DOI: 10.1111/dial.

12449

THEME ARTICLE

The dangers of religious nationalism: Lessons from Srebrenica

Noreen Herzfeld

College of St. Benedict and St. John's

University
Correspondence
Noreen Herzfeld, St. John's University
Collegeville, MN 56321, USA.
Email: NHerzfeld@csbsju.edu
Abstract
What are the consequences of the politicization of religious myths and symbols for
religious communities? The ethnic cleansing that culminated in the massacre of Sre-
brenica was promoted to the Serbian population, both in Serbia proper and in Bosnia,
through the use of religious mythology and symbols. In Bosnia, religious language
lost its meaning, religious observance remained low and it became difficult for reli-
gious leaders to join together to address community issues. We see a similar use of
religious language and symbolism today in the U.S., particularly from evangelical
leaders justifying the current president and his jingoistic actions. We can look to the
conflict in Bosnia as a warning to the U.S. not to link religion and nationalism.
KEYWORDS
Bosnia, evangelical nationalism, genocide, Milosevic, nationalism, Srebrenica, Trump

1 G E NOC I D E AT S R E B R E N I CA We should take the results of co-opting religion and religious

Twenty-three years ago, more than 8,000 Muslim men and
boys were killed in Srebrenica in a genocidal attack by Ser-
bian forces, part of a war that resulted in more than 100,000
casualties, 50,000 rapes, and almost a quarter of the popula-
tion eventually displaced. What did religion have to do with
this?
Articles of religious faith did not motivate the war in
Bosnia, nor was it fought to convert or to impose the insti-
tutions of a religion. Thus, it was not a religious war, per
se. Religion, however, was instrumental in this war in two
important ways. First, religion became the primary factor
in defining the warring parties, providing a mechanism for
the ethnic separatism that was a primary political goal. Sec-
ond, religious rhetoric and religious symbols were used both
to gain public support for the war and to provide a jus-
tification for Serb aggression, and the subsequent Bosniak
response.
But twenty-three years is a long time since this conflict
ended. Why should we care about a war that now seems long
ago and far away? Mark Twain is reputed to have said, “His-
tory doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes.” Today in the U.S.
we hear echoes of a similar cadence. Religious language and
symbolism are being used to foster a nationalist ethnocen-
tric ideology that underlies a naked bid for power and to jus-
tify actions that would normally be considered unjustifiable.
16 © 2019 Wiley Periodicals and Dialog, Inc.
language to serve the cause of ethno-nationalism in Bosnia as
a cautionary tale. The war in Bosnia, culminating in the geno-
cide at Srebrenica, provides a lesson in the dangers of going
down the road of religious nationalism, for both the short and
the long term.
1.1 The Bosnian war: A quick overview
The ethnic cleansing that culminated in the massacre at Sre-
brenica was part of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia,
a dissolution that began formally with the secession of Slove-
nia in 1991, though it had been brewing since the death of
Josip Broz Tito in 1980 and the economic collapse brought
about by the opening of Eastern Europe to the West following
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Not having any sizable minorities,
especially of Serbs, the Yugoslav army was withdrawn from
Slovenia nine days after its secession. Croatia seceded shortly
after Slovenia and found itself immediately at war with Serbia.
Bosnia was caught in the middle.
In 1991, 44 percent of Bosnians were Muslim (Bosniak),
31 percent Serb, 18 percent Croat, and 6 percent simply called
themselves Yugoslavs. The Croats wanted to secede and join
the newly proclaimed Croatia. The Serbs wished to remain,
since Serbia now represented the primary force in what was
left of Yugoslavia. Bosniaks feared being a minority in a
Serb-dominated country, but knew Bosnia was too small and
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dial Dialog. 2019;58:16–21.
HERZFELD
landlocked to prosper on its own. Nonetheless, Bosnia
declared independence in March of 1992.
Despite the war between Croatia and Serbia, the Bosnians
hoped for a peaceful exit. On April 5, more than 100,000
people marched for peace in Sarajevo. Serb snipers fired
on the crowd, killing six. War broke out within days. Inter-
national horror at the genocide of Srebrenica precipitated
the end of the war, as the U.S. and European allies forced
Serbian president Slobodan Milošević to the peace table at
Dayton.
1.2 Religious rhetoric in the Bosnian war: A
quick overview
The genocide at Srebrenica, like the larger war, was not
directly religiously motivated. It was neither rooted in tenets
of the Orthodox faith, nor directly promoted by religious lead-
ers. However, religious mythology, ritual, and overtly reli-
gious language were used to promote aggression.
We find the roots of a religio-nationalist mythology in
nineteenth-century Serbian folklore, which created a cult of
the doomed medieval Serbian kingdom, defeated and lost in
the 1389 battle against the Ottoman Turks at Kosovo Polje.1
This battle became a nation's defining historical and spiritual
event. In the context of this myth, the defeated Prince Lazar is
a symbol of both the suffering Christ and the suffering Serbian
people.2
Serbian president Slobodan Milošević referred directly to
this myth at a rally marking the six-hundredth anniversary of
the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1989, in which he noted that
Serbia was “the bastion that defended the European culture,
religion, and European society in general.” Milošević’s sug-
gestion of battles yet to come was the first intimation of the
war, “not armed battles, though it may come to that.” The
crowd chanted slogans such as “Kosovo is Serb” and “We love
you, Slobodan, because you hate the Muslims.”3 Although
the mention of religion in this speech is brief, the subtext is
obvious: Serbia was and remains the last bastion of Christian
Europe against the Muslims. More explicit were posters sold
at the rally depicting Christ, Prince Lazar, and Milošević him-
self, as a new iconic Trinity.4
References to religion among the Serbs, by both ecclesias-
tical and military leaders, become more explicit and frequent
during the war. I illustrate with a few examples. Metropolitan
Nikolaj, the primate of the Orthodox Church in Bosnia, pro-
claimed at Easter 1993 that those who accepted the leadership
of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko
Mladić were “following the difficult road of Christ.” Mladić
stated that the problem of Bosnia would be solved if only
the Muslims would convert to Orthodoxy,5 while Karadžić
declared in 1994 that, “Our faith is present in all our think-
ing and decisions, and the voice of the Church is obeyed as
the voice of supreme authority.” At a rally held in Sarajevo's
17
Zetra stadium, Karadžić proclaimed “Tonight even God is a
Serb!”6
Such rhetorical references to religion do not stem from reli-
gious devotion. After years of communism, few of the Serbs
who fought in paramilitary militias and in the Bosnian Serb
army were religiously observant. That did not prevent them
from wearing religious symbols on their uniforms and using
semi-religious rituals. A gross example is the wedding of the
militia leader Željiko Raznjatović, better known as Arkan,
which was steeped in religious symbolism—he wore a huge
cross and his bride was dressed as the “maiden of Kosovo,”
a Mary Magdalene figure in Serbian religious iconography.
In this use of religious symbolism is always the implica-
tion, stated by Arkan himself, that “we are fighting for our
faith.”7
1.3 The primacy of community
Faith referred to the community rather than the tenets of
Orthodoxy. After all, Orthodoxy, like all forms of Christian-
ity, follows Jesus, who taught that we should love our enemies,
turn the other cheek, and do good to those who hate us. “Our
faith,” in Arkan's statement, is not a reference to doctrine, but
is coterminous with “our people.” This primacy of community
is reinforced in the words of theologian Georges Florovsky:
“Christianity is a liturgical religion and the Church is first of
all a worshipping community.”8 Fr. Želko Teofilic, Orthodox
priest in Srebrenica shortly after the war, confirmed this, stat-
ing that his primary work is the liturgy. However, the auto-
cephalous nature of Orthodoxy links state and church, and,
at times, this link has allowed the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SOC) to “leave behind its primary duties” for a political
cause; then Orthodox Patriarch Pavle was reputed to have said,
“a priest has to be a teacher and a judge, and to pull a gun to
defend himself and his family.” Fr. Želko wryly noted that a
church labeled Serbian Orthodox does seem to put ethnicity
first and confession second. Religion follows the state.9
The use of religious rhetoric and symbolism was not con-
fined to the Serbian side. Although the Bosnian government
consistently supported a multi-ethnic state, critics pointed
to Alija Izetbegović’s 1970 Islamic Declaration (republished
in 1990) in which he wrote: “the first and foremost con-
clusion is always the incompatibility of Islam and non-
Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor co-existence
between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political
institutions.”10 Bosniak forces, like their Serb counterparts,
used Islamic symbols—green bands or bands with Quranic
inscriptions tied around the forehead, units named Muslim
Brigades, El Mujahidin, etc. Izetbegović was described as a
“fighter for Islam, sent by God to lead the Muslims along
the true path” and awarded a Saudi medal by King Fahd for
contributing to the spread of Islam.11 Both imams and priests
blessed the troops for battle.
18 HERZFELD

1.4 Mimetic rivalry previously held in the country. So, did religion benefit from
its politicization?
This pattern of mimetic rivalry exemplifies the theories of
Omer Spahić, the first Muslim to return to the town of
theologian René Girard.12 Girard understands the relation-
Srebrenica, finds the frenzy of religious construction ironic.
ship between violence and religion as following a pattern in
“People turned to religion [after the war] but it was an illu-
which the desires, followed by the actions, of those who are
sion. Now the mosques and churches are empty. Religion is
locked in conflict become imitative. Though the Bosniaks
not that important.”
initially showed little use of Muslim symbols and rhetoric,
The rate of religious observance is low among all faith
as Serbian attacks on religion mounted and the Serbs them-
groups. Religious literacy, despite the teaching of religion
selves used religious motifs, the Bosniaks began to do like-
in the schools, remains equally low. Hate crimes continue.16
wise. The use of religious symbols increased, and the trap-
General Jovan Divjak, an ethnic Serb who defied sectarian-
pings of state became increasingly Islamic.13 We see an eerily
ism and led the defense of Sarajevo against Serb nationalist
similar mimesis between the Catholic Croats and the Serbs.
forces, noted in 2012, “The hate is worse now than it was
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said “Whatever the Serbs
just after the war. It's not getting better. It's getting worse.”17
do, we do also.”14
Milorad Dodik, the newly elected Serb member of a tripartite
The importance of religious symbols also can be seen in
presidency, echoes this continuation of a quasi-tribal hatred.
the wide and intentional destruction, then reconstruction, of
This October he said of the U.S. and Britain, “they are forc-
sacred buildings and monuments. It is estimated that through-
ing us again to live with those we couldn't live with in a
out Bosnia approximately 1000 mosques, and 340 Orthodox
big Yugoslavia. The only response is to strengthen the Serb
and 450 Catholic churches and monasteries were destroyed.
national identity.”18
Some 92 percent of the mosques and virtually 100 percent of
Twenty-three years later, fear of the other still drives Bosni-
the minarets in Serb-held territory were destroyed or heavily
ans to vote within their ethnic and religious enclaves, even
damaged. In Srebrenica all five mosques were destroyed, one
for politicians whom they know are deeply corrupt. In the
in 1997, two years after the Dayton accords.
end, it is precisely these voters who suffer. An imam and the
The locations of these mosques (except for the White
Orthodox priest serving in Srebrenica spoke of the same prob-
Mosque, reconstructed in 2002) are given over to weeds and
lems among the faithful in their community, problems of drug
rubbish, or, as has so often been the case throughout his-
addiction, depression, loss of faith, loss of meaning. The loss
tory, symbols of the victor are superimposed on the ruins of
of trust in religion, of a spiritual anchor, is perhaps the greatest
the vanquished to mark one's territory. In Srebrenica, a cross
tragedy of the religio-nationalist link.
erected in the old town and a new church, built in 2013 in
Politically motivated religious rhetoric demeans our reli-
nearby Potočari where the disinterred bodies of the Muslim
gious vocabulary. Theologian William Schweiker, speaking
victims have been buried, remain flashpoints of controversy.
of his own country, the U.S., notes that, “at stake … is the
In the nearby village of Konjic Polje, an Orthodox church con-
reach, depth, and nuance of human existence. What is defaced
structed on land belonging to a Muslim woman (Fata Orlović)
is the universe of discourse for articulating the highest human
has been a locus for violent clashes and death threats that con-
aspirations as human aspirations whatever else they might
tinue to the present day. It now stands empty, awaiting removal
be.”19
to another location.
There are immediate practical losses as well. Several years
ago, the two religious leaders in Srebrenica spoke to me of
2 RELIGION: T H E U SE D O R T H E joining together to address these problems within the commu-
USER? nity. The political rhetoric of the priest made this an impos-
sibility. Religion co-opted is religion destroyed for the use of
Was religion the instrument of nationalism or nationalism the the people.
instrument of religion? One might think war led to renewed
religious identity and thus, a religious revival. Churches and
mosques were among the first objects restored or rebuilt after 3 DA NGER S IG NS I N T H E RH Y M E S
the war. Reconstruction of sacred spaces brought in monies OF HISTORY
from religious and political communities of various nations,
including Greece, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Italy. Religion is I visited a Serbian war memorial in a town near Srebrenica.
now taught as part of the regular curriculum in the Bosnian Striking up a conversation with a few old men who were sit-
schools.15 Women in downtown Sarajevo, who previously ting there, we told them we were Americans. One of them said
thought scarves were only for grandmas, appear in hijab. The there had been some fine American leaders. When asked who,
January 2004 Law on Religious Freedom confers on reli- he said “Robert E. Lee.” Many Serbs draw a parallel between
gious communities a legal status and protection beyond any Kosovo Polje and Appomattox, lost battles, lost causes.20
HERZFELD
President Donald Trump also recently referenced Robert
E. Lee as “a great general” and stoked division and con-
troversy by saying there were “fine people” on both sides
of the deadly rally in Charlottesville in 2017, a comment
with a similar ring to one heard frequently from Serbians
that “all sides were guilty” during the war. Like Miloše-
vić at Kosovo Polje, Trump hinted at violence to come,
telling a recent gathering of evangelical pastors that should
Democrats win elections they will “overturn everything that
we've done and they'll do it quickly and violently … these
are violent people.” He added that the midterms are “very
much a referendum on not only me, it's a referendum on your
religion.”21
President Trump has said a lot of things. To what should
we pay attention? It is hard to say. Words and symbols often
have a cumulative effect. I'll highlight here three parallels that
I see between the U.S. and the Bosnian experience.
First, as before the war in Bosnia, Americans are see-
ing a rise in nationalistic ethnocentrism concurrent with
a loss of observant religious participation. Journalist Peter
Beinart notes, “As Americans have left organized religion,
they haven't stopped viewing politics as a struggle between
“us” and “them.” Many have come to define us and them in
even more primal and irreconcilable ways.”22 According to
the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), the percent-
age of white Republicans with no religious affiliation has
nearly tripled since 1990.23 These Americans have weaker
community ties, higher divorce rates, more joblessness, and
a generally darker view of the times. They are more hos-
tile to immigrants and Muslims. And, lacking strong com-
munity ties, they are susceptible to nationalism, ethnocen-
trism, or a cult of personality as a source for a sense of
belonging. At Trump's rallies we have seen all three of these,
just as we did at Milosevic's. As Alex Wagner writes, “If
mainline Protestantism is a bastion of the educated, upper-
middle class, the Church of Trump is a gathering place for its
castoffs.”24
Second, there is an eerie similarity in much of the rhetoric
we are hearing, particularly from evangelical ministers, in the
drawing of analogies between political and religious figures
and in the stoking of the fear of others, particularly Muslims.
Televangelist Pat Robertson has compared Trump to Jesus,
saying that in a dream he saw Trump sitting at the right hand of
God. Pastor David Jeremiah drew a similar analogy between
Jared and Ivanka and Joseph and Mary, saying, “It's just like
God to use a young Jewish couple to help Christians.” Jerry
Falwell, Jr. believed evangelicals have “found their dream
president” whom he says will be more effective than Jesus.25
And, like Milošević, Trump rally-goers approve of the fact
that “he hates the Muslims” and cheer when he sanctions vio-
lent acts.
Both leaders, Trump and Milošević, mobilized their base
by stoking fear and anger coupled with an appeal to their
19
Christian identity and a cult of personality that is almost mes-
sianic. Milošević promised to reinstate a “Greater Serbia.”
Trump will “Make America Great Again,” and has claimed
he came to protect Christianity. Both encourage a nostalgia
for an earlier and better time.
Third, as in Serbia, where the state supported the church
and the church the state until it became difficult to separate the
two, evangelicals and Trump have become locked in a similar
circle of mutual reinforcement. Trump promises an evangeli-
cal agenda that includes appointing justices who might over-
turn Roe v. Wade, revoking the Johnson amendment that pro-
hibits political endorsement from the pulpit, supporting Israel
at the expense of the Palestinians, and pushing back recent
rights gained by the LGBT community. In their turn, evan-
gelical pastors overlook Trump's lack of religious interest or
knowledge, give him a “mulligan” on his infidelities, and bless
him at every opportunity.
If the Bosnian experience is anything to go by, this will not
serve evangelicals well. Evangelical pastor Timothy Keller
notes, “‘Evangelical’ used to denote people who claimed the
high moral ground; now, in popular usage, the word is nearly
synonymous with ‘hypocrite.’”26
As we saw in Bosnia, religion bound to a cult of nation-
alism suffers, becoming a violent symbol rather than a way
of life. Young people, in particular, are quick to note when
actions and words no longer coincide. White evangelicals in
America have begun to experience the decline in membership
that was once the province only of mainline Protestants. The
share of evangelicals in the U.S. population has dropped from
23 percent to 17 percent over the last decade and much of this
has come from a loss of youth, with 62 percent of evangelicals
now over the age of 50.27
Hatred hardened between differing factions is very slow to
heal. Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote: “A man who lies to himself,
and believes his own lies, becomes unable to recognize truth.”
So do such a person's followers. We know what Milošević's
words led to. Yugoslavia went through five years of war, eth-
nic cleansing, rape camps, and the displacement of hundreds
of thousands of refugees, most of whom have not returned
to their ancestral homes. Bosnia remains a failed state, with
deeply entrenched ethnic factions and political parties and
structures that fan division rather than promote unity. Young
people continue to leave; 35,000 left Bosnia in the past year.28
We cannot say the same for the U.S. But have we started down
a similar road?
4 CONC LUDING S EEDS O F H O PE
Despite the above, I would like to conclude on a note of hope.
Reconciliation and change is possible in both groups and
individuals who work toward rebuilding trust. This happens
most easily when persons of differing religions, ethnicities, or
20
political parties work together on a common project, and such
projects have been sponsored in Bosnia by a variety of reli-
gious and non-religious NGOs.29 Hope is also possible in
the return of pastors, teachers, and believers to the teachings
inherent in all of our religious traditions regarding treatment
of the other and the holy work of hospitality.
I experienced this hope for Bosnia during a brief visit to a
farm outside of Bratunac. There, two women, one Serb, the
other Muslim, shared a stove in a burnt shell of a house that
stood between their respective houses. They joked and argued
together as to whose cups were the better ones to serve the
visiting American scholar. For them, the war was long over,
ethnicity had ceased to matter, and religion was all about serv-
ing the wayfarer.
Pope John Paul II gave us a sign of hope in his 1997 visit
to Sarajevo:
Building a true and lasting peace is a great task
entrusted to everyone. Certainly, much depends
on those who have public responsibility. But the
future of peace, while largely entrusted to institu-
tional formulations, which have to be effectively
drawn up by means of sincere dialogue and in
respect of justice, depend no less decisively on
a renewed solidarity of [individual] minds and
hearts.30
There has been progress in Bosnia, albeit slow. It is my hope
that Bosnia will continue down this path to reconciliation. It
is also my hope that we in the U.S. will recognize the dan-
gers of religious nationalism, heed the lessons of the past, and
turn away from the religious rhetoric and divisiveness of our
current, or indeed any, administration.
E N D NOT E S
1
The development of such a myth was not uncommon in Europe dur-
ing the rapid transformation and rising nationalism of the nineteenth
century.
2 tion in Bosnia: Integration not separation? Brigham Young University
The parallel between Lazar and Christ extends so far as a description of
a mythic Last Supper between Lazar and his comrades and a betrayal
by one of them.
3 to the U.S. State Department.
Sells, M. A. (1996). The bridge betrayed: Religion and genocide in
Bosnia (p. 87). Berkeley: University of California.
4 conflict continues to haunt. The Guardian.
Malcolm, N. (1996). Bosnia: A short history. London: Papermac.
5 Ibid.
6 Mahmutćehajić, R. (2000). The denial of Bosnia. University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University.
7 Sells (1996), 82.
8 Quoted in Mylonas, C. (2003). Serbian Orthodox fundamentals: The
quest for an eternal identity (p. 37). Budapest: CEU.
9A more problematic example is the blessing of the Serbian Scor-
pion unit by an Orthodox priest (Abbot Gavrilo from Holy Angels
HERZFELD
monastery in Sid, Serbia), as shown in the recently released videotape
of the execution of Muslim prisoners from Srebrenica. In a statement
issued June 12, 2005, the SOC condemned the killings, yet noted that
the blessing of soldiers is traditional in Orthodoxy.
10 Izetbegović, A. (1990). Islamska Delkaracija (2nd ed., p. 98).
Sarajevo. Online at http://www.angelfire.com/dc/mbooks/Alija-
Izetbegovic-Islamic-Declaration-1990-Azam-dot-com.pdf (accessed
Dec. 8, 2018).
11 Veliknoja, M. (2001, Oct.). In hoc signo vinces: Religious sym-
bolism in the Balkan wars 1991-1995. Religion in Eastern Europe
21(5), 9.
12 Girard, R. N. (1977). Violence and the sacred. (P. Gregory, Trans.).
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. See Ted Peters’ article for more
on Girardian scapegoat theory applied to religious nationalism in this
issue of Dialog: Peters, T. (2019). Covenant, blood, and violence:
America at war with itself and others. Dialog: A Journal of Theology
58(1).
13 For example, at a rally in Grebak in 1996, an address by Izetbegović
was mixed with Islamic music and verses from the Quran.
14 The relationship between the Catholic church and the HDZ is beyond
the scope of this paper. As a church that is not autocephalous and
that must take leadership from Rome, this relationship was never as
clear cut as that between the SOC and the Milošević regime. Although
the Catholic paper Veritas published rhetoric that sounds similar to
that used by the SOC (For example, in 1992 an article by Josip
Beljan states “The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag.”
See Banac, I. (1989). The national question in Yugoslavia: Origins,
history, politics (p. 108). London: Cornell.) notes “the ideologists of
Croat nationhood, almost to the last practicing Catholics, resisted the
equation of Catholicism and Croatdom.” See also Bellamy, A. (2002).
The Catholic church and Croatia's two transitions. Religion, State, and
Society 30(1).
15
In theory, religious education classes in public schools in BiH are
optional. The reality is that in some municipalities children who do
not choose to attend these classes are subject to pressure and discrim-
ination from peers and teachers. In other locales, including most of
the RS, only the religion of the majority of the population is offered in
the public schools. Adult religious education is practically non-existent
among the three religious groups in Bosnia. This has led to a percep-
tion, expressed to me by the architect in charge of the rebuilding of the
bridge in Mostar in June 2003, that religion is only for children and not
needed for adult life. See also Russo, C. (2000). Religion and educa-
Law Review.
16
There have been 198 such crimes between 2010 and 2016, according
17 Borger, J. (2012, April 4). Bosnian war 20 years on: Peace holds but
18 Emric, E. and Geco, J. (2018, Oct. 5). Bosnia election seen as key for
future of war-ravaged nation. AP News.
19 Schweiker, W. (2018, Oct. 22). Mute religion. Sightings. Online at
https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sightings/mute-religion (accessed Dec.
8, 2018).
20 The rhetoric of the “lost cause” has become popular again in the South,
paralleling a rise in the display of the Confederate flag. See Sellers,
F. S. (2018, Oct. 22). Confederate pride and prejudice: Some white
Northerners see a flag rooted in racism as a symbol of patriotism. The
HERZFELD 21

Washington Post. Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 28 There is even a Facebook page devoted to urging young people
national/wp/2018/10/22/feature/some-white-northerners-want-to- to leave and easing their process. http://www.balkaninsight.com/
redefine-a-flag-rooted-in-racism-as-a-symbol-of-patriotism/?utm_ en/article/facebook-group-urges-bosnians-choose-life-choose-to-leave-
term=.bc3b0cda05ae&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1 (accessed Dec. 8, 10-23-2018
2018). 29 Fora summary and case studies of successful NGO projects in BiH,
21 Bort, R. (2018, Aug. 29). Why Trump will never lose evangelical sup- see Peuraca, 2003.
port. Rolling Stone. 30 John Paul II (1997, April 13). Address to the Representatives of
22 Beinart, P. (2017, April). Breaking faith. The Atlantic. Authorities of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Sarajevo. http://www.instesw.
23 Cox, D. and Jones, R. P. (2017). America's changing religious identity. ebox.lublin.pl/ed/1/janpawel.html.en.
PRRI. Online at https://www.prri.org/research/american-religious-
landscape-christian-religiously-unaffiliated/ (accessed Dec. 8, 2018).
24 Wagner, AU T H O R'S B I O G R A P H Y
A. (2018, August). The church of Trump. The Atlantic.
25 Gerson, M. (2018, April). The last temptation. The Atlantic.
Noreen L. Herzfeld is Nicholas and Bernice Reuter Professor
26
Keller, T. (2017, Dec. 19). Can evangelicalism survive Donald Trump
of Science and Religion at the College of St. Benedict and St.
and Roy Moore? The New Yorker. Online at https://www.newyorker.
John's University in Collegeville, Minnesota. She is author of
com/news/news-desk/can-evangelicalism-survive-donald-trump-and-
roy-moore?mbid=social_facebook&fbclid=IwAR3fBLWNcFXP7Z2 In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit
6YYwRW6S8VQoXk3r5fSfCEvmZ5mnWy8nAmAHVWGgo_wA (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002).
(accessed Dec. 28, 2018).
27
Cox, D. (2018, Jan. 24). Are white evangelicals sacrificing the How to cite this article: Herzfeld N. The
future in search of the past? FiveThirtyEight. Online at https://
dangers of religious nationalism: Lessons
fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-white-evangelicals-sacrificing-the-
from Srebrenica. Dialog. 2019;58:16–21.
future-in-search-of-the-past/ (accessed Dec. 28, 2018).
https://doi.org/10.1111/dial.12449
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