an
RJTF’s area of operations using the resources based within that area to accomplish
the mission. Its command is delegated to the RJTF commander.
b. Complex operation. A complex operation is any operation that exceeds the
capability of a single RJTF or crosses over RJTF area of operations boundaries.
Commander CJOC will normally retain OPCOM of complex operations, with
functions delegated to the RJTF commanders.
Conduct of Domestic Operations

1011. General. Provincial and territorial governments have the primary responsibility for
emergency preparedness. As such, DND/CAF will primarily play a supporting role, and will
become involved based on a formal request by that level of government. The exception to this
rule pertains to the defence of Canada role, for which DND is the lead department. Domestic
operations conducted within Canada and along the maritime and air approaches to Canada are
generally undertaken in partnership with OGDA embracing the comprehensive approach.
1012. Routine operations. Standing authority to initiate routine operations is delegated to
Commander CJOC, and may be further delegated to RJTF commanders dependent on the
operation. Routine operations will be conducted with forces allocated to CJOC/RJTFs in
consultation with the environmental commands. During routine operations, there will be no
change in activity other than the individual routine operation.
1013. Contingency operations. In the domestic context, contingency plans are developed by
CJOC in relation to anticipated tasks that emerge with sufficient warning time to permit
deliberate operations planning. Such tasks may deal with pandemics, maritime disasters, natural
events such as earthquakes, environmental disasters, terrorist incidents, and CAF assistance to an
RCMP major security event. The authority to initiate contingency operations will depend on the
nature and scope of the operation, legal authorities, and direction received from the CDS.
Commander CJOC will normally direct a RJTF commander to conduct operations. If required,
the RJTF commander will designate a task force commander to address the situation.
132
CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D), p. 7-7.
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1014. Rapid-response operations. Rapid-response operations may be initiated and conducted

on a national or regional basis as described below:
a. National rapid-response operation. The CDS or Commander CJOC, upon
determining that an event has or will develop into an event necessitating a national-
level response, may declare a national rapid-response operation. In such cases
Commander CJOC will assume OPCOM of all forces in Canada.
b. Regional rapid-response operation. Commander CJOC has delegated the
authority to declare regional rapid-response operations to RJTF commanders. In
such instances, the RJTF commander will assume OPCOM of all CAF assets in
their region to save lives and prevent human suffering.
Section II
Support to Domestic Operations
Concept of Support to Domestic Operations

1015. Support to domestic operations will be task-tailored and scalable. Moreover, the concept
of support used for a specific operation will largely depend upon the following key factors:
a. the type of the operation (routine, contingency, or rapid-response);
b. the nature of the task (aid of the civil power, assistance to law enforcement,
humanitarian assistance, or sovereignty protection);
c. the anticipated scale of the operation (i.e. the number and type of military forces
required); and
d. the distance of the area of operations from the main operating bases of those CAF
elements tasked to carry it out.
Support to Limited Domestic Operations

1016. RJTFs are responsible for the provision of Tactical-level support to the allocated forces
within their area of operations for limited domestic operations. CJOC will monitor the situation
to maintain situational awareness. Operational-level support will be provided through existing
CAF support infrastructure, such as CAF bases. In such cases, external operational support may
not be required or, if so, may be minimal.
Support to Complex Domestic Operations

1017. For complex domestic operations, CJOC will coordinate the provision of additional
forces and support resources with other RJTFs, the environmental commands, and the SJS.
Depending on the circumstances, CJOC may also obtain support from OGDA and US Northern
Command.
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1018. In such instances the provision of operational support to the force conducting the
domestic operation will, for the most part, be similar to that which is used within international
operations. CJOC will establish the Strategic lines of communication, assist in activating the area
of operations, and will establish a JTFSC to provide general and specialist support. The JTFSC
will normally be assigned OPCOM to the JTF commander for the duration of the operation.
Sustainment will be conducted through the Strategic lines of communication, which will be
operated by CJOC. In the event that the operation is in a remote location, a forward support base
may be established as part of the overall operational-support concept.
Health Services Support to Domestic Operations

1019. As stated in CFJP 3-2, Domestic Operations (Ref. E), the primary role of CAF health
services personnel is to provide or coordinate the provision of health services support to CAF
members involved in the domestic operation. Provision of health care to Canadian civilians is
primarily a provincial or territorial responsibility (exceptions to this include Health Canada for
First Nations populations, Corrections Canada for inmates of federal penitentiaries, and the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police for their uniformed members).
1020. CAF health-services personnel, as a general rule, may not provide health care to civilians.
However, in accordance with paragraph (2)(a)-(d) of Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&O)
34.30, Provision of Medical Care to Civilians (Ref. Y), CAF health-services personnel may
provide care to civilians under the following circumstances:
a. in an emergency, at the discretion of the senior health-services officer present,
examination and treatment to alleviate pain and suffering and to preserve life to the
extent required to evacuate the patient to a civilian health services facility;
b. where no civilian health-services facilities exist;
c. at the request of a federal minister, or a provincial or territorial minister responsible
for health, where it is necessary to supplement civilian health services; and
d. as directed by the Minister of National Defence.
Sources of Support for Domestic Operations

1021. CAF support. Military support to a domestic operation may be drawn through a
combination of military organizations and facilities. These will include local CAF bases or
stations, the CFJOSG, or support units belonging to the environmental commands.
1022. United States forces support. Frameworks exist for US forces to operate in support of
the CAF (and vice versa) in public welfare emergencies, mitigation of the effects of a terrorist
attack and support to law enforcement. The two primary plans, that can be used to guide rapid
response or deliberate planning and operations are the Canada – US Civil Assistance Plan and
the Canada-United States Combined Defense Plan. Use of these plans requires the approval of
the two governments.
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1023. Support from municipal, provincial, or territorial governments. Within the context of
domestic operations, support may be obtained through the municipality, province, or territory
within which the operation is being conducted. Such support will be coordinated by the JTFHQ
through the local, provincial, or territorial emergency preparedness organizations.
1024. Local contractors. As with the case of international operations, local companies may
able to provide additional sources of support to domestic operations. The support staff involved
should acquaint themselves with the resources available in the area of operations.
Support to Northern Operations

1025. General. Support for the North differs from other domestic operations and needs to
address the unique challenges faced in the austere, sparsely populated region. Operations in the
North must meet challenges based on weather and environment, increased distances, time
requirements, resource availability, and contracting concerns. The development of a support-and-
sustainment system for northern operations that can be activated when needed will be of prime
importance. Moreover, to support contingency or crisis operations in the North the support
element must be capable of deploying anywhere in the region, and at any time of the year. This
will include the capability to rapidly establish the Strategic lines of communication. All
equipment used in the North must be air-transportable. If feasible, and where time permits,
consideration should be given to using sealift to transport equipment.
1026. Planning support to northern operations. The support staff must consider the
following characteristics of Canada’s North:
a. Climate. The region’s harsh climate makes the ability to support and sustain a
deployed force absolutely critical. Deploying forces need to carefully plan their
capability to ensure self sufficiency until the military support and sustainment
networks become effective.
b. Lack of local support capability. The support staff must ensure that sufficient
quantities of mission-critical stores and other necessary equipment are deployed so
as not to negatively affect northern communities, which typically have just enough
support capability and infrastructure to sustain their routine requirements. For
operations requiring the long-term establishment of CAF infrastructure, planners
must bear in mind the extensive process required to obtain the applicable permits
from federal departments and agencies, territorial, and/or municipal governments.
Planners should be aware of industrial and other capabilities in the area that may be
tapped in the event of an emergency, such as mining or lumber camps.
c. Lack of transportation infrastructure. As there are few good roads, no railways,
and few seaports in the North, the CAF will often have to rely on aircraft and low
ground pressure cross-country vehicles to support mobility needs.
d. Poor communications. Radio communications in the North suffer from
propagation difficulties and exceptional planning steps are essential for
communications in northern areas. Additionally, many communities are not
serviced by commercial terrestrial links (fibre optic or microwave backbone) and
are exclusively serviced via commercial satellite communications with limited to
non-existent coverage north of 55 degrees. Regardless of how a community is
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provided with commercial services, military planners must be cognizant of capacity

limitations and the potential impacts on a community.
e. Environmental concerns. The fragile nature of the northern environment, as well
as the numerous government rules and regulations for managing it, will have a
significant impact on the ability to sustain forces.
1027. CAF operations in the North. Northern operations are generally conducted as follows:
a. Routine operations. Routine operations focus on providing situational awareness,
maintaining a visible presence in support of Canadian sovereignty in the North, and
preparing forces to conduct northern operations. To ensure a balance of temporary
and permanent presence in the North, CJOC, in conjunction with RJTFs, force
generators, and OGDA, will integrate and coordinate sovereignty patrols, exercises,
and other northern activities.
b. Contingency/rapid-response operations. Contingency and rapid-response
operations are conducted along similar lines as those within other parts of Canada,
the primary difference being the lack of a sizable military presence within the
North. JTFN will, in many instances, require the support of other RJTFs and
Operational-level support provided by CJOC to conduct large-scale operations in
the North.
1028. Concept of support to northern operations. Support to northern operations is based on
the following pillars:
a. Self-sustainable. Given the scarcity of local support infrastructure in the North,
tasked units will deploy as self-sustained as possible, and in the case of a formation-
level deployment, with integral second line support.
b. Mutual support with OGDA. Most domestic operations will require close
coordination with OGDA in delivering services required for Canadians. In many
instances, OGDA will look to CAF resources to assist their immediate or short term
efforts.
c. Limited support from northern industry. As feasible, contractors and industrial
locations such as mining camps with capacity beyond local requirements should be
included in the support concept. Military demands on local industry should not
create shortages for local residents.
1029. Deployment. In such instances where the nature of a contingency/rapid-response
operation exceeds the capability of JTFN’s resources, forces will deploy from their main
operating bases in southern Canada via the most expeditious means, usually aircraft. Wherever
possible, such forces will be landed at an aerodrome capable of handling large transport aircraft
that is located at or in very close proximity to the employment area. Where this is not possible,
forces will be landed at the next closest aerodrome, and move to their employment area by
rotary-wing aircraft or surface transport.
1030. Northern Strategic lines of communication. Given the isolated nature of the North, the
deployment of CAF elements to the region should be considered as equivalent in effort to
Strategic movement. As such, CJOC will normally develop and operate northern Strategic lines
of communication.
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1031. Local contracting in the North. Military expectations of contracted services must be
tailored to what northern industry can be reasonably expected to provide. Contracting in the
North must also take into consideration the potential impacts of comprehensive land claim
agreements on the contracting process. Contracting through local companies will be done
wherever possible and if there are no resulting detrimental effects to either local northern
communities or the environment. Standing offers will be first used, but if they do not meet
operational requirements, then the normal contract bidding process will be employed.
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CFJP 4-0
Glossary
Note: The definitions in this Glossary are derived from a number of sources. Where this
publication is the source of a definition, no source is indicated. Definitions taken from other
sources are indicated in parentheses at the end of each term, utilizing the following
abbreviations:
 AJP-4.9 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistics Support

(Ref. AG)
 CFASD – Canadian Forces Aerospace Sustain Doctrine (Ref. M)
 DTB – DND Defence Terminology Bank (Ref. W)
 MC324/2 – The NATO Military Command Structure (Ref. AJ)
administration
The provision and implementation of regulations and procedures related to the management of
an organization in support of the accomplishment of its mission. (DTB, record 34920)
administrative control (ADCON)

The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to
administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not
included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
(DTB, record 3289)
advance party
An element that precedes a unit to establish contact with on site units to facilitate the arrival of
the main body of the troops. It also prepares the installation. (DTB, record 19426)
allied operation
A multinational operation based on formal agreements, standards and procedures.
Note: “Allied” (with capital A) is used specifically for NATO. (DTB, record 35677)
area of operations (AO)

A geographical area, within an area of responsibility, assigned to a subordinate commander
within which that commander has the authority to plan and conduct tactical operations.
(DTB, record 3528)
area of responsibility (AOR)

The geographical area assigned to an Operational-level commander within which that
commander has the authority to plan and conduct military operations. (DTB, record 34612)
assembly area
An area in which the elements of a force are assembled in preparation for further action.
(DTB, record 14116)
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assembly base
The base, designated by the parent command, at which personnel and materiel are initially
assembled for training and administration prior to deployment. (DTB, record 15677)
cadre operational support hub

A task-tailored operational support hub that provides a limited range of operational support
capabilities to CAF operations. (DTB, record 47815)
caretaker operational support hub

An operational support hub for which all arrangements, agreements, and plans for activation
have been completed, but that is not manned. (DTB, record 47816)
casualty support team (CST)

An intermediate medical staging facility located along the Strategic lines of communication.
coalition operation
A multinational operation based on agreements, standards, and procedures specific to that
operation. (DTB, record 35678)
combat ration
Individual ration designed for issue as the tactical situation dictates and when no other form of
feeding is practicable.
Note: The ration is self-contained and provides food for one man for one day.
(DTB, record 15700)
combat service support (CSS)

The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.
(DTB, record 409)
combat support (CS, cbt sp)

Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (DTB, record 3817)
Command
The operational function that integrates all the operational functions into a single comprehensive
Strategic-, Operational- or Tactical-level concept. (DTB, record 26166)
command and control (C2)

The exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned, allocated, and attached
forces in the accomplishment of a mission. (DTB, record 5950)
component
In joint operations, an organization subordinate to the joint task force responsible for the
planning, integration and conduct of operations for a specific environment or function.
Note: Typical components are maritime, land, air, special operations, and support.
(DTB, record 44197)
GL-2
CFJP 4-0
comprehensive approach
A philosophy according to which military and non-military actors collaborate to enhance the
likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.
Note: The actors may include joint or multinational military forces, Canadian government
departments and agencies (whole of government), other governments (foreign, provincial and
municipal), international organizations (NATO, UN), non-governmental organizations (CARE,
OXFAM), private sector entities or individuals. (DTB, record 34522)
concept of operations (CONOPS)

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander to accomplish his
given mission. (DTB, record 3862)
contingency operation
A deliberate operation planned in advance of a known event or an event that could reasonably be
expected. (DTB, record 22309)
control (con)
The authority exercised by commanders over part of the activities of subordinate organizations,
or other organizations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility
for implementing orders or directives.
Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (DTB, record 375)
course of action (COA)

In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a
mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (DTB, record 20891)
deliberate planning
Formal planning for routine or deliberate contingency operations for which the location and
nature of the operation is known or anticipated.
deployed operating base (DOB)

1. An expeditionary base that supports the employment and sustainment of deployed forces.
(DTB, record 30809)
2. Any aerospace operation conducted at destinations other than the main operating base at
which the aircraft and related personnel are normally based. (CFASD)
deployment
The relocation of forces to desired areas of operations. (DTB, record 1203)
drawdown
The graduated, orderly reduction of forces, services, arrangements, and materiel in a theatre of
operations.
estimate of the situation

A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers the circumstances affecting the
military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken to accomplish the
mission. (DTB, record 3508)
GL-3
CFJP 4-0
force employment
1. At the Strategic-level, the application of military means in support of strategic objectives.
2. At the Operational-level, the command, control, and sustainment of allocated forces.
(DTB, record 32173)
force generation
The process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for employment. (DTB, record 32171)
forward operating base (FOB)

An expeditionary base, located in the combat zone, that supports the employment and
sustainment of deployed forces. (DTB, record 28933)
full command
The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It
covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national
services.
Note: The term “command”, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than
when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command
over the forces assigned to him since in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only
operational command or operational control. (DTB, record 4340)
fully activated operational support hub

A task-tailored operational support hub that provides a broad range of operational support
capabilities to CAF operations. (DTB, record 47823)
Gantt chart
In project planning, a bar chart of activities against a timeline showing how long each activity
will take and indicating start and end dates for each. (DTB, record 46193)
host nation (HN)

A nation that, by agreement allows:
a. another nation’s forces to operate on or from, be located on, or transit through its territory; or
b. another nation’s materiel to be located on or transported through its territory.
(DTB, record 4465)
host-nation support (HNS)

Civil and military assistance rendered by a nation, in time of peace, crisis, or war, to a force that
is located on, operating in/from, or is transiting through that nation’s territory.
(DTB, record 4466)
hub-and-spoke method (hub-and-spoke)

A method of sustaining outlying locations, formations and units from a central and secure
position. (DTB, record 43593)
integrated operation
An operation involving the coordinated and complementary efforts of military and non-military
organizations to achieve a common goal. (DTB, record 37297)
GL-4
CFJP 4-0
intermediate staging terminal (IST)

A terminal located along the Strategic lines of communication that temporarily provides
operational support to forces in transit.
Note: In NATO, this is called an “intermediate staging base.”(DTB, record 2049)
joint operation
An operation executed by a temporary grouping of elements from at least two components, in
which the application of capabilities is coordinated to achieve a common objective.
(DTB, Record 35629)
joint task force (JTF)

A temporary grouping of elements from more than one component, under one commander,
formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
Note: Typical components are maritime, land, air, special operations, and support.
(DTB, record 31012)
lead nation (LN)

The nation that provides the essential political and military leadership to plan and execute a
multinational operation.
Note: A lead nation will normally provide some significant capabilities for the execution.
(DTB, record 31028)
lines of communications (LOC)

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases
of operation, and along which supplies and reinforcements move. (DTB, Record 814)
logistics (log)
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.
Note: In its most comprehensive sense, logistics is the aspects of military operations that deal
with:
a. design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition of materiel;
b. transport of personnel;
c. acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and
d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
(DTB, record 815)
Remark: In NATO, logistics also includes medical and health service support.
logistics control (LOGCON)

The authority granted to a NATO commander over assigned logistics units and organizations in
the Joint Operations Area, including national support elements (NSEs), to synchronize,
prioritize, and integrate logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission.
(MC 324/2)
GL-5
CFJP 4-0
logistic lead nation (LLN)

In multinational operations, a nation that assumes overall responsibility for organizing and
coordinating an agreed broad spectrum of support for all or part of the multinational force, within
a defined geographical area and for a defined period. (AJP-4.9)
logistic role specialist nation (LRSN)

In multinational operations, a nation that assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing
a specific logistic capability or service for all or parts of the multinational force, within a defined
geographic area and for a defined period. (AJP-4.9).
main body
During deployment operations, the major element of a force excluding reconnaissance, advance
and rear parties.
main operating base (MOB)

A base responsible for supporting the generation, employment, and sustainment of permanently
assigned air, land, or maritime forces. (DTB, record 41464)
marshalling area
An area within which materiel, especially vehicles, is assembled and organized for onward
movement. (DTB Record 7870)
mounting
All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It
includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation, and maintenance within the mounting
area, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if
applicable. (DTB, record 4821)
mounting base
A designated base that accommodates personnel and materiel prior to loading at the ports of
embarkation. (DTB, record 15770)
multinational operation
Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together. (DTB, record 3826)
national command element (NCE)

A headquarters that exercises command over its national contingent. (DTB, record 35170)
national support element (NSE)

In multinational operations, a deployed organization that provides support to a nation’s
contingent using lines of communications between the home nation and the theatre of operations.
Note: Command and control of this organization will not normally be transferred to the
multinational headquarters.(DTB, record 41459)
operation termination (mission termination)

The conclusion of the military, administrative, and other activities related to an operation.
(DTB, record 47832)
GL-6
CFJP 4-0
operation transition (mission transition)

The implementation of a significant change in the role or composition of a deployed force in
response to a corresponding change in the nature or scope of the operation.
(DTB, Record 47833)
operational command (OPCOM)

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
deploy units, to reallocate forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as
the commander deems necessary.
Notes:
1. Operational command does not include responsibility for administration.
2. In the NATO definition, the expression “to reassign forces” is used rather than “to reallocate
forces.”
(DTB, record 19477)
operational control (OPCON)

The authority delegated to a commander to direct allocated forces to accomplish specific
missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units
concerned, and to retain or delegate tactical control of those units.
Notes:
1. Operational control does not include authority to assign separate employment of components
of the units concerned, neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
2. In the NATO definition, the expression “forces assigned” is used rather than “allocated
forces”.
(DTB, record 1056)
operations planning process (OPP)

A decision-making process employed by a commander and staff. (DTB, record 21039)
operational stocks
The level of stock necessary to meet possible operational requirements over and above
holdings/allowances. (DTB, record 1063)
operational support
The specialized and common support activities provided to aid or sustain the operations of a
force within a theatre of operations and along the Strategic lines of communication.
Note: Operational support generally encompasses the support activities that are not specific to a
particular component or are beyond the capability of tactical-level support organizations,
including reception, staging and onward movement; theatre opening and closing; and theatre-
level logistics, equipment maintenance, military engineering, communication and information
services, personnel support, military police, contracting, and health support services.
(DTB, record 47813)
operational support hub (OS Hub)

Within a pre-established global hub-and-spoke network, an operational support node situated
along or at the terminus of Strategic lines of communication. (DTB, record 47834)
GL-7
CFJP 4-0
port of embarkation (POE)

A seaport, airport, or railhead where personnel, equipment and/or stocks are loaded onto a means
of transport. (DTB, record 31682)
port of debarkation (POD)

A seaport, airport, or railhead where personnel, equipment and/or stocks are unloaded from a
means of transport. (DTB, record 31681)
rapid-response operation
An operation conducted in response to an unforeseen event or emergency that requires urgent
involvement to save lives, reduce human suffering or mitigate property damage.
(DTB, record 35680)
rapid-response planning
Mission planning, often abbreviated, in response to an immediate or sudden crisis.
reachback
The means by which a deployed force receives support from organizations external to the area of
responsibility. (DTB, record 37303)
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)

The process that enables JTF elements, on arrival in a theatre of operations, to attain full
operating capability as part of a joint or multinational force.
reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM)

The support activities within the RSOI process.
reconnaissance party (recce party)

A group composed of personnel that a commander assigns to reconnoitre and prepare an area of
operations such as a deployment area, concentration area or assembly area, for subsequent
occupation. Its tasks may include: clearing the area to be occupied and protecting it as required,
carrying out limited ground clearance for routes and operating space, selecting and marking in
and out routes, and guiding the main body into the area. (DTB, record 24736)
reconstitution
Measures taken to restore a formation or unit to an acceptable level of readiness.
(DTB, record 35053)
redeployment
The relocation of forces to a new area of operations.
Note: Redeployment can involve returning the forces to their main operating bases or
deployment to a new location to carry out a different operation. (DTB, record 36932)
relief in place (RIP)

An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area
by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the
assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the
operation as ordered. (DTB, record 5241)
GL-8
CFJP 4-0
routine operation
A force employment activity that is normally recurring in nature, can usually be planned for and
can be programmed on an annual basis. (DTB, record 35679)
staff check
A rudimentary assessment conducted to investigate one or more aspects of a proposed military
activity. (DTB, record 47839)
staging area (SA)

A locality established for the concentration of personnel and materiel between movements over
lines of communications. (DTB, record 15836)
staging base
A base located between the assembly and mounting bases, where fuel, lodging, feeding, and
other services are provided to personnel and materiel in transit. (DTB, record 47840)
Strategic lines of communication (SLOC)

All the land, water and air routes that connect a deployed force with the home nation, and along
which sustainment activities occur, as well as the activities themselves.
Note: The lines of communications include the transportation nodes. The associated activities
include reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOMI); third-location
decompression and medical evacuation.(DTB, record 41456)
support (sp)
The administrative and logistic aid provided to a formation, to a unit, or to an individual.
(DTB, record 1361)
supported commander
A commander who has the primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned military task and
has the authority to give general direction for supporting efforts. (DTB, Record 37280)
supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces, capabilities, or other support
and/or who develops a supporting plan.
Note: The relationship between supported and supporting commanders does not constitute a
formal command relationship. (DTB, record 37281)
sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required
to achieve its objectives. (DTB, record 5474)
sustainment
The ability of a nation or a force to maintain effective military power to achieve desired effects.
(DTB, record 34949)
tactical command (TACOM)

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (DTB, record 5491)
GL-9
CFJP 4-0
tactical control (TACON)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (DTB, record 5493)
task force (TF)

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a
specific operation or mission. (DTB, record 1457)
technical control
The control applied to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of
professional or technical jurisdiction. It works with chains of command to ensure policy
compliance within specialized areas such as legal, engineering, procurement, medical, and
communications.
terminal (tml)
A military or commercial transportation facility used for the loading, offloading, or in-transit
handling of cargo or personnel. (DTB, record 15859)
theatre of operations (TO)

A geographical region in which one or more military campaigns are conducted.
(DTB, record 1470)
theatre activation
The diplomatic, operational planning, and support activities required to shape an operation and
prepare the theatre for the conduct of conduct operations.
Note: Theatre activation includes intelligence gathering, liaison with multinational staff,
diplomatic engagement, arranging host-nation agreements, and theatre opening.
(DTB, record 47841)
theatre closing
In the context of theatre deactivation, the dismantling of the theatre support structure.
Note: The theatre support structure consists of all materiel, infrastructure, services, and
arrangements.
(DTB, record 47842)
theatre deactivation
The diplomatic, operational planning, and support activities required to conclude an operation.
Note: Theatre deactivation includes liaison with multinational staff, diplomatic engagement,
concluding host-nation agreements, and theatre closing.
(DTB, record 47843)
theatre opening
In the context of theatre activation, the establishment of the theatre support structure required for
the deployment and sustainment of the force.
Note: The theatre support structure consists of all materiel, infrastructure, services, and
arrangements.
(DTB, record 47844)
GL-10
CFJP 4-0
third-location decompression (TLD) facility

A facility established at an intermediate point along the strategic lines of communication at
which redeploying troops “decompress” prior to rejoining their families.
transfer of authority (TOA)

The formal transfer, between commanders, of a specified degree of authority over forces
allocated to an operation. (DTB, record 5558)
transfer of command authority (TOCA)

The formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces allocated to an operation from a
force or capability generator to a force employer, as well as from force employer to a force or
capability generator upon return from operations. (DTB, record 30432)
whole-of-government (WoG) approach

An integrated approach to a situation that incorporates diplomatic, military, and economic
instruments of national power as required. (DTB, record 35242)
GL-11
CFJP 4-0

CFJP 4-0
List of Abbreviations
3 CSU 3 Canadian Support Unit

4 CFMCU 4 Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit
A&E ammunition and explosives

ACP aid of the civil power
ADCON administrative control
ADM(Fin CS) Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services)
ADM(IE) Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure & Environment)
ADM(IM) Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management)
ADM(Mat) Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
ADM(Pol) Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
AJP Allied joint publication
ALEA assistance to law-enforcement agencies
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
APOD air port of debarkation
APOE air port of embarkation
CA Canadian Army
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CANCAP Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program
CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CDS Chief of Defence Staff
CF Canadian Forces (only used in titles)
CFJP Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFJOSG Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group
CFPM Canadian Forces Provost Marshal
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communication and information services
CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command
CMP Chief Military Personnel
CMSG Canadian Materiel Support Group
COA course of action
COE contingent-owned equipment
comd commander
CONOPS concept of operations
COS chief of staff
CRD commander’s required date
CSOEU Canadian Special Operations Enabling Unit
CS close support
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CST casualty support team
AL-1
CFJP 4-0
DAOD Defence Administrative Orders and Directives

DND Department of National Defence
DFATD Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DFS Department of Field Support (UN)
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRMIS Defence Resource Management Information System
DTB Defence Terminology Bank
Engr engineers
fin finance
FLC force logistic coordinator
FLS forward logistic site
FMS foreign military sales
GLC group logistic coordinator

GS general support
HNS host-nation support

HQ headquarters
HSS health services support
IS integral support
IST intermediate staging terminal
ILOC Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication
Agreement
int Intelligence
JLSA joint logistic support area (NATO)

JLSG joint logistic support group (NATO)
JTF joint task force
JTFA Joint Task Force Atlantic
JTFC Joint Task Force Central
JTFE Joint Task Force East
JTFHQ joint task force headquarters
JTFN Joint Task Force North
JTFP Joint Task Force Pacific
JTFSC joint task force support component
JTFW Joint Task Force West
LLN logistic lead nation

LOC lines of communications
log logistics
LOGCON logistics control
LOGFAS logistic role specialist nation
LRSN Logistics Functional Area System
AL-2
CFJP 4-0
MAMS mobile air movements section

MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic
MARPAC Maritime Force Pacific
MC movement control
MCC movement coordination centre
Mov Con Det movement control detachment
MIDD materiel and infrastructure distribution directive
MILU multinational integrated logistics unit
MIMU multinational integrated medical unit
MLSA mutual logistics support arrangement
MLU multinational logistic unit
MMC materiel management centre
MMU multinational medical unit
MND Minister of National Defence
MNLC multinational logistics commander
MOU memorandum of understanding
MP military police
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCE national command element
NCR National Capital Region
NDHQ National Defence Headquarters
NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command
NPF non-public funds
NSE national support element
NSPA NATO Support Agency
OGDA other government departments and agencies

OPCOM operational command
OPCON operational control
OPP operations planning process
ops operations
OS Hub operational support hub
pers personnel
POD port of debarkation
POE port of embarkation
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PWGSC Public Works and Government Services Canada
QR&O The Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

RCN Royal Canadian Navy
recce reconnaissance
ref reference
AL-3
CFJP 4-0
RJTF regional joint task force

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSOM reception, staging, and onward movement
SAR search and rescue

SJS Strategic Joint Staff
SLOC Strategic lines of communication
SOF special operations forces
SOODO Standing Operation Order for Domestic Operations
SOPG strategic operations planning groups
SOTF special operations task force
SPOD sea port of debarkation
SPOE sea port of embarkation
TACOM tactical command

TACON tactical control
TFMO task force movement officer
TFMT task force movement table
TLD third-location decompression
TOA transfer of authority
TOCA transfer of command authority
TO&E table of organization and equipment
trg training
UN United Nations
US United States of America
WoG whole-of-government
AL-4
CFJP 4-0
List of References
Canada
Canadian Armed Forces
A. CDS, “CDS Directive on Canadian Armed Forces Command and Control and the
Delegation of Authority for Force Employment” (28 Apr 2013)
B. VCDS, “Command and Control Operating Concept” (14 Jun 2012)
C. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (Apr 2009)
D. CFJP 3-0, Operations (Sep 2011)
E. CFJP 3-2, Domestic Operations (Jul 2011)
F. CFJP 3-12, Military Engineering Support to Canadian Forces Operations (6 Jun 1999)
G. CFJP 3-16, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (4 Dec 2012)
H. CFJP 4-1, Movement (Sep 2002)
I. CFJP 4-10, Health Services Support to Operations (10 Feb 2007)
J. CFJP 5-0, The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (Change 2, Apr 2008)
K. CF Postal Service Manual (A-PS-204-001/AG-001)
L. Food Services Manual (A-85-269-001/FP-001)
M. RCAF, Canadian Forces Aerospace Sustain Doctrine (B-GA-406-000/FP-000)
(Feb 2011)
L. CA, Sustainment of Land Operations (B-GL-300-004/FP-001) (Dec 2010)
N. CA, Combat Service Support Units in Operations (B-GL-345-001/FP-001)
O. Provision of Services to Non-Defence Agencies (B-GS-055-000/AG-001)
P. CJOC, “Directive on Deployed Operations”
Q. CJOC, “Standing Operation Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)” (26 Apr 2012)
R. CJOC, “Canadian Forces Northern Employment and Support Plan (NESP)” (Working
Draft, Nov 2011)
Department of National Defence
T. National Defence Act
U. Canada First Defence Strategy (2009)
V. DAOD 4003-0, Environmental Protection and Stewardship (30 Jul 2004)
W. Defence Terminology Bank [http://terminology.mil.ca]
X. DM/CDS, “Directive for the DND/CF in Canada’s North” (12 Apr 2011)
Y. QR&O 34.30, Provision of Medical Care to Civilians
REF-1
CFJP 4-0
NATO
Z. AJP-3.12, Allied Doctrine for Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations
(Ed. A, Version 1, Sep 2010) (STANAG 2238, Ed. 2)
AA. AJP-3.13, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces (Ed. 1, Jun 2008)
(STANAG 2532, Ed. 1)
AB. AJP-3.2.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police (Ed. 1, 21 Sep 2009) (STANAG
2296, Ed. 1)
AC. AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine (Ed. A, Version 1, 15 Oct 2010) (STANAG 2180,
Ed. 2)
AD. AJP-4.4, Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine (Ed. B, Version 1,
6 May 2013) (STANAG 2506, Ed. 3)
AE. AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host-Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures (Ed. B, Version 1,
6 May 2013) (STANAG 2234, Ed. 3)
AF. AJP-4.6, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group (Ed. B, 15 April
2010) (STANAG 2232, Ed. 2)
AG. AJP-4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support
(Ed. A, 7 Feb 2013) (STANAG 2512, Ed. 2)
AH. AJP-4.10, Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine (Ed. A, Mar 2006) (STANAG 2228,
Ed. 2)
AI. AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communications and Information Systems
(Ed. 1, Apr 2011) (STANAG 2525, Ed. 1)
AJ. MC 324/2, “The NATO Military Command Structure (NCS)” (16 Feb 2010)
AK. MC 469/1, “NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection (EP)”
(14 Oct 2011)
AL. Bi-Strategic Command, “Allied Joint Operational Guidelines for Logistics”
(15 Feb 2013)
AM. STANAG 2034, NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance
Australia
AN. ADDP 4.2, Support to Operations (2004)
United Kingdom
AO. JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations (3rd ed., Apr 2007)
United Nations
AP. Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003)
AQ. UN Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008)
REF-2
CFJP 4-0
AR. COE Manual – Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and
Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in
Peacekeeping Missions (2011)
REF-3
CFJP 4-0 - Support
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B-GL-005-400/FP001

Canadian Forces Joint Publication

Custodian: Canadian Joint Operations Command

Joint Doctrine Branch

1st Edition, 2014

Intra-Theatre Lines of Communications.................................................................................... 2-21

Section III – The Support Estimate

Section III – Theatre Opening

Postal Services ........................................................................................................................... 7-10

Chapter 9 - Support within Multinational Joint Operations

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h. personnel support services, including personnel management, administration,

Overview of the CAF Support Framework

Figure 2-1: The CAF Support Framework

Levels of Conflict and Sustainment

0210. There are four lines of support:

Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support

Figure 2-2: Relationship between Levels of Sustainment and Lines of Support

0215. Information network. The information network, which includes communications

Whole-of-Government (WoG) Approach

Figure 2-3: National Support

National Defence Headquarters

Force Employment Commands

Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)

0230. Support responsibilities. CJOC support responsibilities are divided as follows:

Fourth-Line Support Units

Other Government Departments and Agencies (OGDA)

National Infrastructure and Industry

International Agreements and Arrangements

0236. Authority and responsibility. The following should be noted:

Figure 2-4: The Strategic Lines of Communication

c. casualty support teams (CSTs); and

Operational Support Hubs (OS Hubs)

• 2-20 permanent staff

• Not normally manned

Figure 2-5: OS Hub Employment Postures

Intermediate Staging Terminal (IST)

Casualty Support Team (CST)

Third-Location Decompression (TLD) Facilities

Figure 2-6: Theatre Support

Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) Staff

Figure 2-7: Organization of a Generic Joint Task Force Headquarters

Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC)

Health Equipment Contract JTFSC First

Movements Transport TranspoPostal Supply

Figure 2-8: Functional Organization of a Generic JTFSC

0255. Functions. The functions of the JTFSC include the following:

JTF Component Support Organizations

0258. Sources of contracted support. Contracts may be established to provide goods or

Intra-Theatre Lines of Communications

Host-Nation Support (HNS)

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g. Command support. “The integrated system of resources necessary to enable

c. Single-component operation. Operations undertaken by the forces of an individual

be delegated outside of our national chain of command (e.g. delegated to a NATO

in a transfer of authority (TOA) or in accordance with NATO principles and

Supported Commander/Supporting Commander

Component Command Method

Figure 3-1: Component Command Method in a Multinational Joint Operation