LIET KYNES IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE ATTACKS ON MEDICAL PERSONNEL OF THE

RAVEEN IMPERIAL FORCES

Your execellencies, before proving the lacking elements to be liable for the war crime
provided under Article 8 (2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statue, let me discuss the absence of the
individual criminal responsibility of Liet Kynes.

1. WE CONCUR that Liet Kynes is not individually criminally responsible for

committing the war crime under (Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute)

Article 25 (3)(b) provides that: a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:

(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;

In the present case, Mr. Liet Kynes is not responsible with respect to the attacks on medical
personnel of the Raveen Imperial Forces, on the basis of individual criminal responsibility for
ordering, inducing or soliciting. Nowhere in the facts would lead to the conclusion that it was Mr.
Kynes who orders, induces or solicits the attack to be made against the medical personel. Such
order must be unequivocal ande expressed.

The mere fact that he was the previous commander of the TFRA will not hold him liable. Take
note that he was previous commander.

2. As for the liablity of Liet Kynes for the War crime of attacking objects or persons
using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, we concur that not all
the elements under the statute were present to make Kynes liable such war crime.

Article 8 (2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statue provides:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more persons, buildings, medical units or transports or
other objects using, in conformity with international law, a distinctive emblem or other
method of identification indicating protection under the Geneva Conventions;

2. The perpetrator intended such persons, buildings, units or transports or other objects so
using such identification to be the object of the attack;

3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not
of an international character; and

4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an
armed conflict.

The second element of the crime of attacking objects or persons using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions under Article 8 (2)(e)(ii) is not present. In the case at
bar, Kynes did not intend to make medical personnel to be the object of the attack because it
was not established that he was the one who commanded the attack.

Only persons who objectively have control over the crime and subjectively are aware of
this control are considered principal. The accused must have participated, physically or
otherwise directly, in the material elements of a crime provided for in the Statute, through
positive acts or omissions, whether individually or jointly with others.

Otherwise stated, Intent is hard to prove however it maybe properly established by the
presence of over acts which will prove such intention. However, in the case at bar, there
was absence of such overt acts. Since the prosecution was not able to prove any overt
act, the the intention of Mr. Kynes was not properly established to make him liable for the
crime

And while the TFRA claimed responsbility for the death of the medical personnel, TRFA
did not mention nor confess any participation or direction from Kynes.
2. He was not the present commander
it was not mentioned that the said attack was pursuant to the order of Liet Kynes. Hence,
the admission made by the TRFA cannot be considered as against Mr. Kynes.

3. Moreover, while under Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, there
is a need to protect medical personnel in international and non-international
armed conflicts, this is only true when the medical personnel performs
humanitarian functions such as medical care for wounded or sick combatants and
civilians. In the present case, the medical personnel were not neutral as they were
tasked to deliver the go-pills to the Raveen Imperial Forces of the government. We
cannot consider them to be included in the protection guaranteed by the Geneva
Convention.

4. The leaked information about the conflict as well as those posted on social
medias were inadmissible in evidence
As held in the cases of Commonwealth vs. Banas and Morrocan Oil vs. Marc
Anthony Cosmetics.

Facebook photos is inadmissible when the defendant in a trademark infringement action

offered the screenshots without supporting circumstantial information. Applying this
same rule to Facebook photos, the photos were dismissed.

ANYONE CAN PUT ANYTHING ON THE INTERNET. NO WEBSITE IS MONITORED

FOR ACCURACY.
LIET KYNES IS NOT LIABLE WITH THE ALLEGED RECRUITMENT OR USE OF CHILDREN
BY THE RED EAGLES

 That military commander does not know that the forces were committing or about
to commit such crimes

Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute provides:

A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally

responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:

(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and

(ii) (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

It encompasses two standards of fault element. The first, which is encapsulated by the term
‘knew’, requires the existence of actual knowledge. With respect to the suspect's actual
knowledge that the forces or subordinates were committing or about to commit a crime, it is the
view of the Chamber that such knowledge cannot be ‘presumed’. Actual knowledge may be
also proven if, ‘a priori, a military commander is part of an organised structure with established
reporting and monitoring systems’. Thus, the Chamber considers that these factors are
instructive in making a determination on a superior's knowledge within the context of article 28
of the Statute."

Although in this regard, the superior’s position may per se appear to be a significant
indication from which knowledge of a subordinate’s criminal conduct can be inferred,
such status is not to be understood as a conclusive criterion but must be supported by
additional factors. Moreover, in the case at hand, there are no other factors given to prove
that Kynes failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress the commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. Infact, Kynes is only their former commander, not their
current commander. We cannot frown upon the act of Former Commander Kynes not to
take necessary measures considering that he no longer is with the positition.

Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi)

War crime of using, conscripting or enlisting children

Elements
1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national
armed forces or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.

 3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were
under the age of 15 years.

4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed
conflict.

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an
armed conflict.

 Liet Kynes did not conscript or enlist children under the age of fifteen years into
armed forces to use them to participate in hostilities

Conscription' encompasses any acts of coercion, such as abductions and forced

recruitment of children by an armed group with the purpose of using them to participate
actively in hostilities.

In the case at hand, Liet Kynes was only the former commander of the group, hence, not
indicative of knowledge what the group is actually committing. It does not mean that
since Kynes was the previous commander, he can now be liable to the present acts of
the group. It is not the responsibility of Kynes to ascertain definitely the age of the
children involved as he is only a former commander.

 The perpetrator conscripted one or more persons below the age of fifteen into an
armed force or group

To conscript” is defined as “to compel to military service by conscription, to enlist compulsorily.

The simple acceptance of using one or more of these persons is sufficient.

1. AS TO HOSTILITIES- Conscription' encompasses any acts of coercion, such as

abductions and forced recruitment of children by an armed group with the
purpose of using them to participate actively in hostilities. There was no sufficient
evidence that children herein are being used and are actively participating on military
combats. To be liable, it is necessary that these children are being compelled to
actively participate in the armed conflict with the purpose of the commission of a
crime. Thus, without proof of such, Kynes cannot be held liable with the alleged
charge.
2. NO PROOF OF AGE/ PHYSICIAL APPEARANCE-
3. LIET KYNES DID NOT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN-