139

Alcantara vs. Reta

372 SCRA 364
Pardo, J.

DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: Where a person is allowed to construct his house on the
land of another to facilitate his gathering of fruits, this would be in the nature of a
personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA. Alcantara
and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land ownedby
Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to
eject them.They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land,
they have the right of firstrefusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of
Presidential Decree No. 1517, the UrbanLand Reform Act. They also claimed that the
amicable settlement executed between Reta and RicardoRoble, one of the petitioners,
was voidab initiofor being violative of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed
that the land is question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not
proclaimedas an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed
complaint for the exerciseof the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional
Trial Court. However, such complaint wasdismissed and such dismissal was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first
refusal.
RULING: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said
decree, one must be: (1)a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2)
must have built his home on the land bycontract; and, (3) has resided continuously for
the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within thesaid category cannot be
considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to
purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a
reasonableprice within a reasonable time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the
other hand,failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in
court. Reta allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
gathered tuba. This arrangement would showthat it is a usufruct and not a lease.
Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land becauseit would facilitate his
gathering oftuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement underArticle 614
of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlementis valid or not, the conclusion would
still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus,
Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.
 140
Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
301 SCRA 52
Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE OF THE LAW: The word “passage” does not “clearly and unmistakably”
convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road since
the ordinary meaning of the word is that it is “the act or action of passing: movement or
transference from one place or point to another,” and its legal meaning is not different,
which is the “act of passing; transit; transition..
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA. Prosperity
filed an injunctive suit in the RTC Quezon City alleging that Metropolitan refused to
allow them to make excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of
water pipes; that Metropolitan banned entry of their trucks and those of its tenants; and
that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary searches. It sought the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring Metropolitan "to allow Prosperity to
proceed with the MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow
Prosperity and [its] tenants' delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any
time and without undergoing unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize
Prosperity’s] right of way over the said lot."
Metropolitan alleged that Prosperity's right to undertake excavations on the access road
was not provided for in the Memorandum of Undertaking. Metropolitan alleged that it
was Prosperity which caused damage to Metropolitan's tenants by undertaking, without
its consent, construction works on the access road which raised its level to about a
meter and caused serious flooding of the nearby buildings whenever it rained; and that,
as a result, its tenants demanded compensation for damage to their merchandise and
equipment occasioned by the flooding. RTC ruled in favor of prosperity. CA reversed
the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there was grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
RULINF: YES. There is doubt in Prosperity's right to it. There is no question as to the
meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress”. The question concerns the meaning of the
phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase to mean that
Prosperity had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to
install a network of water pipes. Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to
Black's Law Dictionary, the ooact of passing; transit; transition." To achieve a meaning
such as that which Prosperity proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing
the parties' intention in using the word which can only be done during trial on the merits.
Until such time, Prosperity cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right
justifting the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case.