Brief of Appellant

In 2021 Georgia Courts in Thomas et al. V. Kia Auto Sports of Columbus, Inc. et al.
, conspired with the

defendants to circumvent the law to obstruct justice.
The Thomases’ case deals with the same scam that is found in Erik Brucker vs. United States of America,
No. 1:11-cv-751/1:08-cr-85 2012 (Brucker v. US), where the auto dealership, Ducktown Dodge conspired
with a SunTrust Bank employee, to falsify customers’ credit applications based upon false income
information provided to the bank by the auto dealership.
The issue before the courts was whether the fraudulent credit statement attached to the moving party
SunTrust Bank motion for summary judgment, was created without permission or consent in violation of
the laws in the state of Georgia?
As demonstrated by the court orders and the documents below the courts refuse to address, or consider
the fraudulent documents, or the Thomas claims;
1) the fraudulent credit application that was attached to SunTrust Bank motion for summary
judgment, which support the claims against the defendants;
2) judge Frank J. Jordan Jr. corrupt order only granted Defendant KIA Auto Sport of Columbus,
Motion which does not address the fraudulent credit application, or the claims against SunTrust;
3) Judge Katherine K. Lumsden corrupt order granted SunTrust Bank motion for summary judgment
without addressing the claims surrounding the fraudulent credit application;
4) the appellate brief filed in the Court of Appeal pointed to the lower court orders that failed to
address or consider the fraudulent credit application attached to SunTrust Bank motion, in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party; and
5) the Court of Appeal order affirming Judge Katherine K. Lumsden corrupt order, in doing so
refused to carry out the court's obligation to “view the pleadings and evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, ... accept the credibility of the evidence upon which the
nonmoving party relies, ... afford that evidence as much weight as it reasonably can bear, and to
the extent that the moving party points to conflicting evidence, ... discredit that evidence for
purposes of the motion.” Johnson v. Omondi, 294 Ga. 74, 84-85, 751 S.E.2d 288 (2013)
(Blackwell, J., concurring)..
As the documents clearly shows my claims against the defendants was never considered by the courts, nor
was I recognize as a citizen with rights. This is a clear message from the Jim Crow courts, and others in
the state of Georgia, not only to me, but also for YOU.
Therefore, I call on you to take action by requesting the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
Criminal Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest Washington, DC 20530 to investigate these
crimes.
1
The fraudulent credit application that was attached to SunTrust Bank motion for
summary judgment, which support the claims against the defendants;
That the defendants fraudulently changed the September 30, 2009 three-page credit
application that was filled out by the Thomases, by replacing the first and second pages
with this fraudulent first and second pages of the three-page credit application printed on
October 7, 2009 containing fraudulent income for the Thomases.
(%°°,
--N!
I
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CHATTAHOOCHEE COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
JAMES R. THOMAS, JR. and

SABRINA R. THOMAS,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v.
NO. 11-CV-154
KIA AUTO SPORT OF COLUMBUS,
INC. and SUNTRUST BANK, JUDGE LUMSFORD
Defendants.
SUNTRUST BANK'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE REMAINS FOR TRIAL
COMES NOW, SUNTRUST BANK, a Georgia banking corporation ("SunTrust
Bank" or "SunTrust"), a named Defendant in the above-captioned civil action and
Movant herein, by and through its undersigned counsel, and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-
11-56 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.5, files this Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in support of its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and for a Bill of Peace
Against Plaintiffs (the "Motion"), respectfully showing this honorable Court as follows:
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.
In the course of purchasing a vehicle from KIA Autosport of Columbus, Inc.
("KIA" or "Kia") on September 30, 2009, Plaintiffs James R. Thomas, Jr. ("Mr.
Thomas") and Sabrina R. Thomas ("Mrs. Thomas") (collectively, "Mr. and Mrs.
Thomas" or the "Thomases") each signed a "Vehicle Buyer's Order," an "Applicant's

Credit Statement," and a "Retail Installment Agreement" (hereinafter, the "Contract").
(Compl., ¶9).
2.
True and correct copies of the "Vehicle Buyer's Order," "Applicant's Credit
Statement," and the "Retail Installment Agreement" are attached hereto as Exhibit 1,
Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 3, respectively, and incorporated by reference herein.
3.
In completing the paperwork to purchase the vehicle, the Thomases freely
provided Kia their names, their respective Social Security numbers, their respective
driver's license numbers and birth dates, as well as their occupations and salary or other
source of income. (Compl., T119 and 10; see also Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 hereto).
4.
Additionally, the Thomases signed a separate document entitled "Arbitration
Agreement."
5.
Kia subsequently submitted the Thomases' credit information to, inter alia,
SunTrust Bank to secure financing for the vehicle.
6.
The Thomases drove the vehicle home.

7.
SunTrust Bank received the signed Retail Installment Agreement [the Contract],
dated September 30, 2009 and executed by James R. Thomas, Jr. and Sabrina R. Thomas,
from Kia on October 8, 2009. (Ex. 3).
8.
Following approval, the Thomases set the retail loan up for automatic payments
using SunTrust's automatic payment system and paid as agreed through July 2010.
9.
A true and correct copy of the "Authorization to Charge SunTrust Account for
Auto Loan Payment" executed by Mr. Thomas and Mrs. Thomas and dated November 9,
2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein by reference.
10.
The Thomases' August 2010 payment was received by SunTrust but returned, as
the deposit account from which the payment was drafted had been closed.
11.
Plaintiffs subsequently requested to voluntarily return the vehicle and, ultimately,
to rescind the loan.
12.
Because the loan was delinquent and no payments had been made since July 2010,
SunTrust was forced to repossess the vehicle on October 13, 2010.

13.
Plaintiffs were notified of SunTrust Bank's intention to sell the automobile at
auction, and the vehicle was subsequently sold at auction on November 4, 2010.
14.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 2, 2011..
This 5th day of January, 2018.
Respectfully submitted,
MONICA K. GILROY
Georgia Bar No. 427520
KENT E. ALTOM
Georgia Bar No. 014054
Attorneys for SunTrust Bank
3780 Mansell Road, Suite 140

Alpharetta, Georgia 30022
Tel: (678) 280-1922
Fax: (678) 280-1923
Email: monica.gilroy@gilroyfirm.com
kent.altom@gilroyfirm.com
4
181
0 B
Columb(MUA9gF
TO 0 (706) 562-0400 • Fax: (706) 562-0419
www.kiaautosport.com
((6‘)
Date on:
OEM NO. 15061
VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER Sales Person
BUYER DRIVERS LICENSE NO. DATE OF BIRTH
liKr ROOSEVEL 711011AS JR

Cl..)-BL.07ER 114PIRMsE NO, 0 E 0 el
[RADII, A THcnA
Ab oRE55
21N0L-1111g 137 PO AtA ?.F,.2 C.1;:44:-T.A
HOME PHONE BUSINESS PHOhlE
119(15 l Mr, I cog -rf.21-:c

YEAR MAKE . MODEL. SERIAL NUMBER
911Qct fi -v `.LIkf..1,1'.0 /11134177. 105f3`11(110

COLOR CYL. MILEAGE STK. NO.
r cc • •• •
GROB—EROS-1
DIX NEW 0 DEMO . 0 USED 0 OFF LEASE poidEisEEnoEtiscounrrs... 274511.00
PROGRESSfVE
bbaNUEldU
50981
A ,,,ee h tootte .r • so p•v.

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4 vi;;TOTAIPSEIAIRG:PRICEV
'' ri 27451, 00
P 1/.6.fil.: 't xe-ar .. .4.4•.;:••--,E.t' I - 24:00.143. .0
'AS IS The only warranties applying to this vehicle are those offered by TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE NI A
the manufacturer. The selling dealer expressly disclaims alt warranting,
either expressed or implied, including any implied warrantioa of reetri. 4h74%."''''P'`?'41M11.6&.'''." 4.1,'12, 01 V1
'LA,PCASH4OIFfEREIIICErf fr. 0.,,,a.,,..„
:
27453.00
chantabillty or Bowes tor i particular purpose. and neither assumes or eq:-a.- v..a.64.; • .4.:-..... T. l'T.. '
authorizes any other person to assume for it any liability in connection
with the gala of this vehicle. Buyer *het not be entitled. to recover from SETTLEMENT & CLOSING FEES
the sailing dealer any consequential damages, to property, damages for tteOeet.redoetos.enetehetaieht pewhheemere awe mit 399 I 95
loss of use. logo of limo, toes of profits, or income, or any other Incidental
damages. The BOW( hereby acknowtedegaa that the Dealer hag made AMOUNT TAXABLE ?.7843.95
available -Warranty Pre-Sale Information" as disclosed in the Warranty
Birders pastrami to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. X
SALES TAX 1 39(', 50
TRADE-IN iti.00
TITLE, TAG & OFFICIALTV
YEAR MAKE MODEL ., .q.C. 13.00
VIN A MILES EXTENDED SERVICE PLAN

,t1312 42
,1
LEINHOLOSit PAYOFF ' 14Macatla.11ysighziliq»-Tp a „.. ,
1101 it•I
it ." e 3114.47
• ' -..- itATEITAIYPRICE
,
44.:
^
. it ,
ACCOUNT 0 I
BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN I N/A
SECOND TRADE-IN
YEAR MAKE MODEL
TOTAL AMOUNT OWED 318515.47
.si ,
,gstmtala...,r. 7,I.1- a ., :, • L2 , .40 1
YIN a MILES ,
.-4-
VADOWNIPAYINIU Ir '..,c'; . I N/A
a . •:t3i. if'Wiet
...V"' Vheth,' ' . - i
EF IR-FiNITE fl PAYOFF I
\ CASH ON DELIVERY 300p. 00
ACCOUN I
FACTORY REBATE 30+,00

The shawl payorl information is subject to verification at a later data
Any error Or incorrect information tecieved as to the idle or OaVefi • via......s.tsvai.mtediarerieutmea,vawnsy.$1,apetto,r
amount will be the responsibility of the buyer. p&IIIPAID BA LARICELDFXASHIP RICEr41 2589b,47
ix.m.eavitt.417..,
..,
,•ea,Atanratavat, gen r
• • Title S Tag Foos are estimate-any excess will be refunded by Dealer when registration Is delivered, any shortage must bo paid by Buyor(s) when registra-
tion is delivored. This charge includes the official State Fee for MOTOR VEFIICI It WARRANTY ENFORCEMENT ACT. Waste Tire toad Battery and Now
Wheels Impact Iga.lost title services 550.00- Refundable it litlo produced within 3 business days.
Buyer's Initials ) .
An odometer milago statement is required Information contained on a separate disclosure statement. Buyer by hisiber execution of this Order certifies II-Mittel
she is to years of ago or older and acknowledges that haistin has read Its terms and conditions, and has received a hue copy of this order upon delivery. ANY
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE BREACH THEREOF SHALL BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION
IN NORTH FLORIDA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AND JUDGEMENT UPON THE AWARD
RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATION(S) MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF.
On a cash transaction this offer Is not valid unless signed and accepted by Dealer.
On a credit transaction the Buyor(s) oder is not accepted and the transaction is not consummated until (e) approved in writing by Dealer and a responsible
Bank or Finance Company and (61 all disclosures required by Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth In tending Ad) have been given and (c) Buyer(s)
and Deafer have signed an installment Sale Contract. The annual percentage rare (APR) for the installment sale of an automobile may he negotiated with thp
Dealership, and the Dealership may receive some portion of the finance charge or receive other compensation for providing financing. Buyer's Initials
I HEREBY AGREE TO ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONSS
-‘' • ii t
EXHIBIT 1 Buyer's Signature • ' co-Buyera Signature ;
ACCEPTED BY DEALER'S REPRESENTATIVE
2
6 02Z OV S TOT 6C;
DEALER NAME DEALER TELEPHONE NUMBER DEALER FAX NUMBER

KIA AUTOSPORT OF COLUMBUS 706 - 562 - 0400 706 - 562 - 0419
APPLICANT'S CREDIT STATEMENT

0 Individual Credit Check 0 If you are applying for individual credit in your name and relying on your own income or assets and not the
Appropriate income or assets of another personas the basis for repayment of the credit requested, complete only Section A.
Joint Credit Box
E If you are applying for joint credit with another person, complete sections A and B.
We intend to apply for joint credit
0 Community Property State
Applicant Co-Applicant
0Business Application • If you are married and live In a community propoerty state, please complete Section A about yourself and
Section B about your spouse. You must sign this application. Your spouse must sign this application only if s/he
wishes to be a Co-Applicant.
A. Applicant's Personal Credit Information
1111111111101D JAMES THOMAS

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER or (TAX ID) FIRST NAME OR BUSINESS NAME MI LAST NAME
EMAIL ADDRESS DRIVER'S LICENSE # DRIVER'S LICENSE STATE
05 / 1941. 706 - 989 - 12 1 Hos Homeowner

DATE OF BIRTH (MWDDNYYY ) HOME PHONE # CELL PHONE 4 (See below) TIME AT ADDRESS HOUSING STATUS
401 GA HWY 137 HW
CURRENT STREET # AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE
CUSSETA GA 31805 235

CITY STATE ZIP CODE MTG PYMT OR RENT
PREVIOUS STREET a AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE
YRS MOS
CITY STATE ZIP CODE TIME AT ADDRESS
onalM111111111t Retired
EMPLOYED BY or TYPE OF BUSINESS (if business application) EMPLOYMENT STATUS OCCUPATION
3 YRS 5 MOS 2464 Monthly

BUSINESS PHONE # TIME EMPLOYED SALARY SALARY TYPE
YRS MOS
TIME EMPLOYED
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT (If V I IIIII1 11111 11111 1 Ell 11111
•510 0000 61 00 299244
. 11111 0111 11111 III 11111 11111 1111111111 11111 1111111111 1111 IIII
OCCUPATION
1.111111111111111111111111
Alimony, child support, or se Ned as a basis for repaying this obligation.
OTHER INCOME (MONTHLY) SOURCE OF OTHER INCOME
By providing my cell phone number, I give my prior express consent to receive calls and text messages from the creditor or its
third party debt collector at that number, Including calls and messages made by using an autodialer or prerecorded message.
EXHIBIT
Printed on 10107/2009 at 10:07 AM

• ; •
- ,
4-6
O
I-4 B. Co-Applicant's Personal Credit Information
VI 252278437, SABRINA THOMAS
• SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER Or (TAX ID) FIRST NAME OR BUSINESS NAME MI LAST NAME
Q
N
▪ EMAIL ADDRESS DRIVER'S LICENSE # DRIVERS LICENSE STATE
05 / 25 / 191" V06 - 989 - 12 yRS 1 MQS Family

DATE OF BIRTH (MM/DD/YYYY ) HOME PHONE # CELL PHONE # (See below) TIME AT ADDRESS HOUSING STATUS
401 GA HWY 137 HW

CURRENT STREET # AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE
CIISSETA GA 31805 0
CITY STATE ZIP CODE MTG PYMT OR RENT
PREVIOUS STREET # AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE
YRS MOS
CITY STATE ZIP CODE TIME AT ADDRESS
Employed diMan0
EMPLOYED BY or TYPE OF BUSINESS (if business application) EMPLOYMENT STATUS OCCUPATION
111111111116
BUSINESS PHONE #
02 YRS 1 mos
TIME EMPLOYED
2760
SALARY
Monthly
SALARY TYPE
YRS MOS
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT (if [ass than 2 yrs at current) EMPLOYMENT STATUS BUSINESS PHONE # TIME EMPLOYED
Spouse
OCCUPATION RELATIONSHIP
Alimony, child support, or separate maintenance income need not be revealed if you do not wish to have it considered as a basis for repaying this obligation.
OTHER INCOME (MONTHLY) SOURCE OF OTHER INCOME
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
By providing my cell phone number, I give my prior express consent to receive calls and text messages from the creditor or its
third party debt collector at that number includin calls and messa es made b usin a an autodlaler or • rerecorded messa e.
Printed on 10/07/2009 at 10:07 AM

TEZ.017 5T 3T 60
AGREEMENT
The words 'you,` "your" and 'yours' mean each person submitting this application. The words "we," 'us,. *our' and "ours' as used
below refer to uS, the dealer, and to the financial institution(s) selected to receive your application.
You authorize us to submit this application and any other application submitted in connection with the proposed transaction to the
financial institutions disclosed to you by us the dealers. This application will be reviewed by such financial institutions on behalf of themselves and
us the dealer. In addition, in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, you authorize that such financial institutions may submit your
applications to other financial institutions.
I
You agree that we may obtain a consumer credit report periodically from one or more consumer reporting agencies (credit bureaus) in
connection with the proposed transaction and any update, renewal, refinancing, modification or extension of that transaction. You also agree that
we or any affiliate of ours may obtain one or more consumer credit reports on you at any time whatsoever. If you ask, you will be told whether a
credit report was requested, and if so, the name and address of any credit bureau from which we or our affiliate obtained your credit report.
You agree that we may verify your employment, pay, assets and debts, and that anyone receiving a copy of this is authorized to provide
us with such information. You further authorize us to gather whatever credit and employment history we consider necessary and appropriate in
evaluating this application and any other applications submitted in connection with the proposed transaction.
We may keep this application and any other application submitted to us and information about you whether or not the application is
approved. You certify that the information on the application and in any other application submitted to us, is true and complete. You understand
that false statements may subject you to criminal penalties.
FEDERAL NOTICES
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR OPENING A NEW ACCOUNT To help the government fight the funding of terrorism
and money laundering activities, Federal law requires all financial institutions to obtain, verify, and record information that identifies each person
who opens an account. What this means for you: When you open an account, we will ask for your name, address, date of birth, and other
information that will allow us to identify you. We may also ask to see your driver's license or other identifying documents.
STATE NOTICES
California Residents: An applicant, if married, may apply for a separate account.
Ohio Residents: Ohio laws against discrimination require that all creditors make credit equally available to all creditworthy customers and that
credit reporting agencies maintain separate credit histories on each individual upon request. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission administers
compliance with this law.
New Hampshire Residents: If this is an application for balloon financing, you are entitled to receive, upon request, a written estimate of the
monthly payment amount that would be required to refinance the balloon payment at the time such payment is due based on the creditor's current
refinancing programs.
New York Residents: In connection with your application for credit, we may request a consumer report which contains information on your credit
worthiness, credit standing, personal characteristics and general reputation. II we grant you credit, we or our loan servicer may order additional
consumer reports in connection with any .update, renewal or extension of the credit. If you ask us, we will tell you whether we obtained a consumer
report and if we did, we will tell you the name and address of the consumer reporting agency that gave us the report.
Vermont Residents: By signing below you authorize us and our employees or agents to obtain and verify information about you (including one or
more credit reports, information about your employment and banking and credit relationships) that we may deem necessary or appropriate in
evaluating your loan application. If your application is approved and the loan is made, you also authorize us, and our employees and agents, to
obtain additional credit reports and other information about you in connection with reviewing the account, increasing the available credit on the
account (if applicable), taking collection on the account, or for any other legitimate purpose.
Married Wisconsin Residents: Wisconsin law provides that no provision of any marital property agreement, or unilateral statement, or court
order applied to marital property will adversely affect a creditor's interests unless, prior to the time that the credit is granted, the creditor is
furnished with a copy of the agreement, statement or decree, or has actual knowledge of the adverse provision. It you are making this application
individually, and not jointly with your spouse, the full name and current address of your spouse must be properly disclosed in the co-applicant
section of this application.
This application may ha $ubmitted to the 100owing financial insetutions Name(s) and Address(es)]
-, By IGNING BELOW, YOU CERTIFY THAT-Y(7y ilAVEREAD AND AGREE TO THE TERMS AND DISCLOSURESON,TNE THREE PAGESOF THIS .
APPLICANT'S SIGNATURE DATE CO. APPUCANTS SIGNATURE DA
COPYRIGHT (C) 2007 1,EALEFITRACK, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

0
Seller yer
O RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT KIA AUTOSPORT OF COLUMBUS INC B
giATkNPORStribLTASTHOMAS JR
1-4 AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
1801 BOX ROAD 401 GA BUY 139 PO BOX 252
Na, ' COLUMBUS GA 31907 CUSSETA GA 31805
Date 09/30/2009 "We" and "es" mean the Seller above, its
"You" and "your mean each Buyer above, and
0 successors and assigns. guarantor, jointly and individually.
NSALE: You agree to purchase tram us, on a time basis, subject to the terms and conditions of this contract and security agreemen
vt (Contract). the Motor Vehicle (Vehicle and services described below. The Vehicle is sold in its present condition, together with the usua
Naecessories and attachments.
Description of Year 2009 VIN KN D311735795891980 Other:

Motor Vehicle Make K IA Lie. No/Year
Purchased Model SORENTO lJtNew 0 Used
Description at
Trade-In
SECURITY: To secure your payment and performance under the terms of this Contract, you give us a security interest in the Vehicle, all
accessions, attachments, accessories, and equipment placed In or on the Vehicle, together called Properly, and proceeds of the Property.
You also assign to us and give us a security interest in proceeds and premium refunds of any insurance and service contracts purchased with
this Contract.
PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS: You promise to pay us the principal amount of $ 26645,47 plus finance
chal egeccming on the unpaid balance at the rate of 7 . 65 % per year from today's date until maturity. Finance charges accrue on a
day basis. After maturity, or after you default and we demand payment, we will earn finance charges an the unpaid
balance at 7 . 65 % per year. You agree to pay this Contract according to the payment schedule and late charge provisions shown In
the TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES. You also agree to pay any additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of this Contract.
ODITIONAL FINANCE CHARGE: You agree to pay an additional, nonrefundable finance charge of $ N/A that will be
Wa id in cash. 0 added to the Cash Price. 0 paid proportionally with each payment.
0 MINIMUM FINANCE CHARGE: You agree to pay a minimum finance charge of $ N/A it you pay this Contract in lull
before we have earned that much In finance charges.
DOWN PAYMENT: You also agree to pay, or apply to the Cash Price, on or before today's date, any cash, rebate and net trade-In value described
in the ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED. 0 You agree to make deferred payments as part of the cash down payment as reflected in
your Payment Schedule. TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES
ANNUAL FINANCE AMOUNT FINANCED TOTAL OF PAYMENTS TOTAL SALE PRICE
PERCENTAGE RATE CHARGE The amount of credit The amount you will have The total cost of your purchase on
The cost of your credit as The dotter amount the provided to you or on paid whet, you have made crecit, inducing your down payment of
a yearly rate. credit will cost you. your behalf, all scheduled payments. $ 6000,00
7.65 $ 6771.17 $ 26645,47 $ 33416.64 $ 39416,64
Payment Schedule Your payment schedule will be
Number el Payments Amount of Payments When Payments Are Due
11 464.12 MONTHLY BEGINNING: 11/15/2009
Security: You are giving a security interest in the Motor Vehicle purchased.
Late Charge: If all or any portion of a payment is not paid within 10 days of its due date, you will be charged a late charge of the lesser of
5% of the unpaid amount of the payment due or $50.
Prepayment: it you pay MI this Contract early, you 0 may g will not have to pay a Minimum Finance Charge.
0 If you pay off this Contract early, you will not be entitled to a refund of part el the Additional Finance Charge.
Contract Provisions: You can see the terms of this Contract for any additional Information about nonpayment, default, any required
repayment before the scheduled data, and prepayment refunds and penalties.
CREDIT INSURANCE: Credit lite, credit disability (accident and ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED
health), and any other insurance coverage quoted below, are not 1392.50 )$ 28842,50
required to obtain credit and we will not provide them unless you sign Vehicle Price (incl. sales taAAS ,
and agree to pay the additional premium. It you want such insurance, Service Contract, Paid ten' " 'r" " ' $ 2631'U2
we will obtain it for you lit you quality for coverage). We are quoting N/A
below ONLY th e coverages you have chosen to purchase. Amount to Finance line e. (if e. is negative) $
Cash Price $ •-- . 314/4 • bZ
Credit Life: Insured Manufacturer's Rebate S 3000,00
0 Single 0 Joint Prem $ N/A Term N/A Cash Down Payment S 3000.00 '
Credit Disability: Insured Deferred Down Payment $ N/A
N/A Term N/A 6000.00
0 Single ED Joint Prem $ a. Total CasteRebate Down $
b. Trade-In Allowance $ N/A
c. Less: Amount owing $ N/A
Paid or N/A
d. Net Trade-In (b. minus c.) S N/A
Your signature below means you want (only) the Insurance e. Net CashrTrade-In (a. plus d ) $ 6000.00
coverage(s) quoted above. If none are quoted, you have declined 6000,00
any coverages we offered. Down Payment (e.: disclose as $0 it negative) $
Unpaid Balance of Cash Price $ 25474,52
05/25/1974 Paid to Public Officials • Filing Fees $ 21.00
Buyer rtro!b Buyer cVat Insurance Premiums' $ N/A
Additional Finance Charge(s), Paid to Seller $ N/A
PROPERTY INSURANCE: You must insure the Property securing To: UNITED STATES -WARRANTY CO FOR SAP*
this Contract. You may purchase or provide the insurance through any 750.00
Insurance company reasonably acceptable to us. The collision coverage To: KR SVCS FEE $ 399.95
deductible may not exceed $ 500.00 . If you get insurance To: N/A $ N/A
kom or through
ro us you will pay $ NM for $ N/A
N/A of coverage. Too.
T N/A ChargesfAmounts Pd. to Others $ 1170,95
This premium is calculated as follows: Less: Prepaid Finance Charges $ N/A
Os N/A Deductible, Collision Coverage $ N/A Amount Financed $ 26645.47
0$ —NIA Deductible, Comprehensive Con $ N/A 'We may retain or receive a portion of this amount.
0 Fife-Theft and Combined Additional Coverage $ N/A NOTICE TO BUYER
0 $ N/A Do not sign this agreement before you read It or if it.
.....1.= noes, Wank gnacas. You are entitled to an
Liability Insurance coverage tor bodily injury and property
damage caused to others le not Included In thls Contract
unless checked and indicated.
'in SERVICE CONTRACT: With your purchase of the Vehicle,
•MN,'
I 11E11 1111111111111111111H!
yo agree purchase a Service Contract to cover
2005 K 1A
IA
wan me seller. 1 rte outlet Indy eaaryn aura
This Service Contract will be in Contract and retain Its right to receive a part of
select for the Finance Charge.
ASAtgfnig, - Ibia Contract and Security Agreement Is assigned Buyer:
bAttr. 09/30/2009
to
the Assignee. phone i HUD ItiL I - /U1/6 This assignment is made Sig . .11 ■ rifi
gazugu . Data
0 under the terms of a separate agreement. 0 under the terms of
the ASSIGNMENT BY SELLER on page 2. 0 This ssignment is made 09/30/2009
S enalure Dale
with r
Seller * 14,0‘0.1 411114. tail/iret;ieNg,
2009
Seller: B
GEORGUIFIEWANSTALWENTCONIRACTANDSECURITYAGREEMENY
0,14,1995121..onSAImitnc-.51.0.3.1,41firoomliSSIMVL,GA 0/15/2005 MOTOR VEHICLE- NOTFOTMANUFACNreEDHOMEs
ADDITIONAL TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
GENERAL TERMS: You have been given the opportunity to purchase By choosing any one or more of these remedies, we do not waive our
the Vehicle and described services for the Cash Price or the Total Sale right to later use another remedy. By deciding net to use any remedy, wo
Price. The Total-Sale Price is the total price of the Vehicle and any do not give up our right to consider the event a default it it happens again.
services it you buy Meat over lime. You agreed to purchase the items You agree that If any notice IS required to be given to yea of an
over time. The Total Sale Price shown In the TRUTH IN LENDING intended sale or transfer of the Property, notice is reasonable il mailed to
DISCLOSURES assumes That all payment; will be made as scheduled. your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10 days
The actual amount you will pay may be more or less depending on your before the data of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period Of
payment recotd. time as is required by law).
We do not Intend to charge or collect, and you do not agree to pay, You agree that, subject to your right to recover such property, we may
any finance charge or lee, that is more than the maximum amount lake possession of personal property left in or on the Property securing
permined for this sale by state or lederat law. If you pay a finance charge this Contract and taken kilo possession as provided above. Notice of
or fee that is contrary to this provision, we will. instead, apply it first to intent to dispose of the personal property will be delivered to you within
reduce the principal balance, and when the principal has been paid in full, 10 days pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14.411.1. You will have 30 days
refund it to you. from Ma date of this notice to claim the personal property. If you do not
You understand and agree that some payments to third ponies as claim the personal property, a second notice will be sent. If you do not
a pert of this Contract may Involve money retained by us or paid claim the personal property within 30 days alter the date of the second
back to as as commissions or other remuneration. notice, the personal properly will be disposed of. Any proceeds will be
If any seder) or provision of this Contract le net enforceable, the other dispersed according to Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14-412.
terms wilt remain part of this Contract. WAIVER AND ASSIGNMENT OF EXEMPTIONS: You waive and
The law of Georgia will govern this transaction. It is also governed renounce all exemptions as they relate to any interest in the Property.
by applicable federal law and regulationS. In the event of a dispute, You assign to us sufficient amount of exemptions to pay the amount due
the exclusive forum, venue, and place of jurisdiction will be in under this Contract. You direct any trustee to deliver to us a sufficient
Georgia, unless otherwise required by law. amount of the Properly claimed as exempt to pay oft the amount so
NAME AND LOCATION: Your name and address indicated on allowed on this debt.
page 1 are your exact legal name and your principal residence. You INSURANCE: You agree to buy property insurance on the Properly
will provide us with at least 30 days notice prior to changing your protecting against loss and physical damage and subject to a maximum
name or principal residence. deductible amount indicated in the PROPERTY INSURANCE section, or
PREPAYMENT: You may prepay this Contract in full or in part at any as we will otherwise require. You will name no as loss payee on any such
time. Any partial prepayment will not excuse any later scheduled In the event of loss or damage to the Properly, we may require
payments unlit you pay in full. additional security or assurances of payment before we allow insurance
A refund of any prepaid, unearned insurance premiums may be proceeds to be used to repair or replace the Property. You agree Mat if
obtained from us or from the insurance company named in your policy or the insurance proceeds do not cover the amounts you still owe us, you
certificate of insurance. will pay the difference, You may purchase or provide the insurance
OWNERSHIP AND DUTIES TOWARD PROPERTY: By giving us a through any insurance company reasonably acceptable to us. You wilt
security interest in the Property, you represent and agree to the following: keep the insurance in full force and effect unul this Contract is paid in full.
A. Our security interest will not extend to consumer goods unless If you fail to obtain or maintain this insurance, or name as as a loss
you acquire rights to them within 10 clays after we enter into payee, we may obtain insurance to protect our interest in ihe Property.
this Contract, or they are installed le or affixed to the Vehicle. This insurance may include coverages not required at you. This
B. You will defend our interests in the Property against claims insurance may be written by a company other than one you would
made by anyone else, You will do whatever is necessary to keep choose. It may be written at a rate higher than a rale you could obtain it
our claim to the Property ahead of the claim of anyone else. you purchased the property insurance required by this Contract. We will
C. The security interest you are giving us in the Property comes amount add the premium for this insurance to the amount you owe us. Any
we pay will be due immediately. This amount will earn finance
ahead of the claim of any other of your general or secured charges from the daM paid at the post-maturity rate described In tho
creditors. You agree to sign any additional documents or provide PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS section until paid in lull.
us with any. additional information we may require to keep our
claim to the Property ahead of the claim of anyone else. You will OBLIGATIONS INDEPENDENT: Each person who signs thi5
not do anything to change our interest in the Property. Contract agrees to pay this Contract according to ifs terms. This means
0. You will keep the Property in your possession in good condition the following:
and repair. You will use the Properly for its intended and lawful A. You most pay this Contract even d someone else has also signed it.
purposes. Unless otherwise agreed In writing, the Property will B. We may release any co-buyer or guarantor and you will still be
be located at your address fisted on page 1 of this Contract. obligated to pay this Contract.
E. You will not attempt to sell the Property (unless it is properly C. We may release any seceder and you will still be obligated to pay
identified inventory) or otherwise transfer any rights In the this Contract.
Property to anyone else, without our prior written consent. O. II we give up any of our rights, it will not affect your duty to pay this
F. You will pay all taxes and assessments on the Property as
they become due. E. IC(cwnetrilxcle
nd new credit or renew this Contract, it will not affect your
G. You will notify us of any less or damage to the Property. You will duty to pay this Contract. '
provide as reasonable access to the Property for the purpose of WARRANTY: Warranty information is provided to you separately.
inspection. Our entry and inspection must be accomplished WAIVER: To the extent permitted by taw, you agree to give up your
lawfully, and without breaching the peace. rights to require us to do certain things. We are not required to: (1)
DEFAULT: You will be in default on this Contract it any one of the demand payment of amounts duel (2) give notice that amounts due
following occurs (except as prohibited by law): have not been paid, or hove not been paid In the appropriate
A. You fall to Worth any obligation that you have undertaken in this amount, tInta et manner; or, (3) glee notice that we intend to make,
Contract. or are making, thls Contract Immediately due.
B. We, In good faith, believe that yea cannot, or will not, pay or
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract, THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT
it you default, you agree to pay our costs for collecting amounts owing, By signing below you agree to give no a security interest in the
including court costs, reasonable attorneys' fees (if referred for collection
to an attorney not a salaried employee of Ours) and fees for repossession, Property described in the SALE section. You also agree to the terms
of this Centred, including the WAIVER section above, except that
repair, storage and sale of the Property securing this Contract.
II an event of default occurs as to any one of you, we may exercise you will not be liable for the payments it requires. Your Interest in the
our remedies against any or all of you_ Properly may be used to satisfy the Buyer's obligation, You agree
that we may renew, extend, change this Contract, or release any
REMEDIES: If you are in default on this Contract, we have all of the party or properly without releasing you from this Contract. We may
remedies provided by law and this Contract lake these steps without notice or demand upon you.
A. We may require you to immediate} pay us, subject to any refund
rewired by law, the remaining unpaid balance of the amount You acknowledge receipt of a completed copy of this Contract.
financed, finance charges and all other agreed charges.
B. We may pay taxes, assessments, or other liens or make repairs
to the Properly it you have not done so. We are not required to Signature Date
do so. Any amount we pay will be added to the amount you owe
us and will be due 'mediatory. This amount will earn finance NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
charges from the date paid at the post-maturity rate described in CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
the PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS section until
paid WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
C. We may require you to make the Property available lo us at a OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR
place we deSignale that is reasonably convenient to you and us. WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
D. We may immediately take possession of the Property by legal THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
process oesell-help, belie doing so we may not breach the peace DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
or unlawfully enter onto your premises. We may then sell the
Property and apply what we receive as provided by law to our IF YOU ARE BUYING A USED VEHICLE, THE INFORMATION
reasonable expenses and then toward your obligations. YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS
E. Except when prohibited by law, we may sue you for additional PART OF THIS CONTRACT. INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW
amounts If the proceeds of a sale do not pay all of the amounts you FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE
Owe us. CONTRACT OF SALE
ASSIGNMENT BY SELLER
Seller sells and assigns this Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement, (Contract), to the Assignee. its successors and assigns, inducting all its fights,
title and Interest In this Contract, and any guarantee executed In connection with this Contract. Seller gives Assignee full power, either in its own name or in
Seller's name, to lake all legal or ether actions welch Seller could have taken under this Contract. (SEPARATE AGREEMENT:11 this Assignment is made 'under
the terns of a separate agreement' es indicator) on page 1, the terms of this assignment are described in a separate writingts) and not as provided below.)
Seller wanants:
A. This Contract represents a gale by Seller to Bum on a time price basis and not on a cash basis. ,
B. The statements contained in thls Contract are true and correct.
C. The down payment was made by the Buyer in the manner slated on page I of this Contract and, except for the application of any manufacturer's rebate, no
panel the down payment was loaned or paid to the Buyer by Seller or Sellars representatives.
O. This sole was completed in accordance wire all applicable federal and slate lows and regulations.
E. This Contract Is valid and enforceable in accordance with its terms.
F. The names and signatures on this Contract are not forged, fictitious or assumed, and are true and correct.
0, This Contract Is vested in the Seiler tree of all liens, is not subject to any claims or defenses of the Buyer, and may be sold or assigned by rho Seller.
H. A completely fillechln copy of this Contract was delivered to the Buyer at the limo of execution.
I. The Vehicle has been delivered to Ma Buyer In good condition and has bean accepted by Buyer.
J. Seller has or will perfect a security interest in the Property In favor of the Assignee.
It any of these warranties is breached or untrue, Seller will, upon Assignee's demand, purchase this Contract from Assignee. The purchase shall bo in
cash In the amount of the unpaid balance (including finance charges) plus the costs and expenses of Assignee, including attorneys' lees,
Seller will indemnify Assignee for any loss sustained by it because of judicial set-olt or as the result or a recovery made against Assignee as a result of a
claim or defense Buyer has against Seller.
Seller waives notice of the acceptance at this Assignment, notice of non-payment or non-performance and notice of any other remedies available to
Assignee.
Assignee may. without notice to Seller, and without affecting Ma liability of Seller under this Assignment, compound or release any rights against, and grant
extensions of time for payment to be made, to Buyer and any other person obligated under this Contract.
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ON PAGE 1, THIS ASSIGNMENT IS WITHOUT RECOURSE.
WITH RECOURSE: II this Assignment is made 'with recourse' as indicated on page 1, Assignee lakes this Assignment with certain rights of recourse against
Seller. Seller agrees that if the Buyer defaults on any obligation of payment or performance under this Contract, Seller will, upon demand, repurchase this
Contract for the amount el the unpaid balance, Including finance charges. duo at the! time.
C.,ohtPr 0 tow, toss SWrte !ems. Inc., S. C.d.roil FO,m assowLe-c,it witsneas reap 2 ors)
2009-11-04 22:54 >> P 1/1
(.0 N.u\ ACHS

H
Authorization To Charge SunTrust Account
SuNTRusir For Auto Loan Payment
1JJiSTRUCTIONS 0.91i
.4:4 Review the information below end rrick0 corrections. if croptioobro, It win take four chars from the time we receive your request
to
• Print and sign this town to Indicate your OpPrOlial, setup your automatic payment. Therefore, any payment due
Lti Make a copy of the completed form for your records. during the four-day setup period should be made using yOuf
}.0 Submit One copy 01 the completed form as inetruCtee DelOw. normal payment method_
Client Information
Nom e(a) Telephone Number (Area C000 Required)
James or Sabrina R Thomas 706- • 8 -0233
Address .
14 0 \ (01 14 \API 1 rl
city State Zip Code
e.Q5-7e,A-0.• C5C) 3605
unsa.ean Account Number
—.--..
AL.10,on1",1
rimati len4e SunTrust To Draft Your DeE*sit Account For Your Month ly
V Loan Pay men!
I authortze sun-I-rust (3am to MOM charges for tne scheduled payment amount or greeter 6 t-klo 0, S5
beginning in the month of ...... Al Ovg h ..15'-". year LISIOS - Payment will be deducted from the deposit
account On the scheduled due date according to the note or agreement evidencing the obligation. If the payment date falls on a
date that the Sank does not p'ooess payments, the payment wal ire deducted on the next day that the Sank does process
payments,
I agree to maintain sufficient collected feriae in my dePOSit account to permit the automatic transfer described above, The Sank
May sanest this automatic agreement if funds are not available to permit the transfer and my payment is rejected.
Bankin Atcount Information

AccountBeCha .ed
chcodn9 Account Number Savings Account Number Money Market Account Number
1111110411411110‘
0%
Beret Name Bonk Routing ono transit Number
GunTrust Bank IMPIP104
Client Si . nature Re • utred For All Requests
t/ AllEIN Ald
lrUIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIidrr:5/1
lit . igrsature
1 10 Dal liTiO 9
-------------
Form Distribution
ip(Submit corn Med and signed er using ONE of the following methods
Ea: CM AIL u.s. MAIL.
Tiniki Myles TinikilidlylaseSunTrus-teem SunTrust .
e12.354.4104 Attention; Tiniki Myles
611 Stephenson Ave, Sutta 103
Oavennsh, GA atises
This Section Is For SunTrust Bank use Onix (If this form is completed in a Brenah)
Stanch Name Cost Center Branch Prewar
SO 5 C110-1111
3115,UMMODIn
Suantst Cirporvio Forms
9f18 -3 ZOO/ZOOd Z86-.L -WOOL4 8S:ZT 60,-SO-IT

2.
judge Frank J. Jordan Jr. corrupt order only granted Defendant KIA Auto Sport
of Columbus, Motion which does not address the claims against SunTrust or the
claims against either defendant and Clearly misrepresent the law;
STATE OF GEORGIA .
JAMES R. THOMAS, JR.,
and SABRINA R. THOMAS, CASE NO.: 11-CV-154
Plaintiffs,
Atssa:a Fried p --
JUN 12 2012
vs. tauntMar
chnr wochao
Supadar
ccturt
ly
KIA AUTOSPORT OF JUDGE FRANK J. JORDAN,

- J127. rli - -
COLUMBUS, INC. and
SUNTRUST BANK,,
Defendants.
ORDER +
Pending before the Court is Defendant Kia Autosport of Columbus, Inc.'s,
Motion to Dismiss Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Stay the Proceedings and
Compel Arbitration.
DISCUSSION
After considering the arguments of both parties, as well as all of the
evidence, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Kia Autosport's Motion to Stay
the Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.
All of the claims of the Thomas's' are subject to arbitration. In completing
the purchase of their automobile from Kia Autosport of Columbus, the Thomas's
signed two arbitration agreements, both of which clearly state that all claims
on
arising from the sale shall be arbitrated. Furthermore, this Court finds the
arbitration agreements valid and all issues are arbitrable under the language of the
arbitration agreement.'
The Court hereby DISMISSES the Thomas's claims for identity theft and a
RICO Act violation. By voluntarily providing their "identifying information" to
MA, the Thomas's claim does not rise to the level of a violation of 0.C.G.A. § 16-
9-121 (a)(1), (5) and O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 (4), (5). The Court finds their claim for
identity theft without merit. Furthermore, the Court also finds the Plaintiffs'
allegations of a RICO Act Violation meritless. The Plaintiffs' have made no
showing of a "pattern of racketeering activity"2 and therefore, this claim is also
DISMISSED.
Based upon the foregoing discussion and the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Kia Autosport's Motion
to Stay the Case and Compel Arbitration.
So ORDERED this 11th day of June, 2012.
e
HONORAB J. JORDAN JR.
SUPERIOR CO T OF CHATTAHOOCHEE COUNTY
CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Knit v. Whitecap Hour. Group, 268 Ga.App.436, 442-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
2 0.C.G.A. § 16-14-4.
\
3.
Judge Katherine K. Lumsden corrupt order granted SunTrust Bank motion for
summary judgment without addressing the claims surrounding the fraudulent credit
application;
This order clearly shows the court had no attention to consider the Thomases
claims under the law or the facts.
STATE OF GEORGIA
JAMES It THOMAS JR.,

SABRINA R. THOMAS,
Plaintiffs,
) Civil Action Number:
v. ) 11-CV-154
KIA AUTO SPORT OF COLUMBUS,

INC., and
SUNTRUST BANK,
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant SunTrust Bank (hereinafter
`Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment. After fully considering the briefs,
eviewing all pleadings in the matter, and consideration of applicable Georgia Law, this
ourt hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment finding as follows:
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
nterrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
s no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
udgment as a matter of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). Thus, to prevail on a motion for
ummary judgment, "the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
aterial fact," Montgomery v. Barrow, 286 Ga. 896, 898 (2010), so that the party "is
ntitled to judgment as a matter of law." Kaplan v. City of Sandy Springs, 286 Ga. 559,
60 (2010).
c.c. Filed_
Ati _._•_,
--/, &Clock
OCT 0 7. 2019
Laura Marion
Clerk Superior Court
By
Chattahoochee ounty, GA
"A defendant may do this by either presenting evidence negating an essential
element of the plaintiff's claims or establishing from the record an absence of evidence to
support such claims." Oglethorpe Dev. Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 271 Ga. 173, 173 (1999).
Thus, "the rule with regard to summary judgment" is that a defendant who will not bear
the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case,
but may point out by reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of
evidence to support any essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Cox Enters.,
nc. v. Nix, 274 Ga. 801, 803 (2002).Where a defendant moving for summary judgment
discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must
oint to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue." Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261
a. 491, 491 (1991); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (e).
H. HISTORY
James Thomas and Sabrina Thomas (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") Complaint arises as
result of the Plaintiff's purchase of an automobile from nulled Defendant, KIA
utosport of Columbus (hereinafter "ICIA"). The undisputed evidence of record reveals
at on September 30, 2009, the Plaintiffs in connection with purchasing a vehicle from
entered into an agreement. Each signed a "Vehicle Buyer's Order", "Applicant's
redit Statement", and "Retail Installment Agreement" (hereinafter collectively the
`Contract"). In furtherance of the Contract the Plaintiffs provided KIA with their credit
ormation, including their names, social security numbers, occupations and salaries.
subsequently provided the Plaintiffs' credit information to SunTrust Banking to

James R Thomas Jr,
Sabrina R. Thomas,
v.
Kia Auto Sport of Columbus, INC. &
SunTrust Bank
II-CV-I54
Chattahoochee County Superior Court
a
secure financing for the vehicle. StufTrust Bank approved the Plaintiffs for financing and
Plaintiffs on November 9, 2009 signed up for SunTrust's autopay program to make
payments to SunTrust in relation to the financing for the vehicle. In August of 2010,
Plaintiffs' sought to rescind the loan and voluntarily return the vehicle, SunTrust
repossessed the Vehicle in October of 2010 due to Plaintiffs' failure to make a payment
since July of 2010.
HI. FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW
Count II: "Identity Theft, Conspiring, Ratification of Identity
Theft & Fraud"; Count IV: "Violations of GA RICO"
First, the Court takes into account the previous order of Hon. Frank J. Jordan Jr.
dismissing all claims of Identity Theft and RICO Act Violation claimed by the Plaintiffs,
thus all arguments in relation Count II and Count IV are moot.
Count VI: "Violation of GA Fair Business Practice Act"
Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the Georgia Fair Business Practice Act by
opening its doors by committing and conspiring to commit identity theft fraud causing
he plaintiffs to become liable for a fraudulent auto loan at a higher price."
After reviewing the evidence before it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
arty, the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient
vidence to show that the Defendant violated the Act. The evidence of record shows that
James R. Thomas Jr,
Sabrina I?. Thomas,

SunTrust Bank
11-CV-154
3
the Defendant provided financing on a vehicle that the Plaintiffs purchased from KIA. In
completing required paperwork with KIA in relation to the purchase of the vehicle,
Plaintiffs authorized KIA to send financial and identification information to third parties
in order to gain financing. Georgia Courts have held that to be successful in a claim of
Violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practice Act the Plaintiff must show "a violation
of the Act, causation, and injury."Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137,
139, 610 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2005). Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Defendant violated
the act and that such violation caused injury for which the Plaintiffs are entitled to relief
om the court.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no genuine issue of material fact on the claim
f "Violation of Georgia Fair Business Act" and as such Defendant is entitled to a
ummary Judgment as a matter of law as to Count VI.
Count VII: "Breach of ACS Agreement Fraud"
Plaintiffs claim that "Defendant along with co-defendant MA altered
laintiffs' identity information without their knowledge and consent." The plaintiff also
aguely pleads that the Defendant committed fraud in relation to the ACS agreement.
After reviewing the evidence before it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
arty, the Court finds there is no admissible evidence in the record to show that the
efendant breached the agreement between the parties. Furthermore, the Court finds that
e Plaintiff has failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9
James It Thomas Jr,
Sabrina R. Thomas,
V.
Sun Trust Bank
11-CV-154
4
(b). The undisputed evidence shows that On October 8, 2009 the Defendant received the
Contract between KIA and the Plaintiffs dated September 30, 2009 and upon review
approved the Plaintiffs for financing of the vehicle. Subsequent to such approval the
Plaintiffs began making payments to the Defendant and set up automatic payments using
SunTrust's automatic payment systern.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no genuine issue of material fact on the claim
of "Breach of ACS Agreement Fraud" and as such Defendant is entitled to a Summary
Judgment as a matter of law as to Count VII.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby finds Defendant is entitled to
udgment a matter of law as to all of Plaintiffs' claim and ORDERS judgment for the
defendant on all claims.
elk
SO ORDERED this day of October, 2019.
one a Katherm . Lumsden

Judge, Superior Court
Houston Judicial Circuit
James R. Thomas Jr,

Sabrina R Thomas,
v.
SunTrust Bank
11-CV-154
S
4
the appellate brief filed in the Court of Appeal.

Case A20A0711 Filed 11/26/2019 Page 1 of 37
lL "o E i i-t Oi t eTL

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF GEORGIA :20}9NOV25 AH!!:U5
COURT OF APPEALS CASE

NO:A20A0711
l-iLED IN OFFICE
James R. Thomas, Jr.,
Sabrina R. Thomas,
NOV 26 2013
Appellants, COURT CLERK
COURT OF appeals OF GA
VS.
KIA Auto Sport of Columbus, ESTC.,

SUNTRUSTBank
Appellee.
APPELLANTS BRIEF
APPELLANTS:
JAMES R. THOMAS. JR.. PRO SE

PO BOX 252
CUSSETA,GA 31805
(706)989-0233
Jamesabrina@hotmail.com
SABRINA R. THOMAS. PRO SE.

PO BOX 252
CUSSETA,GA 31805
(706)989-0233
Jamesabrina@,hotmail.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Citation and Authority i
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 1
PART 1. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1
A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1
B. COURT PROCEEDINGS 3
1. IN THE BIFURCATED CASE AGAINST KAS 3
2. IN THE BIFURCATED CASE AGAINST STB 7
B. STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 9
C. PRESERVATION OF ERRORS 13
II. ENUMERATION OF ERRORS 13
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS 14
III. ARGUMENTS AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 14
(1) Former-Judge Legal Theory Was Erroneous To Support The Nunc Pro Tune
Order 14
Standard of Review 14
(2) It Was Error In Failing To Set Aside Prior Orders 16

(3) It Was Error To Denv The Thomases Motion For Default 17

(4) It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment To STB 20
a
(5) It Was Error To Deny The Thomases Summary Judgment 26
(6) The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Recuse 26
(7) The CJC MOA Violate The USCR 28

CONCLUSION 30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 31
Table of Citation and Authority
Case
Amahv. Whitefield Academy, 331 Ga.App. 258,262(2), 770 S.E.2d 650 (2015)... 21
Andrew L. Parks, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 248 Ga.App. 846, 848, 545 S.E.2d 31
(2001) 16
Matioulis v. Inteson Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997)
20
C.W. Matthews Contractins Co. v. Walker, 197 Ga.App. 346 (1), 398 S.E.2d 297
(1990) 20
Carter v. State ofGa., 93 Ga.App. 12, 21(7), 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955) 19
Coen V. CDC Software Corp.. 304 Ga. 105. 112(2), 816S.E.2d 670 (2018) 19
Cuzzortv. the State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999) 29
DeKalb County v. Adams, 529 S.E.2d 610, 272 Ga. 401 (2000) 17
Edenfield & Cox, P. C. v. Mack, 282 Ga. App. 816, 816, 640 S.E. 17,18
Fulton Countvv. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 96 (2) (149SE2d 140) (1966) 17
Hicks V. McGee, 289 Ga. 573. 578-579 (2), 713 S.E2d841 (2011).. 19
In Re Judicial Qualifications Com'n, 794 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 2016) 27, 28
Javcee Atlanta Dev., LLC v. Providence Bank, 330 Ga.App. 322, 325, 765 S.E.2d
536 (2014). 21
Johnson v. Durrence, 136 Ga.App. 439, 440, 221 S.E.2d 652 (1975) 18
Leever v. SAFEBUILTGEORGIA, INC., A19A1175 (Ga.Ct. Add. Nov. 1,

2019) 20
Lewis V. Lewis, 316 Ga. App. 67, 68, 728 S.E.2d 741 (2012) 18
Mayor & Aldermen ofthe City ofSavannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114,
119/1) 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012) 26
Newsome v. Graham, 254 Ga. 711 (334 SE2d 183) {1985) 6, 15
Parks V. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 238 Ga.App. 814, 815 (1), 520 S.E.2d 494
(1999) 19
Pfeiffery. Ga. Dept. ofTransp.. 275 Ga. 827, 829(2), n. 10, 573 S.E.2d 389
(2002)... 28
Polito y. Holland. 258 Ga. 54(3). 365 S.E.2d273 (1988) 15
Stephens v. Stephens, 249 Ga. 700, 702, 292 S.E.2d 689 (±982) 17,29
Stokes & Clinton, P.C. v. Noble Sys. Corp.. 318 Ga.App. 497. 498, 724 S.E.2d253
(2012) 16
Suarez v. Halbert. 246 Ga.App. 822. 824(1). 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000) 14
Taylor v. State, 128 Ga.App. 13, 195 S.E.2d 294 (1973) 26
Zhonsy. PNC Bank. 345 Ga. Adv. 135. 145 (3) (b) (i), n. 3. 812 S.E.2d 514
(2018) 24
Statutes
O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-54 15
O.C.G.A. §9-11-55 4, 14,15
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-1 15
O.C.G.A.S 9-15-2 6,14,15
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 5
O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121 5, 19
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-902 21
15U.S.C. § 1681b If) 25
15U.S.C. §1681q ! 25
Rules
Canon 2 27
Canon 2.11 26
Court of Appeals Rule 36 1

Constitutional Provisions
Ga. Const. Art. VI, § V, III 14
Ga. Const. Art. VI, § VI, t II 14
Other authority
ORDER of the Superior Courts of the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit 2020 Method
Of Assignment
http://www. muscogeecourts.com/judges_corner. htm ...8
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
COMES NOW James R. Thomas, JR., and Sabrina R. Thomas, (together,
"Plaintiffs, James, Sabrina, Thomases, or Appellants"), in the above-styled action,
hereby presenting their brief in support of their appeal. The Thomases also filed in
the Court of Appeal, multiple Applications for Appeals, which was dismissed for
failure to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure in; A12D0455: A12A2325
withdrawn; A13A1661: and A17D0350. In A1710208 was Denied; and A18A1242
denial of the mandamus, affirmed in accordance with Court of Appeals Rule 36.
PARTI. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This bifiircated case has been pending in the lower court for almost 10 years
and during this time no judge has address, considered, or rule on the cause ofactions,
the wrong exerted against the defendant "KIA Auto Sport of Columbus" ("KAS"),
that surrounds the unlawful actions of "creating, and using a fraudulent Applicant
Credit Statement," hereinafter "K-ACS," containing the Thomases identifying
information without their authorization, or consent, with the intent to use
fraudulently, in violation of, among other things, state and federal laws, with the
intent to, willfully causing injury, as a result the Thomases suffered severe damages,
giving them the rights under the law to this tort action. K-ACS per se is a Prima
Facie Case against its creator KAS, as to liability.

The facts in the record will show, KAS answer was receive one day late,
triggering the automatic default. Because KAS was able to circumvent the Method
of Assignment, by assigning the judge of their choosing to hear the case, and even
though KAS failed to open the default, and never address the cause of action, were
able to obtain an erroneous ruling in their favor from the judge, who failed to decide,
or address, or consider the cause of action but based the ruling on issues irrelevant
to the cause of action, was clearly erroneous and must be reversed.
The Second Defendant the cause of actions, the wrong exerted against
"SunTrust Bank" ("STB"), in this bifurcated case, surrounds the unlawful actions
of knowingly, and willingly accepting K-ACS, for identification purposes with
knowledge that it was fraudulent, or fictitious, when irregularities clearly existed on
its face, in violation of, among other things, state and federal laws, with the intent to
willfully causing injury, as a result the Thomases suffered severe damages, giving
them the rights under the laws to this tort action. K-ACS per se is a Prima Facie Case
against STB as to liability in the Thomases favor.
The trial court failed to follow establish law, concenTng the granting or denial
of motion for summary judgment, by failing to consider or decide the Thomases
cause of action under the undisputed facts, which included K-ACS. The trial court
only recognized K-ACS as undisputed evidence, to erroneously support STB
conclusion statements, which are irrelevant to the cause of action. The trial court
committed reversible error by adopting and applying an erroneous concept of the
law, when granting summary judgment to STB, must be reverse,
B. COURT PROCEEDINGS
On December 2, 2011, the Thomases' filed their pro se complaint and attached
affidavits with exhibits, against KAS and STB, V2-23-52. which later became
bifurcated, V2-158-9. in the Superior Court of Cusseta-Chattahoochee County, case
number 1l-CV-154, unknown to the Thomases, was assigned to trial judge Arthur
Smith, III, September 24, 2012 trial docket. V2-292. V2-294-5: V2-623-5.
1. IN THE BIFURCATED CASE AGAINST KAS
KAS was serve On December 26, 2011 and on January 26, 2012, the clerk of
the court received their untimely answer and motion one day late, triggering the
automatic default. V2-57-8: 782.
KAS on or before March 7, 2012 was able to choose the now retired judge
Jordan hereinafter former-judge to hear it's motion on his March 23,2012 rural visit
docket that shows a printed date of March 7, 2012, V2-296: V2-626. seven days
later KAS attorney wrote a letter dated March 14, 2012 .V2-297-8: V2-627-8. and
notice of hearing to be placed on former judge March 23, 2012 docket filed March
' the"Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit" ("CJC") in2012 "official schedule" ("Method

Of Assignment" or "MOA") "All civil cases are assigned to a particular judge for
all hearings to final disposition. All six judges are assigned their own civil cases."
V2-292: 623.
16, 2012, V2-137. which made it appear it was the first time counsel for KAS
contacted the court. At the March 23,2012 hearing, the former-judge never question
KAS counsel concerning the Thomases' claims, never address the contradictions or
fraud on the face of K-ACS. V3-1-43.
On April 24, 2012, the Thomases' filed a Motion for default Judgment and
affidavit against KAS, V2-189. And KAS on May 10, 2012, filed its motion and
affidavit to open the default, which put forth two arguments the first argument was;
Indeed, Defendant's responsive pleadings were docketed one day later.

Because Plaintiffs filed a pauper's affidavit to secure indigent status and
did not pay a filing fee to the Court, there were no accrued court costs for
Defendant to pay. See Affidavit of Attorney of Record, attached hereto
as Exhibit "A" Accordingly, the default was opened as a "matter ofright"
before Plaintiffs filed their instant motion. See O.C.G.A § 9-1 l-55(a).
V2-223 A: V2-228 ^ 9. Counsel never provided any proof or evidence as to the date
counsel allegedly contacted the clerk of the court in the court records to inquire of
the amount ofaccrued court costs. And the second argument as to was;
.... As stated in the attached Affidavit of Attorney of Record, Plaintiffs

willingly provided their names. Social Security numbers, driver's
license numbers, and birth dates for the purpose ofpurchasing a vehicle
and obtaining financing for the vehicle. Defendant then sent the
information to banks to help secure financing for the vehicle....
V2-224-5; V2-227-8 |4; V3-23 at 6-17. In preparing a response to KAS motion to
open default the Plaintiffs contacted the clerk of court by letter requesting an
affidavit as to when counsel contacted the clerk, in which the clerk refused. V2-230,
4
V2-243. The Thomases filed a motion for sanction against counsel for KAS for filing
a false affidavit. V2-231.
On June 12, 2012 without addressing or deciding the default motion or the
cause of actions, the wrong exerted surrounding the creation of K-ACS, the former-
judge applied an erroneous concept of the law in granting KAS's motion, the order
states in part: "By voluntarily providing their "identifying information" to KIA, the
Thomas's claim does not rise to the level of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121
(a)(1), (5) and O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 (4), (5)." V2-20. This decision is clearly
erroneous and must be reversed.
On Aug. 31, 2012 the Thomases filed a motion to attack the June 12, 2012 as
void for lack of subject matter because KAS never open the default. V2-253. The
former-judge applied an erroneous concept of the law by entering a nunc pro tune
order: "Because this case was filed by Plaintiffs' as indigents, no costs had accrued
at the time Defendants sought to open the default. Therefore, the default shall be
opened as a matter ofright.. ."denying the Motion for Defauxton Sept. 14,2012 nunc
pro tune May 1, 2012, V2-18. This decision is clearly erroneous and must be
reversed.
The Thomases received a calendar showing that the case was assigned to trial
judge Smith Sept. 24, 2012 calendar docket and during calendar call Judge Smith
made some statements, which became apparent that Judge Smith had ex parte
communications with the defendants concerning the case, which caused the
Thomases to file a motion for recusal, in which Judge Smith refer to motion to the
then-Chief Judge. V2-256. On 10/05/2016, all Judges of the CJC recusing
themselves and the case was assigned to Judge Katherine Lumsden hereinafter "the
trial court". V2-266.
The trial court on February 17, 2017 entered the order denying plaintiffs
emergency motion to vacate void orders, V2-299-305: V2-793-9. in denying to
vacate the former judge order, the trial court overlooked or ignored the 2012 MOA
and other documents in the court record that shows Judge Smith was exclusively the
assigned trial judge to the case, V2-299-301.
Also in the same order the trial court committed reversible error by adopting
and applying an erroneous concept ofthe law, when denyir g the motion for default,
V2-303-4. misapplies the relevant law in the decision in Newsome v. Graham, 254
Ga. 711 (334 SE2d 183f (1985) concerning OCGA § 9-15-2 (a) (1). KAS cannot
offer a meritorious defense to its own creation of K-ACS. See V2-271 at C. The
court was without discretion, to deny the default motion, as such must be reversed.
On 3/27/2017 the Thomases filed a motion for recusal on the ground that the
trial court gave the appearance of being bias by ignoring court documents and given
opinions as to the intention of the defendants. V2-281. Denying recusal. V2-310.

2. IN THE BIFURCATED CASE AGAINST STB
On 9/08/2017 the Thomases filed a motion for summafy judgment along with
affidavits arguing a prima facie case that STB have no defense to unlawfully receive
and use K-ACS when there, clearly "exist irregularities on the face of the negotiable
instrument that would place a reasonable person on notice under a reasonable
commercial standard."V2G25. On 9/26/2017, the Thomases filed their third
amended verified complaint with affidavits based on their personal knowledge, V2-
392, and also on the same date the trial court signed an ex parte order prepared by
STB to stay the case, V2-644-5, which caused the Thomases to file a second and
third motion for recusal V2-513, V2-538. Order denying recusal. V2-544.
On 1/8/2018 STB filed their unverified response/cross motion for summary
judgment, V2-561-602. failed to address the cause of action or pierce the pleadings.
Also STB refer to an order dismissing the identity theft and RICO against it, V2-587
12 (a). Because the trial court filed a rule nisi hearing for oral arguments, V2-776,
and the Thomasesdid not have any knowledge ofthe order dismissing identity fraud
against STB, and was unable to prepare for the rule nisi hearing the Thomases filed
a motion for criminal civil contempt sanctions, V2-(r03, and a motion for
continuance, so STB could produce said order V2-649, then later hastily filed a
notice to appeal, which the trial court stayed the case. V2-777.
While the case was still in the Appellate Court, STB attorney on 08/09/2019
filed a rule nisi hearing, V2-779-80, which made it appear judge Benjamin Land had
order a rule nisi hearing,'^' the Thomases did not find out about the rule nisi hearing
until a day before the schedule hearing, when the Thomases' discovered KAS
Attorney E. Carson Lange email, which cause the Thomases to hastily filed an
incomplete motion in opposition of STB motion for s.:mmary judgment with
affidavits, V2-652-3, and a motion to object to the hearing. V2-765.
On 10/07/2019 the trial court without lifting the stay order, entered the order
granting STB cross-motion for summary judgment, V2-5, and denying the Thomases
motion for summary judgment, V2-10. While the trial court recites the proper
standards on summary judgment, she then ignores these standards completely by
accepting STB unsupported version of events without question. The trial court
clearly adopted and applied an erroneous concept of the law, which is in conflict
with establish laws governing summary judgment, as such, required reversal.
^ the CJC 2019 MOA...Cases in the Superior Courts of Chattahoochee, Harris,

Marion, Talbot and Taylor Counties shall not be assigned exclusively to a specific
Judge unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
http://www.muscogeecourts. com/judges_corner. htm
B. STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
Neither Defendants disputed that the Thomases on Sept. 30, 2009 provided
KAS their true identifying information in the "Original Fill In By Hand Applicant
Credit Statement" ("ACS") and signed on Sept. 30, 2009, V2-5911, 3;
1. "In the course of purchasing a vehicle from KIA Autosport of

Columbus, Inc. ("KIA" or "Kia") on September 30, 2009, Plaintiffs
James R. Thomas, Jr. ("Mr. Thomas") and Sabrina R. Thomas ("Mrs.
Thomas") (collectively, "Mr. and Mrs. Thomas" or the "Thomases") each
signed a "Vehicle Buyer's Order," an "Applicants Credit Statement"
and a "Retail Installment Agreement" (hereinafter, the "Contract").
(CompL, fPT"
3. "In completing the paperwork to purchase the vehicle, the Thomases

freely provided Kia their names, their respective Social Security
numbers, their respective driver's license numbers and birth dates, as well
as their occupations and salary or other source of income. (CompL, ff9
and IQ-, see also Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 hereto)."
(Emphasis added). STB admitted to facts, in the original complaint in;
9. "In Section A of the ACS, Sabrina fill in by hand all real and relevant
information, including her occupation as a certified nursing assistant
(CNA) and her monthly income $1,025 a month. In Section B of the
ACS, Co-Applicant, Sabrina fills in all real and relevant information for
James R. Thomas, JR stating that he was medically disabled and received
$1,285. On the last page ofthe ACS, Sabrina signed as the applicant, and
James signed as the co applicant."
10. "The plaintiffs met Ron's boss and negotiate the vehicle down to
$23,700, after splitting the dealer's incentive... Ron's boss then went on
to state that if we wait to Friday, we would lose out on the $3,000 rebate,
which would bring the vehicle down to $20,700 and this is the last rebate
for the year and its ends today "
V2-25 at ^1f 9-10, and affidavits V2-44 9-10. Unbeknown to the Thomases',
sometime before or on October 2, 2009 KAS switch the identity as to the buyer and
co-buyer, and STB had knowledge and their approval V2-20914:
AsiiicantNBas: : :, toiwdhsatti • • B6M

ilioma&Ssbdia
APSft mmmm T«jik 72
.St^: AniwsvadV Afeai!6i(S>Fias:
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Coromwts tj» Analyst

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2
V2-216. On October 7, 2009 KAS while in possession of the ACS, created K-ACS
switching the Applicant and Co-Applicant, with inflated incomes and false job title,
this was done without the Thomases' knowledge, V2-27-8 111122-3:
1) A section of K-ACS shows James is now the Applicant, V2-48:
CREDIT
'Bbac
lAteMnhd farfoM
A. Applieairt's ^'•raomd Craciit ii^nmafion
JAttCBS Tacaaas
socutt. o> <tMc iDi
2) James income has been inflated to $2.464.00 from $1.285.00. .Id:
10
sstmmmn
:-- :-... . . l-stss-ls:»«8: .:2464 Hbatlily

iit^NessPHdfffi i ^pQ^cwaj a«J!^ smawivk
3) K-ACS page A, at the bottom has a printed date of October 7, 2009, .Id:
4) B section of K-ACS on the second page shows Sabrina is now the Co-
Applicant, V2-49:
s^iaagR
sxsmLs^xmrrt!^^ "m t'»rrv.me.
5) Sabrina income has been inflated to $2,760.00 from $1,025.00, .Id:
awMsmtia fipugg
a?so rnmrn^
nmmpum mm mmrm
6) K-ACS page B, at the bottom has a printed date of October 7, 2009, .Id:
7) Attach to K-ACS is the Agreement page of the Thomases ACS sign on
September 30, 2009 which states in part, V2-50:
"The words "we," "us" "our" and "ours" as used below refer to us, the
dealer, and to the financial institution(s) selected to receive your
application...You authorize us to submit this application and any other
application submitted in connection with the proposed transaction to
the financial institutions disclosed to you by us the dealers...You
certify that the information on the application and in any other
application submitted to us, is true and complete. You understand that
false statements may subject you to criminal penalties." (Emphasis
supplied).
11
8) The third or Agreement page is in direct conflict with K-ACS pages A, and B,
that shows the following: I) Sabrina signed as the applicani on September 30, 2009;
II) James signed as co-applicant on September 30, 2009; III) Above the signatures
the agreement states. By Signing below You Certify That You Have Read and Agree
to the Terms and Disclosure on the Three Pages of This Application; and IV) There
is no printed date of October 7, 2009, .Id:
WWJCAMTSSliSttTUfffi D«E / (»-Ai».W<WSSimTOHE , '

OT(twtc)j»ioE*tOT(MK.i«:Au:«Msm${W6o,
KAS through US mail or wire sent K-ACS to STB, which approve the loan
for $26645.47, V2-219:
lOl- Fri Oct 0% 2009 :
SmtB CODE: G MM/OO/XY - EXXT $0 HAIK

•***• liOAN IHFOI^TIOM *** ***•».****•* fggs »•♦***♦♦ 0jseiW3SORE
TVPE...: s PIW/riHflN CHRSs 0000.00 *TI. JSS 0.00 / OAY
DATE. . . J 003009 PIN/FEE.......; 0000.00 CREDIT MFEW } : 0.00
aST »5T DTE, s 111509 8EN/PI!HAN CHRes 0000.00 A « H.... . . ): 0.00
OATfS fO 1ST. ! 00046 gOG/HMAN CHite: 0000-00 iEVfil, Mra.lM | 0.00
liOAN AMOUNT. !• 0026645.47 MC/FBE ,..J: 0000.00 AMf FINANCED..26645.4?
mtm ooooooo.oo
BAUIOON AST.! 0000000,00 SERVICE CHGs 0000.00 INTEREST.: 6535.?3
I MONTHS.072 ORIG .s 0000.00 TTt FIN CHARGE.; 6535.73
:imOU£NCT...J" M -OCh: STAMPS.! 0000.00 'TTL WAN AKT..33101-20
RATE/DT BASE: 07,400 / 0 IIWANG TM-S 0000,00 72 PAYMENTS OFi 460.83
EXP PREM...t 0000.00
POINTS.....! OOOti.OO
INSURANCE —***** OO.OOO' mO REG Z APR^ . s 07,401
V2-218. STB willingly accepted, concealed and use K-ACS for identification
purposes and when the Thomases later discovered K-ACS STB refused to rescind
the auto loan instead, proceeded to fraudulently repossess the Sorrento, and
submitted to credit agencies that the loan was delinquent. V2-394-7; 656 5-17.
12
As a direct and proximate result of KAS and STB separate illegal willful
misconduct, fraud, wantonness, oppression, and that entire want ofcare which would
raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, the Thomases
have separately suffered damages and injuries. V2-661-754.
C. PRESERVATION OF ERRORS
The enumerated errors were preserved through; Plaintiffs' objection, the
pleadings, affidavits, briefs, exhibits; and by appealing interlocutory orders enter in
the case by filing a timely Notices ofAppeal from the Grant ofa motion for summary
judgment in favor of the opposing party which is directly appealable. V2-1-4.
II. ENUMERATION OF ERRORS
1. FORMER JUDGE ERRD IN ENTERING NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER FOR

AN ACTION NOT TAKING.
2. IT WAS ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE PRIOR ORDERS.
3. IT WAS ERROR TO DENIAL THE MOTION FOR DEFAULT.
4. IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO STB.
5. IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE THOMASES SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECUSE.
7. THE CJC MOA VIOLATE THE UNIFORM SUPERIOR COURT RULES.
13
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS
Jurisdiction is properly vested in this Court because this Appeal involves a
subject upon which jurisdiction is not conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Georgia Constitution Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph II, and involves correction
of errors of law. Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals under Article VI,
Section V, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution.
m. ARGUMENTS AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
1. FORMER-JUDGE LEGAL THEORY WAS ERRONEOUS TO

SUPPORT THE NUNC PRO TUNG ORDER.
Standard ofReview We owe no deference to a trial court's ruling on questions
of law and review such issues de novo. Moreover, where it is apparent that a trial
court's judgment rests on an erroneous legal theory, an appellate court cannot affirm.
Suarezv. Halbert, 246 Ga.App. 822, 824GT 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000).
The Thomases argue that the former judge legal theory was erroneous to
support a nunc pro tune order to deny the Motion for Default, "Because this case
was filed by Plaintiffs' as indigents, no costs had accrued at the time Defendants
sought to open the default. Therefore, the default shall be opened as a matter of
right...," V2-18, this theory of law change the Thomases' substantive rights under
OCGA § 9-15-2 (a) (1), and O.C.G.A. 9-11-55, "substantive law creates rights.
14
duties, and obligations while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing
those rights, duties, and obligations," see Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54(3), 365
S.E.2d 273 (1988). Here OCGA § 9-15-2 (a) (1), creates substantive rights that the
indigence litigants' rights shall be the same as ifhe hadpaid the costs, while OCGA
9-11-55(a) are procedural rights, duties and obligations. To permit otherwise would
essentially render OCGA § 9-15-2 (a) (1) and OCGA § 9-11-55 null as to the
indigence litigants, and therefore indigence litigants would not have the same rights
as ifhe hadpaid the costs. Furthermore costs had accrued when the complaint was
filed, it was just deferred until one of the party loses. See in Newsome v. Graham.
254 Ga. 711 034 SE2d 183) (1985) the Supreme Court provides:
"....indigence... party shall be relieved from paying the costs and his
rights shall be the same as if he had paid the costs." OCGA § 9-15-
1 In all civil cases ..., the party who dismisses, loses, or is cast in
the action shall be liable for the costs thereof...., at OCGA § 9-11-54
(d),... costs shall be allowed as a matter ofcourse to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs. ... It is equally sound that the
unsuccessful litigant — and not the general public — bear the cost of
private litigation, when the trial judge shall so determine.
ICAS was the losing party by the automatic default and therefore are responsible for
court costs. The court records is void of any action taken by the former-judge or
KAS to open the default before or after May 1, 2012, V2-782-6. "The purpose of
entering an order nunc pro tune... may not be used to ... supply omitted action, but
15
to supply omission in the record of action really had but omitted through
inadvertence or mistake. The general rule is that nunc pro tune entries are proper to
correct clerical errors but not judicial errors."(Citations and punctuation omitted;
emphasis supplied.) Andrew L. Parks. Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 248 Ga.App. 846, 848,
545 S.E.2d31 (200n.
Therefore the former-judge legal theory is unsupported by law, a nunc pro
tune order cannot be used to supply an action not then taken by the court.
Accordingly, the former-Judge's judgment order denial motion for default Nunc pro
tune May 1, 2012, must be vacated, and the case against KAS stands in default.
2. IT WAS ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE PRIOR ORDERS.
Standard ofReview: Our standard of review in this regard is the any evidence
rule, and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse a trial court's refusal to
set aside a judgment. (Footnote omitted.) Stokes & Clinton. TC. v. Noble Svs. Corp..
318 Ga.App. 497. 498. 734 S.E.2d 253 120121.
The Thomases argue the trial court erred by failing to set aside prior orders,
when concluded "If this case were assigned to Judge Smith, it was only assigned
before any hearings had occurred," V2-301, the trial court should have applied the
2012 MOA, which states in part"All civil cases are assignedto a particularjudge for
all hearings to final disposition. All six judges are assigned their own civil cases,"
16
V2-287-309, and therefore, trial Judge Smith was assigned to and had exclusive
control over case ll-CV-154 in the Superior Court of Cusseta-Chattahoochee
County. There is no order of reassignment in the record transferring the Case before
Sept. 24, 2012. (V-783).
Clearly under the 2012 MOA, the former-judge was without authority to enter
any orders in a case assigned to the trial judge Smith. See DeKalb County v. Adams,
529 S.E.ld 610, 272 Ga. 401 (2000), "Judge Mallis had no authority to issue any
order in a case assigned to and under the exclusive control of Judge Fuller." The
Thomases was denied an impartial judicial officer to consider the merits of the case.
"All parties before the court have the right to an impartial judicial officer." Stephens
V. Stephens, 249 Ga. 700, 702, 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982). When a Judge act in a case
without. Authority or jurisdiction, require setting aside, all his judgment, as being a
nugatory and void. See Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90. 96 (2) (149 SE2d
1401(1966).
Therefore all the former-judge orders was without authority in case 11-CV-
154 being a nugatory, void, and must be vacated.
3. IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE THOMASES MOTION FOR DEFAULT
Standard of Review We review the denial of a motion for entry of default
judgment only for an abuse of discretion. Edenfield & Cox. P. C. v. Mack, 282 Ga.
17
App. 816, 816,640 S.E.2d343 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs where a ruling
is unsupported by any evidence ofrecord or where that ruling misstates or misapplies
the relevant law." Lewis v. Lewis, 316 Ga. App. 67, 68, 728 S.E.2d 741 (2012)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
The Thomases incorporate by reference, all of the above Enumeration of
Errors, as fully restated herein, and argue that the trial court applied an erroneous
concept of the law, in denying the Motion for Default Judgment;
"This Court finds that payment of costs was not applicable as the Court
waived costs when they approved Plaintiffs' pauper affidavit at the outset
of litigation.... In that affidavit. Defendant's counsel made a sworn
statement that she spoke with the Clerk at the time offiling regarding the
late filing and asking what costs needed to be paid.... As such, this Court
will treat Defendant as having satisfied their duty to statutory pay costs,
by either no such costs were actually paid by Plaintiff, or that the Clerk
informed Defendant that no such costs were due."
V2-304. KAS affidavits to open the default, does not provide any facts or proof in
the court records that counsel contacted the clerk of court at any time to inquiry
about court costs, and the record shows that the clerk of the court did not support
counsel statement, V2-230-243, as such, the trial court has no authority to exercise
it legal discretion. "A judge is always required to exercise a legal discretion, and in
order to do that, some facts must be proven before him which warrant the exercise
of legal discretion." Johnson v. Durrence, 136 Ga.App. 439, 440, 221 S.E.2d 652
119751.
18
The trial court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata'^' in this case, when
ruling that "Res judicata demands that his ruling be respected. Upon review of the
motion and the record, this Court finds no merit to disturb Judge Jordan's findings,"
V2-304. Res judicata is not applicable in this case because the cause of actions,
the wrong asserted against KAS surround it's action of fi-audulently creating and
using K-ACS, was never considered, decided or ruled on. The Former-judge June
12, 2012 order erroneous dismissing KAS was decided on issues not reverent to the
cause of actions and the law. The fact that the Thomases in good faith willingly
provided their information, is nonsensical under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121.
^ Coen V. CDC Software Corp.. 304 Ga. 105. 112('2T 816 S.E.2d 670 (2018J
Specifically, three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies — (1)
identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3)
previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competentjurisdiction. Cause of
action," in turn, is "the entire set offacts which give rise to an enforceable claim."
with special attention given to the "wrong" alleged. Id. at 675. (Citation,
punctuation, period and emphasis supplied.)
^Carter v. State ofGa.. 93 Ga.App. 12. 2U7), 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955) (The trial court,
"acting upon an erroneous concept of the law, binding him, as he thinks, upon a
single point, and so acting fails to determine the questions of fact involved in the
controversy, the case will be reversed by this court and remanded with direction that
the trial court again review the evidence in the record and from it determine the issue
of fact.").
^ Parks V. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.. 238 Ga.App. 814. 815 (1). 520 S.E.2d 494
(1999) ("[T]he [law of the case] rule applies only to actual decisions, not to issues
raised by the parties but never ruled upon.") (citation and punctuation omitted); see
also Hicks v. McGee. 289 Ga. 573. 578-579 (2\ 713 S.E.2d 841 (201IJ.
19
And as a matter of law KAS has no defense, to its' own created fraudulent K-
ACS with forgery signatures and therefore cannot offer a meritorious defense to
opening the default, V2-274 Defendant KAS Failed To Plead Meritorious Defense.
The trial court "was without discretion to [deny the Thomases'] motion." (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.) C.JV. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Walker, 197
Ga.Ar)p. 346 (1). 398 S.E.2d 297 (19901 See Leever v. SAFEBUILT GEORGIA,
INC., A19A1175 (Ga.Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2019). Therefore all orders in case 11-CV-
154 rests on an erroneous legal theory, and must be vacated.
4. IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO STB
Standard ofReview; Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-
11-56(c). We review the evidence de novo and view the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Matioulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d
684(19971.
Errors, as fully restated herein, and argue that the trial com' adopted and applied an
erroneous concept of the law, when granting summary judgment to STB;
20
1) The trial court failed, to consider the Thomases pleadings, or exercise her
discretion, to determine the questions of fact, involved in the controversy, between
the wrong exerted, against STB, and KAS, when concluded that:
"First, the Court takes into account the previous order of Hon. Frank J. Jordan
Jr. dismissing all claims of Identity Theft and RICO Act Violation claimed by the
Plaintiffs, thus all arguments in relation Count II and Count TV are moot," V2-7.
adopted the erroneous June 12, 2012 order, V2-5, which must be reverse, it was
decided on issues irreverent, to the Thomases' cause of actions, and the law. The fact
that the Thomases in good faith willingly provided their information, is nonsensical.
2) While the trial court recites the proper standards on summary judgment,
she then ignores, these standards completely, and did the opposite of the law, by
accepting all STB irreverent, unsupported conclusion version of events, without
question, that benefit STB the movant; and ignored, or rejecting, all reverent
admissible evidence of undisputed facts, in the verify pleadings, affidavit, loan
documents, which favor the Thomases as the non-movant.
^Jaycee Atlanta Dev., LLC v. Providence Bank, 330 Ga.App. 322, 325, 765 S.E.2d
536 (2014) (loan documents were self-authenticating under OCGA § 24-9-902 (9)).
(the defendants waived any objection on authentication grounds .... by not objecting
to their inclusion as exhibits in support ofthe summaryjudgment motion.) SeeAmah
V. Whitefield Academv, 331 Ga.App. 258. 262 (2\ 770 S.E.2d 650 (20151.
21
As shown in the trial court order, the acknowledgment ofthe agreement page,
signed by the Thomases on Sept. 30, 2009, attached to K-ACS, as the ^"undisputed
evidence ofrecord," to erroneous support STB misleading fraudulent statement that;
"Plaintiffs provided KIA with their credit information, including their names,
social security numbers, occupations and salaries. [Now come, the misleading or
false statement that] KIA subsequently provided the Plaintiffs' credit information
to SunTrust Banking to secure financing, see;
"11. HISTORY...The undisputed evidence of record reveals that on

September 30, 2009, the Plaintiffs ... entered into an agreement. Each
signed a "Vehicle Buyer's Order", ''Applicant's Credit Statement", and
"Retail Installment Agreement" {hereinafter collectively the
^'Contract"). In furtherance of the Contract the Plaintiffs provided KIA
with their credit information, including their names, social security
numbers, occupations and salaries. KIA subsequently provided the
Plaintiffs' credit information to SunTrust Banking .... SunTrust Bank
approved the Plaintiffs for financing....
V2-6. The trial court ignored the facts; A) that STB stated the Thomases provided a
ACS that was fill in by hand sign on Sept. 30, 2009, V2-591-2 f^l. 3. referring to
the original comp., V2-25 ^^9-10; B) that STB contradict itself, by presenting K-
ACS with a printed date of October 7, 2009 which is, noticeably, not a hand fill in
ACS, V2-592 ^2: 596-8: C) that KAS never stated, it provide STB the Thomases'
occupations and salaries, see affidavits to open default;
""Plaintiffs willingly provided their names. Social Security numbers,

driver's license numbers, and birth dates to DefenAam ... and ... sent
the provided information to banks
22
V2-277-8 at 14: see V3-23 at 6-17. The trial court relied on unsupported
conclusions that KAS provided the Thomases actual incomes and occupations.
The trial court then in the same order, "finds there is no admissible
evidence in the record to show that the defendant breached the agreement
between the parties," then in the same paragraph contradict herself by
acknowledging, the agreement page signed by the Thomases on Sept. 30,2009,
attached to K-ACS, see;
III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW...Count VII: "Breach of ACS

Agreement Fraud".... After reviewing the evidence before it in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds there is no
admissible evidence in the record to show that the defendant breached
the agreement between the parties...The undisputed evidence shows
that On October 8, 2009 the Defendant received the Contract between
KIA and the Plaintiffs dated September 30, 2009 and upon review
approved the Plaintiffs for financing of the vehicle."
V2-7. The trial court clearly stated in the above history that the Thomases, "entered
into an agreement,'' which would include the ACS agreement page, signed by the
Thomases on Sept. 30, 2009, attached to K-ACS, states;
""The words "we," "us" "our" and "ours" as used b^ low refer...to the
financial institution{s) selected to receive your application...Fom
certify that the information on the application .. .submitted to us, is
true and complete...By Signing below You Certify That You Have
Read and Agree to the Terms and Disclosure on the Three Pages of
This Application". /
23
V2-598. This undisputed fact shows STB was the financial institution
receiving the agreement page therefore a party, which the trial court recognized
as undisputed evidence. The trial court's conclusion was erroneous because
the undisputed facts clearly shows the defendant breached the agreement by
receiving, considering, and approving the first two pages of K-ACS created
October 7, 2009, V2-662, In doing so violated several staie and federal laws
with the intent to injure and causes damages to the Thomases.
As a direct and proximate result of STB unlawful tort actions, the Thomases
have separately suffered. "In [Thomases] verified complaint, [and affidavits] stated
that [they] was severely damaged including financial damage, damage to [their]
credit and reputation for creditworthiness and other damages as a result of [STB
willingly accepted, and used K-ACS and] failure to [rescind the fraudulent loan].
[V]erified pleading may provide evidence in opposition to summary judgment. The
evidence on summary judgment includes the facts alleged in [Thomases] verified
complaintthat are within [their] personal knowledge. (Quotations omitted,emphases
supply) Zhonsv. PNCBank. 345 Ga. Ann. 135. 145 (3) (b) m. n. 3, 812 S.E.2d 514
(2018). The record in this case contains sufficient evidence to calculate the amount
of the Thomases' loss or damages, with a reasonable degree of certainty, V2-675.
The court record is devoid of any evidence, testimony, or witnesses on the
behalf of the defendants to contradict the Thomases claims, to the contrary, STB
24
through its motions, and silence, admits it had constructive actual knowledge of K-
ACS that caused the Thomases injuries. STB failed to show that there was no
genuine issue as a matter of law that it is entitled to summary judgment. The trial
court failed to give the Thomases, as the non-movant, the benefit of any favorable
inferences, under the cause of action, that STB willingly receive K-ACS to defraud,
that may be drawn from the face of K-ACS, shows genuine issue of material facts.
K-ACS per se shows a prima facie case that STB intentionally and willfully
committed several tort, and therefore is liable to the Thomases on all claims; Breach
Of Contract Tort. V2-400-1TO5-9. V2-661-3: Identitv Fraud. V2-398-9 111T25-30.
V2-663-5; RICO, V2-665-7; Fraud, V2-667-8; GA Fair Business Practice Act V2-
668; Violationof 15 U.S.C. $ 1681b ffl,V2-669; Scam To Violate 15U.S.C. $1681q,
V2-669-70; Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, V2-6671-2; Punitive
Damages, V2-6672.
The trial court clearly adopted and applied an erroneous concept of the law,
that is in conflict with the laws in granting summary judgment to STB view the
evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Matioulis v. Inteson Gen. Ins. Corp.. 226 Ga.App.
459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (19971. which the trial court should under the undisputed
facts had Granted summary judgment to the Thomases on all claims, such an
erroneous concept of the law requires reversal.
25
5. IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE THOMASES SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Errors, as fully restated herein, and argue that the trial court erred in denying
summary judgment to the Thomases, V2-10. Clearly STB admission that it willingly
received, use, and continue to use after the Thomases brought K-ACS to its attention
in August 2010, establish liability Per se against STB on all of the Thomases claims
that STB knowingly concealed K-ACS, V2-323-6, which caused them to make
payments on the fraudulent loan to their injury. "Knowingly passing as genuine a
forged instrument is conclusive ofthe intent to defraud." (Citation and punctuation.)
Taylor v. State. 128 Ga.App. 13. 195 S.E.2d 294 ri973T V2-663-4.As a direct and
proximate result of STB unlawful tort actions, the Thomases have separately
suffered damage and injuries. Such an error requires reversal.
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECUSE.
Standard of Review: Canon 2.11 (A) Judges shall disqualify themselves in
any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, or in
which: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party "does not
require the exercise of discretion; rather, they present questions of law, for which
the appropriate standard of review is de nova. " Mayor & Aldermen of the City of
Sayannahv. Batson-Cook Co.. 291 Ga. 114, 119,(1) 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012).
26
The Thomases respectfully argues, that under the facts in this case shows, the
trial court orders gives the appearance that she never intended to be a trier of fact,
but has offer herself as a surrogate attorney for the defendant by ignoring court
documents, the Thomases complaint, undisputed facts, giving opinions as to the
intention of the defendant and creating facts that are not in the record, misapplying
the laws, see recusal motions, V2-281-309; the trial court order V2-310. The trial
court denied the Thomases of a Fair Hearing, when the court engaging in Ex Parte
Communications, with STB, and allowed STB to lift the stay when appropriate,
given STB full control over the case and the power to deny, or delay, timely access
to the court, see V2-513-531 the trial court failed to rule on this recusal. see recusal
motion, V2-538-543, and the order denying recusal, V2-544, the trial court failed to
follow the basic procedural and substantive rules governing motions to recuse, V2-
548 at ff 14-6. Deny the Thomases the opportunity to adequately prepare for the
summary judgment hearing, V2-616: misapplied the laws and the facts or ignoring
them to grant sumniary judgment in favor of STB, V2-5-11.
The trial court as abandoned her role as a neutral, detached and unbiased
arbiter primarily by knowing and willful misapplication of the law, that amount to
bad faith. The Thomases cannot receive a fair and unbiased court proceeding under
See In Re Judicial Qualifications Com'n, 794 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 2016T"Rather.

Canon 2 (A) requires a judge to endeavor in good faith and with her best efforts to
27
the trial court. Therefore all orders enter by the trial court must be vacated in the
case to reassign to a judge outside the third district.
7. THE CJC MOA VIOLATE THE USCR.
Standard of Review; Under the "Special circumstances could include a
jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public
policy, a change in the law, or an error that works manifest injustice." (Citation and
punctuation omitted) Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dept. ofTransp., 275 Ga. 827, 829(2), n. 10.
573 S.E.2d 389 t2002\
The record in this case shows no judge was assigned to this case, even after it
was assigned to the trial court, see the docket of the clerk shows no judge assigned
to the case V2-782. By not assigning a judge to a particular case allows certain
litigants to seek the judge of their choosing to hear and decide the issues. This MOA
allow some cases to move forward by the action of certain litigants through ex parte
communication with the judge, this system is fundamentally unfair and goes against
the very principle the spirit and purpose of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, this
discern the law, and it demandsthat she then attemptto apply the law as she honestly
understands it to the cases that come before her. A knowing and willful
misapplication of the law, of course, would amount to bad faith and thereby
implicate the Code of Judicial Conduct... "legal error amounts to judicial
misconduct where "a legal ruling or action is made contrary to clear and determined
law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation and where
this legal error was egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern or
practice of legal error"" " (Citation, the brackets and footnote omitted)).
28
state Supreme Court noted that the "precise method of assigning and calendaring
cases ... must comport with the notion of due process ... as well as the spirit and
purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes" Cuzzortv. State, 271 Ga. 464.
519 S.E.2d 687 (19991. "uphold a system of case assignment and calendaring that
allows a party to assign a case and then randomly call the case for trial." Id. at 465(3),
519 S.E.2d 687. "[s]uch a system fail[ed] to comply with the intent and purpose of
the uniform rules and applicable statutes, and thus fail[ed] to serve the administration
ofjustice." Id.
In this case although under a different MOA in 2012 KAS was still able to
engage in ex parte communication with the former-judge to place the case on his
docket, V2-626-628, and the record shows later the former-judge ruled in favor of
KAS without addressing the cause of action, V2-635, denying the Thomases an
impartial judicial officer to consider the merits of the case. "All parties before the
court have the right to an impartial judicial officer." Stephens v. Stephens, 249 Ga.
700, 702, 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982). In September 2019 STB through its counsel tried
to under the 2019 MOA repeat KAS actions to have the case dismissed by place the
case before another judge with knowledge that the case was assigned to the trial
court, V2-765-786. If it wasn't for attorney for KAS email, V2-781, the Thomases
would not have been present at the Sept. 20, 2019 hearing, in which the case would
have been dismissed without the Thomasesknowledgenor an opportunity to appeal.
29
Such a Method ofAssignment ofnot assigning a judge to civil case and allows
certain litigants to present a case to a specific judge works manifest injustice and
would essentially render the USCR null and void. The judicial system must be
protected from litigants and their attorneys that would take a vantage of such a
method of assignment to the not opposing litigant to a fair a>^d unbiased trier of facts.
The CJC MOA must be stricken as a violation of the USCR.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Thomases pray that this Court vacate or reverse all
erroneous orders of the lower court; that liability be entered against the defendants
on all claims, and the case to proceed to trial on damages against the defendant; that
the defendants and their counsel be sanctioned for the misconduct; and that the case
ll-CV-154 be reassigned to a judicial officer outside of the Third Judicial District;
and that the Thomases be awarded, all costs for preparing and filing their Appeals,
against the Defendants and Attorneys based on the above misconduct.
Respectfully submitted on this 26^^ day of November 2019,
Ihbrina R. Thomas,N¥o Se, & ^ames R. Thomas Jr., Prj0^Se

P.O. BOX 252 Cusseta GA 31805 (706)989-0233
30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The Thomases hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF

APPELLANTS, has been furnished to name counsels of record for the defendants,
via the United States Postal Service Certified Mail on November 26, 2019:
E. Carson Lange, Esq. Monica K. Gilroy, Esq.

ROGERS POWERS, P.A. The Gilroy Firm
1301 Riverplace Boulevard, Suite 1500 3780 Mansell Road, Suite 140
Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Alpharetta, GA 30022
Attorneys for Kia Auto Sport OfColumbus, Inc. Attorneys for SunTrust Bank
CMRN:7013 1090 0002 0843 4686 CMRN:7013 1090 0002 0843 4693
3d this day of November 2019,

[day] [month] [yeaj:
(Sign beforeNotary) (Mgn beforeNothry)

Sabrina R. Thomas, Pro Se James R. Thoma/Jr., Pro Se
P.O. Box 252 Cusseta, Ga. 31805 (706)989-0233
Sworn to and affirmed before me, this 26 dav of November 2019,

_ [day] [month] [year]
NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:
(Notary Seal)
i \
31
5.
the Court of Appeal order affirming Judge Katherine K. Lumsden corrupt order;
FIFTH DIVISION
REESE, P. J.,
MARKLE and COLVIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS

COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN
THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.
June 24, 2020
NOT TO BE OFFICIALLY
REPORTED
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A20A0711. THOMAS et al. v. KIA AUTO SPORTS OF COLUMBUS,
INC. et al.
REESE, Presiding Judge.
In this case, the following circumstances exist and are dispositive of the appeal:
(1) The evidence supports the judgment;
(2) No reversible error of law appears, and an opinion would have no
precedential value;
(3) The judgment of the court below adequately explains the decision; and
(4) The issues are controlled adversely to the appellants for the reasons and
authority given in the appellee’s brief.
The judgment of the court below therefore is affirmed in accordance with Court
of Appeals Rule 36.
The Appellants’ motion for sanctions is denied.
Judgment affirmed. Markle and Colvin, JJ., concur.

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In 2021 Georgia Courts in Thomas et al. V. Kia Auto Sports of Columbus, Inc. et al.

, conspired with the

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CHATTAHOOCHEE COUNTY

JAMES R. THOMAS, JR. and

SUNTRUST BANK'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

COMES NOW, SUNTRUST BANK, a Georgia banking corporation ("SunTrust

Bank" or "SunTrust"), a named Defendant in the above-captioned civil action and

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

In the course of purchasing a vehicle from KIA Autosport of Columbus, Inc.

Thomas" or the "Thomases") each signed a "Vehicle Buyer's Order," an "Applicant's

Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 3, respectively, and incorporated by reference herein.

In completing the paperwork to purchase the vehicle, the Thomases freely

Additionally, the Thomases signed a separate document entitled "Arbitration

SunTrust Bank to secure financing for the vehicle.

The Thomases drove the vehicle home.

from Kia on October 8, 2009. (Ex. 3).

2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein by reference.

Plaintiffs subsequently requested to voluntarily return the vehicle and, ultimately,

to rescind the loan.

SunTrust was forced to repossess the vehicle on October 13, 2010.

Plaintiffs were notified of SunTrust Bank's intention to sell the automobile at

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 2, 2011..

This 5th day of January, 2018.

3780 Mansell Road, Suite 140

liKr ROOSEVEL 711011AS JR

119(15 l Mr, I cog -rf.21-:c

911Qct fi -v `.LIkf..1,1'.0 /11134177. 105f3`11(110

A ,,,ee h tootte .r • so p•v.

VIN A MILES EXTENDED SERVICE PLAN

FACTORY REBATE 30+,00

I HEREBY AGREE TO ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONSS

ACCEPTED BY DEALER'S REPRESENTATIVE

DEALER NAME DEALER TELEPHONE NUMBER DEALER FAX NUMBER

APPLICANT'S CREDIT STATEMENT

A. Applicant's Personal Credit Information

1111111111101D JAMES THOMAS

EMAIL ADDRESS DRIVER'S LICENSE # DRIVER'S LICENSE STATE

05 / 1941. 706 - 989 - 12 1 Hos Homeowner

CUSSETA GA 31805 235

PREVIOUS STREET a AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE

3 YRS 5 MOS 2464 Monthly

OTHER INCOME (MONTHLY) SOURCE OF OTHER INCOME

Printed on 10107/2009 at 10:07 AM

▪ EMAIL ADDRESS DRIVER'S LICENSE # DRIVERS LICENSE STATE

05 / 25 / 191" V06 - 989 - 12 yRS 1 MQS Family

401 GA HWY 137 HW

PREVIOUS STREET # AND NAME APT/SUITE # PO BOX # RURAL ROUTE

OTHER INCOME (MONTHLY) SOURCE OF OTHER INCOME

Printed on 10/07/2009 at 10:07 AM

APPLICANT'S SIGNATURE DATE CO. APPUCANTS SIGNATURE DA

COPYRIGHT (C) 2007 1,EALEFITRACK, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Description of Year 2009 VIN KN D311735795891980 Other:

(.0 N.u\ ACHS

Bankin Atcount Information

9f18 -3 ZOO/ZOOd Z86-.L -WOOL4 8S:ZT 60,-SO-IT

KIA AUTOSPORT OF JUDGE FRANK J. JORDAN,

Pending before the Court is Defendant Kia Autosport of Columbus, Inc.'s,

After considering the arguments of both parties, as well as all of the

the Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.

All of the claims of the Thomas's' are subject to arbitration. In completing

RICO Act violation. By voluntarily providing their "identifying information" to

allegations of a RICO Act Violation meritless. The Plaintiffs' have made no

showing of a "pattern of racketeering activity"2 and therefore, this claim is also

to Stay the Case and Compel Arbitration.