SHELL PHILIPPINES VS. JALOS G.R. NO.

179918
FACTS:

Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the
exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-
Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This entailed the
construction and installation of a pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea, from Shell’s
production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals, claiming that they
were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a complaint for damages against
Shell on the ground that their livelihood was adversely affected the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline.
Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), not the trial court, has primary
jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages and that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
immunity without the State’s consent on the basis that it merely serves as an agent of the Philippine government in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves through Service Contract 38.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the PAB. CA reversed RTC’s order upon respondent’s
petition for certiorari. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but the same was denied. Hence, Shell filed this
petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the PAB.

PAB;
Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case
that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the
PAB;
RULING:
YES. First. Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does not use the word "pollution" in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the
Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shell’s pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish
away from the coastal areas. While the complaint did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific act of "pollution," it alleged that " the
pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in the
Mindoro Sea.” This constitutes "pollution" as defined by law.

It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life claimed by Jalos, et al is caused by some kind of pollution emanating from Shell’s
natural gas pipeline. The pipeline, they said, "greatly affected" or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters’ natural
function as fishing grounds. Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et al’s claim for damages, the proper tribunal must determine whether or not the
operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters’ properties and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and
expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB.

Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control Commission provided in
R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984.11 These empowered the PAB to "determine the location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and
effects" of water pollution. Among its functions is to "serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution." In this regard, the PAB has the power to conduct hearings,13 impose penalties for violation of
P.D. 984,14 and issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and decisions.15 The PAB’s final decisions may be reviewed by the CA under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts.
The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition of the term "pollution" itself connotes the need for specialized
knowledge and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills
are not within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of
expertise in determining pollution-related matters. To this extent, the failure of Jalos, et al to allege in their complaint that they had first
taken resort to PAB before going to court means that they failed to state a cause of action that the RTC could act on. This warranted the
dismissal of their action.

PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LLDA V SM PRIME HOLDINGS (2010)

Petitioner: Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, General Manager Calixto Cataquiz
Respondent: SM Prime Holdings
SM was fined by LLDA for failing to conform to the effluent standards for inland water imposed by law. CA found for SM,
saying that LLDA is not expressly granted power to impose fines for violations of effluent standards. SC reverses CA, holding
that LLDA has, by statute and jurisprudence, the authority to impose fines.

Doctrine: The intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA not only with the
express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for
the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions . Must exhaust first all the available administrative
remedies; lesser expense and speedier disposition of cases – before regular courts can intervene.

DONALD MEAD VS. HON. MANUEL ARGEL, CFI

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him for his alleged violation of RA
No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air
Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

The Court ruled that the filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the matter. Petitioner
was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal) (Sec 9). The Court held that the exclusive
authority to determine whether or not ‘pollution’ did exist is vested in the Commission (PAB), who is in better position to determine the
same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of
Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

RULING: Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code (RTC) or until there is a ruling by the Commission on the alleged
act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8). Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission (PAB) that the
provisions of the subject law had been violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.

AC ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. FRABELLE PROPERTIES

Facts: AC enterprises, petitioner herein, is a corporation who owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. On the other hand, Frabelle, respondent
herein, is a condominium corporation whose condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent complained of the 'unbearable”
noise emanating from the blower of the air-conditioning units of petitioner.

Issues: WON the “unbearable noise” in the case at bar is a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings.

HELD: Yes. It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise becomes
actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of
the listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house an actionable
nuisance–– in the conditions, of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations. The determining
factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.

PAB – no jurisdiction because it is not a pollution case; does not involve alteration or discharge which has detrimental effect to the environment

LGU – although they had the power (Sangguniang Bayan) to enact laws to prevent or abate nuisance, they cannot declare a particular thing
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The declaration of nuisance requires exercise of judicial power – under jurisdiction of RTC.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS AND OTHERS

FACTS: This case was concerned with garbage being disposed by the City Government of Caloocan in the Tala Estate. The complainants
sought to end the operations of the dumpsite as they were concerned with the environmental and health impacts. An investigation found that the
City Government of Caloocan was operating the dumpsite without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate. The Lake Laguna
Development Authority (LLDA) issued an order to the City Government asking them to stop operating the dumpsite. Activities at the site ceased
for a few months, but resumed again after that. Another cease and desist order was filed.

The City Government then filed a petition seeking a declaration that they have sole authority over promoting the health and safety of the
Caloocan residents in light of a balanced ecology of the region in which case all orders issued asking them to stop operations of the dumpsite
would be void. The lower court allowed this petition declaring the City Government of Caloocan to have sole authority over these matters and
ruling that the LLDA did not have the power to issue a cease and desist order.

ISSUE: Who has Jurisdiction and the power to issue a cease and desist order?

RULING: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
SC held that the LLDA had the authority to issue a cease and desist order concerning the operations of the dumpsite seeing as Republic Act. No
4850 explicitly authorized them to make such orders where it serves the aim of stopping pollution. Furthermore, the Court pointed out Article II,
section 16 of the Constitution which grants the right to a healthy environment, as well as state policy which declared to promote the right to
health which is also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Declaration of Alma-Ata as a fundamental right.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake
region, as opposed to the Local Government Code. LLDA has responsibility to protect inhabitants of the Laguna lake region from
deleterious effects of pollutants from the discharge of waste from surrounding areas.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. COURT OF APPEAL AND SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORP.

Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board on the ground that
the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for the said Order is remiss. Petitioner reasoned that
under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte cease and desist order
upon prima facie evidence that the respondent corporation has waste discharge beyond the allowable standards set by the NPCC
(Sec5, Effluent Regulations of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD 984). If it has not yet been subject to the allowable standard, the Board may
still issue ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the effluent pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The court held that the Board, as the government entity tasked to
determine whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory
and regulatory provisions, has the authority to issue the order as it may see fit. This is, after all, allowed by law to address
relevant pollution issues as an immediate recourse.

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY VS LLDA

Facts: Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 5
September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LagunaLake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent which showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL
still failed to conform to the regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, in
response to the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in
all parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be imposed
from the date of initial sampling to the date there quest for re-sampling was received by the Authority.

ISSUE: WON LLDA has power to impose fines and penalties.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has the power to
impose fines on establishments found polluting the lake in violation of its effluent standards for inland water.

Section 4 (d) of Executive Order 927, which further defines the functions and powers of the LLDA, provides that the agency has
the power to “make, alter, modify orders, requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within
which such discontinuance must be accomplished.” Under this law, the SC said, the LLDA is given authority to “exercise such
powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities” under EO 927.
The intendment of the law… is to clothe the LLDA not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are
implied or incident but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full proper implementation of its purposes and
functions.

The court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex -parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by
law.