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BURMA CAMPAIGN 1942 – 45

INREODUCTION

1. Burma strategical importance to the britain lay in her oil and mineral resources,
sea and Singapere. At the out break of II World War, Burma was operationally under
control of the Far East command with headquarter with Singapore where as
administration remained undet the war office. Burma was separated from india in
1937 as a result small Burma Army was created for the security of the country.

2. On january 1942 the Japanese poured in across the south eastern frontier of
Siam. They reached the gead of the Burmese river vally undet northen area of
mountains. They fought and forced britain- Chinese army and defeated. The Chinese
withdrew into Yunan and almost all land of Burma wsa lots.

3. For more then eighreen nonths, the Japanese had been masters of vast
defensive area covering their early conquest. This stretched form jungle covered
mountain of northen and westarn burma where British and indian troops at close grips
eith them.

4 The allied lauched series of offensive to reconquest Burna since December 1942.
The inirial result was humilating and allied troops were felt no match to japanese
counter parts. However, finally the allied troops were successful reconquesting
Burmaon May 1945. The campaign brought many lesson which it feet inportant in the
military field.

Aim

5. The ain of this research papet is to highlight the military lessons learnt in Burma
campaigh.

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TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE OF BURMA

General

6. The geographical location of burma liea between China and India. It forvs a
imortant part of Indo-china prninsula. During the out break of II World War it was it
was a barrier of mountains, monsoons, malaria, rivers and jungle. At the out break of II
World War, Burma had an area of 2,61,610 square miles and was bounded by French
Indo China and Thiland in the east, Malaya and Indian ocean in the south, Indian
province of Bangal and Assam in the west and China in the north.

7. Burma could be divided geographically into two distinct region Lower and upper.
Lower burma includes the great plains and deltas of the Irrawaddy, plains of Sittang
and salween rivers and the Arakan. The Upper Burma consists of upper Irrawaddy vally
and hill tracts which sorrounds it. Economically Lower Burna is important for
agricultural wealth and upper burma most of the mineral wealth of the country.

Communication

8. The principle means of overland supply at the world war II was mainly of three
types are:

(a) Water ways: The main ricers are Chindwin, Irrawaddy, Sittang and
Salween. These rivers are running fron north to suith. these rivers are running
from north to south. These rivers are navigable for water ways, which is the
chief means of Communication.

(a) Railways: Although rail communication were existing from Rangoon to

Mondalay, Lashio, indaw to Myitkyina and Rangoon to prome. They were undet
decveloped and proved as great handicap to Burma army during retreat in 1942 .

(c) Road Cummunication: Road Condition of Burma at the time of war was
very primitive. However following roads were existing:-

(1) Rangoon to Mandalay

(2) Rangoon to Prome

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(3) Mandalay to Lathio and Burma road to Kunming

(4) Mandalay to Myitkyina fare weather road

(5) Track from Kalemyo to Tamu.

(d) Communication into Burma: The main supply route into Burma was sea
but the capture of surrounding island by the Japanese closed this avenue. The
railing from calcutta to Demapur covered about 600 miles but in between
Wagon has to be transported by a ferry. In northern front railway extended upto
Ledo which was about 800 miles from Calcutta. Inland water way distance from
Calcutta to Northern front was 1136 miles. The road was no worthwhile.
However in Dec 1942 Imphal – Tamu road was made usable in time to enable
Burmese Army to beat monsoon in it's withdrawal. In 1943 following roads were
under construction.

(1) Ledo to Chinese front

(2) Demapur to central front

(3) Dohazari to Arakan

Climate

9. The climate of Burma controlled primarily by the north east and south west
monsoons. The north east monsoons lasts from November to March and distinguished
by bright day conditions and generally clear night skies. The south west monsoons
season lasts from may to October accompanied by heavy rainfall. Between the two
monsoon period April and may constitute the hot season with heavy thunder storms.
The rainfall measures 32 to 200 inches each year. Flooding is generally occurred in
summer months.

10. The average temperature is high at all season. From March to may the
temperature is measured 100 degrees. However the effect of temperature is reduced
bye relative humidities. During south west monsoon both temperture and humidity are
high and imposes severe strain on human body.

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MILITARY EFFECT OF TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

11. The following effect on the conduct of ops is felt during conduct of Burma
campaign:

(a) Required improvement and development of rail way line from India to
Assam and road communication to dimapur to Imphal and further upto Tamu.

(b) Chitagong could be established as advanced base in order to capture

southern coast and Arakan.

(c) Since there were no dependable line of communication air maintainance

was felt necessary.

(d) The central plain areas is observed suitable ground for mobile operation.

(e) to keep overland route open capture of Myitkyina and development of

airbase was also necessary help in upper belt.

(f) Due to lack of lateral available seperate operation were required to

capture Arakan, central sector and Myitkyina.

(g) The whole area was largely material and diseased infesed and therefore
requied high degree of medical care.

STRATEGICAL BACKGROUND

12. The reorganisation of Japanese Armed force and its modernisation started from
1881. It developed Army and Navy rapidly along with the national economic
development. After the first World War fall of prices affected Japan adversely. This was
followed by earhtquake of 1923 which also disorganised her economy. This made her
import of raw materials in order to sustain her economy. When she found she lack raw
materials for industry it became major cause for her expansion and aggression.

13. The rising tide of nationalist which considered Japanese Armed forces as a chief
protector of the nation . By the end of 19 th century the amry and navy could approach
directly to the Emperor on military matters. The Japanese army also needed to
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establish their domination over whole eastern Asia, particularly China. From 1930
onward the armed forces by threat and assassination virtually controlled Japanese
policy.

14. Japan acquired the Kurile, Bonin and Ryukyu island and volcano group between
1987 to 1891. She also occupied Formosa, Perseadore and Port Arthur from China in
1894 to 95. In 1905 she took control over port Arthur after her successful war with
Russia. She finally annexed Korea in 1919. In 1929 Japan invaded Manchuria this
brought her conflict with China. She also invaded China on July 1937. This began
underclared war between them and later merged into World War.

15. Japan in her fear of Russia and communism entered into pact with German in
1936 and ITaly in 1937. In September 1940 she signed the Three Power Pact by which
these power undertook to oppose any fresh country that joined the allies. This was
aimed priarily against inervention by America.

16. In july 1941 Bratain and America declared a kind of economic war on Japan since
her protective Control of Indo-china. On 20 Oct 1941 the government of Japan under
General Tojo demanded from USA to supply oil to Japan and assisting China. This was
impossible demand and Jaanese however had no option but to go to war if they were
to remain great inustrial power.

17. The situation was also favouring to Japan as Russia was being pressed hard by
Germany and was near defeat. Britain had her full hands in Africa and Atlantic and USA
was not prepared for war.

Japanese Strategy

18. The main of Japanese strategy was to deny sea and air bases to USA which was
great industrial power with unlimiting resources. The Japanese made enemy with USA
attacking Pearl Harbour. The essential plan of her was to acquire Burma, Malaya,
Burma, Sumatra Java and Borneo for herself supporting as an insustrial power. The
Japanese offensive was to secure required oil supplies that would enable her to
overcome China and cut off communication to China. Where as occupation of land to

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have something to exchange for peace with USA. The following where the objective of
Japanese strategy .

(a) To delelop strong perimeter to include Burma, Malaya. Netherland, East

Indies and New Guinea.

(b) The offensive operation was divided inti two part. The Army was tasked to
capture Malaya, Burma, Sumatra and Navy was tasked for the capture of Pearl
Harbour, Souther Philippines, Borneo, Celebess, Java and New Guinea.

(c) The Malayan campaign was still in progress when Japan attacked Burma
on 14 Dec 1941. The following reason prompted Japan to conquer Burma:

(1) The Japanese having blocked the China coast wanted to cutoff
Burma road which had the possibility of being major land route
connecting China.

(2) The capture of Burma would provide Japan a strategic shield and
defensive circle to fight away from homeland.

(3) The oil fields of Yenang Yavng and Chauk could be of industrial
importance.

(4) The capture of Burma would creat political instability to india. They
expected Indian National Army lead by Netaji subash Chandra Boss to
fight Bratain backed by the Japanese Army.

(5) The rice production, tungsten, timber and other raw materials was
also cause of economic importance of Burma.

Allied Defense Plan of Burma

19. Burma strategical importance to the Bratain lay in her oil and mineral resources,
sea and air communication with Malaya and Singapore. The Britain always regarded
very remote possiblity of land attack to Burma and as long as Singapore remained in
British possession that there was little danger of a sea borne invasion of Burma.

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20. Burma was politically seperated from India in 1937. To meet the security need of
Burma a small army was created. As the security of Burma directly affected that of
India it was sesveral time requested by C-IN-C India to be it's part of command. It was
not accepted till July 1941 when Japan entered Idol China. Ultimately the responsibility
for def of Burma was handed over to India command on 15 Feb 42. The major defense
plan was following :

(a) The government of Burma till Feb 1941 was assured by war office that is
likely that Burma will envolve in large scale war. It was felt that Burma natual
defense and lack of communication would make land invasion extremely
difficult. However threat from ground forces is visualised from Shanstates of
Thailand due to good road communication and maximum danger is felt from air.

(b) Till the 15 Dec 41 General staff in India failed to forecast the direction of
attack. Attack on Tenasserim was believed to be subsidiary attack in conjuction
with man offensive in Malaya.

(c) The defender of Burma had no clear comprehension of the war picture upto
last moment. Due to this reson adequate preparation was not made and Britain
commanders were unable to judge Japanese capability to operate effectively in
under developed terrain.

JAPANESE INVASION AND ALLIED RETREAT

21. On January 1942 the Japanese poured in across the South Eastern Frontiers of
Siam and reached the head of Burmese river valley under northen area of mountains.
The hasily prepared Bratain and Chinese forces retreated across the Chindwin and over
the jungle ranges into India. The Chinese withdrew up the wild gorges of the Saiween
into Yunan. Almost all the land of Burma was lost and defense of India were exposed.

(a) Allied Forces : Following units were in Burma :

(1) Two Bratain Inf Bn.

(2) Two Indian Inf Bde.

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(3) Eight Bn of Burma Rifles.

(4) The Burma Frontier Forces equivalent of 6 Inf Bn.

(5) Four mtn Batteries and one four gun 18 pounder Battery

(b) Reinforcement : First reinforcement was 16 Indian Infantry Brigade which

arrived toward the end of Jan 1942. followed by 48 Indian Infantry Brigade at
first week of Feb. These two brigade fomed the 17 division and established
moulmein on 5 Jan 1942. Later 63 Indian Bde on March and 3 British Infantry
Battalions and 7 armoured Brigade arrived forward the end of Feb 42.

(c) Command Setup : Major General McLad was the General officer
commanding of Burma Army at the time of Japanese invasion. He was replaced
by Lt.General Hutten on 27 Dec who came just before battle of Sittang,
Lt.General Alexander took over command and Lt.General Hutten remained as his
chief of staff.

(1) Burma corps was formed after the fall of Rangoon and Lt General
Slim assumed command in March 42.

(2) Burma corps was command by Maj General Bruce Scot Throughout
the retreat. Maj General J D Smith was commander of 17 Indian Divison.
He was repalced by Maj General D T Cowers after the Sittang Battles who
commanded Division successfully throughout the campaign.

(3) The Chinese Army offered 5th and 6th Army ill equiped and strength
was not equivalent to British Division.

(d) Airforce : At the out break of war only one squandrons of bombers in
Burma. Later two bombers came as reinforcement. These also destroyed by
Japanese and they had complete mastery of the Throughout the invasion.

(e) Deployment Burma forces consider of 1 Burma Division and 17 Indian

Division. The disposition was I Div in the Shan states to the east of the Mandalay
facing the frontiers of Indo china and Siam and 17 Indian stretched out strip 1. It
was given the task of covering all the approaches from the south and south east.

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(f) The courses of campaign : Japanese invasion started on 14 Dec 41, when
a detachment of 15 Army moved into Tennasseim to seize three key air fields
and block British air reinforcement to malay. Their aim was to get astride road
and rail communication, North of Rangoon. The major events are following :
1
East and south of Moulmein down the Tennasrim

(1) Japanese initially employed two division for invasion. Two more
division and two tank regiments were brought after the fall of Rangoon.

(2) Due to lack of timely information of the Japanese movement across

the border the Burma Army was compeletely ignorant of the situation.

(3) Starting from Jan 20 to 30 Japanese captured Kawakerik and

Mouelmein in 16 Bde front. After this 17 Indian Div tried to stop Japanese
along the line of Saleween river.

(4) On 22 Feb, the Japanese launched a strong attack on the bridge

head at Sittang. When it was feared of falling bridge into enemy's hand it
was blown on the morning of 23 Feb. The destruction left the whole 16
and 46 Infantry Bdea and two Battalions of 48 Jnf Bde on the far side if the
river. Only the bulks of troops crossed the river nmbering 2500 men with
550 rifles 12 Bren grnd and 12 Tommy grnd. All heavy equipment were left
on the east side of the bank. After this bdes couldn't be regarded as more
than remnants.

(5) After the Sittang battle 17 Indian Div was withdrawn to pegu and I
Burma was positioned South of Peu Toungoo to cover the main road and
railway lone to Mandalay. By 6 Mach Rangoon-Pegu road had been cutoff
south and almost Rangoon was surrounded, which threatened oil
refineries at Siyrim. Demolition of Rangoon was carried out successfully
and evacuation 6 March.

(6) After the fail of Rangoon Chinese Fifth Army was ordered to relieves
Burma Div on Toungoo front. Toungoo Div ws brought to Irrwadding with
17 Indian Div to form a continuous defense front for the oil fields along

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the line of Prome Toungoo. Lieut Gen Slim was appointed as Burma corps
commander on 9 March 1942.

(7) On 24 March Japanese again cutoff Chinese 200 Div north of

Toungoo 17 Div was forced to withdraw from Prome which was attacked
on 1 April 1942. By now whole Japanese 33 Div was under Burma corps
while Japanese 55 Div was fighting on the Toungoo salient against
Chinese.

(8) On 14 April 42 Yenanyaung oil fields were demolished and by 25

April Japanese were already on the top of Pyawbwe and there was no
troops in Meiktila to stop the Japanese advance toward Mandalay.
General Alexander decided to withdraw right back to India. By 30 April all
troops had been withdrawn north of Irrawaddy. The Chinese also
retreated to Yunan.

(9) On the evening of April strong Japanese forces surprised Bratain

troops at Monwa and their pursuit to Kelmyo continued on 17 May troops
of Burma were concerntated in the area of Tamu and on 20 May came
under 4 Indian corps. Burma Army ceased to exit from that day.

Causes of Allied Defeat

22. The defense of Burma had not been planned in conjuction with the defence of
India. The communication axis between the two was through port of Rangoon and
once Rangoon was lost the loss of Burma was considered a certainity. The main
reasons for the loss of Burma are following :

(a) The command Set Up : The preparation for the defense of Burma were
made in January 1941. It was taken out of India command and put under new
ABDA command. In his vast command Burma received low priority for troops
and war materials.

(b) Aim : The army in Burma were not given clear cut aim except to keep on
fighting for retaining as much territory as possible.

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(c) Faulty Strategy : Initailly to defend and delay every where which resulted
in the dispersion of forces in small groups. Brigades were spread over vast areas.
The policy led to distergration of these isolated groups one after another.

(d) Lack of preparation : The war in Burma was never expected by both
military and civil authorities in Burma and as such no preparation was made to
meet threat. The lack of road communication between India and Burma, frequent
changes in responsibility, the division of operational and administrative controls
are some factors which presents lack of preparation.

(e) Lack of Troops : The Burma army was not considered enough to hold its
frontier. Two Chinese armies which came into Burma would have certainly
influenced if they had come little earlier.

(f) Lack of Equipment : Troops in Burma were ill equipped for the type of
war they had to fight. 17 Division which was equipped for desert warfare had to
fight jungle warfare in Burma.

(g) Lack of Intelligence : This was the major cause of defeat. There was no
information about Japanese technique of jungle warfare. Lack of information
about Japanese strength and movement which resulted in loss of well organised
positions on many occasions. This blindness enabled the Japanese to achieve
tactical surprises in most of the battles.

(h) Administration : No administration arrangement were made to sustain

division battle particularly in jungle. After the fall of Rangoon all cmmunication
with India were cut expcept by air.

(i) Airforce : The airforce were unable to defect and react Japanese airforces.
There was no protection against air attack which continuously harassed the
ratreating Bratain forces.

(j) Training : The training of Britain forces inadequate. The orgainisation and
equipment not suited for Burma campaign. The Japanese were more superior in
mobility particularly in underdeveloped terrain.

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(K) Locals : The locals in Burma were not educated or prepared against
Japanese to fight. Although hill tribes were loyal hte Burmese in Plain helped
Japanese for variety of reasons.

(l) Morale : The morale of the forces in the beginning was not just much
affected. But later on it became very bad due to lack of training of equipment and
continuous defeat in conjuction with heavy casualty.

ALLIED OFFENSIVE TO RECONOUST BURMA

Allied Planning

23. Five months of monsoon which followed the fall of Burma and jungle and
mountains across the frontiers with no communication had prevented Japanese
exploiting their intial success to conduct offensive in India. The Japanese were close to
threat Indian frontiers and industrial states like Calcutta which came under Japanese
air strikes to panic civilians. General wavell, therefore, decided that pushing back of
Japanese from Arakan is essential to remove the Japanese threat to land and sea
routes. His intention crystalised into capture of Akyab Islands, Strengthen the positions
in the Chin hills and occupation of the line of chindwin from sittang to Kalewa. Early in
June 1942, General Wavell completed his outline plan for the offensive operations into
Burma by land, having discarded the idea of a sea borne attack against lower Burma
lacking trained troops and equipment. The plan finalised by the end of 1942 as follows:

(a) Stilwell's Chinese troops were to reopen the land route to China by
covering Northern Burma and building a high way from Ledo across the
mountains to link with Burma Road at some point beyound Myitkyina.

(b) Brigadier Wingate was to lead a small long range penetration group
consisting of about a brigade and carryout a heavy raid into North Central Burma
to disrupt enemy's communication.

(c) An advance into the Arakan with the object of capturing Akyab.

First Arakan Campaign

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24. Arakan is narrow strip of land consisting of coastline on the Bay of Bengal. From
the coast towards inlands, the terrain comprises mountain and river. The foot hills is
covered with jungle, shrub and paddy field cultivation. The terrain ideally suits the
defender.

25. Plan: Initially General Wavell had planned to retake by a sea borne landing
primarily for its air bases. His plan also envisaged a diversionary attack along east coast
and 4 corps was to contain the Japanese forces along Indo Burma front. But due to
shortage of assault craft a land thrust towards was accepted as the main attack.
Toadvance upto Foul Poul was planned by land and it was to be ferried to cross Mayu
river to Akyab island.

26. Conduct of Operation: In December 1942, 14 Indian Division under Lloyed

consisting of only two bde was tasked to conduct offensive on both sides of Mayu
range. By the end of December the advancing elements reached near Donabaik and
out skirts of Rathedung, the Japanese had well prepared defense in this area. The allied
frist attack on both of them failed. After the failure of even second attack four fresh
brigades were resulted as reinforcements making a total of nine brigades on 14
Division. The allied again launched third attack on Donabaik this also failed. The
reinforcement of 6 Britain Bde and 4 Bns of 2 Inf Div was done. The final attack also
failed.

27. After the failure of attack 14 Div was decided to withdraw. In the meantime
Japanese launched counter attack in the rear of 6 Britain bde. The Brigadier Cavendith
died. Colonel Tanashi further counter attacked in Kaladan valley and exploited towards
outskirts of Rathedung to cut off and annihilate 14 Indian Div. However Britain troops
avoided this trap by withdrawing up to the Mayu river. The army was back by May
1943 from where it had started.

28. Casualty: This campaign cost was 2500 battle and 8000 malaria casualty. This
failure highly demoralized the British troops and allies.

The First Chendit Expedition

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29. Early in 1942, General Wavell felt the need of long range penetration guerrilla
forces in Burma to reconquest lost territory. He asked the service of Lt/Col, OG
Wingate, who had served under wavell in Palestine in 1938 and in Abyssinia in 41.

30. Formation of Chindits: Wingate formed 77 Indian Infantry Bde comprising 13 Bn

of Kings regt. 3/2 GR, 2nd Bn of Burma Rifles and 142 commando coy specially trained
to penetrate deep into enemy territory and operate there by mens of air supply and
radio, without depending upon normal military lines of communication.

31. Conduct of Operation: The original aim of the Chindit in this operations was to
help Chinese offensive from Yunan. As the Chinese operation did not materialise still
Wavell decided Wingate to carry out expedition on 8 Feb, 1943. However, the
objective of Chindits were following :

(a) To cut the main north and south railway line between Mandalay and
Myitkyina. Also to cross Irrawaddy and cut railway line between Mandalay and
Lashio.

(b) The Chindits advanced rapidly from 4 corps front succeeded initial
objective and headed in dispersed column towards second objective which was
necessary to cross Irrawaddy. Wingate realised that his force was running out
due to heat, sickness and failure of the air supply system. He abandoned his
second objective and withdrew back to India in small group. By June 1943,
Wingate expedition was over.

32. Evaluation of Mission: The objective of the expedition did not achieve any
strategic value. About one third of the force didnot comeback. This operation wasnot a
success because it wasnot coordinated with other major operation.

Allied Strategy

33. Allied Strategic Planning:

34. In May 1943 Quebic Conference gave birth to South East Asia Command.

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35. Based on directives gave to SEAC, it planned to reconquest Burma by launching

strong offensive from Northern, Central and Southern direction.

36. Evolution of New Plan:

37. Based on above agreement between UK and USA a compromise was reached
and a directive was issued by combined chiefs of staffs to SEAC on 3 June 1943 as
under.

38. The Final Strategy:

39. Command Set Up:

40. There was no logical command set up in Burma before the birth of SEAC.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OPERATION UP TO JUNE

1944

THE BUILD UP OF OPPOSING FORCES

Gen

41. No maj important operation was done during the winter of 1943.

Japanese Force

42. Japanese built up its five div with a sixth on its way to Arakans.

43. Whole of the part of Burma was held by Japanese.

44. Japanese had fairly high air superiority.

Allied Forces

45. Allied forces had the following forces:

(a) 11 Army group was under General Giffard and consisted of-

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46. Disposition of Fourteenth Army was as following:

(a) North Burma

(b) Central Force

(c) Arakan

47. Navy:

48. Air:

(a) NCAC Front

(b) Central Front

(c) Arakan

(d) 222 RAF Group was based in Ceylon.

49. Chindits:

50. Auxiliary Forces:

51. Chinese Forces in India:

Projected Operation of Allies

52. By British and American interests and global commitments the ops were
projected as following for 1944:

(a) The advance of Stilwells force to Myitkyina.

(b) The overland advance of 15 corps in the Arakans.

(c) Limited advance by 4 corps.

(d) Chindits to assist Stilwells advance by operating deep inside the territory.

53. The Supreme cdr SEAC decided to carry out:

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(a) Ops Capital: Overland advance into North Burma.

(b) Ops Dracula: Ambhibian assault to capture Rangoon.

54. The Ops Capital and Draculla were implied as following:

(a) A limited advance in Arakan by 15 Corps, Supported by 224 RAF Group.

The tasks were-

(1) To secure the fwd posn

(2) Prevent interference with airfield.

(b) An advance across Chindwin by Fourteenth Army supported by 221 Group

RAF up to capture of Mandalay.

(c) Complimentary adv by NCAC & Yunan Chinese supported by 10th & 14th
AAF.

(d) Sea and air assault some time before the capturing of Rangoon.

THE SECOND ARAKAN CAMPAIGN

Operation by 15 Indian Corps

55. Gen Slim ordered to 15 Indian Corps to clean the Mayu peninsula and capturing
of road Mundaw- Butthidaung.

56. This initial planning was to trapping of 55 Japanese Dib. But it was changed due
to the lack of landing craft.

57. By the beginnig of Feb 1944, the occupation of 15 corps was as following:

(a) 5 Div: Mayu Range with Maungdum & Western end of tunnel.

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(b) 7 Div: East of the range & in touch with 5 Div via the Ngakyedauk pass.

58. On 4 Feb 1944, the Japanese began their counter offensive. The 54 & 55
Japanese Div were there.

The Japanese Counter Offensive

59. The operation 'C' had 2 phases-

(a) Phase 1 (Ha-Go)

(b) Phase 2 (U-Go)

60. Japanese meant to split the British and the counter offensive in the Arakan was
designed to annihilate 5 & 7 Indian Divs & called Operation 'C'.

61. The Plan

62. But unfortunately Japanese plan was captured early in the battle so, Lt Gen.
Christison already set up the Corps find maintenance area. Divs were told to prepare
for all round defence, to hold the Japanese ground attack. All the troops could be
supplied by air.

The Battle Of the administrative Box

63. Tanahashi and Kubo Forcfe struck on the night of ¾ Feb. They captured Tang
Bazar. Doi forces launched a strong frontal attk against 7 Div. They succeeded
according to their plan in early stage. On 6 Feb 7 Div HQ was over run by the enemy. By
10 Feb Tanashshis force abled to link up with Doi forces and complete the
encirclement of the Adm area. Troops were suplied by air.

64. It was critical position and Lt Gen Slim committed his res eg 26 Indian Div, Div
Fourteenth army res at Comilla were ordered to rejoin 15 Crops. 26 Div established a
road block near their objective Maunghnama.

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65. By this time Japanese momentum became slow. Their supplies were not
effective. They couldn't block the en & it was air supply for 15 corps. Japanese aircraft
were loosing their air superiority.

Counter Attack by 15 Corps

66. The 26 Div joined to 15 Corps. On 16 Feb, British Div began to relieve 26 indian
Div to concerntrate east of the Mayu ange. The counter attack were as fols

a. 26 Div captured the western end of Ngaku pass

b. By 23 Feb the adm box was relived after heavy fighting.
c. 15 Corps captured Tang Bazar, Ngakyedauk and Razabil.
d. The 81 West African Div was pulled over the Kalapanzin valley to cover Tang
Bazar

67. Now the Japanese "March to Dellhi" had been defeated due to lack of food
supply, heavy casualties and tactical failures.

Causes of Japanese Failure

68. The fol main reasons are considered –

(a) Air superiority of Allies

(b) Numerical superiority of Allies

(c) Allied training

(d) Lgs Risks and Japanese optimism in plan.

(e) Allies Air suppy was very effective

(f) Japanese Rigid Tactics.

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Remarks

69. The battle of Administrative Box changed. The entire sit in Burma as fols –

(a) Actually Japanese defeated in Arakan.

(b) Allied morale became high & the rft took very effictive value.

(c) Only encirclement could do nothing. If not stopping of air supply.

(d) It helped Allies' future offensive to central front.

(e) Training was the most powerful weapon and allround defence in jungle
proved a good tactics.

(f) Attack should be launched by wide front.

(g) Air supply made vital importance.

(h) Knowledge of local area & timely adm back up should a great importance.

(i) Air superiority needs for offensive or defensive ops.

NORTHEN FRONT

70. Gen Stilwell to occupy North Burma up to and including Mongaung-Myitkyina to

cover the construction of the overland route to China and to make the existing air
route to China more secure from en air attack from South. With a view to helping Gen
Stiwells advance the fol complementary ops were to be launched –

(a) 4 Corps was to contain the main Japanese froce on the Central front.

(b) Chinese Expiditionary Force was to be induced to advance from Yunan.

(c) Wingate's special froce was to cut the en road & rail communication of
the Japanese forces.

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(d) A long range penetration group (Merrill's Maraunders) were to protect the
left flank, move ahead of main froce and putting and removing blocks.

(e) The Gurkhas & Kachin Levies were to harass the en by raid, ambush etc.

71. Stilwell's forces were consisted of-

(a) 22 and 38 Chinese Divs.

(b) A Chinese tank rgt.

(C) An American task force of 25000 men (Merrill's Marauders)

(d) The engr & labour bn

(e) 16 Bde under Brig Ferguson (Part of Chindit force)

Operations

72. Gen Stiwell and his Sino-American forces had to fight in every inch of the way
against Japanese on Hukawang valley. Japanese thrust through Manipur made him
apprehensive of his Assam L of C. Then planned to send 38 Chinese Div to protect rear.
The screen delayed the advance the held up in North of Kamaing.

73. Slin didn't to want to diversion of his effort to many front. So he guarantee that
the NCAC L of C wouldn't be interruped for more than 10 days. So he paid his full
attention to Japanese 18 Div & gaining the upper hand. The Galahad force outflanked
of Japanese posn, the main force invested Shaduzup and fell on 30 March 1944.

74. Myitkyina was to be captured and japanese 18 Div was there. Throughout April
1944 the NCAC forces slowly headway towards Kamaing. On 17 May, Galahad force
(Merrils Marauders) attacked Myitkyina & captured the air field. Engineers and A D
arty were sent by air tps and captured the airfield within 2 days. The ground tps
attacked the town but failed due to the incorrect appre of ens defence.

75. By this time Slim had 5 Chinese Divs eg 14, 22, 30, 38 and 50. On the 3 rd week of
April 1944, Gen Chiang Kai Chek ordered to China force to advance from Yunan. They

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were given limited air supply by Troop Carrier Command. On 3 August after 78 days
Myitkyina captured by the allies. Japanese 56 Div cdr Mizukami committed suicide.
Maruyama, who then took over command.

76. Now, it was the end of the first stage of the campaign in Northern Burma and
also resulted in the largetd seizure of Japanese held territory till the time. Allied had
large numerical superiority till now. Stilwell thus completed his first mission for the
road between India & China to be linked.

Remarks

77. The capture of Myitkyina resulted as fols-

(a) The air route to China became short.

(b) It facilated extension of Ledo road towards its planned terminal for a link
with China.

(c) It provided a riverhead on the Irrawaddy and advance bomber base.

(d) Tts capture destroyed the Japanese power in North Burma.

THE CENTRAL FRONT

78. Now the Japanese had to launch the Operation U and it was second phase of
Operation C. It had three main purposes as a part of the grand plan for "March to
Dellhi"- (a) To cut the Bengal- Assam railway, the main supply life line of
Stilwell.

(b) To cross the frontier & seize the Allied base at Imphal.

(c) To overrun the Assam airfield and disrupt air traffic over China.

Imphal and its General Importance

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79. Gen: The plain area, 600 sq miles plateau and 3000 ft up of the Manipue hill. It
was the main junction point of several railways, motor ways and other roads. Imphal
plain was using as maintenance area for fwd tps in the central front.

80. Strategic importance for Japanese : The capture of Imphal would have brought
the fols advantages to the Japanese after its capturing-

(a) The Japanese could undertake ops aimed at cutting the main of comn by
the road & rail to Stilwell's force.

(b) Could secure a most suitable base for Japanese to launch subsequent ops
against India.

(c) Would make easy to overrun the Assan airfield and cut the air supply
raute to China.

(d) The great concentration of the war material in Imphal was to glittering a
prize for the Japanese who were short of material every type.

81. Strategic importance for Allies:

(a) As strong base for future ops.

(b) It could protect for L of C to the Northern & Central front.

(c) It was nodal point for the defence of Assam & India, where the allies could
have lost this area it was the matter of political & prestige issue.

Relative Strength and Dispositions

82. Japanese : By Feb 1944, the Japanese had the fol –

(a) Eight Divs of combat forces.

(b) Many of the fighters & bombers aircrafts.

(c) Large number of river crafts (Chindwin bank)

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83. Allies: No 4 Corps was operating there and the fols were till the beginning of
March 44 :

(a) 23 Indian Div : One bde in the Ukhrul area, the reminder of the div was
deployed South & South East of Imphal.

(b) 20 Indian Div : On the Tamu road and in the Kaban valley.

(c) 17 Indian Div : Minus 1 Bde. Area Tiddim.

Japanese Plans for Operation 'U' (U-Go)

84. The following were the objective-

(a) 33 Div : To throw out the 17 Indian Div in Tiddim with outflanking tactics.

(b) 15 Div : Ops was suppose to start after 10 days of 33 Div. Tasks were to
sweep Northwards around Imphal & encircle it.

(c) 31 Div : To seize & cut off Dimapur Imphal road which could hamper to
Dimapur & Kohima – Imphal road too.

85. Gen Slim's courses upon Japanese :

(a) Course A : To expect the en offensive by x-ing Chindwin & attacking him
first.

(b) Course B : To hold the Japanese 33 Div in Tiddin area & fight with it to
destroy them. Beside that to cross the Chindwin river & make foot hold too.

(c) Course C : To concentrate 4 Corps in the Imphal plain & fight the decisive
battle on ground of own choosing.

86. There had many advantages and disadvantages of the above courses. Slim
decides to adopt course C and fol plan was made according to above course –

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(a) To fight at Imphal concentrated with

(1) 17, 20, and 23 Divs

(2) Corps reserve were 23 Div less one bde group, 17 Div less one bde,
50 Indian parachue bde and 254 Tank Brigade.

(b) Defence to the based on the protection of all weather airfields at Imphal &
Palel.

(c) Provision to be made rft fmns eg.5 and 7 Indian Divs, 50 Indian parachute
bde and 2 British Div.

(d) Lt Gen Scoones was authorised to withdraw of 17 Indian Div to Imphal

plain. Because offensive was expected to start soonly.

Courses of Operation and Japanese Move :

87. 31 Div : Commenced adv on in 15/16 March & assaulted Ukhurl, held by a
parachute bde on 19 March. The top events were considered -

(a) Parachute Bde till back to Imphal on 26 March.

(b) Road Kohima – Imphal was cut off on 30 March.

(c) Assault on Kohima launched on 04 April and Kohima was cut off from
North.

88. 33 Div : The offensive started on 6 March as fols-

(a) 17 Divs was cut off by 14 March dur to the seizuring of road behind
Tiddim.

(b) Also cut off the Bishenpur –Silchar track & in conjunction with 15 Div
worth of Imphal, isolated Imphal completely.

89. 15 Div : Advanced commenced in 2 axis –

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(a) Axis A – Tamu Palel road

(b) Axis B – North area & South of Ukhrul.

(1) By the end of March this Div estd the posns and started investing
Imphal from North.

(2) Same time 33 Div did same from South and west.

90. Effects on Allies :

(a) Air supply had to be restored due to the capturing of Inphal road.

(b) One bde of 5 Indians Div was flown to Imphal to rft.

(c) Non combatants & immediately not importants persons (who were drain
on the supply service) were flown out from Imphal.

(d) HQ 33 Corps, 2 British Div & 268 Inf Bde were sent to Dimapur from
Central & Southern India & it was to relieve to 4 Corps. finally the 33 Corps was
consisted to –

(1) 2 British Div

(2) 7 Indian Div (less one bde)

(3) One Bde of 5 Indian Div

(4) 23 Long penetration Bde

(5) Detts of Rgts of tks & lorried inf bde.

91. The Japanese main thrust was to Kohima from North Burma. Then Stilwell
planned to deploy 38 Chinese Div Dinjan to protect the Assam L of C continued his
march to Myitkyina.

93. The Battle of Imphal

(a) By 9 Ppril, the encircement of Imphal had completed.

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(b) The 17 Div faught against 33 japanese Div along the Tiddim road. By 7
April this forces reched to Impha. Now the Japanese force were in cut off posn,
holding & containing b allies & pushing up form the different places.

(c) Lt Gen Stopford adovted the fols to fulfissed his given tasks-

(1) To sweeping out the reminder of the en from Kohima.

(2) Teopening the road to Imphal.

(3) Link up of 2 British & Indiam Div.

(4) According to the plan ge succeded & above both Divs meet at
milestone log from Dimapur & the road to Imphal was opened.

(d) Now the Japanese march on India had been halted & turned back.

94. Cause of Japanese Failure

a) Japanese Rigidity of Plan.

b) Logistical Tisks of Japanese.
c) Air Superiority of Allies.
d) Quick rft by Allies.
e) Japanese faulty appre upon en.
f) Allies Air supply.
g) Japanese lack of sunchornisation.

95. Remarks:

a) L of c\C plays a vital role in battle. Because, opening of road from Kohima

to Imphal and elimination of the thereats of L of C in NE Assam change the

whole battle sit.

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b) Japanese Lost their offensive value. They had estimated casualties in killed

alone amounted to 13500.

c) Japanese lost their superiority.

d) 4 Corps was initially depended upon air suppply so air sup is very vital in

battle.

e) Unnecessary man power were flown out of Imphal to save the air supplies.

f) Japanese learned a good lesson from this and it made the first defeating

history for Japanese Army.

THE SECOND CHINDIT EXPEDITION

96. Gen: The first Chincit Expidition proved that through trg, resolute leadership &
tacrfull game in jungle was very possible to defeat the japanese. The locals also pro-
British to get info.

The Plan

97. Main principles were to make numbers of strong holds & cut the Japanese L of C
in Northern Burma. It had fol aims-

a) Inflict max confusions, damage & loss in Japanese rear.......

b) Provide help to Chinese force.

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c) To provide helps to Stilwells force to Myitkiyan by drawing of the

Japanese pressure.

d) Establish a base behind Japanese L of C.

e) To interfere to Japanese ops on the centre front too.

98. Compositions: They were Wingate's special forces consisted of British

Gurkha (Nepalese) & West Africans which were as fols-

a) 77 & 111 Indian Inf Div.

b) 14,23 British Inf Bed.

c) 3 East African Bde.

d) NO of air commandos, fighter, bombers, tpt aircrafts & other planes also

arranged.

OPERATION THURSDAY

99. The Wingate's second Chindit expediton had to be commenced with flying his
main body on THURSDAY March 1944. The code name was given OPERATION
THURSDAY. The plan were as such:

a) 3 Indian Div should divert to Japanese tps committed in invasion of India and
extablishment of ear communication.

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b) Then Chindit columns would strike against the railway, road & river system
which served the Japanese army against Gen Stilwells force & Central
divisional front.

100. The operation started as fols-

a) Brigadier Ferguson moved on foot from Ledo with 3 Indian Div & 16 Long
Range Penetration Bed to guard Stilsells right flk.
b) That force moved abput 100 miles, supplies & bridging eqpt were air dropped.
c) The force couldn't have rest but Freguson launched an attk on Indaw. The
attack failed.

101. The Fly Plan: Broadway, Picaddilly and Chowringhec wsa detailed for the
landing of 3 Div by air. Next, 77 Bde also to be dropped by 50 gleders. Due to the
unfavourable situation the entire Bde was dropped on Broadway.

102. The landing:It was successful & surprise. But a lot of wpn & eqpt were lost.
Latter on the III Bde slso loaded on the Broadway. Then the both force started
opetraion agains the ens main L of C towards the North.

Conduct of Operation

103. On 16 March the ops conducted as fols-

a) 77 Bde attacked Malwu & established road block (white city) which cut the L of
C of 18 Japanese Div.
b) To dislodge the Japanese pressure on Manipur, the second phase of fly started, in
spite of conveying 5 Inian Div ot Imphal,14 LTP Bde & 3 West African Bde were

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landed at Aberdeen. Now maj Gen W Wingate was killed in a air crash in the
Naga hill & Naj Gen WDA Lentaigne too over 3 Div.
c) Throughout April & May, 77 III Bde carried out independent ops eg destroying of
dumpos & railways.
d) III Bde cross Irrawaddy, cut the road Bhamo Myitkyina & cut off the rft to
Centrla fornt.
e) 77 Bde invested to Japanese on Mogung.
f) Meanwhile Genral Stiwell was advancing on Myitkyina North. The extension of
NCAC brought special force under his operational control.
g) III Bde estol a block at Hopin.
h) The japanese 5 Div was in gardship due to blocked and it was almost innihilated.
i) The special force done their job very nicely.
j) Early in June, 77 Bde completed the reduction of Mogoun.
k) The force started to withdraw after the conference btn Gen Stilwell & Maj Gen
Leataigne.
l) Myitkyina, which tell on 3 Augusts, after holking out of 78 days & with fall of
Muitkyina the special forced fall back.

Evaluation of Operation

104. The following were the assessments of Ops Thursday-

a) The 77 Bde was able to capture Mogaung, So, the railway and other roads were
cut off.
b) The special mission tectics eg raids & ambushes were about of effective. Because
allieds speicial tps were more casualties thanJapanese. But the disaggresively,
harassing and destroying of dummps were very effective.

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c) The Chinese Yunan force was heavily encountered by Japanese 56 Div. Japanese
launched spoiling & counter attacks. It effected a heavy losses to Chinese army.
d) The special forces couldn't prevent the rlt of central front Only few bns of 15 Div
were delayed for 2 months.

105. Causes of uneffectiveness

a) The special forces had the tactics of stronghold techique limitations.

b) Lack of proper coordination with ground forces.
c) Over Endurances
d) Dependency only on air supply.

106. Remarks: More emphasis wsa given to special forces, trainde by Wingate. The
fol. Points can be presented as mil comments.

a) The results, which was given by the Chindits were not so commensurate as the
efforts were paid upon them.
b) But the new concept was introduced in mol tactics eg special forces operated deep
inside the en territory.
c) It proved that underdeveloped terrain and favourable air sitution was needed for
deep pentration into en territory.
d) Value of intimate sp and loop between air and grnd tps was high lighted.

OPERATION CAPITAL

107. With the defeat of the Japanese in the Imphal Kohima battle, the slage was set for
a counter offensive in Burma. The American wanted to give priorities to the recapture of
Burama only so that supplines through the Ledo Road could be taken speeding to China
for launching ops against Japan itself form the Chinese mainland.

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108. During the mansoon Gen Mountbatten Produced 8 Plan X,Y and Z. Stillwell
Proudced a fourth one. Plan X envisaged an overland advance by NCAC rorce by the
14th army to the Chindwin Supported by an airborne ops against the Wunthu area. Plan
Y was an offensive across the Chindwin by 4 and 33 Corps with a view to destroying
the Japanese in Shwebo and Mandalaya with the NCTC tps. Plan Y came to be known
as "Operation Capital" and was finally recommended. Plan Z code name Darcula was
directed at the invasion of Rangoon by air and sea. A combination of plan Y and Z was
the best solution if resources would be made available. Resources from the European
theatre wasnot available to Laumu both capital and Dracula operation. Operation
Dracula was postponed and a smaller amphibious operation Romulus was planned for
Arakan, Maybon and Minbya and the operates take place in Jan beginning of 1945
capital had already began.

109. In accordance will operation capital NCAC was to hold Myitkyina airbase and
advance to Lashio in confirmity with the advance of the 14th Army. This ops was
divided into three phases.

(a) Phase I: The seizure of Kaluwa and Kalemyo.

(b) Phase II: An overland and Airbase assault and securing lower Burma
Thabikkyin- Mongole- Mongnik.

(c) Phase III: The securing Burma down to line Mandalay- Pokolec.

ADVANCE TO CHINDWIN

110. On Jan Phase I of Operation Capital was completed by establishing a brigehead

cross the Chindwin as Kalewa. The Lushai which had advanced down the Myitha river
valley south of Kalewa drove the Japanese across the Chindwin towards Gangaw. 19
Indian Div across the bridgehead at Shittang. Chinese 1 Army captured Bhamo and link
up with the NCTC near Nanhkan and reopened the overland route to China.

111. Fd Marshal Slim was preparing to fight the Japanese in the Shwebo plain. In
between evident in Dec that they had withdrawn the major part of their force behind the
Irrawaddy. The 14th Army abandone the plan for concentrating all its force about
Shwebo and produced a modified plan for the 3rd phase of operation capital Slim

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decided to cross Irrawaddy and fight the major battle in the plain around Mandalaya and
in the hill around Meitkula.

122. In the meantime the situation-in China bad been deteriorating the japanese had
advanced over 500 miles in the last five months and now threatened Kunming, the vital
American base in China. In view of this, two Chinese Div and three combat cargo
squandrons had to be teleased from Burma to China. This had the following effects on
Fourteenth Army plan.

a) The relese of two Chinese has virtually halted the advance of the Chinese
Southwards. This withdrawal enable the Japanese to switch over more forces to
stop the Fourteen army at Irrawaddy. Eight Japanese Div were concentrated in
Central Burma which was more than Fourteenth Army. This force Slims to
change his plan.
b) The Division of the tpt aircraft had ratarded the campaign by two or three weeks
which not only gave extra time to the Japanese reaching of Rangoon before the
monsoon set.

CROSSING THE IRRAWADDY

133. The airbone part of 'Operation Capital' had also to be cancelled. According to the
revised plan 33 corps was to continue towas Shewbo, Monywa and Mandalay. 4 Corps
was to be swithed over to the right fland of 33 Corps to advance to the Kabour and
Myitha valley toward Pakokku 4 Corps with 7 and 17 Indian Div on the right fland of
33 corps was put into ops. A dummy corp HQ was establised north of Tamu and it
continue to pass normal liver traffic whilst hte real corp HQ moved in complete wireless
silence. By the time the Japanese became aware than a sizeable force wasw moving
toward Pakokku. They were in blieve that allied main corps obj was the capture of
Yengyang oilfield. The presence of 19 Div north of Mandalay wa likely to confirm to
the Japanese the presence of 4 Corps north. The British also employed as feint crossing,
inquiries form local people regarding boats, strenght of current etc at wrong place,
losing maps indicating false obj and other similar deveces.

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114. 7 Indian Div captured pauk after Gangaw and 17 Indian Div less one bde started
to concrntrate in cangaw. Pakokku was captured Div less one started to concentrate in
Gangaw. Pakokku was captured by 114 Bde after some opposition. The East African
Dde was sent further shouth to make a feint at ctossing pt Chauk. Two other deception
crossing were planned at Pakokku and at Pagan. 7 Indian Div with one Regt from 255
Tank Bde effects a surprise crossing at Myangu at the night of nt 13/14 Feb. Where the
Irradday was just over 1000 meter wide and was busy expanding the bridgehead. 17
Indian Div with 255 Indian Tk bde under command crossed the Irrawaddy at Mayngu
between 18 and 21 Feb. Then the 4 corps had moved south was still not known to Gen
Kimura. He believed that the crossing in the north continued the main threat. He was
certained that the fate of Burma would be decided around Mandalay.

115. On North at the beginning of Jan 19th Indian 19 and 2 British Div were racing
toward Shwebo. 19 Indian Div reached on 7th Jan, 2nd British Div on the 8th, 18 Indian
Div advanced from Shwebo had secured a foot hold and across te Irrawaddy at
Thabeikky and Kyaknyang by 15 Jan. The Japanese resistance will all their arty
concentrate by 19th Indian Div held firm and gradually strengthen their posn. 20 Indian
Div captured Monywa on 22 Jan after fierce fighting the same day some of the tps of the
div reached Irrawaddy at Myinma. After ten days continuous race for suitable crossing
places the Div cross nt of 12/13 from suitable two places, Maul at Myinma and another
at 10 km down stream. 20 Div expanded its bridgehead to 12 km by four in depth. 2 nd
British Div after unsuccessful attempt on 24 Feb, establish a bridgehead at Ngazum
about 15 km east of 20 Div bridgehead on 26 Feb.

JAPANESE REACTION

116. By the end of Jan, the Japanese were aware that 33 corps, with 20 Indian Div
building up on the North bank of the Irrawaddy was massing a drive immediately of
Mandalay. They also believe that 19th Indian Div was a part of 4 Corp and 12 Indian Div
crossing North of Mandalay was to be followed by the whole of 4 Crop. The Japanese
therefore decided to concentrate all available forces in the destruction of 19 Indian Div.
A series of savage counter attack supporters by the heaviest ever only concentration
against 19 Ind Div bridgehead were launched.

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117. Lt Gen Kimura had rapidly withdraw his force from NCAC from Arakan and
South Burma and concentrated in the central Burma with the aim of destroying 4 and 33
Corps on the Mandalay area. Japanese concentration in the area with nine div as well as
large communication zone tps. He carried out these moves with remarkable efficiency
and speed inspite of allied bombing attacks on his communication.

CAPTURE OF MEITKILA

118. 17th Indian Div less one bde and 225 Indian Tk bde had begun adcance towards
Tangtha and in two column and capture it. It was main centre for 33 Japanese Div. 17
Indian Div captured Maliang and airstrip at Thaubuthkon on 25 and 26 Feb. The appch
to Meithkila from the north, west and south are covered two large lakes and no of
irrigation channel. Maj Gen Kasuya, immediately organised def all round def making
use of A/tk guns and fd guns and issuing plenty ammoniation to the tps.

119. On 28th Feb, 63 Bde moved close to the town and established rd blocks across the
main road from Chauk. On arty took up posn at Antu about 6 km in the north west of
the town. 48 Bde struck at the northern def, 225 tank bde 2 Ind Bu moved round the
north, north east and east and cut off the road to Thazi in the east and Pyawbwe in the
south. The Japanese resist last men and better fight took place on the front of 48 and 53
Bde as well. There was hand to hand fighting as 3 sides of Meitkilu. By the evening of
3rd March remained town had been captured. As 4 and 5 March wider sweeps with the
closeat air support were made to clear all sides of the town.

CAPTURE OF MANDALAY

120. Mandalay is situated in Mandalay Hill which is a great rock about 300 meter high
was heavily defended. Fort Duffins which was a great rectangular, walled enclosure
contained many barrack and residental building inside it. It was more seven meter
height backed by earth work 25 meter wide at their base and most about 70 moeter wide
and filled with water surround it.

121. 19th Indian Div which had linked it bridgehead at Thabeikkyau and Kyalmyang
had broken out and Japanese were pushed back demoralised and confused. 19 Dev

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outskirt the Mandalay on the night of 19/20th March, the Japanese withdraw from it. 62
Bde of 19 Div had captured Myammio t he summer capital of Burma. 20 Div and 2 Div
both expanded their bridgehead 20 Divs pushed out an armoured column to Myotha and
captured and cleared Windwin administration centre of the Japanese 18 th Div. By 30
March the Divs captured Kyakse a main supply centre of the Japanese Army. The Allied
air force were playing havoc with Japanese HQ and communications. 2 British Div
capured Ava fort on 17 March and made contac with 20 Div the next day.

122. During the battle of Meitkula and Mandalay, the Japanese heavy casualty and lost
a good deal of their eqpt including transport. It has been proved that the Japanese army
was quite unable to cope with the allied new technique of using motorized ingantry and
armour over country for suitable for fast moving operations. The jungle and mountain
which had given the Japanese a high degree of immunity from tanks and aircraft could
no longer protect them and now that they had been forced into the open and had no
effective defence against the allied armoured a air attack.

THE THIRD ARAKAN

Reason

123. The third Arakan campaign was planned to release the locked up div from Arakan
and mark available airfield. The Japanese had been using the airfields there for
occasional raids on India's large cities. These bases were essential to the allied to bring
Japanese held Rangoon within flying range.

124. Operation were planned for the capture of Akyab island, Myebon and Mibys. By
removing the Japanese threat in the Arakan, it was hoped to release the major post of 15
corps for further operations inside Burma. It was commence with middle of Dec 1944
by which date the ground in the Arakan would be sufficiently dry for tanks to move.

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125. Forces :

(a) 15 corps supported by 224 RAF gp and Naval force. 81 'w' was assigned
for the ops. b

(b) The grnd forces were concentrated in the area of manugduw, Ruthidaung
tunnels and the Kaladin valley.

(c) On 10 Dec 1944 Adv started with

(1) 25 Inf Div artride the Mayu Ruge.

(2) 82 West African Div on left.

(3) 81 west African Div from the flank to prevent the Japs outflanking.

126. Japs Resistance & Capture: There were large number of Japanese who tried to
hold out to the bitter end. Reinforcement were drawn from their Akyab garrison. By the
last week of Dec 25 Div hand secured Roul point on the tip of the Mayu peninsula. 15
corps was to mount a two attk on Akayab Island from the North & South. But it was
revealed from the int reports that the Japanese were withdrawing the attk on Mayu was
started and on 3 Jan 1945 25 Div carried out an unopposed landing.

127. The ops were then directed against Kyebon on mainland 30 miles from Akyab in
order two cut the rd which the Japs were withdrawing down cost. The Japanese reacted
strongly to this threat against the Courns. It took the allies hardly four weeks to clear the
area Kargaw village and hill. 170. 82 West African Div was on the left flank end of 15
corps was approaching from the North and the main Japs forces were about to be
trapped between these two Divs. The Japanese, however, quickly recovered and bitter
fighting ensured in which the Japs forces were able to withdraw with very heavy
casualties.

128. These amphibious ops were being carried out in the jungle river. The west India
fliet was assembled for the invasion of Romrel Island. 26 Div was to carry out the
invasion. Two Bdes were landed on the island on 21 1945. 41 Kyaukpu on the North
HQ. The third Bde landed at the South of island. The Japs were only about 1000 strong
did not put up any organized resistance and tried to escape. The route was already
blocked by allied and majority of the Japs were shot up. By the middle of Feb, the island
was secure in Allied hands.
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THE RECONOUEST BURMA

Adv & Capture of Rangoon

129. Background : With successful crossing of the River Irrawaddy and the decisive
victory at Mandalay and Mektila it was now necessary to recapture the southern portion
of Burma, and capture the important part of Rangoon and in the process to destroy the
Japs Army as a cohesive fishing force, with a view to extending operations for the re-
conquest of Malaya, Indo-China and Indo-Nesia.

130. The outline plan :

(a) 4 corps with 5 and 17 Ind Div and 255 TK Bde were to be the main strike
force advancing down the railways axis with maximum speed for the capture of
Rangoon before the outbreak of the mansoon in may 1945.

(b) 33 corps with 7 & 17 Ind Divs were to form the subsidiary thrust down
both banks of the River Irrawaddy to reach and assist in the capture of Rangoon.

(c) An Amphibious attack by 26 Ind Div was to coincide with the ;amd tjrist pf
4 cpr[s & 33 corps. This was called Ops Dracula and was to be supplemented by
an assault on Elephant port by a Para Bn.

131. There were two main axis of adv. One from CHAUK via the R Irrawaddy a
distance of about 380 miles and the railway route from Meiktila southward a distance of
approximately 325 miles.

132. After the successful completion of the battle for central Burma, there were only
40 days before the mansoon, the time become the prime factor so the railway route was
shorter and was given priority. Gen Slim feared tjat of tje to,e was govem they would
organise the def of Rangoon with the consequent need for a long drawn out fight in the
built up areas with resulting heavy casualties. Because time was critical-pockets of en
resistance were by passed.

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Battle Events

133. On 30 Mar 45 : 4 Corps began its adv down the longest and narrowest sailent
known in warefare from Meiktila to Pyabwe, which was the key to the Jap def on the
main foute to Rangoon.

134. The Plan envisaged 17 Ind Div exerting pressure on Pyawbe from west and north.
While 255 Tank Bde launched the main attk from the west and souty.

135. 17 Ind Div was ordered by Gen Meiserky to by pass the strong held village of
Yindaw which was a covering posn for Pyabe.

136. On 10 April after a highly coordinated attk by air armour and inf Pyabe was
captured scattering 33 Jap army and causing about 1000 casualties.

137. On 9 April, the TK Bde cut the rd Pyabe-Rangoon.

138. On 16 April, Shwemyo was captured by to mechanised Bde of 5 Ind Div and
strong Jap Bde defended sector was (Shwemyo Bluff) was outflanked by a Bde of 5 Ind
Div.

139. By 21 April 45, the airfield at Lewe was captured as also Pyinmana where Gen
Honda Goc 33 Jap army just escaped capture.

140. By 24 April 45, Tungoo airfields was captured and being only 160 miles from
Rangoon. On the first day of the capture 100 Dokotas landed and took off from the
airfield.

141. By 25 April 45, Inf Div was secured the far side of R. Pyu.

142. Within 21 day of capture of Meiktila 4 corps had advanced 170 miles and
inflicted 5000 casualties on retreating Jap.

143. On 22 April 95, 7 Ind Div captured Yenagyau town. This was the escape route the
Peguyomas.

144. On 2 May – Prome was captured. Thus the last escape route of the Japs in Arakan
was close as Prome an important river port or the R Irrawaddy. On 3 March, the
monsoon broke.

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Operation Dracula (Capture of Rangoon)

145. Gen Slim, Gen Kimura had ordered the evacuation Rangoon as he felt that he
could not hold it with the for ces under him. He felt their by concentrating his force East
of the R Sittang. He would able to provide cohesive resistance to allied forces.

146. It was essential to reopen the port of Rangoon to maintain the operations in the
Southern Burma as the land line of comn had badly detiorated and the air maintenance
was over stretched. Thus Ops Dracula the amphibian attk on the port of Rangoon was
considered essential by Gen Slims.

147. The Plan :

(a) The main amphibian force was to be from Gan Chamber's 26 Ind Div being
launched fron the Akyab and Ramseu port.

(b) The amphibian attk on Rangoon was to be preceeded by a para Bn deopped

on Elephant point.

(c) Novel Task Force 'w' in six convoys was to carry the amphibians force.

(d) SP was to be provided by 224 RAF Group and 2 battleships, 2 escort

carriers, 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers.

(e) A heavy pre assault bombing by liberators and Mitchells was carried out on
1 May 45 against all identified Jap defs.

118. A Bed ex 26 Ind Div was landed on both sides of the rd. Rangoon after one bn ex
50 Ind Para Brigade had been dropped on Elephant point.

149. Battle events :

(a) On 3 Nay, this Bde had entered Rangoon while Para Bn dealt with the 40
men guide squad left at elephant pt.

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(b) By 5 May, Rangoon had been captured evn as the landward thurst.
Southward by 4 and 33 corps was taking place, towards it.

150. By a magnificent sapper effort the port of Rangoon was soon organized to carry
300 tons of maintenance traffic for 14 Army and this inspite of the heavy cyclone the hit
the area and the onset of the mansoon two weeks earlier than normal.

151. Japs Posn :

(a) 56 Jap Div was in the Shan Hills, east of Meiktila, a force of about 6000 all
ranks.

(b) 25000 troops of 33 Jap army were in the Irrawaddy valley and the hill of
the Pagu Yomas.

(c) 24,500 men of 24 Indop Dde and the Rangoon Garrison were concentrated
in the mountain area and on the east cost of the Gulf of Martaban. After the
capture of Rangoon 14 army was reorganized to comprise 15 and 34 corps under
Lt Gen Dempsely.

152. Lt Gen Stopford took ovet newly formed 12 army comprising the 4 corps and Div
of te disbanded 33 corps.

153. The vreakout

(a) By 15 jan 44, 33 jap arny nade a desperate countet attk in the area of the
old sitting channel, to divert the atten of 4 Corps from the eastern exists from
the Yomas through Which 28 Jap army Planned to break outs. This failed the
battle of Sitting Bend was over.

(b) On 20 July 44, Jap groups of 500 men strength teied to cross the rd Rangoon-
Mandalay on all three sectors of 4 corps front but with two troops barriers, of the
Ind Div and Burmese National Army, this was thwarted.

(c) By 4 Aug 44, the battle of the breakout was at end, the Japs Iosing about 6300
casualties to the allied 95 Only.

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154. Japanese Surrender: the Japanese in Burma had severely and by the end of
August they virtually ceased to exist as a force. The Use of the automatic bombs on 6 to
9 Aug 1995 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced the Japanese Govt to surrender on 14
Aug. According to Gen Kimura was ordered to cease hospitalites to surrender the
Japanese Burma Area Army.

155. Achienements: There are:

(a) Superior generalship of Slim manifests itself in all phases of the campaing.

(b) Gen Messervy proved himself a skilled master in exploitation and monility.

(c) Technical superiority and superior to the Japs and been proved by the
allies.

(d) The RAF contribution, Tpt or air sply.

Factors Affecting the Battle

(a) Routes: There were Only two main axis of adv is via. The River Irrawaddy
other were Railway route from Meiktila.

(b) Air supply: At the time, with the tpt air craft available and capacity of the
fwd aristrips was not possible to provide air maintenance to 4 force larger than
three Div and a tank Bde.

(c) Timwe and Space: Aftet successful completion of the battle for
central Burma there were only 40 days before mansoon breakout.

(d) Def of Rangoon: Gen Slim Feared that if time was given they would
organise the def of Rangoon.

(e) Supporting Army: The Serviceanility state of the armoured cars the
Stuart, Shermans and grant were available. Heavy repairs and constant
maintenance were used to Keep there or road for the last phase.

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(f) Shortage of TPTs: Because of the Shortage and the number of

breakdowns due to rough use over bed roads maximum tpt fron units not taking
and part were centralized. So capture of fwd air strip was given priority for air
supply.

(g) Delay elements: Because time war critical, pockets of en resistance were
go be bypassed.

(h) Flank Protection: As the Japanese could attk 4 Corps vulnerable flank
during the adv from the Shaw Hills.

Air

156. (a) Strategic: Bombing tps concs, and mil HQ, amn sply dump. They
achieved camplete isolation of Rangoon port by droping tps.

(b) Supply: Rangoon was maintained by air thus enabling 12 corps

to cover 175 miles in a approx 21 days. The charge in plan enabling Gen
Slim to employ flesibility in Ops Capital sending 12 corps down the
Gangow valley was possible only bevause of air supply.

(c) Cas eval: The method was to use light ac for fwd airfds and later
transit them into Dakotas fron rear fds back to base hospital.

157. Naval

(a) raise of en sea comn and protection of allied sea comn and
distruction en sea potential .

Resources

158. The additional resouces demanded by the supreme allide cdr for this
ops were:

(a) One combat cargo group in addition to three already held.

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(b) Two Inf Div in addition ot three being withdraw from Canteal
and North fronts.

PRINCIPLE OF WAR FOLLOWED

159. Selection and Maintenance of Aim: The success for Burma campaign in later
stage was due to clear cut ain of allied tps to drive out from India and to reopen land
communication to China and final one was that of clearing Burma and the capure of
Rangoon. This caused Japanese ains during the early pact of their offensive.

160. Offensive Action: The value of offensive action was well followed during the
monsoor aftet the defeat in Imphal plain. Although pursuit involved considetable risk
but inflicted heavy casualties to the Japanese andled to the speedy victory.

161. Concentration of Force : Befort lunching any opetation Slim ensured that
the had a ferce superior ot what the japanese could deploy against him. Although
Japanese had overall superiority in Burma. The Japanese on the other hand failed to
concentrate superior forces at the required time and place and scattered them against
subsidiary thrust thereby dissapointing these effort.

162. Flexibility: The foremost exanple of flexibility in this operation was switching
over of 4 corps fron North ot South of Mandalay and its subsequent drive to meiktila.
the change over demanded flexibility of main on the part of commandets and ataff
added mobility on the part of the fomation. Development of air supply agve the army
necessary tactical mobility. The Japanese lacked air supply and transport were less
mobile than allied. This caused greatest surprise to Japanese during the campaign.

163. Maintenance of Morale:The greatest factor ehich builds he morale of the troops
and establishes theit configence in their commanders success in the battle. Immediately
after the defeat of Japanese in Imphal, the morale of the troops were high and this was
exploited by maintaining pursuit. Other factors which contributed for sound morale and
air supply and reduction of non battle casualty rate, improved medical facilities and
postal arrangement. The Japanese lacked all thexe and they have nothing to compensate
defeat of their men.

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164. Administration: The success alwas depends upon sound adminstrative

arrangement. Thus the 14th Army deed by development of air supply, making use of
socal resources and eccellent administrative planning. The Japanese depanded upon
local resources more than justified. the aeninistration of Japanese during the withdraeal
fron Inphal and Maiktila totally broke down. Their medical facilities were inadequate
and lost large number lack of medical evacuation.

CONCLUSION

165. The great lesson in Burma campaign is that commanders in the field, in fairness
to them and their troops must be clearly and definitely told, in fairness to them and their
troops must be clearly and definitely told what is the object they are locally to attain.
failure from higher directives to so will certainly achieve nothing in battle field.

166. It is always essential for the planning of opetation. The preparation includes
information, equipment, administrarive, politocal that all required for the unforeseen
development in the vattle field. The Soldier who lacks morale doesnot give strong
resistance to the enemy. The japanese Generals lacked morale and physical courage but
the soldiers marched and fought till they are dead. Slim says that if 500 japanese were
ordered to hold a position that we have to kill 495 and 5 killed themselves.

167. Night fighting is, in effect. a form of dispersed fighting because, although men may
be close together they suffer from isolation. The more we become civilized we draw
our soldiers in well lighted town. The fighting in Burma almost all took place at night.
We should develop such army to fight during night when enemy is primitive type.

168. When having multinational forces the commander should given a thought about
individual qualities of his soldiers. Like the European soldiers may have natural
intelligence to learn about the equipment very fast but for the Asian soldiers they took
time to master their weapon .

169. The More modern war becomes, the strict the discipline is required to fight a
battle. In Burma, lesson was brought that strict discipline is no only required in battle
freed but also inside the bivouac, not anly for success but also survival.

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170. The must distinctive aspect of Burma war was the great use of air power and air
transport. This was he first major battle where the large formation were maintained by
air supply and standard division moved front in support of air power. The second
Chendit operation in March 1944 landed 30,000 menand 5000 animals behind the
enemy lines and maintained them or months. It os possible and alternative transport
mode is needed to conduct battle in underdeveloped terrain.

171. The use of Special Forces has been considered very helpful during such operation.
The Special forces does not mean the special of kind but they were made special by
giving them special equipment according to our need. The experience of Burma was
brought necessity of Special Forces for the conduct of successful operation.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

172. In Burma, a form of welfare developed where resources were lavishly

concerntrated by allied forces. Even though such warfare gives certain lessons for
modern warfare. These are :

(1) Regular movement and maintenance is necessary by air when fighting in

underdeveloped terrain.

(2) When communication is not reliable and terrain permits scanty information
great tactical freedom should be given to subordinate commander.

(3 The operation in most difficult country should be launched with smaller

forces in tactical independence but in strategic combination.

(4) The use of local resources makes easier for maintenance system.

(5) Soldier should have high quality of morale, toughness and discipline and
acceptance of hardship. He should develp ability to move on his own feet and
look after himself while fighting in underdeveloped terrain.

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