Conclusion 237

C onclusion
perspective well and simply set forth in the Fed eralist
236 . the war sentiment of others. In
Papers, especially in those written by Hamilton and Jay.
the peace w1sh of some, h af ter the Second
World
the U mte . d States and elsewf ere . pal1·cy debate was What would happen, Jay asks, if the thirteen states,
War, a muted th of ore1gn- the . quickly before instead of combining as one state, should form themselves
d the
ee bomb
necessity of prevenu e wafr- ropwar has time to make into severa! confederations? He answers:
one
the . ly opponent m a uture more states equipped . h Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all appre
hke . o or w1t
of his own. Even w1th tw
systems a ntary shift in the balance hension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would sóon ex
similar weapon
mome '. advantage tinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each
·1
.
. . ·1· temporan y confederation, instead of the general interests of all America, would
dec1s1ve m1 ltary moment in order to be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
of terror, g1vmg a
to one state, may te . . the
m pt 1t to se1ze t t1·on would be bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes
propor- .
escape
ear. from f And the temp a mutual f ear of and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.9
h f r
. F. b1g
tionate to t e ea ltself 11Y• eace a spate of smaller
ma International anarchy, Jay is here saying, is the explana
. . d f
weapons may produce, mstea o p ' tion for international war. But not international anarchy
wars. · f the danger of destroy- alone. Hamil ton adds that to presume a lack of hostile
The fear of modern weaponlsd, º. not sufficient to motives among states is to forget that men are "ambitious,
estab-
ing the . - 1· · of the wor ''d d in our discuss1ons
. of vindictive, and rapacious ." A monarchical state may go
lS civ1 lzauons
.fi
. . f peace 1 enu
. el relations. One can to war because the vanity of its king leads him to seek
lish the con d ltions o .
. .
the three lmages of mternauona glory in military victory; a republic may go to war because
.f the peace wish ex1sts
1y 1 . .
equate fear w1t . h w orld peace on pohc1es. d 1·n their of the folly of its assembly or because of its commercial
. ·f mly expresse .
in all states and lS _um or oal of few men or states. If it interests. That the king may be vain, the assembly foolish,
But peace is. the pnmary g . le state that state
were the .
oal of even a smg ' . or thetable.
inevi commercial interests
However, irreconcilable:
so many none
and so varied are of
thethese is
causes
pnmary g t any . ly by surrendermg.
could have peace a ume-s1mp "Peace can be a of war among states that "to look for a continuation of
F D Hes so often warns, " cover whereby evil mn P p t be· Who shall gain
a
But, as John • oste: u er etrate diabolical wrongs..
harmony between a number of independent, wciuld be to disre
unconnected .
The issue sovereigns· d inpute
the may
samenoneighborhood,
· dominate the gard the uniform course of human events, and to set at
m a g1ve lS . '\Th shall
.? I ay mstead be . " n
from l t t m h 0 best course eve defiance the accumulated experience of the ages." 1
º
f
o
world? In such cirumsltancesd, ftinee· their ability Jay and Hamilton found in the history of the Western
always
f
reasonable men · d1fficu t to e •
·mpossible state system confirmation for the conclusion that among
lS . orce, to assume.
. l .
to contnve so three images is separate sovereign states there is constant possibility of
. w1thout f 1the
uuons ly
.
If soluuons .
m ms of none o n can work on war. The third image, as constructed in Chapter VI, gives
. ter then reaso . the
presently- 1f passible . sted by view1ng a theoretical basis for the same conclusion. It reveals why,
ever-
'
. h. the framework that lS sugge . f h third, a
w1t m . . ·h erspecuve o t e 9 The Federalist, pp. 23-24 (No. 5).
first and second lmages m t e p . 11 1955). lo !bid., pp. 27-28 (No. 6); cf. p. 18 (No. 4, Jay), and pp. M-40 (No. 7,
ddress on Peace" (Washington, Apnl • liamilton).
s "Excerpts from Dulles. A 6
in New York Times, Apnl 12, 1955, p. .
238 Conclusion
in the absence of tremendous changes in the factors in
cluded in the first and second images, war will be perpet
ually associated with the existence of separate sovereign
states. The obvious conclusion of a third-image analysis is
that world government is the remedy for world war. The
remedy, though it may be unassailable in logic, is unat
tainable in practice. The third image may provide a uto pian
approach to world politics. lt may also provide a realistic
approach, and one that avoids the tendency of sorne realists
to attribute the necessary amorality , or even immorality, of
world politics to the inherently bad character of man. If
everyone's strategy depends upon everyone else's, then the
Hitlers determine in part the action, or better, reaction, of
those whose ends are worthy and whose means are
fastidious. No matter how good their intentions, policy
makers must bear in mind the implications of the third
image, which can be stated in summary forro as follows:
Each state pursues its own in terests, however defined, in
ways it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the
externa! ends of states because there exists no consistent,
reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that
inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of
anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image of
international relations is neither moral nor immoral, but
embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us.
The third image describes the framework of world politics,
but without the first and second images there can be no
knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and
second images describe the forces in world politics, but
without the third image it is im possible to assess their
importance or predict their results.