ARELLANO UNIVERSITY Cases:

SCHOOL OF LAW 1. Larrobis, Jr. vs. Phil Veterans Bank, 440 SCRA
REMEDIAL LAW DEPARTMENT 2. Chavez vs. CA, 610 SCRA
3. Koruga vs. Arcenas, 590 SCRA
S Y L L A B U S 4. Tantano vs. Espina-Caboverde, 702 SCRA – 7/29/13
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II 5. Hiteroza vs. Cruzada, 794 SCRA 511 (2016)
SCHOOL YEAR 2021-2022 6. Banco Filipino vs. BSP, 864 SCRA 32, June 4, 2018
PROF. HENEDINO M. BRONDIAL
D. Replevin (R-60)
1. When writ may issue (S-1)
2. Requirements (S-2)
I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES (Rules 57-61) 3. Third Party Claim (S-7)
4. Judgment and Damages (S-9,10)
A. Preliminary Attachment (R-57)
1. Grounds (S-1) Cases:
2. Requirements (S-3) 1. Orosa vs. CA, 329 SCRA
3. Manner of Attaching (S-5) 2. Smart Communiations vs. Astorga, 542 SCRA
4. Discharge of Attachment (S-5,12,13) 3. Hao vs. Andres, 555 SCRA
5. Third Party Claim (S-14) 4. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA
6. Claim for damages (S-20) 5. Agner vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA, 6/3/13
Cases:
1. Lim Jr. Vs. Lazaro, 700 SCRA E. Support (R-61), relate to Articles 194-208 of Civil Code
2. Ligon vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 56, 717 SCRA 1. Application for Support Pendente Lite (S-1)
3.Mangila vs. CA, 387 SCRA 2. Comment, Hearing, Order (S-2,3,4)
4. Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA 3. Enforcement of Order (S-5)
5. Alejandro Ng Wee vs. Tankiansee, 545 SCRA 4. Restitution (S-7)
6. Torres vs. Satsatin, 605 SCRA
7. Luzon Dev. Bank vs. Krishman, 755 SCRA, April 13, 201, Cases:
8. Northern Luzon Island Co. vs. Garcia, 753 SCRA 603 1. De Asis vs. CA, 303 SCRA
9. Watercraft Venture Corp. vs. Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179 2. People vs. Manahan, 315 SCRA
10. Phil. Airconditioning Center vs. RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265 3. Lim vs. Lim, 604 SCRA
4. Gotardo vs. Buling, 678 SCRA
B. Preliminary Injunction (R-58) 5. Republic vs. Yahon, 726 SCRA
1. Definition, Classes (S-1) 438
2. Grounds (S-3); TRO 6. Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem, 744
3. Requirements (S-4) SCRA516
4. Damages (S-8) 7. Lim-Lua vs. Lua, 697 SCRA
8. Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA
Cases: 560
1. Idolor vs. CA, 351 SCRA 9. Abella vs. Cabanero, 836 SCRA
2. Gustilo vs. Real, 353 SCRA 453 (2017)
3. Lagrosas vs. Bristo-Myers, 565 SCRA
4. Jenosa vs. Delariarte, 630 SCRA
5. Solid Builders Inc. vs. China Bank, 695 SCRA, 4/3/13.
6. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., 824 SCRA (2017) II. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Rules 62-71)
7. Novecio vs. Lim, 754 SCRA 111
8. Cayabyab vs. Dimson, 830 SCRA 520 A. Interpleader (R-62)
9. Republic vs. Cortez, 769 SCRA 267 1. What is an action in Interpleader (S-1)
10. AMA Land, Inc. vs. Wack-Wack Residents’ Assoc., Inc. SCRA
328 ( requisites for Injunction) Section 1. When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting
11. Roldan vs. Barrios, (concurrent jurisdiction of Injunction, claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a
4/23/18) person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
12. Phil. Investment Two Inc. vs. Mendoza, 886 SCRA 197 (2018) interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he
13. Phil. National Construction Corporation vs. Hon. Jesus B. may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them
Mupas to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. (1a,
Promulgated November 10, 2020 R63)
- What cases/subject matters proscribe injunctive relief?
2. Requisites (S-1)
3. Procedure (S-2 to 7)
C. Receivership (R-59)
1. When writ may issue (S-1)
2. Requirements (S-2) Section 2. Order. — Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall
3. Power of receiver (S-6) issue an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with
4. Termination and Compensation (S-8) one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct
in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.
(2a, R63)
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Section 3. Summons. — Summons shall be served upon the
conflicting claimants, together with a copy of the complaint and
order. (3, R63)
Section 4. Motion to dismiss. — Within the time for filing an answer,
each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the ground of
impropriety of the interpleader action or on other appropriate
grounds specified in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be
tolled and if the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5)
days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)
Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. — Each claimant shall file
his answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days from
service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each
of the other conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as
provided by these Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the
time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in default
and thereafter render judgment barring him from any claim in respect
to the subject matter.
The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-
claims, third-party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as
provided by these Rules. (4a, R63)
Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting
claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in
accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their
respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, R63)
Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation
expenses as liens. — The docket and other lawful fees paid by the
party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and
litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or change upon the subject
matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise. (6a, R63)
What is an interpleader?
Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his
possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the
defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the
same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or
payment of the obligation. (Beltran vs. PHHC, G.R. No. L-25138,
August 28, 1969)
What is the purpose of interpleader?
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
liability. (Beltran vs. PHHC)
1. A classic example is that of a warehouseman who has custody of
goods claimed to be owned by two or more persons who do not have
the same interests. He may file an action for interpleader for the court
to determine the rightful owner. The basis of the need to file an
interpleader in the case of a warehouseman is actually the substantive
law provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law. Under said law,
where a warehouseman delivers the goods to one who is not in fact
entitled to possession, the warehouseman shall be liable for
conversion (Sec. 10, Warehouse Receipts Law). He may also be sued
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for damages for non-delivery if he refuses to deliver the goods.
Hence, Sec. 17 of the same law authorizes the warehouseman to
require all known claimants to interplead to shield him from
liability. (Dean Riano)
2. Another usual example is the case of a lessee who may commence
a complaint for interpleader when he is confronted with adverse
claimants on the rentals due and he is in doubt as to which of them
should be the rightful recipient.
Recall that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, a cardinal
principle to be observed for the validity of payment or performance
is that payment must be made "to the person in whose favor the
obligation was constituted" (Art. 1240, Civil Code of the
Philippines). This means that as a rule, payment to the wrong person
is not a valid payment and does not extinguish the obligation. Where
two or more persons who do not represent the same interests claim
the right to collect, the debtor will have to file an action for
interpleader to effect the extinguishment of his obligation. (Dean
Riano)
What are the requisites of interpleader?
1. There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting
interests to a property in the custody or possession of the plaintiff.
2. The plaintiff has NO CLAIM upon the subject matter of the
adverse claims, or if he has an interest at all, such interest is NOT
DISPUTED by the claimants.
3. The subject matter of the adverse claims must be one and the
same.
What court has jurisdiction over an interpleader case?
1. MTC - If the subject matter of the action is personal property,
valued at not more than P300,000.00 outside Metro Manila, and in
Metro Manila, at not more than P400,000.00, the Municipal Trial
Court has jurisdiction.
2. RTC - If the subject matter is real property with an assessed value
at not more than P20,000.00 outside Metro Manila, and in Metro
Manila, at not more than P50,000.00, the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction.
When should the interpleader be filed?
An action for interpleader should be filed within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the
contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or
undue delay. (Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won, G.R. No.
L-23851, March 26, 1976)
If the the allegations of the complaint do not show conflicting
claims between or among the persons required to interplead,
what would be the ground for the dismissal of the complaint for
interpleader?
It is believed that where the allegations of the complaint do not show
conflicting claims between or among the persons required to
interplead, the complaint for interpleader is subject to dismissal on
the ground of impropriety of the interpleader, not a failure to state a
cause of action under Rule 16 because the meaning of a cause of
action in ordinary civil actions cannot apply to an interpleader.
Besides, for an interpleader to be proper such conflicting claims must
exist (Sec. 1, Rule 62, Rules of Court). Conversely, there is
impropriety where no such adverse claims can be found from the
reading of the complaint. (Dean Riano)
Procedure:
1. Filing: A complaint for interpleader is filed by the person against
whom the conflicting claims are made. The docket, other lawful fees,
costs and other litigation expenses shall be paid by the complainant;
but these will constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of
the action, unless the
court hold otherwise.
2. Court Order: Upon filing of the complaint, the court shall issue
an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one
another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct that
the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.
3. Summons: Summons shall be served upon the conflicting
claimants, together with a copy of the complaint and order.
4.Motion to Dismiss: Within the time for filing an answer (15 days),
each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds specified
in Rule 16 and on the ground of impropriety of the action for
interpleader.
The period to file an answer is interrupted or tolled by the filing of
the motion to dismiss. If the motion is denied, the movant may file
his answer within the remaining period to answer, but which shall
NOT BE LESS THAN 5 days in any event from the notice of denial
of the motion.
5. Answer: Each claimant shall file his answer within 15 days from
service of the summons, serving a copy thereof upon each of the
other conflicting claimants, who may file their reply thereto.
If claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may,
on motion, declare him in default and render judgment barring him
from any claim in respect to the subject matter.
6. Other pleadings: The parties may file counterclaims, crossclaims,
third-party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto.
7. Pre-trial: A pre‐trial will be conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
B. 8. Determination: Court shall determine conflicting claimants’
respective rights and adjudicate their several claims.
C.
Bar Questions:
LTA, Inc. is the lessee of a building owned by Mr. Tenorio
paying rental of P10,000.00 a month. The owner died on
May 10, 1988 and since then, LTA has not paid the monthly
rentals, now amounting to P40,000.00 because two women
are both claiming to be widows of Tenorio and are
demanding rental payments. What legal action may LTA's
counsel take, before what court and against whom to protect
LTA's interest? (Bar 1996)
Suggested answer.
LTAs counsel should file an action for interpleader against the
two women and pray that the court resolve their conflicting
claims. The action should be filed in the Municipal Trial Court
because the subject of the action is an amount within the
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jurisdiction of said court. Note: When the question was asked,
jurisdiction was with the Regional Trial Court. At that time the
jurisdictional amount for the RTC was an amount exceeding
P10,000.00.
A lost the cashier's check she purchased from XYZ Bank.
Upon being notified of the loss, XYZ Bank immediately
issued a "STOP PAYMENT" order. Here comes B trying to
encash the same cashier's check but XYZ Bank refused
payment. As precautionary measure what remedy may XYZ
Bank avail of with respect to the conflicting claims of A and
B over the cashier's check? Explain. (Bar 1996)
Suggested answer:
XYX Bank should file a complaint for interpleader and leave
unto the court the resolution of the conflicting claims of A and
B. Note: The examiner made reference to "conflicting claims."
This is a clue as to what the examiner desires as an answer. The
examinee should therefore, refrain from making assumptions or
unnecessary analysis.
H insured his life with X Insurance Co. and designated W as
beneficiary. The policy provided that the beneficiary could
be changed by a written notice designating the new
beneficiary sent by the insured and received by X Insurance
Co. before the death of the insured. After the death of H, Q
demanded from X Insurance Co. the proceeds of the policy,
claiming that she had been designated as the beneficiary by
H as may be seen from a copy of a written notice signed by
H and allegedly received by X Insurance Co. before X's
death. W who is also demanding from X Insurance Co. the
proceeds of the policy, claims that the signature of H
appearing on the written notice is forged. As counsel for X
Insurance Co., what advice would you give to your client
and why?  (Bar 1978)
Suggested answer:
I would advice my client not to pay either of the claimants in the
meantime and instead file a complaint for interpleader against
them and let the court resolve their conflicting claims (Sec. 1,
Rule 63, Rules of Court).
D.
E.
What courts have jurisdiction over the following cases filed
in Metro Manila?
F. xxx
G. (d) An action for interpleader to determine who between the
defendants is entitled to receive the amount of P190, 000.00
from the plaintiff.
Suggested answer.
(d) The action shall be filed in the Metropolitan Court in Metro
Manila. The amount of P190, 000.00 not being in excess of
P400, 000.00, is within the jurisdiction of said court. (Bar 1997)
Cases:
1.Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won, 70 SCRA
Facts: Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed a complaint for
interpleader against Won and Tan who both claim ownership over
membership fee certificate 201. Won claims its ownership stemming
from a decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 entitled "Lee E. Won
alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club,
Inc." Meanwhile, Tan claims ownership from the assignment made
by the alleged true owner of the same certificate. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata by reason of
the previous civil case that issued Won the right to the certificate.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?
Held: There is no question that the subject matter of the present
controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an
interpleader suit. However, the Corporation may not properly invoke
the remedy of interpleader.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a
position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to
show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder
defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said
suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. 
In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to
proceed to final judgment. It was aware of the conflicting claims of
the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long
before it filed the present interpleader suit. Yet it did not interplead
Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation and to defend itself
therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it
and said judgment has already been executed. It is therefore too late
for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader
To now permit the Corporation to bring Won to court after the latter's
successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the
membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish
the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of
interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the
benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because
having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044,
with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to
the consequences of defeat.  motion for execution. The other case involved the propriety of a CA
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his
defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect
be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in
effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil
case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to
membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his
rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case
might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said
case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay. (Wack-Wack Golf
and Country Club vs. Won, G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976)
2.Eternal Gardens vs. IAC, 165 SCRA
Facts: A Land Development Agreement  was executed between
Eternal & Mission. Mission owned the property & Eternal was to
develop it into a memorial park. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale
w/ mortgage was executed. BUT Maysilo claimed ownership over
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the land. Thus, Eternal filed w/ the CFI a complaint for interpleader
vs. Mission & Maysilo Estate. It alleged that, in view of the
conflicting claims & to protect its interests, defendants should be
required to interplead & litigate between themselves.
Mission filed a Motion for placing on judicial deposit the amounts
due & unpaid fr. Eternal. Motion was DENIED. The contract was
declared ineffective on the ground that the subject matter of the sale
was not existing.
Mission then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Interpleader. TC ordered
Eternal to comply w/ the contract EXCEPT w/ regard to the
interpleader of Maysilo Estate. Maysilo filed Motion for Recon w/c
was GRANTED by the TC. Hearings on the merits were ordered
BUT Mission filed for Writ of Execution. This was DENIED. On
appeal, CA dismissed & this was affirmed by the SC. The order
became final & executory.
In 1983, heirs of Singson spouses filed an action for quieting of title
where Eternal & Mission were defendants. This case is still pending.
In the present case, Mission filed a petition for certiorari w/ the CA
for the setting aside of RTC orders regarding the setting of the
hearing on the merits. CA dismissed BUT later on reversed. Eternal
filed a Motion for Recon w/c was again DENIED.
Held: Courts have the power to amend their judgments, to make
them conformable to the applicable jurisprudence PROVIDED said
judgments ARE NOT YET FINAL. In the CAB, Eternal admitted it
still has to pay whoever will be declared as owner. Therefore, there
was no plausible reason for petitioner’s objections to the deposit
order after having asked the ct. by complaint for interpleader whose
deposit is not only required but is a contractual obligation.
Finally,  there is no res judicata here bec. there was no judgment on
the merits. Also, there was no identity of issues. One case involved
the propriety of motion for recon w/o a hearing & the denial of the
order that Eternal shall deposit what was required of it pending the
trial on the merits.
After it becomes final and executory
3.Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty: Petitioners did not pay rentals
because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be
made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if
such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should
have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but
to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted
to refrain from making payments.
Are petitioners entitled to a writ of possession after being
adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to
buy the subject property, considering that a “deed of sale” has
already been executed in their favor? The answer is in the
negative.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances:
[1] Land registration proceedings;
[2] Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;
[3] Judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened, and;
[4] Execution sales.
4.Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Dev. Bank, 681 SCRA
5. Belo Medical Group, Inc. vs. Jose L. Santos and Victoria G. Belo,
838 SCRA 142, Aug. 30, 2017
BELO MEDICAL GROUP V JOSE L. SANTOS G.R. No. 185894,
August 30, 2017 Leonen, J. DOCTRINE: A conflict between two (2)
stockholders of a corporation does not automatically render their
dispute as intra-corporate. The nature of the controversy must also be
examined. FACTS: The controversy began on May 5, 2008 when
Belo Medical Group received a request from Santos for the
inspection of corporate records. Santos claimed that he was a
registered shareholder and a co-owner of Belo's shares, as these were
acquired while they cohabited as husband and wife. Santos sought
advice on his probable removal as director of the corporation
considering that he was not notified of meetings where he could have
been removed. He also inquired on the election of Alfredo Henares
(Henares) as Corporate Secretary in 2007 when Santos had not been
notified of a meeting for Henares' possible election. Finally, he
sought explanation on the corporation's failure to inform him of the
2007 annual meeting and the holding of an annual meeting in 2008.
Santos' concern over the corporate operations arose from the alleged
death of a patient in one (1) of its clinics. Belo wrote Belo Medical
Group on May 14, 2007 to repudiate Santos' co-ownership of her
shares and his interest in the corporation. She claimed that Santos
held the 25 shares in his name merely in trust for her, as she, and not
Santos, paid for these shares. She informed Belo Medical Group that
Santos already had a pending petition with the Regional Trial Court
to be declared as co-owner of her properties. She asserted that unless
a decision was rendered in Santos' favor, he could not exercise
ownership rights over her properties. Belo also informed Belo
Medical Group that Santos had a business in direct competition with
it. She suspected that Santos' request to inspect the records of Belo
Medical Group was a means to obtain a competitor's business
information, and was, therefore, in bad faith. Thus, Belo Medical
Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with Branch 149, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City on May 21, 2008. Belo Medical Group
alleged that while Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder,
there was nothing on the record to show that he had paid for the
shares under his name. On May 29, 2008, Belo Medical Group filed
a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group
relied on Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request
for inspection. Belo Medical Group's Complaint and Supplemental
Complaint were raffled to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-
corporate.
On July 4, 2008, Belo Medical Group filed an Omnibus Motion for
Clarificatory Hearing and for Leave to File Consolidated Reply,
praying that the case be tried as a civil case and not as an intra-
corporate controversy. It argued that the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies did not include special civil
actions for interpleader and declaratory relief found under the Rules
of Court. Belo Medical Group clarified that the issue on ownership of
the shares of stock must first be resolved before the issue on
inspection could even be considered ripe for determination. ISSUE:
Whether or not the present controversy is intra-corporate. HELD: To
determine whether an intra-corporate dispute exists and whether this
5
case requires the application of these rules of procedure, this Court
evaluated the relationship of the parties. The types of intra-corporate
relationships were reviewed in Union Glass & Container Corporation
v. Securities and Exchange Commission: [a] between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders,
partners, members, or officers; [c] between the corporation,
partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; and [d] among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For as long as any of
these intra-corporate relationships exist between the parties, the
controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate. This is known
as the "relationship test." DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol
Mountain Reserve, Inc. employed what would later be called as the
"nature of controversy test." It became another means to determine if
the dispute should be considered as intra-corporate. Applying the
relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and Santos are
named shareholders in Belo Medical Group's Articles of
Incorporation94 and General Information Sheet for 2007. The
conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it involves two (2) shareholders
although the ownership of stocks of one stockholder is questioned.
Applying the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra-
corporate dispute. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a
determination of the true owner of the shares of stock registered in
Santos' name. Ultimately, however, the goal is to stop Santos from
inspecting corporate books. This goal is so apparent that, even if
Santos is declared the true owner of the shares of stock upon
completion of the interpleader case, Belo Medical Group still seeks
his disqualification from inspecting the corporate books based on bad
faith. Therefore, the controversy shifts from a mere question of
ownership over movable property to the exercise of a registered
stockholder's proprietary right to inspect corporate books.
BELO MEDICAL GROUP v. JOSE SANTOS GR No. 185894, Aug
30, 2017 Intra-Corporate Controversy, “Relationship Test”, “Nature
of Controversy Test”
JUNE 19, 2019
FACTS: Belo Medical Group received a request from Jose Santos for
the inspection of corporate records.
Belo objected to this request and wrote Belo Medical Group to
repudiate Santos co-ownership of her shares and his interest in the
corporation, claiming that the 25 shares in his name were merely in
trust for her, as she, and not Santos, paid for these shares.
Thus, Belo Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader to
compel [Belo and Santos] to interplead and litigate their conflicting
claims and for declaratory relief,  praying that Santos be perpetually
barred from inspecting its books. Said complaints were raffled to the
special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate.
Belo prayed that the case be tried as a civil case and not as an intra-
corporate controversy, arguing that intra-corporate controversies did
not include special civil actions for interpleader and declaratory
relief, and clarified that the issue of ownership of the shares of stock
must first be resolved before the issue on inspection could even be
considered ripe for determination.
Instead of filing an answer, Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Though a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies, the trial court ruled that according to the Rules of
Court, motions to dismiss are allowed in interpleader cases, while
the complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper.
Belo filed her Petition for Review before the CA.
Belo Medical Group, on the other hand, directly filed its Petition for
Review with this Court.
The CA dismissed Belo’s Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present controversy is intra-corporate.
RULING:
Belo Medical Group filed a case for interpleader, the proceedings of
which are covered by the Rules of Court. At its core, however, it is
an intra-corporate controversy.
To determine whether an intra-corporate dispute exists and whether
this case requires the application of the rules of procedure, this Court
evaluated the relationship of the parties. The types of intra-corporate
relationships were reviewed in Union Glass & Container Corporation
v. SEC:
[a] between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public;
[b] between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
[c] between the corporation, partnership or association and the state
in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned;
and
[d] among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.
For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exist
between the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-
corporate. This is known as the “relationship test.”
DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc. employed
what would later be called as the “nature of controversy test.”
In said case, this Court held that it was not just the relationship of the
parties that mattered but also the conflict between them.
This Court now uses both the relationship test and the nature of the
controversy test to determine if an intra-corporate controversy is
present.
Applying the relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and
Santos are named shareholders in Belo Medical Group’s Articles of
Incorporation and General Information Sheet for 2007.
The conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it involves two shareholders
although the ownership of stocks of one stockholder is questioned.
Applying the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra--
corporate dispute. In the interpleader case, Belo Medical Group
sought his disqualification from inspecting the corporate books based
on bad faith. Therefore, the controversy shifts from a mere question
of ownership over movable property to the exercise of a registered
stockholder’s proprietary right to inspect corporate books.
The circumstances of the case and the aims of the parties must not be
taken in isolation from one another.
As an intra-corporate dispute, Santos should not have been allowed
to file a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court should have continued on
with the case as an intra-corporate dispute considering that it called
for the judgments on the relationship between a corporation and its
two warring stockholders and the relationship of these two
stockholders with each other.
H. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (R-63)
1. Nature; Kinds (S-1)
Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803,
17 February 1998)
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership
under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this
Rule. (1a, R64)
6
2. Parties (S-2)
Section 2. Parties. — All persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties;
and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. (2a, R64)
3. Conversion into ordinary action (S-6)
Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. — If before the final
termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon
be converted into an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed
to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. (6a, R64)
Cases:
1.Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Ind., 542 SCRA
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA v. BATHALA
MARKETING INDUSTRIES, GR No. 150806, 2008-01-28
Facts:
Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries,
Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia,
renewed its Contract of Lease[4] with Ponciano L. Almeda
(Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of...
petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed
to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong
Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a
monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from
May 1,... 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental
rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the
property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be
increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by
authorities... on the lot and building where the leased premises are
located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes
due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion
hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present
assessment or tax on... said property should be reduced, LESSEE
shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in
proportion to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of
Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso
at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter,
respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter[7] dated December 29,
1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and
collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly... rentals. In
response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the
rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the
VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1,
1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect
On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from
petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be
increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and
Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners'
demand and insisted... that there was no extraordinary inflation to
warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement
of this Court in various cases.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as
demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount
set forth in their contract.
On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory
relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of
condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and
prejudice
The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent
the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a new tax that would
call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court,
likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in...
rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as
provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the
payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by
petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former
of the... amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that
in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights
and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to
the parties.
The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the
application of the decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC.
However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the
restitution of... its excess payment.
Issues:
1. whether the action for declaratory relief is proper; 2)
whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 7716; and 3) whether the amount of
rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason...
of extraordinary inflation or devaluation.
Ruling:
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the
instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already
in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
We do not agree.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the
months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and
conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals
stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to...
petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no
showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of
the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from
instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory... relief.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a
separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been
commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the
subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same
forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation[17] we held that the petition for declaratory relief should
be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for
unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same... ruling to
the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had
already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the
declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted
that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over... the action for
unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court
had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the
pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court,
7
where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the...
suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to
entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it,
notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before
the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write...
finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the
question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual
stipulations subject of this controversy.
Now, on the substantive law issues.
Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment
of VAT and for rental adjustment allegedly brought about by
extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial court and the
appellate court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason
to depart... from such findings.
As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite
with approval the ratiocination of the appellate court, viz.:
Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the
lessor who may choose to pass it on to the lessee or absorb the same.
Beginning January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in the ordinary
course of business, whether for commercial or residential... use,
when the gross annual receipts exceed P500,000.00, is subject to
10% VAT. Notwithstanding the mandatory payment of the 10%
VAT by the lessor, the actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the
lessee is clearly optional on the part of the lessor, under the terms of
the... statute. The word "may" in the statute, generally speaking,
denotes that it is directory in nature. It is generally permissive only
and operates to confer discretion. In this case, despite the
applicability of the rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as amended by
R.A. 7716, granting... the lessor the option to pass on to the lessee
the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1, 1996,
the original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-
appellee the 10% VAT nor provided for its additional imposition
when they renewed the contract of... lease in May 1997. More
significantly, said lessor did not actually collect a 10% VAT on the
monthly rental due from the lessee-appellee after the execution of the
May 1997 contract of lease. The inevitable implication is that the
lessor intended not to avail of the option... granted him by law to
shift the 10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x x.[19]
In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the
burden of paying the VAT.
Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise,
unavailing. This provision clearly states that respondent can only be
held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract
of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they... pertain to the lot
and the building where the leased premises are located. Considering
that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a
"new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth
stipulation.
Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment
because of extraordinary inflation or devaluation.
Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not
apply to this case because the contract stipulation speaks of
extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of
extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the doctrine
pronounced in Del
Rosario v. The Shell Company, Phils. Limited[20] should apply.
Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention
of the contracting parties, and such determination must take into
account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This
intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the...
contract.[21]
While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of
"extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as compared to Article
1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the
parties used the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to
depart from Article
1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the contract should, thus,
be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.
That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners'
letter[22] dated January 26, 1998, where, in demanding rental
adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made
explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even... quoting
the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not
warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article
1250 should be considered.
Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:
In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency
stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of
the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment,
unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit,
or both, without a corresponding increase in business transaction.
There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money
and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and...
continuing rise in the general price level.[23] In a number of cases,
this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes extraordinary
inflation, thus:
[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase
in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual
or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and
such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably... foreseen
or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the establishment of the obligation.[24]
The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make
out a case of extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify
the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to
stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past...
three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of
most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the
decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that
span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered
as... the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of
the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or
declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary
inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation
are not to... be applied. [25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
Principles:
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute,... and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.
Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as
no other... adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances. [15]
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory
relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
8
order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents
and... the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in
question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
5) the issue must... be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.[16]
2. De Borja vs. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na
Mangingisda ng L, M at V., 823 SCRA 550 (2017)
Petitioners de Borja and Tambuyong Devt Center seek to nullify the
previous Resolution and Decision of the CA which reversed the
RTC’s decision and dismissed the petition for declaratory relief filed
by De Borja and petition for intervention filed by TDC. De Borja, a
commercial fishing operator, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the RTC, asking the court to construe and declare his rights
under Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Code asked court to determine the
reckoning point of the 15km range of municipal waters De Borja
claimed that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15km
range affects his rights because he now exposed to apprehensions and
possible harassments that may be brought by conflicting
interpretations of the Fisheries Code. RTC granted De Borja’s
petition for declaratory relief Upon intervenors appeal, CA
REVERSED the RTC’s decision on the ground that the petition for
declaratory relief was: 1. premature 2. it did not meet the 2 requisites
of a petitioner for declaratory relief (Justiciable controversy and is
ripe for judicial determination 3. there was no actual case or
controversy regarding the definition of municipal water for
municipalities with offshore islands because the DA has yet to issue
guidelines with respect to these De Borja filed MR arguing that ROC
allows any interested person to bring an action for declaratory relief
for the construction of a statute aka Fisheries Code; while TDCI also
argued that the issue is of transcendental importance because it
involves the protection of small and marginal fisherfolk
CAROSENDO DE BORJA v. Pinalakas ng Ugnayan ng Maliliit na
Mangingisda FACTS: Petitioners de Borja and Tambuyong Devt
Center seek to nullify the previous Resolution and Decision of the
CA which reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the petition for
declaratory relief filed by De Borja and petition for intervention filed
by TDC. De Borja, a commercial fishing operator, filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC, asking the court to construe and
declare his rights under Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Code.
DENIED Petitioners filed their own petition for review which was
consolidated ISSUE: WON the declaratory relief should prosper- NO
RULING: - For a petition for declaratory reliefto prosper, it must be
shown that: a. there is a justiciable controversy b. the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse c. the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and d. the issue invoked
is ripe for judicial determination -De Borja’s petition lacks all 4
requisites 1. No justiciable controversy A justiciable controversy is a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of
law through the application of a law. It must be appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, admitting of specific relief through a
decree that is conclusive in asked court to determine the reckoning
point of the 15km range of municipal waters De Borja claimed that
the construction of the reckoning point of the 15km range affects his
rights because he now exposed to apprehensions and possible
harassments that may be brought by conflicting interpretations of the
Fisheries Code. RTC granted De Borja’s petition for declaratory
relief Upon intervenors appeal, CA REVERSED the RTC’s decision
on the ground that the petition for declaratory relief was: 1.
premature 2. it did not meet the 2 requisites of a petitioner for
declaratory relief (Justiciable controversy and is ripe for judicial
determination 3. there was no actual case or controversy regarding
the definition of municipal water for municipalities with offshore
islands because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to
these De Borja filed MR arguing that ROC allows any interested
person to bring an action for declaratory relief for the construction of
a statute aka Fisheries Code; while TDCI also argued that the issue is
of transcendental importance because it involves the protection of
small and marginal fisherfolk CAROSENDO DE BORJA v.
Pinalakas ng Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda FACTS:
Petitioners de Borja and Tambuyong Devt Center seek to nullify the
previous Resolution and Decision of the CA which reversed the
RTC’s decision and dismissed the petition for declaratory relief filed
by De Borja and petition for intervention filed by TDC. De Borja, a
commercial fishing operator, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the RTC, asking the court to construe and declare his rights
under Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Code
he went to conclude that the construction/interpretation of the 15km
range of municipal waters under the Fisheries code would affect his
right -there was no actual or imminent threat 2character. It must not
be conjectural or merely anticipatory, which only seeks for an
opinion that advises what the law would be on a hypothetical state of
facts. -In his petition, De Borja failed to provide factual allegations
showing that his legal rights were subject of an imminent or
threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief
& In other words, the question demands an agency action from the
DA -The record shows that no rule, regulation, or guidelines have
been issued by the DA to date, in coordination with BFAR, as
regards municipalities with offshore islands. There are serious gaps
in the implementation of the law which the DA and the concerned
agencies would still need to fill in. As it stands, therefore, there is no
agency action to speak of, much less a "final agency action" required
under the ripeness doctrine.3 No legal interest in controversy nor
adverse legal interest between him and others -De Borja failed to
establish his legal interest and that of the others were adverse
interests - He did not even implead any respondent and merely stated
that he was engaged in fishing operations in various fishing grounds
within the internal waters of the Philippines. -he simply made general
statements that there are varying interpretations of the reckoning
point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters under the 1998
Fisheries Code, without elaborating as to what these conflicting
interpretations of the law were 4. Not ripe for adjudication - 2 fold
aspect: a. Fitness of the issues for judicial decision- the issue
tendered is a purely legal one and that the regulation subject of the
case is a "final agency action b. the hardship to the parties entailed by
withholding court considerationmandates that the effects of the
regulation are felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties - The
question calling for the interpretation of the definition of municipal
waters for municipalities with offshore islands is not a purely legal
question because the given set of facts from which our interpretation
will be based are not yet complete
3. Malana vs. Tappa, 600 SCRA
4. Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more
than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
9
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It
is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a
representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress
should have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members
only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and
the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members
to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to
having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one
seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’
non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
5. Sabitsana vs.Muertegui, 703 SCRA (8/5/13)
SPOUSES SABITSANA VS MUERTEGUI G.R. No. 181359/5
August 2013J. DEL CASTILLOTopic: Declaratory ReliefDoctrine:
Declaratory relief is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation;
hence, RTC has jurisdiction. Facts: P Clemencio Sabitsana, lawyer,
was the counsel of Respondents. The dispute involved a parcel of
land bought by R Juanito by virtue of an not notarized deed of sale
from Garcia. Juanitos father and his brother Domingo, also R herein,
took actual possession of the land. Later on, Garcia sold the same
land to P, this time, through a notarized deed of sale. When Rs father
passed away, the heirs applied for the registration and coverage of
the lot under Public Land Act or CA No. 141. P opposed the
application, claiming as a true owner of the lot. Respondents filed for
quieting of title and preliminary injunction against Ps, Clemencio and
his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the land in bad faith and
are exercising possession and ownership of the same, which act thus
constitute cloud over the title. RTC and CA ruled in favour of Rs.
Issue: Whether RTC has jurisction over the declaratory relief.(Ps
contention: should be based on assessed value of the property; hence,
jurisdiction should only be first level court-No!)Decision: YES,
petition dismissed. The RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for
quieting of title.On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the
Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute.
Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,an action to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
appropriate RTC.Additional: Both the trial court and the CA are,
however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code. That
provision does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Act
No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.What applies in this
case is Act No. 3344,as amended, which provides for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344
expressly declares that any registration made shall be without
prejudice to a third party with a better right. The question to be
resolved therefore is: who between petitioners and respondent has a
better right to the disputed lot? Respondent has a better right to the
lot since P purchaser in bad faith.
6. Dept of Finance vs. De la Cruz, Jr., 768 SCRA 73
Department of Finance V. Dela Cruz, G.R.NO. 209331, August 24,
2015
Topic(s): Validity of administrative issuances, publication
Executive Order No. 140 was issued on 2 September 2013 creating
the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of
Finance. Section 3 of EO 140 provides that “CPRO shall be
composed of its organic personnel, as approved by DBM upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by
DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from
other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x.” Section 9
of EO 140 states that it shall “take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” EO 140
was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17
September 2013. On the same day of the publication of EO 140,
BOC Commissioner Biazon issued CPO 189-2013 detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI,
including respondents in this case, to CPRO “effective immediately
and valid until sooner revoked.” CPO 189-2013 was approved by
DOF Secretary Purisima.
Is CPO 189-2013 illegal and unconstitutional for having been
issued on the same day at EO No. 140 was issued?
NO. The Court already ruled that “interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published.” EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the
personnel of the DOF and the BOC. It remains valid even without
publication.
NOTE: The court found the CPO was invalidly issued because of its
failure to provide the period of respondent’s detail. It only provided
that the order “shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner
revoked,” making the detail of respondents indefinite. The court
ruled the CPO violated Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181.
7. Erice vs. Sison, 846 SCRA (2017)
 
EDGAR ERICE vs. PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO SISON,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407,November 22, 2017FACTS:
Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City filed a complaint
againstthen Mayor Echiverri and other city officials before the Office of the
Ombudsman. TheOmbudsman issued an Order of Preventive Suspension
against Echiverri, et. al. The CAaffirmed this Order of Suspension. Echiverri,
et al. Filed a Petition for Declaratory Reliefwith Prayer for TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injuction. RTC Executive Judge Kwongissued a 72-hour ex-
parte Order to enjoin the DILG and Erice from implementing theOrder of
Suspension. Without giving the OSG a chance to cross examine the
witnesspresented by Echiverri Respondent Judge Sison issued an Order
extending the TRO to20 days. This Compelled Erice to file an Urgent Motion
to Inhibit. Without ruling on theMotion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued and
10
Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.Thereafter, the OCA in
its Report dated November 4, 2014, the OCA recommended that:x x x
[R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
FINED inthe amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning
that a repetition of thesame or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The basis for the OCA'srecommendation, among others was Sison's act of
issuing a TRO and writ of preliminaryinjunction against Erice and the DILG
to enjoin the latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order
of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 6770,which provides:SEC. 14.
Restrictions.
 - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
primafacie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of theOffice of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal
or application for remedyagainst the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on purequestion of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Writ of Preliminary Injuction is Valid?
RULING:
No. In Carpio Morales,  the Court: (1) declared as unconstitutional Section
14(2)of RA 6770, and (2) declared as ineffective the policy in Section 14(1)
of RA 6770 against the issuance of a provisional injunctive writ by courts
other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. Notably,
the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases,
more so,  because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10,
2012 and proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17,
2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman Order of Suspension,
the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension  in its
Decision dated January 2, 2012
8. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Standard Insurance Co.
Inc., 885 SCRA 69, Nov. 7, 2018
I. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the COMELEC and
COA (R-64)
- The distinctive nature and procedure of this special
civil action
Case: Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs.
COMELEC 705 SCRA 340, September
10, 2013
J. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (R-65)
1. Certiorari (S-1)
a. grounds
b. requirements
c. procedure; parties and effects
Cases:
1. Ampil vs. Ombudsman, 703 SCRA, 7/31/13
2. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA, 1/28/14
3. Maglalang vs. PAGCOR, 712 SCRA, 12/11/13
4. People vs. Castaneda, 712 SCRA, 12/11/13
5. UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Teylan, 227 SCRA
6. Tuazon vs. RD of Caloocan, 157 SCRA
7. GSIS vs. CA, 867 SCRA (2018)
8. Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan SCRA, 868 SCRA (2018)
2. Prohibition (S-2)
 a. grounds
b. requirements
c. procedure; parties and effects
Cases:
1. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA 8/7/13
2. Corales vs. Republic, 703 SCRA, 8/27/13
3. Javier vs. Gonzales, 815 SCRA (2017)
4. Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service Commission,
819 SCRA 482 (2017)
3. Mandamus (S-3)
a. grounds
b. requisites
c. procedure; parties and effects
d. damages
Cases:
1. Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay, 581 SCRA 3/17/09
2. Sanchez vs. Lastimosa, 534 SCRA, 9/25/07
3. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 517 SCRA, 3/7/07
4. Laygo vs. Mun. Mayor of Solano, N.V., 814 SCRA (2017)
5. Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA, February 24, 2015
Cudia v. Philippine Military Academy, G.R.NO. 211362, February
24, 2015
Topic(s): Commission on Human Rights; administrative due
process; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Cadet 1CL Cudia is a student of the PMA. His 4th period class under
Dr. Costales was from 1:30-3:00pm while his 5th period class was
from 3:05-4:05pm. Prof. Beron of the 5th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia because he was late for 2
minutes in his 5th period class.
In Cudia’s defense he came directly from his 4th period class. They
were dismissed a bit late by the instructor. Major Hindang meted
Cudia the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Maj. Hindag
clarified with Cudai that the basis of the punishment was the result of
his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never
dismissed her class late and followed the protocol to dismiss the calss
10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled.
Cudia sought a reconsideration of his punishment and addressed his
request for reconsideration to Ma. Benjamin L. Leander asserting
that he was not in control of the circumstances on why he was late.
Maj. Leander asked Maj. Hindag to submit his reply. Maj. Hindag in
his reply that based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not
dismissed late. As a result, the penalty was sustained. Maj. Hindag
reported Cudia to the HC for Violation of the Honor Code on the
basis of lying where Cudia states that his 4th period class ended at
3:00 that made him late in the succeeding class.
Cudia clarified the matter with Dr. Costales. Costales said that when
Hindag had asked her on whether or not she dismissed the class late,
She and Hindag were not in the same time reference.
Cadet Cudia in his letter of explanation on the Honor Report averred
that his understanding of the “Class” covers not just a lecture in a
typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students and in their case,
some cadets were asked for queries and he was given instruction by
which were directly related to their class. Dr. Costales transaction
and communication with other classmates may have already ended
but his and Dr. Costales extended for a little bit.
The PMA Honor Committee found Cudia guilty for violating the
Honor Code. Cudia was placed on indefinite leave of absence
11
without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation by
the AFP barring him from future appointment and/or admission as
cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance
requirements to the PMA.
CRAB (Cadet Review and Appeals Board) reviewed the case of
Cudia. Pending review, Special order No.1 was issued directing all
PMA cadets to ostracize Cudia. Cudia and his family engaged the
services of the PAO. The CRAB Chariman informed Cudia that it
could not favourably consider his request for copies of the HC
minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of
the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate no the
authorized body to take action thereon.
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter complaint before the
CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC
members and Maj. Garcia for alleged violation of the human rights of
Cudia.
CRAB submitted a report to the AFP General Headquarters
upholding the dismissal of Cudia. The CHR-CAR came out with its
preliminary findings recommending that the PMA and the HC
pronounce Cudia as not guilty of the charge filed against him before
the Honor Committee, to restore Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a
full-fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate.
The AFP Chief of Staff affirmed CRAB’s denial of Cudia’s appeal.
AFP Headquarters resolved to deny the appeal for lack of merit.
THE CHR moved to conclude and recommend that there existed
probable cause for Human Rights Violations against the officers and
members of the PMA Honor Committee and certain PMA officials
for violations of the rights of Cudia to dignity, due process,
education, privacy of communication and good life. The CHR
recommended that authorities should investigate several PMA
officials.
The office of the president sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of
Staff and the CRAB. And that the initial recommendations of the
Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that
Cudia’s due process rights were violated.
Does the power of the Commission on Human Rights to
investigate include the power to adjudicate?
NO. The CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a
quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims on
the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication. The findings of facts and
the conclusions of law of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
are merely recommendatory and, therefore not binding to the
Supreme Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate
extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights.
Fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This 7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. unreasonable;

Did Guzman entirely do away with the due process requirements 8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
outlined in Ang Tibay? Is Cudia guaranteed the right to have his
counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the 9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in
participating fully in said hearings?
YES. Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong already settled the 10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially remedy; and
deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more
apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be 11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic intervention.
institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of
students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of
fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.
Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give
due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during
Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of
entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of
while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this
Service Commission, the Court held that “a party in an supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on failure
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, to exhaust administrative remedies.
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the
6. Villanueva vs. JBC, 755 SCRA 182
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with
counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.

Pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cudia’s appeal, should K. Quo Warranto (R-66)
the Court decline jurisdiction for non-exhaustion of 1. Parties (S-1 to 6)
administrative remedies? 2. Period (S-8)
NO. In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or 3. Limitation (S-11)
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been 4. Judgment for Cost (S-12)
exhausted. In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States, which was Read for class discussion: Republic vs. Sereno,
cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case May 11, 2018, 863 SCRA 1
involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must Cases:
exhaust his remedies within the military before appealing to the 1. Mendoza vs. Allas, 302 SCRA
court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance 2. Calleja vs. Panday, 483 SCRA.
between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial 3. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 621 SCRA
resources. 4. Aratea vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA
5. De Castro vs. Carlos, 696 SCRA, 4/16/13
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a 6. Velasco vs. Belmonte, 779 SCRA 81 (1/12/16)
party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following
is present:
L. Expropriation (R-67)
1. when there is a violation of due process; 1. The right of Eminent Domain
-Constitutional provision: “private property
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question; shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation”
- RA 7160: The Local Govt. Code, Sec. 19
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to 2. Who may expropriate
lack or excess of jurisdiction; 3. Two stages in expropriation
1. determination of public use
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency 2. just compensation
concerned; Cases:
1. City of Manila vs. Serrano, 359 SCRA
2. National Power Corp. vs. CA, 436 SCRA
5. when there is irreparable injury;
3. Republic vs. Andaya, 524 SCRA
4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an 5. Abad vs. Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA
alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of 6. NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Dev. Corp., 712 SCRA 550
the latter; 7. Limkaichong vs. LBP, 799 SCRA 139 (8/2/16)
8. LBP vs. Dalauta, 835 SCRA (2017)

12
 Cases:
M. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (R-68) 1. Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA
1. The Complaint (S-1) 2. Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., 429 SCRA 258
2. The Judgment (S-2) 3. Espanol vs. Formoso, 525 SCRA
3. Sale of foreclosed property (S-3) 4. Marantan vs. Diokno, 716 SCRA 164, 2/2014
- Equity of Redemption vs. Right of 5. Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club vs. Sanchez, 717 SCRA
Redemption 6. Tormis vs. Paredes, 749 SCRA 505, Feb. 4, 2015
4. Deficiency Judgment (S-6) 7. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA (2017)
Read the law on extra-judicial foreclosure: RA 8. Causing vs. De la Rosa, 857 SCRA (2017)
3135, 4118 9. Sps. Bayani & Myrna Partoza vs. Lilian Montano & Amelia
Cases: Solomon, 866 SCRA 35 (2018)
1. Ramirez vs. Manila Banking Corp., 712 SCRA, 12/2013
2. Marquez vs. Alindog, 714 SCRA, 1/2014
3. Ardiente vs. Provincial Sheriff, 436 SCRA III. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Rules 72 to 109)
4. LZK Holdings vs. Planters Dev. Bank, 714 SCRA, 1/2014
5. Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 693
SCRA, March 13, 2013 A. Settlement of Estate
6. Solid Builders vs. CBC, 695 SCRA (also on injunction) 1. Venue vs Jurisdiction (R-73)
7. Robles vs. Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75 2. Kinds of settlement
8. MBTC vs. CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc., 760 SCRA 59 a. Extrajudicial
9. Roldan vs. Barrios, 862 SCRA 318, April 23, 2018 (1) By Agreement
10. PDBank vs. Lubiya Agro Ind. Corp, 885 SCRA 470, Nov. 14, (2) By self-adjudication
2018 (Re: RA 3135) b. Judicial
(1) Summary (R-74)
(2) By Petition (R-75 to 90)
H. Partition (R-69) a. Intestate
1. The Complaint (S-1) b. Testate
2. The Order (S-2) (3) By partition (R-69)
3. Stages of Partition: 3. The Administrator or Executor
4. Rule of Commissioners (S-3 to 7) (a) Special vs Regular (R-80)
5. The Judgment (S-11) (b) Bonds (R-81)
Cases: (c) Powers and Duties (R-84)
1. Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA (d) Accountability (R-85)
2. Feliciano vs. Canosa, 629 SCRA 4. Claims Against the Estate (R-86)
3. Mangahas vs. Brobio, 634 SCRA 5. Actions by and against Executor and
4. Vda. De Figuracion vs. Figuracion-Gerilla, 690 SCRA Administrator (R-87)
5. Agarrado vs. Librando-Agarrado, 864 SCRA 582, June 6, 2018 6. Distribution and Partition (R-90)
I. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (R-70)
1. Parties (S-1) Cases:
2. Procedure: Summary (S-3 to 15) 1. San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA, February 2007
3. Judgment (S-17) 2. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, 702 SCRA, 7/31/13
4. Immediate Execution (S-19 vs S-21) 3. Agtarap vs. Agtarap, 651 SCRA, June 2011
- preliminary injunction (S-20) 4. Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 683 SCRA, October 2012
5. Appeals 5. Lee vs. RTC of Q.C., 423 SCRA, February 2004
6. Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz, 252 SCRA, January 1996
7. Unionbank vs. Santibanez, 452 SCRA, February 2005 (R-86)
Cases: 8. Heirs of Maglasang vs. MBC, 706 SCRA 235
1. Prov. of Cam. Sur vs. Bodega Glassware, 821 SCRA (2017) 9. Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Briones, 514 SCRA, February 2007
2. Santiago vs. Northbay Knitting, Inc., 842 SCRA (2017) 10. Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA, June 2013
3. Regalado vs. De la Rama vda. De dela Pena, 848 SCRA (2017) 11. Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA
4. Ferrer vs. Rabaca, 632 SCRA 12. Silverio Sr. vs. Silverio Jr., 733 SCRA 183, (8/13/14)
5. CGR Corp. vs. Treyes, 522 SCRA 765 13. Butiong vs. Plazo, 765 SCRA 227
6. Zacarias vs. Anacay, 736 SCRA 508, 9/24/14
7. Supapo vs. De Jesus, 756 SCRA 211, 4/20/15
9. De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Estomo, 862 SCRA (2018)
10. Iglesia de Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Phil. Inc. Vs. B. Escheats (R-91)
De la Cruz, 862 SCRA (2018) 1. Definition
11.Emma Buenviaje Nabo v. Felix C. Buenviaje G.R. No. 224906, 2. Historical background and legal basis
Oct. 7, 2020 (On tolerance) 3. Actions for Revisions (S-5)
Cases:
J. Contempt (R-71) 1. Alvarico vs Sola, 382 SCRA
1. Kinds: direct (S-1); indirect (S-3) 2. Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, 770 SCRA 397
2. Procedure (S-4 to 9) 3. Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc. 831 SCRA 319, July 2017
3. Judgment and Review (S-11) 4. Republic vs. Heirs of Menardo Cabrera, 884 SCRA (2017)

13
 C. Guardians and Guardianship (R-92 to 97) as amended
by
A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, May 1, 2003
1. Venue vs Jurisdiction (S-92)
2. Appointment, kinds, Qualifications (S-93)
3. Requirement (S-94)
4. Power and Duties (S-96)
5. Termination (S-97)
Cases:
1. Goyena vs. Ledesma Gustilo, Jan. 13, 2003
2. Caniza vs. CA, Feb. 24, 1997
3. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 683 SCRA
4. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, 671 SCRA (4/2012)
5. Abad vs. Biazon, 687 SCRA (12/2012)
D. Trustees (R-98)
1. Parties
2. Kinds/Classes
Cases:
1. Advent Capital and Finance Corp. vs. Alcantara, 664 SCRA
2. Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Perez, 672 SCRA
E. Adoption and Custody of Minors (R-99-100)
1. The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA
8552)
2. Inter Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA
8043)
3. Rule of Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
dated July 31, 2002, effective Aug. 22,
2002)
a. Who may adopt (S-4)
b. Who may be adopted ( S-5)
c. Venue and Jurisdiction S.20)
Cases:
1. Cang vs CA – 296 SCRA 128
2. Vda de Jacob vs CA – 312 SCRA 772
3. Republic of the Phil. Vs Hon. Jose R. Hernandez- 253 SCRA
509
4. Republic vs CA – 255 SCRA 99
5. Reyes vs. Mauricio, 636 SCRA
6. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia, 454 SCRA
7. Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim, 588 SCRA 98
(2007)
8. Nery vs. Sampana, 734 SCRA
9. Castro vs. Gregorio, 738 SCRA
10. Bartolome vs. SSS, 740 SCRA
11. Re: Adoption of Karen Herico Licerio, 886 SCRA 318, Nov. 21,
2018
- On immutability of judgments; exceptions
F. Habeas Corpuz (R-102)
4. Definition and Nature or Scope (S-1)
5. Requisites for Application (S-3)
6. Disallowance or Discharge of Writ (S-4)
7. Preliminary citation vs writ (S-6)
8. The return: when evidence; when plea (S-
10,12,13)
14
Cases:
1. Ilusorio vs Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
2. Serapio vs Sandiganbayan- 396 SCRA 443
3. Lacson vs. Perez, 357 SCRA 756
4. Sangca vs. City Prosecutor of Cebu, 524 SCRA 610
5. Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355
6. Tujan-Militante vs. Cada-Deapera, July 28, 2014
7. Datukan Malang Salibo vs. The Warden, 755 SCRA 296
8. Padilla vs. Congress of the Phil., 832 SCRA (July 2017)
-0n suspension of privilege during martial law
9. Osorio vs. Navera, 856 SCRA 435, February 267, 2018
Change of Name vs. Correction/Cancellation of Entries, as amended
R.A. 9048 and 10172 (Rule 103 vs. Rule 108)
6. Venue vs Jurisdiction
7. Contents of Petition/Grounds
8. Hearing
9. Judgment
10. R.A. 9048 and its Implementing Rules
Cases:
1. Eleosida vs Civil Registrar of Q.C. – May 9, 2002
2. Republic vs. Kho – 526 SCRA
3. Petition for Change on Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang –
454 SCRA
4. Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ. – 607 SCRA (2009)
5. Republic vs. Silverio – 537 SCRA
6. Republic vs. Cagandahan –565 SCRA
7. Republic vs. Uy – 703 SCRA (August 12, 2013)
8. Minoru Fujiki vs. Marinay, June 26, 2013
9. People vs, Merlinda Olaybar, February 10, 2014
10. Onde vs. CR of Las Pinas, 734 SCRA, Sept. 2014
11. Almojuela vs. Republic, 801 SCRA 399
12. Gan vs. Republic, 803 SCRA 204
13. Chua vs. Republic, 845 SCRA 407, Nov. 2017
I. Prerogative Writs
A. Writ of Amparo
Cases:
1. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA
2. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Asso., 554 SCRA
3. Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA
4. Razon vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA
5. Roxas vs. GMA, 630 SCRA
6. Burgos vs. Esperon, 715 SCRA, February 2014
7. Republic vs. Cayanan, 844 SCRA 183 (2017)
8. Gadian vs. Librado, 841 SCRA (2017)
- Amparo Writ is both preventive and curative
9. Lucena vs. Ilago, G.R. No. 252120, Sept. 15, 2020
B. Writ of Habeas Data
Cases:
1. Caram vs. Segui, August 5, 2014
2. Vivares et Al. vs. St. Therese College, Sept. 29, 2014
3. Meralco vs. Lim, 632 SCRA
4. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59
 C. Writ of Kalikasan
Cases:
1. Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA (continuing Mandamus).
2. Paje vs. Casino, 749 SCRA 39 (Writ of Kalikasan)
3. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102
4. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait
vs. Angelo Reyes et Al., 756 SCRA 513, April 21, 2015
5. West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind. Corp., 758 SCRA
6. Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission, 819 SCRA 543March 7,
2017
4. Maquiling vs. COMELEC, 700 SCRA - admissibility of foreign
laws/official records
5. People vs. Baharan, 639 SCRA - admissibility of extrajudicial
confession/plea of guilty
6. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 662 SCRA - exception to
admissibility of testimonies in other cases
7. Ligtas vs. People, 767 SCRA 1 - admissibility of decisions and
records in other cases
8. Juan vs. Juan, 837 SCRA, Aug. 24, 2017 - website article is not of
judicial notice
Amended Sections 1, 3 and 4 by inserting certain words *

IV. E V I D E N C E (Rules 128-133) C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

(As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC effective May 1, (Rule 130, Sections 1-54)
2020)*
1. Object/Real Evidence (Section 1)
Cases:
1. Salas vs. Matusalem, 705 SCRA -how to establish paternity and
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION filiation
(Rule 128, Sections 1-4: General Provisions) 2. People vs. Mercury de la Curz, 802 SCRA, Sept. 7, 2016
3. People vs. Manuel De la Rosa, Dec. 13, 2017
1. Definition/Meaning and Scope of E. 4. People vs. Lazaro, 886 SCRA,Nov. 21, 2018
2. Kinds and Classifications of E. 5. People vs. Emmanuel Oliva, January 7, 2019 - on chain of custody
3. Axioms of Admissibility rule
a. Relevancy 6. People vs. John Orcullo y Susa, July 8, 2019
b. Competency
c. Authenticity
d. Offer
4. Kinds of admissibility 2. Documentary Evidence (Sections 2-10)
a. conditional Cases:
b. multiple 1. St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Const. Corp. 847 SCRA
c. curative 2. People vs. Vibar, 858 SCRA - on admissibility of private
documents
Cases:
1.Ong Chia vs. Republic, 328 SCRA - on naturalization a. The Best Evidence Rule, NOW Original
2. Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA - on privacy of communication & Document Rule
correspondence
3. People vs. Yatar, 428 SCRA - on the right against self- Cases:
incrimination (DNA) 1. MCMP Const. vs. Monark, Nove. 10, 2014
4. Tating vs. Marcella, 519 SCRA - on admissibility, weight and 2. Loon vs. Power Master, Inc., 712 SCRA
sufficiency of evidence 3. Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA
5. People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA - - multiple admissibility 4. Republic vs. Mupas, 769 SCRA
6. SCC Chemicals Corp. vs. CA, 353 SCRA - curative admissibility 5. Robinol vs. Bassig, 845 SCRA
(hearsay evidence admissible when not objected)
b. Secondary Evidence
Sec. 3 inserted the words “the Constitution” *
c. Parole Evidence
Cases:
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED 1. Leoveras vs. Valdez, 652 SCRA
(Rule 129, Sections 1-4)) 2. Paras vs. Kimwa Const., 755 SCRA
3. PNB vs. Pasimio, 769 SCRA
4. Mancol vs. DBP, 846 SCRA
1. Judicial Notice Amendments are found in Sections 2, 3, 3(b), 3(c), 4 (a)(b)(c), 7 {9
a. mandatory and discretionary is now 10}
b. when to take judicial notice
2. Judicial Admissions
a. when is there judicial admissions d. Electronic Evidence
Cases: - A.M. 01-7-01-SC, Rules on Electronic
1. LBP vs. Banal, 434 SCRA - contents of the records of other cases Evidence
2. People vs. Kulais, 292 SCRA - of testimonies in other cases - R.A. 8792, E-Commerce Law
3. Laureano vs. CA, 324 SCRA - admissibility of foreign laws Cases:
1.Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 408 SCRA
2.Torres vs. PAGCOR, 661 SCRA
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3. Ang vs. Republic,618 SCRA - by conspirators (S-31)
4. People vs. Enojas - by privies (S-32)
5. Syhunliong vs. Rivera, June 4, 2014 - by silence (S-33)
6. Bartolome vs. Maranan, 740 SCRA Cases:
7. BBB vs. AAA, 750 SCRA 1. Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr. 706 SCRA
8. Astorga & Repol Law Offices vs. Villanueva, 751 SCRA 2. Cambe vs. Ombudsman, 812 SCRA Dec. 6, 2016
3. 3. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, 830
Section 4 of Rule 130 incorporated Electronic Evidence rule SCRA
Sections 11-20 remain: Interpretation of Documents
e. Offer of Compromise (Section 28)
3. Testimonial Evidence (Sections 21-54)
f. Confessions (Section 34)
a. Qualifications: “one who can perceive and perceiving - judicial vs. extra-judicial
can Cases:
make known his 1. People vs. Dacanay, 807 SCRA, (2016)
perception” 2. People vs. Opiniano, 832 (2017)
i. ability to observe/perceive 3. Cruz vs. People, 846 SCRA
ii. ability to recall/remember
iii. ability to relate/communicate g. Previous Conduct (Section 35)
Cases:
b. Disqualifications: 1. People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715
Case: Marcos vs. Heirs of Andres Navarro, 700 SCRA 2. People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339
Note: mental incapacity or immaturity in Section 3. RP vs. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., 393 SCRA 361
21 has been deleted. Is it no longer a
disqualification? h. Hearsay Evidence Rule (Sections 37-49)
Case: People vs. Golimlim, 427 SCRA Cases: Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA
People vs. Golidan, 850 SCRA 579, Jan.2018 People vs. Aguirre, 845 (independently
i. marital disqualification (Sec. 23) relevant statement)
Cases: i. Exceptions:
1. Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA. i. Dying Declaration: Pp vs. Calinawan, 817 SCRA 424
2. People vs. Castaneda, 88 SCRA ii. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind
iii. Declaration against interest: Pp vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA
ii. privileged communication (Sec. 24) iv Declaration about pedigree: Tizon vs. CA, 276 SCRA
Cases: v. Family Reputation or tradition: Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA
1. Chan vs. vi. Common reputation
Chan, 702 SCRA vii. Res gestae: Pp vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA;Pp vs.
2. Lacurom vs. Mercado, 883 SCRA, Oct. 2018
Jacoba, 484 SCRA viii. Records of regularly conducted business activity
3. Samala vs. (formerly, entries in the course
Valencia, 514 SCRA of business)
4. Almonte vs. Phil. Airlines vs Ramos, 207
Vasquez, 244 SCRA SCRA 461
5. Syhunliong ix. Entries in Official Records: Pp vs. Corpuz, 856 SCRA
vs. Rivera,725 SCRA 610; Sabili vs. COMELEC, 670 SCRA; Cercado-Siga, 752 SCRA
x. Commercial lists: Meralco vs. Quisumbing, 336 SCRA
iii. death or insanity/dead man’s statute xi. Learned treatises
(Section 39) xii. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding: Pp
Cases: vs. Ortiz-Miyako, 279 SCRA; Go vs. People, 677 SCRA
1. Razon vs. CA, 207 SCRA xiii. Child Witness Rule: People vs. Ibanez, 706 SCRA
2. Sunga-Chan vs. Chua, 363 SCRA People vs. Esugon, 759
3. Bordalba vs. CA, 374 SCRA xiv. Residual exception (Section 50)

Discuss Executive Privilege under the doctrines laid down in Senate j. Opinion Rule Sections 51-53)
of the Philippines vs. Ermita (488 SCRA) and Neri vs. Senate i. Expert Witness: Lavarez vs. Guevarra,
Committees (435 SCRA) 822 SCRA 130
Avelino vs.
c. Testimonial Privilege People, 701 SCRA
i. Parental and filial privilege ii. Ordinary Witness: Pp vs. Duranan, 349
(Section 25) SCRA
ii. Privilege relating to trade secrets (Section 26)
k. Character Evidence (Section 54)
d. Admission of a Party (Section 27) People vs. Deopita, 436 SCRA 794
- by third parties (S-29)
- by partners (S-30)

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 Investment Corporation vs. Francia, Jr.,
D. BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF EVIDENCE AND 661 SCRA
PRESUMPTIONS
(Rule 131, Sections 1-6) (What is the Apostille Convention?)

1. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence 3. Offer and Objection (Sections 34-40)
Case: FEBTC vs. Chante, 707 SCRA -Tender of Excluded Evidence
Fortune Tabacco Corp. vs. Com of Int.
2. Presumptions Rev.,761 SCRA 173
a. Conclusive presumptions Amoquis vs. Ballado, 878 SCRA, Aug. 20, 2018
i. Ibaan Rural bank vs. CA, 321 SCRA
ii. Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an, 401 SCRA
iii. University of Mindanao vs. PSP, 778 SCRA (1/11/16) F. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
b. Disputable presumptions (Rule 133, Sections 1-8)
i. Rosaroso vs. Soria, 699 SCRA
ii. Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Canada, 712 SCRA
iii.Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA The Hierarchy of Evidence:
iv. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43
Overwhelming Evidence
- suppression of testimony: People vs. Padrigone, 382 SCRA
Metrobank vs. CA, 333 SCRA i. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. “
- official duty: De los Santos vs. COA, 703 SCRA; Pp vs. That degree of proof which produces
Barte, 819 SCRA conviction in an unprejudiced mind”
People vs. Candidia, 707 SCRA 1. People vs. Caliso – 659 SCRA
- cohabitation: People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 2. People vs. Patentes – 716 SCRA
3. People vs. Arcenal – 821 SCRA 549
- survivorship; absence 4. People vs. Alboka – 856 SCRA 252

3. Legitimacy or Illegitimacy (Section 4) ii. Clear and Convincing

1.Supreme Court vs. Delgado – 658 SCRA
2.Govt of Hongkong Special Adm. Region Vs. Olalia, Jr. – 521 SCRA
4. Presumptions in civil actions/criminal actions (Sections 5 & 3. People vs. Fontanilla – 664 SCRA
6) 4. People vs. Cabiles, 827 SCRA

iv. Preponderance of Evidence

E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
(Rule 132, Sections 1-40) 1. PCIB vs. Balmaceda – 658 SCRA
2. De la Llana vs. Biong – 711 SCRA
1. Examination of Witnesses (Sections 1-18) 3..Canlao vs. People – 659 SCRA (equipoise doctrine)
- Order of Presentation of Evidence. People vs Fabre, 385
SCRA v. Substantial Evidence
- Leading and Misleading Questions. People vs.
Perez, 397 SCRA
- Impeachment. People vs. Castellano, 400 SCRA 1. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Reyes – 658 SCRA
- Reference to Memorandum 2. Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank – 711 SCRA
- Present Memory Revived, People
vs. Plasencia, 249 SCRA vi. Prima facie evidence
- Past Recollection Recorded, Canque vs. CA, 305 SCRA
1. Lucas vs. Lucas – 650 SCRA
Note: Former Section 14 transposed to Section 54 of 130 2. Estate of Marcos vs. Republic – 814 SCRA 600
3. Marcos vs. Cabrera-Faller – 815 SCRA 285
2. Authentication and Proof of Documents (Sections 19-
33) vii. Probable Cause
- Classes of Documents
- Public Documents 1. PNB vs. Tria - 671 SCRA
Cases: 1. Iwasawa vs. Gangan, 705 2. Del Castillo vs. People – 664 SCRA
SCRA
2. Asian Terminals vs. Philam
Insurance, 702 SCRA viii. Iota of Evidence (circumstantial)
- Private Documents 1. People vs. Anticamara – 651 SCRA
- Offer of Evidence. Aludos vs. Suerte, 673 2. People vs. Deocampo 666 SCRA
SCRA; Westmont 3. Celedonio vs. People, 761 SCRA 363
4. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCRA 525

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By: Henedino M. Brondial, Sr.
Chair, Remedial Law Department
Arellano University School of Law

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