AW EMES: Sey CONFIDENTIAL December 3, 1969 wt MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD a SUBJECT: Luncheon Conversation with Soviet Embassy Couhselor ‘At lunch today, Vorontsov began by noting the coincidence of meetings at NATO and in Moscow. He asked why we were opposed to a European security conferente when the Europeans were mostly in favor. I said he was mistaken: no one to my knowledge thought there was merit in the kind of conference the Soviets were proposing for early 1970; at the same time, neither we nor others ruled out a conference at some point. He then went through the catechism about how a conference would contribute to the atmosphere, while I went through the refrain about how conferences in the past had produced disappointment and how we want progress on substance not atmosphere. He then said they were totally confused about our reported proposal on balanced force reductions. This was obviously a propaganda ploy to put off the Conference since the Administration was in fact opposed to troop cuts (viz. its attitude on the Mansfield Resolution and its statements that it would not reduce forces through fiscal 1971). I said there was a difference between unilateral cuts and mutual ones, He said that we had always re- jected mutual cuts when they had proposed them on the grounds that we had to move back 3000 miles and they only 300, I said this was indeed an asymmetry that one had to take into account; another difference, I said, was that their troops in Eastern Europe had internal security functions While ours had only a military role. He said both our forces were in Europe for the same reason. By the time the main course was served we agreed that each of us would wait and see what the other side's meeting would produce later this week and then form our opinions. He then asked what I thought of our bilateral relations, I said the cultural exchange negotiations looked like they would pose no problem. He said the negotiations about constructing new embassies were deadlocked because State insisted that our building in Moscow must be built entirely with hon-Soviet material and labor. He gathered this was for security reasons ly these were no worse for us than for them; and they are using but sure! I said I was ‘American contractors, labor and material for their building. not informed. CONFIDENTIALee GSh By CONFIDENTIAL - 1 then said that I was disappointed by their recent decision to bar further USAF support flights for our Ambassador in Moscow. He said they were merely ending a unilateral favor to us; no other foreign embassy in Moscow had such a privilege and they did not have it here. I said that they have a state-owned airline. Moreover, their move really was a slap in the face of the President who had travelled to Moscow in 1959 in an Air Force plane. He said no insult was intended; if the President or some other VIP wanted to visit Moscow the USAF could send all the planes it wanted, I said, nonetheless, this was my impression. He said this factor had not entered their mind when they made the decision, The real problem was that because of Vietnam, many in Moscow felt badly in the presence of USAF planes. I said that internal Soviet politics were not a good basis on which to make moves against us. I said] hoped this could be worked out, I steered away from SALT. When he raised it at the end I said I was interested in their change of position on ABMs from arguing that they were humane (1967) to conceding that they could be destabilizing, He said Kosygin's argument in 1967 was at one level and was not necessarily incompatible with the strategic point about instability. He said he had always been sorry that McNamara had never had a chance, at Glassboro, to complete his explanation to Kosygin about the dangers of heavy ABM. f- ENFELDT/f’ HELMUT SOND Orig. to HAK Mz. Ash CONFIDENTIAL