Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26 : ClA-RDP90-00965R000302540003-8 ARTICLE APPEARED ONPAGE_/4 PHILADELYRIA. ENOL 8 March 1987 TER Secord led secret anti-terror unit, probers say ~TBy Frank Greve WASHINGTON — President Reagan im_ 1984 authorized an_ultrasecret US, counterterrorism unit. whose leaders included retired Air Force Ma). Gea, Richard V. Secord.that was intended TO-OYPESE-Hormal govern- ment contfols, according 10 inter- ‘Views and recent government inves- ‘ugations. ‘AS a leader of that unit, Secord often dominated White House aide Ui. Col Oliver L. North, who has been generally depicted as the driving force behind the Iran-contra affair, associates of both men and federal Investigators say: ‘Memos released by the Tower com- mission show that North frequently Communicated with Secord, but Tarely curbed, commanded of con: trolled nim. More often, the memos show that North simply asked his Superiors to support Secord’s views land proposals, particularly on trad: ing arms to Iran for American hos tages. Secord and bis business partner. Albert Hakim, were described by the ‘Senate Intelligence Committee as “al- most co-equal lieutenants” with North 19 the Irancontra affair ‘A Pentagon special operations off- ‘cer who has worked with North and Secord went further. "Hakim had money; Secord had ideas; North got captured,” he said. «Second, a private citizen with a personal financial — and no public accountability — thus influ: Enced some of the US. government's ‘most sensitive nationalsecurity deci- Federal investigators have docu- mented that Secord pl role in the Iran-contra affair; He de- Tivered arms to Iran, opened Swiss bank accounts for the transactions ‘and supplied weapons to the Nicara- ‘guan rebels. ‘Secord and North have refused to be interviewed and pleaded the Fifth ‘Amendment before the Senate Intel Higence ‘Committee. White House spokesman Dan Howard said, “Every. thing North and others did 1s cur- rently under investigation, and we ‘will aot be commenting on that.” "The ultra-secret anti-terrorist tsk force that Secord helped run was set up to report directly to the National Security Council at the White House, ‘former Secord associate atthe Pen tagon said. Tt was intended to take tough, “pro- active” approaches to terrorism. he said, bypassing what Reagan admin- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540003-8 istration officials considered reluc: tant, slow, leak-prone bureaucracies at the State Department, Central In felligence agency and Defense De- partment. The Pentagon kept the ‘Dnit's existence such a secret that its ame could not de learned. "The idea for such a task force de- veloped. in informal discussions among. administration officials in 1942 and 1983, the source sald. Presi dent Reagan approved the arrange- ment on. Apri 3, 1984, wien be signed a National Security Decision Directive drafted by NSC aide North, according to sources in the Penta ‘One esental part ofthe directive authorized the Beense Intelligence ‘gency — the Pentagon’ version of the Cla — to employ itelizence gents to collect informetion con cerning terronsm. alte the CIA the DIA isnot re aquired t report certain sensitive op Stations to Congress Sceordlng to the former associate, second a stocky Sfoot9 fighter plot Sha veteran arr commendo, led the Shrvterorst task force a8 one of" Stall group of government employ Seoand consultants experienced feorie from the Middle East and Soctneast Asia. -abolutely trust Sort. low protle people who won't tak ‘Sccord had retired from the mic tary tre year before in 8) and wes Wager ot the sew counterterrorism Ssigament,sccording fo the former Pentagon associate, aSecord Loyalist. Nolongeron active duty, he souree ow dees business with the Pente fon and asked not to be Identifed “The Tower commission report of term evidence supporting the a=" feria ando aterviews with Secore's {Sumer Pentagon colleagues and par- Neipanes i contraatd elfor's Be feport revented for he first time thal Secord, North and North's URE Wine time, White House cat boss Fecunty adviser Johe M. Poin exter seriously considered a com genigo aid In Lebanon lst June to Thaw hostages held by radial Mus tims The reid was concsived as 20 op yon atwiks and sts trades fall Hon one port tld the negotie seeooe ran that they Mgnt “pro. were te with current iptlligence of! hele ibe Rostges! location,” and Re jmmandos would Take i fFom there: the report sai rena had recruited 40 Drse mil tion withthe ad of late gover amet Qpuntererrorism specialist Beran Ni according tO ¢ NOT that implies Secord's authority, North wrote Poindexter that "Dick Tates the possibility of success on this operation as 30. percent. but that’s better than nothing.” In another memo, North wrote that available resources for such an as- sault included “one ISA officer in Beirut,” although more could be in- filtrated. The initials (SA probably refer to the Intelligence Support Ac- tunity, a seeret US. counterterrorist commando unit that Secord hel organize in 1980 i Tt was intended to improve US. counterterrorist capability after the failed 1980 mission to rescue US, hostages in Iran, according to com: gressional testimony. Secord, who had served in Iran beiween 1975 and 1978, was principal airlift planner for that ilMfated attempt Indeed, of the roughly 30 former military officers and crewmen who helped airdrop arms to contra rebels Tast ear, a Tees bed taken part ia the attempted rescue of US. Embassy bostages 1a Tehran, according to 12. terviews with the crewmen, ‘The ISA was supposedly” desct- vated in 1983, the same year Secord Tetired. A year ister, the New York ‘Times reported thatthe ISA was pro- Viding "both equipment and person: hel to the Clavfor its covert oper. tions in Central America” Following his retirement, Secord remained ta a position to oversee overt activities He served ase nome Salaried. member of the. Pentagon Special Operations Polley Advisory Group unit October 1988, according to Pentagon records SOPAG was cre ted in {084 5-8 panel of retired Commando generals to advise Noel Koch, thea deputy assistant defense Secrviary in charge of special oper tons. couaterinsurgene) and coun terterrorism Secord aso performed other sens tive tasks ay € elvan, suggesting & continuing. action tole it secret counterterrorism operations. in Jaa tar) 1986, for example. he served the CIA's “parehasing agent” for trsubound TOW missiles tasea from Pentayon stocks despite resistance by" Defense Secretary Caspar” W. Wemberger, the Tower report sad in august 1986, the Tower report revealed Secord turned up in Brus Sela, Belgium, “arranging’a pickup for our friends in a certain resist ance movement” probably arms for Afghanistan's entreommunist rebels, according to one former Se Continues STAT: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540003-8 4 eae es femal tay el et Tied eminent fa do Mle eee ctr aaa eae Teaco ase weenie | Noy af ge fcr rd common background, They had Worked in the air Force Office of Spectal Plans, which reported to Se When it came to retaliating against cord from 1981 1 1983 terrorists and rescuing hostages, Koch sa ite was done because the CIA "figured the Pentagon Fesponsibiity for action” But the guar ehief of Air Fores stlligence, Pentagon did aot want the job either, explained Ik was an office set up to according to Koch. “The generals faciuate CIA requests to ihe Air Were covering thelr asses.” he said. orce for covert airiaxt servic “The people this troubled,” Koch They pave” misins they conduct ee ere eple wh Fespons around the world, including ex: Dulity for seeing something get dove tremely sensitive missions involving yo oe eae, whe i suppor of Febel Tetons. gue Feat rele ungenvs promise of ‘swift nila movements and the secret ir [and effective retribution’ against ter if of arms and personnel, which the and effective retribution Sg White House andior the CIA desire : supported and which are of a nature contra affair "were lucky to get him.” In an interview, retired air Force Ma}. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr. for Secord was uniquely qualified: He that cannot be made public was expert in counterterrorism and ‘The office's duties, Keogan said, covert operations, and his connec: Include “responsibility for certain tions in the Middle Bast were impec: types of covert operations, including ‘cable. He bad served in fran and hod Yeronga miltary’cales thot are ol lose tiesto the royal family of Saud clandestine or covert nature.” ‘Arabia, for whom he had helped win He sald It was "sometimes" possi- from Congress the AWACS early. ble for the office to act on a White warning system. the cornerstone of House request without notifying the Seudi miltery security. Until he re Secretary of defense tured, Secord also was the Pentagon's ‘We can regret the fact that such ost influential expert on the Iran- business goes on til hell freezes rag war. over,” he observed, "but it is far more effective to carry out and con- duct and implement certain types of limited foreign policy by secret and covert means than it Is to wage open War. That's what it botls dowa to. Both Secord and Saudi King Fahé feared fallout from the Iran-Iraq war. A victorious Iran might overrun Saud! oft flelds. near the Persian Gulf, while an Iran on the ropes might launch terrorist attacks against them. ‘Congressional investigators now believe, despite official denials, that the Saud) royal family contributed tup to S31 million to aid US. efforts fageinst Iranian terrorism and on be: half of anticommunist groups, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540003-8