SH5202 QUANTIFIED RISK ANALYSIS

(AY2019/2020 Semester 1)

SAFETI Assignment: Ammonia Iso-tanker

Daniel Tham Mun Yew

A0081040Y
 Executive summary

Safeti QRA study is performed for ammonia-manufacturing company using DNV GL Safeti
8.22. The study is performed on Ammonia 20m3 iso-tanker located at SVY21 coordinates
1.278910, 103.705297, under liquid phase which is at atmospheric temperature and pressure of
around 10.7 barg. The iso-tanker is located in hazardous materials parking area with minimal
congestion. Consequence analysis, frequency analysis, risk summation is performed on the
ammonia iso-tanker for scenarios from 4mm, 13mm, 25mm, 50mm, and catastrophic rupture.

Word-count: 1285 words

Contents

Executive summary 2
1. Introduction 4
2. Consequence Analysis 14
2.1 Explosion 19
2.2 Flash fire 24
2.3 Jet fire Lethality Radii 25
2.4 Late Pool Fire Lethality Radii 29
2.5 Toxic Outdoor Lethality Footprint 30
3. Frequency Analysis 35
3.1 Failure rates 35
3.2 Ignition probabilities 37
4. Summation of Risks 42
5. Conclusion 43
6. References 44
7. Annexes 45
 1. Introduction

We perform a Safeti QRA study on Ammonia iso-tanker for an ammonia manufacturing

company, to identify the risks and provide recommendation for mitigation if required. The
hazard identified in our study is the release of ammonia from ammonia iso-tanker due to
scenarios of 4mm, 13mm, 25mm, 50mm release hole and catastrophic rupture.

The Ammonia iso-tanker is 20m3 in volume. It is located at SVY21 coordinates 1.278910,

103.705297. The iso-tanker is under liquid phase which is at atmospheric temperature
(stipulated at 30°C in Singapore Technical QRA Guidance) and pressure of around 10.7 barg.
The iso-tanker is located in hazardous materials parking area with minimal congestion.

Consequence analysis, frequency analysis, risk summation is performed on the ammonia iso-
tanker for the scenarios from 4mm, 13mm, 25mm, 50mm, and catastrophic rupture. For
consequence-based results, distances to specific harm levels (per Singapore Technical QRA
Guidance) and outcome frequencies are provided and specified harm zones produced. For risk-
based results, the groups of footprints to specified harm levels along with outcome frequencies
and weather data for the different categories are used to calculate individual risk (IR).

Occupied building assessment is not carried out as the scenario given in the study does not
include occupied buildings.

We apply the following standards and scenarios for our study:

(1) Personnel vulnerabilities are based on Singapore QRA Technical Guidance Table 14
weightings. 0.03 fatality corresponds to probit of 3.12, 0.10 fatality to probit of 3.72
and 0.50 fatality to probit of 5.00.

(2) Harm levels are consistent with Singapore QRA Technical Guidance Table 6 and
presented in Metric Units.
(3) Meteorological conditions: Humidity set at 85%, ambient temperature set at 30℃. Day
time considered for 2B and 3C weather conditions, while night time considered for 1F
weather condition.
Singapore’s local meteorological conditions are input into Safeti, with reference from QRA
Technical Guidance Table 13.
Zero wind speed conditions are not given a probability of 0.1 within the process unit.

(4) We model both Toxic and Flammability effects for Ammonia. Volume inventory is
specified for the 20m3 iso-tanker.

(5) We input pressure and temperature at 10.7barg and 30℃ respectively. Fluid state is
given as liquid as per the assignment scenario.
(6) We use pseudo-component modelling for mixtures; it is single phase liquid ammonia
in our scenario.

(7) Horizontal jet is modelled for jet fire

(8) Assume 1m elevation for release location. Valid assumption for 20m3 iso-tanker

(9) We use the following models for discharge parameters

(10) We do not model safety system as the scenario does not stipulate as having a
safety (isolation/blowdown) system

(11) Dispersion parameters: 200ppm Toxicity for ERPG-2 per Technical QRA
requirement. Release lasts long enough to produce a large cloud with duration > 10
minutes. Averaging time for ERPG, IDLH and STEL are 60min, 30min and 15min
respectively which is >10 min.
 (12) Type of terrain is taken as concrete with no bund, over land.

(13) Fixed averaging time used for toxic parameters. Dose levels (ppm) is
calculated from Probit equation, where a = -15.6, b = 1, n = 2, t = 30min. Molar mass
is 17g/mol for ammonia.

We can consider 20 min for manual isolation but for conservatism we consider
maximum of 30 min.

Three Probit levels used as per Singapore QRA Technical guidance for Toxic effects: 3.12,
3.72 and 5.00 for 0.03% fatality, 0.10 fatality and 0.50 fatality respectively.
(14) Explosion model used is TNT model due to unconfined, minimal congestion
area assumption, with default TNT efficiency of 0.1

(15) Fireball parameters using TNO yellow book model, with probit levels as per
Singapore QRA Technical Guidance
(16) Jet fire parameters, using cone model, with probit levels as per Singapore
QRA Technical Guidance

(17) Pool fire with probit levels as per Singapore QRA Technical Guidance
 (18) Outdoor vulnerability: 5, 7 and 10 psi converted to bar for 0.03, 0.10, 0.50
fatality: 0.344738 bar, 0.482633 bar, 0.689476 bar respectively.

Radiation intensity method: 30s exposure time for fire

 2. Consequence Analysis

DNV GL Safeti 8.22 is used to model the consequence for our scenarios.

Jet fire effects are applicable for all hole sizes

Toxic effects are applicable for all hole sizes
 2.1 Explosion

Explosion results not observed for 4mm hole size. As expected, the explosion radius increases
with hole size from 13mm to catastrophic rupture, from about 20m to about 300m.

4mm
13mm
25mm
50mm
Catastrophic rupture
2.2 Flash fire

Flash fire results are not observed for 4mm, 13mm, 25mm, 50mm, or Catastrophic rupture
scenarios. The ammonia is modelled as liquid; although it can be vapour after release, we do
not observe flash fire scenario in the modelled results.
2.3 Jet fire Lethality Radii

We observe the jet fire lethality radius increasing from about 12.5m to about 135m. We do not
observe jet fire scenario for catastrophic rupture.

4mm
13mm
25mm
50mm
2.4 Late Pool Fire Lethality Radii

Late pool fire lethality radius of about 35m is observed in the case of catastrophic rupture but
not in the 4mm to 50mm hole release scenarios.

Catastrophic Rupture
2.5 Toxic Outdoor Lethality Footprint

The toxic outdoor lethality radius is observed to increase as hole size increases from 4mm to
13mm, from about 270m to 1280m. Then decreases as hole size increases from 13mm to
50mm, from 1280m to 680m. For 50mm and catastrophic rupture scenario, we observe that 3C
weather condition does not garner the smallest contours, unlike for 4mm to 25mm where 1F is
largest contours and 3C is smallest contours. Instead 3C gives the middle contours for 50mm
and catastrophic rupture scenario.

4mm
13mm
25mm
50mm
Catastrophic Rupture
 3. Frequency Analysis

3.1 Failure rates

UK HSE failure rate are used for iso-tanker failure rates. Iso-tanker is equipped with release
valve and failure due to dropping not credible. We only consider the credible scenarios of 4mm,
13mm, 25mm, 50mm diameter hole releases and catastrophic failure.

4mm

13mm

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25mm

50mm

Catastrophic Rupture

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3.2 Ignition probabilities

(2) Ignition probability is based from OGP 434-06 Ignition Probabilities

Probability (Immediate ignition) = 0.0010

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To calculate delayed ignition, we use Safeti to derive the release rates:

Scenario Peak Total ignition Delayed ignition Non-ignition

flowrate probability probability probability

4mm 0.31kg/s 0.0019 0.0019 – 0.0010 = 0.0009 1 – 0.0019 = 0.9981

13mm 3.21kg/s 0.0204 0.0204 – 0.0010 = 0.0194 1 – 0.0204 = 0.9796

25mm 11.88kg/s 0.0564 0.0564 – 0.0010 = 0.0554 1 – 0.0564 = 0.9436

50mm 47.50kg/s 0.1107 0.1107 – 0.0010 = 0.1097 1 – 0.1107 = 0.8893

Catastrophic 1000kg/s 0.6000 0.6000 – 0.0010 = 0.599 1 – 0.6000 = 0.4000

Rupture

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Ignition Probabilities input into Safeti

4mm

13mm

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25mm

50mm

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Catastrophic rupture

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4. Summation of Risks

Risk contour of 5 x 10-6 is observed. We do not observe a risk contour of 5 x 10-5 though we
expect one that is closer to the release source (even if very small). This could be a distance
filter setting in the Safeti programme, or the 5 x 10-5 risk contour is so small that we are unable
to observe it in the map.

A 3 x 10-7 injury contour is observed that is about 600m from the 5 x 10-6 contour outer radius.

Both risk contours remain within the site boundary.

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5. Conclusion

Below is the local risk criteria stipulated in the NEA QRA criteria guidelines set within the
boundaries of the plant.

We find 5 x 10-6 risk contour confined to the industrial site and is thus within acceptable limits/
ALARP. Hence, based on this reported IR, no further measures may be required to reduce the
IR.

Detection or shutdown systems may be installed, or toxic refuges built if management wishes
to further reduce the IR.

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6. References

1) UK HSE Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Risk Assessments, 2019

2) OGP Ignition Probabilities 434-6, 2010

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7. Annexes

1. Safeti Consequence Summary Report

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