Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI
judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title
to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the
absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds;
that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time
immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they
obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s
father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced
some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and
palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included
for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued
to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the
concept of an owner.

The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is already a
survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was already issued to them.
Petitioner now contends that being an adjacent owner of the land in question they were not notified of
the survey. The Surveyor’s Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego
Francisco (petitioner’s father), and Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco
were already dead from the date of the notice and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was
established that the petitioner and her brother and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent
land of the land in question were not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication in the
Official Gazette and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol
Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his lifetime and after his
death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open possession of
the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner
of this parcel of land.

Respondent contends that the petitioner’s claim for ownership of the land in question is insufficient in
form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires ownership of the land in
question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for reopening and review of a decree
should be made by a person who is deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of
section 38 of Act 496 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show
fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to
avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act. The mere claim of ownership of
petitioner lacks this requisite to merit in granting of their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos, the
respondent’s father owns the land and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in
1920 and has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
2. Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.

Ruling:

It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice was served and
that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a person. The court finds it absurd
that the respondent claims that they complied with the requisite of serving notice to interested parties
on the land in question. It is clear that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual
occupants of the adjacent lots were not notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the
petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the land in question
allowing the respondents to successfully register the land in their name. It was also established that
respondents did not state the true adjoining owners of the North, East and West of the land in question.
On the North side it is no longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is the petitioner by
virtue of transfer of the homestead patent of their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it is no longer
Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already by a different person after his death. On the West, it is
no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it is Paula Francisco, petitioner’s sister who is in
actual possession of the land.

The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for registration from
the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual notice of their application for
registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. The court cited the failure of the surveyors of
the respondent to comply with the requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners
of the said land. The court held that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover
and shelter bad faith. Thus, it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the lower
court without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court complying with the additional requirements for
the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the RTC of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel
of land located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the
application for registration while the records were still with the RTC. The RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu
proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was
allegedly less than ₱100,000. Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with
the reception of evidence.9 Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favour, and a Certification from the DENR Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and
disposable zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the petitioner had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge, petitioner is thereby estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.
The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over
the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II. Dissatisfied
with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in
support of its appeal that the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for original registration of land
title. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings
in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
ISSUE:
WON the Republic of the Philippines is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land
registration case
RULING:
Petition is DENIED.
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the
jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. It is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. The
CA’s ruling with regards to questioning jurisdiction upon active participation of the ROP is based on the doctrine
of estoppel by laches. The MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. In assailing the jurisdiction of the
lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour of
the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC
set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration
Decree. While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order
setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. The
RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of
the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the court’s its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that
period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. However, the MTC had jurisdiction because the
value of the lot in this case does not exceed ₱100,000.
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we
find that the lower court erred in granting respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the
absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Here, respondent Corporation only presented a
CENRO certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original
registration.
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the property in
question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Corporation presents
a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original
registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and
disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should be denied.