27
People v. Diaz ISSUE: W/N Diaz was engaged in illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 112175
Torres. Jr., J.
TEACHER
STUDENTS
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The crime of illegal recruitment
is committed when two elements concur, namely: 1)
That the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; and 2)
That the offender undertakes either any activity
within the meaning of recruitment and placement
defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34.
FACTS: Three women (Navarro, Fabricante, and
Ramirez) were enrolled at the Henichi Techno
Exchange Cultural Foundation in Davao City, studying
Niponggo, when they were informed by their teacher,
Mrs. Aplicador, that she knew of a Mr. Paulo Lim who
also knew of one Engineer Erwin Diaz who was
recruiting applicants for Brunei 700 dollars per month.
Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three women
went to Mr. Lim who told them that his children had
already applied with Engr. Diaz. The four women were
then accompanied by Mr. Lim to the CIS Detention
Center where Engr. Diaz was already being detained.
After Navarro and Ramirez had already given 20kas
placement fee, Fabricante went to the office of the
POEA and found out the Engr. Diaz was not licensed.
Fabricante informed the two women about her
discovery and they all withdrew their applications. It
was the accused who told them that they would be
working in one of the department stores in Brunei and
receiving a monthly pay of $700.00 for working only
four hours a day Engr. Diaz refunded their payments.
Agency is confidential, owner was his mistress.
DEFENSE: Testifying in his behalf, appellant denied
these complainants' allegations. He asserted that he
never made a promise in favor of complainants for
employment abroad but assisted them in the
procurement of passports and medical certificates.
the espiration of her license, she applied for its
renewal by writing a letter to the Bureau of Labor
RULING: YES. Diaz was neither a licensee nor a
holder of authority to qualify him to lawfully
engage inrecruitment and placement activity.
Appellant told the three women that he was
recruiting contractworkers for abroad, particularly
Brunei, and promised them job opportunities if
they can produce variousamounts of money for
expenses and processing of documents. He
manifestly gave the impression to thethree
women that he had the ability to send workers
abroad. Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of
workers for Brunei, he promised them work for a
fee and convinced them to give their money for
thepurpose of getting an employment overseas.
28
Aquino v. CA
G.R. No. 91896
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
CONTRACTOR
DOCTRINE OF LAW: Illegal recruitment is not
constituted when recruiter receives payment after
the expiration of the license for services rendered
before said expiration
FACTS: Aurora T. Aquino (Aquino) disclosed that in
1973, she was a licensed contractor authorized to hire
laborers as evidenced by a Labor Contractor's
License. Said license was issued after payment of
P6,000.00 for the year 1973-1974 in the recruitment
of worker. Rodrigo Nicolas, Braulio Sapitula, Aurelio
Costales and Benito Vertudez applied for a Guam job
at appellant's agency. They all paid initial required
fund of at least PHP 1500. All of them were not able
to go to Guam and all of them asked for a refund
however only PHP1000 will be refunded and the
remaining money will go to a group refund check.
They then discovered that the check cannot be cash
for lack of funds. On November 2, 1978, a complaint
was filed against Aquino before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. She alleged that on 18 May 1974 on
addressed to Minister Blas Ople. She was told by said
Under-Secretary Inciong to proceed with her
operation "until such time as the Secretary will go
home." Because Secretary Ople was currently in Italy.
She waited for the renewal but was not able to receive
any reply from the Department of Labor; hence, she
stopped operations in 1976. She contends that her
license was not renewed, not because of any
violations, but because of a Ministry of Labor
policy phasing out all private recruitment
agencies. The applicants Benito Vertudes, Sapitula,
Empredo, Nicolas, were not able to leave for Guam
within such period. However, the lower court found
the Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in violation of Art. 25, PD 442 and
penalized under Art. 39 par. (b), Labor Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
The Solicitor General contends that when Ms.
Aquino continued to charge and collect fees from
her applicants/recruits after May 18, 1974, she
engaged in illegal recruitment violative of Article
24 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N Aquino was engaged in illegal
recruitment.
RULING: No. The court ruled that the receipt of
payments, after the expiration of the license, for
services rendered before said expiration does
constitute illegal recruitment. Recruitment refers to the
ordering of inducements to qualified personnel to
enter a particular job or employment. The advertising,
the promise of future employment and other come-
ons took place while Ms. Aquino was still licensed.
True, the payments for services rendered are
necessary consequences of the applications for
overseas employment. However, it is asking too much
to expect a licensed agency to absolutely at the stroke
of midnight stop all transactions on the day its license
expires and refuse to accept carry-over payments
after the agency is closed.

29.
People vs. Señoron
January 30, 1997
DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: Illegal recruitment is
defined under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, as "any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority."
FACTS: Taiwan. This is a petition to review the
decision of the appellate court convicting Senoron as
charged and sentencing her "to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100, 000.00)" for illegal recruitment
AND ESTAFA.
Senoron's defense dwells on the alleged insufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence to prove her guilt:
1. There is nothing on record . . . which says that
placement fees received by Aquilino Ilano from the
three (3) private complainants was turned over to her
2. The receipts of payment of alleged placement fees
were received and receipted by accused Aquilino
Ilano.
3. Appellant also harps on her being a mere
accommodation party
ISSUE: Whether Senoron is guilty of Illegal
recruitment.
RULING: YES. The trial court's decision is affirmed.
The SC held that it is not the issuance or signing of
receipts for the placement fees that makes a case
for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking
of recruitment activities without the necessary
license or authority. Thus, To prove illegal
recruitment: (1) the person charged with the crime
must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of
the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor
Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not
have a license or authority to do so. Appellant made
a distinct impression that she had the ability to
send applicants for work abroad.
Appellant's residual arguments that she was just
an accommodation maker in the issuance of the
check and that private complainants failed to
notify her after the check bounced do not merit
serious consideration. It has to be emphasized
that appellant is not being prosecuted for
violation of the anti-bouncing check law19 where
the foregoing contentions may have an impact,
but for illegal recruitment which the prosecution
was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt.
30.
People vs. Panis
July 11, 1990
DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: The number of persons
dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act
of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of
the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
win constitute recruitment and placement even if only
one prospective worker is involved.
The basic issue in this case is the correct
interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring,
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
FACTS: This is a petition on certiorari to review the
decision of the appelate court in granting the motion
of Panis to quash the complaints on the ground that
the information did not charge an offense because he
was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in
each of the four information.
The view of the private respondents is that to
constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts
mentioned in this article should involve dealings with
two or more persons as an indispensable
requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues
that the requirement of two or more persons is
imposed only where the recruitment and placement
consists of an offer or promise of employment to such
persons and always in consideration of a fee. The
other acts mentioned in the body of the article may
involve even only one person and are not necessarily
for profit.
ISSUE: Whether Panis is guilty of Illegal recruitment.
RULING: YES. The Orders to dismiss the complaints
were set aside and information against Panis is
reinstated. The SC held that the number of persons
dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win
constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is
collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed
to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement.
31
People vs. Goce
G.R. No. 113161
Regalado, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: It must be shown that the
accused gave the complainant the distinct
impression that she had the power or the ability to
send the complainant abroad for work, such that
the latter was convinced to part with her money to
be so employed. Where such an act or
representation is not proven, there is no
recruitment activity and conviction for illegal
recruitment has no basis.
FACTS: This is a petition for appeal. Representing
herself a manager of the Clover Placement Agency,
Nelly Agustin was approached by Rolando Dalida and
7 others. Agustin showed them a job order assuring
that they could easily be deployed for overseas
employment. They were required to pay P5000 each
as down payment. Subsequently, they also met
Spouses Loma and Dan Goce, owners of the agency.
They surprisingly learned that they had to give
P12,000 instead for placement fees. Two of the
complainants were even assured to be cutter/sewer in
Oman.
After multiple follow-ups, they were only given their
visa but were not deployed. They discovered from
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) that the agency was not duly licensed to
recruit job applicants. When a warrant of arrest was
issued, only Agustin was arrested due to the Goces
being missing. Agustin then alleged that he was not in
conspiracy with the spouses as he was only their
neighbor and only referred complainants to the
spouses out of the goodness in his heart. Also, he
argued that his acts do not fall within the meaning of
"referral" under the Labor Code to make her liable for
illegal recruitment in large scale. He was then
convicted for illegal recruitment in large scale,
punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor
Code.
(1) her act of introducing complainants to the
Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of
illegal recruitment and placement under Article
13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit
illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce
spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant
offered or promised overseas employment to the
complainants.
ISSUE: Whether there was legal recruitment and
placement?
RULING: NO. Judgment affirmed. On the other hand,
referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an
applicant for employment after an initial interview of a
selected applicant for employment to a selected
employer, placement officer or bureau. Being an
employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for
him to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they
being the owners of the agency. As such, he was
actually making referrals to the agency of which she
was a part. He was therefore engaging in recruitment
activity.
it was Agustin whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from
her that they learned about the fees they had to pay,
as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was
after they had talked to her that they met the accused
spouses who owned the placement agency.
he latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis papunta
sa Oman." 28 Indeed, Agustin played a pivotal role in
the operations of the recruitment agency, working
together with the Goce couple.
32
Darvin vs. CA
G.R. No. 125044
Romero, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: To prove engagement in
recruitment activities as to commit the crime of
illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the
accused gave the distinct impression that she had
the power or ability to send a person abroad for
work such that the latter was convinced to part
with her money in order to be so employed.
“By themselves, procuring a passport, airline
tickets and foreign visa for another individual,
without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment
activities.”
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Macaria Toledo approached
Imelda Darvin at the latter’s residence through a
common friend. In said meeting, accused-appellant
allegedly convinced Toledo that by giving her
P150,000, the latter can immediately leave for work
as a nursing aide in the US without any meeting with
the embassy. The money will supposedly be used for
the airfare and US visa. However, Toledo returned to
her residence to inquire about any development and
she was not in her home. Toledo then discovered
from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stating that she is neither
authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. The accused-appellant was then
arrested for simple illegal recruitment and was
convicted by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this appeal. Darvin claims that she never
promised any employment and contends that the
money was used for her travel to the US with their
common friend, as evidenced by the receipts wherein
it listed as follows: P45,000.00 for plane fare each;
P1,500.00 for passport, documentation and other
incidental expenses for each person; P20,000.00 for
visa application each; and P17,000.00 for services.
She further claims that she was previously connected
to a travel agency and even scheduled an interview
with the US embassy.
ISSUE: Whether there was recruitment?
RULING: NO. Darvin is acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt. 2 elements need to be shown: (1)
the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said
person does not have a license or authority to do so.
It is not clear that accused gave the impression that
she was capable of providing work abroad. What is
established, however, is that accused-appellant
received P150,000.00. The claim of the accused that
the P150,000.00 was for payment of air fare and US
visa and other expenses cannot be ignored because
the receipt for the P150,000.00, which was presented
by both parties during the trial of the case, stated that
it was "for Air Fare and Visa to USA." Had the
amount been for something else in addition to air fare
and visa expenses, such as work placement abroad,
the receipt should have so stated.
33
People v. Yabut
G.R. No. 115719-26
Quisumbing, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: No person or entity not
authorized by law may recruit or employ any persons
without property authority from agencies of
government and the Law per se. Any falsified notices
and information by a person not authorized by Law is
to be penalized by the Law.
FACTS: The appellant Fernando Cortez who is the
live in partner of Irene Yabut is charged with large
scale illegal recruitment and syndicated estafa. The
appellant is a previous policeman who acted as the
doorman and entertains the applicants for their
application for overseas. The couple is involved in the
alleged processing and employment of the visa
papers of the applicants wherein they are not
authorized by Law. The complaint was filed by Ilar
who paid around Php30,000.00 for the supposed
processing of the Japan Visa wherein the employment
did not push through as well as any flight therein.
Appellant argues, the sole person guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale should be Yabut since she
was the only one who signed the receipts for the
amounts received from the complainants. He
contends that the mere fact that he is "romantically
linked" with Yabut does not mean he acted in
conspiracy with her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of large
scale illegal recruitment and in violation of Art 34 of
the Labor Code?
RULING: YES. The elements of illegal recruitment in
large scale are:" (1) the accused undertakes any
recruitment activity defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or
any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of
the Labor Code; (2) he does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and, (3) he commits the same
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group."
It is immaterial that appellant ingeniously stated to
one of the complainants that he (appellant) was a
member of the PNP and a government employee,
hence could not sign the receipts.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for
conviction. Conviction for offenses under the
Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction
for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It
follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa
will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice
versa.
(1) He received deposits of money to defray
travelling expenses
(2) He informed the complainants that the money
turned over would be used for the processing of
papers and visas for Japan
(3) He gave assurance to the complainants that
they would be able to leave for Japan otherwise
their money would be refunded
(4) He stayed at the apartelle office and manned
the office by entertaining job seekers even after
his co-accused Irene Yabut had gone into hiding
34
People v. Saulo
G.R. No. 125903
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: No person or entity not
authorized by law may recruit or employ any persons
without property authority from agencies of
government and the Law per se. Any falsified notices
and information by a person not authorized by Law is
to be penalized by the Law.
FACTS:  Having learned from a relative of accused-
appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for
Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with
Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to
discuss her chances for overseas employment.
During that meeting which took place sometime in
April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya
that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a
factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the
fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime
in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la
Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in
Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they
were authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers
for Taiwan.Seeing that he had reneged on his
promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a
complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.
The prosecution clearly established that accused-
appellant promised the three complainants - Benny
Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon
employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he
asked them for money in order to process their papers
and procure their passports. Relying completely upon
such representations, complainants entrusted their
hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange
for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of
obtaining employment abroad.
In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was
also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas
employment. He asserts that it was for this reason
that he met all three complainants as they all went
together to Amelia de la Cruz’ house in Novaliches,
Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow
up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied
that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that
he was working as an agent for one. He also denied
having received any money from any of the
complainants or having signed any of the receipts
introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is
accused-appellant’s contention that the complainants
were prevailed upon by accused-appellant’s mother-
in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file
the present cases against him.ISSUE: Whether or not
the appellant is guilty of large scale illegal recruitment
and in violation of Art 34 of the Labor Code?
RULING: Accused-appellant contends that he could
not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and
employment officer at the POEA, testified that
licenses for recruitment and placement are issued
only to corporations and not to natural persons. This
argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code
states that "any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement." Corrolarily, a nonlicensee
or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or
entity which has not been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement by
the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority
has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the
POEA or the Secretary. It also bears stressing that
agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or
a holder of authority but whose appointments are not
previously authorized by the POEA fall within the
meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of
authority. Thus, any person, whether natural or
juridical, that engages in recruitment activities
without the necessary license or authority shall be
penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.
35
Athenna Internation Manpower Services Vs.
Villanos
GR 151303
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Athenna International Manpower
Services, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in
recruitment and placement of workers for overseas
employment. Respondent Nonito Villanos is a
contract worker recruited by petitioner to work as
a caretaker in Taiwan. Respondent alleged that he
was assessed ₱100,000 placement fee by petitioner.
As he had only ₱30,000 to pay petitioner, respondent
begged for a reduced fee. Petitioner agreed and the
placement fee was reduced on the condition that the
remaining balance shall be paid through salary
deductions upon his deployment. On October 15,
1998, he flew to Taiwan. He was assigned to a
mechanical shop, owned by Hsien, as a hydraulic
installer/repairer for car lifters, instead of the job for
which he was hired. Since then, he traveled from one
place to another, even during nighttime. He did not,
however, complain because he needed money to pay
for the debts he incurred back home. Barely a month
after his placement, he was terminated by Hsien.
Respondent was made to sign a document stating
that he was not qualified for the position. He did not,
however, sign the document. On November 16, 1998,
respondent was handed his salary, with the
accompanying computation and instruction for his
departure to the Philippines.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he
immediately went to petitioner’s office and confronted
its representative, Lorenza Ching, about the
assignment given to him and demanded that he be
reimbursed. Petitioner gave him a summary of
expenses amounting to ₱30,493, which it allegedly
incurred for his deployment abroad. Aggrieved,
respondent filed a complaint before the Adjudication
Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. He filed a complaint against petitioner
for illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery
of unpaid salaries and other benefits before the NLRC
Sub-Regional Arbitration. respondent avers that  he
was not informed of any qualifications needed for the
job prior to his deployment, as mandated by Article
281 of the Labor Code. In its defense, petitioner
alleged that it hired respondent was to undergo a
probationary period of (40) days. However, at the job
site, respondent was found to be unfit for his work,
thus he resigned from his employment and requested
for his repatriation signing a statement to that effect.
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding
petitioner and Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the
wages representing the unserved portion of the
employment contract plus damages. On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals held that Wei Yu Hsien
violated the contract of employment when respondent
was made to work as hydraulic installer/repairer, not
as caretaker. The appellate court concluded that the
supposed voluntary resignation of respondent was
inconsistent with his immediate demand for refund of
the placement fee upon his arrival in the Philippines;
his filing of an administrative case before the POEA
Adjudication Office; and his subsequent filing of the
complaint with the Labor Arbiter.  complainants and all the other applicants were not
ISSUE: W/N petitioner complied all pre-employment
requisites before respondents deployment and W/N
he resigned voluntarily
RULING: NO. An employee voluntarily resigns
when he finds himself in a situation where he
believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service;
thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate
himself from his employment. Records show that
upon his repatriation from Taiwan, respondent
immediately went to petitioner’s office and confronted
its representative, Lorenza Ching, about the
assignment given to him which was contrary to the
agreed position of caretaker, for which he specifically
applied. Thus, the presumption stands to the effect
that respondent was illegally dismissed by his
employer. Even assuming respondent was a mere
probationary employee as claimed by petitioner,
respondent could only be terminated for a pertinent
and just cause, such as when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards of employment made known to him by his
employer at the time of his engagement.
36
Rodolfo Vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 146964
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Accused-appellant (Rosa Rodolfo)
approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and
Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to
apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The
accused-appellant being their neighbor, private
complainants agreed and went to the former’s office.
This office which bore the business name "Bayside
Manpower Export Specialist" was in a building
situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro
Manila. In that office, private complainants gave
certain amounts to appellant for processing and other
fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee and
another P4,000.00. Likewise, Corpus gave
appellant P7,000.00. Appellant then told private
complainants that they were scheduled to leave for
Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, private
able to depart on the said date as their employer
allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was
rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the
same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked,
private complainants demanded of appellant to return
their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to
Ferre, appellant was not able to return private
complainants’ money. Tired of excuses, private
complainants filed the present case for illegal
recruitment against the accused-appellant. RTC
rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of illegal
recruitment. For her defense, appellant denied ever
approaching private complainants to recruit them
for employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was
the private complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and
friend, she brought the private complainants to
the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency
because she knew Florante Hinahon, the owner of
the said agency.  finding no merit in the appeal, the
CA Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed
Decision EXCEPT the penalty which is hereby
changed to (5) years as minimum to (7) years as
maximum with perpetual disqualification from
engaging in the business of recruitment and
placement of workers. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, the present
petition was filed.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in affirming the decision of the
RTC finding petitioner guilty of IR.
RULING: NO. That the first element is present in the
case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior
Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, testified that
the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is
authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.  In weighing contradictory
declarations and statements, greater weight must
be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the
defendant. Petitioner’s admission that she
brought private complainants to the agency
whose owner she knows and her acceptance of
fees including those for processing betrays her
guilt.
37
People vs Delos Reyes
G.R. No. 198795
Tijam, J.
FACTS: Accused without first securing the required
license and authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment recruited and promised
employment/job placement abroad to the six victims.
On the one hand, accused-appellant maintains that
she could not be held liable for the crimes of illegal
recruitment and Estafa since she never made any
promise or gave the impression of having the ability to
send the complc;tinants abroad. She avers that the
cash vouchers and letters acknowledging receipt of
complainants' payments were not signed by her, but
by a certain Manzie Delos Reyes. She likewise avers
that she did not engage in recruitment activities as
defined by law since All Care Travel & Consultancy
(Philippines)is engaged in visa applicatfons. She
further avers that she did not know complainants
Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, and Bagay, Jr.
On the other hand, the OSG counters 14 that the RTC
correctly convicted the accused-appellant of Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment and Estafa, the prosecution
having adduced sufficient evidence to established her
guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale
RULING: Yes, The offense of illegal recruitment in
large scale has the following elements: (1) the person
charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined
under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have
the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed
the same against three or more persons individually
or as a group.
First, the RTC found accused-appellant to
have undertaken recruitment activity when she
promised the private complainants overseas
employment for a fee. This factual finding was
affirmed by the CA.
Second, the March 1, 2004 Certification
issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration unmistakably reveals that the accused-
appellant neither had a license nor authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
Third, it was established that there were five
complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay,
Jr., and Duldulao.
38 JURISDICTION
EASTERN ASSURANCE CORP VS SECRETARY
OF LABOR
GR NO l 79436-50
FACTS: Petitioner filed a surety bond for the
application for a license to engage in business as a
recruitment agency with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) of J & B
Manpower Specialist, Inc. As narrated by the
Secretary of Labor, 33 persons applied for overseas
employment with J & B In consideration of promised
deployment, complainants paid respondent various
amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts issued
were sighed by Executive Vice-President of J & B.
Because of non-deployment, applicants filed separate
complaints with the Licensing and Regulation Office of
POEA against J & B for violation of Articles 32 and 34
(a) of the Labor Code. POEA found EASCO was
declared jointly and severally liable with & B to twenty-
nine (29) complainants and be forever banned from
participation in the overseas employment program. It
is ordered to cease and desist from further engaging
in recruitment activities otherwise it shall be
prosecuted for illegal recruitment. EASCO contends
that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction"
over the monetary claims in question because the
same "did not arise from employer-employee
relations. Section 4 (a) of EO 797
charged and collected fees from them in amounts
exceeding what is prescribed by this
Administration. (REFUND)
ISSUE: Whether POEA has jurisdiction over the
claims of the applicants
RULING: Yes. Secretary of Labor has the power
under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions,
as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not
only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also to
"promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions" governing
said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power
thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the
POEA "on its own initiative or upon filing of a
complaint or report or upon request for
investigation by any aggrieved person, authority
to conduct the necessary proceedings for the
suspension or cancellation of the license or
authority of any agency or entity" for certain
enumerated offenses including:
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly,
of any amount of money, goods or services, or any
fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the
Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations.
39
Capricorn Travel and Tours v. CA
G.R. No. 91096, April 3, 1990
Cortez, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The requirement for the
posting of a cash bond is an indispensable
adjunct to the requirement that the agency
undertakes to assume joint and solidary liability
with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract of overseas
employment and to guarantee compliance with
existing labor and social legislation of the
Philippines and the country of employment
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA). Judgment was rendered in
favor of Petitioner Capricorn Tours and against
Private respondent (PR) Tagala. A writ of execution
was issued and a notice of garnishment of the cash
bond posted by PR was served on the POEA. The
POEA delivered a check representing the amount of
the cash bond to petitioner's counsel. PR moved to
quash the notice of garnishment which the CA
granted, annulling the notice of garnishment, enjoining
petitioner from attaching, levying and garnishing PR's
cash bond, and ordering petitioner to return it to the
POEA, if still unreturned. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: W/N the cash bond posted by a recruitment
agency in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) may be garnished by a
judgment creditor of the agency
RULING: No, petition denied. Considering the
rationale for requiring the posting of a cash bond and
its nature, it cannot therefore be argued that the cash
bond is not exempt from execution by a judgment
creditor simply because it is not one of those
enumerated in Rule 39, sec. 12 of the Rules of Court.
To accede to such an argument would be tantamount
to turning a blind eye to the clear intent of the law to
reserve the cash bond for the employment-related
claims of overseas workers and for violations of labor
laws.
constitutional mandate for the State to "afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas" [Art. XIII,
sec. 3]. F
rom a different angle, neither may it be argued
that petitioner's judgment credit, pertaining as it
does to the value of airline tickets ostensibly used
by private respondent to transport overseas
workers abroad, this one of those for which the
cash bond should answer.
40
Stronghold Insurance Co. v. CA
G.R. No. 88050, January 30, 1992
Cruz, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The surety bond required of
recruitment agencies is intended for the
protection of citizens who are engaged for
overseas employment by foreign companies. The
foreign principal is outside the jurisdiction of our
courts and would probably have no properties in
this country against which an adverse judgment
can be enforced. This difficulty is corrected by the
bond, which can be proceeded against to satisfy
that judgment.
FACTS: This is a petitioner for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Pan Asian
(PA), a domestic recruiting agency, hired Adriano
Urtesuela as captain of vessel for 12 months and
submitted a surety bond, along with Petitioner
Stronghold Insurance, to answer for the liabilities of
the foreign employer. Under the bond, it was also
understood that notice to the Principal is notice to
the surety. Being dismissed within 3 months,
Urtesuela filed a complaint against PA for breach of
contract and received a favorable decision. Urtesuela
then filed a complaint against petitioner on the basis
of the surety bond since PA ceased to operate. The
Insurance Commission held that the complaint should
be reformed because the provisions in the surety
bond were not stipulations pour autrui to entitle
Urtesuela to bring the suit himself. It held that the
proper party was the POEA. CA reversed and rule
that as the actual beneficiary of the surety bond,
Urtesuela was competent to sue Stronghold, which as
surety was solidarily liable with PA. The petitioner
contends that the said stipulation is
unconstitutional because it is "a virtual waiver" of
the right to be heard. Petitioner claims that it
should be deemed as having received no notice at
all of the complaint and therefore deprived of the
opportunity to defend itself.
ISSUES: W/N petitioner is exempted from liability on
a surety bond executed for the protection of a Filipino
seaman on the ground of due process.
RULING: No, petition dismissed. The
technicalities raised by the petitioner do not
impair the rudiments of due process or the
requirements of the law and must be rejected in
deference to the constitutional imperative of
justice for the worker. The right to be heard is as
often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long
as the party is given an opportunity to be heard
on his behalf. The circumstance that the chance to
be heard is not availed of does not disparage that
opportunity and deprive the person of the right to due
process. Neither is public policy offended on the
wicked ground of fraud and collusion imagined by the
petitioner. For one thing, the speculation contravenes
without proof the presumption of good faith and
unreasonably imputes dishonest motives to the
principal and the obligee. For another, it disregards
the fiduciary relationship between the principal and
the surety, which is the legal and also practical reason
why the latter is willing to answer for the liabilities of
the former.
41
Catan vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 192084
Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: If the agency has been
entrusted for the purpose of contract with
specified persons, its revocation shall not
prejudice the latter if they were not given notice
thereof.
FACTS: Petitioner, in this special civil action for
certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency,
as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi
Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in
Saudi Arabia as a steelman. The term of the contract
was for one year however but provided for its
automatic renewal. The contract was automatically
renewed when private respondent was not repatriated
by his Saudi employer but instead was assigned to
work as a crusher plant operator. While he was
working as a crusher plant operator, private
respondent's right ankle was crushed under the
machine he was operating. After the expiration of
the renewed term, private respondent returned to the
Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta.
Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred
expenses. On the basis of the provision in the
employment contract that the employer shall
compensate the employee if he is injured or
permanently disabled in the course of employment,
private respondent filed a claim against petitioner with
respondent Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. Petitioner claims that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
petitioner was liable to private respondent for disability
benefits since at the time he was injured his original
employment contract, which petitioner facilitated, had
already expired. Further, petitioner disclaims liability
on the ground that its agency agreement with the
Saudi principal had already expired when the injury
was sustained. POEA rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent and affirmed by NLRC. Hence, this
petition.
2. were the consequence of private respondent's
negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when
he knew that he was not yet medically fit to do so.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Catan is liable for the medical
expenses.
RULING: YES. Petition dismissed. Private
respondents contract of employment can not be
said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it was
automatically renewed since no notice of its
termination was given by either or both of the
parties at least a month before its expiration, as
so provided in the contract itself. Therefore,
private respondent's injury was sustained during
the lifetime of the contract. Even if indeed
petitioner and the Saudi principal had already
severed their agency agreement at the time
private respondent was injured, petitioner may
still be sued for a violation of the employment
contract because no notice of the agency
agreement's termination was given to the private
respondent
No evidence was introduced to prove that private
respondent was not medically fit to work when he
returned to Saudi Arabia. a certificate issued by
Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp doctormerely stated
that private respondent was "unable to walk
properly, moreover he is still complaining [of]
pain during walking and different lower limbs
movement" Nowhere does it say that he was not
medically fit to work.
42
Royal Crown vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 78085
Cortes, J.
DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: Contractual
undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding
private employment or recruitment agencies,
liable jointly and severally with its principal, the
foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by
recruited workers which may arise in connection
with the implementation of the service
agreements or employment contracts
FACTS: This is a petition which seeks the nullification
of a resolution of NLRC which affirmed a decision of
the POEA. In 1983, Royal Crown International, a
private employment agency, recruited and deployed
Virgilio P. Nacionales for employment with ZAMEL as
an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. On
February 13,1984, ZAMEL terminated
employment of private respondent on the ground that
his performance was below at par. For the next three
successive days, the private respondent was detained
at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work
until his exit papers were ready. On February 16,
1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the
Philippines. Private respondent filed a complaint for
illegal termination against petitioner and ZAMEL with
POEA which was ruled in the private respondent’s
favor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
the NLRC denied it for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner contends that there is no
provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for
the "third-party liability" is erroneous.
ISSUES: W/N petitioner as a private employment
agency may be held jointly and severally liable with
the foreign-based employer.
RULING: YES.. Petitioner voluntarily assumed
solidarity liability under various contractual
undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of
Employment services. Under Sec.2 (e) Rule V Book
1, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976), the
requirement to operate a private employment agency
for overseas recruitment and placement is to submit a
document whereby it assumed all responsibilities for
the proper use of its license and the implementation of
the contracts of employment with the workers it
recruited and deployed for overseas employment. And
also it is required to file with the Bureau a formal
appointment or agency contract executed by foreign-
based employer in its favor to recruit and hire
personnel for the former, which contained a provision
empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarity
with foreign principle for any of the violations of the
recruitment and the contracts of employment. This is
under Sec. 10 (a)(2), Rule V Book 1, Rules to
Implement the Labor Code (1976). It was required as
well to post such cash and surety bonds as
determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee
compliance with prescribed recruitment procedure,
rules and regulations and terms and conditions of
employment as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec.
1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of the Labor Code].
It cannot be denied that the petitioner is an
agent of ZAMEL, one of the documents presented by
the petitioner contains an admission that it is the
representative and agent of ZAMEL.
the
43
TRANSACTION OVERSEAS CORP VS
SECRETARY OF LABOR
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE OF LAW: The power to suspend or
cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is
concurrently vested with the POEA and the
Secretary of Labor.
FACTS: Petitioner, a private fee-charging
employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible
recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong.
Private respondents sought employment as domestic
helpers through petitioner's employees.
The applicants paid placement fees but petitioner
failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund
proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to
institute complaints against petitioner for violation of
Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts
allegedly collected from respondents, and averred
that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and
interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were
not authorized to collect fees from the applicants.
Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money
claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it
even warned respondents not to give any money to
unauthorized individuals. The license of respondent
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to
participate in the overseas placement and recruitment
of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective
immediately. Labor Undersecretary Nieves R.
Confesor rendered the assailed order to pay and
cancelled license.
Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed orders viz: it is the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) which has the
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide illegal recruitment cases, including the
authority to cancel recruitment licenses.
Issues: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the
license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
Ruling: The power to suspend or cancel any license
or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code
provides:
ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License
or Authority. - The Minister of Labor shall have the
power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to
recruit employees for overseas employment for
violation of rules and regulations issued by the
Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment
Development Board, and the National Seamen Board,
or for violation of the provisions of this and other
applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of
Instructions."
The Secretary of Labor has the power under Section
35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the
authority conferred by Section 36, not only to 'restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies,' but also to 'promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement
the provisions' governing said activities. Pursuant to
this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of
Labor gave the POEA on its own initiative or upon
filing of a complaint or report or upon request for
investigation by any aggrieved person, to conduct the
necessary proceedings for the suspension or
cancellation of the license or authority of any agency
or entity for certain enumerated offenses including the
imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any
amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or
bond in excess of what is prescribed by the
Administration, and any other violation of pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws,
rules and regulations.
44
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ
G.R. NO. 81510 MARCH 14, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.:
DOCTRINE OF LAW: It is only a judge who may
issue warrants of search and arrest. The Secretary
of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the
Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.
Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint
against petitioner. Having ascertained that the
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar
to implement the order. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development. However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and
witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
Petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding
the return of the confiscated properties. They
alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that
since the house the POEA raided was a private
residence, it was robbery.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: No. it is only a judge who may issue warrants
of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question,
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant.
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the
things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.
45
Republic v. Human Link Manpower
VILLARAMA, JR., J
Doctrine of the Law: Once a recruitment license of
an entity is cancelled, its officers and directors
are automatically prohibited from engaging in
such activity.  statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Secretary DOLE and the Administrator of POEA.
Renelson Carlos applied at Worldview International
Services Corporation as a heavy equipment driver in
Doha, Qatar. His recruiting agency Humanlink
Manpower Consultants, Inc. made him sign an
employment contract stating that he was going to
work as a duct man instead of the position he
applied for but he was told that this is only for
purposes of entering the country. Humanlink
promised that
he would work as a heavy equipment driver as applie
d for. However, upon his arrival inDoha, he worked as
a duct installer. Carlos filed a complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Labor Office but the complaint
was not acted upon. This prompted him to speak with
the Qatar Labor Office where he discussed his
grievance. Consequently, Carlos was informed that
his visa was cancelled and that he was being
repatriated at his own expense. POEA Adjudication
Office found Carlos’ assertions credible. POEA
cancelled Humanlink’s license and automatically
disqualified its officers from participating in any
overseas employment program.
CLAIM:The power of administrative agencies is
confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect.
Issue:
WON POEA can automatically disqualify officers and  that these are substandard or are capable of
directors fromparticipating in the government's
overseas employment program upon the cancellation
of a license.
Ruling: Yes. Upon the cancellation of a license,
persons, officers and directors of the concerned
corporations are automatically prohibited from
engaging in recruiting and placement of land-
based overseas Filipino workers. The grant of a
license is a privilege and not a right thus making it
a proper subject of its regulatory powers. If we are
to protect the welfare of vulnerable overseas workers,
then we must prevent all instances wherein they may
be taken advantage upon. This must be so since the
rules must be read as a whole to achieve its particular
purpose. Particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions but as a whole and every part of the
any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole.
It is inconsequential therefore whether or not the
POEA or the DOLE stated then in their decision
that persons, officers and directors are
disqualified from participating in the
government's overseas employment program. The
law and rules implementing the same
unequivocally state that once a recruitment
license of an entity is cancelled, its officers and
directors are automatically prohibited from
engaging in such activity. The failure of the POEA
and DOLE to indicate this fact cannot by any
means indicate the contrary. Dura lex sed lex.
46
Virjen Shipping v. NLRC
GUTIERREZ, JR., J
DOCTRINE: “Filipino seamen are admittedly as
competent and reliable as seamen from any other
country in the world; otherwise, there would not
be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every
ocean and sea on this globe. They are entitled to
government protection when they ask for fair and
decent treatment by their employers and when
they exercise their right to petition for improved
terms of employment, especially when they feel
improvement according to internationally
accepted rules. Also, the standard forms embody
the basic minimums which must be incorporated
as parts of the employment contract. They are not
collective bargaining agreements or immutable
contracts which the parties cannot improve upon
or modify in the course of the agreed peril of
time.”
Facts: This is a motion to reconsider the decision of
respondent NLRC and reinstated the decision of the
National Seamen Board. The records show that
private respondents have a manning contract for a
period of one year with petitioner in representation of
its principal Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd. Three months
after the commencement of their employment,
the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their
salaries and benefits while their vessel was en route
to a port in Australia controlled by the International
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) where the ITF
could detain the vessel unless it paid its seamen the
ITF rates. The agent of the owner of the vessel
agreed to pay a 25% increase, but when the vessel
arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, the seamen
were repatriated and their contracts were
terminated.
Issue: WON the seamen violated their contracts of
employment.
Ruling: No. The form contracts approved by the
National Seamen Board are designed to protect
Filipino seamen not foreign ship-owners who can take
care of themselves. The standard forms embody' the
basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts
of the employment contract. They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which
the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the
course of the agreed period of time. To state,
therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition
their employer for higher salaries during the 12
months duration of the contract runs counter to
established principles of labor legislation. The
National Labor Relations Commission, as the
appellate tribunal from decisions of the National
Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did
not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.
47
Suzara v. Benipayo
G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW:
FACTS: The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino
seamen who were declared by the defunct National
Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their
employment contracts with the private respondent
because they demanded, upon the intervention and
assistance of a third party, the International Transport
Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over
and above their contracted rates without the approval
of the NSB. In a corollary development, the private
respondent, for failure of the petitioners to return the
overpayments made to them upon demand by the
former, filed estafa charges against some of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to the
amounts they received from the private respondent
representing additional wages as determined in the
special agreement.
RULING: Yes. Petition granted. therefore, we cannot
affirm the NSB and NLRC's finding that there was
violence, physical or otherwise employed by the
petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The
fact that the petitioners placed placards on the
gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's
demands for wage differentials for their own benefit
and the resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do not
constitute violence. The petitioners were exercising
their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments in
their hearts when they placed the placard We Want
ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of
these petitions, we see no reason to deprive the
seamen of their right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the
fundamental law of Canada where they happened to
exercise it. We likewise, find the public respondents'
conclusions that the acts of the petitioners in
demanding and receiving wages over and above the
rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in
effect an alteration of their valid and subsisting
contracts because the same were not obtained
through. mutual consent and without the prior
approval of the NSB to be without basis, not only
because the private respondent's consent to pay
additional wages was not vitiated by any violence or
intimidation on the part of the petitioners but because
the said NSB-approved form contracts are not
unalterable contracts that can have no room for
improvement during their effectivity or which ban any
amendments during their term. From the foregoing,
we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of
using intimidation and illegal means in breaching their
contracts of employment and punishing them for
these alleged offenses.
48
Seagull Maritime v. Balatongan
G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989
Gancayco., J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: Apparently, the intention of
the law when Art. 34 of the Labor Code was
enacted is to provide for the prohibited and
unlawful practices relative to recruitment and
placement.
FACTS: A "Crew Agreement" was entered into by
private respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare
Shipping and Equipment Supply (hereinafter called
Philimare) whereby the latter employed the former as
able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz"
(renamed "Turtle Bay"). Said agreement was
processed and approved by the National Seaman's
Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982. While on board
said vessel the said parties entered into a
supplementary contract of employment. Balatongan
met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result
of which he was hospitalized. Later, he was
repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at
the Makati Medical Center. The medical certificate
was issued describing his disability as "permanent in
nature." Balatongan demanded payment for his claim
for total disability insurance as provided for in the
contract of employment but his claim was denied for
having been submitted to the insurers beyond the
designated period for doing so. Thus, Balatongan filed
a complaint against Philimare and Seagull Maritime
Corporation in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for non-payment of his claim
for permanent total disability. Hence, Seagull and
Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: W/N there is validity and enforceability of the
second contract of employment entered into by and
between complainant and respondents on board the
vessel where the former had served as a member of
its complement despite the absence of NSB
verification or approval.
RULING: Yes. Petition dismissed. With respect to the
findings of facts in the appealed decision, We
consider the same as duly supported by substantial
evidence and the admissions of the parties in their
pleadings. The supplementary contract of
employment was entered into between petitioner and
private respondent to modify the original contract of
employment The reason why the law requires that the
POEA should approve and verify a contract under
Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to insure that the
employee shall not thereby be placed in a
disadvantageous position and that the same are
within the minimum standards of the terms and
conditions of such employment contract set by the
POEA. This is why a standard format for employment
contracts has been adopted by the Department of
Labor. However, there is no prohibition against
stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee
than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein
a "supplementary contract" was entered into affording
greater benefits to the employee than the previous
one, and although the same was not submitted for the
approval of the POEA, the public respondents
properly considered said contract to be valid and
enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of public
respondents have the effect of an approval of said
contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily
entered into by the parties the same is binding
between them. Not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, its validity
must be sustained. By the same token, the court
sustains the ruling of public respondents that the
provision in the supplementary contract whereby
private respondent waives any claim against
petitioners for damages arising from death or
permanent disability is against public policy,
oppressive and inimical to the rights of private
respondent. The said provision defeats and is
inconsistent with the duty of petitioners to insure
private respondent against said contingencies as
clearly stipulated in the said contract. There is no
question that under the said supplementary contract
of employment, it is the duty of the employer,
petitioners herein, to insure the employee, during his
engagement, against death and permanent invalidity
caused by accident on board.
49
Chavez vs Bonto-Perez
G.R. No. 109808
Puno, J.
DOCTRINE OF LAW: It is understood that the terms
and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are
in conformance with the Standard Employment
Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA
under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986.
Any alterations or changes made in any part of this
contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be
null and void
FACTS: Petition for certiorari to review the Decision
of the NLRC. Petitioner, an entertainment dancer,
entered into a standard employment contract for
overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with
Planning Japan Co. and POEA approved the contract.
The contract had a duration of 2-6 months to be paid
$1,500 per month. Petitioner later executed a side
agreement to reduce her salary of $250 as
commission to her manager leaving her with only
$500 net as monthly salary.
Petitioner worked for 6 months and after returning to
the Philippines filed a case for underpayment of
wages with the POEA. She prayed for the payment
$6,000.00, representing the unpaid portion of her
basic salary for six months. Complaint was dismissed
by public respondent POEA Administrator. NLRC
upheld the Decision.
ISSUE: W/N the side agreement is valid binding
contract
RULING: NO. Petition granted. Decision of POEA and
NLRC are reversed and set aside. Clearly, the basic
salary of $1,500.00 guaranteed to petitioner under the
parties' standard employment contract is in
accordance with the minimum employment standards
with respect to wages set by the POEA.
“The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II,
Book V: Sec. 2. Minimum
Provisions for Contract. The following shall be
considered the minimum requirements for contracts of
employment: a. Guaranteed wages for regular
working hours and overtime pay for services rendered
beyond regular working hours in accordance with the
standards established by the Administration; …”
Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's
basic wage to $750.00 is null and void for violating the
POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not
having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side
agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to
by unscrupulous employers against our helpless
overseas workers who are compelled to agree to
satisfy their basic economic needs. The managerial
commission agreement executed by petitioner to
authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct $250.00 Petitioners alleged that he had refused to sail
from her monthly basic salary is void because it is immediately to South Africa to the prejudice and
against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It damage of petitioners causing damages due to lost
cannot supersede the standard employment contract voyage time. The POEA dismissed the complaint.
approved by the POEA. NLRC reversed the decision ruling that Tayong had
only acted in accordance with his duties to maintain
the seaworthiness of the vessel and to insure the
safety of the ship and the crew.
ISSUE: W/N Captain Tayong was dismissal was valid
50
Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises vs NLRC RULING: NO. Petition dismissed. NLRC decision
G.R. No. 115286 affirmed. The official report of technical director in fact
Feliciano, J. supports the NLRC's conclusion that private
respondent Captain did not arbitrarily and maliciously
DOCTRINE OF LAW: A ship's captain must be
delay the voyage to South Africa. Stating that a
accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary
disruption in the normal functioning of the vessel's
authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of
turbo-charger and economizer and that had prevented
its crew and cargo specifically requires on a stipulated
the full or regular operation of the vessel.
ocean voyage. The captain is held responsible, and
properly so, for such safety. The decision of Captain Tayong did not constitute a
legal basis for the summary dismissal and for
FACTS: Respondent-Tayong, a licensed Master
termination of his contract with petitioners prior to the
Mariner with experience in commanding ocean-going
expiration of the term thereof. We cannot hold this
vessels, was employed by Petitioners-Trenda World
conclusion of the NLRC to be a grave abuse of
Shipping (Manila), Inc. and Sea Horse Ship
discretion amounting to an excess or loss of
Management, Inc. through Petitioner Inter-Orient
jurisdiction; indeed, we share that conclusion and
Maritime Enterprises, Inc. as Master of the vessel M/V
make it our own.
Oceanic Mindoro, for a period of 1 year, as evidenced
by an employment contract. The vessel sailed from
Hong Kong for Singapore. The ship, being 14 years
old, encountered machinery trouble which is a safety
concern as it stopped 6 hours in en-route to
Singapore. Upon arrival Captain Tayong called the
shipowner, Sea Horse…and informed them that the
departure of the vessel for South Africa may be
affected because of the delay in the delivery of the
supplies. He also called the technical director giving
him the direction that the vessel cannot sail without
the oxygen and acetylene for safety reasons due to
the problems with the turbo charger and economizer.
When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay,
South Africa on Captain Tayong was instructed to
turn-over his post to the new captain. He was
thereafter repatriated to the Philippines, after serving
petitioners for a little more than two weeks. He was
not informed of the charges against him.
Captain Tayong instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the POEA, claiming his unpaid salary
for the unexpired portion of the written employment
contract, plus attorney's fees. Petitioners denied that
they had illegally dismissed Captain Tayong.