Imago Dei, and The Sanctity of Human Life, Robert Barry - Article

"Imago Dei" and the Sanctity of Human life
Author(s): Robert Barry

Source: Angelicum , 1996, Vol. 73, No. 2 (1996), pp. 217-254
Published by: Pontificia Studiorum Universitas a Sancto Thomas Aquinate in Urbe
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44617410
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"Imago Dei" and the Sanctity
of Human life
There are probably not many beliefs in Catholic moral

theology and Protestant medical ethics which have been in-
voked so frequently and yet examined so inadequately as the
belief in the « sanctity of human life ». And there are probably
few concepts that have spawned so wide a variety of view-
points and understandings as this one and as a result it has
been employed to argue for virtually every moral position con-
ceivable in Catholic and Protestant medical ethics. Twentieth-
century Catholic orthodoxy holds that all deliberate omission
or commissions intended to end the life of an innocent indi-
vidual are morally wrong because of the requirements of t
doctrine. And contemporary Protestantism has presented a
great number of interpretations of the nature and requirements
of this doctrine and many of these perspectives are shared by
current Catholic theologians.
The doctrine of the sanctity of human life is founded on
Genesis 9:6 which holds that the blood of the innocent is not
to be shed because it was made in the image of God: « He wh
sheds man's blood shall have his blood shed by man, for in
the image of God man was made ». While there has been a
great deal of thought in the history of Christian reflection de-
voted to the imago Dei doctrine of Gn 1:27 there has been little
consideration given to Genesis 9:6. Most of the studies of Gn
1:27 were anthropological or Trinitarian in nature and did not
examine the moral dimensions of this principle. There is very
little evidence of attempts by either the ancient Fathers or the
medievais to examine the link between the image of God and
the prohibition of killing, and they usually commented on the
teaching in order to expound upon the nature of man or our

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218 Robert Barry, O.P.
relation to God, but not on its impli

of killing. Virtually all of the major
veloped a serious theological anthropology claimed that the
human person was made in the « image and likeness of God » Q.
This doctrine stands at the foundation of classical Christian
theological anthropology and doctrines formulated about the
special nature of the human person, but the doctrine of the
divine image in man does not tell us why our creation in the
image of God makes direct killing of the innocent immoral. Just
because the human person in some fashion mirrors the divine
nature in their being and is close to the Divine Being does not
provide us a with moral reason for not killing human beings.
Because of this, the grounds for the claim that image of God
in man prohibits all killing of the innocent will be examined
here to determine the moral reason in this doctrine for this
prohibition. To do this, I will first present a survey of cont
porary thought concerning the requirements of the doctrine o
the sanctity of life to show the diversity of judgments abo
implications of the belief that human life possesses sanctity
And then I will investigate the doctrine to locate the mor
grounds contained in it for the prohibition against direct killi
There is litle evidence of a belief in either the ancient or
the medieval Church that human life possessed sanctify. A
bert Schweitzer was the first to claim this in his 1923 work Kultur
und Ethik where he developed his philosophy of civilization
and was harshly critical of western ethics 0. Schweitzer stated
that not just human life, but all life, possessed sanctity and
that the destruction of any form of life, whether human or
nonhuman, was unethical. In claiming this, he was apparently
reacting to the horrifying destruction of human life in the last
half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
0) Maloney, George, Man: The Divine Icon , (Pecos, New Mexico:

Dove, 1973), pp. 164-5.
(2) Schweitzer, Albert, Kultur philosophie , « Kultur und Ethik ». This
was published in his autobiographcal reminiscences, Aus Meiner Kindheit
und Jugundzeit in 1924.

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« Imago Dei » and the Sanctity of Human Life 219
twentieth century. With the development of the popular cons

tutional republics following the American and French Rev
tions, whole nations and peoples were set against one anoth
in some of the worst wars in all of recorded history. The
American civil war killed an estimated 630,000 combatants,
World War I killed 9 million and the Russian revolution and
civil war killed another 15 million. Schweitzer's claim imme-
diately set off a storm of controversy in Protestant theolo
because many objected to his claim that the killing of any
living being was wrong.
Other perspectives on the sanctity of life during this ti
were provided by Pope Pius XI who reacted to the decision
the Anglican Church at Lambeth in 1930 giving limited end
sement to artificial contraception by issuing his famous enc
clical Casti Conubii in 1933 (3). Against Schweitzer, he claim
that only innocent human life was to be absolutely protec
from direct killing. This was the first authoritative use of
precise term « sanctity of life » to refer to human life in c
trast to Schweitzer who referred more to the reverence that
was due all living beings rather than to just human life (4). Pius
argued that it was not unjust to kill some human beings who
were not innocent, but that the deliberate destruction of human
beings who were not guilty of an action to merit death was al-
ways and everywhere immoral.
At the present time, there is such an array of views of the
nature and requirements of the sanctity of human life that
reviewing them would aid in properly understanding this
doctrine.
(3) Pius XI, Acta Apostolici Sedis, 22, (1930) 553-554.

(4) Pius declared that the lives of both the mother and child « are
equally sacred and no one, not even public authority, can ever have the
right to destroy them ». Pius would only attribute this sanctity to persons
and no to all life as would Schweitzer.

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CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOLOGICAL

AND MEDICAL ETHICAL OPINION
Karl Barth
As mentioned above, Karl Barth objected to Schweitzer's

view that all life possessed some form of sanctity and was to be
revered by arguing that some forms of killing of humans or
animals was unobjectionable. He claimed that Schweitzer's as-
cription of such a value to human life was a modern form of
idolatry (5). Barth believed that whatever value or dignity human
life possessed, it was an « alien dignity », not intrinsic to the
human person, and based in some fashion on God's communica-
tion of life (6). Barth's views were mirrored by other twentieth-
century Protestant moralists (such as Fletcher and Gustafson who
will be reviewed later) who agreed that Schweitzer's require-
ments were exceptionally stringent O- They also objected that
such a requirement would prohibit many forms of killing ac-
cepted as legitimate by the common morality.
Barth sees the human person as created to live under the
command of God which forms us as free, intelligent and rational
beings whose lives are to be directed to Him. Life is a gift and
we are to show respect for it by willing to live and preserving it.
Life possesses sanctity, but this sanctity is an « alien value »,
not deriving from anything intrinsic to life itself, but from the
fact that it is a gift from God. For Barth, the command of God
alone is absolute and ascribing and absolute or inviolable char-
(5) Barth, Karl, « Respect for Life », Church Dogmatics, III/4 »(Edin-
burgh: T & T Clark, 1961), p. 324.
(6) Ibid., pp. 342-3.
(7) Schweitzer's understanding of the sanctity of life would prohibit
killing in self-defense, the use of force against unjust aggressors in war,
capital punishment for certain egregious crimes and even the withdrawal
of certain forms of medically and morally extraordinary medical treat-
ments.

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acter to human life idolizes life and relativizes the absolute com-
mand of God (8). But even though the command of God to live
is absolute in relation to human life, in its practical implemen-
tation it can be limited, but even these restrictions should not
be allowed to manifest any disrespect of life (9).
Barth holds human life in very high regard, but he is dis-
inclined to absolutely forbid all deliberate destruction of innocent
human life because this would risk idolizing human life. But
precisely because he forbids deliberate killing of the innocent
in some narrowly specified circumstances, one must wonder if
he takes the doctrine of the sanctity of human life seriously.
Barth admits that there are situations in which the command to
will to live would permit ending human life, but these could
only take place in a context where life itself was respected (10) .
In classical Catholic and orthodox thought, it stood as the grounds
of the absolute prohibition of killing the innocent, but such kinds
of killing might be permissible for Barth if one only « respected »
the gift of life (n).
James Gustafson
One of the most unique views of the sanctity of life has been
presented by the Lutheran moralist James Gustafson. His axio-
logy is fully in accord with classical Lutheran theology which
affirmed the dominance and pervasiveness of sin in the human
existence (12). He expresses well the Lutheran view of the sanctity
of life and holds, like Barth and many other contemporary evan-
gelical theologians, that human life itself is not an absolute
(8) Barth, Church Dogmatics, « Respect for Life », III/, p. 324.

(9) Ibid., pp. 23942.
(10) Ibid., pp. 242-3.
(n) Ibid. Joseph Fletcher has apparently given support to his views
and has argued that killings could be respectful of life as when the
killing of an innocent baby could save an entire community. One is
desperate to learn form Barth as to whether he would permit the killing
of one innocent man to save an entire town would be a respectful killing.

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value. He rejects the doctrine of the

implies an absolute prohibition of d
nocent.
Gustafson does not assert that innocent human life is ab-

solutely and universally inviolable but rather that it is a mul
valued entity which stands in a complex relationship with other
entities and values in the world (13). Human life is « the indis-
pensable condition for human values and valuing, and for its
own sake is to be valued » (14). He advances this belief and con-
tends that life itself has many values depending on its conte
and situation, and in a given situation, it is often difficult t
ascertain its precise value (15). In some cases, one can harmon
the conflicting values attributable to human life, but some
these values are contrary to the will and command of God a
are therefore irreconciliable and must be rejected (16). For G
stafson, there is a certain ambiguity in all evaluations of human
life, and it is not always possible to make a fair and accura
assessment in every situation.
Despite these difficulties, we are without the means to de
termine how life is to be disposed of:
... [i]nsofar as the transcendent God is the One beyond the

Many (H. R. Neibuhr), or the unspeakable ground of being (Til-
(12) See his: « The Transcendence of God and the Value of Human
Life », in On Moral Medicine, edited by Stephen Lammers and Allen
Verhey, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 121-126. Evangelical and
Lutheran thinkers would object to the classical notion that the image
of God within us remains intact and only the likeness of God is radically
altered by Adam's sin. They would claim that the entire image and
likeness of God is destroyed by the first sin, and all goodness within
us was abolished by the first sin. This radical approach to the nature
of the primal sin meant that we were wholly unable to restore the like-
ness of God within us and that we were utterly reliant on the grace
of God. They rejected the classical Orthodox and Catholic approach
allowing us to restore the likeness of God through our cooperative action
with grace.
(») Ibid., pp. 122-124.
(14) Gustafson, op. cit., p. 122.
(is) Ibid., pp. 124-5.
(i6) Ibid.

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lich) he is peculiarly devoid of meaningful content, and thus

man is left almost no substantial theological resources in the
determination of the values and purposes which ought to govern
his participation in the created order, including his use of
human physical life (17).
Gustafson's views require religious believers to make estim-

ates of God's transcendent purposes for the conduct of life within
the plurality of values, and there is no guarantee that these
estimates will be correct in either human or divine eyes (18). We
can gain some insight into God's purposes, but there is no cer-
tainty that these perceptions will correspond to God's aims, and
this discrepancy could lead to agents performing morally objec-
tionable actions (19). Therefore, one is required to rely on these
clouded perceptions along with whatever one could glean from
our human existence to learn how we are to dispose of human
life. But within human existence, Gustafson claims there are
resources to inform us how to dispose of life, and these indicate
such principles as life is to be preserved unless other values of
greater significance intervene in the particular circumstance to
justify its destruction C20).
What Gustafson does not make clear, however, is whether
the complex process of ascribing values to human life is any
different from the process of ascribing values to other entities
(17) Gustafson, op. cit., p. 123.

(») Ibid., p. 125.
(19) Ibid., p. 125. This view is somewhat problematic from the
Catholic perspective because it raises the question of why God would
allow this situation to prevail in the wake of Christ's redemptive activ-
ities. If Christ is truly the victor over evil, the Catholic moralist would
ask why He would permit the values associated with his redemptive
activities to be so radically obscured and confused.
(20) Ibid., p. 126. The primary resource we possess is faith which
enables us to accept life as a gift and acknowledge our dependence on
God. Faith predisposes us to have respect, reverence and honor of life,
to love others and to love the world. Faith also conditions the ends
and purposes we attribute to the world and thus limits our utilization
of other persons. Faith makes the values we attribute to other cohere
with God's valuations and effects our valuations, intentions and relation-
ships with others.

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in the world. Such human institution

the state (for example) are morally
not clear if values should be ascribed
human life itself. For Gustafson, t
to determine the actual value of hum
would seem to be no different from
entities and there are no utterly u
herent to human life that would command use of a different
moral methodology (21). If human life did possess a sanctity
that made it universally inviolable, its value and the method of
determining this could be quite different from that used to
evaluate other entities. But Gustafson asserts nothing such as
this, which forces the conclusion that the value of human life
is not different in kind from any other value.
The clear implication of his view is that one cannot be certain
of making valid and legitimate moral evaluations of the value
of human life in concrete situations. Because we are unable to
do this, we cannot claim moral justification or rectitude before
God and must beg divine mercy. Gustafson resolves that issue
by claiming that we must simply make the gest possible evalua-
tions of the value of human life in ambiguous and complex
situations and plead for divine mercy if these evaluations are
in error. Hidden within his assertion is the view that innocent
human life may be destroyed in some circumstances because it
value has been reduced by circumstantial factors. Gustafson
does not specify the situations in which such killing would be
(21) As a Lutheran, Gustafson would probably object that no created

entity could have perfect and unambiguous value that it would be wrong
always and everywhere to destroy it, and to make such a claim would
be to absolutize and idolize such an human life. Gustafson affirms the
classical radical monotheism of Protestantism and claims that declarin
any created entity or value absolute makes an idol of it and compromis
divine sovereignty. Every created thing is so infected with sin and of
such ambiguous value that one could not affirm the radical attributes
of the doctrine of the sanctity of human life. Ultimately, the classical
doctrine of the sanctity of human life is unnecessary, for any question
concerning the disposal of human life can be treated like any other
moral problem.

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permitted and he does not examine killing from the perspective

of the virtues.
Gustafson holds that human life sould be preserved unless
there are substantial grounds for regarding other values as being
of greater significance in the particular situation in which the
decision would be made. He does not regard this as wrong or
dangerous, even though it makes the protection afforded an
indivdiual's life contingent upon circumstances beyond the control
of the individual which could negate or radically reduce the pro-
tection of the individual. For Gustafson, full and complete pro-
tection of human life can come about only when values extrinsic
to the person concatenate to impute a value to the person that
would make deliberate killing immoral. But this view can be-
come dangerous to the medically vulnerable because protection
of the individual would be situation-dependent, and minor al-
terations of the situation could destroy the value foundation for
individual's protection against deliberate killing. This implies
that one seeking to protect his or her life should avoid those
situations in which the value of their lives would be reduced.
He presents us with a view of the sanctity of human life
as seen through Lutheran doctrines of divine transcendence and
sin, and this view has all but destroyed the force of the doctrine
of the sanctity of innocent human life. For Gustafson, the human
person is not an image of God that shines above all creation,
but rather is one trapped in the darkness and sin of creation.
And the person's plight in the world might be even worse than
for lower creatures because the person seems to need more
precise and explicit direction from God to determine the purposes
of life, but unfortunately this direction is given only vaguely
and ambiguously. The classical doctrine of the image of God
in man suggested that there was an element unique to the person
that enabled the person to communicate intimately and confi-
dently with God, but Gustafson does not offer much to bolster
confidence in the validity of these claims.

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Joseph Fletcher
This famous Protestant proponent of situation ethicist dis-

counts the importance of the doctrine of the sanctity of human
life in decisions concerning the preservation of life. Fletcher
would consider the classical doctrine prohibiting all deliberate
killing of the innocent to be « vitalist » and a « taboo », which
idolizes life and is an unjustified moral absolute C22). He opts for
a doctrine of « situational agapism » which makes love the one
and only absolute moral norm for human conduct and he agrees
with William Temple that the notion of life being sacred was
more Hindu or Buddhist than Christian in character C23). Schwei-
tzer's claim that the killing of innocent human beings was prohi-
bited by the sanctity of human life is for Fletcher « vitalism »
or « naturalistic determinism » C24).
For Fletcher, the doctrine of the inviolability of human life
require us to not eliminate « vegetables » or bring back the dying
from death Í25). He objects to the principle of the sanctity of
human life because he believes it prohibits the exercise of rational
(22) Fletcher, Joseph, Moral Responsibility , (Philadelphia: Westminster

Press, 1968), p. 151. Fletcher does not admit it explicitly, but he does
hold to at least four absolutes and taboos: 1) the dominance of « rational
control » in every circumstance; 2) the requirement that all actions
express « love »; 3) consequences alone determine the morality of actions,
and; 4) it is always permissible to use an immoral means to produce
loving consequences.
(«) Ibid., p. 194.
(") Ibid., p. 194.
(24) Ibid., p. 193.
(25) Ibid :
The beauty and spiritual depths of human nature are what
should be preserved and conserved in our value system with the
flesh as the means rather than as the end. The vitalist fallacy
is to view life at ony old level as the highest good. This betrays
us into keeping « vegetables » going and dragging the dying
back to brute « life » just because we have the medical know-
how to do it.
pp. 151-2.

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control and indirect compassionate euthanasia (26). When and

where rational control conflicts with the demands of the sanctity
of life, he believes that the objectives of rational control should
prevail (27). For him, the absolute prohibition of deliberately
destroying innocent human life is more of a « taboo » than a
defensible moral principle (28). Any absolute ban of deliberate
killing is merely a taboo and he regards the doctrine of the
sanctity and inviolability of human life is little more than an
intellectualized taboo C29). If human life were unconditionally and
absolutely good, one would have to wait until we were called
from this life by God, for we could not make judgments of the
« value of life » in order to allow one to die C30).
Like Gustafson, Fletcher denies that there is anything unique
about the value of human life and he claims its value is merely
one among many, even though it may be one of high order (31) .
(26) Fletcher, Joseph, Moral Responsibility , (Philadelphia: Westminster

Press, 1968):
The right of spiritual beings to use intelligent control aver
physical nature, rather than submit beastlike to its blind work-
ings, is the heart of many crucial questions. Birth control, arti-
ficial insemination, sterilization, and abortion are all medically
discovered ways of fulfilling and protecting human values and
hopes in spite of nature's failures or foolishness.
p. 151.
(2D Ibid., p. 151.
(28) Fletcher, Joseph, Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics , (Buf-
falo: Prometheus Books: 1979), p. 145:
However, all these claims [to an unqualified right to livel]
are only relatively valid, whether they are or are not consti-
tutionally formulated. At best they are only 'prima facie'.
They are relative and not absolute for the sufficient reason that
they can and often do cut across each other. Ethical problems
are, when thoroughly examined, problems of relative choice
among competing values or 'goods', and to posit values at all
entails priorities for making risk-benefit and gain-loss judg-
ments. Hence the relativity of rights.
(29) In some respects, Fletcher shows in his teachings here that he
is the true follower of Karl Barth because he affirms as did Barth
that human life could be ended willfully in some circumstances and not
violate divine commands.
(30) Ibid., pp. 149-150.
(31) Ibid.:
Life itself would be only one value among values, even though

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He seeks to replace the principle of the

with an ends-means calculus of life whi
be ended when there was a proportion b
end (32). Overturning the sanctity of h
against death would be rational and mor
maximize happiness and minimize suffe
Fletcher believes the doctrine of sanctity
is « aprioristic » and prejudiced against
action, and he opposes the deontological approach to human
life to his situational approach C4) . Fletcher believes that the
a high-order one, and therefore some infants' lives (like some

lives in any other age group) might properly be sacrificed on
the principle of proportionate good.
p. 146.
(32) Ibid.:
No undeclared premises are hiding behind the discussion in
this essay, by the way. It is based on ethical relativism - i.e.,
situational or contextual relativism, not cultural relativism. This
is my mode of approach to the ethics of induced death in
general and infanticide in particular.
p. 146.
(33) Ibid.:
As an absolute taboo he (E. W. von Kluge) cannot justify
this on humane or humanistic grounds... To contend that there
are cases in which it is good and therefore right to induce the
end of a person's life obviously assigns the first-order value to
human well-being, either by maximizing happiness or minimizing
suffering. This view assigns value to human life rather than
to being merely alive, and holds that it is better to be dead
than to suffer too much or to endure too many deficits of
human suffering.
p. 146.
(34) Ibid.:
I believe that this mode of ethics is both implicit and
explicit in the morality of medical care and biomedical research.
Is retasoning is inductive, not deductive, and it proceeds em-
pirically from the data of each actual case or problem, choos-
ing the course that offers an optimum or maximum of desirable
consequences. Medicine is not a prioristic or prejudiced in its
ethos and modalities, and therefore to proscribe either suicide
or mercy killing is so blatantly nonconsequential that it calls
for critical scrutiny. It fails to make sense. It is unclinical
and doctrinaire.
The problem exists because of the other kind of ethics which

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value of a person's life can be diminished by a loss of quality,

and it can do this to such an extent that its overall value can
be utterly and totally destroyed (35).
The crucial issue for Fletcher is whether showing compas
sionate care (i.e., deliberate mercy killing) ranks above respectin
a taboo, which Fletcher would say is always the case. The
« well-being of persons » should determine whether life should
be ended or not, and this is the highest good.
Lewis B . Smedes
Smedes expresses what has been widely regarded as the

« pro-life » position on the principle of the sanctity and invio-
lability of innocent human life. He argues that the Sixth Com-
mandment prohibits deliberate killing of the innocent, and not
merely unjust or illegal killing, and he ask what it is about this
sort of killing that makes it immoral i36). He contends that in-
nocent human life is inviolable because it possesses sanctity,
and while he admits that sacredness is difficult to define, he sees
it as a holy specialness that signals people to stand back(37).
This sanctity derives from the fact that the person was created
holds that we ought or ought not to do certain things no matter

how good or bad the consequences might foreseeably be. Such
rules are prohibitions or taboos, expressed as thou-shalt-nots.
While my ethics is theological or end-oriented, the opposite ap-
proach is deontologica I (from the Greek deontis , meaning duty);
i.e., it is duty-ethics, not goal ethics.
p. 156.
(35) Ibid.:
And the reason for this, we can add, is that human beings,
unlike purely instinctual creatures, do not regard life as an end
in itself. Life to be up to human standards has to integrate
a number of other values, to make it worth our while. Truly
human beings can choose to die not only for reasons or love
and loyalty, but just because life happens to be too sour or bare.
p. 174.
(36) Smedes, Lewis, Mere Morality, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982),
p. 99.
(37) Ibid., pp. 103-106

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Ž3Ú Robert Barry, O.P.
out of love by God and is prized especially by

person, beautiful or ugly, productive or id
is the one whom God made, whom God loves, whose life is in
Goďs hands, and for whom Christ died on the Cross (38). It is
the human « person », and not merely human 'life', that imposes
Barth's attitude of reverence and respect upon us, not the
« value », but the sanctity of the person that requires this attitude
of respect of us (39).
For Smedes, only God has the authority to take innocent
human life, and to willfully destroy this life is to challenge God's
authority. Our responsibility toward human life is to protect and
nourish it but not assault it i40). God gave us life as a gift and
we should demonstrate our reverence for this treasure by not
destroying it. Life can turn sour and become a burden, but in
and of itself, it is not evil, could not be an evil as ethicists like
Fletcher would suggest (41). Smedes takes the Scriptural com-
mand to refrain from the killing of the innocent as literally and
seriously as anyone, and he is the least prone to limit or qualify
the strictness of this teaching. For him, all innocent life is pro-
tected against direct killing and this is because of its proximity
to God himself (42).
One could agree with Smedes that human life possesses
sacredness, but one needs stronger reasons for accepting this
view rather than the vague special relationship human life has
with God, and also with the equally vague special love God has
for the person. One could readily agree that human life possesses
sacredness, but the reasons he posits for ascribing this sacredness
(38) Ibid., p. 106.

(39) Ibid., pp. 104-6.
(40) Ibid., p. 108.
(4i) Ibid., pp. 108-109.
(42) Smedes makes little mention of the likeness of God in which
man is created, and the difficulty with this perspective is that it can be
made, at least remotely and indirectly about all of creation. All created
beings are « prized » by God (maybe not especially, but they are prized
nonetheless), and the Son died to restore all of creation to the union
with the Father. In this perspective, sacredness can be ascribed to vir-
tually all of creation.

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would also justify ascribing sacredness to virtually all of crea-

tion. There must be a special feature in the person, one which
he has not identified, that warrants ascribing sacredness to it
and not other created beings.
Richard S tit h
Further objections to Schweitzer's interpretation of the

sanctity of life were raised by other contemporary Protestant
thinkers such as Richard Stith. He wishes to formulate the
principle of the sanctity of human life in such a way tha
prohibits what he intuitively considers immoral killings b
would permit those he believes to be in accord with justice
For him, the principle of the sanctity of life primarily requ
nonviolation of innocent human life rather than positive act
preserve it, but this is not to say that there are no positive
to promote and enhance life C'4). Stith stands closer to the im
Dei of Scripture than do other commentators and he concl
that willfully killing the innocent is impermissible.
Unlike Barth and Gustaf son, he objects to the claim of so
theologians that human life possesses infinite value (45). T
mere possession of such a kind of value would not entail t
prohibition of killing one being of infinite value to save ano
being of infinite value. He believes that ascribing an « inf
value » to human life would prohibit all forms of killing,
killing to defend justice and protect the innocent, and he th
fore asserts that the sanctity of life must mean something els
It is difficult to claim that a being of infinite value would
destroyed when killed, for in all other respects the human b
(43) Stith, Richard, « Toward Freedom from Value », in On Moral

Medicine, pp. 127-143.
(44) Ibid., pp. 137-9.
i45) Ibid., pp. 128-130: « ...it is my contention here that the value of
life cannot adequately explain our reluctance to kill, that some other
factor is at work ».
(46) Ibid., pp. 128-129.

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is finite and limited (47). And he wonders

status of these beings of infinite value woul
in unjust aggression in warfare. Should it
such an action would be so heinous as to n
value of their being?
For Stith, human life should be the object
the proper response to human life is not
but to revere it (48). The sanctity of life do
pect, for that is more apropriate for obje
and an attitude of respect would not in an
killing (49). We respect virtues such as justic
fulness, but it seems that respect is also le
for those who possess these virtues. Stith de
of « infinite value » to human life would
of deliberate killing, and he defends our intu
destroying innocent life would be wrong
preserve some other infinite values. This m
circumstances, however he does not give e
reasons why it might be right to destroy
entity in order to preserve either other bei
Reverence for human life implies not o
gation to refrain from actions or omission
death of innocent persons, but also a posit
mote their life, security and well-being i50)
principle would prohibit all killings (excep
it is the grounds of all other moral principl
person based on the sanctity of life not o
life from being casually and negligently des
berates us from being forced to undertake
(47) ibid., p. 128.

(48) To value objects or persons rather than revere them ultimately
leads to dominating them while an attitude of reverence toward life
demands we do not deliberately kill and that we take positive steps to
promote and enhance it there is sanctity and not merely infinite or in-
definite value in the human person.
(49) Ibid., pp. 131-132.
(so) Ibid., pp. 132-135.

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to preserve human life (51). Because the human person is capa

of evils unequalled by all of creation, it is hard to see how
sanctity of human life can be based on the person.
Does a low quality of life destroy its sanctity? Does sin
destroy the sanctity of human life, and if so why? If not, then
how can sin and sanctity abide in the human subject? Can one
who has killed an innocent human being be said to still possess
sanctity of life? For Stith, reverence for human life would
not be significantly diminished by any of these. He believes
that the sanctity of life is grounded in the nature of the person,
but he does not explicitly state why it is that the person should
possess sanctity, and that is why he has difficulty coping with
the questions of sin and sanctity in human life (52). Stith rightly
sees the principle of the sanctity of human life as the foundation
of every other moral principle. It is the reason why truth, justice,
fairness, equality and the other basic moral values are to be
sought, promoted and defended.
William E . May
One of the most complete expressions of the conservative
Roman Catholic position on the sanctity of human life was pro-
posed by William E. May. He asks what it is about the human
person that makes it a being of « moral worth » and in possession
(51) The doctrine of the sanctity of life implies the conditions arti-
culated by the ordinary-extraordinary distinction. This distinction is
valid and he believes it holds that even extraordinary medical treatments
should not be removed if the aim would be to bring death. He denies
that capital punishment would be morally legitimate in itself and that
a policy of inflicting death can be valid. But actions which risk death
but which do not aim at it can be permitted.
(52) Ibid., p. 134. There is a difficulty with ordering the sanctity of
life towards persons, for the personhood of some of the least among
us (the unborn and those near death) is problematic. For the better part
of his article, Stith points sanctity toward human life, but he seems
to slip occasionally and ascribe it to persons on some occasions.

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of a value that is superior to that of a

He argues that membership in the h
the sanctity of life because this imp
and spiritual nature which makes the
being i54). Because we are members
telligent, free, moral and spiritual bei
other sorts of beings (55). We are be
understanding which radically distin
beings who lack our spiritual nature
from all other beings without a spirit
a different sort of value on ourselv
source of our spiritual nature is th
person was created. Because the pers
God within their nature, they deserve
and awe. However, from a theologica
and insightful analysis raises almos
answers. He does not directly confron
about the spiritual person that mak
wrong, particularly if such a killing w
of another spiritual being possessing
other moral virtues. And May's posi
problems of those who claimed the
value. May does not answer the questio
offend the sanctity of human life if
or to punish wrongdoing. For it is c
not violate justice, but it is not clear w
sanctity of life. May's theory of the s
gests that the theological content to t
of the person is seccondary to its m
species. While it would seem that mainstream Christianity
would ground the sanctity of human life directly in the imago
Dei , he bases it on biological membership. He approaches the
(53) May, William, E., « What Makes a Human Being of Moral

Worth?», The Thomist, Vol. 40, (1976), pp. 416443.
(54) Ibid., p. 421.
(55) Ibid., pp. 423424.

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problem from a nontheological starting point, and his ana

of the imago Dei tracts is nonexistent. He parts company w
many of the ancients who saw the person created not only
the image of God but also in the likeness of God, and this mi
explain why he has difficulty in explaining why killing an
nocent makes one vulnerable to direct killing. May argues
the human person is a being of moral worth without making
reference to the doctrine of creation, the Incarnation or Re-
demption wrought by Christ, and his doctrine is fundamentally
philosophical rather than theological. One cannot help but
wonder if the Incarnation, Resurrection and Redemption have
any bearing on this issue for him. And it is not clear from his
perspective why the killing of an innocent person is so egregious
an action that it makes the indirect killing of one created imago
Dei is permissible.
Richard McCormick
Richard McCormick takes a unique approach to the nature

of the sanctity of human life and its requirements. In his article
« The Quality of Life and the Sanctity of Life », he makes no
mention of the classical doctrine that the person is created
imago Dei much less in the likeness of God (56). Rather, he
presumes that human life possesses sanctity and the claims that
this sanctity of life is linked in some fashion to its quality C57).
(56) McCormick, Richard, « The Quality of Life and the Sanctity of

Life », in How Brave a New World?, (New York: Doubleday, 1981), pp.
383-402.
(57) Ibid.:
Some who compare 'santity of life' and 'quality of life'
approaches see the former as the more satisfactory. It focuses
our attention on our obligations to preserve life and avoids
degrees of discrimination in quality-of-life criteria. Actually the
two approaches ought not to be set against each other in this
way. Quality-of-life assessments ought to be made within an
over-all reverence for the sanctity of life, as an extension of
one's respect for the sanctity of life. However, there are times

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The presumption to be drawn from su

sanctity attributable to a human lif
portion to the quality of life of the
would not agree that an innocent pers
always and everywhere prohibits th
in any circumstance and he suggests
direct killing is contingent upon one's
quality of life radically deteriorates, i
and any lethal action directed agains
intended and culpable. McCormick
his approach to Gn 9: 6 which holds th
image Dei is wrong, and he insinuates
when a certain quality of life of an in
like other Protestant authors, he argu
bition of direct killing, but not becau
is idolatrous (59).
when preserving the life of one with n

pects of life that we regard as human is a violation of the
sanctity of life itself. Thus to separate the two approaches and
call one sanctity of life, and the other quality of life, is a false
conceptual split that very easily suggests that the term 'sanctity
of life' is being used in an exhortatory way.
pp. 396-37.
(58) Ibid.:
Every person is of 'equal value'. But not every life (once
again the distinction noted) is of equal value if we are careful
to unpack the terms 'life', 'equal', and 'value'. If 'life' means
the continuation of vital processes but in a persistent vegetative
state; if 'value' means 'a good to the individual concerned'; if
'equal' means 'identical' or 'the same', especially, I believe it
is simply false to say that 'every life is of equal avlue'.
p. 397.
(59) Ibid.:
Concretely, if 'life' means only metabolism and vital pro-
cesses, then what is meant by saying that this is a 'good in
itself'? If that means a good to be preserved independently of
any capacity for conscious experience, I believe it is a straight-
forward form of vitalism - an approach that preserves life (mere
vital processes) no matter what the condition of the patient.
One can and, I believe, should say that the person is always
an incalculable value, that some point continuance in physical

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It is not clear that this is authentically Catholic which

held that the Decalogue did teach moral absolutes: no lying
adultery, killing, dishonoring of parents or stealing, and i
not objected to calling some moral rules absolutes. McCorm
views of the sanctity of life hold credence today, not beca
they are clearly rooted in orthodox Christian tradition and gi
clear but modern expression to that tradition, but more becau
they reflect the thought of contemporary Protestant culture
theology.
Given the wide variety of views of the principle of the
sanctity of life, it would be well to examine its origins in the
ancient Christian teaching of the imago Dei .
II
« IMAGO DEI » AND THE TRANSCENDENCE

OF HUMAN LIFE
The Genesis doctrines (Gn 1:27 and Gn 9:6) that the hu

person was created imago Dei is one of the richest and
widely discussed themes in antiquity and it formed the
ation for the theological anthropology of most of the
And partly because of its richness, gaining a clear pict
where the image of God is found and what it entails is ex
difficult. There are, however, some general claims tha
made about it.
« Imago Dei » and Immortality before Augustine

The fundamental difficulty with patristic and medieval dis-
cussions of the image of God was that they only considered the
life offers the person no benefit. Indeed, to keep 'life' going

can easily be an assault on the person and his or her dignity.
p. 396.

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concept of the image of God in one co

The ancients and medievais only exp
the uniqueness of the created person
our relationship to the Triune God.
the human person would be transcen
order, but merely demonstrating th
necessarily entail a moral reason for
killing.
There are a number of general points of agreement in the
classical teachings about the image of God in man. Most Pa-
tristic authors agreed that Christ was the perfect image of God
because He is the perfect image of the Father O. The physical
body, almost universally rejected as the locus of the divine image,
could only reflect the divine image in a vague and ambiguous
manner, and the seat of the image was almost certainly in the
spiritual part of the person (61). There was some sympathy for
the view that the image was expressed in human freedom, but
this is almost totally absent in St. Augustine who was ancient
Christianity's greatest exponent of the doctrine of imago Dei (62).
St. Athanasius argued, it was generally agreed, that we were
created to the image of the Image of God and that the aim of
(60) See: Maloney, George, op. cit., p. 70; Ramsey, Paul, Basic Christian
Ethics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 258.
(61) See: Sullivan, O.P., John, The Image of God, (Dubuque, IA:
Priory Press, 1963), pp. 4446. Virtually all of the pre-Nice and post-Nicene
Fathers located the image either in the mind or in some other non-
corporeal aspect of the human being.
(62) Gregory of Nyssa wrote the following:
For He who made man for the participation of His own
peculiar good and incorporated in him the instincts for all that
was excellent, in order that his desire might be carried forward
by a corresponding movement in each case to its own like,
would never have deprived him of that most excellent and
precious of all goods; I mean the gift implied in being his own
master and having a free will. For if necessity in any way was
the master of the life of man, the 'image' would have been fal-
sified in that particular part by being estranged, owing to this
unlikeness to its archetype.
De Oratione Catechetica Magna, Ch. 5, LNPF, p. 479. Translated by
Mahoney, G., op. cit., pp. 139-140.

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Christian life was to bring this image to perfection by growing

in the likeness of Christ (63). Generally the image of God within
man was seen as dynamic as the perfection of the image was
associated with sanctification and reconciliation C64). Either
through the perfection of the image or through the perfection of
the likeness of God within us, one achieves sanctification. Even
though there was much agreement on the nature and con-
sequences of being created imago Dei , there was also much
diversity of opinion about it.
Many of the Father considered immortality to be at least
a vestige if not an image of God, but this claim was not sup-
ported by either St. Augustine or St. Thomas. The Greek Fathers
spoke only of incorruptibility and immortality as the main cha-
racteristics due to God in His essence (65). Only God was im-
mortal in essence:
The term athanasia (immortality) which we find together with

the word aphtharsia (incorruptibility) to designate the state
of 'image'... calls for similar remarks. The opposition is not
between existence and nonbeing, since we are on the human
level in which the spirit possesses a radical immortality, that
is to say, the condition of man separated from God which is
true death and, as a consequence of this, is endowed with an
animal nature subject to mortality, and the state of athanasia
(immortality) which is at the same time the life of the soul
united to God and the liberation from biological mortality i66).
Gregory of Nyssa held that God was the source of immor-

tality which was shared only with men and the angels. He
regarded immortality as a sign of the presence of the image
of God, but immortality was more than the natural immortality
(63) Maloney, S.J., George, Man : The Divine Icon, (Pecos, New Mexico:
Dove), pp. 99-103.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid., p. 140. « Only God was immortal and unchangeable in His
essence, freed from any mutation or movement, from imperfection to a
new state and higher perfection ».
(66) J. Danielou, Platonisme et Theologie Mystique. Doctrine Spiri-
tuelle de Saint Grégoire de Nysse, Paris, 1944, pp. 55-6.

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of the Platonic soul and was a gratuit

ation (67). The true destiny of man w
corruptibility, and he employed the me
of skin » as the remedy given man by
tality (68). According to Gregory, we
were given our mortal state, our « ga
provides us the means to reacquire im
a mutable nature in this « garment of
to cooperate with God's redeeming act
Cyril of Alexandria affirmed our cr
and immortality but these were lost b
through the Spirit of Jesus C0)- For C
after receiving the Spirit, but we we
better through the Spirit for we rea
(67) ibid., pp. 140-141.

(68) Ibid.:
One who regards only the dissolution of the body is greatly
disturbed and makes it a hardship that this life of ours should
be dissolved by death; it is, he says, the extremity of evil that
our being should be quenched by this condition of mortality.
Let him, then, observe through this bloomy prospect the excess
of divine benevolence... Now since by a motion of our self-will
we contracted a fellowship with evil... falling away from that
blessedness which is involved in the thought of passionlessness,
for we have been viciously transformed - for this reason, man,
like some earthen potsherd is resolved again into the dust of
the ground, in order to secure that he may part with the soul
which he has now contracted, and that he may, through the
resurrection, be reformed anew after the original pattern; at
least if in this life he has preserved what belongs to that image.
De Oratione Cathech. Magna, Ch. 7, LNPF, p. 405.
p. 147.
(69) Ibid., p. 147-148.
(70) Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem, III, 316. Ed by P. E. Pusey,
Sancii pat ris nostri Cy ritti archiepiscopi Alexandrini in Joannis evange-
lium. Accedunt fragmenta varia necnon tractatus ad Tiberiu, diaconium
duo, 3 Vols., Oxford, 1872.
Our transformation will not be a transfer into some other
nature... for we shall be what we are, that is, men - but we shall
be incomparably better. The poitnt is this, we shall be incor-
ruptible and imperishable, and besides this we shall have been
glorified.
In Maloney, op. cit., p. 183-184.

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immortality and were glorified as well. Cyril of Alexandria

gave up the search for the Trinitarian image in man as futile Ç1).
According to him we were given divine filiation which raised
us to the image of Christ, the perfect image of the Father, and
to incorruptibility and immortality. Some, such as Gregory of
Nyssa, thought that immortality was found in the body and was
one of the gifts given at creation which we received by being
united with immortality itself at creation and this image Ç2).
God created man for immortality and made him in his own na-
ture and he placed the seat of the image in the mind f73)- Origen
followed Ireneus and considered immortality to be one of the
fundamental gifts of creation C74)- Athanasius saw sin as cover-
ing over the image of God and causing us to lose immortality C5) •
(71) Sullivan, op. cit., p. 188.

(72) George Maloney says the following:
Gregory seems to imply that the mortal, material element
of man, in which part the passions and sex are radicated, was
an addition to the intended nature of man. 'The grace of the
resurrection is the restoration of fallen man to his primitive
state'. Yet in other places, as has been already suggested,
Gregory considers the material body, distinguished by being of
one or the other sex, as God's fully willed and created man,
through his foreknowledge of man's sins:
But as He perceived in our created nature the bias
towards evil, and the fact that after its voluntary fall from
equality with the angels it would acquire a fellowship
with the lower nature, He mingled, for this reason, with
His own image, an element of the irrational.
God's plan provided that man, with a mutable nature, would
cooperate in his own liberation. But this process of 'return'
to man's ideal situation of immortality and incorruptibility was
not entirely within man's own power.
p. 148.
(73) Ibid., p. 155-156.
(™) In Rom., X, 14, PG 14, 1275 A.
(75) De Incarn., 4, in A Select library of Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers of the Christian Church, 2nd. series, P. Schaff & H. Wade, eds.,
Vol. 4, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957):
For man is by nature mortal, inasmuch as he is made out of
what is not; but by reason of His likeness to Him that is (and
if he still preserved this likeness by keeping Him in his know-
ledge) he would stay his natural corruption and remain incorrupt.
p. 38.

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Christ, the perfect image of God destr

bility and won for us a share of it C76)-
« Imago Dei » in Augustine
The most complete study of the image of God in man was

St. Augustine's in De Trinitate where he thoroughly and care-
fully examined this concept C7). He discovered a number of
« vestiges » of the One and Triune God in man, and he conclud-
ed that most perfect image of the Trinity was found in the
memoria , voluntas and intelligentia of the person C78)- However,
the image of the Triune God, while of great interest to system-
atic theologians and spiritual writers, is of less interest to the
moralist who searches for the theological foundation for the
doctrine that all deliberate killing of the innocent is immoral.
Augustine's reflections about the imago Dei were influenced
by ancient Platonism and he was hostile to any claim that the
corporeal body could image God in any significant fashion. He
found the most perfect image of the One God in the mens
or the composite of spiritual and intellectual power of the per-
son. The mens had for him many of the features of a Plotinian
soul, and he appears to have wanted to entirely separate the body
from the image of God in the person C79). The operations of the
inner soul (the mens) were related to the body only with dif-
ficulty, and he believed that the body was only distantly involved
in the image of God i80). « ... [T]here is no doubt that man
(76) ibid.
(77) P. 98.
(78) De Trinitate, XV, 20, 39.
We have done our best to admonish those who seek a reason
for such things to perceive the invisible things of him as th
are able through the things that are made, and especially throu
the rational or intellectual creature which is made in the image
of God; through which they may see, as in a mirror, if they
can and as far as they can the Trinity of God in our memory,
understanding and will.
(79) Sullivan, op. cit., p. 48.
(so) Ibid., p. 48.

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was made to the image of God that created him, not according
to the body, nor according to any part of the soul, but accord-
ing to the rational mind where the knowledge of God can
exist » (81).
The mens was the highest part of the soul and it was the
seat of reason and understanding (82) . The term mens had a
multiplicity of meanings for Augustine, and it referred to ratio ,
intellectus or intelligentia (83). It could be identified with the
animus which is the principle of rational and intellectual life
in man, but it is probably most accurate to identify the mens
with the « inner man » of St. Paul's thought (M). It encompassed
all that was specifically human and rational in the person. In-
telligible realities, including the divine being were grasped by
the mens , even though to Augustine's embarrassment the mens
was found in close association with the body.
The doctrine that human life was created in the image and
likeness of God held that the very nature of God was commu-
nicated in some fashion at creation, and the communication
of this nature elevated the human being above all creation, in-
cluding the wholly spiritual creatures. Creation in imago Dei
implied that the person was perfect from God's creating hand
and that no human faults or errors could be imputed to the
Creator.
Aquinas and the « Imago Dei »

St. Thomas and the most well-developed understanding of
(si) De Trinity XII, 7, 12 (BAC 5:670).

(82) De Trinit., XV, 1, 1 (BAC 5:828):
...we have now arrived at the image of God in man, in that
wherein he excels the other animals, that is by reason or under-
standing, and whatever else can be said of the rational or in-
tellectual soul (anima) that pertains to what is called the mens
or animus. For by this name some writers... distinguish that
which excels in man, and is not in the beast, from the soul
(anima) which is in the beast as well.
(83) De Trinit., XII, 7, 12 (BAC 5:670).
(84) See: Sullivan, op. cit., p. 48.

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the image of God in the person of all medieval and ancient

theologians, and even though he accepted many of the teachings
of Augustine, he presented them in an Aristotelian form and gave
them a precision not found in Augustine's thought. Aquinas ex-
amined the concept of an image more deeply and with greater
precision and orderliness than did Augustine. First, he held
that an image imitated the form of its model, and manifested a
likeness or an equality with the model. An image was a like-
ness to an exemplar which was an express and proximate sign
of the species of the exemplar.
The nature of an image consists in imitation, from which its

name is also taken... Two things are to be considered about
the nature of an imitation; that in which there is imitation and
those things which imitate each other. But that in regard to
which there is imitation is some quality, or a form understood
in the manner of a quality. Whence likeness is of the nature
of an image. Nor does this suffice, but it is necessary that
there be some equivalence in that quality, either according to
quality or according to proportion... It is also required that
this quality be the express and proximate sign of its nature
and species... (85).
For Aquinas, an authentic image represented the paradigm

with precision and clarity in comparison to a vestige of God
which was a confused an imprecise image of the exempláři86).
Because of this more perfect representation, one can gather
something from the nature of the exemplar from an image, but
not from a vestige.
In his more mature thought, Aquinas held that an image
was not only a likeness of the exemplar but also found its origin
in the exemplar. An image proceeded « from another like to
it in species or at least in specific sign », and a proportionate
equality between the image and exemplar was all that was ne-
cessary for a perfect image of an exemplar (87) . In his later
(85) Aquinas, Thomas, I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. 1.

(86) I Sent , d. 28, q. 2, a. 1.
(87) Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 93, a. 1.

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thought, Aquinas moved close to Augustine and claimed that a

proportional equality between the image and the exemplar was
necessary for an image to perfectly mirror its model (88).
Aquinas parted from Augustine in one respect and held
that angels were created in the image of God because they pos-
sessed an intellectual nature, which is where the image was
found C89). The image was located in the mens , and by this
term he implied not only the narrow sense of intellect alone,
but also the wider sense of the seat of the spiritual powers of
memory, will and intellect. Thomas defined the mens as a po-
testative whole, encompassing the entire spiritual powers of
the person. He was in agreement with Augustine that the image
of God in man is found only in the mind of the intellectual
creature. There was an analogical likeness to God to be found
in all creatures, but in the image of God in man, the analogical
likeness of the person is in the intellect which constitutes the
very species of the person. This likeness is analogical because
in God there are no species, and intellectuality (the highest
grade of being and perfection proceeding from God) is only a
sort of a « quasi-species ». The human person was the most
perfect image because it participated in the being, life, existence
and intellectuality of God. In the intellectual creature, the image
conforms perfectly to this divine attribute. Augustine lacked a
formal concept of analogy, and Aquinas held that there was
an analogical likeness between the exemplar and image of God
in man.
Contemporary Protestan Thouht

Early in his scholarly career Paul Ramsey wrote extensively
on the nature of the image in the human person, and his thoughts
are important because he is primarily an ethicist and is one
who was deeply aware of the difficulties involved in linking the
(88) Ibid., I, q. 93, a. 1. Also see: I, Sent., dģ 28, q. 2, a. 1.

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prohibition of direct killing with the

approcahes the doctrine of the image
stant evangelical standpoint. He argue
wrong but he denies that there is any
human person making him so inheren
death always and everywhere wrong. He is concerned that
much reflection on the divine image in man separates the person
from physical nature to such an extent that the person is vir-
tually identified with the divine. He claims that our stress on
that which separates us from animals leads us to discover that
there is little that differentiates us from God and to avoid re-
ducing us to animals, we almost declare ourselves to be semi-
divine. We risk blurring the human-divine distinction by clam
ing there is a spark of the divine in us in imitation of the
Stoics:
... definitions of the image of God as some faculty or capacity
or perfection within man's possession tempt him to abandon
his proper place as creature and encourage his pretensions of
being sufficient unto himself, in fact himself as his own God
in microcosm Í90).
Echoing Kierkegaard, he prefers to consider the image of

God not as a quality in the human being, but as a relationship
between God and man (91). It is Ramsey's view that our re-
lationship with God gives us a distinctive value (92). But when
(89) Aquinas, Thomas, I Sent., d. 16, a. 1, a. 3; Summa Theoolgica,

I, q. 93, a. 3.
(90) Ramsey, Paul, Basic Christian Ethics , (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), p. 254.
(91) Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics , p. 255. Kierkegaard held that
man exists in the image of God and the image of God does not exist in
man. Kierkegaard, Soren, The Gospel of Suffering and the Lilies of the
Field , (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), pp. 211-2. Barth echoes these views
and holds that the image refers to that to which human nature is ap-
pointed in his existence. He is appointed to recognize God's glory and
act to give God glory. Barth, Karl, The Knowledge of God and the
Service of God According to the Principles of the Reformation , (New York:
Scribners, 1939), pp. 42-3.
(92) Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics , p. 258:
In other words, the image of God does not consist of man's

82.191.49.154 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 07:21:50 UTC
seen in the context of the history of Christian thought, this

analysis must look somewhat eccentric. In that history, the
image of God implies that we have our existence within the
love of God which requires love of God and love of neighbor
of us. And Ramsey denies that we were created immortal, for
immortality was given only through the redemptive work of
Christ (93).
With Ramsey's traditional concern for ethics one would
think he would examine Gn 1:27 in light of Gn 9:6 and seek
the moral foundation for the prohibition of direct killing in
the doctrine of imago Dei , but he does not. He may think this
was made evident in the relationship between man and God,
but it is not clear that this relationship is sufficient moral reason
for prohibiting direct killing. Reason and intelligence as we
know them now are properties acquired because of sin and the
fall, and they come to full stature only through the act of sin C94).
being man and not snowflakes by the sea, however humanly

important this may be, but in his being in the relationship of
acknowledging and serving God with all these human powers,
for this he was appointed to do and in the image of giving
God glory was he created.
(93) Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 263:
And the third image of God, immortality, man possesses
neither by creation nor by acquirement. Man is not inherently
immortal, as he is now inherently rational and as he was com-
pletely happy as long as he remained obedient. Immortality
comes as an eschathological gift, always more God's possession
than man's even when it is given him, lest it come true, as was
said by God when at Babel he viewed another of man's efforts
to assault the battlements of divinity, that 'if this is what they
can do as a beginning, then nothing that they resolve to do
will be impossible for them'. (Gn. 11:6).
This is difficult to accept, for he implies that man at creation was
inherently happy, but it is hard to see how happiness could be complete,
knowing that death was not accidental but essential to his existence.
(94) Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics :
In the Genesis story, reason and intelligence are far from
being the imago Dei', at least in the coming to full flower in
the 'knowledge of good and evil', these capacities gained only
through sin and the Fall. God told Adam what fruit of the
Garden to eat and what not to eat. Adam did not discover this
by the light of natural reason, and ever since then the sons

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Reason is only an instrument of pride o

an instrument of man's spiritual orient
This contemporary approach fails t
sophical roots of imago Dei reasoning.
he too did not discuss the issue of the
prohibition of direct killing in the imag
Ill
« IMAGO DEI », THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE

AND DIRECT KILLING
The purpose of this study is to locate the moral

for the prohibition of direct killing of the innocent in
ne of the sanctity of human life. This can be best
examining a number of alternatives.
1. One possible ground for this doctrine's prohi
direct killing could be the claim of Gn 9:6 that life
God Himself and killing unjustly deprives God of h
prized possession. This view asserts that to delibera
another is immoral because it deprives God of a po
which is rightly His, and this is the source of the i
direct killing. According to this view, one who destroy
human life deprives God of a rightful possession a
of Adam have had difficulty seeing any reason in it. Thus, in

Genesis, far from being the imago Dei , reason comes to its full
eight only through an act of sin.
p. 263.
(95) Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics :
However superior its value, rationality is an instrument either
of pride or of obedience. Nothing will ever alter the in-
tellect's instrumental function. Man is a creature whose nature
is always to be in some God-relationship; whichever way man
faces in that relation, reason is always in service to his spiritual
orientation.
p. 264.

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justly toward God. The inherent immorality of killing der

from the injustice of destroying one of God's children w
life He alone has the right to take.
But it is not clear that this line of reasoning can justify
absolute prohibition of direct killing. All creation is « own
by God and if direct killing is wrong, it might well be th
any and all deliberate destruction would also be wrong (but
to a lesser degree) because it would deprive God of His proper
« possessions ». If direct killing of the innocent is wrong be-
cause human life is God's possession, then it would seem that
any action which « deprived » God of a possession would also
be seriously wrong. Also, this perspective does not explain why
it would be wrong to destroy one prized possession of God (an
innocent life) to save another prized possession (another inno-
cent life). If two innocents would die if one was not killed, it
is not clear why this view would condemn destroying one in-
nocent life to save another.
This view implies that God's right of possession is absolute

and that it cannot be overridden in any circumstance. It would
also suggest that an innocent human life could not be destroyed
even indirectly and indeliberately. If innocent life is the distinc-
tive and unique possession of God, it is not clear why indirectly
allowing it to end by giving an injection of pain relievers to
stop a patient's suffering would not be equally immoral. In
addition, classical Catholic moral thought held that virtually
all rights of ownership could be waived in some cases and one
could steal in order to preserve one's life. If God's right of
possession of innocent life is one of these rights, it is not clear
why it could not be waived so that another innocent could be
saved. This view implies that killing is wrong because of our
relationship with God and because killing violates God's right
to our lives rather than because of something intrinsic to the
human person resulting from our creation in the image of God.
This differs from much of the thought of the Fathers on imago
Dei who believed that a quality in the human person made
killing wrong, and it is thus not clear that direct killing is wrong
because life is a possession of God.

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2. Another possible reason why di

nocent is prohibited by the doctrine
this killing destroys an intellectual
one would remotely and indirectly
highest perfection in God, His « quasi
Direct killing of the innocent would b
the only intellectual being in the ma
mirrors God's intellectuality, the hi
line of reasoning would hold that th
be given extraordinary protections fro
cause it mirrors the highest attribute
But it is not clear that this could stand as a solid moral
grounds for a prohibition against direct killing for intelle
lity may not be distinctively moral in its content. While
might be a bad thing to destroy an intellectual being, it i
clear that this is wrong precisely because that destroyed
intellectual (%). It its not clear that intellectuality is so r
cally superior to and unqualifiedly better than other trait
warrant such extensive protections. Intellectual creatures a
often killed for various reasons which we do not consider evil,
and innocent persons can be indirectly and unintentionally killed
in many circumstances, even though their deaths are tragic.
Thus, while destroying an intellectual creature is probably not
good, it is not clear that the intellectuality of the person makes
its deliberate destruction immoral.
3. Another possible reason why direct killing of the inno-

cent is prohibited by the doctrine of the image could be the
co-creative power of the person established in the image which
reflects the creative power of God. Aquinas held that the image
was not just in a beings' nature but also in its operations C97).
(96) There is also the problem of why intellectuality should be shield-

ed from death. It would seem that the great sin against intellectuality
would be foolishness, falsehood and error but not death.
(87) Aquinas, Thomas, De Ventate, q. 10, a. 2. These powers, such
as the will, were spiritual and freed from matter.

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The image is not only found in the mens , the seat of the po
testative whole of spiritual powers that the image, but also in
the operations of the mens . The divine creative activity is re
flected not just in the power to co-create human life, but als
in the very actions which accomplish this as well. This powe
is unique to the human being, as the angels do not have any
such ability, and the lower animals only generate material an
nonspiritual beings. The human person was created by God
with the power to generate not just life, but spiritual being
as well who were destined to participate directly in divine lif
The person is a partner in the creation of free, spiritual and in-
tellectual beings and because of this limited power the perso
is a sharer in the divine creative powers (98). In human co-
creative action, one not only images creation itself, but also
shares in and participates in the divine action of creating the
spiritual person (").
In ancient theological cosmology, the angels did not share
in this divine creative power, for they were created beings
without any generative powers, and sub-human creatures could
not beget spiritual beings. If it is true that the imago Dei re-
flects the divine power to create spiritual persons, then destroy-
ing the image of that creative power might be a moral reason
for prohibiting direct killing of the innocent (10°). Directly kill-
(98) This position has to be granted, unless one claims that the human
person is responsible solely for the generation of the material body, or
that the person is not actually involved in creation at all and that all
creative action is the product of divine action alone. This human par-
ticipation in creation may well be a divine action through secondary
causes, but even if this is the case, human action is involved in creative
action.
(") Including human co-creative capacities in the imago Dei would
explain much of Christian spirituality as well. At creation, this co-creative
capacity existed without corruption, but through original sin, it may have
become deeply corrupted.
(10°) The ancients did not discuss at length the possibility that the
seat of the image of God could be in human procreative power to co-
operate in the divine creative activity. It is understandable that Augus-
tine would not consider this option because of his profoundly negative
views of sexuality. He considered it to be the sign of human corruption

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ing another person would be logicall

to co-create spiritual beings, and on
betrays their co-creative capacities.
power of the person to share in the
is the sole reason why killing the inn
well be that this is an important re
vestigated but a little by the ancients
why direct killing destroys the image
4. Another possible reason why th

Dei prohibits direct killing of the i
mortality with which persons are created. Simply put, this
view would hold that willfully visiting death upon an innocent
is wrong because they are created for a future freed from death.
Aquinas parted company with Augustine in his analysis of the
imago Dei and held that the angels were created in the image
of God because of their intellectual natures. In affirming this,
Aquinas was implicitly holding that both humans and the angels
were created for immortality. Like the angels, the person was
and sinfulness, and it would have been difficult for him to admit that
the image could be seated in any manner in human sexuality. Yet he
seemed to have been aware that there were difficulties in asserting that
the image was found only in the spiritual mens for he had to admit
that the mens related to the body in some fashion.
(101) Origen taught that sin imprinted the image of the devil on
the soul which erased the image of God. This theme was echoed by
Aquinas who accepted the doctrines of the Fathers and their claims
about the image and likeness of God within us. He affirmed that the
image of God remained intact after the sin of Adam and that the like-
ness of God within us was shattered by Adam's sin. But for Aquinas,
the process by which we restore the likeness of God in us was by growth
in the moral and theological virtues. For him, growth in perfection of
theological faith, hope, charity and the cardinal virtues of prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice was the process by Christian author-
ities claimed in any way that human life in any manner possessed
sanctity, and it is rather apparent that the concept never occurred to
them. Aquinas did not claim, as did Pelagius, that the likeness of God
was restored in us solely by our own power. This could not come about
without the gifts of grace which empower us to the actions required by
the moral and theological virtues that are necessary to refurbish this
likeness.

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« created transcendence » and as a consequence was created

immortality, and only God, humans and angels were spirit
and immortal either at creation or by nature. But becaus
Adam's sin, only man could suffer from death and thus be
alienated from his natural and created immortality (102).
In this perspective, killing an innocent human person would
involve destroying a being destined at creation for eternal exist-
ence with God, and restoration of this capacity would be one
of the primary objectives of the Redemptive activities of Christ.
This grounds would hold direct killing of the innocent immoral
because it would deliberately destroy a being destined at creation
to live immortally with God and would introduce death where
there should be immortality. It would see that killing an in-
nocent person comes as close to striking a blow at our immorta-
lity as is possible and our immortal destiny so limits our moral
power to kill that we can never willfully kill the innocent.
The created immortality of the human person could stand
as a valid moral grounds for the prohibition of direct killing
because it would be directly opposed to death. But one can
wonder why the protection afforded by this principle would
be given only to those inocent of capital offense and not more
narrowly to those who are free of sin. We can also wonder
why those guilty of capital offenses would not be protected
from deliberate killing. What is unique about this principle
is that one would presume it would give protection to either
only those who were sinless or to all human life. Instead, it
gives protection only to those who are innocent of certain
action.
Perhaps the only explanation for these seemingly conflict-
ing conditions is that killing an innocent person violates not
just their created condition of immortality, but justice as well,
while the death of a guilty party violates immortality but not
the requirements of justice in the situation. And precisely be-
(102) Original sin destroyed the immediate possibility of obtaining

immortality, but it did not destroy the remote possibility of gaining it
through the redemptive actions of Christ.

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cause justice is not violated, the delibe

of serious offenses is not objection
created immortal is not so grievous
when the victim is innocent for th
and when guilty when it is the only m
a proportionate punishment. Being created immortal means
that God alone has the power to determine when our lives are
to be ended, and we can only end the life of another when their
actions against us personally or the common good are so grave
that their death is demanded.
Conclusion
While there are a number of possible grounds for the clas-

sical prohibition of the doctrine of the sanctity of human life
of killing the innocent, the strongest of these is the natural im-
mortality of the person. Unlike the other possible grounds
such as our co-creative capacities or intellectuality, there is a
conceptual harmony and fittingness between this ground and
the prohibition of direct killing. This form of killing is wrong
because the human person was created precisely not to be de-
liberately brought to death by us. This ground is also an ap-
propriate grounds for the doctrine of the sanctity of human
life's prohibition of direct killing because like the sanctity of
human life, it is a theological and transcendent category. Both
the sanctity of life and immortality are unlike the traditionally
accepted grounds for prohibitions of direct killing such as
freedom, intelligence, the power to love and the power for
moral action because these are not specifically theological ca-
tegories.
Fr. Robert Barry, O.P.

82.191.49.154 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 07:21:50 UTC

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"Imago Dei" and the Sanctity of Human life

Author(s): Robert Barry

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44617410

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There are probably not many beliefs in Catholic moral

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relation to God, but not on its impli

0) Maloney, George, Man: The Divine Icon , (Pecos, New Mexico:

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twentieth century. With the development of the popular cons

(3) Pius XI, Acta Apostolici Sedis, 22, (1930) 553-554.

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CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOLOGICAL

As mentioned above, Karl Barth objected to Schweitzer's

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(8) Barth, Church Dogmatics, « Respect for Life », III/, p. 324.

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value. He rejects the doctrine of the

Gustafson does not assert that innocent human life is ab-

... [i]nsofar as the transcendent God is the One beyond the

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lich) he is peculiarly devoid of meaningful content, and thus

Gustafson's views require religious believers to make estim-

(17) Gustafson, op. cit., p. 123.

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in the world. Such human institution

(21) As a Lutheran, Gustafson would probably object that no created

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permitted and he does not examine killing from the perspective

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This famous Protestant proponent of situation ethicist dis-

(22) Fletcher, Joseph, Moral Responsibility , (Philadelphia: Westminster

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control and indirect compassionate euthanasia (26). When and

(26) Fletcher, Joseph, Moral Responsibility , (Philadelphia: Westminster

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He seeks to replace the principle of the

a high-order one, and therefore some infants' lives (like some

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value of a person's life can be diminished by a loss of quality,

Smedes expresses what has been widely regarded as the

holds that we ought or ought not to do certain things no matter

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out of love by God and is prized especially by

(38) Ibid., p. 106.

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would also justify ascribing sacredness to virtually all of crea-

Further objections to Schweitzer's interpretation of the

(43) Stith, Richard, « Toward Freedom from Value », in On Moral

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is finite and limited (47). And he wonders

(47) ibid., p. 128.

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to preserve human life (51). Because the human person is capa

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of a value that is superior to that of a

(53) May, William, E., « What Makes a Human Being of Moral

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problem from a nontheological starting point, and his ana

Richard McCormick takes a unique approach to the nature

(56) McCormick, Richard, « The Quality of Life and the Sanctity of

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The presumption to be drawn from su