CANON 9
[No. L-16731. March 30, 1960] Manila. Gatmaitan, J.
FELIPE ECO, petitioner and appellant, vs. JUAN DE G.
RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., respondents and appellees.
1. 1.PETITION FOR RELIEF; COMPUTATION OF PERIOD
TO APPEAL; NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL RESULTING
IN ERRONEOUS COMPUTATION NOT GROUND FOR
RELIEF.—The duty to compute the period to appeal is one
that devolves upon the attorney. He should not delegate
this duty to an employee, because it concerns a question of
study of the law and its application. If he does so and the
employee makes an incorrect computation of the period,
resulting in the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal
bond out of time, such negligence on the part of the attorney
cannot be considered excusable as to be a ground for relief
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
1. 2.ID.; ALLEGED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL AS GROUND FOR
RELIEF; CASE AT BAR.—The petition for relief in the case
at bar was predicated principally on the ground that the
court erred in not holding that the ruling of the Director of
Forestry, affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources, suspending appellant's
registration certificate, was made in abuse of discretion,
because said officials allegedly deprived him of his day in
court. However, it
613
VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 613
Eco vs. Rodriguez, et al.
1. is for this reason that the latter official ordered a formal
investigation of the matter to enable the parties to present
their respective evidence, but appellant refused to submit
to such investigation. The ruling of the Director of Forestry
was therefore affirmed.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A. Vicente and B. Zapata for appellant.
Ramon Marfori and Vicente Bonot for appellees.
Asst. Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor
Dominador Quiros for appellees Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and Director of Forestry.
BARRERA, J.:
In a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Civil Case No. 33674) on September 11, 1957,
Felipe Eco sought annulment of all proceedings, orders, and
decisions rendered by the respondents Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources and Director of Forestry,
claiming that the latter committed an abuse of discretion in
suspending his certificate of Private Woodland Registration
No. 1329, covering a tract of land with an area of 700 hectares,
290 hectares of which were forestal, and the former, in
dismissing petitioner's appeal.
After the respondents had duly filed their answer justifying
the controverted act, the case was heard.
On April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment
finding, inter alia that on January 17, 1956, petitioner Eco
obtained from the Bureau of Forestry a certificate of private
woodland registration under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the strength of a possessory
information title covering 700 hectares but which was made to
appear later on a sketch to contain 290 hectares of forest land,
99 hectares of new logged area and 811 hectares cultivated
area; TigMan Lumber Co., another timber licensee,
614
614 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eco vs. Rodriguez, et al.
protested against this registration and filed a petition for
reconsideration which was apparently granted because the
Director of Forestry suspended the operation of Eco's
certificate; that likewise, it was found that portions of the area
released from the forest zone were under occupancy by some
80 oppositors; that after a series of protests and counter-
protests, objections and counter-objections between the
parties, the Director of Forestry recommended cancellation of
Eco's certificate of private woodland and the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources approved the
recommendation; that upon the appeal of Eco, the Secretary
reopened the case and ordered a formal investigation of the
whole controversy to give the parties "ample opportunity to
formally present their respective sides of the controversy and
(be) given their 'day in court' "; that petitioner Eco refused to
submit to this rein estigation, insisting that it was not
necessary; that in the face of this attitude of Eco, the Secretary
of Agriculture & Natural Resources issued a decision, the
pertinent part of which reads:
"In the light of the above findings and circumstances, this Office is
of the opinion, \ and so holds that the dismissal of the appeal of
Felipe Eco is perfectly in order. This is because of his adamant stand
(not) to submit to the formal investigation duly ordered by this
Office. A clear indication of this attitude is shown by his failure to
appear at the investigation on May 2, 1957, when be was duly
notified thereof thru his counsel.
"WHEREFORE, and as the forested portion of the land in
controversy is actually occupied by the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd.,
the appellee herein, and the remaining area which was released
from the forest zone is under actual occupation and cultivation by
public land applicants who had duly 'filed their respective public
land applications therefore, the instant appeal of Felipe Eco should
be, as hereby it is, DISMISSED. Conformably herewith, the TigMan
Lumber Co., Ltd., is hereby authorized to resume its operation
inside the land in question.
"HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute
once and for all, the appellant herein is hereby given a period of
ninety (90) days from the date hereof within which to institute
voluntary
615
VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 615
Eco vs. Rodriguez, et al.
registration proceedings covering the land; otherwise, this Office
will take the necessary steps to bring the land under the operation
of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in
conjunction with Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be taken
by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view to
supporting its opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings
that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the move of
the Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute
compulsory registration proceedings pursuant to Sec. 53 of the
Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.
"So Ordered."
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial court, Judge
Magno S. Gatmaitan presiding, dismissed the petition for
certiorari, stating:
* * * * * * *
"The Court believes and so holds that there was nothing inherently
wrong in the actuations of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and of the Director of the Bureau of Forestry; the Court
concurs with their opinion that in order to terminate the litigation
between all the parties here, the most proper procedure was for
petitioner to institute voluntary registration proceedings; nor can
petitioner claim that equity is with him in the meantime since as
already stated above, much can be said about the excess in his area.
The result will be dismissal. * ° *."
Copy of this decision was actually received by counsel for the
petitioner on May 5, 1958.
On June 3, 1058 or 28 days thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied
on June 14, 1958, for lack of merit. On June 21, 1958,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond.
Respondents registered opposition thereto for the reason that
the filing of said notice of appeal and appeal bond was made
out of time. Sustaining this allegation, the court, by order of
July 5, 1950, disapproved petitioner's appeal bond and notice
of appeal.
 On September 6 of the same year, petitioner filed a motion
for relief under Rule 38, praying for the setting aside of the
decision on the ground of excusable negligence. The alleged
negligence consisted of the erroneous compu-
616
616 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eco vs. Rodriguez, et al.
tation by counsel's clerk of the period within which an appeal
may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the
prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days
like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in
Section 17 of Rule 41. The motion for relief was denied for lack
of merit. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals but this court certified the case to us, the question
involved herein being one of law.
In support of his view, petitioner-appellant cites our ruling
in the cases of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil.,
446, and Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., G. R.
1
No. L-2587, promulgated on September 19, 1950. The
aforecited ruling has no application to the one at bar. The
delay in the filing of the pleadings in those cases was brought
about by the inability to file the same due to the illness either
of the clerk or of the attorney. It is quite different in the instant
case. Evidently, what was delegated by petitioner's counsel to
his clerk was the computation itself of the period within which
the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly
prudent or wise. As the lower court aptly said: "the duty to
compute the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the
attorney which he can not and should not delegate unto an
employee because it concerns a question of study of the law
and its application, and this Court considers this to be a
delicate matter that should not be delegated." The negligence
here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.
________________
1 In the Coombs case, the clerk's failure, on account of his illness, to call the
attention of his employer-defendant's counsel—to the time within which the
pleading must be filed, which resulted in the latter's failure to file an answer
on time, was considered excusable negligence.
2 In the Herrera case, the employee's inadvertance in placing in one of his
drawers the envelope containing the answer, and the employer's being
prevented, by reason of illness, from verifying whether the answer was actually
filed or not, was held to be excusable negligence.
617
VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 617
Eco vs. Rodriguez, et al.
Even considering it on the merits, appellant's cause must also
fail. The petition for relief was predicated principally on the
ground that the court -a quo erred in not holding that the
ruling of the respondent Director of Forestry, affirmed by the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources,
suspending his Private Woodland Registration certificate was
made in abuse of discretion, because said officials allegedly
deprived him of his day in court. It is noteworthy to mention,
however, that it is precisely for this reason that the Secretary
of Agriculture & Natural Resources ordered a formal
2
investigation of the matter to enable the parties to present
their respective evidence. Yet, appellant Eco refused to submit
to such investigation. Naturally, the ruling of the respondent
Director was affirmed. How can it be claimed then that the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources gravely bused
his discretion in dismissing Eco's appeal?
Furthermore, in his questioned order of June 11, 1957, the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources
provides:
"HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute once
and for all, the appellant (Eco) herein is hereby given a period of
ninety (90) days from the date hereof within which to institute
voluntary registration proceedings covering the said land;
otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land
under operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth
Act 141) in conjunction with Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps
shall be taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government
with a view to supporting its opposition to the voluntary registration
proceedings that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain
the move of the Government in the event that it will be compelled to
institute compulsory registration proccedings pursuant to Sec. 53 of
the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.
"SO ORDERED."
Apparently, instead of taking this course and thus proving his
alleged right over the property, appellant elected to institute
certiorari proceedings against the abovementioned officials in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Under
618
618 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People's Surety & Ins. Co. vs. Vda. de Limcaco, et al.
the circumstances, it is evident that appellant's action has no
foundation at all.
Wheref ore, finding no error in the appealed order denying
petitioner's motion for relief, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez
David JJ., concur.
Ordered affirmed.
_____________
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
[No. 5346. January 3, 1911.]
W. W. ROBINSON, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARCELINO
VILLAFUERTE Y RAÑOLA, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.POWERS OF ATTORNEY; EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW POWERS TO BE FALSE —In order to prove the
falsity of two powers of attorney, executed on different dates
before two different notaries, it is not enough to show, by
the testimony of several witnesses of doubtful capacity, and
by unauthenticated documents, that, on the dates of their
respective execution, the principal was absent from the
place where it is supposed that the said instruments were
drawn up and authenticated; it is necessary that clear,
strong, and irrefutable evidence be produced showing that
the notaries could not have certified that the said person
was actually in their presence, that they heard him ratify
the contents of the respective documents, and that they
could not have certified to the number of his cedula, the only
one exhibited
172
172 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
1. to both notaries, without manifestly perverting the truth.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a
competent public official, with the formalities required by
law, are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter. They are also evidence against the contracting
parties and their legal representatives with regard' to the
declarations the former may have made therein. (Arts.
1216, 1218, Civ. Code.)
1. 2.ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF PRESENTATION OF
PERSONAL CEDULA.—Without proof, or rational
explanation, acceptable in the ordinary course of affairs, it
is impossible to believe that the personal certificate of
registration, which identifies a citizen, was for several
months in the possession of another person residing in a
 distant place; therefore the categorical affirmation of two
notaries, that a cedula of the same date and number was,
on different days, exhibited to them by a person whom they
knew and whose name appears thereon, ,may not be
rejected without positive and conclusive proof that their
statements were false; this for the reason that a notarial
document, guaranteed by public attestation in accordance
with the law, must be sustained in full force and effect so
long as he who impugns it does not present strong,
complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaw or defect provided against by law.
1. 3.ATTORNEY-AT-LAW ; INTERVENTION BY ONE NOT
AN AUTHORIZED PRACTICING ATTORNEY.—There
are no legal provisions authorizing a private person to
intervene at the hearing of a suit, even though he be a clerk
for the attorneys of one of the litigants, if he does not
possess the qualifications of a practicing attorney, and is
not one of the parties interested in the litigation; his
intervention was improperly allowed, even though an
attorney acting in place of original counsel was present at
the hearing; therefore, upon objection being raised to the
presence of the said private person and to his intervention
in the suit and to the performance by him of acts incumbent
upon an attorney-atlaw, the judge should have sustained
such objection by the attorney for the opponents and should
have refused to allow the private party to conduct the trial.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES.—Even
though the questions addressed by a private person to the
witnesses of the litigating party whom he endeavored to
represent be considered as stricken out, yet no reason,
based upon any positive prohibition of the law is submitted
to authorize the striking out of the answers given by the
witnesses interrogated, even though such answers may
have been provoked by questions by a person not authorized
by law, and there is much less reason for rejecting the cross
173
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 173
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
1. questions put to the same witnesses by the attorney for the
other side, and the answers thereto.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; INTRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE.—The exhibition of documents of a probative
character by a person who does not possess the
qualifications of an attorney-at-law may not be held to be
improper when such exhibition was authorized by an
attorney who was the legal representative of the interested
party and was present at the hearing, and who, after the
attorney for the other side had consented that the
documents exhibited should continue to be attached to the
record, proceeded to discuss and assail their authenticity
and validity and concluded by asking that the said
documents, as well as the inscription of some of them, be
declared null and void. The intervention of the said person,
unauthorized by law, can not be considered to have in any
manner prejudiced the rights and interests of the adverse
party, for the judgment afterwards rendered in the case was
; result of the merits of the evidence, as a whole, adduced by
th party in whose favor it was pronounced, as well as a
result o the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony
given by the opposing party.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas. Powell, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
R. Diokno, for appellant.
Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y
Rañola, alleging as a first cause of action: That the plaintiff
was engaged, in the city of Manila and at the time specified
further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other
products from abroad, with an office in the city of Manila, a
business which he still continued, through the agency of Castle
Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the
defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument
duly executed on October 19, 1906, by his attorney in fact and
legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepción, who was
fully empowered and authorized for the purpose, and ratified
on the same date before
174
174 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
the notary public of Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and
.confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50;
that by the said instrument duly executed the defendant
bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum
of P3,852.50 in four monthly installments from that date, at
the rate of P1,000 for each of the first three installments and
P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at
the rate of 8 per cent per annum, to be adjusted and paid at
the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in the
said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case
the latter should recur to judicial process for the collection of
the aforementioned debt; and that, as security for the payment
of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for
costs and expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by
means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a
special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute
ownership and control, which are:
A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433, consisting of land
planted in coconut trees, in the barrio of Dumacaa of the
municipality of Lucena, and containing an area of 2 hectares,
57 ares, and 73 centares.
B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of coconut land
in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena, 2 hectares, 4 ares,
and 78 centares in area.
C., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 435, consisting of unirrigated
land containing 1,200 coconut trees, in the same barrio of
Lucena, and with an area of 7 hectares, 81 ares, and 4
centares.
D., p. 74. A rural estate, No. 436, consisting of coconut land
containing 700 coconut trees, in the barrio of Silangan Mayao,
Lucena, with an area of 1 hectare and 84 centares.
E., p. 74, back. A rural estate, No. 438, consisting of land
planted with 300 coconut trees, in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena,
and measuring 52 ares and 66 centares in area.
F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of coconut
175
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 175
Robinson vs, Villafuerte.
land containing 500 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, with an area of 98 ares and 66 centares.
Go, p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440, consisting of coconut
land containing 800 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, with an area of 36 ares and 5 centares.
H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441, consisting of coconut
land containing 300 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, measuring 50 ares and 73 centares.
L, p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of improved
land, planted with 1,000 coconut trees and situated in the
barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60
centares in area,
J., p. 76. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of improved
land, planted with 100 coconut trees and situated in the barrio
of Cotta, Lucena, of 93 ares and 22 centares in area.
K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of improved
land, planted with 200 coconut trees and situated in the same
barrio and pueblo, of 13 ares and 4 centares in area.
The respective boundaries of each one of the estates above
enumerated were set forth in the said instrument of mortgage,
which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas.
This deed does not appear to have been canceled, and
constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described in
favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in the instrument referred
to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed
in the following manner:
The estate described under letter A responded f or
P800 of the
debt and for the sum of P75 as costs
.........................
Estate letter B, liability P200, costs P40
........................
Estate letter C, liability P160, costs P40
.........................
Estate letter D, liability P130, costs P40
........................
Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs P30
......................
Estate letter F, liability P150, costs P40
.........................
Estate letter G, liability P280, costs P40
........................
Estate letter H, liability P250, costs P40
.........................
Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs P75
.......................
Estate letter J, liability P260, costs P40
..........................
Estate letter K, liability P130, costs P40
.........................
Total ....................................................
176
176 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
It was stated further, as an express condition, that default of
payment of any of the installments specified in the fourth
preceding paragraph would cause the entire obligation to
mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to
require the payment of the same in its totality and forthwith
to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the
mortgaged properties.
The complaint further alleged, as a first cause of action,
P875.00 that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon the
defendant, the latter had not paid his debt nor the interest
thereon, excepting the sum of P550, paid on different dates on
account of the debt and interest due, wherefore the defendant
240.00 owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,302.50, the remainder of his
debt and besides P385.57 as interest due from December 6,
200.00 1906, to the date of the filling of the complaint; that the
plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage, and that
170.00 he had not been paid the whole nor any part of the sum
expressed in the preceding paragraph.
122.50 As a second cause of action against the defendant, the
complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by
means of an instrument duly executed on December 21,
190.00
1906? by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and
320.00
authorized—an instrument ratified on the same date before
the notary Daniel R. Williams—and in consideration of the
290.00 credit which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said defendant
up to the sum of P3,560, executed a special voluntary mortgage
1,475.00 of the properties of his absolute ownership and control which
are described as follows:
300.00 No. 1, p. 72. Estate No, 432, first inscription, volume 28,
general register; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees,
___170.00 26 hectares? 56 ares, and 87 centares in area, situated in the
barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, A part of this land is planted with
4,352.50 coconut and nipa palm trees and the rest is arable,
No. 2, p. 72, back. Estate No. 433, first inscription of the
177
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 177
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
same volume; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 2
hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares in area, situated in the same
barrio and pueblo.
 No. 3, p. 71, back. Estate No. 431, first inscription of the
same volume; coconut land containing 1,500 coconut trees, 16
hectares, 2 ares, and 27 centares in area, situated in the same
barrio and pueblo.
No. 4, p. 73. Estate No. 434, first inscription of the same
volume; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 2
hectares, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area, situated in the barrio
of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena.
No. 5, p. 73, back. Estate No. 435, first inscription of the
same volume; coconut land containing 1,200 coconut trees, 7
hectares, 81 ares, and 4 centares in area, in the same barrio
and pueblo.
No. 6, p. 74. Estate No. 436, first inscription of the same
volume; coconut land containing 7,000 coconut trees, 1
hectare, 88 ares, and 54 centares in area, situated in the barrio
of Silangan Mayao, Lucena.
No. 7, p. 74, back. Estate No. 438, first inscription of the
volume aforesaid; coconut land, 52 ares and 66 centares in
area, containing 300 coconut trees and situated in the barrio
of Cotta, Lucena.
' No. 8, p. 75. Estate No. 439, first inscription of the same
volume; coconut land, 98 ares and 66 centares in area,
containing 500 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio
and pueblo.
No. 9, p. 75, back. Estate No. 440, first inscription of the
volume mentioned; coconut land, 36 ares and 5 centares in
area, containing 500 coconut trees and also located in the same
barrio and pueblo.
No. 10, p. 75, back. Estate No. 441, first inscription of the
said volume; coconut land, 50 ares and 73 centares in area,
containing 300 coconut trees and located in the same barrio
and pueblo.
No. 11, p. 73. Estate No. 914, consisting of improved land
planted with 1,000 coconut trees, located in the barrio
178
178 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
of Dumacaa, Lucena, with an area of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and
60 centares.
No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106 general register;
an improved piece of land, 93 ares and 22 centares in area,
containing 800 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of
Cotta, Lucena.
No. 13, p. 79. Estate No. 916, volume 106 general register;
an improved piece of land, 13 ares and 4 centares in area,
containing 200 coconut trees and located in the same barrio
and pueblo.
No. 14, p. 127. Estate No. 932, volume 106, general register;
an improved piece of coconut land, 2 hectares, 79 ares, and 49
centares in area, containing 2,000 coconut trees and located in
the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.
The respective boundaries of each of the estates above
enumerated were set forth in the said instrument of mortgage,
which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas,
and does not appear to have been canceled, and constitutes an
encumbrance on the properties described, in favor of the
plaintiff. It was stated, in the instrument referred to, that the
liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the
following manner:
The estate described under No. 1 responded for P890.00
P800 of the
debt and for the sum of P90 as costs
...................
Estate No. 2, liability P420, costs P40 460.00
......................
Estate No. 3, liability P420, costs P40 460.00
.......................
Estate No. 4, liability P120, costs P40 160.00
......................
Estate No. 5, liability P100, costs P30 130.00
.......................
Estate No. 6, liability P100, costs P30 130.00
.......................
Estate No. 7, liability P120, costs P40
.......................
Estate No. 8, liability P110, costs P40
...........................
Estate No. 9, liability P110, costs P40
..........................
Estate No. 10, liability P110, costs P40
.......................
Estate No. 11, liability P80, costs P25
........................
Estate No. 12, liability P80, costs P25
......................
Estate No. 13, liability P90, costs P30
.......................
Estate No. 14, liability P900, costs P90
....................
Total ..................................................
179
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
That the aforementioned mortgage was executed as security
for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the
defendant might owe him by reason of the said credit, which
was granted under the following terms and conditions:
1. 1.That the said credit should not exceed the sum of
P3,560 and was granted for the period of six months
from the 20th of November, 1906, and the defendant
was to make use of it in taking flour from the plaintiff's
warehouses, at current prices, by means of written
duebills or orders signed by the defendant or by his
attorney in fact.
2. 2.That the said written duebills or orders should be paid
within thirty days from their date, and it was
stipulated that the amount or value of each one of them
160.00 should bear an annual interest of 8 per cent from the
date of their maturity, if not paid before.
150.00 3. 3.That the total amount of what the defendant might be
owing, by reason of the said credit, should be settled
150.00 and entirely paid, together with the interest thereon,
by the 20th' of May, 1907, on which date all the orders
150.00 or duebills issued by the defendant against the said
credit should be considered as matured, even though
105.00 the extension above mentioned should not have
expired.
105.00 4. 4.That it should be optional on the part of the plaintiff
to honor the duebills or orders which the defendant
Marcelino Villafuerte might issue against the said
120.00
credit, in the event that the latter should fail to pay the
amount of his previous duebills or orders at the time
___990.00
they should respectively fall due, or should fail to
comply with and observe any of the conditions and
4,160.00 stipulations contained in the said instrument of
October 19, 1906, ratified before notary Williams; that
179
the defendant should be bound to pay to the plaintiff
P600, in case of litigation, and also to pay all the
expenses that might be occasioned by the execution of
the said instrument of December 21, 1906, those of its
inscription in the registry, cancellation, and release, as
well as the expenses incurred by the plaintiff
180
180 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
1. on account of the instrument of October 19, 1906,
referred to in the first cause of action, together .with
those of its inscription in the registry; provided,
moreover, that the aforementioned instrument of
December 21, 1906, should be retroactive in its effect
from the 20th of November of the same year, and that
the flour which the said defendant, through his
attorney in fact, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, had
withdrawn from the plaintiffs warehouses since the
20th of November, 1906, should be included in the
credit opened; that the estates described under the
Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, bore a first
mortgage in favor of the plaintiff executed as security
for the obligation, the f ulfillment of which is
demanded in the first cause of action; that, by clause
14 of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it was
stipulated that in case W. W. Robinson, the plaintiff,
should have to institute foreclosure proceedings
against the property above described, either by reason
of the mortgage hereby placed on the same, or of the
obligation affecting the said property, in his favor, by
virtue of the said instrument of October 19 of the
present year, Robinson should be entitled to take
charge of the management of all or any of the said
realties until they should be sold, and to collect their
revenues, rentals, fruits, and products for the purpose
of applying the same to the payment of the judgment;
that, by clause 15 of the said instrument of December
21, 1906, it was also stipulated that it was expressly
covenanted that, in case Robinson should have to
proceed judicially against the property therein
mentioned in order to collect any amount to the
payment of which they were subject, all the orders or
duebills issued on account of the credit granted in the
said instrument should be considered as matured and
payable, and Robinson should be entitled forthwith to
demand the payment of any balance found to be due
him by Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, with the
privilege of levying upon all or any of the realties
comprised within the mortgage mentioned in the said
instrument; that the amount credited for the expenses
referred to in No. 7 of the fifth paragraph of this cause
of action
181
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 181
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
1. reached P174.95; that the defendant, availing himself
of the credit granted in the aforementioned instrument
of December 21, 1906, took and withdrew from the
plaintiff's warehouses, on different dates between the
20th of November and the 19th of December, 1906,
inclusive, various quantities of flour, the total value of
which amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant had
not paid any part of this amount, except the sum of
P375, and was owing a balance of P5,213.15; that at
the time of the complaint the said defendant owed the
plaintiff the sums of P174.95 and P5,213.15, in
addition to P503.79 as interest due up to the date of
the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal
owner of the mortgage above referred to, and that none
of the sums mentioned nor any part thereof had been
paid to him: wherefore the plaintiff asked that
judgment be rendered in his favor against the
defendant, for the following amounts: (1) For the sum
of P3,302.50, the principal demanded in the first cause
of action, and interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum
from date until its payment; (2) for the sum of P385.57,
as interest due on the principal mentioned in the
preceding paragraph and remaining unpaid, and, in
addition, the interest on this sum at the rate of 6 per
cent per annum f rom the date of the complaint until
paid; (3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount of the
debt claimed in the second cause of action, together
with the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per
annum from date until its payment; (4) for the sum of
P503.79, the interest due on the principal mentioned
in the preceding paragraph, with interest thereon at 6
per cent per annum from date until payment; (5) for
the sum of P174.95, claimed in paragraph 9 of the
 second cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per
cent per annum from the date of the complaint until
payment; and, (6) for the sum of P1,000 for costs and
attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further prayed that an order be issued directing
the delivery to the plaintiff of the properties described in the
complaint, in order that he might administer them during the
course of this suit and until they should
182
182 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
ultimately be sold, and authorizing him to collect and receive
the revenues, rentals, fruits, and other products of the said
estates and to retain them in his possession in order to satisfy
the judgment that would be rendered in this case, and that in
case the said judgment be not satisfied thereby, the sale of the
said properties be ordered and the proceeds thereof be applied
to the purpose.
The defendant, in his answer, made a general and specific
denial of each and all of the allegations of the plaintiff for each
and all of the actions instituted by him in each and all of the
paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special defense, and in
his crosscomplaint, alleged: That the def endant did not
execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a power of
attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, empowering the latter to mortgage, pledge, or
otherwise dispose of, to the plaintiff or to any person whatever,
any of the properties mentioned in the complaint, nor to accept
from and open with the plaintiff any credit nor establish with
him any business in flour; nor execute any power of attorney
nor grant any authority whatever in favor of the said
Concepcion so that the latter might represent him and accept
in his name credit, or moneys whatsoever from any person; nor
dispose of, mortgage, or encumber any of the properties
described in the complaint; that the defendant received no sum
whatever from the plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt for
the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum of
money; that he did not give his consent to all or to any one of
the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all the said
mortgages on the properties therein mentioned were founded
on a supposed power of attorney said to have been executed by
the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which
power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null and
void, that it was not executed by the def endant, nor did the
latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney
had no true reason for existence; wherefore the defendant
asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the
complaint with the costs
183
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 183
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the
mortgages alleged in the complaint and the inscription of each
of them in the office of the register of property of Tayabas, and
by ordering the cancellation of all the-inscriptions of the said
mortgages and encumbrances on the aforementioned
properties.
The plaintiff, in answer to the countercomplaint, set up a
general and specific denial of each and all of the allegations of
the defendant with respect to each and all of the actions
brought by him in each and all of the paragraphs of the
countercomplaint, and prayed that judgment be pronounced in
his favor, and against the defendant, in conformity with the
petitions made in his complaint.
The case came up for hearing on November 30, 1908, and
after the presentation of oral evidence by both parties, the
documentary evidence being attached to the record, the court,
on December 15 of the same year, rendered judgment whereby
it directed that the plaintiff should recover from the defendant
the sum specified in the first instrument of mortgage,
P3,302.50, as principal, the additional sum of P385.57 as
interest up to April 30, 1908, besides the interest on the said
principal, at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from the date
just above mentioned until its complete payment, also the
P500 stipulated in the said instrument as payable by the
defendant as costs and expenses in case of litigation; and the
sum mentioned in the second instrument of mortgage,
P5,213.15 as principal, besides P503.79, as interest up to the
30th day of April, 1908, in addition to the interest on the said
principal at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, from the date
just above mentioned until its complete payment, and the sum
of P174.95, as expenses for the execution of the instrument, for
its inscription, cancellation, and acquittance, as provided for
in clause 17 of the said instrument, and the additional sum of
P600, which it was stipulated in the second instrument the
defendant should pay for costs and expenses in case of
litigation. The judgment further ordered that the defendant
should pay the several amounts above mentioned, with the
interest and
184
184 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
costs, on or before the first day of the sitting of the court in
April, 1909, and that, in case such order should not be
complied with, the mortgages should be foreclosed and a final
writ should be issued directing that all the properties before
described be sold, the proceeds of the sale to pay the principal,
interest, and costs. The defendant, when notified of this
judgment, took exception thereto, announced that he would
file a bill of exceptions, and moved for a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law.
This motion was denied and exception was taken by the
appellant, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was
certified to, approved, and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
By an order of March 1, 1909, it was provided that the
execution of the aforesaid judgment should not be suspended
pending the appeal, unless the def endant, f or the reasons
stated in the said order, should give a bond for P10,000.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W.
Robinson, is the collection of various sums owed by the
defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, the payment of
which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out
in the two notarial documents evidencing the debt, exhibited
under letters A and B, and inscribed in the property registry
of the Province of Tayabas.
The mortgage action brought by the creditor, based upon
the two aforementioned notarial documents is proper,
inasmuch as it is sought to collect certain sums specified in the
said instruments on account of their not having been paid
within the periods therein stipulated, and consequently the
real properties offered as security for the solvency of the debts
contracted by the debtor are duly liable for the satisfaction of
the same; and although the credit of P3,852.50, the value of
the flour furnished to Camilo C. Gomez, in account with the
defendant, and referred to in the instrument lettered A, was
to have been paid in four installments from October 19, 1906,
at the rate of P1,000 in each one
185
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 185
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
of the three first months and P852.50 in the fourth and last
month, yet since the debtor, notwithstanding the demands
made upon him, did not comply with his obligation nor pay his
debt in conformity with the tenor of the said instrument, letter
A, for he only paid the creditor the sum of P550 delivered
partially on different dates, the default of payment of any of
the installments agreed upon produces the effect that all of
these must be deemed to have matured and entitles the
creditor to demand the payment of his entire credit and to
proceed against the mortgaged properties for the purpose of
collecting his credit, which amounts to P3,302.50, after the
deduction of the said P550 from the principal, with the interest
due from the 6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.
With respect to the credit mentioned in the instrument,
Exhibit B, and granted by the plaintiff to the defendant
Villafuerte under agreement that the latter should make use
of the said credit by taking flour from the creditor's warehouse
by means of written duebills or orders signed by the debtor, or
his attorney in fact, under condition that the value or amount
of the said duebills should be paid within thirty days from
their date and that these acknowledgments of debt should
bear interest of 8 per cent per annum from the date of their
maturity, it was also a condition that the aforesaid instrument
should be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from November
20, 1906, that the quantities of flour which were taken from
the plaintiff's warehouse since the said November 20, 1906,
should be considered as included, and that the total amount of
whatever the defendant might owe, by- reason of the credit
mentioned, together with the interest thereon, should be
settled and entirely paid on May 20, 1907, on which date all
the orders or duebills issued against the said credit should be
deemed to have matured, even though the thirty days' delay
stipulated should not have expired.
In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded in
withdrawing flour to the value of P5,078.15, without his
having
186
186 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
paid the amount due therefor, except P375, it can not be
denied that there still remains a balance to be paid of
P4,703.15 (pp. 5 and 88 of the record).
In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a statement of the
sacks of flour which were taken on account of the said credit
by means of the nine duebills, Exhibit F, attached to the
aforementioned account, in which it also appears that the
value of the said sacks of flour was P4,703.15, after the
deduction of P375.
The complaint which gave rise to the present suit is in
accordance with the provisions of section 255 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and the mortgages constituted in the two
instruments aforementioned fulfill the conditions and
requirements prescribed in articles 1857, 1874, and 1875 of
the Civil Code; wherefore judgment should be rendered
favorable to the mortgage creditor, in accordance with section
256, and following, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant debtor denied the existence of the
obligations contained in the said instruments; he asserted that
the latter, and the powers of attorney executed in favor of
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion were false, and likewise denied
that he owed the plaintiff any of the amounts claimed in the
complaint, or that he had authorized the said Concepcion to
mortgage the realties described in the said complaint, and in
asking for his release, he prayed that the aforementioned
mortgages and the inscriptions of the same in the property
registry be declared null and void.
If It is true, as it appears to be, that the defendant
Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola executed, on July 11 and
October 29, 1906, in this city, the powers of attorney, Exhibits
C and D, in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, before the
notaries Eugenio de Lara and Daniel R, Williams,
respectively, it not having been proved at trial that the said
powers of attorney were false or null and void, the mortgages
upon the real properties, executed by the attorney in fact, duly
authorized for the purpose, in the instruments designated
under letters A and B, the first of them ratified in the notarial
record, letter G, by the debtor before the same
187
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 187
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
notary, Williams, must be accepted as valid and in force,
inasmuch as the said mortgage deeds appear to have been
ratified in due form by the contracting or interested parties
before the said notary in Manila, it not having been proven at
trial that they contained any flaw or defect which might
operate to annul them.
The evidence adduced by the defendant in his attempt to
prove that, on the two dates before mentioned, when the said
two powers of attorney appear to have been executed, he was
in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in this city of Manila, has not
resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity, and force of the
said powers of attorney, for the truth of their contents as well
as their ratification by the person executing them was certified
to by the notaries before whom they were exhibited
respectively in the presence of two witnesses; the oral
testimony presented by the defendant was insufficient to
prove that the notaries Lara and Williams untruthfully
certified that Marcelino Villafuerte, whom they attested under
oath that they knew, personally appeared before them and
ratified in its totality the contents of the aforementioned
document, declaring that he had executed it freely and
voluntarily and exhibited for the purpose his cedula, No.
453963, issued in Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15, 1906.
In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical result of
the evidence, that the said two notaries, falsely, and entirely
irrespective of the truth, issued the certificates which appear
under their respective signatures and seals at the foot of the
powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not sufficient to prove,
by means of the testimony of witnesses, (mostly relatives) and
by unauthenticated documents, that on the dates of the
execution of the powers of attorney the person executing them
was not here in Manila, where the instruments were certified
to, but in Lucena, Tayabas; clear, strong, and irrefutable proof
must be adduced to prove that the said notaries could not have
averred that the said person was actually in their presence,
that they heard him ratify the contents of the respective
documents,
188
188 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
and could not have certified to the number of his cedula, the
only one exhibited to both notaries, without having ostensibly
perverted the truth. The defendant himself, who averred that
he was in Lucena on July 11, 1906, the date of the first power
of attorney, said that he was not sure whether on October 29
of the same year, the date of the second, he was in the said
pueblo or in this city of Manila.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a
competent public official, with the formalities required by law,
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gives rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. They
shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and their
legal representatives with regard to the declarations the
former may have made therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil
Code.)
"The force of proof of depositions of witnesses shall be
weighed by the courts in accordance with the provisions of the
law of civil procedure, taking care to avoid that, by the simple
coincidence of some depositions, unless their truthfulness be
evident, the affairs may be finally decided in which
instruments, private documents, or any basis of written
evidence are usually made use of." (Art, 1248, Civil Code.)
The defendant debtor having been requested by letter, in
the beginning of the year 1907, to pay his debt, were it true
that he had not contracted the obligations contained in the
instruments lettered A and B, nor executed in favor of Vicente
Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D, would have
at that time made the proper investigations and taken the
necessary steps for the annulment or invalidation of the said
instruments. The defendant did not even attempt to do
anything of the kind, and we do not find any just reason nor
any legal ground whatever to warrant a discussion of the
conclusion arrived at by the lower court from his appreciation
of the whole of the evidence presented in this suit.
Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July and
189
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 189
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
the 29th of October, 1906, the defendant Villafuerte was in
Lucena, Tayabas, and not in Manila, it is not understood how
two notaries who attested that they personally knew him could
have certified that, on the respective dates aforementioned,
the said defendant appeared in person before them, ratified
the instrument of power of attorney which he had executed,
and, to identify his personality, exhibited to the said notaries
his certificate of registration, the only one and the same one
which he presented at each of his appearances on the said
dates. Without proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it
is impossible to believe that the personal certificate of
registration, which identifies a citizen, was for some four
months in the possession of another person residing in a
distant place. It was not proved in a satisfactory manner at
the trial how or why the said cedula, or registration certificate,
came to remain for so long a time in the possession of the
Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of Vicente Marcelo, as averred by
the defendant or his counsel, and under this supposition, so
strange, anomalous, and out of the ordinary rule that every
citizen should necessarily keep his certificate of identification
in his possession, no explanation whatever was given by the
defendant's counsel as to the purpose for which the defendant
parted with his cedula and sent it to either the said Chinaman
or Marcelo. The Chinaman was not examined in this litigation
and the attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had received
the said cedula sent by his constituent. So that for the reasons
hereinbefore stated, it is evident that the defendant
Villafuerte personally exhibited the said cedula to the two
aforementioned notaries, on his ratification of the respective
instrument of power of attorney before each one of them, and
it is not permissible to conclude that the instruments of power
of attorney executed by the defendant, as well as the
certifications subscribed by the notaries Lara and Williams,
are false, because of the absolute absence of proof as a f
oundation f or such a charge; for a notarial document,
guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law,
must be sustained in full force
190
190 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
and effect so long as he who impugns it shall not have
presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against
by law.
Although the documents exhibited by the defendant's
counsel could not, for lack of proof of their authenticity,
destroy or impair the value and force of the notarial documents
or instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is based, it is,
however, to be noted that Pedro Cantero, whose signature
appears attached to the papers found on pages 159, 162, and
170, of the record, was not examined either, even for the
purpose of identifying his signature, he being a Spaniard and
an attorney it is not possible to believe that he wrote the
aforementioned documents in the form and style in which they
appear to have been drawn up; wherefore, on account of these
circumstances, it is reasonable to presume that the documents
of pages 159 and 170, and the note of page 162, of the record,
were not authentic.
It is also to be observed, in the document or letter found on
page 136 of the record, and which also was unauthenticated,
that the aforementioned dates of the 11th of July, 1906, appear
therein with a correction, made in the proper place, of the
figures 11 and 6 of the first date, a repetition and details which
induce the presumption that the said letter was written on a
different date.
By the foregoing it has been duly shown that the fourth,
fifth, sixth, and seventh errors attributed to the judgment are
devoid of reason and legal foundation. With respect to the
third error alleged we hold that the admission of the
documents designated by the letters L and M was proper for
the purpose for which they were presented, because that of
letter L is an original and one of the triplicates drawn up for a
single purpose, as stated therein, and that of letter M is also
an original ratified before a notary, in the certificate of which,
dated July 13, 1906, there certainly appears an annotation of
the same number 453963 of the cedula of the def endant Villaf
uerte which he exhibited
 191
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 191
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
to the notaries who authenticated the powers of attorney,
Exhibits C and D.
With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose
Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address questions to some
of the witnesses during the hearing of the cannot
nothwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez,
who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable tt the
intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs.
Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in
this suit, was improperly admitted; it was n authorized by any
law, for the reason that the said Lalle did not have the capacity
and qualifications of a lawr admitted under oath to practice
his profession before 3 courts of these Islands, and therefore,
on objection beg made to his presence at the hearing of the
case, the dge should have sustained such objection and should
he excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to address
questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact
tt Attorney Agustin Alvarez, designated in substitution f the
said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff
representative in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, as
present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of
some of the proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno
Lacalle are not subject to annulments no positive detriment
was caused to the defendant, although such intervention is in
no manner permitted by the law of procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle
to the plaintiff's witnesses and the presentation of documents
of various kinds exhibited at the trials be stricken out for the
reason that they were made by a person who was neither a
party to the suit nor counsel for e plaintiff, yet we do not find
any reason, based upon y positive prohibition of the law, to
authorize the striking out of the answers given by the
witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said
answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a
person not authorized by law, and
192
192 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Robinson vs. Villafuerte.
there is muchless reason for rejecting the cross-questions
addressed to the same witnesses by the def endant's attorney,
and the answers thereto.
Although e presentation of the documents which support
the class of the plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on
account of their having been made by a person who had not
the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is nevertheless
true that their presentation was authorized by the attorney
Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued to benited to
the record and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by
the other side, but, on the contrary, the attorney or the
defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and
validity of the said documents, made allegations against the
same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also
the inscription of those designated under letters A and B, be
declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the
intervention' Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no
mann prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and
that, if judgment was rendered against him and in favor of the
plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy anworthlessness
of the testimony given by the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented
substantial, wrong and convincing evidence of the falsity of the
two wers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marce
Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have
been totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would
have had a different ending.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, to
affirm the judgment appealed from, as we hereby do, with the
cost against the appellant, and in consequence thereof we quit
the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative to the VOL. 126, DECEMBER 29, 1983 389
declaration of nullity of the mortgages and inscriptions,; Tan Tek Beng vs. David
requested by the defendant. The first day of the termf court Adm. Case No. 1261. December 29, 1983. *

immediately following the date on TAN TEK BENG, complainant, vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID,
193
respondent.
VOL. 18, JANUARY 3, 1911 193 Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Practice of
Salva vs. Salvador. soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or
which the fulfillment of this judgment is ordered shall be set through paid agents is void and tantamount to malpractice;
for the payment of the amounts due and the foreclosure of the Malpractice, defined.—We hold that the said agreement is void
said mortgages. So ordered. because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
JJ.. concur. through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of
Judgment affirmed.
duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical
meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21
___________
of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary
notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited
in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58
Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyer guilty of malpractice
for entering into a void and unethical agreement between him and a
paid agent who solicits cases for the lawyer.—We censure lawyer
David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the
complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but
because David should have known better.
Same; Same; Same; Unprofessional conduct in an attorney,
meaning of.—"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which
violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C. J.S. 743).

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
Timoteo A David for and in his own behalf.
________________
 *SECOND DIVISION.
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan Tek Beng vs. David
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be
taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in
1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged
missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the
attorney's fees received by David from the clients supplied by
Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
"December 3, 1970
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
"Manila
"Dear Mr. Tan:
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our
agreement which must be followed in connection with the accounts
that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions
shall be as follows:
1. "1.On all commission or attorney's fees that we shall receive
from our clients by virtue of the collection that we shall be
able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty,
Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from
domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients
or in any criminal cases where they are involved.
2. "2.I shall not deal directly with our clients without your
consent.
3. "3.You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as
advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our
clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.
4. "4,It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover
from the debtors shall be turned over to our clients. Other
clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or
related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that
I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection with our
transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest
and fair with me.
391
VOL. 126, DECEMBER 29, 1983 391
Tan Tek Beng vs. David
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Illegible
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
"P.S.
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my
sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
MR. TAN TEK BENG"
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August
5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David not only
agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself
not to deal directly with the clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek
Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of
doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan
Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant
Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp
Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to
enforce the agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership
was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as
assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and
financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office
maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng
should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the
business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
 This case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were
scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent
should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan Tek Beng vs. David
materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due
to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the
Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City
but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated
August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General's Office was
informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21,
1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act
No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion
that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. 'The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L.
1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm,
J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine
National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law
practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association:
1. "34.Division of Fees.— No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility."
2. "35.Intermediaries.—The professional services of a
lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities
and qualifications are individual He should avoid all
relations which direct the performance of his duties by
or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's
relation to his client should be personal, and the
responsibility should be direct to the client. x x x"
3. "38.Compensation, Commissions and Rebates.—A
lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions,
rebates or other
393
VOL. 126, DECEMBER 29, 1983 393
Tan Tek Beng vs. David
1. advantages from others without the knowledge and
consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix,
Malcolm, Legal Ethics).
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon
such void and unethical agreement We discountenance his
conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who
did not know legal ethics) but because David should have
known better.
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which
violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S.
743).
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty
of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to
his record in the Bar Confidant's office.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., no part.
 Respondent reprimanded.
Notes.—The preparation and ratification of an immoral
affidavit are disgraceful acts which constitute gross
misconduct in office and a violation of the attorney's oath. for
which attorneys may be disciplined by the courts. (Acuña vs.
Dunca, 2 SCRA 289.)
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. (In re: Sycip, 92
SCRA 1.)
Participation of a lawyer in transactions that led to
fraudulent issuance of a transfer certificate of title in his
client's name violative of his oath as a member of the bar.
(Vda, de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 637.)
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs. Court of Appeals
It is presumed that an attorney performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. This presumption must be rebutted
by a clear preponderance of evidence. Where complainant
admits that she did not cohabit with the respondent lawyer
and could not substantiate the allegations in her complaint,
the presumption of innocence is not overcome. (Maderazo vs.
Del Rosario, 73 SCRA 540.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994. *
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.
Labor Law; Judgments; Factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but,
at times finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.—This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times,
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the
evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Labor Code; Article 114; Deposits; The P15.00 daily
deposits to defray shortage in “boundary” is violative of Article 114
of Labor Code where there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor
has recognized the same as a “practice” in the taxi industry.—
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their “boundary” is covered
by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against
requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing
that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the
________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
557
VOL. 235, AUGUST 22, 1994 557
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
same as a “practice” in the taxi industry. Consequently, the
deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded
therefor. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows: “Article
114. Deposits for loss or damage.—No employer shall require his
worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for
the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is
engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 114 of the Labor Code
provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipment supplied by the employer. It does not permit deposits to
defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his “boundary.”—It can be deduced therefrom that the
said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools,
materials or equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same
does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which
the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his “boundary.” Also,
when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the
alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized
deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private
respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with
legal interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Car wash payments doled out by
drivers are not refundable.—Private respondents are not entitled to
the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be
noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from
cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their
P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing
after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact,
dictated by fair play.
Lawyers; Attorney’s Fees; Non-lawyers are not entitled to
attorney’s fees.—On the last issue of attorney’s fees or service fees
for private respondents’ authorized representative, Article 222 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any
labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may
be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative
of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in
either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the
law, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the statutory
rule that an attorney shall be entitled to
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for
his services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney’s fees, and
such relationship cannot exist unless the client’s representative is a
lawyer.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this
special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision of 1
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits
and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of promul-gation of judgment to the date of
actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for
attorney’s fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the
cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose
upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to
small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have
heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist
only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed
monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of
the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian
problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as
2
such, they
_______________
 1 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale, with
Commissioner S. E. Veloso concurring, in NLRC NCR CA No. 003285-92; Rollo,
35.
2 It appears that Maldigan was hired in November, 1987, although
petitioners claim that he was already working as an extra driver in October,
1986. Sabsalon started working on June 24, 1979.
559
VOL. 235, AUGUST 22, 1994 559
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside
from the daily “boundary” of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi
or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
“boundary,” for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra
driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work
for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was
working for “Mine of Gold” Taxi Company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September
6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all
his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized
and after his discharge, he went to his home province to
recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners
as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when
he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on
an “alternative basis,” that is, he drove only every other day.
However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his
“boundary” of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he
abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to
report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was
revealed that he was driving a taxi for “Bulaklak Company.”
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but
herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left
of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the
amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This
was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the
expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners
terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that
his termination from employment was effected when he
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a
complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National
Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal
dismissal and illegal
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter
holding that it took private respondents two years to file the
same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the
natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly
treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere after-thought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the
observation that private respondents failed to controvert the
evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by “Mine of
Gold” Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10,
1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1,
1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar
employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly,
affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private
respondents’ services were not illegally terminated. It,
however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at
the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
 This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly the same does
of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired not apply to or permit deposits not to defray any deficiency
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, “boundary.” Also, when private respondents stopped working
finality if such findings are supported by substantial for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners
evidence. Where, however, such conclusions are not supported
3 required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In
by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical other case, any balance due to private respondents after
and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
discretion. 4 interest.
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim
made by respondents to defray any shortage in their of Sabsalon is as follows:
“boundary” is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make 1987 P1,000.00
deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of 1988 P1,403.00 P 567.00 200.00
Labor has recognized 1989 720.00 760.00 1,500.00
_______________ 1990 686.00 130.00 --
3 San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, Jr., G.R. No. 54244, January 27, 1991 605.00 570.00 --
1992, 205 SCRA 469; Planters Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 78524 165.00 2,300.00 P2,700.00
& 78739, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 328. P3,579.00 P4,327.00
4 San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88268, June 2,

1992, 209 SCRA 494.
561
VOL. 235, AUGUST 22, 1994 561
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
the same as a “practice” in the taxi industry. Consequently,
the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be
refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
“Article 114. Deposits for loss or damage.—No employer shall
require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be
made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials,
or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer
is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991,
Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or
he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to
petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to
Maldigan’s deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the
same even in the present petition.
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that since the evidence shows that he had not
withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of
his accumulated cash deposits. 5

practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or
desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
rules and regulations.”
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the
rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter
had this to say in his decision: “Anent the issue of illegal
deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in
the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the
driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean
condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) recovery of attorney’s fees, and such relationship cannot exist
(private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the unless the client’s representative is a lawyer.
8

expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly
to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal
in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid
by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the
law.” (Words in parentheses added.)
6 respondent to order and effect the computation and payment
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the
refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be
noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents
from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save
their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car
washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry,
and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney’s fees or service fees for private
respondents’ authorized representative, Article 222 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia
was the authorized representative of private respondents, he
was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney’s fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the
7
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED
by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney’s fees and directing said public
by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan’s deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date
of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.,
Chairman), Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
Note.—Parenthetically it may be noted that in cases of
unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be
assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to 10 percent of the amount
of wages recovered. (Lantion vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 181 SCRA 513 [1990])
————o0o———

existence
_______________

5 Rollo, 88.
6 Rollo, 24.
7 Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

563
VOL. 235, AUGUST 22, 1994 563
Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
Canon 10
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998. *
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA
SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
Actions; Judgments; Once a court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved
and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
623
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 623
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals
controversy litigated come to an end.—It is a settled rule that
once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or
among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy
litigated come to an end.
Same; Same; Ownership; Possession; Placing a party in
possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect
or consequence of a decision declaring him as the rightful owner of
the property.—Petitioner’s contention that a determination of the
issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance of a
writ of possession is untenable. Placing private respondents in
possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect
or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring
them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action
for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
Same; Same; Attorneys; Legal Ethics; While lawyers owe entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client’s right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice—they should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay the
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.—
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they
should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert
every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. In Banogan, et
al. vs. Cerna, et al., we ruled: “As officers of the court, lawyers have
a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
the attention of the courts.”
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ruperto G. Martin & Associates and Donardo R.
Paglinawan for petitioner.
Jose V. Marcella for private respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the
execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner,
considering that the issues raised in this second petition for
review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues
which have already attained finality. We now write finis to
this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17)
years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br.
15, Ozamis City: 1 private respondents moved for execution which was granted
“x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
it being essential to the effective administration of justice that once
a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts
must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that
result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and
sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit lit-ium.”
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-
spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
_______________
1249 SCRA 438-439; October 24, 1995.
625
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 625
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central
Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of
nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued
in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the 2
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant’s Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and
void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as
to costs.”
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by respondent Court of
3
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and
eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on
November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5,
1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory,
by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the
trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between
private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and
registered owner of the lot having bought the same from
Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
_______________
2 Regional Trial Court Decision in Civil Case No. C-9297; Rollo, pp. 238-241.
3 Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989; Rollo, pp. 242-248.
4 Entry of Judgment; Rollo, p. 100.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents’
motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the
trial court holding that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which
read:
“We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling
reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case
No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by
respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded
by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee.” 5
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court
of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner’s petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was denied
in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. Upon finality of said
7 “After going over the above-cited pleadings, the Court is prone to reconsider its order of
_______________
5 CA Decision penned by Justice Angelina S. Gutierrez and concurred in by
Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and Justice Jesus M. Elbinias; Rollo, pp.
249-256.
6 CA Resolution; Rollo, pp. 257-259.
7 Supreme Court Resolution:
“G.R. No. 109076 (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.)—Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for
review on certiorari as well as the comment thereon of the private respondents and the
reply thereto of the petitioner, the Court
627
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 627
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October
21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for
the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court
which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration.
Petitioner’s motion was initially granted on August 29, 1994
9
by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon
motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered
on December 19, 1994 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who
10
succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution
were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for
the second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent11
Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591),
arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed
_______________
RESOLVED to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the
Court of Appeals had committed reversible error in the questioned judgment.”
8 See Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 36591; Rollo, p. 131.
9 Rollo, pp. 59-63.
10 RTC Order; portions of which are hereto quoted:
August 29, 1994 for all matters and issues raised therein have already been passed upon
and aptly discussed by the honorable Court of Appeals and the Honorable Supreme
Court. The Court believes there is no change or intervening facts changing the situation
of the parties that would warrant an amendment or modification of the subject
judgment. This Court should not and cannot in effect render null and nugatory the final
and executory judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court for that would be
contemptuous and anomalous and may subject the presiding judge of the trial court to
the severest penalty for being disobedient and disrespectful to the judgment or decision
of the Honorable Supreme Court.”
Rollo, pp. 28-57.
11
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297;
that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated
Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the
private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances
which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render
the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the
issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot
buyers’ freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents’ title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground
12
that the lower court’s decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
“This Court needs(sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent
Court’s decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and
executory. The respondent court’s writs of execution and possession
could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of
legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x Petitioner
Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final
judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by
this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To
Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner’s
dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not
benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant
petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the
assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule
142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents, the instant petition has already become moot and
academic as the property in question was already turned over by the
Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and
possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of
this case to rest.” (Emphasis ours.)
_______________
12Penned by Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justice
Gloria C. Paras and Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo; Rollo, pp. 131-134.
629
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 629
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
January 30, 1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court’s intervention
reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in
their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before
it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect
to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an
end.
Petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot order it
and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between
private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797 when it ruled:
“Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case
No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by
respondent Judge.
“Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded
by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee.”
14
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is,
therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
_______________
CA Resolution; Rollo, p. 139.
13
Rollo, p. 254.
14
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
Further, petitioner’s contention that a determination of the
issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance
of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of
the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the
rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the
private respondents, they do not have to institute another
action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject
realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment
in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the
said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency
of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include
the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the
pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification
why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of
possession of the subject property should be permanently
stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final
resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of
titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not
justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner’s title which
originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already
annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial
court will nullify the said private respondents’ title in Civil
Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed
adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the
present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution
of the judgment.
631
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 631
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
Finally, petitioner’s fear that the grave lots will be disturbed,
desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment
proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders
of the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment
reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been
taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and
made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply
protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial
court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
“The defendant-petitioner are(sic) however not completely without
recourse or remedy because they can still go after the original party-
defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central
Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for
plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the subject
property, due to defendant-petitioners’ arguments that the same
have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be
incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the
plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of
their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they
benefited from the sale of the burial lots.” 15
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive
was given, to wit:
“The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the
plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority
to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access
to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots,
negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner
so that cash payment or cash settlement be made.” 16
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his
Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on
the writ of execution, as follows:
_______________
RTC Order, Rollo, pp. 101-102.
15
Rollo, p. 159.
16
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
“Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within
the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now
have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in
question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be
applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the
eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory
of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of
the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land
within the said memorial park.” 17
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue
as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly
addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and
academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the “Sheriff’s
Return,” dated March 31, 1995, with the attached “Turn Over
18
Premises” indicating therein that private respondents took
19
possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution
of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of
the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has
thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long
been going on, so that by the time this case is finally
terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with
tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real
owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s
right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse
_______________
17 Ibid., p. 60.
18 Rollo, pp. 153-154.
19 Ibid., p. 155.
633
VOL. 293, AUGUST 5, 1998 633
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes. In Banogan, et al. vs. Cerna, et al., we ruled:
20 21
“As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty
by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance
the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully
use the judicial process for the sole purpose of frustrating and
delaying the execution of a judgment. (Millare vs.
Montero, 246 SCRA 1 [1995])
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. (Santiago
vs. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68 [1995])
——o0o——
_______________
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, 249 SCRA 432-433, October 24, 1995.
20
154 SCRA 593, cited in Chua Huat, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 199
21
SCRA 15, July 9, 1991.
634
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
G.R. No. 118584. October 24, 1995. *
AURELIAS. GOMEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamis City; COURT OF
APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; The filing of the
instant petition was nothing but a scheme to frustrate and further
delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.—
Howsoever viewed, the filing of the instant petition was nothing but
a scheme to frustrate and further delay the execution of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither could a claim of
denial of due process save the day for petitioner as the judgment of
the trial court was affirmed only after due proceedings by the Court
of Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost
liberality to petitioner who failed to file her Brief. Said judgment
was ultimately sustained by us in the resolution of 31 March 1993
in G.R. No. 198331, which had long become final, with the entry of
judgment made on 8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no depth of honest
belief as to the innocence of the accused could alter the final verdict.
Same; Same; The Court can neither condone nor tolerate
attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which
would have a bearing on its initial action.—Counsel’s gambit is
condemnable for it clearly disregards a lawyer’s duty to maintain
absolute candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court (Canon 10,
Code of Professional Responsibility). In Santos vs. Paguio (221
SCRA 770, 779, [1993]), we declared, in no uncertain terms, that
this Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it
through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing
on its initial action.
Same; Same; Public policy and sound practice demand that at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.—We stress once
again what we said before, that litigations must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against
any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, they
__________________
*FIRST DIVISION.
433
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 24, 1995 433
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
should frown upon any attempt to prolong it (Lim Kim Tho vs.
Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law.
Same; Same; Lawyers should not misuse the rules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.—While lawyers
owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away
or be withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied
(Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics), they should not forget
that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort and
placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice (Canon 12, Canons of Professional
Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or
unduly delay a case, impeded the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza II & Ligon for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our resolution of 31 May 1995 dismissing this petition for
“utter lack of merit,” we required attorneys for petitioner to
show cause “why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with
for impeding the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case
No. 85-49 and for misusing the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice in violation of Rule 10.03, Canon 10 and Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”
The backdrop of our order is summarized in the resolution in
this wise:
The petitioner seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari and mandamus to annul and set aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City, Branch 15, in
Criminal Case No. 85-49, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of
5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482, and the Resolution of
this Court in G.R.
434
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
No. 108331; and to order the Court of Appeals to give due course to
the petitioner’s appeal upon the filing of appellant’s brief.
The Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General reveals the
following procedural antecedents, some of which are suppressed in
the petition.
In spite of its resolution of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No.
07482 dismissing the petitioner’s appeal from the RTC decision in
Criminal Case No. 85-49 for failure to file the appellant’s brief, the
Court of Appeals accepted her Memorandum of 28 September 1990
wherein she raised the errors allegedly committed by the trial court.
On 8 April 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee’s Brief refuting all the assigned errors. Since no reply brief
was filed by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution of
21 June 1991, resolved to consider the case submitted for decision
without the said brief.
On 9 June 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aurelia
Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel, defined and
penalized under Article 355, in relation to Article 355 (sic) and 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present, she is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the offended party Marieto M.
Tan, Sr. the amount of P70,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals
having been denied, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on
a petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No.
108331. This petition was, however, denied for non-compliance with
Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.
Acting on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, this Court,
in the resolution of 31 March 1993, reinstated the petition but
denied it nonetheless “for being factual and for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment.” Petitioner’s
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of 31 March 1993 were denied with finality.
435
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 24, 1995 435
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
On 28 June 1993, this Court noted without action the petitioner’s
letter requesting that the issues raised in the supplemental motion
for reconsideration be given due consideration.
In the resolution of 23 August 1993, this Court denied the
petitioner’s motion to admit second motion for reconsideration and
the second motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment in G.R.
No. 108331 was accordingly made on 8 September 1993.
The petition further discloses that this Court denied the
petitioner’s petition (G.R. No. 116398) to set aside the RTC’s denial
of her application for probation. The motion for reconsideration met
the same fate. Upon the prosecution’s motion for execution of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest.
In the final analysis then, the instant petition is to annul and set
aside this Court’s final resolution in G.R. No. 108331. The attorneys
for the petitioner know, or ought to know, that the special civil
action for certiorari will not lie against a final judgment of this
Court. Even granting for the sake of argument that it could, this
petition must fail for being filed one (1) year, four (4) months, and
nineteen (19) days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331
or long after the jurisprudentially established “reasonable time”
prescribed for the remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As this Court sees it, the instant petition is a clever ploy to
further delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No.
85-49.
In their Explanation dated 21 June 1995 submitted in
compliance with the above show-cause order, attorneys for
petitioner, namely: Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor
D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon, averred:
Counsel for petitioner beg the indulgence of this Honorable Court in
asking for the extraordinary relief of seeking a declaration of
mistrial of the libel case tried in the lower court through the special
civil action for certiorari as they were impelled by their conviction
that petitioner performed a moral and legal obligation in writing the
letter which was the basis for libel, as she did, which disclosed the
price fixing and price rigging of oil products by the private
complainant, Mr. Marieto Tan, for his private benefit (in Criminal
Case No. 85-49, RTC-Ozamiz City).
While counsel for petitioner are aware that their first bounden
duty as officers of the Court is to honor and follow Court rules issued
for the orderly and efficient administration of justice (Banogon vs.
Zerna, 154 SCRA 593; Toledo vs. Burgos, 168 SCRA 513), they are
equally burdened by their foremost obligation to prevent any
miscarriage of justice in accordance with their convictions. Herein
counsel has perused the available pleadings and court processes in
the libel against
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
petitioner, and were fully convinced thereof and impelled by their
desire to legally assist the latter to substantiate her innocence for
the crime of libel. If they had overstretched the parameters of the
conduct required of lawyers in trying to protect their client’s liberty
by resorting to this judicial process of certiorari, herein counsel had
acted in good faith and beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable
Court for such action.
Contrary to the representations of the Office of the Solicitor
General, herein counsel were candid in the presentation of the
factual and procedural antecedents based on pleadings given to
them by their client. Counsel disclosed in the petition in page 10
thereof that there is already an Entry of Judgment in Criminal Case
No. 85-49.
Herein counsel similarly disclosed that—
“Moreover, up to this date, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records
of the aforementioned case, so that accused-petitioner experienced extreme
difficulties in filing the instant petition. And consequently, accused-
petitioner stands helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of
all orders, judgments, and other processes of the trial court, Court of
Appeals, and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were addressed to
Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin, x x x”
Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented
on the procedural antecedents in this case.
Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they
were invoking the equity jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such
that procedural rules be set aside to serve the ends of justice, as the
liberty of a person is at stake.
Herein counsel comprehend the difficulty in questioning
procedural parameters for the efficient and orderly administration
of justice in strictly following Court orders and jurisprudence
implementing thereof, but equally compelling is their sworn duty to
protect a client who has been innocently charged and stands to
suffer deprivation of liberty should counsel omit to resort to the
extraordinary relief they sought in this petition.
In the resolution of 9 August 1995, we then required the
aforenamed lawyers to inform the Court if they were willing
to submit the disciplinary matter for resolution on the basis of
their Explanation. In compliance therewith, on 8 September
1995, they filed a Manifestation wherein they expressed that
it had not been their intention to violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility and likewise apologized to the
Court “for whatever inconve-
437
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 24, 1995 437
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
nience the filing of the instant petition may have entailed.”
We find the explanation proferred unsatisfactory and the
justification set forth for their action flimsy.
As to the charge of suppression of factual and procedural
antecedents, we cannot lend credence to the gossamer claim of
petitioner’s counsel that they were “candid” in their
presentation of these antecedents as evidenced by their
disclosure, on page 10 of the petition, that there already was
an entry of judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither can
we find tenable the allegation that up to the date the petition
was filed, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the
case, for which reason, petitioner stood “helpless in
determining the material dates of receipt of all orders,
judgments, and other processes of the trial court, Court of
Appeals and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were
addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin.”
In the first place, attorneys for petitioner do not even claim
that Atty. Pactolin unreasonably refused to turn over the
records to petitioner; ex hypothesi, he could have legitimately
retained them pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court until petitioner paid him his lawful fees. In any event,
Attorneys Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza, and Ligon were fully
aware of the existence of their client’s (petitioner’s) case with
the trial court, Court of Appeals, and this Court, and had
unhampered access to the records thereof, especially those of
the Court of Appeals and this Court since their office is located
near said Courts. In less than half a day, any one of them or
their authorized representatives could have personally sought
the information they wanted from said Courts. Anent the
records of the criminal case in Ozamiz City, if for whatever
reason petitioner could not personally secure photocopies of
pertinent pleadings, orders, decisions, and other processes
therein, counsel could have merely requested the Clerk of
Court thereof for the necessary information. As a matter of
fact, the annexes attached to the petition showed beyond cavil
that counsel could have, without exerting undue effort,
obtained the requisite information with respect to the cases
before the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.
Obviously then, the suppression of vital facts by counsel for
petitioner, exposed by the Office of the Solicitor General, was
not due to the unavailability of such facts to counsel nor the
difficulty of obtaining them; in legal contemplation, excusable
negligence
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
was not present in the instant case. Plainly, the concealment
resorted to was nothing but a stratagem to give the petition a
semblance of a valid grievance or a viable cause of action.
Petitioner’s counsel knew, or were reasonably expected to
know, the hopelessness of their client’s cause since the petition
was filed, it bears repeating, one year, four months, and
nineteen days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No.
108331—long after the lapse of the jurisprudentially
established measure of “reasonable time” prescribed for the
remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Howsoever viewed, the filing of the instant petition was
nothing but a scheme to frustrate and further delay the
execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither
could a claim of denial of due process save the day for
petitioner as the judgment of the trial court was affirmed only
after due proceedings by the Court of Appeals which,
parenthetically, even extended the utmost liberality to
petitioner who failed to file her Brief. Said judgment was
ultimately sustained by us in the resolution of 31 March 1993
in G.R. No. 108331, which had long become final, with the
entry of judgment made on 8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no
depth of honest belief as to the innocence of the accused could
alter the final verdict. Petitioner’s counsel, if they are so
minded, can only seek to relieve their client from the effects of
the judgment from another forum, e.g., they may consider
executive clemency.
Counsel’s gambit is condemnable for it clearly disregards a
lawyer’s duty to maintain absolute candor, fairness, and good
faith to the Court (Canon 10, Code of Professional
Responsibility). In Santos vs. Paguio (221 SCRA 770, 779,
[1993]), we declared, in no uncertain terms, that this Court
can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it
through suppression of important facts which would have a
bearing on its initial action.
We stress once again what we said before, that litigations
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being
essential to the effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through
a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence,
courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring
about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to
controver-
439
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 24, 1995 439
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City
sies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it (Lim
Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Kao,82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and
sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at
some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium (Tolentino vs. Ongsiako, 7 SCRA 1001 [1963]; Villaflor
vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 [1968]). And for lawyers who disregard
these postulates, we stated in Banogon vs. Zerna (154 SCRA
593 [1987], reiterated in Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals (199
SCRA 1, 15 [1991]), that:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and law should advise them when a case,
such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause
of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack
of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their
clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their
rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and ability,
to the end that nothing be taken away or be withheld from
them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15,
Canons of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that
they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort and
placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice (Canon 12, Canons of Professional
Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules
of procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon
10, Id.) or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12,
Id.).
As a final point, we wish to state that the apology contained
in the Explanation is misplaced. Counsel ought to know that
they were not required to show cause for the inconvenience the
filing of the petition caused this Court. The apology insinuates,
rather smartly, that we required them to show cause out of our
whims or caprice, which, of course, is baseless, as
demonstrated by our observations in the resolution of 31 May
1995, particularly on the suppression of vital facts by the
attorneys for petitioner.
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Patoray vs. Commission on Elections
We do not then hesitate to declare that counsel for petitioner,
Attorneys Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D.
Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon have breached the
foregoing Canons and Rules.
WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO. FERNANDO C.
COJUANGCO, VIGOR D. MENDOZA, II, and ANTONIO A.
LIGON are hereby CENSURED and warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosi
sima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Attorneys for petitioner censured and warned against
repetition of similar acts.
Note.—Counsel should exercise prudence in appealing
lower court rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not
to retard the resolution of cases. (Krohn vs. Court of VOL. 154, OCTOBER 9, 1987 593
Appeals, 233 SCRA 146 [1994]) Banogon vs. Zerna
No. L-35469. October 9,1987. *

——o0o—— ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and

DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners, vs. MELCHOR ZERNA,
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA,
and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).
Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Laches; Petitioners are
guilty of laches for having delayed not only for 31 days but for 31

_______________

Designated a Special Member of the First Division.

**

*FIRST DIVISION.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Banogon vs. Zerna
years in asserting their claim of fraud.—A reading thereof will
show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine
they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their
delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty
one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly
contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Judgment; Litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere and once a judgment has
become final the winning party should not, through a mere
subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict —This Court has
repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: " 'Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.'' There should be a
greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted
or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the
operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as
shown in this case, the dear and manifest absence of any right
calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Degree of public distrust from lawyers
arise from the way they misinterpret the law; The Court must express
its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading by lawyers
designed precisely to circumvent or violate it—One reason why there
is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to
achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of
justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal
profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say
that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as
indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express
its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed
precisely to circumvent or violate it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Responsibility of lawyers as officers
of the court; Admonition to lawyers not to commence litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts but
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.—As officers of
595
VOL. 154, OCTOBER 9, 1987 595
Banogon vs. Zerna
the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such
as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause
of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack
of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental, Br. III. Vamenta, Jr. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, .J;
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was
rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9,
1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was
filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was
followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on
March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957.
On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to
dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on
December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was
denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us
1
on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved
here are errors of law and lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of
the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been
filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it
was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet
become final and executory because the land in dispute had
not
________________
1 Rollo, pp. 41-43; pp. 44-45.
2 Ibid., pp. 10-17.
3 Id., pp. 42-43.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Banogon vs. Zerna
yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The
said judgment would become so only after one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of
laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to
enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their
name pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the
decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after
30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners
during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one
years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of
the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-
interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more
years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it
until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves
waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition
for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because
the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory
because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered,
the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed
the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the
issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied
this remedy before the decree is issued?" 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition
earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time
in the world because the land has not yet been registered and
the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners
cite Rivera v. Moran, where it was held:
7 Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring
"x x x. It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered
and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition
for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed
'within one year after entry of the decree.' Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for
_______________
4 Id., p. 15.
5 Id., p. 28.
6 Id., pp. 12-14.
7 48 Phil. 836.
597
VOL. 154, OCTOBER 9, 1987 597
Banogon vs. Zerna
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered.
But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been
the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have
been better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be
presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there
can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait
until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud We
therefore hold that a petition for review under section
38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition of
the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the final decree of registration." (Italics supplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions
and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in
asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for
thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their
petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic
and to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers
alike:
" 'Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them.'
"There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that
the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable
to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to
evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any
right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable." 9
"This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an
insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants
had
_______________
8 Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Ko, et al., 82 SCRA 776; Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 36
SCRA 137.
9 Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 394.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer
Banogon vs. Zerna lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v.
________________
Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our
disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 141.
10

justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely Rollo, p.11
11

designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, 599

therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are VOL. 154, OCTOBER 9, 1987 599
intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so Cu Bie vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
again."10

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took
petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so
fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for
ordered.
review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had
Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the
Gancayco, J., on leave.
filing of the petition. Moreover, it was for the petitioners to
11

Petition dismissed.
move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the
Notes.—Delay of 99 days before filing petition for certiorari
private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they
with the Supreme Court is guilty of laches. (Claridad vs.
were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private
Santos, 120 SCRA 148.)
respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.
Action to redeem property sold or have the sale declared
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for
void barred by long inaction. (Vda. de Zalueta vs.
lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the
Octaviano, 121 SCRA 314.)
point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
Laches cannot be asserted by mere possessor without claim
purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at
to title legal or equitable; (Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs.
the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as
Lim, 123 SCRA 46.)
the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that
every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as ——oOo——
indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must
express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add
to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which
is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should
not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of
 VOL. 24, JULY 29, 1968 291
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
No. L-22320. July 29, 1968.
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ . and DAMASO P. PEREZ,
petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORio LANTIN, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the
CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Execution of judgment; Interference with
judgment or decree of a court of coordinate or concurrent
jurisdiction.—The Court of First Instance of Rizal does not have
jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution issued
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, under the settled doctrines
that courts are without power to restrain acts outside their
territorial jurisdiction (Acosta, et al. v. Alvendia, et al, L-14598, Oct.
31, 1960; Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961;
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc. v. National
Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, et al., L-20491, Aug. 31,
1965, and the cases therein cited) or 'interfere with the judgment or
decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
(Cabigao v. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; PNB v. Javellana, 92 Phil.
525; Araneta v. Commonwealth Iiisurance Co., 103 Phil. 522).
Legal ethics; Attorney and client; Duty of counsel towards
292
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
his client—It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
def enseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper
his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause
of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour
and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position.
MOTION for partial reconsideration of a Supreme Court
decision.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
RESOLUTION *
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's
decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the
following observation therein made:
"We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation
below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions,
at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole
purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment
which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were
filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their
counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice."
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the
petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel."
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N.
Bolinao, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the
judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision
in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional
conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
_______________
*See main decision in 23 SCRA 637.
293
VOL. 24, JULY 29, 1968 293
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient
reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the
firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in
the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to
cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners'
counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court'of Appeals
rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with
respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings
interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were
obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by
the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed
that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did
they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the
latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged
the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation
with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of
the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years
after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same
has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez
spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance
of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have
jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso
Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the
rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his
wife, Mercedes Ruth CobbPerez, intruded into the controversy
and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil
case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully
well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court
of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was
294
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
the proper forum for any action relative to the execution.
Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960),
which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on
October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued
enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the
execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her
counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known
beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not
have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself
sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently
issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was
actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent
motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961,
alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez'
judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case
7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact
neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled
hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following
order:
"When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called
this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear
despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for
hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his
right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or
lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is. therefore deemed
submitted for resolution."
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by
Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the
execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another
tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had
staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the
controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case
7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
As most probably anticipated anew by
295
VOL. 24, JULY 29, 1968 295
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala,
presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied
the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among
others, that be had no power to interfere by injunction with
the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied,
Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge
Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in
fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the
order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-
mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the
reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the
first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not
even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to
the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank. As a
1
matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on D-
ecember 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled. Consequently, the respondent
2
Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for
reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the
protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants
that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has
any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate
afore-thought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent
events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses,
coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of
"remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple
money judgment. It is equally ob-
_______________
1 See "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," Annex "G" of Petition
for Certiorari with Urgent Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
2 See "Manifestation," Annex "2" of Answer.
296
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
vious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the
"remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before one
remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the
case reached this Court for the second time. Meanwhile, 3
justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court
are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions
the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper
remedy" when we said that
"In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the
validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made
by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the
recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff
from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the
subsequent issuance of a, permanent injunction, in the event of a
successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted
litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil
cases 75S2 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought
other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of
the judgment debt." (Italics supplied)
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said
cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay.
 The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the
above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context.
We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed
of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases
7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We
used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted
execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper
remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII)
where civil cases 7532
________________
3 On February 4, 1961, Damaso Perez and Gregorio Subong elevated the
judgment in the basic civil case 39407 to this Court on a petition
for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit.
297
VOL. 24, JULY 29, 1968
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not
have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are
without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial
jurisdiction or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court
4 298
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. However, the recall
5
and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil
cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or
dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez
spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases,
they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez
practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in
the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds
which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case
7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own
motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually
deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based
on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case—until the
latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent
of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid
petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it
was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more
assertive x x x a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
________________
297
4 Acosta, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar
Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961; Alhambra Cigar and
Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. The National Administrator of Regional
Office No. 2, etc., et al., L-20491, August 31, 1965, and the cases cited therein.
5 Cabigao vs, Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippme National Bank vs.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
522.
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit
or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. against the petitioners.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several Reyes,
counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles,
rather limited," implying that the decision of this Court JJ., concur.
ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the Concepcion, C.J., voted for denial of the motion for
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. reconsideration.
The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in Fernando, J., did not take part.
construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant Motion denied; decision modified.
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible Nate.—See also Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs.
for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment Arnado, L22304, July 30, 1968, post, where treble costs were
in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had assessed jointly and severally against the petitioner and its
rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. counsel.
And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
Bolinao, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in ________________
the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the
Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas
claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October,
1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No.
55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by
the Hon. Judge Alikpala," although it appears on record that
the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was
over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin
Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion
discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at
least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration
299
VOL. 24, JULY 29, 1968 299
Reparations Commission vs. Macadaeg
is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modif ied in
the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr.
 VOL.215,OCTOBER30,1992 301
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100643.October 30, 1992. *
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal,
REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, respondents.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional
Responsibility; Disbarment; The legal profession demands that
lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents
dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their
secretaries or clerks before filing them with the court.––It is the
bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the
allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted
portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and
the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even
punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers
thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated
or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries
_______________
*EN BANC.
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound
by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound
by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel or the text of a decision or authority or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.––The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the
willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not
be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent
but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath
as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the
Code of Professional Responsibility directs that “[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Misquoting or intercalating phrases
in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the
lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with
the truth.––Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court
decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer’s solemn duty to
act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer
should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or
quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, We
suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others,
submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing
them to be true copies. In Chavez v. Viola, We suspended
respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended
Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false
statements.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay found
guilty of intercalating a material fact in a judicial decision elevated
to the Court on certiorari.––WHEREFORE, We find ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on
certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent
purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a
favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the
standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M.
303
VOL.215,OCTOBER30,1992 303
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from
the practice of law.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner Adez
Realty, Inc., to “SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a
quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with
1 23773 entitled ‘Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar.”
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay “humbly prostrates himself before the
Honorable Court and throws himself at its mercy,” and
explains that––
“x x x whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of
the decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he
simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of
the said decision or order.
“In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the
corresponding pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular
paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss
to explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he was
preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings
necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him which
could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a very
grievous mistake. Such mistake though he does
_______________
1 See Decision of the Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
23773, prom. 30 April 1991; Rollo, pp. 51-55.
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
not condone and he feels upset at the turn of events.” 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex “A” is an
Affidavit of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his Secretary,
3
stating among others that––
“3.x x x in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari
filed with the Supreme Court, it was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay
who dictated to me the contents of said petition;
“4.x x x in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is
wont to do whenever he prepares a petition, to copy the particular
pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as
stated in the Affidavit), et al., respondents’;
“5.x x x when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the
Court of Appeals as instructed by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did
as instructed, but it was only after our office received the copy of the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 x x x that Atty.
Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that portion
which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the Supreme
Court; that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed;
xxxx
“7.x x x I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact
that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so many cases being handled by the
law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention was
distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time.”
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First
Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En
Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the
possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as
simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel’s explanation
that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This
“passingthe-buck” stance of counsel was already aptly treated
in Adaza v. Barinaga, where the Court observed thus––
4
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 93.
3 Annex “A”, EXPLANATION; Rollo, p. 96.
 4Adm. Case No. 1604, May 29, 1981; 104 SCRA 684, and the
305
VOL.215,OCTOBER30,1992 305
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
“Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat
or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other
papers and for the lawyer’s dereliction of duty is a common alibi of
practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases,
counsel’s shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a
concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence,
indolence and ineptitude.”
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how
could the secretary have divined the phrase “without notice to
the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty,” without
counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a
providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material,
and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant’s cause?
Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude
administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of
a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately
drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade
responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly
dictated and signed the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and
recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly
the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein
are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last
word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession
demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions
and other documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or
transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them
with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel,
with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his
secretary who merely follows his orders. 5 knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
The instant case originated from a petition for
reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A.
26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which
petitioner bases one of his causes of action, provides among
others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons
in possession of the property. cases cited therein.
_______________
See Baring v. Cabahug, No. L-23229, July 20, 1967, 20 SCRA 696.
5
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting
a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase
“without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty,” was just the right phrase intercalated at the right
place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally,
much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary at that.
All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our
belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of
Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of
subject property––when in fact it did not make such a finding–
–is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a
portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain
undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more
importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the
final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save
in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are binding upon this Court. The distortion of facts committed
6
by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a
grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only
because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because
it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath as a member of
the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility directs that “[a] lawyer shall not
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text
of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved” (Italics supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court
decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer’s solemn
duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth.
A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false
statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v.
Gonzales, We suspended respondent for six (6) months for,
7
________________
6Austria v. People, G.R. No. 83530, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 342.
7Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151.
307
VOL.215,OCTOBER30,1992 307
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
among others, submitting to the lower court falsified
documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez v.
Viola, We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months
8 308
after he filed an Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases,
has more serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those who
attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal,
should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling
instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has
demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay
even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he
compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame
on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We
have already said––
“x x x that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness,
especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice x x x x A lawyer, on the other hand, has
the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer x x x x It is essential
that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their
clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all x x x sworn
to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court.” 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M.
DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari,
thereby altering
_______________
Adm. Case No. 2152, April 19, 1991; 196 SCRA 10.
8
9Ibid, citing Casals v. Cusi, No. L-35766, July 12, 1973, 52 SCRA 58;
and Panga v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, September 7, 1979, 93 SCRA 87.
308
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals
its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other,
of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable
judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the
standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is
hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of
law.
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at Mezzanine
Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City,
entered upon his personal records, and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
 Narvasa, (C.J.), On leave.
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay disbarred from the practice of
law effective immediately.
Note.––Explanation given by respondent lawyer to the
effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence of his
Secretary is devoid of merit (Gutierrez vs. Zulueta, 187 SCRA
607).
–––––o0o––––––
309
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
G.R. No. 157659. January 25, 2010.*
ELIGIO P. MALLARI, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Petition for certiorari required to be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution or in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.—
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
33Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated
August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was
in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration
vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the
assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October
8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the
petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper
and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in
Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or,
in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.”
Same; Same; The 60-day limitation is considered
inextendible.—It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is
considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed
to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
Writs of Possession; As defaulting mortgagor, petitioner is not
entitled to any prior notice of the application for the issuance of the
writ of possession.—We sustain the CA, and confirm that the
petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act
3135, as amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior
notice of the application for the issuance of the writ of possession.
Same; Instances When Issued.—A writ of possession, which
commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real
property, may be issued in: (1) land registration proceedings under
Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3)
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending
redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Mortgages; Redemption; The redemption period
envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the
registration of
34the sale not from and after the date of the sale.—We clarify
that the redemption period envisioned under Act 3135 is
reckoned from the date of the registration of the sale, not from and
after the date of the sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although
the original Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated
Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its
Section 25 (Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27
(Section 466) of Rule 39, with Section 27 still expressly reckoning
the redemption period to be “at any time within twelve months after
the sale;” and although the Revised Rules of Court (effective on
January 1, 1964) continued to provide in Section 30 of Rule 39 that
the redemption be made from the purchaser “at any time within
twelve (12) months after the sale,” the 12-month period of
redemption came to be held as beginning “to run not from the date
of the sale but from the time of registration of the sale in the Office
of the Register of Deeds.” This construction was due to the fact that
the sheriff’s sale of registered (and unregistered) lands did not take
effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the sale was
registered in the Register of Deeds.
Same; Same; Same; The consolidation of ownership in the
purchaser’s name and the issuance to him of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) then entitles him to demand possession of
the property at any time and the issuance of a writ of possession to
him becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his
name.—The mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the
foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale
with the Register of Deeds in order to avoid the title from
consolidating in the purchaser. By failing to redeem thuswise, the
mortgagor loses all interest over the foreclosed property. The
purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends beyond the
expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of
the property when no redemption is made, that it is no longer
necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required under Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the possession of
the land becomes his absolute right as the land’s confirmed owner.
The consolidation of ownership in the purchaser’s name and the
issuance to him of a new TCT then entitles him to demand
possession of the property at any time, and the issuance of a writ of
possession to him becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation
of title in his name.35 Same; Court cannot exercise any discretion
to determine whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the
writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a
ministerial function.—The court can neither halt nor hesitate to
issue the writ of possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to
determine whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the
writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a
ministerial function.
Same; Proceedings upon an application for a writ of possession
is ex parte and summary in nature.—The proceeding upon an
application for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice
being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief
is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the
person against whom the relief is sought. Its nature as an ex
parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious
proceeding.
Contempt; Two alternative ways by which a person may be
charged with indirect contempt.—A person may be charged with
indirect contempt only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1)
by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against
which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect
contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the
charge is directly made by the court against which the
contemptuous act is committed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals
the decision promulgated on March 17, 2003, whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his petition for certiorari.36
Antecedents
In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling
P34,000.00 from respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). To secure the performance of his obligations,
he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his
wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However, he paid GSIS about
ten years after contracting the obligations only P10,000.00 on
May 22, 1978 and P20,000.00 on August 11, 1978.1
What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves
of the petitioner to delay the efforts of GSIS to recover on the
debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the foreclosed
property.
After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on
May 2, 1979, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a telegraphic
demand to him to update his account. On November 10, 1981,
he requested a final accounting, but did not do anything more.
Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984, GSIS applied for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his
failure to settle his account. On November 22, 1984, he
requested an updated computation of his outstanding account.
On November 29, 1984, he persuaded the sheriff to hold the
publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await
action on his pending request for final accounting (that is,
taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account).
On December 13, 1984, GSIS responded to his request and
rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30,
1985, it sent another updated statement of account. On July
21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no
further payments.
On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the
Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial Court
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 42-43.
37(RTC), Branch 44, in San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7802,2 ostensibly to enjoin them from
proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for
preliminary injunction). The RTC ultimately decided Civil
Case No. 7802 in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already
issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating TCT No. 61171-R
and TCT No. 54835-R in his and his wife’s names.3
GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which
reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996.4The petitioner elevated
the CA decision to this Court via petition for review
on certiorari (G.R. No. 124468).5
On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for
review.6 On January 15, 1997, this Court turned down
his motion for reconsideration.7
As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became
final and executory, rendering unassailable both the
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on September
22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No.
284273-R in the name of GSIS.
GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a
writ of possession on September 2, 1999.8 Granting the ex
parte motion on October 8, 1999,9 the RTC issued a writ of
execution cum writ of possession on October 21,
1999,10 ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the
properties.
_______________
2 Id., at p. 148.
3 Id., at p. 44.
4 Id., at pp. 169-179.
5 Id., at p. 45.
6 Id., at pp. 45, 180.
7 Id., at p. 45.
8 Id., at pp. 51-54.
 9 Id., at p. 55.
10 Id., at p. 56.
38 The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly
because of the petitioner’s request for an extension of time
within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS
acceded to the request.11
Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties,
but instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash
the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.12 Also, the petitioner
commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial
sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case No.
12053), ostensibly for consignation (coupled with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 12053 on
November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling
him to appeal the dismissal to the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No.
70300).13
In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April
5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et al.14 in contempt
of court for painting the fence of the properties during the
pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the
writ of execution.15 He filed another motion in the same case,
dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS and its local manager
Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the
electric company to cut off the electric services to the
properties during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.16
To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC
from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 7802,
GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 45-46.
12 Id., at pp. 57-62.
13 Id., at p. 46.
14 The other respondents were designated as Tony Dimatulac, Allan Doe,
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, Romy Doe, Roland Doe, and Juan Doe.
15 Rollo, pp. 64-66.
16 Id., at pp. 75-78.
39petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on the motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, motions for
contempt of court, and motion for issuance of break open
order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the
case be re-raffled to another branch of the
RTC.17 Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to
Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then denied the motions for
contempt of court on July 30, 2001, and directed the Branch
Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999.18
The petitioner sought reconsideration,19 but the Presiding
Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for reconsideration on
February 11, 2002.20
Ruling of the CA
By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the
CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002,
July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999.21On
March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit,22 stating:
“We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This Court
is not unaware of the legal tactics and maneuvers employed by the
petitioner in delaying the disposition of the subject case (Civil Case
No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the
final resolution by the Supreme Court affirming the judgment
rendered by the Court of Appeals. We construe the actuation of the
petitioner in resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the Rules
of Court, through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions in
litigating this case, as running counter to the intendment of the
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 107-108.
18 Id., at pp. 120-121.
19 Id., at pp. 122-138.
20 Id., at pp. 139-144.
21 Id., at pp. 47-48.
22 Id., at pp. 42-50.
40Rules to be utilized in promoting the objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The issues raised in the present controversy have already been
settled in our existing jurisprudence on the subject. In the case of De
Jesus vs. Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that “generally, no
notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required
before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has already
become final.”
The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has
established the principle of law, as enunciated in Buaya vs.
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that “once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter
of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a
ministerial duty of the court.”
The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya
case that “the effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party
should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent
suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-
bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong,
resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system
of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the
operation of final and executory judgments.”
As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court is emphatic in saying that “the
finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to
depend on the convenience of a party.”
We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the court
below. Thus, we sustain the assailed Orders of the court a quo since
no abuse of discretion has been found to have been committed by the
latter in their issuance. Moreover, this Court finds this petition to
be part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution
of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has
already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest
tribunal of the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.41 SO ORDERED.23
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioner insists herein that the CA gravely erred in
refusing “to accept the nullity of the following orders” of the
RTC, to wit:
1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER
8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX-PARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION
AND/OR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF
POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS;
2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER
21, 1999 GRANTING THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GSIS;
3. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30,
2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS; and
4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY
11, 2002, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO
THE COURT ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.24
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit.
I
Petition for Certiorari in CA
Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period
The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the
following orders of the RTC, to wit:
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 48-49.
24 Id., at pp. 12-13.
42
1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte
motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);25
2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the
issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in
 favor of GSIS);26
3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch
Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ
of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the
motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);27 and
4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion
for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the
reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001).28
The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion
to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in
contempt; and declared GSIS’s motion for issuance of break
open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS
Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the
order of July 30, 2001 had merely challenged the orders of
October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of
execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course).
Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated
August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002
was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999
and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001,
October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be
subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition
for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper
and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined
in Section 4, Rule
_______________
25 Id., at p. 55.
26 Id., at p. 56.
27 Id., at pp. 120-121.
28 Id., at pp. 139-141.
4365, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,29 which
requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or,
in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said
motion.
”It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is
considered inextendible, because the limitation has been
prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
cases.30
II
Nature of the Writ of Possession
and its Ministerial Issuance
The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of the
motion seeking the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ
of possession; hence, the writ was invalid.
As earlier shown, the CA disagreed with him.
We sustain the CA, and confirm that the petitioner, as
defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as
amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice
of the application for the issuance of the writ of possession.
_______________
29 A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Re: Amendment To Section 4, Rule 65 of The 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure) took effect September 1, 2000. This amendment,
being a curative one, is applied retroactively (Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 142803, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 643; Dela Cruz v. Golar Maritime
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 141277, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 173; Ramatek
Philippines, Inc. v. De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 139526, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA
129; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Go Ko, G.R. No. 148641, March 31, 2005,
454 SCRA 586).
30 People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 147832, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA
197; Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137264, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA
85.
44
A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a
person in possession of real property, may be issued in: (1) land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2)
judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4)
execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.31
Anent the redemption of property sold in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power referred
to in Section 132 of Act No. 3135,33 as amended, the debtor, his
successor-in-interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment
creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under
which the property is sold has the right to redeem the
property at anytime within the term of one year from and after
the date of the sale, such redemption to be governed by the
provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to the extent that said provisions were not
inconsistent with the provisions of Act 3135.34
_______________
31 Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing, Inc., G.R. No. 153951,
July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287, 301; Autocorp. Group and Autographics, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 678, 689.
32 Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or
attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of
the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and
redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in
the power.
33 An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted In
or Annexed To Real Estate Mortgages (Approved on March 6, 1924).
34 Section 6, Act No. 3135, as amended, provides:
45In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period
envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the
registration of the sale, not from and after the date of the sale,
as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the original Rules of
Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated Section 464 to
Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its Section 25
(Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27 (Section
466) of Rule 39, with Section 27 still expressly reckoning the
redemption period to be “at any time within twelve
months after the sale”: and although the Revised Rules
of Court (effective on January 1, 1964) continued to provide in
Section 30 of Rule 39 that the redemption be made from the
purchaser “at any time within twelve (12) months after the
sale,”35 the 12-month period of redemption came to be held as
_______________
Sec. 6. Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-
in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within
the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption
shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to
four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far
as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
35 Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive
redemptions. Notice to be given and filed.—The judgment debtor, or
redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time
within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the
amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in
addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate; and if the
purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner,
other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of
such other lien, with interest. Property so redeemed may again be redeemed
within sixty (60) days after the
46beginning “to run not from the date of the sale but from the
time of registration of the sale in the Office of the Register of
Deeds.”36 This construction was due to the fact that the
sheriff’s sale of registered (and unregistered) lands did not
take effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the
sale was registered in the Register of Deeds.37
_______________
last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with
two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or
taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by
him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of
any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The
property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed
from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last
redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with
two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or
taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon,
with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the
sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any
assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any
lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must
in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if
such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens.
36 Garcia v. Ocampo, 105 Phil. 1102, 1108 (1959).
37 Section 50, Act No. 496, states:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease,
charge, or otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered.
He may use forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments
like those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no
deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will,
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk
47Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict
between the texts of the Rules of Court (1940 and 1964) and
Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying
the reckoning of the redemption period in judicial sales of real
property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated in
Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective
on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial construction of
reckoning the redemption period from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, to wit:
“Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on,
successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed.—The judgment
_______________
or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey and effect the land, and in all cases under this
Act the registration shall be made in the office of register of deeds for the
province or provinces or city where the land lies.
Section 51, Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.
—An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise
deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in
law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this
Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land lies.
See also State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99308,
November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 734; Agbulos v. Albert, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 790; Tuason v. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635 (1914); Sikatuna v. Guevara,
43 Phil. 371 (1922); Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646 (1916).
48obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser
the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest
thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the
amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named
amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor
having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the
judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such
other lien, with interest.
Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60)
days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the
last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the
amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner
may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on
such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens
held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The
property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so
disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty
(60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the
last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition,
and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last
previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with
interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who
made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the
place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner
or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the
redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given
to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds; if such notice be
not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a)” (Emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
must redeem the foreclosed property within one year from the
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to
avoid the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing
to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor loses all interest over the
49foreclosed property.38 The purchaser, who has a right to
possession that extends beyond the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made,39 that it is no longer
necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the
possession of the land becomes his absolute right as the
land’s confirmed owner.40 The consolidation of ownership in
the purchaser’s name and the issuance to him of a new TCT
then entitles him to demand possession of the property at any
time, and the issuance of a writ of possession to him becomes
a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name.
The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue the writ of
possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to determine
whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the writ to
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a
ministerial function.41 Verily, a marked distinction exists
between a discretionary act and a ministerial one. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
_______________
38 Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141365, November 27, 2002, 393
SCRA 143.
39 Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759, 771.
40 Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941, August 15, 2003,
409 SCRA 250, 253.
41 De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 203,
213-314.
50requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the
exercise of judgment.42
The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession
is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of
one party only and without notice being sent by the court to
any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even
without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person
against whom the relief is sought.43 Its nature as an ex
parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-
litigious proceeding.44
It is clear from the foregoing that a non-
redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no more right to
challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of
possession upon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could not
also impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could
not undo the consolidation in GSIS of the ownership of the
properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-
R, which consolidation was already irreversible. Hence, his
moves against the writ of execution cum writ of
possession were tainted by bad faith, for he was only too
aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his
non-redemption within the period provided by law for that
purpose.
III
Dismissal of Petitioner’s Motion for Indirect
Contempt Was Proper and In Accord with the Rules of
Court
The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in
dismissing his charges for indirect contempt against GSIS, et
al.;
_______________
42 Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA
273, 277.
43 Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc., G.R. No. 147820,
March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 756, 763-764.
44 Penson v. Maranan, G.R. No. 148630, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 396,
407.
51and that the CA should have consequently granted his
petition for certiorari.
The petitioner’s insistence is plainly unwarranted.
First of all, Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides as follows:
“Section 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions
in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the
petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition
shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision. (n)” (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt
only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified
petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court
against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of
indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified
petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court
against which the contemptuous act is committed.52
Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the
filing of a verified petition for contempt is mandatory:45
“1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the
proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such
proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the
former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts,
has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any
docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section. Worse, and as a
consequence of unregulated motions for contempt, said incidents
sometimes remain pending for resolution although the main case
has already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects but,
at any rate, the same may now be eliminated by this amendatory
procedure.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
petition with full compliance with the requirements
therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the
second paragraph of this section.” (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the petitioner’s charging GSIS, et al. with indirect
contempt by mere motions was not permitted by the Rules of
Court.
And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt
could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have
tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived from
the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under Rule
71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil action. Yet,
the petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in
the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action.
_______________
45 Remedial Law Compendium, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 808; see
also Land Bank of the Philipines v. Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611, August 5,
2003, 408 SCRA 328.
53Truly, the omission to tender filing fees would have also
warranted the dismissal of the charges.
It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the
petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without
regard to the requisites of the Rules of Court simply to vex the
adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly
administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse
of procedures.
IV
Petitioner Was Guilty of
Misconduct As A Lawyer
The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition
for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA was “part of
the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a
final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has
already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest
tribunal of the land.”46
The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence.
Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed
worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no other purpose
except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession,
despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a non-
redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the
extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ
of execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement
of the duly-issued writ of possession could not be delayed. He
thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in
order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick
administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser
GSIS.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a
_______________
46 Rollo, p. 49.
54lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to]
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.” By his dilatory
moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyer’s Oath,
particularly:47
“xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients
xxx”
We stress that the petitioner’s being the party litigant
himself did not give him the license to resort to dilatory moves.
His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and
to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property
already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the
bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the
Court burdened to conduct himself “with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [his] clients.”48 His true obligation as a
lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his
rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above all,
bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution
of a judgment, and not to misuse Court
processes. Consequently, he must be made to account for
49
his misconduct as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review
on certiorari for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on March 17, 2003, with the
costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
_______________ Canon 11

47 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 3. FIRSTDIVISION

48 Lawyer’s Oath.
49 Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility, states:
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse Court processes.
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
[G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L-
27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO v. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT; MINUTE

RESOLUTIONS NOT DECISIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION. — Short resolutions or, in current Court practice,
minute "resolutions," are not decisions within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petitions
for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. A petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion. And so, there is no need to fully explain the Court’s
denial.

2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE ON SERVICE OF

PLEADINGS, MANDATORY. — As a law practitioner who was
admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew —
or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration
to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place
of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Since there is lack of
notice in this regard, the Court cannot act upon said motion —
for it is nothing but a useless piece of paper. If Atty. Almacen
failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court’s
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right.

3. ID.; ID.; COURTS AND JUDGES NOT SACROSANCT; DUTY OF

LAWYER THERETO. — Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They
should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Criticism
of the courts is an important part of the traditional work of the
lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of
lower courts. Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right.
4. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND STANDARDS OF CRITICISM TOWARDS
THE COURT. — The cardinal condition of all such criticism directed
against the Courts or its judges that it shall be bona fide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.
5. ID.; ID.; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF
THE BAR. — Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that
of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." The
Rules of Court constantly remind him to observe and maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first
canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." A lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if
couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute
the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.
6. ID.; ID.; PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, WHAT CONSTITUTES.
— Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible
bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend
to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in
their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited
with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions
by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
7. ID.; ID.; PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF CONTEMPT COVERS
PENDING AS WELL AS DECIDED CASES. — To view the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, is erroneous. The rule that bars contempt
after a judicial proceedings has terminated has lost much of its
vitality. As expressed by Chief Justice Moran, there may still be
contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated.
8. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE COURT, NOT ONLY TO ADMIT BUT ALSO
TO DISCIPLINE AND EXCLUDE. — By constitutional mandate, the
Court has the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the
rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar.
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has
risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has
been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.
9. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST A
MEMBER OF THE BAR. — Accent should be laid on the fact that
disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does
not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.
10. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST A
MEMBER OF THE BAR, DISCRETIONARY UPON COURT. — The
discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity
of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen’s "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title," filed on September 26, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity." His client’s he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s "unjust judgment," has
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He
then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people’s forum,"
so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed
by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the
Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as
follows: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did
it to expose the tribunal’s `unconstitutional and obnoxious’
practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
"Because of the tribunal’s `short-cut justice,’ Almacen deplored,
his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why
he lost the case.
x x x
"There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, `where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity’.
x x x
"He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court `will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions.’" (Italics supplied)
Atty. Almacen’s statement that
". . . our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity,"
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the
Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the
high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear
itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay v. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due
hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966
Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later,
or on July 6, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served
on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify
the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied
both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed
on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This second motion
for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court’s decision
in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Batu Construction & Co.,
L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following
words: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
"Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966
(pp. 90-118, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice
of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless
piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1966), which did
not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he
filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines v. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
"Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant-appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution
of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
"Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
v. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic v.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant’s motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
"There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
"In the case of Republic v. Venturanza, the resolution denying
the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to
those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it `without prejudice to appellee’s
restoring the point in the brief.’ In the main decision in said case
(Rep. v. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue
sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic v. Venturanza
is no authority on the matter in issue." cralaw
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We
refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. 1967
to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make
good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded
to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously
offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition.
To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition
in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero v. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this Court’s September
28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose
to pursue the negative act."
cralaw virt u a1 aw
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of
the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on
November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution,
he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice
virt u a1 a w lib rary hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument
shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To
this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor.
He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event
this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the
ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers no apology. Far from being contrite, Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this
time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
Thus:jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
"At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter
7, St. Matthew: —
" `Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure
you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother’s eye, and yet dost not consider the
beam in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say to thy brother, "Let
me cast out the speck from thy eye" ; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam
from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the
speck from thy brother’s eyes.
" `Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you
lib rary also to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.’
x x x respondent
"Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth
of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer’s oath that `he will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court, that they tend to bring the entire court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming
of a member of the noble profession of law
x x x
"Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but only motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our
pleadings will bear us on this matter, . . .
x x x But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
"To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our
pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards
our particular case.
x x x further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared
"Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution,
you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
for acts he said in good faith.
"Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications
for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given
the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — `the
story is current, though nebulous as to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me
frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines.’
x x x
"We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not
the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. . . . We were provoked. We were compelled by force
of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties.
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with `circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom’, your Respondent rise to
claim his God-given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
x x x
"The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
by our President. . . .
x x x
"What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland’s famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, `O Liberty, what crimes
are committed in thy name’, we may dare say, `O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name’ or more appropriately,
`O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name.’
x x x this Court’s practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
"We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
x x x frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest
"The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only
two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the
sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED,. not one word was spoken or given . . . We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only describe the impersonal state of things and nothing more.
x x x 566: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h
"As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer’s certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide
as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose
between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution, and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter." cralaw virt u a1 aw
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he
claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us
examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for
review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed against
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and
law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this
suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to
tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to withstand critical
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving
due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or Write a full
opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry
out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution.
The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio show, 94 L. ed 562,
"A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as
to the same petition different reasons may read different justices
to the same result . . .
"Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court’s business, in effect,
lib rary
within the Court’s discretion. During the last three terms the
Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases. respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If
the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to take there cases. The time that
would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time make’s review undesirable."
Six years ago, in Novino, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., L-
21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on
this matter. There, the petitioner’s counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
"In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question
has been raised before; and we held that these `resolutions’ are
not `decisions’ within the above constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained
in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
"By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after
the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered `dismissed’." cralaw
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of
appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested
upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec.
4 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which recites:
"Review of Court of Appeals’ decision discretionary. — A review
is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will
be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary "(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court,
nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
jg c:ch an rob les.co m.p h sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rar y
Recalling Atty. Almacen’s petition for review, we found, upon a
thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings and records, that the
Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal
of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of
this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines
etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as
1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for
a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
virt u a1 aw lib rary upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse
party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety &
Fidelity v. Batu Construction & Co., supra: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h
"The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions
in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three
jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an
Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 attack on one’s integrity, competence and honesty, with
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that case as this where those who sit as members of an entire Court
party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may file his reply or opposition." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rar y Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who
vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
lower court’s judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court,
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect
the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive
rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the
most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval courts and judges. The reason is that
of, not only the courts’ rulings but also the manner in which they
are handed down. "An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts." (In
authority, 4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, 6 because then the court’s actuations are thrown open Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the
to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official traditional work of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he
actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public points out the errors of lower courts. In articles written for law
property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see
Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their the flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126
official actions before the chancery of public opinion." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex
Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: jg c:ch an rob les.co m.p h
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in
the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. . . . To
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be entertained. . . . the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657,
665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts
and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty, to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned,
"the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court,
72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations
and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture
into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" 14 and
the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers."
15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts
is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers — even those gifted with
superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is
the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
 city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that
"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
at what he feels is others’ lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some the leaflet went. much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden a right to do.
into a belief that he may attack a court’s decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are "The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the
the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
Philippines v. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967) disrepute with the general public." cralaw v irt u a1 aw l ib rary

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his 3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who
at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the that the judge "used his judicial office to enable said bank to keep
attorney to disciplinary action. that money." Said the court: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of
relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct
nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604,
608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which
brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice
demands condemnation and the application of appropriate
"We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no
limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the
capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence
and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart.
116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex
parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h

penalties," adding that: jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h

"‘It may be (although we do not 80 decide) that a libelous

"It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer,
judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment
which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which of its author.’
are not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the
judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of "Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
the administration of justice is the direct product of false and graver character than those made by the respondent here. But,
scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who
are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed the public confidence in the due administration of justice be
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of maintained. In re Collins 81 Pac. 220." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734,
an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
"Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to
such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants."
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to
allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney’s
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
". . . Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is
the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration
of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence
and reject of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who
are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the
law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their
integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was
plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday
papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public."
cralaw virt u a1 aw
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts
of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying
that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not
appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period
of two years. The Court said:
jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rar y
jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
lib rary
jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
"A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court against whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people’s right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. . . .
"Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of
that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts
and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have
reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends
the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible
for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a
vigilant defender of civil rights." In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended
for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the
statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an
impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:jg c:ch an rob les. com .p h
"We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit
in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial
officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or in proper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is
vested the power to remove judicial offices for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will
be encouraged, and the person making them protected. . . . While
we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the public generally, to criticize the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the
habit of criticising the motives of judicial offices in the
performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticized, tends to
subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice
and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are
made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct."
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement: jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
"I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less
vituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here."
The Supreme Court of Alabama
". . . the expressions above set out, not only transcend the
bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon
the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean
himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client."
virt u a1 aw
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an
attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case,
charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
"The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one
most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. . . .
"The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination as of prime importance under our system and
ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech
cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary
that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice
is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve
their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health
of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water
supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward
cralaw virt u a1 aw l ib rary the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly
declared that: jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs
of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends
his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution — not the court."
cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
9. In Bar Ass’n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the
filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in
cralaw respect to the several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt, and
wicked conspiracies," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
lib rary
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the
name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring
attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case
jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h
of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and
the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the
decisions of certain appeal in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper.
One of the letters contained this paragraph: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h
"You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better
right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a
widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got not undue
advantage. . . . The point is this: Is a proper motive for the
decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students,
or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read
it."
crala w virt u a1 aw lib rary
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of
the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h
"The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because
of acts done by him due his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite
of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to
their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the
accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard
to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. `The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter
to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication.’ 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
"The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold,
from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his
rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded
and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no
right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to court and
judicial officers. `This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official
acts.’ Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon
a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like
cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home of elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think,
entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized
in Ex parte McLeod, supra. while the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticize
rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one
might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause
wholly concluded. `Is it in the power of any person,’ said the
court, `by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own
self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to
the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult be taking the law in his own hands? . . . No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions.’
"That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. `An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote
a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct
and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court.’ Matter of
Manheim, 133 App. div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 the same is held
in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y.
In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New
York, in which it was stated, in a reference to his decision: `It is
not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been
robbed of 80.’ And it was decided that, while such misconduct
was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be `called
to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney.’ `If,’ says the court, `counsel learned in
the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long
before the general public may feel that they may redress their
fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will
be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice
will fall into bad repute.’
"The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was
in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused,
an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while
not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having `willfully failed to maintain respect
due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached
his oath as an attorney.’ As recognizing the same principle, and
in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wail (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214;
Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. 66, 374, 49
Am. Rep. 361; Smith’s Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten’s
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
"Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning
to others. . . ." crala w v irt u a1 aw lib rar y
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a
lawyer’s suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyze him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an
attorney’s unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his
decisions in general, claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 669, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and
bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which
reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied
with the loss of a case, prepared Over a period of years vicious
attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that
his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit
as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even
though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive
affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-
litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of
the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them
into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or
other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian’ of the morals and ethics of the legal
fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the
face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the
power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such
condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may
afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded
the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,"
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the
statements made disclosed
". . . an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco’s
client . . ." cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author
of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to
divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to
be published in a local newspaper a statement expressing his
regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, . .
. the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as
"a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization
of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared: jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
"But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven,
so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded. In order to influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading
the administration of justice . . .
"To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,’
that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation."cralaw virt u a1 aw
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
". . . an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to
the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)"
3. In Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Et Al., supra, where counsel charged this
Court With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsel’s misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:
lib rary
jg c:ch an rob les.c om.p h
"As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed
in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which
this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge
that the decisions of this Court, blind adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making `any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept
that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point
of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to
hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries.
Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of
this court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled
to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of
and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability
of the members — and some former members — of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as `so-called’ the `rule against
splitting of jurisdiction.’"
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other
cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be
reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases
— all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis
that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is
of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has
terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was
the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People v. Alarcon,
20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the
holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,
which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In
re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief
Justice Moran. in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there
may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: jg c:ch an rob les.com.p h
"A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which
tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in
any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as
what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed."cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client’s
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the
pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could
be held liable for contempt for such post-litigation utterances and
actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen’s
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness
as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest
of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a
case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession,
by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 ours is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority
to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have
proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus —
"The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court,
is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To
deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys
to practice — and in this state that power is vested in this court
— has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, to exclude them from practice." 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is
a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that —

". . . whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney
is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and
of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission
and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,
not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion."
24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has
risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has
been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.25 cralaw:red
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we
now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer’s certificate is, of course,
purely potestative on Atty. Almacen’s part. Unorthodox though it
may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making
the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for
his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his
petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered
by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of
his client "in the people’s forum," he caused the publication in the
papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward
the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no
regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the
Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of ad
ministering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions
upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen’s petition,
answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy
public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any
pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit
less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation
of the lawyer’s oath and gross transgression of the Canons of
Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear,
and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity
from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more
than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused
by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of
our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance.
This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only
of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like
the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30
So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the
case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge
the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is
but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much
as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested
upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone
does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that they, acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary
action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the
sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may
range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32
The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity
of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope
that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension
will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how
long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are
impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we
are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have
authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law,
there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in VOL. 177, AUGUST 30, 1989 87
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine
G.R. No. 71169. August 30, 1989. *

for himself how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG,
at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON,
to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR
law. VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-
petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
G.R. No. 74376. August 30, 1989. *
of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their GONZALVEZ, respondents.
information and guidance. G.R. No. 76394. August 30, 1989. *

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO
Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
and BUENA ROMUALDEZ, respondents.
Fernando, J., did not take part. G.R. No. 78182. August 30, 1989. *

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY
and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281. August 30, 1989. *

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL,
and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Contempt; Motions and Pleadings; Atty. Sangco’s remark in his
motion for reconsideration found to be disparaging, intemperate and
uncalled-for.—The Court finds Atty. Sangco’s remarks in his motion
for reconsideration, disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His
suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and
corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but
comes, as

____________

*EN BANC.
88
 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
well, as an open assault upon the Court’s honor and integrity.
In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it,
and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less,
the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge
of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one
party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery
by the other party. He should be aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of
the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of
justice in general.
Same; Same; Same; Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion but
not to a license to insult the court with derogatory statements and
recourses to argumenta ad hominem.—To be sure, Atty. Sangco is
entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In
that event, it is the Court’s duty “to act to preserve the honor and
dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.”
Same; Same; Same; Court is not unreceptive to comment and
critique of its decisions but provided they are fair and dignified.—
Atty. Sangco himself admits that “[a]s a judge I have learned to live
with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions.” Apparently,
he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not
unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided
they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits
of fair comment for which he deserves this Court’s rebuke.
Same; Same; Same; Malpractice; His acts also constitute
malpractice as the term is defined by Canon II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.—In our “show-cause” Resolution, we
sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within
the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined
by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RESOLUTION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt
against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners
Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
89
VOL. 177, AUGUST 30, 1989 89
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring,
among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt “for using intemperate and
accusatory language.” On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
1
explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco’s remarks in his motion for
reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
...
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more
like a Brief for Ayala . . . 2
...
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity
and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft
and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary ... 3
...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted
facts not put in issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case;
the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and
the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom,
are unparalleled in the history of this Court ...4
...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally
constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel-Air
Village, or rule that respondent Court’s admission of said fact is
“inaccurate,” as Ayala’s Counsel himself would like to do but did not
even contend, is a manifestation of this Court’s unusual partiality
to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. 5
...
... [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection
on the Court’s competence and integrity and exemplifies its
manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a blatant disregard of
documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual
findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true
significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this
Court did not bother to read and consequently did not consider and
discuss, least of all in the
______________________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 71169, 410.
2 Id.,387.
3 Id.
4 Id.,388.
5 Id.
90
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions
favorable to Ayala. 6 8 Id., 408.
...
To totally disregard Ayala’s written letter of application for
special membership in BAVA which clearly state that such
membership is necessary because it is a new development in their
relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial lot
buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any
reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ...7
... ...[A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above
suspicion? Will the current campaign of this Court against graft and
corruption in the judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary
power of courts? 8 wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions
that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption
in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes,
as well, as an open assault upon the Court’s honor and
integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the
records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside
influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty.
Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know
better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success
will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He
should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done
an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal
and to the stability of the administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that
we are not bound by the findings of the trial court (in which
his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with the findings
of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted
arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to
review the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not
to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and
recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the
_________________
6 Id., 394.
7 Id., 407.
91
VOL. 177,AUGUST 30, 1989 91
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Court’s duty “to act to preserve the honor and dignity . . . and
to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.” 9
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was
merely defending the interests of his clients. As we held in
Laureta, a lawyer’s “first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.” And while a
10
lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnest and
with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to
resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.
That “[t]he questions propounded were not meant or
intended to accuse but to . . . challenge the thinking in the
Decision,” comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is
11
in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is
the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for
reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should
not “‘think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words’”. As we indicated (see Decision
12
denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169,
74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727,
dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new
arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil
that fact with inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that “[a]s a judge I have
learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my
decisions.” Apparently, he does not practice what he
13
preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment
and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and
dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair
comment for which he deserves this Court’s rebuke.
In our “show-cause” Resolution, we sought to hold Atty.
Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting
language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his
________________
9 In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382, 400.
10 Supra,422.
11 Rollo,id., 416.
12 In Re: Laureta, supra, 402.
13 Rollo,id., 417.
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
actalso constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule11.01 . . .
Rule11.02 . . .
Rule11.03—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule11.04—A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule11.05 . . .
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for
professional misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE: Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from
receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P500.00
payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be
entered in his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Melencio-
Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Co
rtés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., No part on account of close association.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., No part. I have been in close
association with Judge Sangco in the past.
Atty. J. Cezar Sangco suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
Notes.—The use by an attorney of intemperate and
disrespectful language to the Judge while the court is in
session constitutes direct contempt of court which can be
summarily punished. Five days’ imprisonment is sufficient.
(Sulit vs. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 207.)
The power to punish for contempt should be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. (Sulit vs.
Tiangco, 115 SCRA 207.)
——o0o——
93
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Canon 12
VOL. 60, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-34369. September 30,1974.
ANTONIO VILLASIS, MATERNIDAD V. VILLASIS and
SANTIAGO ORENDAIN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
_______________
they must have ascertained from his as well as new counsel the
status of their appeal—which accounts for Atty. Valente's repeated
119 prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of
sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a
year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to
*
their appeal and did f ile the brief.
PETITION by certiorari of a resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

*FIRST DIVISION.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
COURT OF APPEALS, ELEUTERIO VILLASIS and LAURA
S. VILLASIS, respondents.
Appeal; Replacement counsel is deemed to have notice of the
order to file brief received by the previous counsel—New counsel
Tayco's claim in his motion for reconsideration that he had not
received the notice to file brief borders on the frivolous. Such notice
to file brief had been received by his predecessor-counsel Atty.
Valente and is binding on him as the successor. A new counsel who
accepts a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint
himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have
transpired in the record prior to his takeover. It is noteworthy that
Atty. Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to file
brief had been duly served on Atty. Valente and that the period
would expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty. Valente had asked
in his two withdrawal motions that he (Tayco) as new counsel be
granted "suff icient time" to file the brief.
Same; Case at Bar; Failure to file brief not justified.—The
appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the
appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable
reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only
themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and gross
indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year
since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even claim
ignorance of the appellate court's notice to file brief since it had
required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written
conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Augusto A. Kimpo for petitioners.
Silvestre Untaran, Jr. for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court in dismissing the petition and affirming the
appellate court's dismissal of petitioners-appellants' appeal for
failure to file appellants' brief finds that petitioners have
121
VOL. 60, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974 121
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable
failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for
their counsel's utter inaction and gross indifference and
neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of
due notice to f ile the same.
The case originated in the Antique court of first instance
where after due trial judgment was rendered in favor of
respondents-plaintiffs upholding their action for quieting of
title with recovery of possession and damages.
Petitioners-defendants appealed the adverse judgment to
the Court of Appeals. On June 25, 1970, petitioners as
appellants received notice through their counsel Benjamin M.
Valente to submit the appellants' brief within the
reglementary forty-five day period to expire on August 9,1970.
On August 10,1970 (the last day of the reglementary period,
August 9 being a Sunday), petitioners' counsel, Atty. Valente,
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel due to his having been
employed as technical assistant in the Supreme Court, with a
prayer that appellants' newly engaged counsel be given
sufficient time to file their brief. Said new counsel, Atty.
Esdras F. Tayco, filed on August 18, 1970 his appearance with
the appellate court.
On August 27,1970, the appellate court received
respondentsappellees' motion to dismiss the appeal dated
August 5, 1970 for appellants' failure to file their brief within
the reglementary period.
On September 12, 1970, the appellate court required both
counsels of appellants, Atty. Valente (whose withdrawal it
held in abeyance until he filed a proper motion in verified form
with the signed conformity of the clients as per its resolution
of August 18,1970) and Atty. Tayco to comment on the
dismissal motion.
Withdrawing counsel Valente filed his manifestation dated
September 28, 1970 alleging inter alia that he had not
received a copy of the dismissal motion and could not therefore
comment thereon and submitting therewith the signed
conformity of his clients to his withdrawal and reiterating his
prayer for the court to grant his withdrawal and to grant
appellants sufficient time to file their brief. New counsel Tayco
f iled no comment whatsoever.
The appellate court granted withdrawing counsel's motion
to withdraw per its resolution of October 9, 1970 but
meanwhile
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
issued no resolution on the appellees' motion to dismiss the
appeal.
On June 25, 1971 or after the lapse of more than eleven (11
months (or to be more exact, 319 days) without appellants
having filed their brief at all, the appellate court's special sixth
division issued its resolution granting the dismissal motion
1
and dismissing the appeal on the ground stated by appellees
in their motion that appellants had failed to file their brief
within the reglementary 45-day period.
It was only then that new counsel Tayco apparently stirred
from almost a year of inaction and filed a motion dated July
13, 1971 for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal on
the ground that he as new counsel had not received the notice
to file brief. The appellate court per its resolution of August
17, 1971 denied the motion for reconsideration, pointing out
that "Attorney Tayco's appearance was entered [on August
18,1970] after the period for filing brief had already expired
[on August 10,1970]." 2
New counsel Tayco filed a second motion for
reconsideration on September 10, 1971 still without having
filed appellants' brief, which the appellate court denied per its
3
resolution of October 6,1971.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari wherein petitioners
are represented by their third counsel, Atty. Augusto A.
Kimpo, vice Atty. Tayco.
The appeal is patently without merit.
New counsel Tayco's claim in his motion for reconsideration
that he had not received the notice to f ile brief borders on the
frivolous. Such notice to file brief had been received by his
predecessor-counsel Atty. Valente and is binding on him as the
successor. A new counsel who accepts a case in midstream is
presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the
antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in
the record prior to his takeover. It is noteworthy that Atty.
Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to file
brief had been duly served on Atty. Valente and that the period
would expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty. Valente had
_______________
1 Soriano, J. acting chairman and Reyes, A. and Reyes, L.B., members.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 With regular chairman Alvendia, J., presiding vice Soriano, J.
123
VOL. 60, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974 123
 Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
asked in his two withdrawal motions that he (Tayco) as new
counsel be granted "suff icient time" to f ile the brief.
Here the notice to file the brief had been received on June
25, 1970 to expire on August 10, 1970. The appellate court did
not dismiss the appeal at appellees' instance for failure of
appellants to file brief until one year later as per its resolution
of June 25, 1971 or until almost eleven months after the
expiration of the reglementary period on August 10,1970.
The appellate court gave appellants all the time and
opportunity to duly prosecute their appeal by filing their brief
in the interval to no avail. It asked both counsels per its
resolution of September 12, 1970 (which in effect granted
appellants the sufficient time asked by Atty. Valente in his
withdrawal motion to file their brief) to comment on the
dismissal motion but withdrawing counsel Valente claimed he
could not file any comment as he had not received the motion
while new counsel Tayco ignored the court's resolution and
filed no comment and filed no brief.
Even going by new counsel Tayco's mistaken notion that he
was entitled to a new notice to file brief, the appellate court's
resolution of September 12,1970 requiring his comment on the
motion to dismiss appeal for failure to file appellants' brief
was tantamount to such notice and he should then have
prepared and filed the brief within forty-five days thereafter.
But as already pointed out, he never filed the appellants' brief
during the interval of almost 11 months that the appellate
court took before it finally dismissed the appeal per its
resolution of June 25, 1971. During all this period and even
during the three months that followed when he filed two
motions for reconsideration, he presented no earnest of
prosecuting the appeal by at least filing the brief even at that
late date but contented himself with a perfunctory prayer in
his second motion that "appellants be allowed to file their
brief."
The appellate court committed no error therefore in
dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no
valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file
their brief and have only themselves to blame for their
counsel's utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in
not having f iled their brief for a year since receipt of due notice
to file the same. They could not even claim ignorance of the
appellate court's notice to file brief since it had required
withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals
conformity 'before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and
certainly they must have ascertained from him as well as new
counsel the status of their appeal—which accounts for Atty.
Valente's repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal
for the granting of sufficient time for new counsel to file the
brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that
their new counsel did attend to their appeal and did file the
brief.
The case of Alonso vs. Rosario cited by petitioners is clearly
4
inapplicable. There, appellants had filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss their appeal (filed by appellee just five days
after the notice to file brief was served) asking that they be
allowed to file the brief after notice of denial of the motion, and
when the appellate court denied both the dismissal and the
extension, they moved for reconsideration and for at least 15
days to file their brief, but the court therein both denied
reconsideration and dismissed the appeal as well for failure to
file brief within the reglementary period. Within five (5) days
of such dismissal, appellants nevertheless filed their brief,
This Court in reinstating the appeal held that "the period
consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss should
be excluded from the period given to petitioners to submit
their brief, and if this is done, the brief submitted by them on
April 17,1957 may be deemed presented in due time."
It is manifest that there are two basic differences in this
case: here, the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed precisely
on the ground of failure to file the brief after the expiration of
the 45-day reglementary period and no question of suspension there having been no formal application or consent to
of the period arises, whereas there, the appellee questioned substitution, or notice of any such application to the prior
appellants' right to appeal when only 5 days of their 45-day attorney of record. Olivares v. Leola, L-6156, June 30, 1955, 51
period had elapsed such that the rule that a motion to dismiss
5 Off Gaz 3450.
"interrupts the time to plea" was applied by this Court by The mere fact that the attorney originally appearing for
analogy; and here, petitioners-appellants never filed their certain parties to litigation announced in open court that he
brief while there appellants immediately filed their brief would probably be unable to reappear if the hearing was
within 5 days of notice of dismissal of their appeal. postponed, and requested the provincial fiscal to represent the
It may parenthetically be noted that aside from petitioners' officials in question at a subsequent hearing, which the fiscal's
bare assertion of merit in their appeal, the Court has not been office did, but without making a provisional appearance, was
shown that to reinstate the appeal would serve any purpose insufficient to constitute a substitution of
attorneys. Rodriguez vs. Fernandez, L-10823, May 28,1957,
_______________
Off Gaz 1802.
4105 Phil. 654,657 (1959).
5Rule 8, section 4, now Rule 16, section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
125
VOL. 60, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974 125 See SCRA Quick Index-Digest. volume one, page 93 on Appeal;
Villasis vs. Court of Appeals and page 117 on Attorneys.
and not just be a futile waste of time, since petitioners have
———o0o———
never submitted their brief nor their proposed assignment of
errors against the trial court's verdict. To cap it all, petitioners 126
in praying for a reversal of the appellate court's dismissal of © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
their appeal, pray that they be given an extension of f ifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision within which to file the
appellants' brief (at last!) Such laches and lassitude on their
part serve but to confirm the correctness of the appellate
court's dismissal of their appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is dismissed with costs
against petitioners.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma,
JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Change or Substitution of Attorneys. No
substitution of attorneys was effectuated by the mere filing,
after hearing commenced, of a notice of appearance by a
different attorney purporting to represent the defendants,
Canon 13 Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED by Munici-
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
_______________
A.C. No. 1769. June 8, 1992.*
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRINEO L. * SECOND DIVISION.
BUNYI, respondent. 529
Attorneys; An attorney is suspended for one (1) year for VOL. 209, JUNE 8, 1992 529
attempting to draft decision for a judge.—The subject letters indeed Lantoria vs. Bunyi
indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge pal Judge Vicente Galicia, in which respondent Bunyi was the
1

Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing
in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation, for a favor or consideration, the acts
of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Same; Same.—Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of
unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M.
Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of a farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant
Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. It appears that the
2

pending civil case, WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one squatters from the aforementioned farm. These cases were
3

(1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable
directed to inform the different courts of this suspension. Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge
of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). The 4

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court.

defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course,
Conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
declared in default.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of
the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a
PER CURIAM: letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads
as follows:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, "Butuan City
seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. 23 April 1974
Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that
respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member
Santa Cruz, Manila
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the
judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling Dear Atty. Bunye:
of Civil Case Nos. 81,83 and 88 then pending before the
xxx xxx xxx
 Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my
corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the
has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I
the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him. am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to
xxx xxx xxx change or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and
development. please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
_______________ Please excuse this delay. and thanks for your kind assistance in
attending to our cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer
1 Rollo, p. 28,
for your more vigor and success.
2 Rollo, p. 97.
3 lbid. Brotherly yours,
4 Ibid. (SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI" 6

530 Counsel
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia 5Rollo, p. 5.
Mascarinas and all. 6Id., p. 6.
Very truly yours, 531
(SGD.) CESAR L. LANTORIA VOL. 209, JUNE 8, 1992 531
Major lnf PC (ret) Lantoria vs, Bunyi
Executive Director" 5
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of
regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise: which read as follows:
"June 1, 1974 "928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz
Manila
Dear Major Lantoria,
March 4, 1974
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in
Dear Major Lantoria,
your several letters received, which is about the preparation of the
three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential.
have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the
commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have
Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it.
loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can
also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about
remaining cases over there, them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our
against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at
his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end.
Or. at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking you for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) ATTY. I.L. BUNYI" 7 macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis.
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed
with this Court the present administrative case against
respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted
three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974.
Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3)
cases because he (respondent) was the one who unethically
prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the
preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted
disciplinary action against him,
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion
to dismiss the administrative complaint, admitted the exis-
8 for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed
______________
7 Ibid., p. 7.
8 Rollo, p. 36,
532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
tence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents
thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is
selfexplanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was
written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the
Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered
such preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time
holding two (2) salas—one as being the regular Municipal Judge of
Bayugan, and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of
Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit
of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved
would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or
prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the
Respondent, Instead, it came from the understanding between the
Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from
the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the
Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong
He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting
of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the
defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in
default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place
and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June
1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in
the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned—subject to
suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge
Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the same letter, Responding (sic) even apologized
his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved
(Last paragraph, Ibid.)"
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred
the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General
9
submitted his report to the Court, with the following aver-
______________
9Ibid., p. 47.
533
VOL. 209, JUNE 8, 1992 533
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
ments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said
scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that
in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and
complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the
Solicitor General reported the following development—
"Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16,
1979, sworn to before the investigating Solicitor, praying that
the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on
the ground that complainant 'could hardly substantiate' his charges
and that he is 'no longer interested to prosecute' the same. For his
part, respondent manifested that he has no objection to the
withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he
presented complainant Lantoria as a witness and elicited testimony
to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the
original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he
was not prepared to prove his charges." (emphasis supplied)
10
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows:
a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4 March and 1
June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that
respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in
Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge
Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters
indicated that respondent had previous communications with
Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c)
that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost
the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of
the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as
respondent Bunyi, in his motion to dismiss filed with the
Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the
decisions in the said civil cases, and he affirmed the existence
of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that
respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and
to refrain from
_______________
Id., p. 58.
10
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination
of a litigation in which he is counsel. The Solicitor General
11
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the
corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor
12
General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be
more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in
upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the
hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further
notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the
13
case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he
requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6)
months when he expected to return from the United States of
America where he would visit his children and at the same
time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for hearing
in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General
appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on
16 November 1981. In said memorandum, respondent 14
submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions
in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or
consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to
prepare the draft decisions. He also offered his apology to the
15
Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from
his preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that
the determination of the merits of the instant case should
proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his
complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted
that
_______________
Rollo, p. 63.
11
12 lbid., pp. 85 and 86.
13 Id., p. 89.
14 Rollo, pp. 99 and 100.
 15Respondent alleged that at the time complainant filed his complaint in
the case at bar, Judge Galicia was already dead, and was followed by the death
of Mrs. Mascarinas. (Rollo, p. 98)
535
VOL. 209, JUNE 8, 1992 535
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for
an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters
may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the
letters upon which the present administrative complaint is
based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the
acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and
an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action,
deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had
previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83,
and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in
the records would show that respondent got the trial court
judge's consent to the said preparation, for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which
provides as follows:
"3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer
to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties,
subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive
and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue
privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and
deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain
from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-
respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty,
without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal
and official relations between bench and bar."
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's
16
______________
promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988.
16
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lantoria vs. Bunyi
attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon
No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
"CANON 13—A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01—A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention
or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity
with judges."
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical
practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered
in the bar records of the respondent and the Court
Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this
suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon,
JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year.
Notes.—A lawyer is required to be more attentive in his
duties as such (People vs. De Leon, 62 SCRA 536).
Counsel may be reminded to be more careful in his dealings
with the Courts (Philippine British Co., Inc. vs. De los
Angeles, 64 SCRA 118).
 ——o0o——
_______________
17 In the case of Artiaga, Jr. vs. Villanueva (163 SCRA 638, July 29, 1988),
Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva was found guilty of three (3) unethical practices,
namely: (1) causing his client to perjure himself; (2) lack of candor and respect
toward his adversary and the courts; and (3) abuse of the right of recourse to
the courts. He was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
537
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Canon 14
No. L-32994. October 29, 1971.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. GAUDENCIO INGCO, defendant-appellant. IN
REALFREDOR. BARRIOS,respondent.
Attorneys; Duty of Counsel de oficio.—–The mere fact that
counsel de oficio has an extensive practice, requiring his appearance
in courts in Manila and environs as well as the provinces of Bulacan
and Pampanga does not lessen that degree of care required of him
in defending an impoverished litigant.
DISCIPLINARY ACTION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Alfredo R. Barrios for defendant-appellant.
171
VOL. 42, OCTOBER 29, 1971 171
People vs. Ingco
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine
Bar, who was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused in
this case, Gaudencio Ingco, sentenced to death on September
28, 1970 for the crime of rape with homicide, was required in
a resolution of this Court on September 9, 1971 to show cause
within ten days why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for the
extension of time for submitting the brief for appellant Ingco.
The explanation came in a manifestation of September 16,
1971. It was therein stated that respondent “was then busy
with the preparation of the brief of one Benjamin Apelo”
pending in the Court of Appeals; that while he had made
studies in preparation for the brief in this case, during such
period he had to appear before courts in Manila, Quezon City,
Pasay City, Bulacan and Pampanga; and that likewise he did
file, on July 27, 1971, motions for extension in the aforesaid
case of Benjamin Apelo with the Court of Appeals, which
motions were duly granted. He would impress on this Court
then that he was misled into assuming that he had also
likewise taken the necessary steps to file a motion for
extension of time for the submission of his brief in this case by
the receipt of the resolution from the Court of Appeals
granting him such extension.
Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his
own confession, he was woefully negligent. Considering that
the accused is fighting for his life, the least that could be
expected of a counsel de oficio is awareness of the period
within which he was required to file appellant’s brief. The
mere fact that according to him his practice was extensive,
requiring his appearance in courts in Manila and environs as
well as the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, should not
have lessened that degree of care necessary for the fulfillment
of his responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer
inattention, he would confuse the proceedings in a matter
pending before the Court of Appeals with this present case.
Such grave neglect of duty is deserving of severe
condemnation. It is clearly
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ingco
unworthy of membership in the Bar which requires dedication
and zeal in the defense of his client’s rights, a duty even more
exacting when one is counsel de oficio. On such an occasion,
the honor and respect to which the legal profession is entitled
demand the strictest accountability of one called upon to
defend an impoverished litigant. He who fails in his obligation
then has manifested a diminished capacity to be enrolled in its
ranks.
WHEREFORE, respondent Alfredo R. Barrios is severely
reprimanded, this reprimand to be entered in his record.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Vil
lamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Respondent severely reprimanded.
Notes.—–Negligence or want of diligence as ground for
disciplinary action.—–An attorney owes entire devotion to the
interests of his client, warm zeal inmaintenance and defense
of his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in
the prosecution and defense of the client’s rights.
In In re Oliva, Adm. Case No. 228, April 16, 1958, 54 O.G.
6407 a lawyer was disbarred for failure properly to attend a
client’s case not only once, but on two occasions, with results
highly prejudicial to the interest of the client.
In Cervantes vs. Chaves, 73 Phil. 151, however, an attorney
who delayed in perfecting an appeal was not held guilty of
negligence in view of the finding that he was acting in good
faith because of an honest doubt as to whether the appeal
would ‘accomplish anything in view of the evidence presented
in the case.
In Espere vs. Santos, Adm. Case No. 151, April 30, 1955, an
attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case collected
P100 from his client for preparing a brief on appeal, then filed
a petition to extend the time to present the briefs but failed to
give a copy of the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General,
as required to obtain such
173
VOL. 42, OCTOBER 29, 1971 173
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Calma
an extension of time, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal
for not filing a brief ontime. The attorney was merely
admonished to be more careful in the future and ordered to
return the P100 to his client and was not otherwise punished
because if appeared that there was no chance of success in the
appeal in any case.______________
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 VOL. 63, APRIL 29, 1975 493
People vs. Malunsing
No. L-29015. April 29, 1975. *
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs
. FELIPE MALUNSING, ET AL., defendants, MANUEL
VILLEGAS, defendant-appellant.
Constitutional law; Attorneys; Right to counsel is violated by
trial court where it appoints a counsel de oficio for an accused who
had previously manifested a desire to have his own counsel de parte
and thereafter orders the case to proceed for trials.—That would be
to vindicate a fundamental safeguard which in this case, perhaps
from a desire of the lower court to proceed with the trial and thus
ease what could be a congestion in its sala, was inadvertently
disregarded. It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed,
especially so as
_______________
SCRA 279; People v. Abalos, L-29039, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 599; Lamagan
v. De la Cruz, L-27950, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 101.
* SECOND DIV ISION.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Malunsing
here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawy
er of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he
had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor
is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus
named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely
inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting
responsibility . It was unintended, of course, but the result could not
rightly be distinguished from pure travesty . Appellant could then
rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is
intended to assure a just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the
most to a new trial where he can be duly represented either by a
counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio, one who would
discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious
manner and would not readily assume that he need not bother
himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with all the
aspects of the case. For only in such a way may there be an
intelligent defense.
Constitutional law; Right to counsel; A person is entitled to
counsel during police custodial investigation.—What is more, it is
one of the worthwhile innovations of the present Constitution that
even at the stage of custodial interrogation when the police agencies
are investigating a man’s possible connection with a crime, he is
already entitled to counsel. In a true sense, that is merely to
underscore the historical fact that even under the organic acts prior
to the 1935 Constitution, there was an awareness of the importance
of the right to counsel.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur. Vicente G. Ericta, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Felix V. Maka siar, Assistant Solicitor
General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Dominador L.
Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablito Pielago for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
It was the failure of the lower court to respect the
constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is the basis
1
______________
1 Article III, Section 1, par. 17 of the 1935 Constitution. The applicable
provision at the time of the hearing, insofar as pertinent reads: “In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, * * *”
495
VOL: 63, APRIL 29, 1975 495
People vs. Malunsing
for seeking the reversal of a conviction for murder of appellant
Manuel Villegas. There is more than ample support in the
2
records for the charge thus hurled. As therein shown, Attorney
Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of the
trial that appellant inti mated to him that he had his own
lawyer. There was an admission that he did appear for him in
3 496
the preliminary investigation but only because there was no 496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that while
4 People vs. Malunsing
in the origin al comp laint there were two other accused with appellant: “The prosecution during the trial presented its
th e same surname as the lawyer, Geremi as Pajarito and witnesses, and likewise all the defend ants, * * * except the
Samuel Pajarito, after such preli minary investigation, no appellant Manuel Villegas, took the witness stand and
doubt due to the efforts of this particular lawyer, possib ly a testified for and in their defense. The appellant is a very old
kinsman, they “were both discharged for lack of probable man, ignorant and unlettered; during the en tire proceedings
cause.” To resume, the lower court at this stage then asked
5 in th e case, the appellant while present did not know what
whether the appellant notified Attorney Pajarito about his was going on; th e trial court never apprised the appellant of
change of mind. When he answered in the negative, the Court his fundamental r ight to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial
stated: “All right, you have a lawyer who is appearing for court did n o t ev en b o th er inq u irin g wh y th e ap p ellan t
you.” It is to the credit of such counsel that he had
6 Manu el Villeg as did not take the witness stand, [something
reservations about the matter, stating that as the accused had out of the ordinary as] all defendants, except the app ellant,
manifested that he had dispensed with his services, his had testified; and the trial court went on throughou t the
representation might later on be questioned. The court was
7 proceedings of the case with ou t k nowin g wh y th e app ellan
not sufficiently impressed. Appellant was informed that “the t d id n o t testify, th at if th e appellant testified what would
Court will give you a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito is appointed as his testimony be like, what would be his demeanor during his
counsel de oficio for you. We will proceed with the trial.” After 8 testimony, * * *.” Hence, his insistence that no deference was
12

marking it of record th at he was appointed as such counsel de
oficio, the attorney was asked whether he w an ted to con f er
w ith appellan t. Th is was th e an swer: “I th ink I know the
case.” The Court then immediately proceeded with the
9 new trial with all the safeguards thrown around an accused.
hearing, having the first witness called. In the decision itself,
10
there is this mean ingful ad miss ion by the court: “No evidence
was presented for and in behalf of Manuel Villegas.” This is 11
how the matter was characterized in the brief of
_______________
2 He was accused along with a certain Felipe Malunsing and Alfredo Rivera.
3 T.S.n., Session of December 21, 1965, 2.
4 Ibid.
5 Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 1.
shown to the constitutional right to counsel. W e are in clined
to agree and we reverse. Considering, however, the gravity of
the offense charged, instead of an acquittal, there should be a
1. That would be to vindicate a fundamental safeguard
which in this case, perhaps from a desire of the lower court to
proceed with the trial an d thus ease what could be a
congestion in its sala, was inadvertently disreg arded. It is not
enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as
here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer
of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he
had lost confidence in th e me mb er of the bar thus designated.
Nor is it to manifest respect fo r th is right if the counsel de

6 T.s.n., Session of December 21, 1965, 2.

oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused,
7 Ibid, 3.
would just blithely inform the j u dge that he was alread y fully
8 Ibid. prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of
9 Ibid.
course, but the result could not rightly be distinguished from
10 Ibid.

11 Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 3.

pure travesty. Appellant could then rightfully invoke this
constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure
a just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the mo st to a new
tr ial where he can be duly represented either by a counsel of
his choice or by one appointed de oficio, one who would
discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious
manner and would not readily assu me that he need not bother
himself
______________
Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 2.
12
497
VOL. 63 , APRIL 29 , 1975 497
People vs. Malunsing
unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of
the case. For only in such a way ma y there be an intelligent
defense. If the matter be viewed thus, there is no unfairness
to the state either. It can still see to it that a person against
whom a probable cause had been found would have to stand
trial, but, to repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards.
2. It would not be amiss to refer to the opinion of Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado, where the importance of
13
this right was stressed. Thus: “In criminal cases there can be
no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to
be heard by counsel. The right to be heard wou ld be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intellige nt or educated man may have no skill
in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he ma y be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
to be assisted by counsel is deemed s o important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so imp le mented that
under our rules of procedure it is n o t enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own.” There are a number
14
of American Supreme Court decisions to the same effect. In
one of them, W illiam v. Kaiser, Justice Douglas succinctly
summed up th e matter thus: “[The accused] needs the aid of
counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the
law’s complexity, or of his own ignorance or bewilderment.” 15
What is more, it is one of the worthwhile innovations of the
present Constitution that ev en at the stag e of custodial
interrogation when the police agencies are investigating a
______________
13 85 Phil. 752 (1950). Before this leading case, the following decisions may
be noted: People v. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 (1941); People v. Miranda, 78 Phil.
418 (1947); People v. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138 (1948); and People v. Silerio, 81 Phil.
124 (1948).
14 Ibid, 756-757. Cf. Montilla v. Sullano, 89 Phil. 434 (1951); People v.
Nabaluna, 101 Phil. 402 (1957); and People v. Espejo, L-27708, Dec. 19,
1970, 36 SCRA 400.
15 323 US 471 (1945).
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Malunsing
man’s possible connection with a crime, he is already entitled
to counsel. In a true sense, that is merely to underscore th e
16
historical fact that even under the organic acts p r io r to th e
17
1935 Constitution, th ere was an awareness of the importance
of the right to counsel. This is not of course to assert that this
18
Court in the past had invariably accorded it an interpretation
favorable to the stand of an accused. Thus in United States v.
Labial, a 1914 decision, it was held that the failure of the
19
record to disclose affirmat ively that the trial j udge advised th
e accused of their right to co unsel is not sufficient ground for
the reversal of a conviction. When Labial was affirmed
in United States v. Escalante, decided in 1917, Justice
20
Malcolm was moved to file a vigorous dissent. It suffices to
recall his conformity to the view of Cooley that this is “perhaps
the privilege most important to the person accused of
crime.” It is in that spirit, or something ak in to it, that the
21
framers of the 1935 Constitution approached th e subject. Of
even greater relevance is the fact that the present
fundamental law has, as above indicated, vitalized still further
its worth and significance.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 4,
1967
______________
16 According to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution insofar as relevant:
“Any person under inve stigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of su ch right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.” Cf. Magtoto v. Manguera, L-37201-
02, March 3, 1975.
17 Cf. The Philippine Bill, Section 5 (1902) and the Philippine Autonomy Act,
Section 3 (1916).
18 Cf. U.S. v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil.
419 (1905); U.S. v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207 (1905); U.S. v. Bacarrisas, 6 Phil.
539 (1906); U.S. v. Capa, 19 Phil. 125 (1911); U.S. v. Go Leng, 21 Phil.
420 (1912); U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912); U.S. v. Ramirez, 26 Phil.
616 (1914); U.S. v. Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); U.S. v. Custan, 28 Phil.
19 (1914); U.S. v. Kilay ko, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); Tamay o v. Gsell, 35 Phil.
953 (1916); U.S. v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917); People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil
722 (1929); People v. Del Rosario, 56 Phil. 796 (1931); Chua Go v. Collector of
Customs, 59 Phil. 523 (1934).
19 27 Phil. 82.
formal petitio n field in the case, and where such petition had
been accomplished, notice of the judgment rendered in the
case served on counsel of record is, for all legal purposes, notice
to his client. (Damasco vs. Arrieta, 7 SCRA 224; Palanca vs.
American Food Manufacturing Co., 24 SCRA 819; Deluao vs.
Casteel, 26 SCRA 475). Where a party is represented by a
counsel, notice to the former is no t notice in law unless service
upon th e party himse lf is ordered by the cou rt. (Pabiling vs.
Parinacio, 24 SCRA 100; J.M. Javier Logging Corporation vs.
Mardo, 24 SCRA 776).
The substitution of attorneys requires a written application
for substitution and a written consent of both the client and
the attorney to be substituted (Ramos vs. Potenciano, 9 SCRA
589).
A client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute
another in his place (Sec. 26, Rule 138), but it must be e
mphasized that the same provision , which is an incorporation
of R.A. 636 into the Ru les of Court, also provides th at “if the
contract between client and attorney had been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client
fu ll co mp en satio n .” (Aro . vs. Nañ awa, 27 SCRA 1090).
——o0o——

20 36 Phil. 743.

21 Ibid, 747.
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
499
VOL. 63 , APRIL 29 , 1975 499
People vs. Cudalina
insofar as it found Manuel Villeg as guilty of the crime of
murder is reversed and a new trial ordered forthwith for such
accused. Th is decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ. ,
concur.
Decision reversed and new trial ordered for accused.
Notes.—The withdrawal as counsel of a client in a case, or
the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a
Canon 15
A.C. No. 11256. March 7, 2017.*
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS
P. RIVERA, respondent.
Attorneys; Simulation of Court Decision; Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate
of finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification
or forgery.—The respondent acknowledged authorship of the
petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the
decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done
so only upon the complainant’s persistent prodding did not
exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is
unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or participating
in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of finality of
the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery.
One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the
respondent’s case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were
legally intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the
court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected
a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery
of the administration of justice in this country. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
Same; That a lay person like the complainant could have
swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations
was patently improbable.—The respondent would shift the blame to
his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have swayed
a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was
patently improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations
upon the client’s prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a
lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly those quoted
earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from
committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly
frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a
lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land.
Surely, too, he
_______________
* EN BANC.
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under
his Lawyer’s Oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission.” Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly
enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law.
Same; Lawyer’s Oath; By choosing to ignore his fiduciary
responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a
further violation of his Lawyer’s Oath by which he swore not to “delay
any man’s cause for money or malice,” and to “conduct [him]self as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.”—Canon
15 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility required the respondent be true to the complainant
as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for
the sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of
his Lawyer’s Oath by which he swore not to “delay any man’s cause
for money or malice,” and to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according
to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [his] clients.” He compounded this violation
by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own
selfish motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under
Canon 17.
Same; Disbarment; Grounds for Disbarment.—Under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any
of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
Same; Simulation of Court Decision; Falsifying or simulating
the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in
office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.—Falsifying or
simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or
misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient
for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The
moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to
act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility
in
263
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 263
Madria vs. Rivera
the course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on
such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character,
dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as
an officer of the Court.
Same; Disbarment; The power to disbar is always exercised with
great caution and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of
clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.—It is true
that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and
only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar. But we do not hesitate
when the misconduct is gross, like in the respondent’s case. We
wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross
misconduct as herein described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to
remain in the Law Profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Grave
Misconduct and Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not
only violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be
disbarred to maintain the integrity of the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria
consulted the respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her
marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria. After giving the
details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the
annulment, the respondent told her that she had a strong case,
and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of
annul-
264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
ment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost
P25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19, 2002
inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the
annulment. At the time of the consultation, she was
accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her
nephew, Jayson Argonza.1
The complainant returned to the respondent’s office on
November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed her the
petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to
him an initial amount of P4,000.00.2 He acknowledged the
payment through a handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent’s office on
December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to
follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait
for the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she
did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court
notices and processes would be sent to his office, and that he
would regularly apprise her of the developments.4 On
December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her
payment, and he also issued his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant’s daughter Vanessa thereafter made
several follow ups on behalf of her mother. In the latter part
of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that
her petition had been granted.6 Thus, Vanessa went to the Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC
respondent’s office and received a copy of the trial court’s Branch IV, to wit:
decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Officer-in-Charge
Tuguegarao City.7 Regional Consular Office
_______________ Tuguegarao City

1 Rollo, pp. 5-6. Madam:

2 Id., at p. 6.
3 Id., at p. 13. This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on
4 Id., at p. 6.
5 Id., at p. 14.
whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage
6 Id., at p. 7. between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed
7 Id., at pp. 15-16. and decided by this Court.
_______________

8 Id., at p. 7.
265 9 Id., at p. 17.
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 265 10 Id., at p. 44.
Madria vs. Rivera
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her
to allow five months to lapse after the release of the decision 266
before she could safely claim the status of “single.” After the 266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
lapse of such time, she declared in her Voter’s Registration Madria vs. Rivera
Record (VRR) that she was single.8 As per records of this Court, the above entitled case was filed on
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated
respondent a copy of the certificate of finality dated September April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing
26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch
in the alleged decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
4).9
For your information and guidance.
Believing that the documents were authentic, the Very truly yours,
complainant used the purported decision and certificate of (sgd)
finality in applying for the renewal of her passport.10 However, AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
she became the object of an investigation by the National Clerk of Court V11
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner,
Andrew Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for
she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her violation of the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in
marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the Tuguegarao City.12 She claims that she had relied in good faith
certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in on the representations of the respondent; and that he had
the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with
her money and to rely on the falsified court documents.13
 In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the
complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he
would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her
petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare the draft
of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that
she had also prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision
to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to
fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him
that such simulated documents would be kept strictly
confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had
been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no attention to such
information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled
hearings despite notice; and that he had not
_______________
11 Id., at p. 18.
12 Id., at p. 44.
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 23-26.
267
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 267
Madria vs. Rivera
heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned
to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent
had violated his Lawyer’s Oath; and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the
recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two
years to disbarment through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242,
to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria v.
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A,”
considering violation of his lawyer’s oath as a lawyer and a member
of the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the
petition for annulment of marriage of complainant and a certificate
of finality of the annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.16
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 72-76.
16 Id., at p. 70.
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for
annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the decision
and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so
only upon the complainant’s persistent prodding did not
exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is
unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and a
certificate of finality of the same decision is an outright
criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to
know so, but it was worse in the respondent’s case because he
was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable.
Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision
and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of
the administration of justice in this country. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
xxxx
269
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 269
Madria vs. Rivera
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07 – A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a
lay person like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer
like the respondent into committing the simulations was
patently improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the
simulations upon the client’s prodding, he would be no less
responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound
by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly those quoted earlier, which would
have been enough to deter him from committing the
falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate
her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer
to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land.
Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express
undertaking under his Lawyer’s Oath to “do no falsehood, nor
consent to its commission.”17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal
Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in
the course of his practice of law.18 As we have observed in one
case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a
lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
_______________
17 The Lawyer’s Oath, as stated in Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
18 Arroyo-Posidio v. Vitan, A.C. No. 6051, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 1, 8.
19 Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998, 286 SCRA 758, 774.
270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as
the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility required the respondent be true to
the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his
fiduciary responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he
committed a further violation of his Lawyer’s Oath by which
he swore not to “delay any man’s cause for money or malice,”
and to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients.” He compounded this violation by
taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own
selfish motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under
Canon 17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer
_______________
20 Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his client.
21 Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
22 Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
23 Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign
271
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 271
Madria vs. Rivera
may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to
deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was
already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.24 The moral standards of the
Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the
highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the
course of their practice of law.25 That he turned his back on
such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral
character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general
unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court.26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for
unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27 he was
suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized
documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance
shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into
_______________
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. (As
amended by SC Resolution dated February 13, 1992)
24 In re Avanceña, A.C. No. 407, August 15, 1967, 20 SCRA 1012, 1014.
25 Manzano v. Soriano, A.C. No. 8051, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 1, 9.
26 Flores v. Chua, A.C. No. 4500, April 30, 1999, 306 SCRA 465, 483.
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
believing in the documents that he had falsified or simulated.
It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly
removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with
great caution and only for the most imperative reasons or in
cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is
gross, like in the respondent’s case. We wield the power now
because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the
Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido v. Pe, Jr.,29 in
which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a
court decision:
 No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of
the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only
to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath
and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty
in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not
directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his
unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that
the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is
immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and
obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is
whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the
_______________
27 A.C. No. 7123, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 248.
28 Kara-an v. Pineda, A.C. No. 4306, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 143, 146.
29 A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 1.
273
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 273
Madria vs. Rivera
conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.30
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty.
CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER’S
OATH;
and ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let
his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information and
guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR
CONFIDANT for appending to the respondent’s personal
record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera disbarred for grave misconduct and
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
Notes.—The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin
every lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence. (Arroyo-Posidio vs.
Vitan, 520 SCRA 1 [2007])
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 10-11.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madria vs. Rivera
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). (Foster vs. Agtang, 744 SCRA 242
[2014])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 A.C. No. 1346. July 25, 2017.*
PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ATTY.
EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in
the same action or on totally unrelated cases.—A lawyer is prohibited
from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. Conflict of interest exists
when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is
_______________
* EN BANC.
2 retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client,
this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said duty.
The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste.
Same; Same; Same; Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the
client.—Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is
that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the
mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or
use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation.
In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR expressly declares that: “A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” The lawyer’s highest
and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards
and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and
It even survives the death of the client.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s
3
VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 3
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
employment with the client.—It must, however, be noted that a
lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Same; Same; Same; It behooves lawyers, not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.—The rule
prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations
wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is
directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same
way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving
the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it
after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation
of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers, not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. The nature
of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Malpractice
and/or Gross Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Emiliano S. Samson and Mary Anne B. Samson for
complainant.
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
PERALTA, J.:
This is a complaint which Paces Industrial Corporation
(Paces) filed against its former lawyer, Atty. Edgardo M.
Salandanan, for allegedly committing malpractice and/or
gross misconduct when he represented conflicting interests.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the instant case
are as follows:
Sometime in October 1973, Salandanan became a
stockholder of Paces, and later became its Director, Treasurer,
Administrative Officer, Vice President for Finance, then its
counsel. As lawyer for Paces, he appeared for it in several
cases such as in Sisenando Malveda, et al. v. Paces
Corporation (NLRC R-04 Case No. 11-3114-73) and Land &
Housing Development Corporation v. Paces Corporation (Civil
Case No. 18791). In the latter case, Salandanan failed to file
the Answer, after filing a Motion for a Bill of Particulars,
which the court had denied. As a result, an order of default
was issued against Paces. Salandanan never withdrew his
appearance in the case nor notified Paces to get the services of
another lawyer. Subsequently, a decision was rendered
against Paces which later became final and executory.
On December 4, 1973, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel,
sent a letter to Paces regarding the latter’s outstanding
obligation to it in the amount of P96,513.91. In the
negotiations that transpired thereafter, Salandanan was the
one who represented Paces. He was likewise entrusted with
the documents relative to the agreement between Paces and
E.E. Black Ltd.
Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies
ensued among the stockholders and officers in the corporation.
Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out
their shareholdings in the company to the group of Mr. Nicolas
C. Balderama on May 27, 1974.
5
VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 5
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
After said sellout, Salandanan started handling the case
between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now, representing E.E.
Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application
for preliminary attachment against Paces for the collection of
its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in
obtaining an order of attachment, writ of attachment, and
notices of garnishment to various entities which Paces had
business dealings with.
 Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It interest rule, Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan is
argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., he hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full years.
extent, all the information he had acquired as its stockholder,
officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed
that he was never employed nor paid as a counsel by Paces. Resolution No. XXI-2014-413,3 denying Salandanan’s motion
There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-
maintained that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to 120.
his being a stockholder-officer and did not automatically make
him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect to The Court’s Ruling
its account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever
knowledge or information he had obtained on the operation of The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the
Paces only took place in the regular, routinary course of findings and recommendations of the IBP.
business as him being an investor, stockholder, and officer, but Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of
never as a lawyer of the company. Professional Responsibility (CPR) provide:
After a thorough and careful review of the case, the CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Philippines (IBP) recommended Salandanan’s suspension for
xxxx
one (1) year on November 2, 2011.1 On September 28, 2013, the Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013- except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
1202 adopting and approving, with modification, the disclosure of the facts.
aforementioned recommendation, thus: xxxx
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modifi- CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
_______________ AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.
1 Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Oliver A. _______________
Cachapero, dated November 2, 2011; Rollo, pp. 224-228.
2 Id., at p. 223.
3 Id., at p. 231.

6
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
cation, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A,” and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that the Respondent violated the conflict of
7
VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 7
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
Under the aforecited rules, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases.4 Conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said
duty.5 The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste.6
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the
following five (5) rationales:7
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will
represent them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to
be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust.
Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself.
_______________
4 Orola v. Ramos, 717 Phil. 536, 544; 705 SCRA 350, 357 (2013).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Samson v. Era, 714 Phil. 101, 112-113; 701 SCRA 241, 250-251 (2013).
8
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to
enhance the effectiveness of legal representation. To the
extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence
of the lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from
working with appropriate vigor in the client’s behalf, the
client’s expectation of effective representation could be
compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer
safeguard confidential information pertaining to it.
Preventing the use of confidential information against the
interests of the client to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest,
in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public
purpose, is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the
opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not
exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a gift or
grant in the lawyer’s favor.
Finally, some conflict of interest rules protect interests of
the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations to
tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer
might appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the
process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation.
Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this
rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use
any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous
relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR expressly
declares that: “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.” The law-

9 _______________
VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 9
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
yer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by
any other change of relation between them. It even survives
the death of the client.8
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty
to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of
the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.9
Here, contrary to Salandanan’s futile defense, he
sufficiently represented or intervened for Paces in its
negotiations for the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black
Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel of E.E. Black Ltd.
identified him as the Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had
likewise represented Paces in two (2) different cases. It is
clear, therefore, that his duty had been to fight a cause for
Paces, but it later became his duty to oppose the same for E.E.
Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by
him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had
indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the
rights and obligations of Paces which had been placed in him
in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the
identification of those attachable properties and business
organizations that eventually made the attachment and
garnishment against Paces a success. To allow him to utilize
said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit
of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the
element of confi-
8 Id.
9 Supra note 4 at p. 545; p. 358.
10
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
dence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client
relationship.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to
prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present
or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation
of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the
relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with
care.10 It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.11 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.12
In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full
disclosure to it of the conflict of interest, Salandanan should
have either outrightly declined representing and entering his
appearance as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E.
Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer.
Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer the interest conflict with that of his present or former client. (Lee
dire consequences.13 vs. Simando, 698 SCRA 20 [2013])
Applying the above stated principles, the Court agrees with The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to
the IBP’s finding that Salandanan represented conflicting prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
_______________ client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present
or former clients. (Samson vs. Era, 701 SCRA 241 [2013])
10 Supra note 7 at p. 111; pp. 251-252.
11 Supra note 4.
12 Supra note 7 at p. 112; p. 252. ——o0o——
13 Id., at p. 113; p. 253. _______________

14 Supra note 4 at p. 545; p. 358.

11 © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 11
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Salandanan
interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable
for the same.14
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the
practice of law for three (3) years effective upon his receipt of
this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record
of Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and entered in his file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower
courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam and Reyes, Jr. JJ.,
concur.
Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan suspended from practice of
law for three (3) years, with warning against commission of
similar offense.
Notes.—A lawyer may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose

Adm. Case No. 1359. October 17, 1991. * subsequent clients.—The rule here is, rather, that the mere fact that
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO,
respondent.
Attorneys; Code of Professional Ethics; Definition of conflict of
interests.—The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing
parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a conflict of
interests situation in the following manner: “6. Adverse influence
and conflicting interests.—x x x It is unprofessional to represent
conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose. The obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids
also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed.”
Same; Same; Same; In cases where a conflict of interest may
exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties
con-
______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
2 with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buted vs. Hernando
cerned are necessary.—It is clear from the above-quoted portion
of the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of
interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent
of all the parties concerned are necessary. The present Code of
Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering
that consent of the parties is now required to be in written form. In
the case at bar, such consent was wanting.
Same; Same; Same; There is no necessity for proving the actual
transmission of confidential information to an attorney in the course
of his employment by his first client in order that he may be
precluded from accepting employment by the second or subsequent
client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
respondent had acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action for
specific performance should have precluded respondent from acting
or appearing as counsel for the other side in the subsequent petition
for cancellation of the transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses
Generosa and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity for proving the
actual transmission of confidential information to an attorney in the
course of his employment by his first client in order that he may be
precluded from accepting employment by the second or subsequent
client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule founded on principles of public
policy and on good taste.—It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only
to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Absence of monetary consideration does not
exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against
pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists.—The absence of
monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from complying
interest exists. The prohibition attaches from the moment the
attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the
duration of the professional relationship.
3
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 17, 1991 3
Buted vs. Hernando.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Malpractice
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Jorge A. Dolorfino for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted and Benito
Bolisay filed an administrative complaint for malpractice
against respondent Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the
latter with having wantonly abused professional secrets or
information obtained by him as their counsel.
After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on 25 June
1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4 October 1974 referred
the complaint to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a
hearing where respondent took the witness stand on his own
behalf.
The record of the case shows the following background
facts:
In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as
compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was
counsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted.
Involved in said partition case was a parcel of land identified
as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending
Luciana Abadilla’s claim of exclusive ownership over Lot 9439-
B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance
from that partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito
Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was
issued in the name of complainant spouses.
When an action for specific performance was lodged by a
couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as
one of the defendants, the latter retained the services of re-
2
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 17.
2TSN, 24 October 1975, p. 19.
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buted vs. Hernando
spondent. Atty. Hernando however claims that he rendered
his services to Benito Bolisay free of charge. Subject of this
case was a contract of lease executed by Benito’s co-defendant
therein, Enrique Buted, over a house standing on a portion of
Lot No. 9439-B. It appears that the Sy’s were claiming that the
lease extended to the aforementioned lot. Benito was then
asserting ownership over the realty by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed by Luciana Abadilla in his favor. Eventually, the Sy’s
were ordered to vacate the house subject of the lease.
Respondent avers that the relationship between himself and
Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4
December 1969. 3
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the
consent of the heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant
spouses, filed a petition on behalf of the heirs of Carlos,
Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla, seeking the
cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of
complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and
Francisco were Luciana’s registered co-owners in the original
certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. At the hearing,
4
respondent Hernando testified that if the petition for
cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would no longer
be owned by complainant spouses but would be owned in
common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent’s
appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding,
manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated 30 July
1974. Respondent however, pursued the case until it was
6
eventually dismissed by the trial court on 2 September 1974
on the ground of prescription. 7
At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor General and
in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his
involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas
but denied having seen or taken hold of the controversial
Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any
confidential information relating to Lot 9439-B.
______________
3 Rollo, p. 12.
4 TSN, 24 October 1975, p. 42.
5 Id., p. 9; Rollo, p. 18.
6 Rollo, p. 6.
7 Id., pp. 3-12.
5 Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of interests
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 17, 1991 5 _______________
Buted vs. Hernando.
In its Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the
Solicitor General recommends that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for three (3) months for violation of
the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with
conflicting interests, and filed before this Court the
corresponding Complaint dated 30 March 1990.
8 the parties concerned are necessary. The present Code of
The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether or not
respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the
circumstances described above.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing
parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a
conflict of interests situation in the following manner:
“6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests.—
xxx xxx xxx
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed.” (Italics supplied)
Though as regards the first and second cases handled by
respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same cannot be
said with respect to the action for specific performance and the
cadastral proceeding. By respondent’s own admission, he
defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of
complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when
he subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of
complainants’ Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot.
Respondent Hernando was in a conflict of interest situation.
It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the Canons of
8Id., p. 20.
6
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buted vs. Hernando
may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all
9
Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter
considering that consent of the parties is now required to be in
written form. In the case at bar, such consent was wanting.
10
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims
of complainant spouses, he had never seen nor taken hold of
the Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor
obtained any confidential information in handling the action
for specific performance. The contention of respondent is, in
11
effect, that because complainant has not clearly shown that
respondent had obtained any confidential information from
Benito Bolisay while representing the latter in the action for
specific performance, respondent cannot be penalized for
representing conflicting interests. That is not the rule in this
jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather, that the mere fact that
respondent had acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the
action for specific performance should have precluded
respondent from acting or appearing as counsel for the other
side in the subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer
Certificate of Title of the spouses Generosa and Benito Bolisay.
There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of
confidential information to an attorney in the course of his
employment by his first client in order that he may be
precluded from accepting employment by the second or
subsequent client where there are conflicting interests
between the first and the subsequent clients. The reason for
this rule was set out by the Court in Hilado v. David in the 12
following terms:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number
of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant
and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complex-
_____________
9 In Re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258 (1914).
10 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 15, Rule 15.03 which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. See also Canon 37,
Canons of Professional Ethics.
11 TSN, 24 October 1975, p. 69 and 71; Answer, p. 2.
12 84 Phil. 570 (1932).
7
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 17, 1991 7 _____________
Buted vs. Hernando.
ity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney
and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant’s cause. And the theory would be
productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of
confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge
acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides,
would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously
fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their
rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in
what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants
would be in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the
court should accept the attorney’s inaccurate version of the facts that
came to him.
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass’n. 183 Ill.,
97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on principles of public policy, on
good taste. As has been said another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only
to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.” (Italics
13
supplied)
This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, where the 14
lawyer was charged with malpractice for having represented
a new client whose interest was opposed to those of his former
clients in another case:
13 84 Phil. at 578-579; See also, Nombrado vs. Hernandez, 135 Phil.
5 (1968); In re Hamilton, 24 Phil. 100 (1913).
14 57 Phil. 792 (1933); See also Sumangil v. Sta. Romana, 84 Phil.
777 (1949); and Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952).
8
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buted vs. Hernando
“The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the
Matienzo spouses knowing that the petitioner had obtained a
favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that his efforts in
the subsequent civil case No. 5952 would frustrate said judgment
and render it ineffectual, as has really been the result upon his
obtaining the writ of injunction above-mentioned. Obviously his
conduct is unbecoming to an attorney and cannot be sanctioned by
the courts. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case
in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney
and client has terminated and it is not a good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former
client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez,
independent of the former case.” (Italics supplied)
15
Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period
in the following manner: of five (5) months.
“An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a
former one, to do anything which will injuriously affect the former ——o0o——
client in any manner in which the attorney formerly represented him,
though the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
new employment is in a different case; nor can the attorney use
against his former client any knowledge or information gained
through their former connection.” (Italics supplied)
16

The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the

lawyer from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is
established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that
respondent Hernando is guilty of violation of the Canons of
Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting
interests. We believe, however, that a heavier penalty is
appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty.
Harold M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period of
five (5)

______________

15 57 Phil. at 794-795.
16 Legal and Judicial Ethics, 143 (1949).
9
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 17, 1991 9
State Investment House, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A.
months, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. A copy of
this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts and to the
Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record
of respondent.
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tiania vs. Ocampo
A.C. No. 2285. August 12, 1991. *
MARIA TIANIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO,
respondent.
A.C. No. 2302. August 12, 1991. *
FELICIDAD LLANOS ANGEL and ALFONSO ANGEL,
complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO OCAMPO, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Malpractice and gross
misconduct; Representation of conflicting interests.—The specific
law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. We prohibit the
representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation
of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good
taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of
his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—The test of the conflict of interest
in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his
_______________
*EN BANC.
473
VOL. 200, AUGUST 12, 1991 473
Tiania vs. Ocampo
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court.
Malpractice and gross misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
These disbarment proceedings against Attorney Amado
Ocampo were filed by Maria Tiania, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 2285, and by Spouses Felicidad
Angel and Alfonso Angel (hereinafter referred to as the Angel
Spouses), docketed as Administrative Case No. 2302.
Both cases were consolidated upon the instance of Atty.
Amado Ocampo who, in his answer, denied the imputations.
The complaints in Adm. Case No. 2285 and Adm. Case No.
2302 were filed on July 14, 1981 and August 10, 1981,
respectively.
On January 27, 1982, after Atty. Ocampo filed his
comment, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report, and recommendation as provided,
then, by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1
It was only on April 25, 1990, more than eight years later,
that the Office of the Solicitor General returned the entire
records of Adm. Cases Nos. 2285 and 2302 with the
accompanying complaint for disbarment.
Hence, the administrative complaint for disbarment in both
cases was filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2285
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent
Amado Ocampo who has been her “retaining (sic) counsel” in
all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has
_______________
1 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General, March
27, 1990, 18.
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tiania vs. Ocampo
always had her unqualified faith and confidence.
 In 1972, one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for
ejectment from a parcel of land described as “Lot 4131, TS-
2
308.” Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock.
Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured
Tiania that he will take care of everything and that there was
no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still Tiania’s
lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment
case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a
Compromise Agreement which the latter signed without
3
reading. Two years from the submission of the Compromise
Agreement, Tiania was shocked when she received an order to
vacate the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for
4
another two years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a
certain amount for the sheriff. 5
Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled
some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for
Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services
of various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil
cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa.
Thus, he could not be the complainant’s “retaining counsel” in
all her legal problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs.
Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania, in Civil Case No. 1104-
0. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil
case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have
discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer,
and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case. He
admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania
showed to him a document which supported her claim, over
the
_______________
2 “Concepcion F. Blaylock v. Maria Tiania, et al.,” CFI (Olongapo,
Zambales), Civil Case No. 1104-0 filed on November 6, 1972.
3 Civil Case No. 1104-0, Compromise Agreement, signed by Maria Tiania,
on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband as defendants, and by Atty.
Amado Ocampo, as attorney-in-fact and counsel of Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock,
plaintiff, April 2, 1973.
4 Civil Case No. 1104-0, Notice to Vacate, August 20, 1975.
Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, March 27, 1990, 4-
5
5.
475
VOL. 200, AUGUST 12, 1991 475
Tiania vs. Ocampo
property in question. Ocampo, after going over the document,
expressed his doubts about it authenticity. This convinced
Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the
acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months. 6
But Tiania never fulfilled any of her obligations. She
moreover made the situation worse by selling the contested
property to a third party even after an alias writ of execution
had ordered the transfer of the possession of the disputed
property to Blaylock. 7
Significantly, the petition was filed five years after Tiania
allegedly suffered “terrible shock” upon receiving the Notice to
Vacate.
Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, Ocampo said that the
8
overdue filing of a complaint against a lawyer should already
create a suspicion about the motives of the complainant or the
merit of the complaint.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2302
The Angel spouses, complainants in A.C. No. 2302, allege that
sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of Blaylock
(the same Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock in A.C. No. 2285) for the
amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo (the
same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel
and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and
Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought
another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of
Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura
Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition,
Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more
documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale
transaction.
_______________
6 Handwritten letter addressed to Atty. Ocampo from Maria Tiania, August
1, 1975; Promise to pay the obligation, August 4, 1975; Last Promise,
September 1, 1975; Definite Last Promise, September 9, 1975.
7 Alias Writ of Execution, issued February 24, 1975; Deed of Absolute Sale,
executed June 8, 1974.
8 Administrative Case No. 1034, July 23, 1974, 58 SCRA 64.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tiania vs. Ocampo
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate
Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laura
Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of Blaylock.
9
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said
documents until they received a complaint naming them as
defendants in a collection suit filed by Ocampo on behalf of
10
the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm
headed by Blaylock.
The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that
there was no need for them to engage the services of a new
lawyer since he will take care of everything. Ocampo even
appeared as counsel for the Angel spouses in a civil case they
filed sometime in 1976. However, in 1978, a Notice to
Vacate, on the basis of the two (2) documents they signed in
12
1972, was served on them.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of
the legal profession. They lost their property as a result of the
respondent’s fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of
his expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and trusting
clients.
As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate
explanation.
Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion
Blaylock, who introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972.
Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the background of the Angel
spouses in connection with the loan they were seeking from
Blaylock.
In his interview with Mrs. Angel, Ocampo learned that the
amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be loaned to
the Angel spouses from Blaylock would be used to repurchase
the property at 39 Fendler Street, Olongapo City, which the
Angel spouses had originally owned. In turn, the Angel
spouses should sell the same to Blaylock.
Ocampo himself facilitated the transfer by delivering to the
complainants the P20,000.00 for the repurchase of the Fendler
_______________
9 Both the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note are dated
October 17, 1972.
10 Civil Case No. 1332-0, filed on October 23, 1973.
11 Civil Case No. 2020-0, filed on July 30, 1976.
12 Civil Case No. 1332-0, Notice to Vacate, March 15, 1978.
477
VOL. 200, AUGUST 12, 1991 477
Tiania vs. Ocampo
property. This in turn was sold to Blaylock. 13
Since the sale of the Fendler property would render the
Angel spouses homeless, they suggested to Blaylock that they
would need an additional loan of forty thousand pesos
11
(P40,000.00) to purchase from Laura Dalanan another
property located at #66 Kessing Street, Olongapo City, which
was mortgaged in favor of a certain Salud Jimenez.
To expedite the transfer of the Kessing property from
Dalanan to the Angel spouses, Ocampo himself delivered to
Salud Jimenez twenty-two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos from
Blaylock in payment of the mortgage debt of Dalanan. The
balance of eighteen thousand (P18,000.00) pesos was then
delivered to Mrs. Angel upon the execution of the final
documents between the Angel spouses and Dalanan. 14
Ocampo explained that simultaneously he executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the Kessing property and a Promissory
Note for the Angel spouses in favor of Blaylock for the amount
of seventy-four thousand seventy five (P74,075.00) pesos.
Although only forty thousand (P40,000.00) was received by
Mrs. Angel and Dalanan, the difference between seventy-four
thousand seventy five pesos and forty thousand pesos
represented the interests in advance over a period of five years
in which the loan would be paid.
When the monthly amortizations became due, the Angel
spouses never paid any of it despite repeated demands from
Blaylock. Blaylock assigned the promissory note to the
Commercial Credit Corporation which later on filed a civil case
against the Angel spouses.
The Angel spouses never filed an answer and were declared
in default. Upon execution, the Kessing property was levied on
and sold at public auction followed by a Notice to Vacate.
Ocampo admits appearing for the Angel spouses in Civil
Case No. 1458, filed July 26, 1976, but only because he had his
client
_______________
13 Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights over a lot was
executed by the Angel Spouses in favor of Zenaida Blaylock, on September 20,
1972.
14 Deed of Sale of a House and Waiver of Rights over a Lot signed by
Dalanan as vendor and Felicidad Angel as vendee, October 17, 1972.
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tiania vs. Ocampo
Blaylock’s interest foremost in his mind.
Blaylock, through Ocampo, had sued one Benedicto
Hermogeno, a lessee of Blaylock’s property, in an ejectment
case. But before the institution of the ejectment case,
Hermogeno, leased out the same premises to Mrs. Angel on
June 14, 1976. Four days later, Hermogeno, without the
knowledge and consent of Mrs. Angel, regained possession of
the leased premises. Thus, Ocampo, in filing a complaint
against Hermogeno, on behalf of Blaylock, was also doing so
for Mrs. Angel.
These explanations notwithstanding, the Solicitor General
charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with
malpractice and gross misconduct punishable under Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and
violation of his oath of office as an attorney for the following
acts:
1. a)Administrative Case No. 2285
At the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 1104-0, the respondent appeared
as counsel for the plaintiff and while appearing for the same, gave
advice and warnings to the defendant which paved the way for an
amicable settlement and which may have prejudiced the defendant’s
rights.
1. b)Administrative Case No. 2302
1. (1)Respondent while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion
Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation; also
acted as counsel of the complainant Mrs. Angel when he
prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and
Waiver of Rights Over a Lot for Mrs. Angel in favor of
Zenaida Blaylock, daughter of Concepcion Blaylock.
2. (2)Respondent, while acting as counsel for Mrs. Concepcion
Blaylock and her Commercial Credit Corporation, also
acted as counsel of Mrs. Angel when he proceeded to Cavite
and paid Salud Jimenez the sum of twenty two thousand
pesos (P22,000.00) for Dalanan’s Kessing Property.
3. (3)Respondent was representing conflicting interests when
he simultaneously prepared the Deed of Sale of the Kessing
property in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate
Mortgage for the same property to be signed by Mrs. Angel
in favor of Mrs. Blaylock and her Commercial Credit
Corporation.
4. (4)Respondent used Mrs. Angel by pretending to protect her
interest as his client in Civil Case No. 2020-0, when
admittedly he was only “forced to help and assist Mrs. Angel
in said case to protect the property of Mrs. Blaylock.”
479
VOL. 200, AUGUST 12, 1991 479
 Tiania vs. Ocampo _______________
Was the respondent guilty of representing conflicting Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 576-579; US v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 510.
15

interests? In re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 265-266.

16

The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is 480

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which 480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
provides: Floro Cement Corporation vs. Gorospe
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of the
We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only Code of Professional Responsibility, we hereby SUSPEND him
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
abused, the entire profession suffers. 15
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmie
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases nto, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new JJ., concur.
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite of one (1) year.
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the Note.—The active participation of a lawyer in one party’s
performance thereof. Considering this criterion and applying
16
affair in a case in which he is also the counsel of the opposing
it to the present administrative cases, we find no cogent reason party is brazenly unethical and should be condemned. (Zubiri
to disturb the findings of the Solicitor General upholding the vs. Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157.)
complaints against the respondent. Indeed, the
aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing ——o0o——
Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing
party, as in the first administrative case, and once again © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the
legal documents of another opposing party as in the second
case, whether the said actions were related or totally
unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. They are improper
to the respondent’s office as attorney.
However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the
respondent, who would have reached seventy three (73) years,
as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm in its
stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the
advance years of the respondent in his favor.
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hornilla vs. Salunat
A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003. *
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.
RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S.
SALUNAT, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; There is
conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties; Test to determine conflict of interest.—
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s
board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them.—In
other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a
lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors
unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the
corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any
interest of the individual corporate officials. The rulings in these
cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the
wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of
the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought
against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing
conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest
when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.—In the case at bar, the records show that SEC
Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled “Philippine Public School Teacher’s
Assn., Inc., et al. v.
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
221
VOL. 405, JULY 1, 2003 221
Hornilla vs. Salunat
1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School
Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.,” was filed by the PPSTA against its
own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law
Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel
of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent
Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty
of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom
his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Illegal
and Unethical Practice and Conflict of Interest.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D.
Ricafort filed an administrative complaint with the 1
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for
illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They
alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and
Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine
Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondent’s
brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA
Board which approved respondent’s engagement as retained
counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an
intracorporate case against its members of the Board of
Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as
SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for
unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property
of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict
of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which
complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed.
Despite being
_______________
1Record, Vol. 1, p. 1.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hornilla vs. Salunat
told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest,
respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said
cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule
15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
2 2 Rule 15.06—A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence
appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer, respondent stressed that he entered his
3
appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and
in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the
said law firm, he only filed a “Manifestation of Extreme
Urgency” in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. On the other
4
hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another
partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent
claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated,
orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against
members of the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S.
Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the
retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his
individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law
Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA
Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the
Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the
Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
considering that respondents therein are not public officials,
but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent
alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of
Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent
averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of
gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross
misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing
trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he
prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and,
instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-
531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
After investiga-
_______________
any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
3 Rollo, p. 58.
4 Id., p. 79.
223
VOL. 405, JULY 1, 2003 223
Hornilla vs. Salunat
tion, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted
Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
“whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule 5 bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
6
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the
7
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 8 derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is
_______________
5 Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 199 [1999 ed.].
6 Id., citing Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 [1949]; Nombrado v.
Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 [1968]; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695 [1963].
7 Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, p. 199, citing Pierce v. Palmer,
31 R.I. 432.
8 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, supra, p. 220, citing In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil.
258 [1914]; Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A 2d 82 [1954]
and Titania v. Ocampo, 200 SCRA 472 [1991].
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hornilla vs. Salunat
In this jurisdiction, a corporation’s board of directors is
understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers
provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all
business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all
property of the corporation. Its members have been
9
characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary
character. It is clearly separate and distinct from the
10
corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust
either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the
corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy
the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and
other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to
corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. This is what is
11
known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in
a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest
while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s behalf is
only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a
party in the suit. 12
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal
principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the
threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation
defend members of the board of the same corporation in a
enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized.
Although early cases found joint representation permissible where
no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus
be retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics
opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation
from the outset or merely from the lime the corporation seeks to take
an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual
representation should not be waivable by consent
_______________
 9 CORPORATION CODE, sec. 23. prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients,
10 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Permanent Ed.) § 8044
(Importance of determining whether officer a trustee or agent). the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he
11 Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82 (1911), cited in Gochan v. Young, G.R. necessarily entered his appearance therein. Again, this 15

No. 131889, 354 SCRA 207, 12 March 2001. constituted conflict of inter-
12 Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 768; 300 SCRA

579 (1998).
_______________
225
VOL. 405, JULY 1, 2003 225 13 Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Conflict of Interest, 94

Hornilla vs. Salunat HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1339-1342 (1981), cited in SOLOMON, SCHWARTZ,
in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable BAUMAN & WEISS CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY (3rd ed.) 1129
(1994).
of giving valid consent. (italics ours)
13
14 Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corporation, 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D.

In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation Ill. 1975), affirmed in relevant part per curiam 532 F. 2d 1118 (7th Circ. 1978),
wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its citing Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball Club, Inc., 116 U.S.
assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of App. D.C. 362, 324 F. 2d 394 (1963).
15 Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 151-A Phil. 509, 514; 51 SCRA 13 [1973].
interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and 226
should not be influenced by any interest of the individual 226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
corporate officials. The rulings in these cases have persuasive
14
Hornilla vs. Salunat
effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this
ests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit
doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged
in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was
as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the
brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit
corporation.
brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the
interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense,
Code of Professional Responsibility.
we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-
Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 20, 2002, to be too
97-5657, entitled “Philippine Public School Teacher’s Assn.,
harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe
Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine
a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
Public School Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.,” was filed by the
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is
PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits
found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is
that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing
ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a
as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of
severely.
interest when he represented the parties against whom his
SO ORDERED.
other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.,
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented
Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said
case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
 Respondent admonished and warned against repetition of
similar acts.
Note.—By placing his personal interest above his client’s
cause, respondent clearly breached the trust reposed upon
him. (Marquez vs. Meneses, Jr., 321 SCRA 1 [1999])
——o0o——
227
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996. *
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO
V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
_______________
*EN BANC.
123
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 123
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996.*
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in
the course of their duties as lawyers.—It would seem that petitioners
are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of
activities and services performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in
the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail
these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid
cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from
the Third Amended Complaint.
Same; Same; An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed
on him by his client.—In modern day perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed
on him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of
the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior
to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies
what may be considered as a “quasi-judicial office” since he is in fact
an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice of
courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Same; Same; In the creation of lawyer-client relationship there
are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it.—Thus,
in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical
conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest
based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice.
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
Same; Same; Generally, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.—As a matter
of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
Same; Same; Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.—Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
Same; Same; Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability his identity is privileged.—Where disclosure would open the
client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation, prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a
lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
Same; Same; The content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter
of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.—
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations
which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example,
the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged,
since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the
entire transaction.
Same; Same; The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer’s loyalty to his client extends even after the termination of the
relationship.—The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to his
client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not
only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination
of the relationship.
125
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 125
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; It is unreasonable for
the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed
on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.—
I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances
already detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic
attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be the
strength of its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a counsel
against his client. I find it unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to
compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb
to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The prerogative to
determine who shall be made defendant in a civil case is initially
vested in the plaintiff.—The prerogative to determine who shall be
made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or
the PCGG in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when
the issue of “interest” (§2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether
an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a
misjoinder of parties (§7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised.
Same; Same; The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client
relationship is not a cause to exclude a party.—In view of their
adamantine position, the petitioners did not, therefore, allow
themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment,
much less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing
whatsoever. They have no right to make such a demand for until
they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their
exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated
in §1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is
merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (§24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time,
i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as
when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such
confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise
judicially coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or
otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same
privileged matter.
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify
about or otherwise reveal “any [confidential] communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment.”
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The relation of attorney
and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes.—Communications to an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime “x x x partake the nature of a conspiracy, and
it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under
certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do
so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from
merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes
counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney
and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes.” In the well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason, a
lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does
not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity.—
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client
privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as
co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue
of whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to
divulge the identity of a client as contended by the petitioners. As
a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the
right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however,
admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize.
Same; Same; The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions
has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the
existence of the privilege.—Be that as it may, I part ways with the
majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall
within the exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that
the attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation
will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its
protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. The
person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to
present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the
privilege.
127
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 127
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
When these facts can be presented only by revealing the very
information sought to be protected by the privilege, the procedure is
for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in
camera hearing. The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel G. Abello for petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
 Sobreviñas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon for petitioner
in G.R. No. 108113.
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan & Migallos for respondent Roco.
Mario E. Ongkiko for PCGG.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State’s judicial
system, upon which the workings of the contentious and
adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based—
the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.
The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
makes the law profession a unique position of trust and
confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In
this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and
strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the
lawyer’s duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution
of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan
by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
Case No. 0033), entitled “Republic of the Philippines versus
Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.” 1
_______________
1 Agricultural Consultancy Services, Inc.; Agricultural Investors, Inc.;
Anglo Ventures, Inc.; Archipelago Realty Corporation; AP Holdings, Inc.; ARC
Investment, Inc.; ASC Investment, Inc.; Autonomous Development
Corporation; Balete Ranch, Inc.; Black Stallion Ranch, Inc.; Cagayan de Oro
Oil Company, Inc.; Christensen Plantation Company; Cocoa Investors, Inc.;
Coconut Investment Company (CIC); Cocofed Marketing Corportion
(COCOMARK); Coconut Davao Agricultural Aviation, Inc.; Discovery Realty
Corporation; Dream Pastures, Inc.; Echo Ranch, Inc.; ECJ and Sons
Agricultural Management, Inc., Far East Ranch, Inc.; Filsov Shipping Co., Inc.;
First Meridian Development, Inc.; First United Transport, Inc.; Granexport
Manufacturing Corporation; Habagat Realty Development, Inc.; Hyco
Agricultural, Inc.; Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc.; Kalawakan Resorts, Inc.;
Kaunlaran Agricultural Corporation; La-bayog Air Terminals, Inc.; Landair
International Marketing Corporation; Legaspi Oil Co., Inc.; LHL Cattle
Corporation; Lucena Oil Factory, Inc.; Meadow Lark Plantation, Inc.;
Metroplex Commodities, Inc.; Misty Mountains Agricultural Corporation;
Northern Carriers Corporation; Northwest Contract Traders, Inc.; Ocean Side
Maritime Enterprises, Inc.; Oro Verde Services; Pastoral Farms, Inc.; PCY Oil
Manufacturing Corporation; Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
[(COCOFED) as an entity and in representation of the “so-called more than
one million member-coconut farm-ers”]; Philippine Radio Corporation, Inc.;
Philippine Technologies, Inc.; Primavera Farms, Inc.; Punong-Bayan Housing
Development Corp.; Pura Electric Co., Inc.; Radio Audience Developers
Integrated Organization, Inc.; Radio Pilipino Corporation; Rancho Grande,
Inc.; Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.; Reddee Developers, Inc.; Rocksteel
Resources, Inc.; Roxas Shares, Inc.; San Esteban Development Corporation;
San Miguel Corporation Officers Incorporation; San Pablo Manufacturing
Corporation; Southern Luzon Oil Mills, Inc.; Silver Leaf Plantation, Inc.;
Soriano Shares, Inc.; Southern Services Traders, Inc.; Southern Star Cattle
Corporation; Spade 1 Resorts Corporation; Tagum Agricultural Development
Corporation; Tedeum Resources, Inc.; Thilagro Edible Oil Mills, Inc.; Toda
Holdings, Inc.; United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.; United Coconut Planters Life
Assurance Corporation (COCOLIFE); Unexplored Land Developers, Inc.;
Valhalla Properties, Inc.; Verdant Plantations, Inc.; Vesta Agricultural
Corporation; and Wings Resort Corporation.
129
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 129
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P.
Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and
herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala
and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA
Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with
the correlative and incidental services where its members
acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the members
of the law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client’s equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the
client’s name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment
covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission
on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent
PCGG) filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint”
and “Third Amended Complaint” which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No.
33 as party-defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion
3
of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s
for
______________
2Petition in G.R. No. 105938, Rollo, p. 6.
3Id., Annex “B,” Rollo, p. 45.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
whom he acted as nominees/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint
on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello Law Offices (ACCRA)
plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC,
and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of
2
UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the
other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as
holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers’ participation in the acts with
which their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex ‘A’
of the
_______________
Id., Annex “C,” Rollo, p. 143.
4
5 Id., Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 39.
131
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 131
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders
only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said
shares of stock.
 4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the
incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which
was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has
long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore
denies that the ‘shares’ appearing in his name in Annex ‘A’ of the
expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA
law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in
the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
“COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION” dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant
the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants)
as accorded private respondent Roco. The Counter-Motion for
8
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for
hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its “Comment,” respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission
of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings. 9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof
to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latter’s exclusion as
_______________
6 Id., Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 39.
7 Petitioner in G.R. No. 108113, Annex “E,” Rollo, p. 161.
8 Id., Annex “D,” Rollo, p. 145.
9 Petition in G.R. No. 105938, Annex “E,” Rollo, p. 161.
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b)
Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent
Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c)
Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated
September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of
private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or reexamination of the evidence of the
PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners’ contention that he
did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in
PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal
to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG.
It held:
x x x.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal,
and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the
ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated
his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his prin-
_______________
10 Id., Annexes “G,” “H” and “I,” Rollo, pp. 191-196.
 11 Id., Rollo, p. 8.
133
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 133
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
cipal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him.
This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under
the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173
SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the
same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG’s COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make
the disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for
keeping them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot
compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to
Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed
by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini
for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above
resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the
following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as
lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application
of the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr.
Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal
treatment.
_______________
Id., Annex “K,” p. 222.
12
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
1. 1.There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.
2. 2.Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction
as would make the classification reasonable under the
equal protection clause.
3. 3.Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism
and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation
of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
1. 1.Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
2. 2.The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers’
alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV
 The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by
the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with
due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers to the equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion
for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was
denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a
separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113,
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan’s resolution on
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R.
No. 105938.
135
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 135
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable
treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge
the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them
who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law
firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such
an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco,
they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their
principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of
information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners’
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the
client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of
nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that
respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-
defendant because he “(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG
had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to
Roco ‘without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,’
” and he has undertaken to identify his principal.
14 15
Petitioners’ contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the
PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity
of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the “bigger fish” as they say in street parlance.
This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut a
deal with petitioners—the names of their clients in exchange
______________
13 Rollo, p. 303.
Id., at 285.
14
15 Id., at 287.
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandi-
ganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is
explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal,
and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the
ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts
until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Italics ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandi-
ganbayan, Third Division, entitled “Primavera Farms, Inc., et
al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government”
respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG
wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their “so called
client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;” that “it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription
payments in corporations included in Annex “A” of the Third
Amended Complaint;” that the ACCRA lawyers executed
deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to
establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their
so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was
Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
these subscription payments of these corporations who
are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these
lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds
are important to our claim that some of the shares are
137
VOL. 262, 137
SEPTEMBER
20, 1996
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
actually being held by the nominees for the
late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of
these assignments have also blank
assignees. Again, this is important to our
claim that some of the shares are for Mr.
Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos.
Fifth, that most of these corporations are
really just paper corporations. Why do we
say that? One: There are no really fixed sets
of officers, no fixed sets of direc- tors at the
time of incorporation and even up to 1986,
which is the crucial year. And not only that,
they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal Law
Office. They really have no address on
records. These are some of the principal
things that we would ask of these nominees
stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their
clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite
obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to
nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has
no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract
of lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed, wherein lawyers’ services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire, and man-
17
________________
Annex “F,” Rollo, pp. 181-182.
16
Coquia, Jorge, Principles of Roman Law (Manila: Central Law Book
17
Supply, Inc., 1979), p. 116.
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
dato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance
could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all
that he gained by the contract to the person who requested
him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of
18
the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship,
an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge
19
of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney
20
also occupies what may be considered as a “quasi-judicial
office” since he is in fact an officer of the Court and exercises
21
his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it,
among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very
high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by
22
reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothe-
23
________________
18 Id., at 122.
19 Kelly v. Judge of Recorders’ Court [Kelly v. Boyne], 239 Mich. 204, 214
NW 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service
Association, 179 A. 139, 100, ALR 226.
20 Curtis v. Richards, 95 Am St. Rep. 134; also cited in Martin, Ruperto,
Legal and Judicial Ethics (Manila, Premium Printing Press, 1988) at p. 90.
21 Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 100 ALR
226; Cooper v. Bell, 153 SW 844; Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., 98 SW 173;
Armstrong v. 163 NW 179; Re Mosness, 20 Am. Rep. 55.
22 Re Paschal (Texas v. White) 19 L. Ed. 992; Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. (US)
232; 13 L. Ed. 676; Berman v. Cookley, 137 N.E. 667; 26v ALR 92; Re Dunn 98
NE 914.
23 Agpalo, Ruben, Legal Ethics (Manila: Rex Book Store, 1992), p. 136.
139
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 139
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
sis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause
is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that
distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This
conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and
stable tradition. In Stockton v. Ford, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
25 26
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles
of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer
them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious,
to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of
Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on
August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically “forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment.” Passed on 28
into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-
client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.—
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
________________
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569; Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775. 25 C.
24
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 146 (1986).
26 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 247, 13 L. Ed. 676 (1850).
27 Ibid.
28 Act No. 190, sec. 383.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
clientand his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
whichhas been acquired in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client’s business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a
lawyer’s fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes “entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability,” to the end that nothing be taken
or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne
in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does
not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation
of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client
relationships are many and serve several constitutional and
________________
Rules of Court, Rule 130, sec. 24(b).
29
141
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 141
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege
gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose
between legal representation without effective communication
and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets
revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to
either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information
would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another
sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent
is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal
services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options
which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective
lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the
degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client
which in turn requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a
matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners’
client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the
affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in
30
our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name
or identity of his client. 31
_______________
People v. Warden of Country Jail, 270 NYS 362 [1934].
30
58 Am Jur 2d Witnesses, sec. 507, 285.
31
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
 First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
“A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent
is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
32
unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, a state supreme court reversed a lower
34
court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client
on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was
so closely related to the issue of the client’s identity that the
privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence
that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that
he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the
attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the
votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember
whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was
________________
32 Id.
33 5 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2313, pp. 607-608. See also, U.S. v. Flores,
628 F2d 521; People v. Doe, 371 N.E. 2d. 334.
34 270 ALA 254 (1960).
143
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 143
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client’s identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court’s contempt
orders, the state supreme court held that under the
circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described
above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, involved the same exception, i.e.,
35
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a
strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client’s
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyer’s legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings
inquiring into the activities of the “Sandino Gang,” a gang
involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United
States. The respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe
Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973,
the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them
to produce documents and information regarding payment
received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice
versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-
disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements
may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show
that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which
legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in
Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a mater of California law, the
rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that
the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal
policy behind the attorney-client privilege. “In order to promote
freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must
be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on
the client’s consent.” 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In
further-
_______________
35 548 F 2d 1347 (9th Cir. 197).
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
ance of this policy, the client’s identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation, prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow
37
a lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name
of his client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury
when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent
corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant
corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the
attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer
came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a
man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution
of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved
in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances
that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state
supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the
lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the
insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems
immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for
the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim
against him. 38
x x x.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the
purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether
_______________
36 Id. (citations omitted).
249 NYS 631 (1931).
37
38 Id., at 632.
145
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 145
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter
proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as
attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground
of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. x x
x. It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the
second cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential
communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his
address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action
pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been
effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, the 40
lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose
whether he represented certain clients in a certain
transaction. The purpose of the court’s request was to
determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties
were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the
action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the
State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer’s refusal to
divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order
appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase
or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such
evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that
he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of
communications made to him in the course of such employment as
such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has
ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of
a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such information could be
made the basis of a suit against his client.41
_______________
Id., at 634.
39
40 87 NYS 1059 (1904).
41 Id.
146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an
attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client’s name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the
42
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers
in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought
against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers’ returns of previous years
were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients
themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated
tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical
possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the
attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
$12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax
due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the
advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS
in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment,
but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird
identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.
Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names,
and declined to name the attorney and accountants because
this constituted privileged communication. A petition was
filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird’s
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil
contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to the government
voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes,
unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into
that client’s income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a client’s name is privileged
when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services
______________
279 F. 2d 623 (1960).
42
147
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 147
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
rendered that the disclosure of the client’s identity exposes
him to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that
exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the
government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had
not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose—to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the
records for that one year or several years. The voluntary
nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for non-
payment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt
are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed—to
advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be
done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
44
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity
which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client
has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
_______________
43 Id., at 633.
44 Supra, note 20, at 257.
45 R. ARONSON, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 203 (1991).
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
when the client’s name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in
the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant
case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name would lead to
establish said client’s connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case
at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the
three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
1. (a)the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
2. (b)submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and
3. (c)the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
_______________
46 Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 770, 603 P. 2d 19, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1979); Ex
parte McDonough, 180 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 600 F. 2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodge &
Zweig, 548 F. 2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Michaelson, 511 F. 2d 882,
888 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978, 95 S. Ct. 1979, 44 L. Ed.2d 469
(1975); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1960) (applying
California law); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F. 2d 1101, 114 15 (7th Cir.
1976), aff’d. in part and vacated in part, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S. Ct. 2207, 53 L. Ed.
2d 168 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 71 (5th Cir.
1975); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F. 2d, 663, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Harvey, 349 F. 2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F. 2d
633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S. Ct. 505, 9 L. Ed. 2d
499 (1963).
149
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 149
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations
in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice
in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.
 There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners’ legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part
of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the client’s name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, “that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a . . . crime.” 47
An important distinction must be made between a case
where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit
purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for
the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a
_______________
47 Baird v. Koerner, supra. The general exceptions to the rule of privilege
are: “a) Communications for illegal purposes, generally; b) Communications as
to crime; and c) Communications as to fraud.” 58 Am Jur 515-517. In order that
a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must
be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. This includes
contemplated criminal acts or in aid or furtherance thereof. But, “Statements
and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by the party who committed it to an attorney, consulted as such are, of
course privileged communications, whether a fee has or has not been paid.” Id.
In such instances even the name of the client thereby becomes privileged.
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
client thinks he might have previously committed something
illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly
does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be
invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used
or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action
against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the
privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal
act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not
have a case against the client in the second example and
cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case
against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on
the commission of a crime. The reason for the second has been
48
stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the
same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate
court therein stated that “under such conditions no case has
ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the
instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer,
but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client.” “Communications made to an attorney in the course of
49
any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and
which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under
the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications.” Where the communicated information,
50
which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the
_______________
48 58 Am Jur 515-517.
49 Supra, note 40.
50 Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 NY 394, 399.
151
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 151
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
information known to the prosecution which would sustain a 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir., 1965).
52

See, In re Shawmut Mining Co., 87 N.Y.S. 1059 (1904).

charge except that revealing the name of the client would open
53

152
up other privileged information which would substantiate the 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prosecution’s suspicions, then the client’s identity is so
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls
name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals
within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the
much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
is as much “communication” as information revealed directly
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
about the transaction in question itself, a communication
Proceedings and Tillotson v. Boughner. What these cases
51 52

which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot

unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general
reveal such communication without exposing himself to
rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the
charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
prosecution.
entire attorney-client relationship.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his
available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a
client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the
defendant’s counsel as a convenient and readily available
former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including
source of information in the building of a case against the
confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the
latter. Compelling disclosure of the client’s name in
responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights
circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at
to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank,
bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, the US Second District
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not
54

Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it

countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be
breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter’s
revealed by disclosure of an attorney’s retainer, such retainer
former agent in closing a deal for the agent’s benefit only after
is obviously protected by the privilege. It follows that
53

its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus

petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a
causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that
duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter’s identity
breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a
which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent
In fine, the crux of petitioners’ objections ultimately hinges
requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of
on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against
the client.
their clients, the latter’s case should be built upon evidence
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and
Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller requiring strict
55
not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the
obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a
______________ contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of
completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
51 517 F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir., 1965).
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the
lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his
client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement
negotiations were at a critical
_______________
US Case No. 491, 93-7418 (1994).
54
US Case No. 92-2439 (1993).
55
153
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 153
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
stage. While the client found a new lawyer during
the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than
what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of
fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v.
Salmon famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo
56
that “Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behaviour,” the US Court
found that the lawyer invoked was fired for cause, thus
deserved no attorney’s fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to
his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after
the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-
avis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn
to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Homes, “x x x is an
58
exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual
and moral discipline.” The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents’ position without denigrating the noble
profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in
this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives
such scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one’s soul? In what
other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life—so share its
passions, its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and
actor? x x x But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we
are united—this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic
mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men
that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle.
If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know
that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely
passion—only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man
is likened to God.
_______________
249 NY 458 (1920).
56
57 Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Daria, 197 SCRA 428.
58 Lerner, Max, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (New York; Halycon
House, Garden City, 1943), p. 28.
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners’ right not to reveal
the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the
rule that the client’s name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-
client confidential privilege under the circumstances
obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it
would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by
their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the
defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through
the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became
the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB
as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through
the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it
was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among
others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts
constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of
their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents
substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds
of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
exact from petitioners a link “that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.”
155
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 155
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
III
In response to petitioners’ last assignment of error,
respondents allege that the private respondent was dropped
as party defendant not only because of his admission that he
acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking
to testify to such facts and circumstances “as the interest of
truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the
principal.”
59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent
merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in
his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not
merely out-of-court but also in their Answer to plaintiff’s
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming
that their acts were made in furtherance of “legitimate
lawyering.” Being “similarly situated” in this regard, public
60
respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in
order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary
consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG’s
dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise
to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However,
respondents failed to show—and absolutely nothing exists in
the records of the case at bar—that private respondent actually
revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the
undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire
arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking
which is so material as to have justified PCGG’s special
treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution,
respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a “bare asser-
_______________
Rollo, p. 164.
59
Id., at 155.
60
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
tion” that private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were
mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed
certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were
themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both
petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services
while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the
clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged
questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the
case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without
him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr.
Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the
ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made
substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such
substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at
bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides
a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and
regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates
against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment. Those who fall within a particular class ought to
62
_______________
61 As manifested by the PCGG, the following documents constituted the
basis for the PCGG’s decision to drop private respondent:
1. “1.A letter to the PCGG dated 24 May 1989 signed by Mr. Augusto
Sanchez, as counsel for Mr. Roco reiterating an earlier request for
reinvestigation of the case;
2. 2.An affidavit dated 8 March 1989 signed and executed by Mr. Roco
which was an enclosure to the letter of 24 May 1989;
3. 3.A letter to the PCGG dated 21 September 1988 by the Roco, Bunag
and Kapunan Law offices, which was the original request for
reinvestigation and/or reexamination of the evidence in the
possession of the PCGG. Rollo, p. 238.
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971).
62
157
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 157
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to
the liabilities imposed.
x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: ‘Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical
are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the
rest.’ 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes
a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is grossly 64
unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the
others. Moreover, the PCGG’s demand not only touches upon
the question of the identity of their clients but also on
documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in
violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way
one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the
expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners
of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage
of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait
_______________
63Id.
64Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 1. No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are
co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very
beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot
be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right
to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should
never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further
litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the
complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship
and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of
their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early
opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we
should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over
petitioners’ heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day
longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG’s legal mandate to
recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which
violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against
self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is
further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini
as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033
entitled “Repub-lic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., et al.”
159
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 159
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J.) and Regalado J., We join Justice
Davide in his dissent.
Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., In the result.
Davide, Jr., J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Romero, J., No part. Related to PCGG Commissioner
when Civil Case No. 0033 was filed.
Puno, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., On leave.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., No part. I participated in SB
deliberations herein.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny
hurled against it, is still the noblest of professions. It exists
upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to
all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it should, an exalted
position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time,
principles have evolved that would help ensure its effective
ministration. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-
client relationship is one, and it has since been an accepted
firmament in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the
client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full
trust and confidence essential in a justice system that works
on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be
sure, the rule is not without its pitfalls, and demands against
it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate
analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and
will make that rule endure.
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances
already detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic
attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be
the strength of its own evidence but on what it could elicit from
a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the
Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust
reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of
incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for the
GRANT of the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The impressive presentation of the case in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan makes difficult the espousal of a dissenting
view. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that view
because I strongly feel that this Court must confine itself to
the key issue in this special civil action for certiorari,
viz., whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants, the
petitioners herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been
simply buried under the avalanche of authorities upholding
the sanctity of lawyer-client relationship which appears to me
to be prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the pleadings and
summarized in the ponencia, I cannot find my way clear to a
conclusion that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners’ prayer in
their Comment to the PCGG’s Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants
in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG
in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the
issue of “interest” (§2, Rule 3, Rules of Court), as, e.g., whether
an indispensable party has not been joined, or
161
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 161
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
whether there is a misjoinder of parties (§7, 8, and 9, Id.), is
raised.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude from
the complaint original co-defendant Raul Roco because he had
allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by the
PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the identity of the
principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short, there
was an agreement or compromise settlement between the
PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a Third
Amended Complaint without Roco as a defendant. No obstacle
to such an agreement has been insinuated. If Roco’s revelation
violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he
would be solely answerable therefor to his principals/clients
and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary
action if warranted. There is at all no showing that Civil Case
No. 0033 cannot further be proceeded upon or that any
judgment therein cannot be binding without Roco remaining
as a defendant. Accordingly, the admission of the Third
Amended Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be
excluded but only made the request to that effect as a rider to
their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third Amended
Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave
abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan’s part? To me, the
answer is clearly in the negative.
The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit
granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason and logic
dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make
themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they must first
voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by
Roco and must bind themselves to perform certain obligations
as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to the
petitioners’ comment on the aforementioned Motion to Admit
Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that it is
willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave Roco
provided
 162
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
they would do what Roco had done, that is, disclose the
identity of their principals/clients and submit documents
substantiating their claimed lawyer-client relationship with
the said principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds of
assignments the petitioners executed in favor of their
principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because they
believed that compliance thereof would breach the sanctity of
their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his
obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the Third
Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his
agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of action against him. This in turn
has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of
agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA
72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to
substantiate Roco’s compliance. The ponencia itself so stated,
thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to substantiate
compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent
to warrant the latter’s exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request
for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit
dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as
Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the
respondent in behalf of private respondent Roco originally
requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence by
the PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. (Id., 5-6).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which the
Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the PCGG was
satisfied with Roco’s compliance. The petitioners have not
assailed such finding as arbitrary.
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The ponencia’s observation then that Roco did not refute the
petitioners’ contention that he did not comply with his
obligation to disclose the identity of his principals is entirely
irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did
not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot
claim the same treatment, much less compel the PCGG to drop
them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no
right to make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they
cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based
on the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in §1,
Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not cause to exclude a party. It is
merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (§24, Rule
130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the
appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to
answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand,
he is questioned as to such confidential communication or
advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce,
through subpoe-nae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other
documents containing the same privileged matter. But none of
the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or
otherwise reveal “any [confidential] communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment.” What they are
being asked to do, in line with their claim that they had done
the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their professional
relation to their clients, is to identify the latter to the PCGG
and the Court; but this, only if they so choose in order to be
dropped from the complaint, such identification being the
condition under which the PCGG has expressed willingness to
exclude them from the action. The revelation is entirely
optional, discretionary, on their part. The attorney-client
privilege is not therefor applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of
discretion when it denied the petitioners’ prayer for their
exclusion as party-defendants because they did not want to
abide
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with any of the conditions set by the PCGG. There would have
been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because
then it would have capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, and
oppressively imposed its will on the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the
Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal of the case insofar
as they are concerned because either they are invested with
immunity under the principle of confidentiality in a lawyer-
client relationship, or the claims against them in Civil Case
No. 0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit
that the lawyer-client privilege provides the petitioners no
refuge. They are sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No.
0033, a case for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they
are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the acts
complained of for being nominees of certain parties. Their
inclusion as defendants is justified under §15, Article XI of the
Constitution—which provides that the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel—and
E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of 12 March 1986,
E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules and Regulations of
the PCGG. Furthermore, §2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires that the complaint or information should be “against
all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved.”
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint
in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the
majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or
that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they
cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their
principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
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VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 165
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
§ 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.—The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence
in the following cases:
xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk
be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule
on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American
jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the identity of
the client under the exceptional situations narrated therein.
From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out in bold
relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in
grand jury proceedings on different States, which are
preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in court,
and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in the
said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked in
the court where it was already filed and presently pends, and
we have the foregoing specific rules above-quoted. Secondly,
and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the
lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their
clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said
clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly
charged in court as co-conspirators in the offenses charged.
The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the
lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a
crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I
quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, §393 to 395, pages 356-357:
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166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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§ 393. Effect of unlawful purpose.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attorney-
client privilege from attaching. The attorney-client privilege does
not generally exist where the representation is sought to
further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past, present, or
future. Thus, a confidence received by an attorney in order to
advance a criminal or fradulent purpose is beyond the scope of the
privilege.
Observation: The common-law rule that the privilege protecting
confidential communications between attorney and client is lost if the
relation is abused by a client who seeks legal assistance to perpetrate a
crime or fraud has been codified.
§ 394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to protect a client in
the perpetration of a crime in concert with the attorney, even where
the attorney is not aware of his client’s purpose. The reason for the
rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to
give advice on the commission of crime. Professional responsibility
does not countenance the use of the attorney-client privilege as a
subterfuge, and all conspiracies, either active or passive, which are
calculated to hinder the administration of justice will vitiate the
privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this exception to the rule
of privilege is confined to such intended acts in violation of the law
as are mala in se, as distinguished from those which are merely
mala prohibita.
§ 395. Communication in contemplation of crime.
Communications between attorney and client having to do with
the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance
thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney and client. But,
the mere charge of illegality, not supported by evidence, will not
defeat the privilege; there must be at least prima facie evidence that
the illegality has some foundation in fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the same effect, for the rule
is prostitution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will
not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of justice. In accordance with this rule,
where a forged will or other false instrument has come into
possession of an attorney through the instrumentality of the
accused, with the hope and expectation that the attorney would take
some action in reference thereto, and the attorney does act, in
ignorance of the true character of the instrument, there is no
privilege, inasmuch as full confidence has been withheld. The
attorney is then compelled to produce a forged writing against the
client. The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of the criminal or
wrongful purpose, or, knowing it, attempts to dissuade his client, is
immaterial. The attorney’s ignorance of his client’s intentions
deprives the information of a professional character as full
confidence has been withheld. (H.C. Underhill, A Treatise on the
Law of Criminal Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-
837; italics mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED, 516-519,
summarizes the rationale of the rule excepting
communications with respect to contemplated criminal or
fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with respect to
contemplated criminal or fraudulent act.
Various reasons have been announced as being the foundation
for the holdings that communications with respect to contemplated
criminal or fraudulent acts are not privileged.
The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in such
cases there is no professional employment, properly
speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211
SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221 Ky 301, 298 SW
943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW (2d) 599; People v.
Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v.
England (1892) 50 Mo App 338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205
Mo App 495, 226 SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq
455, 21 A 1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM
Dec 287; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc 714,
270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in (1934) 242 App Div 611,
271 NYS 1059); Russell v. Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng
Reprint 558; Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint
751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153-CCR; Re
Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div (Eng) 722.
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In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153-CCR, the court
said: “In order that the rule may apply, there must be both
professional confidence and professional employment, but if the
client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his
solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent. The client
must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal
object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser
professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor’s business to
further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he
reposes no confidence, for the state of facts which is the foundation
of the supposed confidence does not exist. The solicitor’s advice is
obtained by a fraud.”
So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211
SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the court said: “The reason of the principle
which holds such communications not to be privileged is that it is
not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice upon
such subjects, and that it is no part of the profession of an attorney
or counselor at law to be advising persons as to how they may
commit crimes or frauds, or how they may escape the consequences
of contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has already
been committed and finished, a client may advise with an attorney
in regard to it, and communicate with him freely, and the
communications cannot be divulged as evidence without the consent
of the client, because it is a part of the business and duty of those
engaged in the practice of the profession of law, when employed and
relied upon for that purpose, to give advice to those who have made
infractions of the laws; and, to enable the attorney to properly advise
and to properly represent the client in court or when prosecutions
are threatened, it is conducive to the administration of justice that
the client shall be free to communicate to his attorney all the facts
within his knowledge, and that he may be assured that a
communication made by him shall not be used to his prejudice.”
The protection which the law affords to communications between
attorney and client has reference to those which are legitimately
and properly within the scope of a lawful employment, and does not
extend to communications made in contemplation of a crime, or
perpetration of a fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW
(2d) 599.
The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594,
in holding not privileged communications to an attorney having for
their object the commission of a crime, said: “They then partake of
the nature of a conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy, and it is not only
lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circum-
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
stances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests
of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure
shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can
safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot
exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes.”
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec
287, the court was of the opinion that there could be no such relation
as that of attorney and client, either in the commission of a crime,
or in the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an individual, the
privileged relation of attorney and client existing only for lawful and
honest purposes.
 If the client consults the attorney at law with reference to the
perpetration of a crime, and they co-operate in effecting it, there is
no privilege, inasmuch as it is no part of the lawyer’s duty to aid in
crime—he ceases to be counsel and becomes a criminal. Matthews
v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said that the contriving of a
fraud forms part of the professional business of an attorney or
solicitor. Charlton v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint
751. If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his object and
intention as well as facts, there is not professional confidence, and
therefore no privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the
same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW
308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the production of
documents passing between solicitor and client, when the
transaction impeached is charged to be based upon fraud, that is the
matter to be investigated, and it is thought better that the alleged
privilege should suffer than that honestly and fair dealing should
appear to be violated with impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L
Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited
in Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172-CCR), the chief justice
said: “I believe the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an
attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards turns out to be the
commission of a crime or a fraud, that party so consulting the
attorney has no privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney
from stating the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege should be
contended for, or existing, it would work most grievous hardship on
an attorney, who, after he had been consulted upon what
subsequently appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would
have his lips closed, and might place him in a very serious position
of being sus-
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
pected to be a party to the fraud, and without his having an
opportunity of exculpating himself . . . . There is no privilege in the
case which I have suggested of a party consulting another, a
professional man, as to what may afterwards turn out to be a crime
or fraud, and the best mode of accomplishing it.”
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39, although the
question of privilege as to communications between attorney and
client was not involved, the question directly involved being the
competency of a clerk in a business establishment to testify as to
certain information which he acquired while working in the
establishment, the court strongly approved of a view as stated
arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr
(Eng) 1229, as follows: “I shall claim leave to consider whether an
attorney may be examined as to any matter which came to his
knowledge as an attorney. If he is employed as an attorney in any
unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose
it; no private obligations can dispense with that universal one which
lies on every member of society to discover every design which may
be formed, contrary to the laws of society, to destroy the public
welfare. For this reason, I apprehend that if a secret which is
contrary to the public good, such as a design to commit treason,
murder, or perjury, comes to the knowledge of an attorney, even in a
cause where he is concerned, the obligation to the public must
dispense with the private obligation to the client.”
The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213, said:
“It would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was asked and
obtained in reference to a contemplated crime that the lips of the
attorney would be sealed, when the facts might become important
to the ends of justice in the prosecution of crime. In such a case the
relation cannot be taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it.”
And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36,
observed that this rule was not in contravention of sound public
policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance of a higher
standard of professional ethics by preventing the relation of attorney
and client from operating as a cloak for fraud.
Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged if
they were a request for advice as to how to commit a fraud, it being
in such a case not only the attorney’s privilege, but his duty, to
disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907) 3 Porto
Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: “We say this notwithstanding the
comments of opposing counsel as to the indelicacy of his position
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
because of his being now on the opposite side of the issue that arose
as a consequence of the communication he testifies about, and is
interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee, as he
confesses.”
The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential
communications is to protect the client, and not to make the
attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the commission of a
crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60 App Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a
transaction which is in itself a crime. People v. Farmer (1909) 194
NY 251, 87 NE 457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, § 410 and 411, pages 366-368, states:
§ 410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client’s identity is necessary proof of the existence of
the attorney-client relationship and is not privileged
information. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable even
though the information was communicated confidentially to the
attorney in his professional capacity and, in some cases, in spite of
the fact that the attorney may have been sworn to secrecy, where an
inquiry is directed to an attorney as to the name or identity of his
client. This general rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil
actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action, the
opposing party has a right to know with whom he is contending or
who the real party in interest is, if not the nominal adversary.
§ 411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a client is not usually
considered privileged, except where so much has been divulged with
regard to to legal services rendered or the advice sought, that to
reveal the client’s name would be to disclose the whole relationship
and confidential communications. However, even where the subject
matter of the attorney-client relationship has already been revealed,
the client’s name has been deemed privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a client might harm the client
by being used against him under circumstances where there are no
countervailing factors, then the identity is protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.
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In criminal proceedings, a client’s name may be privileged if
information already obtained by the tribunal, combined with the
client’s identity, might expose him to criminal prosecution for acts
subsequent to, and because of, which he had sought the advice of his
attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a
criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, thus, not
covered by the attorney-client privilege, where the attorney has
surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in his possession
by way of the attorney-client relationship, the state must prove the
connection between the piece of physical evidence and the defendant
without in any way relying on the testimony of the client’s attorney
who initially received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may not
be called to the stand and asked to disclose the identity of the client.
However, an attorney cannot refuse to reveal the identity of a person
who asked him to deliver stolen property to the police department,
whether a bona fide attorney-client relationship exists between
them, inasmuch as the transaction was not a legal service or done
in the attorney’s professional capacity.
Distinction. Where an attorney was informed by a male client that his
female acquaintance was possibly involved in [a] hit-and-run accident, the
identity of the female did not come within scope of attorney-client privilege
although the identity of the male client was protected. (emphases supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is not within
the lawyer-client privilege in this manner:
§ 2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit.—The identity of the
attorney’s client or the name of the real party in interest will seldom
be a matter communicated in confidence because the procedure of
litigation ordinarily presupposes a disclosure of these facts.
Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy and may
be able to secure action without appearing as a party to the
proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such a wish. Every
litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents. He
cannot be obliged to struggle in the dark against unknown forces. He
has by anticipation the right, in later proceedings, if desired, to
enforce the legal responsibility of those who may have maliciously
sued or prosecuted him or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as
much right to ask the attorney “Who fees your fee?” as to ask the
witness (966 supra). “Who maintains you during this trial?” upon
the anal-
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
ogy of the principle already examined (2298 supra), the privilege
cannot be used to evade a client’s responsibility for the use of legal
process. And if it is necessary for the purpose to make a plain
exception to the rule of confidence, then it must be made. (Wigmore
on Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609; emphases supplied).
In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following statement:
1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that the rule making
communications between attorney and client privileged from
disclosure ordinarily does not apply where the inquiry is confined to
the fact of the attorney’s employment and the name of the person
employing him, since the privilege presupposes the relationship of
client and attorney, and therefore does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings below, the petitioners
have not shown that they are so situated with respect to their
principals as to bring them within any of the exceptions
established by American jurisprudence. There will be full
opportunity for them to establish that fact at the trial where
the broader perspectives of the case shall have been presented
and can be better appreciated by the court. The insistence for
their exclusion from the case is understandable, but the
reasons for the hasty resolution desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an
authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to
prevent the disclosure of a client’s identity where the lawyer
and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime or
a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not to
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
(Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind
that his great trust is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the
honor
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of his profession and the best interest of his client when he
renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the
client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons strip a
lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires
with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud.
I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
This is an important petition for certiorari to annul the
resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners’ motion to be excluded from the Complaint for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground
that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity
of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No.
33 before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Sued as co-
defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar—lawyers
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo
Escueta and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-defendant
is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected senator of the
Republic. All co-defendants were then partners of the law firm,
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices,
better known as the ACCRA Law Firm.
The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the petitioners
alleged, inter alia, viz:
“x x x
“The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly or collectively
and in unlawful concert with one another, include the
misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts
of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power as
more fully described (in the subsequent paragraphs of the
complaint), all
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
“Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of
Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law offices (ACCRA)
plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC
and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of the San Miguel Corporation shares and
the institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks
ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100
biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of 7
June 1984.”
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal services
offered and made available by their firm to its clients include:
(a) organizing and acquiring business organizations, (b) acting
as incorporators or stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to
clients the corresponding documents of their equity holdings
(i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in blank or blank deeds of
trust or assignment). They claimed that their activities were
“in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.”
In the course of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, the
PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint and
the Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party
defendant. Lawyer Roco was excluded on the basis of
his promise to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in the
case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to comment on the
motion. In their Comment, petitioners demanded that they be
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Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
extended the same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They
prayed for their exclusion from the complaint. PCGG
agreed but set the following conditions: (1) disclosure of the
identity of their client; (2) submission of documents
substantiating their lawyer-client relationship; and (3)
submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed on lawyer
Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions
contending that the attorney-client privilege gives them the
right not to reveal the identity of their client. They also alleged
that lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not in fact reveal
the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992,
the Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in Case
No. 33. It held:
“x x x x x x x x x
“ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal,
and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege;
the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated
his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal,
which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in
turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the
rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173
SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the
same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG’s COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make
the disclosures required by the PCGG.
177
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 177
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for
keeping them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot
compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to
Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed
by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini
for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit.”
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21, 1988 and
September 3, 1992.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
“I
“The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as
lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application
of the law of agency.
“II
“The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr.
Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal
treatment.
1. 1.There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed,
or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the cli-ent(s)
for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. 2.Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as
would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. 3.Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and
undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the
equal protection clause.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
“III
“The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
1. 1.Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
2. 2.The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers’
alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
 IV
“The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by
the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with
due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers to the equal protection of the law.”
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case where the
hinge issue involves the applicability of attorney-client
privilege. It ought to be noted that petitioners were included
as defendants in Civil Case No. 33 as conspirators. Together
with Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having “x x
x conspired and confederated with each other in setting up,
through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and the institutionalization through
presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.” To stress,
petitioners are charged with having conspired in the
commission of crimes. The issue of attorney-client privilege
arose when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the
complaint on condition they reveal the identity of their client.
Petitioners refused to comply and assailed the condition on the
ground that to reveal the identity of their client will violate the
attorney-client privilege.
179
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 179
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
It is thus necessary to resolve whether
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when
it rejected petitioners’ thesis that to reveal the identity of their
client would violate the attorney-client privilege. The
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law. For 1
the first time in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule whether
the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to disclose
the identity of client. The issue poses a trilemma for its
resolution requires the delicate balancing of three opposing
policy considerations. One overriding policy consideration is
the need for courts to discover the truth for truth alone is the
true touchstone of justice. Equally compelling is the need to
2
protect the adversary system of justice where truth is best
extracted by giving a client broad privilege to confide facts to
his counsel. Similarly deserving of sedulous concern is the
3
need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against self-
incrimination and the right to effective counsel in criminal
litigations. To bridle at center the centrifugal forces of these
policy considerations, courts have followed the prudential
principle that the attorney-client privilege must not be
expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search for
truth. Accordingly, a narrow construction has been given to
4
the privilege and it has been consistently held that “these
competing societal interests demand that application of the
privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the policy
considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., ‘the privilege
must be upheld only in those circumstances for which it was
created.’ ” 5
________________
1 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, S. 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2 In re Selser 15 N.J. 393, 405-406, 105 A. 2d 395, 401-402 (1954).
3 See Note, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can Attorney Serve
Two Masters? 54 Va. L. Rev. 145 (1968).
4 United States v. Nixon, 418 US 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039
(1974).
5 In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 83-1290, 723 F2d. 447 (1983)
citing In re Walsh, 623 F2d 489, cert. denied 449 US 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66
L.Ed. 2d 291 (1980); Fisher v. United States,
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define
in clear strokes the substantive content of the attorney-client
privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the
petition at bar. With due respect, I like to start by stressing the
irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can never
be used as a shield to commit a crime or a
fraud. Communications to an attorney having for
their object the commission of a crime “x x x partake the
nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public
justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall
be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he
can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client
cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes.” In the well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason,
6 client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-
a lawyer is not a gun for hire. I hasten to add, however, that
7 etched exceptions which
a mere allegation that a lawyer conspired with his client to
commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the privilege. As 8 summarized in In re Grand Jury Investigation, viz:
early as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice Cardozo held
in Clark v. United States that: “there are early cases
9 rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not
apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not
supported by any evidence, will set the confidences free x x x
But this conception of the privilege is without support x x x To
drive the privilege away, there must be ‘something to give
colour to the charge;’ there must be prima facie evidence that it
has foundation in fact.” In the petition at bar, however, the
PCGG appears to have relented on its original stance as
spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-
conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client
privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners from
the Complaint provided they reveal the identity of their client.
In fine, PCGG
_________________
425 US 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1975).
6 125 American Law Reports Annotated 516-519 citing People v. Van
Alstine, 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594.
7 Millare v. Montero, 246 SCRA 1.
8 81 AM JUR 2d. Witnesses, Section 395, pp. 356-357.
9 289 US 1 (1933).
181
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 181
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
has conceded that petitioners are entitled to invoke the
attorney-client privilege if they reveal their client’s identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-
client privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against
them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the
more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as
contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-
client privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of
the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately
10
“The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general
within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666,
670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651
F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540
(1966); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir.
1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/-
Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various “exceptions” to the general
rule that the identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of
the attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly
grounded in the Ninth Circuit’s seminal decision in Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird the IRS received a
letter from an attorney stating that an enclosed check in the amount
of $12,706 was being tendered for additional amounts due from
undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS summoned the attorney to
ascertain the identity of the delinquent taxpayers the attorney
refused identification asserting the attorney-client privilege. The
Ninth Circuit, applying California law, adjudged that the
“exception” to the general
______________
10 Op cit.
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
rule as pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566
(1915) controlled:
‘The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the
circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material
only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of
such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was
employed.’
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the Baird taxpayer
was adjudged within this exception to the general rule. The Ninth
Circuit has continued to acknowledge this exception.
‘A significant exception to this principle of non-confidentiality holds that
such information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege
is able to show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the
information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal
advice was sought in the first case.’
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.
1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347,
1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600
F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d
189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695
F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This exception, which can perhaps be
most succinctly characterized as the “legal advice” exception, has
also been recognized by other circuits. See: In re Walsh, 623 F.2d
489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66
L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-
70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the legal advice exception is firmly
grounded in the policy of protecting confidential communications,
this Court adopts and applies its principles herein. See: In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however, that the legal advice exception
may be defeated through a prima facie showing that the legal
representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended
continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part
of a larger conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum (Mar-ger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 n. 1; In re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101
S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291 (1980): In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Tinari), 631
183
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 183
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct. 869,
66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600
F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc).
Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client
is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be
tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential
communication. In Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit observed:
‘If the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily
would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication
between attorney and client, then the privilege should extend to such
identification in the absence of other factors.’
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit
promulgated the following exception:
To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the rule itself. The
privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication
has already been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to
disclosure of a confidential communication.
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir.
1965). Accord: United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir.
1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1963); Tillotson
v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944). See also: Chirac v.
Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh
Circuit has added to the Harvey exception the following emphasized
caveat:
The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual
communication has already been disclosed [not necessarily by the attorney,
but by independent sources as well] that identification of the client [or of
fees paid] amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication.
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception, has
emphasized that it is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the link between the client and the
possibility of
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
potential criminal prosecution, which serves to bring the client’s
identity within the protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14,
1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n. 4(3d Cir. 1979). Like the
“legal advice” exception, this exception is also firmly rooted in
principles of confidentiality.
Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit’s en
banc decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d
1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), is recognized when disclosure of the
identity of the client would provide the “last link” of evidence:
We have long recognized the general rule that matters involving the
payment of fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged. In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1975); see cases collected id. At 670 n. 2. There we also recognized,
however, a limited and narrow exception to the general rule, one that
obtains when the disclosure of the client’s identity by his attorney would
have supplied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence
likely to lead to the client’s indictment.’ ”
I join the majority in holding that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when
it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client
privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions discussed
above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it
ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall within the
exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the
attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose
invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it
with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the
privi-lege. The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions
11
has the obligation to present the underlying
facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege. When 12
these facts can be pre-
_______________
11Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. ed. 118 (1951).
12US, et al. v. Tratner, 511 F., 2d, 248-255 (1975); US v. Land-off, 591 F 2d
36 (1978); US v. Bartlett, 449 F 2d 700 (1971); cert. denied, 405 US 932, 92 S
Ct. 990, 30 L.ed. 2d 808 (1972).
185
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 185
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
sented only by revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to
move for an inspection of the evidence in an in
camera hearing. The hearing can even be in camera and ex-
13
parte. Thus, it has been held that “a well-recognized means for
an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the
general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality
of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in
camera ex-parte hearing. Without the proofs adduced in
14
these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual basis to
determine whether petitioners fall within any of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners
have not adduced evidence that they fall within any of the
above mentioned exceptions for as aforestated,
the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the exceptions, hence,
the order compelling them to reveal the identity of their client.
In ruling that petitioners need not further establish the
factual basis of their claim that they fall within the exceptions
to the general rule, the majority held:
“The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case
at bench therefore clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at
least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the
alleged client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection
with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no
attorney-client relationship). Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the client’s name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the word of Baird, “that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a . . . crime.”
_______________
13 US v. Tratner, op cit., p. 252 citing US v. Johnson, 465 F2d 793 (1972).
14 In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F2d 447 (1983).
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
I respectfully submit that the first and third exceptions relied
upon by the majority are not self-executory but need factual
basis for their successful invocation. The first exception as
cited by the majority is “x x x where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients’ name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.” It
seems to me evident that “the very activity for which he sought
the lawyer’s advice” is a question of fact which must first be
established before there can be any ruling that the exception
can be invoked. The majority cites Ex Parte Enzor, and US v. 15
Hodge and Zweig, but these cases leave no doubt that
16
the “very activity” for which the client sought the advice of
counsel was properly proved. In both cases, the “very
activity” of the clients reveal they sought advice on
their criminal activities. Thus, in Enzor, the majority opinion
states that the “unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered
a bribe to violate election laws or that he
had accepted a bribe to that end.” In Hodge, the “very
17
activity” of the clients deals with illegal importation of
drugs. In the case at bar, there is no inkling whatsoever about
the “very activity” for which the clients of petitioners sought
their professional advice as lawyers. There is nothing in the
records that petitioners were consulted on the “criminal
activities” of their client. The complaint did al-lege that
petitioners and their client conspired to commit crimes but
allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as related by the
majority is “where the government’s lawyers have no
case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the
client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime.” Again, the rhetorical questions that
18
answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that PCGG
has “no
_______________
15 270 ALA 254 (1960).
16 548 F2d 1347 (9th Cir. 197).
17 See page 25 of majority decision.
18 See page 31 of majority decision.
187
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 187
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
case” against petitioners without presentation of evidence?
and (2) how can we determine that the name of the client is
the only link without presentation of evidence as to the other
links? The case of Baird vs. Koerner does not support the “no
19
need for evidence” ruling of the majority. In Baird, as related
by the majority itself, “a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers
in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought
against them by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It
appeared that the taxpayer’s returns of previous years were
probably incorrect and the taxes understated. Once more, it is
20
clear that the Baird court was informed of the activity of the
client for which the lawyer was consulted and
the activity involved probable violation of tax laws. Thus, the
Court held:
“The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception
to the general rule. Here money was received by the
government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not
paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in
the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for
but one purpose—to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or
several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of
guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt
that is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons
the attorney here involved was employed—to advise his clients
what, under the circumstances, should be done.”
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly
established by the parties. In the case at bar, there is no
evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made by
petitioners’ client. Again, the records do not show that the
______________
Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners’ right to
claim the attorney-client privilege is resolutory of the
Complaint against them, and hence should be decided ahead
and independently of their claim to equal protection of the law.
Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should
not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also
respectfully submit that there is no immediate necessity to
resolve petitioners’ claim to equal protection of the law at this
stage of the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified
dissent from the majority opinion.
Resolutions annulled and set aside.
Note.—As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn
duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration
of justice. (Cordova vs. Labayen, 249 SCRA 172 [1995])
——o0o——
189
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279 F2d 623 (1960).

19

See pp. 31-32 of majority decision.

20

188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division
subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw
allegations in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated
predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of
the client “x x x would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of
a crime.” The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to
petitioners who are marquee names in the legal profession and
unjust to their undisclosed client.
 [No. L-961. September 21, 1949]
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs. JOSE
GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB
ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
570
570 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
'Hilado vs. David
1. 1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY
AND CLIBNT, WHEN EXISTS.—"To constitute
professional employment it is not essential that the client
should have employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion * * *. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had.
If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established * * *."
1. 2.ID. ; ATTORNEY Is INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF
OF BOTH PARTIES.—There is no law or provision in the
Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from
acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose
interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is
necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section
26 (e), Rule 123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court.
1. 3.ID. ; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED
BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT Is SACRED.—
Information so received is sacred to the employment to
which it pertains, and to permit it to be used in the interest
of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse
party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at
the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the
relation of attorney and client.
1. 4.ID.; ID.—The mere relation of attorney and client ought to
preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
information was received by him from his first client.
1. 5.ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Is
FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC PoLiCY.—The
relation of attorney and client is fbunded on principles of
public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's
wife, not only to keep inviolate the chent's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice
1. 6.ID ; RETAINING FEE, WHAT Is.—"A retaining fee is a
preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure
and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the
client. It is mtended to remunerate counsel for being
deprived, by being
571
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 571
'Hilado vs. Dc&vid
1. retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering
services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received
in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has
no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney
for the services which he has retained him to perform."
1. 7.ID. ; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A
MEMBER OF THE FIRM.—An information obtained from
a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is
information imparted to the firm.
 1. 8.ID. ; PROPESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION
OF.—Prof essional confidence once reposed can never be
divested by expiration of professional employment.
1. 9.ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF
SUMMARY.—The courts have summary jurisdiction to
protect the rights of the parties and the public from any
conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of
justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over
attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over
money collected by them but embraces authority to compel
them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon
them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts,
from the general principles of equity and policy, will always
look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and
guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting
from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The
courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking
is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration.
1. 10.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE
COURTS.—Attorneys are officers of the court where they
practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the
administration of justice and as such subject to the
disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and
directions with respect to their relations to the court as well
as to their clients.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Delgado, Dizon & Flores for petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado
brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to
572
572 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. David
annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the
Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed
an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15,
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their
appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.
On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint
by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his
appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who
had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote
Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the
defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with
him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she
turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter
sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this
suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo OTI
June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the
case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above
and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
"VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
"Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
"July 13, 1945
"Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
"Manila, Philippines
"My dear Mrs. Hilado:
"From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case
No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
'Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad,' I find that the basic facts
which brought about the controversy between you and the
defendant therein are as follows:
"(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described
in the cbmplaint, as the same was purchased ahd/or built with
573
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 573
Hilado vs. David
funds exclusiyely belonging to you, that is to say, the houses and lot
pertained to your paraphernal estate;
"(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with
your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
"(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your
knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
"Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action
against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the
right to presume that your husband had the legal right to dispose of
the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name.
Moreover, the price of F110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of
May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to
warrant the annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during
the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real
purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On this last point,
furthermore, I expect that you will have great difficulty in proving
that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that
death has already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot now
testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
"For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot
appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you
loaned to me are herewith returned.
"Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) "VICENTE J. FRANCISCO."
"VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney
Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker
came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a
woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told
him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs.
Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real
estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the
Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman
asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian
should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid even
though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that
574
574 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. David
this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no
objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him
about a suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian to
annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had
made; that according to her the case was in the hands of
Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased
husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a
lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs.
Hilado retorted that the basis of her action was not that the
money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but
that the premises were her private and exclusive property;
that she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced
that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs.
Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she
answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs.
Hilado that if the property was registered in her husband's
favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on
Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava,
his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him
and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit
concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested her
to leave the "ex~ pediente" which she was carrying, and she
did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not
handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers,
calling Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had
said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office,
Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated
in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expediente" to Mrs
Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon
Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more proper
to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was
rejected; that he forthwith
575
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 575
Hilado vs. Danvid
signed the letter without reading it and without keeping it for
a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado
since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila
Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request
him to handle his case stating that his American lawyer had
gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other
attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28,
1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer
Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David,
later promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the
complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than
that already alleged in plaintifFs complaint in the main cause
was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not
attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this
much is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed
to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the
merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis
of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney
Francisco's professional services. Granting the facts to be no
more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the
relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and
Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics
of the legal profession and meet with our approval:
"In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a
professional one and not merely one of principal and agent, the
attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point,
to prosecute or defend an action in cpurt of justice, or to prepare and
draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the
like." (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited
in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
576
576 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. David
"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the
client should have employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion * * *. It is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney
in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established * * *." (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
"An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor—when he is listening
to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving
advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's
pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court." (Denver
Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
"Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an
attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and
received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in
behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter." (7 C. J.
S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. & Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co 88 A. L.
R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client."
There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting
attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both
parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each
other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the
injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In
fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than
written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron,
22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information
577
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 577
Hilado vs. David
so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains,"
and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse
still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the
element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the
essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret
communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would
not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's
statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to
support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and
client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of
what information was received by him from his first client.
"The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to
represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's
opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client." (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30
Hawaii, 533, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
"Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in
litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with respect
to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not
inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his
former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the
attorney to represent the adverse party." (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App.
D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
"In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing
against a former client, it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in
detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a
bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the
attorney's knowledge thereof." (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
"This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that
an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act
as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting f or his f ormer client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the
subsequent
578
578 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hilado vs. David
adverse employment." (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77
AtL, 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice
the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive
of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of
confidential communication a condition precedent; i. e.) to
make the employment conditioned on the scope and character
of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his
right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of
litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with
lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litlgation.
The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of
what information the attorney has received and in what way
it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants
would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by
an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be
held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version
of the facts that came to him. "Now the abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John H.
Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Sections 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed
not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer
from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.
(Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 111., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.)
It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As
has been said in another case,
579
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 579
Hilado vs. Da/vid
the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we
nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the cause of the
adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal
advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any
injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor
and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning
the respondent's conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent,
we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of
which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute
and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."
There is in legal practice what is called "retaining fee," the
purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney
is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he
has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he
should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf
of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney
resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate
and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived
and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to
an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services,
and induce hini to act for the client. It is intended to
remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by
one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other
and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in
the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is
neither made nor received in payment of
580
580 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
'Hilado vs. Datvid,
the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the
obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services
which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit
A and that Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of
reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If
this letter was written under the circumstances explained by
Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the
fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated,
emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds
and estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as
if he personally had written it. An information obtained from
a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not
a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest
of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his connection
with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The
rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present
instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the
firm and carries his initials intended to convey the impression
that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be
hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his
legal adviser ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure
of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to the
attorney's partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four
months had passed from the date Attorney Francisco first
appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of
her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection
to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal
as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which
throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the
attorney had been suffered so to
581
VOL. 84, SEPTEMBER 21, 1949 581
Hilado vs. Dwvid
act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one
mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection has
not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that prof
essional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1
Wash. Terr., 374,321 A. L. R., 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not
by certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts have
summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and
the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay
over money collected by them but embraces authority to
compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent
upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The
courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will
always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients
and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting
from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts
act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to
appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718; 7 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary
remedy against attorneys flows from the fact that they are
officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the
machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as
such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to
its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the
court as well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137
Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorneys stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court
officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification
should be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.
J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reye
s, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
582
582 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Braca, vs. Tan
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Adm. Case No. 5108. May 26, 2005. * disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D.
VITRIOLO, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Attorney-Client Privilege; In engaging
the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers
of trust and confidence, a relationship that is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary; Abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration
of justice; It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its
client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer
and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any
litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied
from ever disclosing it.—In engaging the services of an at-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
2 client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
torney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting
and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person
be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The
hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. Thus,
the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a
client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of justice. One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is to keep inviolate his client’s secrets or confidence and not
to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-
client relationship, and continues even after the client’s death. It is
the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse
with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with
absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever
to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or
defense of the client’s cause.
Same; Same; Same; Essential Factors to Establish Existence of
Attorney-Client Privilege.—Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client
privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz.: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought, (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived.
Same; Same; Same; Matters disclosed by a prospective client to
a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even
if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment.—Matters disclosed by a prospective
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter
retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason
for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer
will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally
free to obtain information from the prospective client. On the
3
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 3
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a
lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective)
attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The mere relation of
attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality—
the client must intend the communication to be confidential; A
confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act or disclosure between attorney and client in confidence
and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.—The mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential
communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act
of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by
means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information
to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given. Our jurisprudence on the matter
rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared
by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered
to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
Same; Same; Same; The communication made by a client to his
attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations.—The communication made by a client to his attorney
must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of
seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. If the client seeks
an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Without any testimony from the
com-plainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by respondent lawyer without her consent, it is difficult, if
not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication—the Court cannot be involved in a
guessing game as to the existence of
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
facts which the complainant must prove.—Applying all these
rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainant’s allegations. We note that complainant
did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence
disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general
terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated
the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the
criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell
out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove. Indeed, complainant failed
to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial
link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving
that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pablito A. Carpio for respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint
against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from
the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential
information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Stan-
5
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 5
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
dards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
1
Complainant’s husband filed Civil Case No. 40537
entitled “Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco,” for
annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed
by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory on July 15, 1992. 2
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of
complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered
his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel
for complainant. 3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of
Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City that
4
he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in
substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a
criminal action against complainant before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled “Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et
al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado,” and docketed as I.S. No.
PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification
of public document) of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent
5
alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates
of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally
married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place
on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against
her. She denied using any other name than “Rosa F. Mercado.”
She also
_______________
1Rollo, p. 1.
Id., at p. 12.
2
3Id., at p. 10.
Id., at p. 11.
4
5Id., at pp. 16-25.
6
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11,
1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges
against respondent that are pending before or decided upon by
other tribunals—(1) libel suit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Pasig City; (2) administrative case for dishonesty,
6
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession
without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,” before the then Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption; (3) complaint for dishonesty,
7
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he
was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
one month suspension without pay; and, (4) the Information
8
for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as
amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before
the Sandiganbayan. 9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint
for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823)
disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the
civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo
as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring
this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the
criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on
November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for
disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of
separate fact-finding bodies.
_______________
6Id., at pp. 36-39.
7Id., at pp. 40-46.
8Id., at pp. 152-160.
9 Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 4-5.
7
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 7
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are
not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be
innocent until proven otherwise. He also states that the
10
decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct
and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one
month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He
adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct,
which he committed in good faith. 11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the
criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the bases
of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which
are public documents and in no way connected with the
confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as
counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to
him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the
annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged
falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records
Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone. 12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred
the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for
hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted
respondent’s motion to file his memorandum, and the case was
submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by
the parties. 14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the
report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the
respondent
_______________
10 Rollo, p. 90.
11 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1.
12 Rollo, pp. 91-92.
13Id., at p. 61.
14 Rollo, Vol. IV, p. 21.
8
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of
the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after
the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness
for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the
merits of the various criminal and administrative cases filed
against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these
cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the
respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any
withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the complainant.
The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment
proceedings.
 We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client when
he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between
attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege
that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes
on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and
confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a
15
person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney.
The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in
a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the ad-
_______________
15Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996, 262
SCRA 122, 138, citing Agpalo, Ruben, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., p. 136.
9 (2003), citing Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 407-408 (1897).
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
ministration of justice. Thus, the preservation and protection
16
of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal
problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to
the administration of justice. One rule adopted to serve this
17
purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his client’s secrets or confidence and not to abuse
them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s
18
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the
19
client’s death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its
20
fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may
safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or
supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that
the lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full
21
disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney,
adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment
and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the
client’s cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean
Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence
of the privilege, viz.:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
_______________
16 Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 578 (1949), citing J. Wigmore’s Evidence §§
2285, 2290, 2291 (1923).
17Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
18 Agpalo, Ruben, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2002 ed., pp. 177-178.
19 Canon 21, Code of Professional Responsibility.
20 Canon 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; In re Miller, 357 N.C. 316
21 In re Williams, 57 Ill. 2d 63 (1974), citing People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448
9 (1914).
22 8 J.Wigmore, Evidence §2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
10
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make
23
the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with
the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be
divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally
free to obtain information from the prospective client. 24
 On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective)
client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of
the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, where the client
25
and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract,
the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of
the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the
remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client’s
listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
which he had “confidentially” supplied counsel for the purpose
of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease
contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-
client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those
of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the
execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between
the parties, he furnished counsel with the “confidential” list of
his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered
the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held that a
_______________
23 Rule 15.02, Code of Professional Responsibility—A lawyer shall be bound
by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to him
by a prospective client.
24 Agpalo, Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 2002 ed., pp. 186-187, citing
Comments of IBP Committee that drafted the Code, p. 81.
25 Adm. Case No. 927, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 75.
11
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of
that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than
of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
26
communication to be confidential. 27
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given. 28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.
Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant
to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
29 30
document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the
31
element of confidentiality not being present. 32
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity. 33
The communication made by a client to his attorney must
not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of
seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The com-
_______________
Hitpold v. Stern, 82 A2d 123, 26 ALR2d 852 (1951).
26
Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society, 29 Phil. 163, 165 (1915); City
27
& County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P2d 26 (1951).
28 Brown v. Saint Paul City R. Co., 62 NW2d 688, 44 ALR 535 (1954).
29 Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society, 29 Phil. 163 (1915).
11 30 Hiltold v. Stern, 82 A2d 123, 26 ALR2d 852 (1951).
31 Pfleider v. Palanca, Adm. Case No. 927, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 75.
32 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2002 ed., p. 267.
33 Olender v. U.S., 210 F2d 795, 42 ALR2d 736 (1954).
12
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
munication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. 34
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or
35
personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does
36
not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the
evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant’s
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent.
All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because
the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case
for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not,
however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit
of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing
game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must
prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the
IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible
to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link
in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough
to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The 37
_______________
34 Agpalo, Ruben, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2002 ed., pp. 260-261.
35 U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F2d 918 (1961).
36 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 320 F2d 314 (1963).
37 Regala v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, Dissent by Justice R.S.
Puno, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 122, 184,
citing Hoffman v. U.S., 341 US 479 (1951) also cited in Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365
F.3d 778 (2004).
13
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 13
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the
party asserting the privilege. 38
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent
Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Tinga, J., Out of the Country.
Complaint dismissed.
Notes.—The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in
aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications
between attorney and client. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275
SCRA 505 [1997])
Under Canon 6 of the previous Canons of Professional
Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (Teodosio
vs. Nava, 357 SCRA 406 [2001])
The difference between the revocation of the authority by
the act of the client and by the act of the attorney is that the
first may be done at any time with or without cause, whereas
the second can be made only with the client’s written consent
or for justified cause. (Gonzaga vs. Villanueva, Jr., 435 SCRA
1 [2004])
——o0o——
_______________
U.S. v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (1978).
38
14
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 651
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77439. August 24, 1989. *
DONALD DEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.
Attorneys; Lawyer-client relationship; Court cannot disturb
factual finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there
was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private
respondent Mutuc.—Both the lower court and the appellate court
concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship
between petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. We find no
reason to interfere with this factual finding. There may be instances
when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship
has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once
the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was
such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding
of fact, absent cogent reasons therefor.
Same; Same; Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney, the contract may be
express or implied.—The puerile claim is advanced that there was
no attorney-client relationship between petitioner and private
respondent for lack of a written contract to that effect. The absence
of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for
professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received
in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on
behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter.
Same; Same; Same; That professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family
established.—There is no question that professional services were
actually rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family.
Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
his family were further freed from the apprehension that
Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For
such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation and this right cannot be occluded by
petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent rendered
such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the
Philippine consultant of Caesar’s Palace.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Circumstances showing that the
services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner.—On the
first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of
respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes
hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling
P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor
of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner,
the receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably
prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private
respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the
amount of attorney’s fees to be given to the latter; and there was
still a balance due and payable on said fees.
Same; Same; Generally, an attorney is prohibited from
representing parties with contending position unless with their
consent.—Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests
obtained, private respondent’s role therein was not ethically or
legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from
representing parties with contending positions. However, at a
certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer
may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.
A common representation may work to the advantage of said parties
since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially
cognizant of the parties’ disparate positions, may well be better
situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences,
being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation
and confidence of said parties.
Same; Same; A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just
and reasonable compensation for services rendered.—A lawyer is
entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation
for services rendered at the special instance and request of his client
and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his
just fees.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
653
VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 653
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated
February 12, 1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on
May 9, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the
decision of the trial court holding that the services rendered
by private respondent was on a professional, and not on a
gratis et amore basis and ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the latter’s
legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981,
petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his
advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-
known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner’s father was apprehensive over the safety of his son,
Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar’s
Palace and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the
instance of the latter. 1
Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that
he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were
reportedly contracted for P100,000.00. From his residence,
private respondent called up Caesar’s Palace and, thereafter,
several long distance telephone calls and two trips to Las
Vegas by him elicited the information that Dewey Dee’s
outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further
investigations, however, revealed that said account had
actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely
signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated said
information to petitioner’s father and also assured him that
Caesar’s Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia. 2
In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with
the
_______________
1Petition, 4; Rollo, 9.
2Rollo, 9-10, 21-22.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised
the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino
it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the
indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince
Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be
exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private
respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy
and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness.
In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar’s
Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for
a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared
and the casino never bothered him. 3
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother,
private respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner
demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. On October 4, 1982,
private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXXXVI, for the
collection of attorney’s fees and refund of transport fare and
other expenses. 4 contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two important
Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally
engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the
services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer
renders to a client. Petitioner, however, denied the existence
of any professional relationship of attorney and client between
him and private respondent. He admits that he and his father
visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey
Dee’s gambling account. However, he insists that such visit
was merely an informal one and that private respondent had
not been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the
contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his
services “as a friend of defendant’s family” to see what he could
do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given
to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the
nature of attorney’s fees but merely “pocket money” solicited
by
_______________
3Rollo, 10.
4Civil Case No. 1736 (47992): Original Record, 1-4.
655
VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 655
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount of
P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly
voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering
herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
P50,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
filing of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs.
All other claims therein of private respondent and the
counterclaim of petitioner were dismissed. On appeal, said
5
judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court on May 9, 1986. 6
Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration
and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent
was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father,
he was actually working “in the interest” and “to the
advantage” of Caesar’s Palace of which he was an agent and a
consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private
respondent were united in their objective to collect from the
debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming
that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in
view of the conflicting interests involved.
In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court
reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00
already paid by petitioner to private respondent was
commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at
the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he was also
acting as the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving
compensation from, Caesar’s Palace. However, upon a motion
7
for reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the
present respondent Court of Appeals issued another
resolution, dated February 12,
_______________
5 Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, presiding: Original Record, 127-132.
6 Penned by Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Justices Ma. Rosario
Quetulio-Losa and Leonor Ines Luciano concurring; First Civil Cases Division.
7 Penned, likewise, by Presiding Justice Gaviola, Jr., with the concurrence
of Justices Quetulio-Losa and Luciano of the same Division.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986. 8
Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to
overturn the latter resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the
questions arising from the change of stand of the First Civil
Cases Division of the former Intermediate Appellate Court
when, acting on the representations in petitioner’s undated
motion for reconsideration supposedly filed on May 28, 1986,
it promulgated its July 31, 1986 resolution reconsidering the
decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242. Said
resolution was, as earlier noted, set aside by the Twelfth
Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the
same time, reinstated the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues
belatedly raised by petitioner, which issues should have been
disregarded but were nevertheless auspiciously discussed
9
therein, at the risk of seeming prolixity we quote hereunder
the salient portions of the assailed resolution which
demonstrate that it was not conceived in error.
“The reason for then IAC’s action is that it deemed the P50,000.00
plaintiff-appellee had previously received from defendant-appellant
as adequate compensation for the services rendered by him for
defendant-appellant, considering that at the time plaintiff-appellee
was acting as counsel for defendant-appellant, he was also acting as
the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation
from Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada, the entity with whom
defendant-appellant was having a problem and for which he had
engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux of the matter,
therefore, is whether or not the evidence on record justifies this
finding of the IAC.
“Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional services to
defendant-appellant were rendered between the months of July and
September of 1981, while his employment as collection agent and
consultant of Caesar’s Palace covered the period from December
1981
_______________
8 Justice Luis A. Javellana, ponente, with whom concurred Justices Pedro A.
Ramirez and Cecilio L. Pe; Twelfth Division.
9 Sec. 18, Rule 46 and Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court; De la Santa vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 140 SCRA 44 (1985); Dihiansan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 153 SCRA 712 (1987).
657
VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 657
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
to October 1982. This positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee,
however, was disregarded by the IAC for the following reasons:
“1. In August 1983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was a
representative of Caesar’s Palace in the Philippines ‘about two or
three years ago.’ From this the IAC concluded that the period covers
the time plaintiff-appellee rendered professional services to
defendant-appellant.
“We do not think that IAC’s conclusion is necessarily correct.
When plaintiff-appellee gave the period ‘about two or three years
ago,’ he was merely stating an approximation. Considering that
plaintiff-appellee was testifying in August 1983, and his
employment with Caesar’s Palace began in December 1981, the
stated difference of two years is relatively correct. x x x
“2. The plaintiff-appellee had testified that he was working ‘for
the sake,’ ‘in the interest,’ and ‘to the advantage’ of Caesar’s Palace.
xxx
“We detect nothing from the above which would support IAC’s
conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was then in the employ of Caesar’s
Palace. What is gathered is that plaintiff-appellee was simply
fulfilling a condition which plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and
was accepted by, Caesar’s Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee from
his obligation to Caesar’s Palace.
“3. Caesar’s Palace would not have listened to, and acted upon,
the advice of plaintiff-appellee if he were no longer its consultant
and alter ego.
“Why not? We are witnesses to many successful negotiations
between contending parties whose representing lawyers were not
and were never in the employ of the opposite party. The art of
negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools of a good
practitioner, and mastery of the art takes into account the
circumstance that one may be negotiating, among others, with a
person who may not only be a complete stranger but antagonistic as
well. The fact that plaintiff-appellee was able to secure a favorable
concession from Caesar’s Palace for defendant-appellant does not
justify the conclusion that it could have been secured only because
of plaintiff-appellee’s professional relationship with Caesar’s
Palace. It could have been attributable more to plaintiff-appellee’s
stature as a former ambassador of the Philippines to the United
States, his personality, and his negotiating technique.
 “Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was employed by
Caesar’s Palace during the time that he was rendering professional
services for defendant-appellant, this would not automatically mean
the denial of additional attorney’s fees to plaintiff-appellee. The
main
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee additional
compensation was because the latter was allegedly receiving
compensation from Caesar’s Palace, and, therefore, the amount of
P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously received from
defendant-appellant is ‘reasonable and commensurate.’ This
conclusion, however, can only be justified if the fact and amount of
remuneration had been established. These were not proven at all.
No proof was presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee’s
remuneration, and the mode or manner in which it was paid. x x x 10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their
findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between
petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to
interfere with this factual finding. There may be instances
when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client
relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the
trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals
have found that there was such a relationship the Supreme
Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent cogent
11
reasons therefor.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-
client relationship between petitioner and private respondent
for lack of a written contract to that effect. The absence of a
written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for
professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not
an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation,
it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of
a request from the latter. 12
_______________
10 Rollo, 52-55.
11 Vda. de Reyes vs. Court of Appeals et al., 116 SCRA 607 (1982).
12 See C.J.S., 848-849, and Hirach Bros. & Co. vs. R.E. Kennington Co., 88
A.L.R., 1, as cited in Hilado vs. Gutierrez David, et al., 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
659
VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 659
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
There is no question that professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family.
Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey
Dee, with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and
petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by
the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is
indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be occluded by petitioner’s pretension that at
the time private respondent rendered such services to
petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine
consultant of Caesar’s Palace.
On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the
services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner
for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial
payments totalling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to
respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by
said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being
acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz:
that petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc;
that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of
attorney’s fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a
balance due and payable on said fees. The duplicate-original
copy of the initial receipt issued and signed in this connection
by private respondent reads:
“RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional services
rendered, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as
partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (70,000.00), payable on demand.
“Makati, Metro Manila, July 25, 1981.” 13
Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees,
dated August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982,
_______________
13Exhibit S, Folder of Exhibits. While objected to as self-serving (Original
Record, 102), the authenticity and due execution of this document was not
definitively denied by petitioner in his testimony (TSN, Nov. 21, 1983, 20-21).
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
March 7, 1982, and September 7, 1982 were sent by private
respondent to petitioner, all to no avail.
14
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the
aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is
also not completely accurate to judge private respondent’s
position by petitioner’s assumption that the interests of
Caesar’s Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the
casino was a creditor but that fact was not contested or
opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as verifications
revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent’s
representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance
to the casino’s claim but were actually geared toward proving
that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon
Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly
exacted. 15
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests
obtained, private respondent’s role therein was not ethically
or legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited
from representing parties with contending positions. However,
at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court,
a lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent
of the parties. A common representation may work to the
16
advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest
motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties’ disparate
positions, may well be better situated to work out an
acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of
partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and
confidence of said parties.
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private
respondent was during the period in question an agent of
Caesar’s Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he
actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual
representation that he postulates. This knowledge he admits,
thus:
_______________
14 Exhibits B, D, E, F, and G, ibid.
15 Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, then in force, provides:
“Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.”
16 Canon 6, id.
661
VOL. 176, AUGUST 24, 1989 661
Dee vs. Court of Appeals
“It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the land, it was
the private respondent who was singled out by the petitioner’s
father for consultation in regard to an apparent problem, then
pending in Caesar’s Palace. The testimony of Arthur Alejandrino,
cousin to private respondent, and the admission of the private
respondent himself supply the answer. Alejandrino testified that
private respondent was the representative of Caesar’s Palace in the
Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 29, 1983). Private respondent testified
that he was such representative tasked by the casino to collect the
gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in Las Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept.
21, 1983).” 17
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly
and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of
his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees. 18
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating its original
decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 501
against petitioner. Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 160445. February 16, 2006. *

Melencio-Herrera, JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. AGNES R.

(Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sar-miento, JJ., concur. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. SECURITY BANK
Resolution affirmed. CORPORATION, respondent.
Notes.—Findings of existence of lawyer-client relationship Criminal Law; Contempt; Mercado’s addressing such letter to
will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court. (Vda. de Reyes vs. Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad faith and malice
Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 607.) tending directly to degrade the administration of justice.—Bad faith
Absence of proof that a lawyer’s services were rendered imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
gratuitously, the recipient of services should make doing of a wrong. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
compensation. (Dominguez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 135 operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-
will for ulterior purposes. Malice is of the same genre. It connotes a
SCRA 98.)
sinister motive. Mercado’s addressing such letter to Chief Justice
——o0o—— Davide is a perfect illustration of bad faith and malice tending
directly to de-
_______________
_______________
Memorandum of Petitioner, 5; Rollo, 88.
17
*EN BANC.
De Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc., et al., 68 Phil. 643 (1939).
18
502
662
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
grade the administration of justice. It transgresses the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing into
disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente, but also of the entire Judiciary. While
feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief Justice Davide
indeed exerted “tremendous pressure” to the ponente, he repeatedly
humiliated him and the Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent
manner. He accused him of doing an “unthinkable, ungodly, and
malicious” act and of depriving his (Mercado’s) family of their “basic
fundamental rights in the protection of (their) property without due
process.” He concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his
family “is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity.” In an
insulting and insolent tenor, he stated that “if the Chief Justice,
himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our laws,” then there
is “no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our
country.”
 Same; Same; Without doubt, Mercado’s letter is marked with
malice, bad faith and gross disrespect.—Without doubt, Mercado’s
letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross disrespect. He
committed a remarkable feat of character assassination and honor
vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth
of Atty. Villanueva’s statements, the words in his letter are more
accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that his
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. Obviously, they caused
intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente.
Same; Same; A person charged with contempt of court for his
utterances which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily
escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech.—A person charged with contempt of court for his
utterances which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily
escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with
abuse of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous
remarks to Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused
such liberty. His statements cast aspersions to their reputation and
integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.
Same; Same; Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court;
503
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 503
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Mercado held guilty of indirect contempt.—The fact that
Mercado’s letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not
rinse it of its contemptuous character. In In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA
382 (1987), we ruled that letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court. Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of
court.
Same; Same; Attorneys; Court has repeatedly admonished
lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients; Responsibility
enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and
the judicial officers; Court finds Atty. Villanueva also guilty of
indirect contempt of court.—We have repeatedly admonished
lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who
guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy
pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But
when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under
a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty.
Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to
believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced. Responsibility
enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
and the judicial officers. Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt,
degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente and this Court as well. Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva
also guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Remedial Law; Annulment of Judgment; An action for annul-
ment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy
of appeal; A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can
prosper; Grounds for Annulment of Judgment.—The Resolution of
the Third Division of this Court dated September 15, 2004 denying
Mercado’s motion for reconsideration is well explained. A principle
almost repeated to satiety is that “an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.” A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can
prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting
from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for annulment of
judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of
jurisdiction
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
or denial of due process. Having failed to avail of the remedies
and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was
present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant
would find such legal disposition unacceptable.
Same; Same; The reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee
that it will be subsequently granted.—The Third Division initially
denied Mercado’s petition because it is apparent on its face that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing his
petition for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for
reconsideration alleging that the Appellate Court merely relied on
technical rules of procedure and that his former counsel committed
gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course
by reinstating the petition. Now, after considering the petition and
the comment thereon, the Third Division was convinced
that, indeed, the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible
error. Is this irregular? The answer is a resounding “no.” The
reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be
subsequently granted. Otherwise, the filing of comment and
subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Contempt.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Pablo Garcia Macapagal for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The dignity of the Court can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be given cause to break
faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst men.
To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to
the assaults of disrespect. 1
_______________
1See Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
505
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 505
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the
contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T.
Mercado arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004,
insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the
“tremendous pressure” of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank Corporation,
respondent, financed the ponente’s travel to the United States;
and (3) the ponente gave respondent a “go signal” to sell his
property.
The facts are as follows:
On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma.
Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition
for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a)
Decision dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570
2
dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b)
its Resolution dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for
3
reconsideration.
On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of
petitioners’ failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Appellate Court. 4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
the Court of Appeals, in dismissing their petition for
annulment of judgment, merely relied on technical rules of
procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of justice
and equity; and that their former counsel’s gross negligence
constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling the trial
court’s judgment.
On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating their
petition. We likewise required Security Bank Corporation,
respondent, to comment on the petition.
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 48-60. Penned by Justice Sergio L. Pestaño (deceased) and
concurred in by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Justice Noel G.
Tijam.
3 Id., pp. 80-83.
4 See Resolution, Id., p. 151.
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in
the present petition are mere rehash of the issues petitioners
raised before the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence
of their counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot
be considered an extrinsic fraud since through the same
counsel, they actively pursued and recovered moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Furthermore, assuming that petitioners’
counsel refused to file a motion for reconsideration with the
trial court, still, they had the option to terminate his services
and hire another; and that they should not have waited for
four (4) years before filing the petition for annulment of
judgment.
On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the
petition on the ground that petitioners indeed failed to show
that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate
Court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we
dismissed the same in our Resolution dated September 15,
2004, thus:
“We find no compelling reason to grant petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition
for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first file
an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required
by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot
avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would
benefit from their inaction or negligence.
It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.
Petitioners’ contention that their failure to appeal from the trial
court’s Decision was due to the negligence of their former counsel
lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through
their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party
litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and,
therefore, should monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should
have constantly communicated with their counsel to be ad-
507
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 507
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
vised of the status of their case. This way, they would not have lost
their opportunity to appeal.
Granting that petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment is in
order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment of
judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be
present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Petitioner argues that their counsel’s negligence
constitutes extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud
can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is
prevented from presenting his case to the court. This situation is not
present in this case.
We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of
Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners’
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial court’s
order of execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant
case.” 5
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was
denied for being prohibited.
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stating that:
“On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted
our Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due course and
reinstated our petition.
But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying
my Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I immediately called my
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him why on
earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same ground ‘for
failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court? My counsel said,
the ponente informed him that she has to deny our petition
on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure
from the Chief Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation
(SBC). By the way, my counsel and the ponente are very close and
long time friends to each other. When I heard the bad news, I was
so shocked in disbelief.
_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 320-327.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
It is true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and
malicious. It is also very suspicious that after a few days
after my conversation with Atty. Villanueva, he and his
family left for London, leaving my case to the care of one of
his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for the
U.S.A. to visit her children. Is this a coincidence? As the
saying goes, ‘when there is smoke, there is fire.’ Another
coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004,
denying our petition on the basis of SBC’s unsubstantiated
‘Comment,’ SBC sold our property to M. Miranda Development
Corporation and succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the four
(4) building erected in our property from the Forbes Park
Association, even if the case is still pending and we have not even
filed our Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court, not to
mention the Lis Pendens annotated on the title of the property in
the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC for
P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is
drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that one of them
is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property
of the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said ‘I paid already
the property because SBC told me that they already have the
go-signal from the ponente to sell the property.’ Few days
thereafter, all the improvements in our property were totally
demolished by a construction company owned by my provincemate
in Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at
the site while the demolition was being carried out.
Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the
final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to
impart to your children and all the Filipino people? What
you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God
and to humanity. You have deprived us of our precious
possession without due process. This is also the abode of my
wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10
grandchildren, not to mention the several household
members and their families.
I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark
of true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the first
person to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why
foreign investors do not want to invest in our country
because they said, there is no justice in our courts, the
Supreme
509
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 509
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Court in particular. This is in the highest degree of injustice.
You have deprived us of our basic fundamental rights in the
protection of our property without due process. There is no
justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. Do you
think I will bring my case to the Supreme Court by mere question
of facts? From our petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before
the Court of Appeals and now the Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Supreme Court, my wife and I as petitioners-movants have
clearly invoked ‘LACK OF JURISDICTION’ on the part of the trial
court to adjudicate respondent SBC’s ‘counterclaim’ for the payment
of the loan. As I understand, when the ground invoked as basis for
Annulment of Judgment is ‘LACK OF JURISDICTION,’ the Petition
may be filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches,
neither of which is obtaining in our case. Even in layman’s legal
point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a
question of law.
Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the two
(2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade
on the real issue on ‘LACK OF JURISDICTION’ on the part
of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of
counsel and other trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please
refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division.
Let them deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit
themselves on the case. Please let the Institution serve
justice, and not individual pecuniary interests. SBC’s
counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading the
courts. I have a feeling that they might as well have led you to
believe something, which is not true. Please don’t be an
instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court
itself becomes their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the
only Bank which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of
my several sincere offers of amicable settlement since the case was
filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in writing and duly
received by SBC. Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.
 I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I
looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief
Justice. As we would like to know if you really had intervened and
put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel)
to favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please
enlighten us before we seek another forum to seek redress
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and
embarrassment we suffered. If we are wrong about you, and I
hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal for forgiveness
and apologies. GOD is my witness, that what I have told you is the
truth. Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you
are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving justice.
Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations.” (Emphasis
supplied)
On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required
Mercado’s lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the
letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court.6
On November 17, 2004, the Court’s Third Division ordered
Mercado to personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 7
On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo
G. Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared before the Third
Division and swore to the truth of the letter he wrote. He 8
manifested that he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva
told him—that his petition was denied for the second time
“because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice.”
He further manifested that during the wake of Atty.
Villanueva’s mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is “a very very
good, close and long time friend of his.” However, while
9
stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales as Justice Gutierrez. 10
_______________
6 Letter dated November 2, 2004, Id., p. 393.
7 Resolution dated January 26, 2005, Id., pp. 413-415.
8 TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 27.
9 TSN, November 22, 2005, p. 36.
10 Id., pp. 37-41.
511
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 511
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a
Resolution directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written
11
explanation why Mercado should not be held in contempt of
Court.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a
comment, strongly denying Mercado’s allegations in his
12
letter. He denied having told petitioners that their petition
had to be denied again “because there was a tremendous
pressure from the Chief Justice in favor of Security Bank
Corporation.” He also stressed that there was no correlation
between the ponente’s trip to the United States and his trip to
London. He explained that he and his family went to London
to attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso
Villanueva. To substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of
“London School of Economics (LSE) and Political Science
Presentation Ceremonies” where the name of his daughter,
Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the
successful graduates. He likewise submitted a photocopy of his
passport indicating his departure for London on July 14, 2004
and his arrival in the Philippines on July 27, 2004. In addition,
he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including
its lawyers, and that there is no truth to Mercado’s statement
regarding his nephew’s alleged encounter with the new owners
of the subject property.
On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his
explanation why he should not be punished for contempt of
13
court. He claimed that the contemptuous statements in his
letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanueva’s
statements. He offered an apology, explaining that he wrote
the letter while he was “under the impulse of personal stress”
as he was losing his residential house.
_______________
11 Rollo, p. 65.
12 Letter dated November 22, 2004, Id., pp. 366-369.
13 Compliance and Explanation dated November 30, 2004, Id., pp. 403-409.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both
Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005
to elucidate their respective positions.
Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who
informed him that the ponente is Justice Gutierrez.
Atty. Villanueva even bragged that she is his “very, very close
friend.”
For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado
who informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He
also confirmed that she attended the wake of his mother. But
he denied Mercado’s claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez
and said that she is his close friend. 14
Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals
Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive
evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt
incident. 15
On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his
Investigation, Report and Recommendation. He found
Mercado “guilty of improper conduct tending to bring
the authority and the administration of justice by the
Court into disrespect when he openly belittled,
degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the
land, particularly the Chief Justice x x x.” However, he
held that “there was no showing that he acted with
malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly
motivated.” Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined
in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
We cannot sustain Justice Dacudao’s finding that Mercado
did not act with malice or bad faith in imputing those
derogatory and disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.
_______________
TSN, February 21, 2005, p. 12.
14
See Resolution, Rollo, p. 679.
15
513
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 513
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong. It contemplates a state of
16
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.
17
Malice is of the same genre. It connotes a sinister motive.
Mercado’s addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a
perfect illustration of bad faith and malice tending directly to
degrade the administration of justice. It transgresses the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing
into disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief
Justice Davide and the ponente, but also of the entire
Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether
Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted “tremendous pressure” to
the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him and the Judiciary
in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of
doing an “unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious” act and of
depriving his (Mercado’s) family of their “basic fundamental
rights in the protection of (their) property without due process.”
He concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family
“is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity.” In an
insulting and insolent tenor, he stated that “if the Chief
Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our
laws,” then there is “no wonder why foreign investors do not
want to invest in our country.”
Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery
attended the denial of his petition for review. He insinuated
that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad
were financed by respondent bank, stating that “when there is
smoke, there is fire.” He also recklessly accused the ponente of
giving respondent bank a “go-signal” to sell his property. In
this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide to “refrain from
influencing the members of the Third Division”; “let them
deliberate regularly on the case or inhibit themselves on the
_______________
16Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007.
17Air France v. Carrascoso, L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155,
166-167.
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
case”; and “let the Institution serve justice, and not individual
pecuniary interests.”
Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying “there
is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular.”
And with impudence, he threatened Chief Justice Davide to
enlighten him before he “seeks another forum to seek redress
for the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and
embarrassment” his family suffered.
Without doubt, Mercado’s letter is marked with malice, bad
faith, and gross disrespect. He committed a remarkable feat of
character assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his
claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanueva’s
statements, the words in his letter are more accusa-tory than
inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that his accusations
have no basis in fact and in law. Obviously, they caused
intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.
The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated
September 15, 2004 denying Mercado’s motion for
reconsideration is well explained. A principle almost repeated
to satiety is that “an action for annulment of judgment
cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.” A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion
for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the
party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the
action for annulment of judgment must be based either
on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and there
18
being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present,
the petition must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant
would find such legal disposition unacceptable.
_______________
Salonga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111478, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA
18
534.
515
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 515
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his
petition through a mere Minute Resolution and
after reinstating the petition. Apparently, he finds the
Court’s manner of denial and change of heart unusual and
casts sinister undertone to them.
In In Re Laureta, we ruled that the Court is not “duty-
19
bound” to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given depending on its evaluation of
a case. In the same case, we held that “the recall of a due
course Order after a review of the records of the case is
a common occurrence in the Court.” Like the respondents
in the said case, Mercado should not think that it is only his
petition which has been subjected to such recall.
The Third Division initially denied Mercado’s petition
because it is apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in dismissing his petition for
annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for
reconsideration alleging that the Appellate Court merely
relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former
counsel committed gross negligence, the Third Division took
the most prudent course by reinstating the petition. Now, after
considering the petition and the comment thereon, the Third
Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did
not commit any reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer
is a resounding “no.” The reinstatement of a petition does
not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted.
Otherwise, the filing of comment and subsequent
pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado
invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication.
We are not persuaded.
A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances
which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape
_______________
G.R. No. 68635, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382, 417.
19
516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with
abuse of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous
remarks to Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, Mercado
abused such liberty. His statements cast aspersions to their
reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.
The fact that Mercado’s letter was addressed only to the
Chief Justice does not rinse it of its contemptuous character.
In In Re Laureta, we ruled that letters addressed to
20
individual Justices, in connection with the performance of
their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and
are a matter of concern for the entire court.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of
court.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing.—After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx
As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not
categorically state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that
Chief Justice Davide exerted “tremendous pressure” on the ponente,
the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time,
however, we are inclined to believe that Atty.
_______________
20 Supra.
517
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 517
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
Villanueva gave such information to Mercado. Not only that, Atty.
Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he and
the ponente have known each other since 1964; and that
the ponente would be at the wake of his mother, thus:
After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence
adduced in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is fully
convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner
could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the case.
As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned
investigator is inclined to give more credence to the testimony of
petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and
detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his
claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by
presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and
Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that
Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These
admissions tend to strengthen the allegations of petitioner
that Atty. Villanueva was the one who told him the name of
the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and
the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner
attended the wake of Atty. Villanueva’s mother, he was told
by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the ponente, was
coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.” Further, Rule 15.07
provides that “a lawyer must impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.” Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In
informing Mercado that he was “a very very good, close and
long time friend” of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed
upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of
his case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice,
Mercado’s expectation crumbled. This prompted him to hurl
unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against
Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold
assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the
successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure
and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when
the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under
a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty.
Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but
also to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief
Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or
influenced.
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts and the judicial officers. Atty. 21
Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and
dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court
as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect
contempt of court.
On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts
have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt
reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And
that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to lie within
the sound discretion of the court. Considering the 22
circumstances obtaining herein, we believe that Mercado and
Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00 each and warned
that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty.
One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts
to punish for contempt is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without
such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky
_______________
21 Fernandez v. Verzola, A.M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA
369.
22 17 Am. Jur. 2d § 105, citing United Marine Div. of I.L.A. v.
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 773, 71 SE2d 159, cert den 344 US 893, 97 L. Ed. 690,
73 S. Ct. 212.
519
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 16, 2006 519
Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation
foundation. Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and
23
integrity from assaults of disrespect. One reason why respect
of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is because of
unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can
be influenced or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P.
Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.
They are FINED P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a
repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanueva’s
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, ChicoNazario, Tinga and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Corona and Callejo, Sr., JJ., On Leave.
Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva meted
with P50,000.00 fine each for indirect contempt and both
warned against repetition of similar acts.
Note.—The salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised on the preservative not vindictive
principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. (Oclarit vs. Paderanga, 350 SCRA 260 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
See Salcedo v. Hernandez, supra.
23
520
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
Adm. Case No. 2040. March 4, 1998. *
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J.
VALDES, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; As a rule, a lawyer is not barred
from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.—As a rule, a
lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good
faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to
exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard
than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at
“arms length.” Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no
advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded
on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy
position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor.
Same; Same; Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to
deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.—It
ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the Moran
property from the estate which his law firm was representing
evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly
believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at
least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not
agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally presented
his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant
and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his
legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly
unethical.
Same; Same; Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.—Respondent seeks to exculpate
himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the
prepara-
_______________ honesty, probity or good demeanor.—In the case at bar, complainant
is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the
*SECOND DIVISION.
759
common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is
charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 759
of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to repre-
Nakpil vs. Valdes 760
tion of the list of the estate’s liabilities. He theorizes that the 760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of Nakpil vs. Valdes
his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these
sent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were
two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent
presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable
himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed
as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of
error of the accounting firm in charging respondent’s loans against
doubt. Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his
the estate could not have been committed without respondent’s
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from
participation. Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it too”
disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a
and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to
confidence reposed on him.
admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
Same; Same; The proscription against representation of
practice of law.
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
Same; Same; In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than
arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable
full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his
however slight such adverse interest may be.—As regards the third
dealings and transactions with his clients.—Public confidence in law
charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine
an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly
his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
improper to represent both sides of an issue. The proscription
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the
against representation of conflicting interests finds application
Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an
general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intentions and
utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent
motives were honest and he acted in good faith. However,
exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his
parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts.
clients.
Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their
informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible
Misconduct.
adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
Same; Same; The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
 Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis, Carranza & Alampay for
complainant.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzalez & San Agustin for
respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J.
VALDES dates back to the ’50s during their school days in
761
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 761
Nakpil vs. Valdes
De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness
extended to their families and respondent became the business
consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a
summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of
1
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the
Moran property by filing with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with
damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance,
complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the
respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional
ethics when he:
_______________
1The Moran property consists of a four-bedroom bungalow on a 2,490
square meter lot.
762
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes

funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran

1. I.Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the
(Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was
property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it
settling as its lawyer and auditor.
back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two
2. II.Excluded the Moran property from the ‘inventory of
(2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and
real estate properties’ he prepared for a client-estate
P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the
and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to
property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.
purchase the said excluded property as a liability of
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house.
the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title
When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as
to the said property to his family corporation.
the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
3. III.Prepared and defended monetary claims against the
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976,
estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor. 2

respondent’s law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled

the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Complainant
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted
was appointed as administratrix of the estate.
respondent’s offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in
husband’s estate. Respondent’s law firm then filed a petition
the intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded
for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not
the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate. On
include the Moran property in the estate’s inventory. Instead,
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the
respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval
Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its
name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not
belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late
Nakpil in his correspondences with the Baguio City Treasurer
3 owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought
and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that
respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) excluded
the Moran property from the inventory of her husband’s estate,
yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts of
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as
her husband’s loans applied “probably for the purchase of a
house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.”
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that
respondent’s law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed
the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court,
while respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
_______________
2Letter-complaint, dated June 16, 1979; Rollo, pp. 1-9.
3Exhibits “H,” “J” and “L,” adduced also in the reconveyance case.
763
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998
Nakpil vs. Valdes
acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors.
She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests
when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her
husband’s estate which was represented by respondent’s law
firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction
between respondent’s law and auditing firms as respondent is
the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are
housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him.
In his ANSWER, respondent initially asserted that the
4
resolution of the first and second charges against him
depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the
Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his
defense in the reconveyance case that he did not hold the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute
back the Moran property from him, hence, the property
remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpil’s estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the
list of claims against the estate which included his loans of
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of
the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate,
he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm
merely stated that the loans in respondent’s name were
applied “probably for the purchase of the house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City.” Respondent insisted that this was
not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the
phrase “probably for the purchase” did not imply a
consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the
preparation of a letter (Exhibit “H”) of his accounting firm to
763 _______________
4Rollo, pp. 44-63.
764
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for
the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended
that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who
acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property for:
(1) complainant’s February 1979 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2)
complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of
the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the
services of his law and accounting firms in the settlement of
her husband’s estate. However, he pointed out that he has
5
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña (from the
law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a
conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate in
the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J.
Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and
prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for
his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the
late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of
the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President.
Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who,
upon the latter’s death, became the President of ENORN, Inc.
These two claimants had been clients of his law and
accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil.
Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests
was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as
administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests
between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a
modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied
only after full pay-
_______________
5 Attached to his Answer is the retainership agreement, dated February 20,
1976, between complainant and his firms; Rollo, pp. 73-75.
765
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998
Nakpil vs. Valdes
ment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the
claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the
banks’ claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims
caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J.
Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of
the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of
the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and
accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974. He rejoined his
6
accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the
SEC’s certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty.
Percival Cendaña, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the
other hand, the claimants were represented by their own
counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that
in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of
professional ethics, he committed such “misconduct” not as a
lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of
the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held
accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted
her REPLY. She maintained that the pendency of the
7
reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her
disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in the
latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics
and morality of respondent’s conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent’s Annexes to his
Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the
Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed
that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran
property were
_______________
6 He attached to his Answer his letter of resignation addressed to the
765 managing partner of his accounting firm (Rollo, at p. 76) and the SEC
certification that the letter of resignation was duly presented to said body
(Rollo, at p. 77).
7 Rollo, pp. 137-155.
766
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
all prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant of the estate
of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C.J. Valdes
& Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these
Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran
property but were part of respondent’s scheme to remove the
property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the
documents because of the professional counsel of respondent
and his firm that her signature thereon was
required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for
coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the
documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown
unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the estate
and the letter regarding Nakpil’s payment of realty tax on the
Moran property) which were prepared by his law and
accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the
same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but
for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent’s claim that he resigned
from his firms from March 9, 1976 to “several years later.” She
alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence
referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents
merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER, respondent insisted that complainant
8
cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of both the
estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous
for respondent’s accounting firm to act as accountant for the
estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as
accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list
of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their
claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm
_______________
8Rollo, pp. 182-197.
767
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 767
Nakpil vs. Valdes
but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did
not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not
because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He
emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were
fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent’s
law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution, we deferred further
9
action on the disbarment case until after resolution of the
action for reconveyance between the parties involving the
issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of
ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her
complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the
unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her
motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for
reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
The appellate court held that respondent was the absolute
owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of
complainant’s appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted
its Report on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied
11
heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending
review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not
put on notice of complainant’s claim over the property. It
opined that there was no trust agreement created over the
property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof.
Thus, it upheld
_______________
 9 Ibid., p. 200. 12 7 C.J.S. 966.
10 See Resolution, dated July 18, 1984; Rollo, at p. 305. 13 Gould v. State, 69 ALR 709.
11 Rollo, pp. 306-342. 14 5 Am. Jur. 338.

768 15 Nakpil v. IAC, 225 SCRA 456.

16 Ibid.
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
769
Nakpil vs. Valdes
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 769
respondent’s right to transfer title to his family corporation. It
Nakpil vs. Valdes
also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related
to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the ’50s.
of the administrative case. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late
situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the
demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in
connection with the property of his client. trust for the latter. In violation of the trust
agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client
but the business transaction must be characterized with property and refused to sell the property to complainant after
utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith
12
the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later
his client is a much higher standard than is required in transferred it to his corporation.
business dealings where the parties trade at “arms Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially
length.” Business transactions between an attorney and his
13
acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. property. Respondent’s bad faith in transferring the property to
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure his family corporation is well discussed in this Court’s
Decision, thus:
that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This
17

“x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during

rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorney’s favor. 14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the
OSG in its Report. These findings were based mainly on the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance
which was reversed by this Court in 1993. 15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual
findings of this Court in the aforementioned reconveyance
case. It is well-established that respondent offered to the
16
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by
_______________
the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly
recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded
Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil
submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
“The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the
parties x x x can be bolstered by Exh. “I-2,” an annex to the claim
filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his
brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes &
Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit “I-2,” which
is a list of the application of the proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late
Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name
of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already
transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been
included in the list.
“Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under
the arrangement outlined in Exh. “J” was that respondent Valdes
would x x x ‘take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of the
interests due on the notes’ while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil
_______________
17 Nakpil v. IAC, supra.
770
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
would continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years
without remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This
does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period
petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x
Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong
Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and
Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late
Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself.” (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that
complainant’s documentary evidence (Exhibits “H,” “J” and
“L”), which she also adduced in this administrative case,
should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the
Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose
Nakpil. 18
It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the
Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client.
If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to
him, he should have at least informed complainant of his
adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in the
intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to
his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and
the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his
legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is
clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his
accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00 and
P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were
obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the
property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to
exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge
or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities.
He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a
mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that
the information as to how these two loans should be treated
_______________
Ibid., at p. 465.
18
771
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 771
Nakpil vs. Valdes
could have only come from respondent himself as the said
loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the
accounting firm in charging respondent’s loans against the
estate could not have been committed without respondent’s
participation. Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it
too” and subordinated the interest of his client to his own
pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is
guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the
rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent
both sides of an issue. The proscription against representation
19
of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is
20
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It
applies although the attorney’s intentions and motives were
honest and he acted in good faith. However, representation of
21
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent
to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure
alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his
clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible
adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. 22
_______________
19 7A C.J.S. 206-209, citing U.S. - Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
vs. Daniel Intern Corporation, C.A. Ga., 563.
20 Md. - Rippon vs. Mercantile Safe Deposit & T. Co. of Baltimore, 131 A. 2d
695, 699, 213 Md. 215.
21 U.S. - Cinema 5 Ltd. vs. Cinerama, Inc., C.A. N.Y., 528 F. 2d. 1384.
22 7A C.J.S. 215-216; Pa. - Jedwabny vs. Philadelphia Transport Co., 135 A.
2d 252, 390 Pa. 231; 78 S. Ct. 557, 355 U.S. 966, 2 L. Ed. 2d 541.
772
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the
estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the
claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict
between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor,
and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In
fact, at one instance, respondent’s law firm questioned the
claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he
represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He
points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law
firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case
in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the
case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in
the records of this case and in the reconveyance
case, respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
23
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent’s
defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as
early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate
case) is unworthy of merit. Respondent’s claim of resignation
from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof.
The documents on record only show respondent’s resignation
24
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these
documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting
firm on July 1, 1976
_______________
23 Nakpil vs. IAC, supra, at p. 458.
24 Amendment to Amended Articles of Partnership of respondent’s
accounting firm which contains the following information: (a) on July 17,
1973, a week after Jose Nakpil died, the SEC approved the recall of
respondent’s withdrawal from his accounting firm in 1972; see Rollo, at pp. 80-
81; (b) on August 31, 1974, respondent resigned again from his accounting firm;
see Respondent’s letter of resignation from his accounting firm, dated August
15, 1974; Rollo, at p. 76; (c) on July 1, 1976, barely three months after the filing
of the intestate case in court, respondent rejoined his accounting firm; Rollo,
at p. 89. All the foregoing documents refer to respondent’s resignation from his
accounting firm. Moreover, it appears from the records that as of 1978, the
intestate case was still pending in court.
773
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 773
Nakpil vs. Valdes
and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Jose’s estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape
us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his
corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings
was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events
shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant of
the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law
firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of the
estate and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was
25
the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against
it. The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix,
26
did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her
as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his
law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to
complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement
does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed
consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the
late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When a
creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se
adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant,
if she had a claim against her husband’s estate, her claim is
still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly
placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client
could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two
creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s
accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to
determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
_______________
Rollo, at p. 60.
25
Ibid., at p. 59.
26
774
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nakpil vs. Valdes
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was
conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as
his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is
actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner
of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the
case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with
breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate
and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at
the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is
a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed
respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt.
Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from
disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character
27
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar,
28
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to
observe candor,
_______________
Nadayag vs. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 [1994].
27
Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 [1996].
28
775
VOL. 286, MARCH 4, 1998 775
Nakpil vs. Valdes
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his
clients.29
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY.
CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well
as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez,
JJ., concur.
 Melo, J., No part. Previous associate with respondent.
Respondent found guilty of misconduct and suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
Note.—A lawyer by his deceitful actuations constituting
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be
subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good as well as
for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole.
(Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 [1996])

——o0o——
_______________

Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility.

29

776
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