2007 Dallas Field Regional

Meeting
“Dust hazards – Explosion Case
& Deflagration venting*”
Andres Cespedes, Sr. LPC
October 10, 2007
 Objective
• Review of a dust explosion case – Grain
Silo storage & handling complex
• Review of layout & construction aspects
that impacted the severity of loss
• Result of explosion, review of probable
causes & lessons learned (NFPA 61, 68,
69 & GAPS 9.3.2.0)
• Flame arresting device for explosion
vents (BSB)
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 Dust Explosion Case – Blaye
• 20 August 1997 in Blaye (France)
• Grain storage silo complex
• Probable cause – ignition source caused
by mechanical friction
• Loss report (in French) available at
aida.ineris.fr/guide_silo/Fichiers/Article_2/
rapp_blaye.pdf

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Dust explosion case

BLAYE GRAIN STORAGE

ORIGINAL SITE LAYOUT

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 Original Site Layout
• SEMABLA – Société d’Exploitation Maritime
Blayaise – One of the most important complexes
for the storage and exportation of grains in the
estuary of La Gironde at that time.
• Storage capacity 37,200 tonnes (~82,000 lbs) of
grain (storage capacity of that province of France
was 130,000 tonnes (287,000 lbs) at the time of
accident)
• 44 vertical silos
• Physical dimensions: 20’ Diameter x 120’ height
(L/D ratio ~5.9 NFPA 68, 2007, chapter 6)
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Original site layout – contd.

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 Original site layout – contd.
• Two vertical towers at both ends of storage
silos – housing of bucket elevators, weighing
equip., dust removal equipment.
• Gallery above silos & interconnecting the
vertical towers (Approx. ~ 260’ long x 66’
width) housing conveyors.
• Administrative offices, control room in annex
building attached to north tower.
• 21 employees (note: 11 were killed as result
of this explosion – 6 were in the adm offices)
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Original site layout – contd.

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 Original site layout – contd.
• Silos, gallery and towers of concrete
construction
• Intercalated chambers between the silos
were also used for storage (total 26
chambers)
• Structures were not fitted with any form of
explosion protection
• Centralized dust collection system with dust
pick up points at head of chain conveyors,
bucket elevator, motor housing, point of
loading of belt conveyors, etc
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Original site layout – contd.

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Original site layout – contd.

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Dust explosion case

BLAYE GRAIN STORAGE

RESULT OF EXPLOSION

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Blaye – Result of explosion

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 Blaye – Result of explosion
• 11 fatalities, 1 injured (6 victims within the
offices).
• Of the 44 silos only 16 remained in place
(9 on the south side and 7 at the north
side)
• Sized pieces of debris from the explosion
were found several meters from the silo.

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Blaye – Result of explosion

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Blaye – Result of explosion

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 Blaye – analysis
• Investigation conducted by local authority
(Institut National de L’Environnement
Industriel et des Risques).
• Report “Explosion d’un silo de céréales
Blaye (33)”, F. Masson, June 1998.
Available in Ineris web site.

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analysis

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 Analysis
• Report indicates that the most probable
condition leading to explosion was the
formation of explosive dust – air mixture.
• Report indicates that the most probable
sources of ignition were either
malfunctioning or fault in the fan on the
centralised duct collection system located
in the northern tower or auto-ignition of
collected dust within the dust collector.
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analysis

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 Analysis
• The explosion of the dust collector
located within the north tower was
possibly the source of ignition as well as
determinant in resuspension of deposits
of dust.
• Explosion travelled along the upper
gallery and space underside the silos.
• Explosion flame also penetrated the open
silos producing further violent explosions.
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Path of explosion

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 Lessons Learned
• Explosion vents (NFPA 68 requires it, but it is an
issue depending on geometry. Latest 2007 edition
has revised equations for vent sizing, which may
be 40% larger than the area requirements of
previous versions. Ref. Todd Dillon’s
presentation)
• Note: explosion venting may not suffice by itself.
Fireball formed by deflagrations has dimensions
indicated in the next slide.
• NFPA 68 “6.9.1* Where external venting is not
feasible….. a device that operates on the
principles of flame arresting and particulate
retention shall be permitted to be used”
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NPFA 68 – Fire ball size

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 Lessons learned
• Intercalated chambers should not be
used
• Dust collector should be outside of
buildings (in blaye the collector was
inside and collected dust was stored in
the handling tower)
• Centralised dust collector – exhauster
upstream collector: centralised collection
system provided a route for explosions to
spread 25
 Lessons learned
• Isolation (at the time of explosion it is
possible that three cells were open, nearly
empty and connected by the concrete gallery
which ran over the top of cells).
• Removal of solids (metals, gravel)
• Spark extinguishing (ref. NFPA 69 & GAPS
13.9.1)
• Housekeeping, removal of dust layers
• Fire detection in dust collection area (we
would typically recommend a fire control/
suppression system – GAPS 9.3.2.0)
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 Lessons learned
• Siting – distance of silos from third parties
(I would consider the arrangement of
• Video surveillance
• Storage temperature surveillance & alarm

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 Flame arresting devices
• IQR system for interception and retention
of hot gas stream resulting from
deflagration

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Flame arresting device

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Flame arresting device

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Flame arresting device

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Flame arrester

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Flame arrester

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Normally vented deflagration

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Deflagration vented with flame
arresting device

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 Flame arresters
• Recognized by NFPA 68
• “6.9.2 Particulate retention devices shall be
listed and shall be considered only for use
within the tested range of KSt, dust loading,
dust type, enclosure volume, and Pred.
• 6.9.3* The vent area calculated in Chapters 7
and 8 shall be adjusted using experimentally
determined efficiency values. (See 10.6.2.)
• 6.9.4* The areas adjacent to the discharge
point shall be clear of combustible dusts.
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Flame arresters

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