Civil Procedure cases

JURISDICTION

1. Sante v. Claravall
a. Short:
b. Facts:
i. On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of
4
Baguio City a complaint for damages against
petitioners.
1. Allegation:
5
ii. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over
the case.
1. P:th e amount of the claim for moral damages was
not more than the jurisdictional amount of
P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the
total claim.
iii. trial court denied the motion to dismiss
1. TC held: total claim of respondent amounted
toP420,000.00
iv. petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, before the Court of Appeals
1. respondent and her husband filed an Amended
1
Complant increasing the claim for moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
v. CA:
1. Found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
[the] Regional Trial Court
2. case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the
MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was
seeking to recover moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00, which amount was well within
 the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The
Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim
rule used for determining which court had
jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant
case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary
damages was not a separate and distinct cause of
action from her claim of moral damages, but
merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for
exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total amount of the claim.
3. Later CA reversed and agreed with RTC
c. Claims
i. Petitioner
1. complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTCC. They maintain that the claim for
moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in
the original complaint, is the main action. The
exemplary damages being discretionary should
not be included in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount. And having no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed
the amendment of the complaint to increase the
claim for moral damages in order to confer
jurisdiction.
ii. Respondent
1. the nature of her complaint is for recovery of
damages. As such, the totality of the claim for
damages, including the exemplary damages as
well as the other damages alleged and prayed in
the complaint, such as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, should be included in
determining jurisdiction. The total claim being
P420,000.00, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint
2.
d. Issues and Rulings
i. 1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and
1. YES
2. where damages is the main cause of action,
should the amount of moral damages prayed for
in the complaint be the sole basis for determining
which court has jurisdiction or should the total
amount of all the damages claimed regardless of
kind and nature, such as exemplary damages,
nominal damages, and attorney’s fees, etc., be
19
used? Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is
instructive: The exclusion of the term "damages
of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court. (Emphasis ours.)
3. IN THE CASE,the complaint filed in Civil Case No.
5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The
complaint principally sought an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged
shame and injury suffered by respondent by
reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were
at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the
facts alleged in the complaintsince the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate
 20
facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.
4. It is clear, based on the allegations of the
complaint, that respondent’s main action is for
damages. Hence, the other forms of damages
being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
are not merely incidental to or consequences of
the main action but constitute the primary relief
prayed for in the complaint.
5.
6.
ii.
iii. 2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of the complaint?
1. NO
2. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that
an amendment cannot be allowed when the court
has no jurisdiction over the original complaint
and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
23
jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly
had jurisdiction over the original complaint and
amendment of the complaint was then still a
24
matter of right.
3.
e. Note:
i. 1999: outside = P200,000
ii. 2004: outside = P300,000
iii. at the time of the filing
of the complaint on April 5,
2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been
adjusted to P300,000.00.
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner, v. ANNABEL LAGMAY
NG, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY- IN-FACT,
ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.
2. Sebastian v. Ng
a. Short
b. Facts:
i. Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as
representative and attorney-in-fact of her
daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed
a complaint before the Barangay Justice of
Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija.
1. She sought to collect from Michael the
sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to
Michael.
2. She claimed that Annabel and Michael
were once sweethearts, and that they
agreed to jointly invest their financial
resources to buy a truck. She alleged that
while Annabel was working in Hongkong,
Annabel sent Michael the amount of
P350,000.00 to purchase the truck.
However, after Annabel and Michael's
relationship has ended, Michael allegedly
refused to return the money
ii. Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of
P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan
was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel),
Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo.
iii. Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not
repudiated within a period of ten (10) days
from the settlement, in accordance with the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in
the Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and Section 14 of its
Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to
honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the
matter back to the Barangay, but the
Barangay Captain failed to enforce the
 kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification
to File Action.
iv. After about one and a half years from the date
of the execution of the kasunduan or on
January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur
and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for
Execution of the kasunduan.
v. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion
for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's
alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
c. Lower Courts
i. MCTC: FAVOR: Annabel
ii. Plaintiff has proven by preponderance of evidence that defendant has
obligation worth P250,000.00
iii. Motion for execution is granted
iv. Micheal filed an appeal with RTC
1. GAD in prematurely deciding the case
2. a hearing was necessary for the
petitioner to establish the genuineness
and due execution of the kasunduan.
d. RTC; upheld MCTC decision
i. Michael failed to assail the validity of the
kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to
dispute Annabel's claims or the applicability
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 716
ii. Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that:
1. (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration
award can be enforced by the Lupon
within six (6) months from date of
settlement or after the lapse of six (6)
months, by ordinary civil action in the
appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court
and not by a mere Motion for execution;
 and
2. (ii) the MCTC does not have
jurisdiction over the case since the
amount of P250,000.00 (as the
subject matter of the kasunduan) is
in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional
amount of P200,000.00.7
e. RTC: motion for reconsideration was granted
i. dismissed Angelita's Motion for Execution,
and set aside the MCTC Decision
ii. Angelita filed a Petition for Review9 with the
CA.
f. Court of Appeals: reversed RTC decision [upheld MCTC]
i. the "appropriate local trial court" stated in
Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing
Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to the
municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to
Michael's contention, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration award, regardless of the amount
involved
ii. Michael's failure to repudiate the kasunduan
in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No.
7160, rendered the kasunduan final. Hence,
Michael can no longer assail the kasunduan
on the ground of forgery.
iii. Micheal filed a petition for review on
certiorari
g. Petition: Sides
h. Micheal[ SC DENIED THIS PETITION]
i. the kasunduan cannot be given the force
and effect of a final judgment because it did
not conform to the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay law embodied in
 Book III, Title One, Chapter 7 of R.A. No.
7160.
ii. He points out the following irregularities in
the kasunduan's, execution, and claims that
the agreement forged between him and
Angelita was fictitious and simulated [list in
case]
iii. He also reiterates that since the amount
of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of
the kasunduan - is in excess of MCTC's
jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00,
the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's
jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.
Accordingly, the proceedings in the
Barangay are all nullity.
i. ISSUES and RULINGS
j. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and
jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless
of the amount involved;

i. YES

ii. LEGAL BASIS

1. Under Section 417 of the Local

Government Code that after the lapse
of the six (6) month period from the
date of the settlement, the agreement
may be enforced by action in the
appropriate city or municipal court.

iii. APPLICATION

1. The law, as written, unequivocally

speaks of the "appropriate city or
municipal court" as the forum for the
 execution of the settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon.
Notably, in expressly conferring
authority over these courts, Section 417
made no distinction with respect to the
amount involved or the nature of the
issue involved. Thus, there can be no
question that the law's intendment was
to grant jurisdiction over the
enforcement of settlement/arbitration
awards to the city or municipal courts
regardless of the amount. A basic
principle of interpretation is that words
must be given their literal meaning and
applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a
statute are clear,' plain and free from
ambiguity.15

2.

k. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the

force and effect of a final judgment; and

i. YES

ii. LEGAL BASIS

1. Under Section 416 of the Local
Government Code, the amicable
settlement and arbitration award shall
have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration
often (10) days from the date of its
execution, unless the settlement or
award has been repudiated or a petition
to nullify the award has been filed
 before the proper city or municipal
court.
2. Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the
Katarungang Pambarangay
Implementing Rules states that the
party's failure to repudiate the
settlement within the period often (10)
days shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to challenge the settlement on the
ground that his/her consent was
vitiated by fraud, violence or
intimidation.

iii. APPLICATION

1. In the present case, the records reveal

that Michael never repudiated the
kasunduan within the period prescribed
by the law. Hence, the CA correctly
ruled that the kasunduan has the force
and effect of a final judgment that is
ripe for execution.

2.

l. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.

m. On the issue of wrong remedy
i. Micheal alleged that Angelita's recourse should
have been to file a civil action, not a mere
motion for execution, in a regular court.
ii. NO, IT IS THE RIGHT REMEDY
iii. Under Section 417 of the Local Government
Code, an amicable settlement or arbitration
award that is not repudiated within a period
often (10) days from the settlement may be
enforced by:
 1. first, execution by the Lupon within six
(6) months from the date of the
settlement;
2. or second, by an action in the
appropriate city or municipal trial court
if more than six (6) months from the
date of settlement has already el
iv. Angelita opted for the second mode
v. Whether the MCTC, through Angelita's
motion for execution, is expressly authorized
to enforce the kasunduan under Section 417
of the Local Government Code? YES
1. Angelita filed before the MCTC was
captioned "motion for execution," rather
than a petition/complaint for execution.
2. A perusal of the motion for execution,
however, shows that it contains the
material requirements of an initiatory
action.
a. It is sufficient in form and substance
3. It is well-settled that what are
controlling in determining the nature of
the pleading are the allegations in the
body and not the caption.
4. Angelita's motion could therefore
be treated as an original action, and
not merely as a motion/special
proceeding. For this reason,
Annabel has filed the proper
remedy prescribed under Section
417 of the Local Government Code.

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, vs.LEONARDO

V. NONATO, Respondent.
3. BARRIDO V. NONATO
a. Short:
b. Facts:
i. In the course of the marriage of
respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and
petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were
able to acquire a property situated in
Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa
house and lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361.
ii. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was
declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was
no more reason to maintain their co-
ownership over the property, Nonato
asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused.
iii. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 3.
iv. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative
defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph
Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise
moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an
 action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
c. MTCC
i. Ordered the conjugal property of the former spouses to be adjudicated
to Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain
ii. LEGAL BASIS
1. Art. 127 of the Family code
iii. Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision
before the RTC. On July 21, 2004
d. RTC; reversed MTCC
i. even though the MTCC aptly applied
Article 129 of the Family Code, it
nevertheless made a reversible error in
adjudicating the subject property to
Barrido.
ii. Qually partition the house
e. CA: affirmed RTC
i. since the property’s assessed value
was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within
the MTCC’s jurisdiction
ii. . Also, although the RTC erred in relying
on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead
of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its
decision still correctly ordered the
equitable partition of the property.
f. ISSUES AND RULINGS
i. Whether or not the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case
1. YES
2. LEGAL BASIS
a. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129
3. APPLICATION
a. the MTCC has jurisdiction to take
 cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure
of a mortgage on real property.
b. the subject property’s assessed
value was merely P8,080.00, an
amount which certainly does not
exceed the required limit of
P20,000.00 for civil actions
outside Metro Manila tofall within
the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
Therefore, the lower court
correctly took cognizance of the
instant case.
g. The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s
marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of
the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime
governed their property relations. Although
Article 12911 provides for the procedure in case
of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers the
effects of void marriages on the spouses’
property relations. [KAYA TAMA NA EQUAL
SHARES]
h. Requisites of Art. 147
 i. (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other;
ii. (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
iii. (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. Here,
all these elements are present.13 The term
"capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage
i. Here, the former spouses both agree that they
acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Barrido,
however, claims that the ownership over the
property in question is already vested on their
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside
from the title to the property still being
registered in the names of the former spouses,
said document of safe does not bear a
notarization of a notary public. It must be noted
that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted
into a public document,21 making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to
prove its due execution and authenticity. In
 fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to
her position paper. Therefore, the subject
property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided
in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY,

CEBU, petitioner, vs. Heirs of
FRANCISCO PASTOR, namely:
EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO
SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO,
EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE
SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO,
LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO
SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD
SYLIANCO, respondents.
4. Brgy. San Roque v. Ong
a. Doctrine
An expropriation suit is incapable of
i.

pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it

falls within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts, regardless of the
value of the subject property.
b. Short
c. Facts:
 i. Petitioner filed before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu
(Branch 1)[3] a Complaint to
expropriate a property of the
respondents.
ii. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the
MTC dismissed the Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction
1. . It reasoned that "[e]minent

domain is an exercise of the

power to take private property for
public use after payment of just
compensation. In an action for
eminent domain, therefore, the
principal cause of action is the
exercise of such power or right.
The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely
incidental.
2. An action for eminent domain is

therefore within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not with this Court.
iii. RTC
1. dismissed the Complaint when
filed before it,
 2. holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case
should be filed before the MTC or
the RTC. Concluding that the
action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of
the subject property was less than
P20,000
iv. petitioner appealed directly to this
Court, raising a pure question of law.
v. Contention of respondent
1. The Complaint for Eminent
Domain affects the title to or
possession of real property. Thus,
they argue that the case should
have been brought before the
MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as
amended by Section 3 (3) of RA
7691. This law provides that MTCs
shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions
that involve title to or possession
of real property, the assessed
 value of which does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, fifty
thousand pesos exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
d. Whether or not the complaint for expropriation is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC
an expropriation suit is
i. YES because

incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ii. LEGAL BASIS
1. National Power Corporation v.
Jocson,here the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have
two phases:
a. The first is concerned with the

determination of the authority

of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts
involved in the suit.
b. "The second phase of the

eminent domain action is

concerned with the
determination by the court of
 the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
2. It should be stressed that the
primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied
with the requisites for the taking of
private property
3.

iii. APPLICATION
1. In the present case, an
expropriation suit does not involve
the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise
by the government of its authority
and right to take private property
for public use.
iv.
e. Test to determine whether a suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation
i. this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought.
1. If it is primarily for the recovery of

a sum of money, the claim is

considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether
 jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the
amount of the claim.
2. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for
annulment of a udgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court
has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of
first instance.
3. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases,
besides the determination of
damages, demand an inquiry into
 other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest
courts of record at the time that
the first organic laws of the
Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11,
1901)."10
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D.
GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY
KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG
A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP,
AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.

5. Gonzales v. GJH
a. Short:
b. Facts:
i. On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C.
Gonzales4 and Francis Martin D. Gonzales
(petitioners) filed a Complaint5 for
"Injunction with prayer for Issuance of
Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-
Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against
respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly
known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang,
Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty.
Roberto P. Mallari II6 (respondents) before
 the RTC of Muntinlupa City
1. seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land,
Inc.'s shares which they purportedly
bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February
1, 2010.
2. Essentially, petitioners alleged that the
subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid by them in full in the books
of S.J. Land, Inc.,7 but were nonetheless
offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the
corporation's stockholders,8 hence, their
plea for injunction.
ii. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-
077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not
a Special Commercial Court.
1. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a
temporary restraining order,9 and later, in
an Order10 dated August 24, 2011,
granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
iii. After filing their respective answers11 to the
complaint, respondents filed a motion to
dismiss12 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter,
1. pointing out that the case involves an
intra- corporate dispute and should,
thus, be heard by the designated Special
Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.13
iv. RTC:
1. Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss
filed by respondents.
2. The case involves an intra-corporate
dispute that is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs
 designated as Special Commercial Courts.
It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was
specifically designated by the Court as the
Special Commercial Court
v. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
1. arguing that they filed the case with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City which assigned the same
to Branch 276 by raffle
2. the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes under Republic Act No.
(RA) 8799,19 but since the Court selected
specific branches to hear and decide such
suits, the case must, at most, be
transferred or raffled off to the proper
branch.
vi. ISSUES AND RULINGS
1. whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. ?
a. YES
b. petitioners filed a commercial case,
i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with
the Office of the Clerk of Court in the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the
official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court, in
accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC. It is, therefore, from the time
of such filing that the RTC of
Muntinlupa City acquired
jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of the
 action.43 Unfortunately, the
commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch, e.g.,
Branch 276, instead of being
assigned44to the sole Special
Commercial Court in the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, which is Branch
256. This error may have been
caused by a reliance on the
complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case
for Injunction with prayer for Status
Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"45
which, however, contradicts and
more importantly, cannot prevail over
its actual allegations that clearly
make out an intra-corporate dispute
c. Going back to the case at bar, the
Court nonetheless deems that the
erroneous raffling to a regular branch
instead of to a Special Commercial
Court is only a matter of procedure -
that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction
which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had
already acquired. In such a scenario,
the proper course of action was not
for the commercial case to be
dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case
to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge
should then assign said case to
the only designated Special
Commercial Court in the station,
i.e., Branch 256.
i. Note that the procedure would
be different where the RTC
acquiring jurisdiction over the
case has multiple special
commercial court branches;
in such a scenario, the Executive
Judge, after re- docketing the
same as a commercial case,
should proceed to order its re-
raffling among the said
special branches.
ii. Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring
jurisdiction has no branch
designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then it
should refer the case to the
nearest RTC with a designated
Special Commercial Court branch
within the judicial region.48 Upon
referral, the RTC to which the
case was referred to should re-
docket the case as a commercial
case, and then: (a) if the said
RTC has only one branch
designated as a Special
Commercial Court, assign the
case to the sole special branch;
or (b) if the said RTC has
multiple branches designated as
Special Commercial Courts,
raffle off the case among those
special branches.
iii.
d. Note:
i. Branch 276 to have correctly
categorized Civil Case No. 11-
077 as a commercial case, more
particularly, an intra-corporate
dispute
1. considering that it relates to
petitioners' averred rights
over the shares of stock
offered for sale to other
stockholders, having paid
the same in full.
2. Applying the relationship
test and the nature of the
controversy test, the suit
between the parties is
clearly rooted in the
existence of an intra-
corporate relationship and
pertains to the enforcement
of their correlative rights
and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the
internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the
corporation,
3. The present controversy
lies, however, in the
procedure to be followed
when a commercial case
- such as the instant
intra-corporate dispute
-has been properly filed
in the official station of
the designated Special
 Commercial Court but is,
however, later wrongly
assigned by raffle to a
regular branch of that
station.
4. let it be emphasized that a
court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over a particular
case's subject matter is
different from incidents
pertaining to the exercise of
its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law,
whereas a court's exercise
of jurisdiction, unless
provided by the law itself, is
governed by the Rules of
Court or by the orders
issued from time to time by
the Court.
ii. Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was
recently held that the matter of
whether the RTC resolves an
issue in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a
special court is only a matter
of procedure and has nothing
to do with the question of
jurisdiction.
iii. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799
which took effect on August 8,
2000. By virtue of said law,
jurisdiction over cases
 enumerated in Section 528 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A29
was transferred from the
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the RTCs,
being courts of general
jurisdiction.
iv. The legal attribution of Regional
Trial Courts as courts of
general jurisdiction stems
from Section 19 (6), Chapter II
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
129,30 known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980"
v. To clarify, the word "or" in Item
5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was
intentionally used by the
legislature to particularize the
fact that the phrase "the Courts
of general jurisdiction" is
equivalent to the phrase "the
appropriate Regional Trial
Court." In other words, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over the
cases enumerated under Section
5 of PD 902-A was transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction,
that is to say (or, otherwise
known as), the proper Regional
Trial Courts.
1.
c. History
i. history
depicts that when the transfer of SEC
cases to the RTCs was first implemented, they
were transmitted to the Executive Judges of
 the RTCs for raffle between or among its
different branches, unless a specific branch
has been designated as a Special
Commercial Court, in which instance, the
cases were transmitted to said branch.36
ii. It was only on November 21, 2000 that the
Court designated certain RTC branches to try
and decide said SEC cases37 without, however,
providing for the transfer of the cases already
distributed to or filed with the regular branches
thereof.
iii. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court issued
SC Administrative Circular No. 08-200138
directing the transfer of said cases to the
designated courts (commercial SEC courts).
iv. Later, or on June 17, 2003, the Court issued
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the
commercial SEC courts and the intellectual
property courts39 in one RTC branch in a
particular locality, i.e., the Special
Commercial Court, to streamline the court
structure and to promote expediency.40
Accordingly, the RTC branch so designated was
mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as well
as those involving violations of intellectual
property rights, which were, thereupon,
required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Courts, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

v. the Court's designation of Special Commercial

Courts was made in line with its constitutional
authority to supervise the administration of all
courts as provided under Section 6, Article VIII
 of the 1987 Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlib

vi. Such designation has nothing to do with the

statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs
under RA 8799 since in the first place, the
Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate
when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that
the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule,
a matter of legislative prerogative
vii.
viii.