Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant'S Motion To Dismiss The Complaint

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/27/2021 04:48 PM INDEX NO.
652178/2021
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 62 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/27/2021
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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THE PEEBLES CORPORATION, Index No. 652178/2021
Part 36
Plaintiff, Hon. Verna L. Saunders
Motion Sequence No. 002
THE HOEG CORPORATION and DANIEL HOEG,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/27/2021 04:48 PM INDEX NO. 652178/2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities………………………………………………………..…………..………….ii
Preliminary Statement………………………………………………………..………………..….8
Statement of Facts………………………………………………………..……………….……...10
A. The Agreement………………………………………………………..……….……........13
B. Plaintiff’s Default………………………………………………………….……………..14
C. The Current Dispute………………………………………………………..…….............14
D. The Complaint and Injunctive Relief………………………………………………….....15
Argument………………………………………………………..……………..………………...16
I. PLAINTIFF, PEEBLES, FRAUDULENT CONDUCT AND MISREPRESENTATIONS
DURING GOVERNMENT BIDDING …………………………..……………………..16
A. Plaintiff makes an admission of fraudulent conduct ……………...……………..17
B. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege entitlement to injunctive relief ………..….17
C. Plaintiff’s fraud cannot be rectified in a court of equity…………………………18
II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED……………………………..18
A. Complaint is time barred.………………………………………………..…….…19
B. Plaintiff has already sued for the same relief.……………………………..……..20
C. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.………………………….21
D. The Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue under the subject agreement.………….21
III. PLAINTIFF HAS NO CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RELIEF…………………..….…22
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NO AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT…………………….….…25
V. DEFENDANT IS HAS NO “CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS”……………...…25
VI. PLAINTIFF’S “BREACH OF CONTRACT” CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED…...25
A. Plaintiff’s “Breach of Contract” Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.………...……..26
1. Plaintiff did not have an agreement with Daniel Hoeg.………………….26
2. The agreement expired by its terms on September 15, 2012.……………26
3. The Plaintiff does not allege a breach of the agreement.……………...…26
B. Plaintiff allegations do not track with the contract language.……………………27
C. The contract spells out breach of confidentiality is merely “‘cause’ for the
termination of” the Agreement.………………………………………….………28
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D. Plaintiff is actively perpetrating a fraud and cannot suppress disclosures…….....28

E. The disclosures are good faith reports of fraud to government agencies………..29
VII. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR AN INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED………....29
A. Defendant is not a party to the injunctive relief provision of the agreement…….30
B. Agreement language of injunctive relief provision is plain.…………………..…31
C. Plaintiff’s claim is primarily for money damages.……………………………….32
D. Plaintiff cannot meet the burden required for a preliminary injunction.……...…32
E. Plaintiff can sue for breach, or for an injunction, but not both.……………….…33
F. The equities are balanced in the Defendant’s favor.……………………………..34
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….....35
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pages
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso,

75 NY2d 860,862 (1990)…………………………………….…………………………..26
Alexander v United States,

509 US 544, 550 [1993] ……………………………..............................................……..24
Arcamone—Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc.,

83 AD3d 623, 625, 920 NYS2d 362 [2d Dept 2011]........................................................25
Berkoski v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Southampton,

67 AD3d 840, 844, 889 NYS2d 623 [2d Dept 2009]........................................................25
Blum v Drucker,
240 AD2d 609 [1997]........................................................................................................13
Biro v Roth,
121 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2014]..........................................................................................21
Botach Mgt. Group v Gurash,

138 AD3d 771, 771 [2d Dept 2016]..................................................................................14
Brandywine Pavers, LLC v Bombard,

108 AD3d 1209, 1210 (4th Dept. 2013)............................................................................19
Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp.,

41 NY2d 397, 399 [1977]).................................................................................................26
3 of 35
Brummer v Wey (166 AD3d 475, 475 [1st Dept 2018])...............................................................27
City of Long Beach v. Sterling Am. Capital, LLC,

40 AD3d 902, 903 (2nd Dept. 2007).................................................................................25
DaCosta v Trade-Winds Envtl. Restoration, Inc.,

61 AD3d 627, 628, 877 NYS2d 373 [2d Dept 2009]).......................................................13
Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs.,

7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]).................................................16
Doe v. Axelrod,
73 N.Y.2d 748, 750 (1988).................................................................................................27
Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,

3 NY2d 321, 326 [1957]..............................................................................................15, 16
Fischel & Co. v Macy & Co.,

20 N.Y.2d 180, 187….................................................................................................…...29
Fischer v. Deitsch,
168 AD2d 599, 601 (2nd Dept. 1990)...............................................................................28
Fontanetta v John Doe 1,

73 AD3d 78, 86 [2d Dept 2010]........................................................................................15
Golden v. Steam Heat, Inc.,

216 AD2d 440, 442 (2nd Dept. 1995)...............................................................................28
Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co.,

98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]..................................................................................................14
Guggenheimer v Ginzburg,
43 NY2d 268, 275, 401 NYS2d 182 [1977]................................................................13, 22
Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc.,

102 AD3d 251, 255 [2d Dept 2012]).................................................................................21
Ingenuit, Ltd. v Harriff,

33 AD3d 589 (2nd Dept. 2006).........................................................................................25
Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc.,

34 AD3d 433, 434 [2006]..................................................................................................17
Kohman v. Rochambeau Realty & Dev. Corp.,
4 of 35
17 A.D.3d 151, 154 (1st Dep’t 2005)................................................................................18
LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co.,

95 NY2d 210, 216 [2000]).................................................................................................17
Laughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. W. J. Nolan & Co., Inc.,

114 AD2d 165, 174 (2nd Dept. 1986), app. den. 67 NY2d 606 (1986)............................29
Leon v Martinez,
84 NY2d 83, 87-88, 614 NYS2d 972 [1994]...............................................................12, 21
Lieberman v Green,
139 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2016]..................................................................................21
Lucia v Goldman,
68 AD3d 1064, 1066, 893 NYS2d 90 [2d Dept 2009]).....................................................12
Lloyd Capital Corp. v Pat Henchar, Inc.,

80 NY2d 124 [1992]..........................................................................................................13
Matter of Express Indus. & Term. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Transp.,
93 NY2d 584, 589 [1999]..................................................................................................26
Morales v Copy Right, Inc.,

28 AD3d 440 [2d Dept 2006]............................................................................................21
Murray Walter, Inc. v Sarkisian Bros.,

107 AD2d 173 [1985]........................................................................................................13
Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Advert., Inc.,

82 N.Y.2d 158, 160 (1993).................................................................................................18
Neos v Lacey,
291 AD2d 434, 435 (2nd Dept. 2002)...............................................................................29
Parekh v Cain,
96 AD3d 812, 815 [2d Dept 2012])...................................................................................21
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v Simone Dev. Corp.,

46 AD3d 530, 846 NYS2d 368 [2d Dept 2007])...............................................................13
Peterson v. Corbin,
275 AD2d 35, 37 (2nd Dept. 2000), lv. app. dism., 95 NY2d 919 (2000)........................29
Rabos v R & R Bagels & Bakery, Inc.,

100 AD3d 849 [2d Dept 2012]...................................................................................15, 22
5 of 35
Rodolico v Rubin & Licatesi, P.C.,

114 AD3d 923, 924-925 [2d Dept 2014]...........................................................................14
Rovello v Orofino Realty Co.,

40 NY2d 633, 635—636, 389 NYS2d 314 [1976]............................................................13
Ruiz v Meloney,
26 AD3d 485, 486, 810 NYS2d 216 [2d Dept 2006]).......................................................25
Rushaid v Pictet & Cie.,

28 NY3d 316, 331 [2016] …….........................................................................................17
Sabre Real Estate Group, LLC v Ghazvini,

140 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2016]..........................................................................................14
Sandals Resorts Intl. Ltd., v Google, Inc.,

86 AD3d 32, 43 [1st Dept 2011] ……...............................................................................29
Schonberger v Culbertson,
231 AD 257 (1st Dept. 1931) …..........................................................................……......18
Scoyni v Chabowski,
72 AD3d 792, 793, 898 NYS2d 482 [2d Dept 2010]........................................................12
Shasho v Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J.,

67 AD3d 663, 665, 888 NYS2d 557 [2d Dept 2009]........................................................25
Shoe Co. v Washington,

326 US 310, 316 [1945].....................................................................................................17
Sterling Fifth Assoc. v. Carpentille Corp., Inc.,

5 AD3d 328, 329 (1st Dept. 2004).....................................................................................28
Stewart v Volkswagen of Am.,

81 NY2d 203, 207 [1993]..................................................................................................16
Sullivan v State,
34 AD3d 443 [2d Dept 2006])...........................................................................................14
Thomas v Lasalle Bank N. A.,

79 AD3d 1015, 913 NYS2d 742 [2d Dept 2010]..............................................................12
Trepuk v Frank,
44 NY2d 723, 725 [1978]..................................................................................................16
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Turkat v Lalezarian Developers, Inc.,

52 AD3d 595, 596, 860 NYS2d 153 [2d Dept 2008]).......................................................12
Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki,

10 AD3d 604, 781 NYS2d 684 [2d Dept 2004])...............................................................25
Yue Fung USA Enters., Inc. v Novelty Crystal Corp.,

105 AD3d 840, 841 [2d Dept 2013]............................................................................14, 15
Valenza v Emmelle Coutier, Inc.,

288 AD2d 114 [2001]........................................................................................................13
Walsh v. Design Concepts, Ltd.,

221 AD2d 454, 455 (2nd Dept. 1995)...............................................................................28
Wiener v. Life Style Futon Inc.,

48 AD3d 458 (2nd Dept. 2008).........................................................................................26
W.T.Grant v. Srogi,
52 NY2d 496 (1981)..........................................................................................................26
X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v Rivergate Corp.,

83 NY2d 513 [1994] .........................................................................................................13
Statutes and Rules Page(s)
CPLR 302(a)..................................................................................................................................25
CPLR 3211(a)...............................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20
CPLR 3211(a)(3)..........................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20
CPLR 3211(a)(5)..........................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20
CPLR 3211(a)(7)................................................................................................1, 2, 3-5, 14, 16, 21
CPLR 3211(a)(8)............................................................................................................1, 2, 4, 7, 22
CPLR 6301...............................................................................................................1, 2, 3-5, 14, 16
Other
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 396,
400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958).......................................................28
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Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of

Defendant’s motion, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (3), (5), (7), and (8), to dismiss the Complaint
of Plaintiff The Peebles Corporation (“Plaintiff”) dated
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff and its principal, Roy Peebles, Jr., routinely defraud the government.
Plaintiff’s meritless Complaint was filed solely to prevent the disclosure of publicly
available documents to Los Angeles Ethics Officials and land use personnel in Los Angeles.
Plaintiff hopes to continue its fraud against taxpayers without having to deal with the
troublesome documents that prove otherwise: public records, submitted RFP documents, net
worth statements, sworn testimony, bankruptcy filings, and lawsuits (all of which are publicly
available).
Roy Peebles, Jr., is the “Chairman and CEO” of Plaintiff, The Peebles Corporation, a
private company with one shareholder, no investors, and no board of directors. Plaintiff does,
however, have a long and tortuous history of undermining black and female owned businesses
opportunities. In fact, Plaintiff’s entire business model is to prey on the most vulnerable
companies in the financial community: minority and women business enterprises (“MWBEs”).
Plaintiff actively misrepresents its qualifications to win government bids and then cut minority
contractors out of the actual project. Plaintiff does this by selling a majority interest in the project
after it is awarded and then retaining an interest in the deal as the “minority participant”. This
way Plaintiff ensures that the project has a black face for the project while making risk-free
profit without requiring Plaintiff to invest money, waste time developing anything, or expend any
effort other than litigating the inevitable lawsuits. (See Exhibit 12). This business model directly
undermines the goals of MWBE inclusion in competitive bidding.
Plaintiff seeks absurd and extreme relief: asking the Court to silence a private citizen
reporting Plaintiff’s misconduct. More absurd is that Defendant was not a party to the agreement
under which Plaintiff seeks confidentiality. Plaintiff makes a baseless claim for breach of
contract against a non-party, a preliminary injunction for a nine (9) year old contract against a
non-party, and to enforce a confidentiality provision to prevent disclosure of Plaintiff’s
principal’s public bankruptcies, net worth statements, and litigation history. Plaintiff asserts two
claims, both of which should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s complaint is not intended to rectify any
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inequity, but to perpetrate a fraud on the taxpayers of towns all over this country. The first claim
seeks to obtain a breach of contract ruling against Daniel Hoeg, an obvious non-party to the
agreement. The second attempts to obtain an injunction against Daniel Hoeg, a non-party to the
agreement. Neither of these claims hold water and both should be dismissed for the plain fact
that Daniel Hoeg is not a party to these agreements as an individual.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is a thinly veiled and meritless attempt to halt public disclosure of Roy
Peebles, Jr.’s catastrophic business track record. This is an attempt by Roy Peebles, Jr. to prevent
the disclosure of fraudulent misrepresentations and to cover up the fact that Roy Peebles Jr. has
engaged in a career of actively lying to governments in order to win RFP bids. Peebles represents
a business model designed to steal money from the public. Essentially, the Plaintiff is asking the
Court to stop a third party from reporting fraud to government agencies.
The extent of Plaintiff's fraudulent and unscrupulous business practices are best
exemplified by Plaintiff’s involvement in the Long Island Community Hospital debacle in
Brooklyn led to an emergency room and hospital closure. (See Exhibit 23). Plaintiff’s own top
executive1 at the time of that RFP response said that Plaintiff was “facing financial difficulties”
and using “improper conduct… to mask that financial distress from the world” citing Plaintiff’s
“insufficiency of funds, inability to attract financing, and the [Plaintiff’s] need for cash.” (See
Exhibit 15). In Los Angeles City Hall, there is an ongoing investigation by the FBI into
corruption and fraud, with Plaintiff’s principle being the largest lobbyist in that quarter. (Exhibit
23-25).
This motion to dismiss, with annexed affidavit and exhibits, show that Plaintiff has no
contractual privity, no grounds to allege a breach of contract, and no avenue to obtain an
injunction. This motion will show the documentary evidence is clearly in favor of dismissal, but
also that this is a patent attempt to silence good-faith complaints of fraud. This motion should
also illustrate the frivolous intentions of Roy Peebles, Jr.are simply to silence a party who is
familiar with Roy Peebles’s fraudulent business practices and continued attempts to defraud
governmental agencies.
1
Tawan Davis, who would also go on to sue Plaintiff for breach of contract.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a primary matter, the terms of the Retainer Agreement are controlling and Daniel
Hoeg is not a party to the agreement. Nowhere in the Retainer Agreement does Daniel Hoeg
evidence the intent to be bound as an individual. The controlling section of the agreement,
Section 10, states the specific contours of the confidentiality provisions of the agreement and the
only relief available to the Plaintiff is “termination of the agreement.” A breach of the
confidentiality provisions of the Retainer Agreement dictates that a breach of the confidentiality
provisions “shall be deemed cause for termination”. Plaintiff’s claims are meritless because the
remedies for breach of confidentiality are termination of the agreement, not injunctive relief.
This is especially the case against Defendant, who is not a party to the agreement. The Defendant
has no compensation, consideration, or endorsement of the agreement and Plaintiff claims
against Daniel Hoeg are absurd.
Plaintiff’s sole shareholder, Roy Peebles, Jr., styles himself as the black Donald Trump
and has praised Trump on CNN, MSNBC, and even tried to build a Trump hotel in downtown
New York. (Exhibit 6). In fact, Roy Peebles, Jr. went to great lengths to legitimize Donald Trump
to the black community by appearing on national TV shows (at Roy Peebles, Jr. personal
expense) in order to hock for Donald Trump as President. And much like Donald Trump, Peebles
has almost infinite capacity for fraud, misrepresentation, and litigation. One of the bases of this
lawsuit is that while Roy Peebles, Jr. was publicly claiming a net worth of $700,000,000, his
accountants would only certify that he was worth $20,000,000. Peebles does not deny that his
submissions in response to RFPs misrepresent this fact, instead, that the documents were
“confidential”.
Roy Peebles, Jr. misrepresents his past developments, current projects, financial capacity,
and outrageously poor history of performance. In 2012, Roy Peebles, Jr. was far from being an
“established New York developer” - Peebles was renting 3 rooms of office space from Regus,
with one employee2 (excluding his immediate family), and was posting Craigslist ads for a
second employee: an analyst. Roy Peebles, Jr. was going through a contentious separation with
his wife, Katrina Peebles, and begged Defendant not to say anything because Peebles “didn’t
2
Plaintiff’s one employee at the time, Daniel Newhouse, would also sue Peebles for breach of contract. The
Newhouse complaint is the source of most of the information Peebles seeks to enjoin from disclosure.
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want his divorce to be on the cover of The New York Times where my kids can read all about it.”
(Exhibit 5). This was the extent of the self-proclaimed “nationally renowned developers” real
estate enterprise in New York.
Roy Peebles, Jr. got his start when his mother set him up influencing tax appraisers and
seeking out government contracts through the infamous Mayor Marion Barry. Peebles’ mother,
Yvonne Poole, had a close relationship with Mayor Barry that enabled Peebles to get lucrative
contracts with the government. From the outset, Peebles business “strategy” was to provide a
black face to white projects and take a cut. Plaintiff is the worst kind of enemy to black and
women owned businesses: one that steals opportunities for blacks to succeed and provides profits
to only one individual: Roy Peebles, Jr. The Peebles Criminal Enterprise consists of a systematic,
ongoing fraud that attacked noble programs designed to uplift minority and women owned
business enterprises.
Plaintiff’s frivolous claims are designed to do one thing: allow Roy Peebles, Jr. to commit
fraud. Roy Peebles, Jr. has an obvious modus operandi: submit unrealistic bids to municipalities,
commit financial resources Roy Peebles, Jr. doesn’t have, offer terms that Roy Peebles, Jr. cannot
meet, and then, unbeknownst to anybody but Roy Peebles, Jr., negotiate with non-MWBE firms
to stand in his shoes and retain an interest in the project as an MWBE-partner. This is fraud.
Plaintiff routinely submits falsified information and overbids in response to RFPs targeted to
encourage minority participation, frequently letting the project collapse soon thereafter.3
The Peebles Corporation is a small sized firm operating a cross-country fraud that is
masquerading as a real estate development enterprise. The Peebles Corporation is in fact, an
organized bid rigger, designed to put a black face on white projects to take advantage of
government bids intended to uplift the minority business community. The Peebles Corporation
and its eponymous CEO, Roy Peebles, have operated for decades by lining the pockets of more
capable white developers, by flipping MWBE rights to them and undermining the black
businesses these programs are designed to support. Plaintiff intends to continue perpetrating this
fraud through diversion and non-disclosure of material aspects of Roy Peebles’s background:
dozens of failed bids, scores of lawsuits, several bankruptcies, and millions of dollars of
defaulted debt and loan obligations. (See Exhibits 4, 11, 15-16, 23-24, and 30).
3
See Plaintiff’s overbids and subsequent failed awards at Pacifica Quarry (Pacifica, CA), Long Island Community
Hospital and Aqueduct Gaming (Queens, NY), Anacosta’s 5th and I (D.C.), 1801 Vine Street (Philadelphia, PA),
Parcel 13 (Boston, MA), and Overtown Gateway (Miami, FL) projects.
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Peebles Misrepresentations Are Dangerous and Destructive

In 2014, SUNY’s Long Island Community Hospital (“LICH”) was shut down because
Plaintiff and its principal, Roy Peebles, Jr. made a “bad faith” bid and couldn’t live up to the
terms Peebles himself proposed. This was a tremendous loss for the community and led to a shut
down of America’s First Teaching Hospital. Peebles’ bid fraudulently misrepresented his
litigation history against partners and other municipalities, specifically misrepresented Peebles’
past bankruptcies, and deliberately overstated Peebles’ financial capacity. Roy Peebles, Jr. and
Plaintiff were finalists for the LICH project and were SUNY publicly reprimanded for Roy
Peebles, Jr.’s “bad faith” negotiations; SUNY stopped negotiating with Plaintiff at significant
expense to SUNY. (Exhibit 23). Peebles’ bidding fraud cost the City of New York a hospital, and
Peebles’ litigation against SUNY cost taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars. This is not an
isolated incident, this is Plaintiff’s modus operandi.
This time the project is in Los Angeles. Peebles’ was awarded a project named “Angel’s
Landing” by the office of Councilmember Jose Huizar. Jose Huizar has now been indicted by the
FBI on corruption charges and Peebles is attempting to squeeze Los Angeles for all he can. This
is Peebles’ business model: not development. Peebles uses the media to misrepresent his
development history and bid on MWBE projects, admitting that paid appearances on CNBC
“wins us projects”. (Exhibit 30).
Plaintiff, The Peebles Corporation is a fraudulent enterprise designed to steal black
business set asides. When a Peebles project publicly announces 35% MWBE participation,
Peebles means his company will sell a 65% entire interest to the highest bidder and retain a 35%
interest in the project, cutting out all the small contractors. Plaintiff’s principal, Roy D. Peebles,
Jr., maintains a fictitious public image, fueled by paid press releases, perpetrated on taxpayers to
take advantage of minority bidding contracts, and breach contracts with everyone. Plaintiff’s
complaint is entirely designed to prevent disclosure of Plaintiff’s pathetic financial status, history
of litigation and failed projects, and woefully misrepresented development history. Plaintiff is so
desperate to unring the bell that Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant to a contract with
Defendant’s corporation.
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A. The Disclosures Fall Outside the Harlem Retainer Agreement

This case concerns the Harlem Retainer Agreement. The agreement began in May 15
2012 and expired by its terms on September 15, 2012. The Plaintiff complains of disclosures that
were outside the date and scope of the agreement and as such do not fall under the terms of the
Harlem Retainer Agreement. Additionally, Plaintiff complains of documents that do not relate to
The Hoeg Corporation’s consulting work with The Peebles Corporation and many of the
disclosures are years after the Retainer Agreement Expired.
The dates on the documents are controlling and are irrefutably outside the scope of the
Retainer Agreement. The documentary evidence shows that the documents alleged to be in
violation of the Retainer Agreement are from public resources, were submitted in connection
with other projects, or were simply not covered by the Retainer Agreement.
Many disclosures between the parties occurred outside the contract and thus, by the terms
of the agreement, were not a part of the consultancy arrangement. The consultancy was
specifically delineated by contract and any activities outside the contract are not a part of the
consultancy arrangement. For example, in October 2012, after the Retainer Agreement expired in
September 2012, Congressman Gregory Meeks informed Roy Peebles, Jr. that Meeks could
guide an RFP in Jamaica, Queens to The Peebles Corporation. Peebles said Meeks “owed him
favors” - Peebles often has the inside track on real estate developments slated to go to black
developers through his political contacts in Washington D.C. Congressman Gregory Meeks told
Peebles that Meeks could guide Peebles to a winning bid at the Greater Jamaica Development
Center’s Jamaica Station RFP. (See Exhibit 8). There, Peebles was told that Peebles’ bid would
win before the RFP was even issued, yet Peebles still could not muster up the capital to close on
the project. This particular instance was disclosed after the terms of the retainer agreement
expired, and thus, are not covered in the confidentiality provisions of the Retainer Agreement.
The conversations were outside the scope of The Harlem Retainer agreement and thus not
controlled by any confidentiality provisions of the agreement.
B. Plaintiff’s Prior Lawsuit for Breach of Contract

The Hoeg Corporation sued The Peebles Corporation for breach of contract in 2015. The
Peebles Corporation then counter-claimed against The Hoeg Corporation for breach of contract
and breach of confidentiality. The Plaintiff counterclaimed against The Hoeg Corporation for
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breach of contract and breach of confidentiality in 2015. The Complaint alleged breach of
contract and breach of confidentiality against The Hoeg Corporation. Plaintiff and Roy Peebles’s
utter ineptitude required him flipping his development rights ato El-Ad Group, and becoming a
minority partner. This is because Peebles has no assets, no financial partners, and required a
“cash out closing” because Peebles was neither technically, financially, or mentally competent to
do the job Peebles represented in RFP responses. (Exhibit 12).
Nonetheless, the Plaintiff is duplicating that lawsuit now and expanding the pool of
Defendants in a meritless attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction.
C. The Current Dispute

The current dispute is part and parcel of Roy Peebles’s attempt to silence critics and
maintain the illusion that he is a competent real estate developer. Peebles has a modus operandi
of submitting false and misleading information in RFP bids. Peebles makes numerous
misrepresentations in order to secure lucrative government contracts at below market rates,
rarely ever actually building anything.
Take for example, the misrepresentations on Plaintiff’s own website:
“Founded in 1983 by Don Peebles, the company has become an
industry leader with a portfolio of active and completed
developments totaling more than 10 million square feet and $8
billion in the gateway cities of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Washington D.C., Charlotte, Miami, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles.”
Plaintiff misrepresents the company's portfolio size, square footage developed, and even the
cities where it maintains active developments. Peebles’s misrepresentations are not limited to his
website. Peebles submits falsified and misleading information, attests to the truth of it, and then
attempts to bluff and overbid his way into contracts that are intended to empower minority
business communities.
It is important to note that these claims are designed to do one thing: allow Roy Peebles,
Jr.to commit fraud. Roy Peebles, Jr.has an obvious modus operandi: submit unrealistic bids to
municipalities, promise money Roy Peebles, Jr. doesn’t have, offer terms that Roy Peebles, Jr.
cannot meet, and then, unbeknownst to anybody but Roy Peebles Jr.’s, negotiate with
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non-MWBE firms to stand is his shoes and retain an interest in the project as an MWBE-partner.
This is fraud. Roy Peebles Jr.’s fraud is extensive, yet remarkably unsuccessful. As shown in the
exhibits, Peebles has been unable to capitalize on his fraudulent misrepresentations in several
states. Peebles’ has failed projects and lawsuits all over the country: Florida, New York,
California, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Washington, D.C. However, none of these are disclosed
and Peebles’ intentional misrepresentation of Roy Peebles Jr.’s numerous bankruptcy filings are
sufficient to constitute an active an ongoing fraud. Plaintiff routinely submits falsified
information and overbids in response to RFPs targeted to encourage minority participation,
frequently letting the project collapse soon thereafter.4 This lawsuit is an attempt by Plaintiff to
maintain the deception that is Plaintiff’s bread and butter through a frivolous and baseless breach
of contract action.
D. The Complaint and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff now attempts to expand the Retainer Agreement to bind The Hoeg Corporation
and Daniel Hoeg in Daniel Hoeg’s personal capacity. In an attempt to merge Defendant into the
agreement, the Plaintiffs are erroneously making reference to “The Hoeg Defendants”. The Hoeg
Corporation is a different entity from Daniel Hoeg, obviously. Nonetheless, the Complaint seeks
Injunctive relief by muddying the waters and incorporating an individual into a corporate
agreement.
E. Relevant Procedural History

On June 15, 2015, The Hoeg Corporation filed a breach of contract action against
Plaintiff in 2015. Plaintiff filed a counterclaim action alleging breach of contract and breach of
confidentiality in response. On May 30, 2017, The Hoeg Corporation’s action against The
Peebles Corporation was reversed on appeal and dismissed.
4
See Plaintiff’s overbids and subsequent failed awards at Pacifica Quarry (Pacifica, CA), Long Island Community
Hospital and Aqueduct Gaming (Queens, NY), Anacosta’s 5th and I (D.C.), 1801 Vine Street (Philadelphia, PA),
Parcel 13 (Boston, MA), and Overtown Gateway (Miami, FL) projects.
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ARGUMENT
On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts

alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference,
and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal
theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88, 614 NYS2d 972 [1994]; Thomas v Lasalle
Bank N. A., 79 AD3d 1015, 1017, 913 NYS2d 742 [2d Dept 2010]; Scoyni v Chabowski, 72
AD3d 792, 793, 898 NYS2d 482 [2d Dept 2010]; Lucia v Goldman, 68 AD3d 1064, 1066, 893
NYS2d 90 [2d Dept 2009]). A motion to dismiss a complaint based on documentary evidence
pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence that forms
the basis of the defense is such that it resolves all of the factual allegations as a matter of law,
and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claims (see Turkat v Lalezarian Developers, Inc., 52
AD3d 595, 596, 860 NYS2d 153 [2d Dept 2008]). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(7), the court may consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in
the complaint (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d
633, 635—636, 389 NYS2d 314 [1976]; DaCosta v Trade-Winds Envtl. Restoration, Inc., 61
AD3d 627, 628, 877 NYS2d 373 [2d Dept 2009]). When evidentiary material is adduced in
support of the motion, the court must determine whether the proponent of the pleading has a
cause of action, not whether the proponent has stated one (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43
NY2d 268, 275, 401 NYS2d 182 [1977]; Thomas v Lasalle [*13]Bank N. A., 79 AD3d at 1017;
Scoyni v Chabowski, 72 AD3d at 793; Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v Simone Dev. Corp.,
46 AD3d 530, 846 NYS2d 368 [2d Dept 2007]).
I. PLAINTIFF, PEEBLES’, FRAUDULENT CONDUCT AND

MISREPRESENTATIONS DURING GOVERNMENT BIDDING
The annexed exhibits and documentary evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff submits false
and misleading information in sworn affidavits. Plaintiff submits such misinformation for the
purpose of inducing governments to select Plaintiff for competitive real estate development
projects. Plaintiff’s admission that these are authentic documents relating to bankruptcies,
financial documents, and net worth statements are admissions that these documents are true and
authentic.
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As a general rule, illegal contracts are unenforceable. (Lloyd Capital Corp. v Pat
Henchar, Inc., 80 NY2d 124 [1992].) A party to an illegal contract cannot resort to a court of law
for help in carrying out its illegal object. (Valenza v Emmelle Coutier, Inc., 288 AD2d 114
[2001]; Blum v Drucker, 240 AD2d 609 [1997].)
In Exhibit 3, Plaintiff made a sworn statement that its principal; had not filed for
bankruptcy within the previous 7 years. Exhibit 4 is a bankruptcy filing signed by Plaintiff’s
principal that directly contradicts the sworn statement made in Exhibit 3. This is the fraudulent
conduct that does “not receive a healing benediction” in New York Courts. The allegations of a
violation of the retainer agreement should be looked at in the context of the disclosure, namely,
true, good faith reports of fraud to a government agency.
A. Plaintiff makes an admission of fraudulent conduct

Plaintiff does not deny that the documents are authentic and that Plaintiff’s
conduct is illegal, instead arguing that the conduct is protected by confidentiality.
Courts have determined that the critical question is whether performance of the
contract would necessarily encourage illegal conduct. (See X.L.O. Concrete Corp.
v Rivergate Corp., 83 NY2d 513 [1994]; Murray Walter, Inc. v Sarkisian Bros.,
107 AD2d 173 [1985].) Because the Plaintiff’s admissions that the documents are
authentic show that there were fraudulent misrepresentations in multiple
disclosures, Plaintiff seeks an impermissibly broad injunction, relief, and such
relief is against public policy.
B. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege entitlement to injunctive relief

Plaintiff’s complaint nowhere establishes the prima facie showing required to
obtain the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction. The procedural device
of a preliminary injunction is designed to maintain the status quo pending
determination of an action City of Long Beach v. Sterling Am. Capital, LLC, 40
AD3d 902, 903 (2nd Dept. 2007); and Ingenuit, Ltd. v Harriff, 33 AD3d 589 (2nd
Dept. 2006). The decision whether to grant or deny such relief rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Here, Plaintiff does not make any attempt to allege that the
status quo can be maintained with a preliminary injunction. Nor would Plaintiff
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be able to, because a preliminary injunction’s purpose in maintain the parties in

the same position during litigation is absent, and the failure to plead this element
as a requirement is fatal to the Complaint.
C. Plaintiff’s fraud cannot be rectified in a court of equity

To allow the Plaintiff to enforce an obviously baseless claim of confidentiality
would critically affect the ability of government agencies to identify falsehoods in
the process of procurement contracting. The seriousness of the crime is an
important factor in the evaluation of fraud. Here, the seriousness of the crime is
significant, based on the Plaintiff’s ability to obtain large, billion dollar RFPs on
the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation. The crime is so significant that Plaintiff
has caused the shutdown of a hospital, misdirection of millions of dollars in
funds, and freezing of municipal assets in many jurisdictions across the country.
II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) a court must determine
whether the allegations in the complaint fit within any discernible legal theory. To succeed on a
motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) the documentary evidence that forms the basis of
the defense must be such that it resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively
disposes of the plaintiff’s claim. (Summer v. Severance, 85 AD3d 1011, 1012). "A party seeking
dismissal on the ground that its defense is founded on documentary evidence under CPLR
3211(a)(1) has the burden of submitting documentary evidence that resolves all factual issues as
a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claim" (Botach Mgt. Group v Gurash,
138 AD3d 771, 771 [2d Dept 2016]; see Sullivan v State, 34 AD3d 443 [2d Dept 2006]). "A
motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss a complaint on the ground that a defense is
founded on documentary evidence 'may be appropriately granted only where the documentary
evidence utterly refutes [the] plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as
a matter of law'" (Rodolico v Rubin & Licatesi, P.C., 114 AD3d 923, 924-925 [2d Dept 2014],
quoting Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Sabre Real Estate Group, LLC v
Ghazvini, 140 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2016]; Yue Fung USA Enters., Inc. v Novelty Crystal Corp.,
105 AD3d 840, 841 [2d Dept 2013] ["dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) is warranted only
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if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims
as a matter of law"]).
The evidence submitted in support of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss a
complaint on the ground that a defense is founded on documentary evidence "must be
documentary or the motion must be denied" (Rodolico, 114 AD3d at 925 [internal quotation
marks omitted]). "In order to be considered documentary evidence within the meaning of CPLR
3211(a)(1), the evidence 'must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity'" (Rabos v R & R
Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2d Dept 2012], quoting Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73
AD3d 78, 86 [2d Dept 2010]; Yue Fung USA Enters., Inc., 105 AD3d at 841-842). "'Judicial
records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds,
contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify
as documentary evidence in the proper case; however, affidavits and letters are not considered
documentary evidence'"(Hartnagel v FTW Contracting, 147 AD3d 819, 820 [2d Dept 2017]; see
Cives Corp. v George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 AD3d 713, 714 [2d Dept 2012], quoting Fontanetta,
73 AD3d at 84-85; Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d 996, 997 [2d Dept
2010]).
A. Complaint is time barred.

The Complaint alleges the breach of an agreement that by its term expired in September
2012. This is beyond the six (6) year statute of limitations period for breach of an agreement.
(CPLR 213[2]). The Plaintiff filed suit in 2015 alleging that The Hoeg Corporation had breached
the agreement in 2012, during the performance of the contract. See Hoeg Corp. v Peebles Corp.
2017 NY Slip Op 06066 (Aug. 2017).(Exhibit 14).
Plaintiff’s cross-claims against The Hoeg Corporation for breach of contract and breach
of confidentiality show that the Plaintiff filed suit for a breach occurring in 2012. The inquiry as
to whether a plaintiff could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud turns on
whether the plaintiff was "possessed of knowledge of facts from which [the fraud] could be
reasonably inferred" (Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d 321, 326 [1957]). "Generally,
knowledge of the fraudulent act is required and mere suspicion will not constitute a sufficient
substitute" (id.). "Where it does not conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts
from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred, a complaint [*4]should not be dismissed on
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motion and the question should be left to the trier of the facts" (Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723,
725 [1978]; see Erbe, 3 NY2d at 326).
Thus, the Plaintiff has conclusively demonstrated that its claims are time barred by CPLR
213(2).
B. Plaintiff has already sued for the same relief.

Plaintiff’s CPLR 2217(B) affidavit incorrectly states that “no prior action or request for
this or any similar relief has been sought in any prior action by The Peebles Corporation.”
(Plaintiffs CPLR 2217 Affidavit). In truth, this exact type of relief was sought by Plaintiff for the
identical claims of breach of contract and breach of confidentiality in a counter-claim against
The Hoeg Corporation in 2015. Here, it is conclusive that the Plaintiff had knowledge of an
alleged breach in 2012 and filed suit based on that alleged breach in 2015. The Plaintiff’s
counterclaims that were disposed of in 2017 show that the Plaintiff alleged a breach in 2012
during performance of the contract and a breach of confidentiality for filing of the lawsuit, and as
Plaintiff alleged, “using The Peebles Corporation documents” to pursue business opportunities.
C. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Daniel Hoeg, an individual resident of
Colorado. Defendant has no ties to New York and is not a party to the retainer agreement upon
which the Plaintiff’s suit is based.
On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating "satisfaction of statutory and due
process prerequisites" (Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., 81 NY2d 203, 207 [1993]). Under CPLR
302(a)(1), New York's long-arm jurisdiction statute, "proof of one transaction in New York is
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as
the defendant's activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the
transaction and the claim asserted" (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d
65, 71 [2006][internal quotation marks omitted], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]). Due process
is satisfied when a foreign entity has "minimum contacts" with the State and exercise of
jurisdiction does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (International
Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also
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LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 216 [2000]). It is "rare" for personal jurisdiction to
be permitted under the long-arm statute and prohibited by due process considerations (Rushaid v
Pictet & Cie., 28 NY3d 316, 331 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, the Plaintiff cannot plead that Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, has submitted to New York
jurisdiction. There have been no transactions related to New York and the contract upon which
Plaintiff relies is not a transaction between Defendant and Plaintiff. The long arm statute does
not confer jurisdiction and any attempt to proceed with personal jurisdiction against Daniel Hoeg
is inappropriate and prohibited by due process considerations. None of the actions alleged have
any involvement with New York, the Plaintiff is not a New York corporation, and the agreement
is not between the Defendant and Plaintiff.
The Court also does not have jurisdiction through New York’s long-arm jurisdiction
statute because Defendant is a nondomiciliary and has not transacted any businesses within the
state nor contracted anywhere to supply goods or services in the state" (CPLR 302 [a] [1]; see
Bogal v Finger, 59 AD3d 653 [2009]). "CPLR 302 (a) is a 'single act statute [and] . . . proof of
one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never
enters New York, so long as the defendant's activities here were purposeful and there is a
substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted’”. (Kimco Exch. Place
Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc., 34 AD3d 433, 434 [2006], quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v
Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; see Bogal v
Finger, 59 AD3d 653 [2009]). However, the party that transacted business in this case is not the
Defendant, especially not in Defendant’s individual capacity. Thus, the Court cannot say that
Defendant has established minimum contacts in New York or engaged in purposeful activity in
New York under a totality of the circumstances.
D. The Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue under the subject agreement.
The subject agreement does not provide the Plaintiff the legal capacity to sue for breach
of agreement against Defendant and Plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to sue against the
individual defendant, Daniel Hoeg.
The language of the contract controls here. A fiduciary relationship does not arise by
operation of law, but must spring from the parties themselves, who agree to and accept the
responsibilities that flow from such a contractual fiduciary bond. Courts look to the parties’
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agreements to discover, not generate, the nexus of the relation and the particular contractual
expression establishing the parties’ interdependency.” Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Advert.,
Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 158, 160 (1993); see also, Kohman v. Rochambeau Realty & Dev. Corp., 17
A.D.3d 151, 154 (1st Dep’t 2005)(a contract must be interpreted in accordance with its terms).
Since the documents attached to the complaint specifically do not include Defendant, Daniel
Hoeg, in the Confidentiality Provision, the court cannot undermine this exercise of contractual
rights achieved through a bargain conducted at arms length. Here, Daniel Hoeg, and The Hoeg
Corporation, merely asserted their bargained for rights and no breach of contract arises from
these actions. Further, the Retainer Agreement does not provide the right to sue for breach and to
seek in injunction pursuant to the Retainer Agreement’s terms. The Retainer Agreement only
allows the Plaintiff to terminate the agreement for cause if the provision is breached, thus it is is
clear that the remedy for breach of confidentiality is termination of the agreement.
The provisions that provide the Plaintiff the right to seek an injunction are merely “to
prevent further breach of this agreement”, which clearly does not apply to an expired agreement.
In addition to the jurisdiction issues and defects of Plaintiffs arguments, Plaintiff’s complaint
should be dismissed and without a likelihood of success on the merits the preliminary injunction
is moot.
III. SECTION 10 EXPLICITLY STATES THAT A BREACH OF

CONFIDENTIALITY IS “CAUSE FOR TERMINATION”
A basic principle of contract interpretation is that the language of the agreement is to be
construed according to the intent of the parties. In this case, the contract is clearly between the
principal and consultant:The Peebles Corporation and The Hoeg Corporation, respectively. The
contract plain terms do not require or permit Daniel Hoeg, as an individual, to be sued under the
breach provisions of the contract.
It is well settled that, absent fraud, duress or mutual mistake, the parties to a contract are
bound by the express terms and conditions of their agreement. See Law v Edgecliff Realty Co.,
133 NYS2d 418, 419 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County, 1954); Schonberger v Culbertson, 231 AD
257 (1st Dept. 1931) (Generally, rights of parties to contract must be determined by its terms); La
Vere v R. M. Burritt Motors, Inc., 112 Misc 2d 225, 226 (City Ct., City of Oswego, 1981), citing,
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Simpson on Contracts, 2nd Edition, pages 187, 186-88 (absent fraud, the parties to a written
agreement are bound by the written terms of their agreement and the Court will not rewrite a
contract freely entered into by the two parties"even if the contract may be grossly favorable or
unfavorable to either party); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 2 (a party who has voluntarily entered into a
contract is bound by its terms, even though the contract may prove to be unwise or
disadvantageous to him or her); Brandywine Pavers, LLC v Bombard, 108 AD3d 1209, 1210
(4th Dept. 2013), quoting, Da Silva v. Musso, 53 NY2d 543, 550, 444 N.Y.S.2d 50, 428 N.E.2d
382 ("Under long accepted principles, one who signs a document is, absent fraud or other
wrongful act of the other contracting party, bound by its contents.").
In the present case, the Retainer Agreement clearly states that the agreement is “made
effective as of May 14th, 2012, by and between The Peebles Corporation (hereinafter ‘Principal’)
and The Hoeg Corporation (hereinafter ‘Consultant’).” (Plaintiff Complaint Exhibit A). The
Retainer Agreement’s Section 10 contains the Confidentiality Provision. The wording of Section
10 is clear and explicit:
“Consultant (The Hoeg Corporation) agrees to keep all material
matters of their work on behalf of the Principle (The Peebles
Corporation) confidential.”
Thus, Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, is not a party to the agreement. This means that the Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, is bound by the terms of this agreement is not a fact at
all, and not to be given any deference in the context of a motion to dismiss. The evidence
conclusively demonstrates that the agreement was by and between The Hoeg Corporation and
The Peebles Corporation only. The allegations by the Plaintiff are mere allegations and not facts
at all and as such the complaint must be dismissed.
Additionally, the term is explicit that only The Hoeg Corporation was bound, and that
The Hoeg Corporation only agreed to keep “material matters of their work on behalf of [The
Peebles Corporation] confidential.” Thus, only The Hoeg Corporation is bound. Further, only
The Hoeg Corporation is bound to maintain confidentiality in a limited circumstance. Outside the
scope of the agreement are non-material matters that were not part of their work on behalf of The
Peebles Corporation. These would necessarily include items that chronologically fall outside the
scope of the confidentiality agreement and the term of the Retainer Agreement.
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The relevant portion of the agreement, Section 10, continues:

“A breach of this provision by the Consultant shall be deemed
“cause” for the termination of this Agreement.”
Thus, the breach of the provision is cause for the termination of the agreement, but it does not
constitute a breach of the agreement. The only right Plaintiff has against The Hoeg Corporation5
is to terminate the agreement for a breach of confidentiality. The rights conferred on the Plaintiff
against The Hoeg Corporation are to “prevent further breach of the agreement”. Although vague
and unclear, this phrase cannot allow the Plaintiff to defend injunctive relief against a non-party
to the agreement, nor could it allow the Plaintiff to prevent the breach of an agreement that has
already been breached. Contracts, much like pregnancy, cannot be only halfway: it is either
breached or it is not breached. Especially in light of Section 10 reading that a breach of
confidentiality shall be deemed cause for termination of the agreement.
The use of the word “shall” is facial proof that the remedy of terminating the agreement
is non-discretionary. The Hoeg Corporation’s breach of the confidentiality provision of Section
10 of the Retainer Agreement is “‘cause’ for termination of this Agreement.” That is the remedy
that the contract demands and requires. There is no remedial breach provision, no attorney’s fees
clause, and no discretionary action allowed: the agreement is terminated. Thus, there is no
injunctive relief available, there is nothing that can prevent “further breach of the agreement”,
and the injunctive relief that the Plaintiff seeks is null and void because the contract is terminated
for cause by its own terms.
Stated differently The Hoeg Corporation was entitled to breach its confidentiality
provisions with The Peebles Corporation. This would have resulted in “cause” for termination of
the agreement and triggering the right for The Peebles Corporation to terminate the retainer
agreement. However, toread the retainer agreement as requiring The Hoeg Corporation to
maintain a confidentiality provision despite The Peebles Corporation’s mandatory termination of
the agreement is tantamount to removing the wording of the confidentiality agreement.The
parties negotiated and executed the Retainer Agreement at arm’s length and the Court cannot
substitute itself into the position of the parties and change the meaning and context of the
agreement. The Hoeg Corporation was well within the contractual rights to breach the
5
And ONLY The Hoeg Corporation.
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confidentiality provisions and allow the Plaintiff to terminate the agreement. The mandatory
termination of the agreement under the terms of the agreement would have extinguished all
rights and requirements under the terminated agreement.
Thus, the Plaintiff’s choice of remedy was to terminate the agreement. Nonetheless, the
Plaintiff continued to disclose information to The Hoeg Corporation despite the lapse of the
agreement and the confidentiality terms.
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NO AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court should "accept the facts
as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"
(Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Biro v Roth, 121 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2014];
Parekh v Cain, 96 AD3d 812, 815 [2d Dept 2012]). The standard is not whether the complaint
states a cause of action, but whether the plaintiff has a cause of action (see Morales v Copy
Right, Inc., 28 AD3d 440 [2d Dept 2006]). "CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissals merely address the
adequacy of the [pleading], and do not reach the substantive merits of a [party's] cause of action"
(Lieberman v Green, 139 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Hendrickson v Philbor
Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d 251, 255 [2d Dept 2012]).
Here, the documentary evidence is clear that Daniel Hoeg, as an individual, did not
submit to the agreement nor sign the agreement in a personal capacity. The Plaintiff’s complaint
cannot decide to add Daniel Hoeg as a defendant for the mere expediency of having another
Defendant. The documentary evidence and the wording of the Retainer Agreement is clear that
the agreement was between The Hoeg Corporation and The Peebles Corporation. Both were
valid corporations and The Hoeg Corporation was a corporation validly existing under the laws
of New York State. (Exhibit 36).
V. DEFENDANT HAS NO “CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS” TO PLAINTIFF

Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint
pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action,
not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact as
claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant
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dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43
NY2d 268, 274 [1977]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d at 851-852).
The documentary submissions, including the language of the Retainer Agreement are
clear that The Hoeg Corporation is the party to the confidentiality clause. The Plaintiff argument
has no merit. It is utterly disputed by the documentary evidence that Daniel Hoeg signed the
agreement in his capacity as CEO and President of a corporation and that this does not extend a
breach of contract cause of action to him personally. The plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts
that allege that Daniel Hoeg, as an individual, is bound to the terms of the Retainer Agreement.
VI. PLAINTIFF’S “BREACH OF CONTRACT” CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED

Plaintiff’s claim against Daniel Hoeg is demonstrable wrong. As the Plaintiff has already
attempted to sue The Hoeg Corporation for the same breach of contract and breach of
confidentiality years before, the current cause of action against Daniel Hoeg should be
dismissed. The Retainer Agreement relied on by the Plaintiff is clear and does not allow a cause
of action against Daniel Hoeg as an individual. The documentary evidence submitted show that
the contract is not signed by Defendant, Daniel Hoeg. The contract does not implicate the
personal liability of Daniel Hoeg in any way. The agreement shows that Daniel Hoeg does not
owe any contractual duties to The Peebles Corporation or Roy Peebles, Jr.
A. Plaintiff’s “Breach of Contract” Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.
1. Plaintiff did not have an agreement with Daniel Hoeg.

Plaintiff does not have contractual privity with Defendant, Daniel Hoeg.
For this reason alone the Complaint should be dismissed. The Defendant
was not a party to the Retainer Agreement and a plain reading of the
agreement shows that there was no contractual privity between Defendant,
Daniel Hoeg and Plaintiff. Plaintiff attempts to get around a plain reading
of the agreement by lumping together Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, with the
other Defendant, The Hoeg Corporation. Plaintiff refers to the “Hoeg
Defendants” as one entity to mislead the Court and present them as a
single contracting body. This stale and tired technique is sometimes
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effective, and worked for Plaintiff in previous litigation, however, it is still

a bush league technique to create the perception of contractual privity
where there is none.
2. The agreement expired by its terms on September 15, 2012.

The Retainer Agreement was effective on May 15, 2012 and expired by its
terms on September 15, 2012. Obviously, all documents shared by
Plaintiff and The Hoeg Corporation outside of that time period are not
covered by the agreement or the confidentiality provisions of the
agreement. Plaintiff continued to share information with the Defendant at
Plaintiff’s own peril. Such is the risk of operating a fraudulent business
enterprise without a contract and then expecting confidentiality nearly a
decade later. The contractual language controls and the terms of the
contract expired on September 15, 2012. Thus, any information disclosed
after that period of time could not be considered to be within the terms of
the consulting contract and could not be considered to be privileged or
protected information giving rise to a breach of contract claim.
3. The Plaintiff does not adequately allege a breach of the agreement.

By the plain terms of the agreement, the violation of the confidentiality
provisions constitute “cause for termination” of the agreement. Thus the
agreement can be terminated by its terms without being breached.
B. Plaintiff allegations do not track with the contract language.

The Plaintiff’s allegations are inconsistent with the terms of the contact and the
remedies available to the Plaintiff in Section 10 of the Retainer Agreement. First,
the Defendant is not a party to the agreement and the Confidentiality provision
only refers to The Hoeg Corporation. Second, the provisions for breach are
specific and narrow, citing only information that is material and part of The Hoeg
Corporation’s work for Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s Complaint is overbroad, inconsistent
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with the language of the agreement, and inconsistent with the language in the
confidentiality provision.
C. The contract spells out breach of confidentiality is merely “‘cause’ for the
termination of” the Agreement
The language of the complaint is plain that a breach of confidentiality is cause for
the termination of the agreement. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot claim breach
of contract and seek to enforce the preliminary agreement because the terms of
the agreement do not provide for such relief by its own terms.
D. Plaintiff is actively perpetrating a fraud and cannot suppress disclosures.

The documents annexed to the motion to dismiss clearly evidence Plaintiff’s
misrepresentation of material information in bidding with government agencies.
Specifically, Exhibit 3, is an Internal Background Investigation Form submitted by
The Peebles Corporation in its disastrous bid for Long Island Community Hospital
(LICH) which resulted in the hospital being shut down.
In Exhibit 3, The Peebles Corporation specifically misrepresents Roy Peebles, Jr.

history of bankruptcy filings. In Exhibit 4, one of Peebles several bankruptcy
filings are made plain on publicly available websites. Peebles misrepresentation of
bankruptcy filings is a material, criminal fraud that Peebles continually
misrepresents in competitive bidding documents.
Defendants Exhibits 3 and 4 were not disclosed by The Peebles Corporation; these
documents were discovered after the Retainer Agreement’s terms had expired.
They were submitted years after The Peebles Corporation had breached its
obligations to The Hoeg Corporation, and were entirely outside the bounds of the
Retainer Agreement language. Like all of the disclosures related to Peebles’s fraud,
these were made well after any relationship between The Peebles Corporation and
The Hoeg Corporation were dissolved.
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Public policy prevents the suppression of information related to criminal activity

and defrauding the government. Thus, because Plaintiff and its principal, Roy
Peebles, are actively committing a fraud during government bidding, they cannot
use contract law to perpetrate a criminal activity. Absent any wrongdoing, the
Court cannot prohibit Plaintiff from utilizing his knowledge about the Plaintiff’s
fraudulent behavior. (See Restatement, Agency 2d, § 396, Comment b).
E. The disclosures are good faith reports of fraud to government agencies.
New York Courts’ "[t]emporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions — i.e.,
court orders that actually forbid speech activities — are classic examples of prior restraints" and
"[p]rior restraints pose the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights" (id. at 747, quoting Alexander v United States, 509 US 544, 550 [1993] and Hunt v NBC,
872 F2d 289, 293 [9th Cir 1989]). In addition, "[p]rior restraints on speech are the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights, and any imposition of prior
restraint, whatever the form, bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" (id. at
476). Because "to obtain such a restraint . . . [the applicant] must show that the speech sought to
be restrained is 'likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest' [such as] an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," even highly offensive,
repulsive and inflammatory speech does not meet this exacting constitutional standard (id.)
VIII. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR AN INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED
"A party seeking the drastic remedy of a preliminary injunction has the burden of
demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the
merits, (2) the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld, and (3) a
balancing of the equities in the movant's favor" (Berkoski v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of
Southampton, 67 AD3d 840, 844, 889 NYS2d 623 [2d Dept 2009]; see CPLR 6301; Shasho v
Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 67 AD3d 663, 665, 888 NYS2d 557 [2d Dept 2009]; Ying Fung Moy
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v Hohi Umeki, 10 AD3d 604, 781 NYS2d 684 [2d Dept 2004]). "The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to maintain the status quo and prevent the dissipation of property that could render a
judgment ineffectual" (Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d 485, 486, 810 NYS2d 216 [2d Dept 2006]).
"The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court" (Arcamone—Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc., 83 AD3d 623, 625, 920 NYS2d
362 [2d Dept 2011]).
Here, the Plaintiff has not met the standard required for a preliminary injunction. And the
Court is not obliged by the contents of the Retainer Agreement to grant the “drastic remedy
which should be used sparingly”, because this is not the urgent situation where a grave necessity
demands it. Additionally, the Plaintiff has a meritless case, no likelihood of success, and lacks
the showing required. Further, the Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits
because Defendant is not a party to the agreement. The Plaintiff cannot show irreparable injury
because the Plaintiff is essentially asking for a defamation judgment and the breach of contract
claim is a strictly monetary claim. Lastly, the Plaintiff cannot show a balance of equities in the
Plaintiffs favor because Defendant was not a party to the agreement and Plaintiff made numerous
disclosures to the Defendant beyond the scope of the subject confidentiality clause in the
Retainer Agreement. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 NY2d 860,862 (1990); W.T.Grant v.
Srogi, 52 NY2d 496 (1981); and Wiener v. Life Style Futon Inc., 48 AD3d 458 (2nd Dept. 2008).
A. Defendant is not a party to the Retainer Agreement.
"In determining whether the parties entered into a contractual agreement and what
were its terms, it is necessary to look, rather, to the objective manifestations of the
intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and deeds" (Brown
Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp., 41 NY2d 397, 399 [1977]). "Generally,
courts look to the basic elements of the offer and the acceptance to determine
whether there is an objective meeting of the minds" (Matter of Express Indus. &
Term. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 NY2d 584, 589 [1999]).
Defendant is not a party to the agreement. There is no issue of fact here and the
document is conclusive on its face.
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Further, does not provide for injunctive relief against Daniel Hoeg, an individual.
The language of the retainer additionally lays out the right to “seek injunctive
relief”, not the right to obtain it. A New York Court is not instructed, nor can it be
instructed, to enjoin the free speech of an individual merely because a party seeks
to enjoin potential libel.
Further, the Court in Brummer emphasized that "although it may ultimately be

determined that defendants have libeled plaintiff, "[p]rior restraints are not
permissible . . . merely to enjoin the publication of libel". Brummer, 166 AD3d at
477, quoting Rosenberg Diamond Dev. Corp. v Appel, 290 AD2d 239, 239 [1st
Dept 2002]).
Here, the Court is not permitted to enact a prior restraint on the Defendant. The
preliminary injunction is too extreme a measure in this case and its direction is
inconsistent. The Defendant is not a party to the contract and does not come
remotely close to the level of public discussion required for a preliminary
injunction. Additionally, as the Court in Brummer laid out, a preliminary
injunction would not be appropriate to prevent libel, which isn’t even the case at
bar. Defendant has not libelled Plaintiff. It is the opposite, the Defendant has told
the truth to public agencies about the Plaintiff and that is the conduct Plaintiff
seeks to enjoin.
B. Agreement language of injunctive relief only binds The Hoeg Corporation

The language of the retainer agreement is plain. The Retainer Agreement made
effective as of May 14th 2012 by and between The Hoeg Corporation and The
Peebles Corporation. the agreement in no way represents that Daniel Hoeg as an
individual is bound to the terms of the retainer agreement. Section 10 of the
agreement states that the requirements for confidentiality or that the consultant
agrees to keep all matters of their work on behalf of the principal confidential the
parties agree that the actual damages caused by the breach of confidentiality or
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difficult if not impossible to determine and therefore the principal shall have the
right to obtain injunctive relief within the courts for prevent further breach of this
agreement a breach of this provision by the consultant shall be deemed cause for
the termination of the agreement. Dust by the terms of the agreement only the
consultant and principal are bound and not Daniel Hoag as an individual. Thus, a
breach of this provision is deemed cause for the termination of the agreement and
the agreement is express that it is not grounds for a breach of the agreement
remedy. Breach of the agreement would require a violation of the agreement
without any remedies. Here the remedy is made express by section 10 of the
retainer agreement.
C. Plaintiff’s claim is primarily for money damages.

Lost profits, however difficult to compute, are clearly compensable with money
damages. Sterling Fifth Assoc. v. Carpentille Corp., Inc., 5 AD3d 328, 329 (1st
Dept. 2004). Here, the Plaintiff’s allegations sound squarely in terms of monetary
damages. In fact, Plaintiff’s previous lawsuit was for money damages on the same
claim and the parties were identical. The equities do not warrant granting the
Plaintiff a preliminary injunction because it has been demonstrate the Plaintiff
seeks primarily money damages and that the harm of depriving the Defendant’s
First Amendment rights are significantly greater than the harm Plaintiff would
suffer by having true and correct documents circulated that were already
published..
D. Plaintiff cannot meet the burden required for a preliminary injunction.

In the context of a preliminary injunction, irreparable injury is one that cannot be
redressed through a monetary award. Walsh v. Design Concepts, Ltd., 221 AD2d
454, 455 (2nd Dept. 1995). See also, Fischer v. Deitsch, 168 AD2d 599, 601 (2nd
Dept. 1990) citing McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. W.J. Nolan & Co., Inc.,
supra at 174. Monetary loss will not amount to irreparable harm unless the
movant provides evidence, not here present, of [*3]damage that cannot be
rectified by financial compensation. The alleged harm must be shown by the
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moving party to be imminent, not remote or speculative. Golden v. Steam Heat,

Inc., 216 AD2d 440, 442 (2nd Dept. 1995).
Here, a preliminary injunction cannot be granted because the Plaintiff cannot and
has not made the showing required for relief. See Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748,
750 (1988). The Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of ultimate success on the
records and as a matter of law, the preliminary injunction cannot be granted.
Plaintiff cannot make a showing of success because there is nothing binding
Daniel Hoeg to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has no agreement with Daniel Hoeg, the
referenced agreement is beyond the statute of limitations, and the referenced
agreement would have been terminated by its own terms, offering no remedies to
the Plaintiff for breach of contract in the event of the disclosure of protected
information. The Plaintiff has not shown that the Defendant has disclosed or was
even subject to confidential information and every disclosure referenced by the
Plaintiff in the Plaintiff’s complaint was public, non-confidential, and beyond the
period of performance in the Retainer Agreement. Further, the Plaintiff cannot
show the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld.
Lastly, the Plaintiff cannot show a balance of equities tipping in the Plaintiff’s
favor. The Defendant is not a party to the agreement and there is no inequity
caused by a non-party’s actions. The Plaintiff is not engaging in good faith
behavior and the Defendant is not seeking to benefit personally from disclosing
Plaintiff’s business history.
E. The terms of the retainer agreement do not allow Plaintiff to sue for both a
breach and an injunction
The terms of the Retainer Agreement are clear: the Plaintiff can sue for breach, or
for an injunction, but not both. The terms of the retainer agreement are clear and
state that Plaintiff has the option of suing for breach of contract or seeking an
injunction. Obviously, the contract cannot be breached in part and upheld in part.
If the contract is breached the Plaintiff has a remedy for suing for breach of
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contract, but the Plaintiff cannot also seek to have other portions of the contract
upheld in Court. Therefore the complaint should be dismissed because there is the
lack of a justiciable controversy.
F. The equities are balanced in the Defendant’s favor.

It is well settled that a "plaintiff should be denied an injunction where it lacks
equitable standing to obtain affirmative equitable relief". (Fischel & Co. v Macy
& Co., 20 N.Y.2d 180, 187.) Here, the Plaintiff is attempting to obtain an
injunction to prevent the disclosure of fraudulent activities that may result in a
large loss to taxpayers. Plaintiff makes numerous representations that have a
material impact of government decisions to award him projects. The full
disclosure of relevant material is required, otherwise fraud occurs. The injury to
be sustained by plaintiff must be more burdensome to plaintiff than the harm
which would be caused to defendants through the imposition of the injunction.
McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. W. J. Nolan & Co., Inc., 114 AD2d 165, 174
(2nd Dept. 1986), app. den. 67 NY2d 606 (1986). To establish a likelihood of
success on the merits, the movant must show that its right to a preliminary
injunction is plain on the facts of the case. Peterson v. Corbin, 275 AD2d 35, 37
(2nd Dept. 2000), lv. app. dism., 95 NY2d 919 (2000). Proof establishing the
necessary elements must be supported by affidavit and other competent proof
buttressed by evidentiary detail. CPLR 6312(c). Bare, conclusory allegations are
insufficient to support the application. Neos v Lacey, 291 AD2d 434, 435 (2nd
Dept. 2002).
Additionally, the agreement does not provide for an injunction under the factual
scenario presented. But in addition, Plaintiff has not fulfilled his terms of the
agreement including paying expenses or fees. The equities support the termination
of the agreement, but not the refunding of fees, or the application of a
post-agreement injunction. The terms of the agreement are in direct contradiction
to the relief sought.
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CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the Complaint should be dismissed.
Dated: Colorado Springs, CO

April 26, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,
_______________________
Daniel Hoeg
Defendant, pro se
6895 Alpine Currant View
Colorado Springs, CO 80918
danhoeg@gmail.com
(954) 253 - 6016
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Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant'S Motion To Dismiss The Complaint

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Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant'S Motion To Dismiss The Complaint

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/27/2021 04:48 PM INDEX NO.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

D. Plaintiff is actively perpetrating a fraud and cannot suppress disclosures…….....28

Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso,

Alexander v United States,

Arcamone—Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc.,

Berkoski v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Southampton,

Botach Mgt. Group v Gurash,

Brandywine Pavers, LLC v Bombard,

Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp.,

Brummer v Wey (166 AD3d 475, 475 [1st Dept 2018])...............................................................27

City of Long Beach v. Sterling Am. Capital, LLC,

DaCosta v Trade-Winds Envtl. Restoration, Inc.,

Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs.,

Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,

Fischel & Co. v Macy & Co.,

Fontanetta v John Doe 1,

Golden v. Steam Heat, Inc.,

Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co.,

Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc.,

Ingenuit, Ltd. v Harriff,

Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc.,

Kohman v. Rochambeau Realty & Dev. Corp.,

17 A.D.3d 151, 154 (1st Dep’t 2005)................................................................................18

LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co.,

Laughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. W. J. Nolan & Co., Inc.,

Lloyd Capital Corp. v Pat Henchar, Inc.,

Morales v Copy Right, Inc.,

Murray Walter, Inc. v Sarkisian Bros.,

Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Advert., Inc.,

Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v Simone Dev. Corp.,

Rabos v R & R Bagels & Bakery, Inc.,

Rodolico v Rubin & Licatesi, P.C.,

Rovello v Orofino Realty Co.,

Rushaid v Pictet & Cie.,

Sabre Real Estate Group, LLC v Ghazvini,

Sandals Resorts Intl. Ltd., v Google, Inc.,

Shasho v Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J.,

Shoe Co. v Washington,

Sterling Fifth Assoc. v. Carpentille Corp., Inc.,

Stewart v Volkswagen of Am.,

Thomas v Lasalle Bank N. A.,

Turkat v Lalezarian Developers, Inc.,

Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki,

Yue Fung USA Enters., Inc. v Novelty Crystal Corp.,

Valenza v Emmelle Coutier, Inc.,

Walsh v. Design Concepts, Ltd.,

Wiener v. Life Style Futon Inc.,

X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v Rivergate Corp.,

Statutes and Rules Page(s)

CPLR 3211(a)...............................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20

CPLR 3211(a)(3)..........................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20

CPLR 3211(a)(5)..........................................................................................1, 2, 4-5, 14, 16, 18, 20

CPLR 3211(a)(7)................................................................................................1, 2, 3-5, 14, 16, 21

CPLR 6301...............................................................................................................1, 2, 3-5, 14, 16

Defendant, Daniel Hoeg, respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of

Peebles Misrepresentations Are Dangerous and Destructive

A. The Disclosures Fall Outside the Harlem Retainer Agreement

B. Plaintiff’s Prior Lawsuit for Breach of Contract

C. The Current Dispute

D. The Complaint and Injunctive Relief