PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 1
PROBLEMS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
Atty: Jose Glenn C. Capanas
EH 406 3rd year 2nd sem S.Y. 2020-2021
Module 6
Duties of a Lawyer (Part 3)
Specific Areas
Observance of law and compliance with court’s
order or process
RULE 138 SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension DGCVWC
1. Deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office;
2. Grossly immoral conduct;
3. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
4. Violation of the Oath;
5. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court
Ignoring a directive of a Court constitutes willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the Court and constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Dimayuga v. Rubia
A Court’s Resolution or Order is not to be construed as
a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively.
6. Corruptly or Willfully appearing as an attorney
without authority.
Ramos v. Ngaseo
This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio
A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by
demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos,
the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated
property, as payment for his appearance fees.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are
prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment
the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.
The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not
only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial
sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence
and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the
expense of his client. However, the said prohibition
applies only if the sale or assignment of the property
takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client's property. Consequently, where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the
illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer
of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in
favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v. Lopez,
respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and
suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he
registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the
transfer of title over the part of the estate despite pendency
of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject
property. In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia
v. Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio
Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law
when he purchased his client's property which was still the
subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the
property in litigation since the respondent only made a
written demand for its delivery which the complainant
refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not
a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article
1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for
delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the
purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January
29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No.
SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
-REPRIMANDED
ARTICLE 1491 NCC. The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
XXX
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State
or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of
which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply
to judges and government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession;
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. XXX

Elements of Art. 1491
1. There must be an attorney-client relationship
2. The property or interest of the client must be in
litigation
3. The attorney takes part as counsel in the case
4. The attorney by himself or through another purchases
such property or interest during the pendency of the
litigation.
General Rule
A lawyer may not purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, in person or through the mediation of another,
any property or interest involved in any litigation in which
he may take part by virtue of his profession. This
prohibition is entirely independent of fraud and such need
not be alleged or proven.
Exceptions
1. Property is acquired by the lawyer through a
contingent fee agreement.
2. One of the elements is missing.
• This prohibition only applies if the sale/assignment of the
said property takes place DURING THE PENDENCY of
the litigation involving the client’s property.
• When there is a matter pending in relation to the
property, remember that it is now subject to litigation.
• Art. 1491 extends even to the lawyer’s family members
due to the clause, “through the mediation of another”.
• Art. 1491 also applies to legal redemption as stated Art.
1492 and leases in Art. 1646.
Art. 1492. The prohibitions in the two proceeding
articles are applicable to sales in legal redemption,
compromises, and renunciations.
Art. 1646. The persons disqualified to buy referred to
in Articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to
become lessees of the things mentioned herein.
Umale v. Villamor
The contention lacks merit.
The cases cited by petitioner involved the prohibited
acquisition by a lawyer of his client's property that was the
object of the litigation in which the lawyer represented his
client. However, in this case, the property occupied by MC
Home Depot is registered under Mid-Pasig, and the records
show that the litigation over the property was between
Rockland Construction Company, Inc. and Mid-Pasig.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent's case is within the
ambit or is violative of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan
Facts:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos
(Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent Atty. Jaime
S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty. Linsangan acted as
counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which
involving the recovery of a parcel of land located in Alabang,
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 2
Muntinlupa City. Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan
forced them to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel
of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots with
complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of
income taxes when he divided his share in the subject
property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and
children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Linsangan violated the Lawyer’s Oath
Held: YES.
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that
while the cases involving the subject property were still
pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan
entered into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan
wherein his attorney's fees shall be that equivalent to 50% of
the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that may be
recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he
apportioned upon himself, and to his wife and children, half
of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan,
through a Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly,
such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered
into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently
with the pendency of several cases before the CA and this
Court involving the very same property. What is more, Atty.
Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be charged of
having undue interest over his client's property in litigation,
caused another lawyer to appear but all the while making it
absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was
nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and
supervision."
Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491
(5) of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by
purchase or assignment, the property that has been the
subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of
their profession.
Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491
(5) of the Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.
While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above
proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is not made
during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's
property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the
case handled by the lawyer, such is not applicable to the
instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to Atty. Linsangan was
made while the subject property was still under litigation, or
at least concurrently with the pendency of the certiorari
proceedings in the CA and the petitions for review in this
Court.
-SUSPENDED for 6 months
Willful disobedience of any lawful order
CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 v. Santamaria, A.C. No. 11173
(Resolution)
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five
Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely
contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to
comply with the CA resolutions, respondent displayed not
only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack of
respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent ought to
know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for

that matter, is not a mere request that may be complied
with partially or selectively.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court. In particular, Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." In addition, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides that a
"lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others."
Dimayuga v. Rubia
Preliminarily, We shall address respondent's apathetic
attitude towards this case, to which this Court has been very
tolerant. We have given respondent several opportunities to
file her comment and explain her side on the accusations
against her since 2011 but, up to present, respondent has yet
to file the required comment. This Court cannot, anymore,
accept respondent's excuses for such defiance, i.e., trauma,
stress, and life-threatening situations, considering that she
was able to file pleadings stating such explanation but still
failed to file the required comment. Nothing can be concluded
therefrom but that respondent's acts or inaction for that
matter, were deliberate and manipulating, which
unreasonably delay this Court's action on the case. These
acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which, not only works against her case as she is now
deemed to have waived the filing of her comment, but more
importantly is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment pursuant to Section 27, 25 Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Such attitude constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. "A Court's Resolution is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied
with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, the Court, considered the failure
to comply with the court's order, resolution, or directive as
constitutive of gross misconduct and insubordination.
Proceeding to the merits of the Complaint, We find that the
allegations of delay in the performance of duty and
misappropriation of funds were not sufficiently substantiated.
"In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Corollary to this is the established rule
that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for
mere allegation is not evidence. "The complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
the complaint."
In this case, complainant alleged that she and her family gave
respondent P150,000 on June 17, 2002, inclusive of
respondent's attorneys fees and the legal fees necessary for
the transfer of the property. Despite that, respondent did not
pay the transfer tax and donor's tax until 2007. However,
there is nothing on the records, except for complainant's bare
allegation, which proves that such amount was indeed given
to respondent on the claimed date. Hence, We cannot
judiciously rule on the alleged delay and misappropriation
without relying upon assumptions, surmises, and
conjectures.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 3
What is apparent in the Complaint, however, is the fact that
respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale, covering
a parcel of land, which was evidently prohibited to be sold,
transferred, or conveyed under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
Time and again, We have held that a lawyer's conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. CANON 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws, and promote respect for law and legal
processes. Also, Rule 15.07 thereof mandates a lawyer to
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
principles of fairness.
Indeed, in preparing and notarizing a deed of sale within
the prohibited period to sell the subject property under
the law, respondent assisted, if not led, the contracting
parties, who relied on her knowledge of the law being
their lawyer, to an act constitutive of a blatant disregard
for or defiance of the law.
Moreover, respondent likewise displayed lack of respect and
made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment as her act of notarizing such illegal
document entitled it full faith and credit upon its face, when it
obviously does not deserve such entitlement, considering its
illegality due to the prohibition above-cited.
SUSPENDED for 3 years, DISQUALIFIED as notary for 3
years
Dumlao, Jr. v. Camacho
In this case, the infractions committed by respondent are
influence peddling, attempted bribery, threatening court
officers and disrespecting court processes. These
offenses are different from that of his previous administrative
case that caused his disbarment. There is no monetary
penalty that could be imposed against respondent because
he has no unpaid debt or misappropriated funds. Verily, a fine
or an order to pay a monetary obligation cannot be imposed
upon him. Thus, the Court finds that, as respondent was
previously disbarred, it is proper to give the corresponding
penalty of suspension for two (2) years from the practice of
law for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file in
the OBC.
In the event that respondent should apply for the lifting of his
disbarment in Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, the penalty in the
present case should be considered in the resolution of the
same.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Manuel N. Camacho
GUILTY of violating Canons 10, 11, 13, 19 and Rules 10.01,
11.03, 13.01 and 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
However, considering that he has already been previously
disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed. In the event
that he should apply for the lifting of his disbarment in Sison,
Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, the penalty imposed in the present case
should be considered in the resolution of the same.
Turla v. Caringal
Prior to its amendment on January 14, 2014, BM No. 1922
imposed a stiff penalty for a practicing lawyer's failure to

indicate the details of his/her MCLE Compliance/Exemption
in the pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, i.e., the dismissal of the case and expunction of the
pleadings from the records, which, in effect, ultimately
penalized said lawyer's clients, too. Atty. Caringal, in this
case, not only failed to indicate the necessary MCLE
details in his pleadings and motions, but purposely
stated therein the false information that he was
exempted from MCLE II and III. As he had filed the subject
pleadings in 2010, prior to the amendment of BM No. 1922
on January 14, 2014, he risked the dismissal of the cases and
expunction of the pleadings and motions by the courts, to his
clients' detriment. In fact, as Turla mentioned, the pleadings
which Atty. Caringal filed before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 09-269, were indeed expunged
from the records per the Order 29 dated March 4, 2013
because of the false MCLE information he indicated therein.
Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn
oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood" as well as the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in
the pleadings and motions he filed, although in fact he was
not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also
disrespectful of the courts. He undoubtedly placed his clients
at risk, given that pleadings with such false information
produce no legal effect and can result in the expunction of the
same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his
clients and actually violated his duty to serve his clients with
competence and diligence.
The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."
Considering Atty. Caringal's willful statement of false MCLE
details in his pleadings to the prejudice of his clients,
aggravated by his lack of diligence in fully and promptly
complying with the MCLE requirements within the compliance
period, and his seemingly defiant and unremorseful attitude,
the Court deems it apt to adopt the recommendations of both
the IBP Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon
Atty. Caringal the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for three years.
Zafra III v. Pagatpatan
The more pressing issue to be tackled in this case is the
fact that Atty. Pagatpatan has been practicing law
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 4
despite the issuance of a suspension order by this Court
on June 15, 2005. There were no records showing that
he served said suspension or moved to lift said order
because Atty. Pagatpatan, himself, admits that he
continued practicing the legal profession notwithstanding
said order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefore. — A
member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
Ours)
On record, Atty. Pagatpatan had been
representing party litigants in court from 2005 until the
instant case was filed before the IBP in 2016. Atty.
Pagatpatan has made a mockery of this Court's authority
by defying this Court's suspension order for over eleven
(11) years. If Fr. Zafra had not filed the instant case, Atty.
Pagatpatan would have continued disregarding the
suspension order of this Court. His actions clearly
constitute gross misconduct as defined under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which is a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment.
This Court emphasizes that the practice of law
is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence
of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is
meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. Atty. Pagatpatan's acts in wantonly
disobeying his duties as an officer of the court show utter
disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.
Therefore, his disbarment is warranted.
Rodil v. Corro
In a nutshell, Dr. Rodil alleged that Atty. Corro received
PhP10 Million for drafting a decision intended for the

acquittal of a litigant whose case was pending before the
Supreme Court.
As recommended by the OBC, the Court imposes the
absolute penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Corro.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that "disbarment
proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their
own, and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions. To
be sure, a finding of liability in a civil case or a conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar
guilty in an administrative proceeding." Undeniably, this case
is unique because it involves a lawyer who previously worked
in the halls of the Supreme Court, and disrespected the
institution by placing it in a bad light. Thus, the Court may
consider the totality of circumstances and evidence
presented in order to determine Atty. Corro's liability and
appropriate penalty.
Taking these grounds into account and juxtaposing it with the
established factual circumstances of the case, there is no
doubt that by demanding and accepting the bribe in the
amount of PhP10 Million, Atty. Corro, as found by the OBC,
committed gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct,
and violated the laws against bribery, graft and corruption in
the government service.
To reiterate, Atty. Corro received the full amount of Ten
Million Pesos (PhP10,000,00.00) from Dr. Rodil (which was
supposedly funded by the family of Alejandro) in exchange
for a favorable decision of acquittal for Alejandro in G.R. No.
205227. This undeniable fact warrants Atty. Corro's
disbarment since he is guilty of gross misconduct as well as
grossly immoral conduct for committing such reprehensible
acts. His additional infractions in ignoring and disrespecting
lawful issuances or orders from the Court only added to the
long list of reasons why he should no longer be given the
privilege to practice law or to be a member of the Bar.
Essentially, Atty. Corro maintained his innocence from the
deed. Yet, he consistently and continuously ignored and
disrespected the Court when he failed to attend the hearings
despite notice, which to Our mind, would have been the best
avenue to clear his name if he is truly blameless.
Notwithstanding his choice not to attend the said hearings or
to file the appropriate pleadings or responses to the
accusations against him, he had the gall to accuse the Court
of not affording him due process, even when every
opportunity was already provided to him. To this, the Court
deems it fit to mention its pronouncements in a previous
administrative case involving another lawyer but with a similar
question: "[R]espondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession
was at stake. He could ill-afford to just stand by and wait. It
was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by
his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts, to the
end that notices could reach him. In all these, he failed. On
the face of the environmental facts, respondent gave this
Court ample reason to believe that he purposely stayed
away.”
-DISBARRED
Moral Righteousness
Good moral character as continuing requirement
In re Atty. Leon G. Maquera
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 5
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the
Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision
covering this case's central issue. Up to this juncture, its
reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an
unsettled case.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his
client's property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his
legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article
1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the
lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property
which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer.
Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in
legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and
Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of
his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself
at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste illustrates the significance of the
aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney
acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was
acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at
the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay
him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's
acquisition of the property of his clients under the
circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for
malpractice. The Court held:
...Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance
of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by the
respondent, or at the latter's behest, as contended by the
complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a
vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed
client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the confidential
relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client,
and of the rights of both".
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's
acquisition of Castro's right of redemption, his subsequent
exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed
property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith
when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an
exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since
the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in
payment for his legal services, and since the property
redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as
of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption
was assigned to him),he is liable for misconduct for accepting
payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees
which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year
suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are
also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law
in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn
duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes

fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust
and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment
ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in
Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his
suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the
judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes
prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a
lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he
be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present
testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an
investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges
against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on
the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an investigation may be
conducted ex parte.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to
adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of
unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain
that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to
ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in
order that another notice, this time specifically informing him
of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why
he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds
(through this Resolution),may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera
should be suspended from the practice of law for non-
payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules
of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and
default in such payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW
CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for
his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings
against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his
subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose
in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal
Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 6
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of
media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez' wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using
the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.
Held:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.
The standard form issued in connection with the application
to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to
aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or
omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or
accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense
or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3)
pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of
the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari'a
Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully
well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In
Alawi v. Alauya, the Court had the occasion to discuss the
impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of
the Shari'a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used
the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection
with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar

Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court,
such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering
justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of
service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest
employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but
likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity.
Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's
faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact
of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations
and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a
result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom
until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks
the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling
as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari'a Bar
is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court,
the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Yap v. Buri
That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is
immaterial. Her being a lawyer calls for — whether she was
acting as such or in a non-professional capacity — the
obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in her
relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer
could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed
outside of his professional capacity. Buri's being a lawyer
demands that she conduct herself as a person of the highest
moral and professional integrity and probity in her dealings
with others.
The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one (1) year-suspension from the
practice of law.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Fabugais v. Faundo Jr.
In both their professional and personal lives, lawyers
must conduct themselves in such a way that does not
reflect negatively upon the legal profession.
Factual Antecedents
This is a Complaint filed by complainant Oliver Fabugais
(complainant) against Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr.
(respondent lawyer), for gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit
and immoral relations with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B.
Fabugais (Annaliza).
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 7
It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of
complainant's death and the apparent lack of interest on
the part of complainant's heirs. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they are intended
and undertaken primarily to look into the conduct or behavior
of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to exercise
the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them
accountable for any misconduct or misbehavior which
deviates from the mandated norms and standards of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which are needful
and necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the legal
profession. Because not chiefly or primarily intended to
administer punishment, such proceedings do not call for the
active service of prosecutors.
"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. This Court has held that for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree."
-SUSPENDED for 1 month
Bunagan-Bansig v. Celera
Bansig alleged that respondent's act of contracting marriage
with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar,
which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the
Bar.
Ruling:
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while
his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without
addressing rather respondent's defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint.
This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more
than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have
preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he
will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions
directing respondent to comment on the complaint against
him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of
the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondent's cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondent's conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court's
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his

character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
We find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of
lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
HDI Holdings Philippines, Inc. v. Cruz
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof
required is preponderance of evidence which the
complainant has the burden to discharge. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is,
as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of
the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary
evidence.
However, in the instant case, Atty. Cruz has chosen to
remain silent despite the severity of the allegations
against him. He was given several opportunities to comment
on the charges yet no comment came. The natural instinct of
man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature to
just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. Silence in such cases is almost always
construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.
Consequently, we are left with no choice but to deduce his
implicit admission of the charges levelled against him. Qui
tacet consentive videtur. Silence gives consent.
Thus, we find that the evidence submitted by HDI, albeit
secondary evidence only being mere photocopies, when
put together with Atty. Cruz' written confession and his
subsequent non-cooperation during the proceedings before
the IBP, would give a convincing conclusion that indeed Atty.
Cruz is guilty.
In the instant case, considering all the above-cited infractions,
it is beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct. In several occasions, he
manifested a propensity to lie and deceive his client in order
to obtain money. Obviously, his misrepresentations in order
to compel HDI to release money for cash bids, fictitious
purchase of a property, the overpriced purchase price of the
Q.C. property and his misrepresentation that he had authority
to collect rentals in behalf of HDI and CGI, as well as his
execution of fictitious documents to give semblance of truth
to his misrepresentations, constitute grave violations of the
CPR and the lawyer's oath. These reprehensible conduct of
Atty. Cruz without doubt breached the highly fiduciary
relationship between lawyers and clients.
-DISBARRED.
Conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which
is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 8
BP 22 involves moral turpitude.
Nulada v. Paulma
The instant administrative case arose from a verified
complaint for disbarment by reason of dishonesty and
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by
complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
Facts:
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005,
respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of
P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of
respondent's standing as a respected member of the
community and his being a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo,
complainant accepted the check without question.
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it
was dishonored due to insufficient funds. Respondent failed
to make good the amount of the check despite notice of
dishonor and repeated demands, prompting complainant to
file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22 against respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be administratively
disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Ruling:
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP
Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.
In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a
crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become
final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as
well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the
IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.
-SUSPENDED for 2 years
Barrios v. Martinez
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It involves "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable
in this case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld
the imposition of one year's suspension for non-payment of
debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation. However,
in these cases, for various reasons, none of the issuances
resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for
either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that
the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross

misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has
been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment
of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,
which is similar to this case in that both respondents were
convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to
be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from
the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until
further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which
were decided after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be
the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, we disbarred a
lawyer convicted
of estafa without discussing the
circumstances behind his
conviction. We held that:
There is no question
that the crime of estafa involves
moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become
final but has been executed. No
elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the
privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to
say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself
unfit to protect the
administration of justice.
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles, a
lawyer was convicted of the
crime of attempted bribery in a
final decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals. "And since
bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7
C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p.
428), this Court, much as it
sympathizes with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to
decree his disbarment as
ordained by Section 25 of Rule
127."
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v.
Quinciano Vailoces, the erring
lawyer acknowledged the
execution of a document
purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned
out to be a forgery. He was
found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document,
which the Court held to be a
crime involving moral turpitude,
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 9
said act being contrary to
justice, honesty and good
morals, and was subsequently
disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings
Against Atty. Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez, Atty. Gutierrez was
convicted for murder. After
serving a portion of the
sentence, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the
President. Holding that the
pardon was not absolute and
thus did not reach the offense
itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term,
the court nevertheless
disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Atty.
Vinzon was convicted of the
crime of estafa for
misappropriating the amount of
P7,000.00, and was
subsequently disbarred. We
held thus:
Upon the other hand,
and dealing now with the merits
of the case, there can be no
question that the term "moral
turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good
morals. In essence and in all
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude
because the act is
unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals (In re
Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263,
July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil.
275–76). As respondent's guilt
cannot now be questioned, his
disbarment is inevitable.
(emphasis supplied)
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña, the
conditional pardon extended to
the erring lawyer by the Chief
Executive also failed to relieve
him of the penalty of
disbarment imposed by this
court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, a
lawyer was charged and found
guilty of the crime of
falsification of public document
for having prepared and
notarized a deed of sale of a
parcel of land knowing that the
supposed affiant was an
impostor and that the vendor
had been dead for almost eight
years. We ruled that
disbarment follows as a
 PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 10

consequence of a lawyer's profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only

conviction by final judgment of
a crime involving moral
turpitude, and since the crime
of falsification of public
document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered
respondent's name stricken off
the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty.
Teresita Sta. Ana, we upheld
the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors to disbar a
lawyer who had been convicted
of estafa through falsification of
public documents, because
she was "totally unfit to be a
member of the legal
profession."
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty.
Ciriaco C. Sayson, a lawyer
was disbarred for having been
convicted of estafa by final
judgment for misappropriating
the funds of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the
appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot
and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to
his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."
-DISBARRED
upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must
at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach." The foregoing
abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of
the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended
by the IBP proper and commensurate. . . . We stress that
membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding
a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement
for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession. In sum, when lawyers are
convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances
— not the mere fact of their conviction — would demonstrate
their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

Soriano v. Dizon

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of

moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,
he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His
overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant,
we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert
a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide,

the attending circumstances — not the mere fact of their
conviction — would demonstrate their fitness to remain
in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
member of the bar.

DISBARMENT JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The

actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public
perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral
turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble

Module 7
Duties of a Lawyer (Part 3)
Specific Areas
REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
RULE: A lawyer cannot represent clients with conflicting
interests. Hence, as soon as the lawyer perceives the
probable generation of conflicting interests, he must
disclose the same to the prospective client.
There is a conflict of interests when the lawyer has to
pursue an issue positively in behalf of one client but has
to pursue it negatively in behalf of his other client.
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the
affected clients' written consent is given after a full
disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of
representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.|||
(Northwestern University Inc. v. Arquillo, A.C. No.
6632, [August 2, 2005], 503 PHIL 466-473)
Q: How can the same lawyer validly represent such
conflicting interests?
• Written conformity of everyone concerned must be
obtained.
Ocampo-Ingcoco v. Yrreverre, Jr
As to conflicting interests
The respondent cannot be held liable for representing
conflicting interests in acting as defense counsel for the
Billiones Spouses in Civil Case No. LP-00-0230 while acting
as counsel for defendant-intervenor JCY Loans and
Mortgage, Inc. in the same case. The evidence presented
by the respondent shows that when the Billones
Spouses secured his services as counsel, they were
made fully aware of the pertinent facts and
circumstances. Their consent and written conformity was
obtained after full disclosure of the facts of the case. They
even submitted a verified written manifestation of conformity
to show proof that the respondent was hired with their
approval. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule
against a lawyer's representation of clients with
conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly
consent to the dual representation after the prospective
counsel makes full disclosure of the facts to the parties.
As to Notarial Law
When the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
without ascertaining that the vendors-signatories thereto
were the very same persons who executed it and personally
appeared before him to attest to the truth of what were stated
therein, he undermined the confidence of the public on
notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
In acknowledging that the parties personally came and
appeared before him, the respondent also made an untruthful
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 11
statement, thus violating Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he
shall do no falsehood.
-SUSPENDED for 6 months
San Jose Homeowners Association Inc. v. Romanillos
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent
interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was
admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez
against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the
propriety of respondent's continued representation of Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean
tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of
violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure.
Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that
he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the
title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading
statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services.
The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring
to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to
mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in
his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of
the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He
resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v.
Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct and would have been
dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement
and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled
agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title 'Judge'
is one of such privileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as
"Justice" is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
and may not be used by any other official of the Republic,
including those given the rank of "Justice". By analogy, the
title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges, incumbent
and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably
discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said
title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench
and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed
or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.
-DISBARRED
Atty GCC:
(a) There are 2 disbarment cases mentioned in the case;

(b) Good faith as a defense was found in the report of the
Investigating Commissioner in the first disbarment case
(c) The issue in the present case (2nd disbarment case)
is – notwithstanding the admonition, the lawyer STILL
continued to represent the 3rd party.
Northwestern University Inc. v. Arquillo
Three Separate Tests To Determine Existence Of Conflict
Of Interests.
(1) When, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required
to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose
it for another client;
(2) When the acceptance of the new retainer will require an
attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first
client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against
the first one any knowledge acquired through their
professional connection; or
(3) When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of an attorney's duty to give undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that
duty.
Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties
first, respondent should have known that there was an
obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged
belief that they were on the same side.
It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the
complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of
the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly
enounced: "As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had
the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G.
Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be impossible
since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And
it appears that it was [r]espondent who prepared the Motion
to Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose
G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint
wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the
counsel for the complainants. Here lies the inconsistency.
The inconsistency of interests is very clear. "Thus it has
been noted. 'The attorney in that situation will not be able to
pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client's claim against the
other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated
action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected
by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the
successful client. The foregoing considerations will strongly
tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those
special elements which make it one of trust and confidence.
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a
hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyer's
representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper.
The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise
with respect to the same general matter, however slight such
conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from
honest intentions or in good faith.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
The following are NOT VALID defenses:
a) Not enough lawyers to serve the exploding
population
b) Good faith or honest intention
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 12
c) The lawyer felt that it was his “duty and
responsibility” to file the case because he felt
responsible for the cancellation of the title and its
subsequent transfer in complainant’s name; he
“will be forever bothered by his conscience” if he
did not file the case
d) With the knowledge of one client
e) With the knowledge of all clients
Knowledge is not enough. There must be written
consent of all concerned parties after full disclosure.
Q: What is the effect of termination of relation insofar
as the proscription against representation of
conflicting interests is concerned?
None, except with written consent of all concerned after
full disclosure of the facts.
Reason: Client’s confidence, once reposed, cannot
be divested by the expiration of professional
engagement.
Q: Does the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests apply even if the lawyer has not
acquired confidential information from a former
client? Yes.
a. A bare attorney-client relationship will suffice.
b. If the prohibition is made to depend on whether the
attorney has acquired confidential information, it will of
necessity call for investigation of that question and will
lead only to the revelation in advance of trial of matters
that may further prejudice the former client. In addition,
the inquiry will violate the confidential relation (Hilado v.
David, cited in Agpalo).
Q: Does the rule apply to a law firm?
a. Rules: the employment of one member of a law firm is
considered as an employment of the law firm; the
employment of a law firm is equivalent to a retainer of the
members thereof (A.B.A. Opinions, cited in Agpalo)
b. The rules apply even if a lawyer who is a member of a
law firm uses an address different from the law firm
(Agpalo)
c. The rules still apply even if free practice is given to a
member of a law firm.
Q: When is the rule inapplicable?
1. When there is written consent of all concerned after
full disclosure of the facts
2. Where no conflict of interests exists:
a. Where the clients represented have similar duties
and asserting no interest adverse to that of the
other parties (i.e., lawyer representing an
administrator of estate of deceased wife and
subsequently the administrator of the deceased
husband – Magno v. Gellada, cited in Agpalo)
b. Where complainant desisted from further
prosecution in a criminal action, counsel for
accused may properly prepare, upon request of
complainant, a motion to dismiss the action and

intervene on the latter’s behalf during the hearing
of the motion (Nombrado v. Hernandez, cited in
Agpalo)
3. Where there is no attorney-client relationship:
a. Where none of the parties is a former client
b. A public prosecutor may ethically sustain an
information against an accused who is the
complainant in another information filed by
the same prosecutor because the latter
represents not the private complainant but
the people of the Philippines as the real
offended party (People v. Mediavilla, cited in
Agpalo)
4. When the conflict of interests has ceased (Agpalo)
Quiambao v. Bamba
Good faith is not a defense for as long as it is found that
there is conflicting interests
Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director
of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc (AIB). Quiambao procured
the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate
affairs of AIB. Atty. Bamba was also the official legal counsel
of an ejectment case filed by Quiambao against spouses
Santiago and Florito Torroba. When Quiambao resigned from
AIB, Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as counsel from the
ejectment case, represented AIB in a complaint case for
replevin and damages against her. Quiambao filed charges
against Atty. Bamba for representing conflicting interests and
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct
for representing conflicting interests in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflicting
interests. Despite Atty. Bamba’s contention that his legals
services extend to AIB’s employees, this should not cover the
personal cases filed by its officers. Furthermore, he failed to
show that he disclosed or procured the approval of Quiambao
before pursuing the replevin case against her.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." This
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various
tests to determine whether a lawyer's conduct lies within this
proscription.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 13
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the
rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty.
Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon
in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It
is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for
the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated.
It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers
with each of them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
THE CRITERION IS PROBABILITY AND NOT CERTAINTY
OF CONFLICT.
It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer's private
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-
professional capacity. In the process of determining whether
there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is
probability, not certainty, of conflict. Since the respondent has
financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged in
a business competing with his client's, and, more importantly,
he occupies the highest position in SESSI, one cannot help
entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind
of situation passes the second test of conflict of interest,
which is whether the acceptance of a new relationship would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of
both companies does not negate the conflict of interest.
Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI
is "a mere pebble among the sands."
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Atty GCC: The second test was applied by SC in both
circumstances of conflict of interests: “whether the
(1)acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or (2)invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
of double dealing in the performance of that duty”.
Lim, Jr v. Villarosa
Respondent was the lawyer of Lumot Jalandoni. She had two
sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her
daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the
herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the
Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC). Respondent represented

Mrs. Jalandoni in a civil case involving PRC. He then filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel without her approval or
knowledge. This caused irreparable injury to Mrs. Jalandoni
as she lost the case. Spouses Jalbuena was later sued by
PRC for estafa. Respondent represented them. A case was
filed against respondent due to conflict of interest to his
clients and for not releasing significant documents which
belonged to Mrs. Jalandoni which was allegedly used for the
benefit of Spouses Jalbuena in the case filed against them by
PRC.
ISSUE: Was there a conflict of interest?
RULING: YES. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness
and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. It is
only upon strict compliance with the condition of full
disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client;
otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided
but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new
clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly
involved the parties' connection to PRC, even if neither PRC
nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-
litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client
undivided allegiance. After being
retained and receiving the confidences
of the client, he cannot, without the free
and intelligent consent of his client, act
both for his client and for one whose
interest is adverse to, or conflicting with
that of his client in the same general
matter. . . . The prohibition stands
even if the adverse interest is very
slight; neither is it material that the
intention and motive of the attorney
may have been honest. (emphasis
ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting
interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties
concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes
professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Even respondent's alleged effort to settle the
existing controversy among the family members was
improper because the written consent of all concerned was
still required. A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Paz v. Sanchez
Simon Paz and his partners engaged the services of Atty.
Sanchez to assist them in the purchase and documentation
of such purchase of several parcels of land from tenant
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 14
farmers in Pampanga as well as defend Paz’s claim on the
properties against the claim of George Lizares. After the
termination of their lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Sanchez
filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Board (DARAB) on behalf of Isidro Dizon (Dizon) for
annulment of TCT No. 420127-R in the name of Paz and his
partners. Paz then explained that the subject property was
among the properties purchased by them with Atty.
Sanchez’s assistance. Later, Atty. Sanchez filed a civil case
against Paz and Sycamore Venture Corp. before the RTC,
San Fernando, Pampanga for annulment of TCT No. 483629-
R while the DARAB case was pending. Paz then filed the
administrative complaint alleging conflict of interests and use
of malicious machination in the filing of the DARAB case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sanchez represented conflicting
interests when he later represented Isidro Dizon in the
DARAB Case
RULING: YES. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."
By respondent's own admission, when he filed the DARAB
case on Dizon's behalf against complainant, both
complainant and Dizon were respondent's clients at that time.
Respondent was representing complainant in the cases
against Lizares where respondent was duty-bound to defend
complainant's title over the properties against the claims of
Lizares. While it is not clear from the records that the Lizares
cases included Dizon's property, it is undisputed that
respondent acted as complainant's counsel in the Lizares
cases. At the same time, respondent was also representing
Dizon before the DARAB for cancellation of lis pendens
involving Dizon's property, which cancellation was needed for
complainant to purchase the Dizon property. In filing the
second DARAB case on Dizon's behalf, respondent was
duty-bound to assail complainant's title over Dizon's property,
which complainant had purchased from Dizon. Respondent
was clearly in a conflict of interest situation.
The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that
he represented conflicting interests. Respondent merely
offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was
his "duty and responsibility" to file the case because he felt
responsible for the cancellation of TCT No. 25214 and its
subsequent transfer in complainant's name. Respondent
stated that he "will forever be bothered by his conscience" if
he did not file the case. However, good faith and honest
intentions do not excuse the violation of this prohibition. In
representing both complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was placed under
a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited
himself from representing Dizon against complainant in
the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of interest.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Capinpin, Jr. v. Cesa, Jr
Complainant executed a real estate mortgage on his two lots
in favor of Family Lending Corporation (FLC) as security for
a loan. This was, eventually, foreclosed. FLC engaged
respondent's (Atty. Cesa) legal services to handle the
foreclosure proceedings.

The complaint alleges that during the foreclosure
proceedings, respondent, without the knowledge of his client
FLC, approached complainant to negotiate the deferment of
the auction sale and the possible settlement of the loan
obligation at a reduced amount without resorting to the
auction sale. Respondent allegedly represented himself as
being capable of influencing the sheriff to defer the auction
sale. For this, the complaint alleges that respondent
demanded payment of professional fees from complainant.
Despite respondent receiving payments in the form of
checks, the auction sale proceeded.
Ruling: Cesa violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
FLC engaged respondent's legal services to represent it in
opposing complainant's actions to forestall the foreclosure
proceedings. However, Cesa extended help to the Capinpin
in negotiating with FLC for the reduction of the loan payment
and cessation of the foreclosure proceedings. Cesa's
admission that he received advance payments of
professional fees from the Capinpin made matters worse for
him. It was highly improper for respondent to accept
professional fees from the opposing party.
Lawyer-client relationship
Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be
so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was
within the knowledge of his client will not exonerate him
from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
Respondent presented a number of documents to support his
allegation that all the communications between him and the
complainant were relayed to his client but We find no record
of any written consent from any of the parties, especially
from his client, allowing him to negotiate as such.
Respondent's admission that he received advance payments
of professional fees from the complainant made matters
worse for him. As correctly found by the Investigating
Commissioner, it was highly improper for respondent to
accept professional fees from the opposing party as this
creates clouds of doubt regarding respondent's legal practice.
As aptly stated by the Investigating Commissioner, if a lawyer
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 15
receives payment of professional fees from the adverse
party, it gives an impression that he is being paid for services
rendered or to be rendered in favor of such adverse party's
interest, which, needless to say, conflicts that of his client's.
Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from
his client. This holds true even if eventually such fees will be
reimbursed by the adverse party depending on the
agreement of the parties. Respondent cannot justify his
act of accepting professional fees from the complainant
by alleging that such was in accordance with the
arrangement between his client and the complainant as
there is no clear proof of such arrangement. The April 22,
2005 Letter signed by the complainant and addressed to FLC
through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the respondent, does not, in
any way, prove that there was an agreement between
complainant and FLC. Moreover, the fact that respondent
was already receiving several amounts from the complainant
even before the date of the said Letter, supposedly stating an
agreement between the complainant and FLC as regards the
settlement of the loan obligation and the payment of his
professional fees, is also suspicious. Such circumstance
reveals that even before the complainant and FLC have come
to such purported agreement, he was already receiving
professional fees from the complainant. Respondent's
allegations to the effect that negotiations had already been
going on between the parties through him via phone calls
even before that Letter do not hold water. To be sure, it would
have been easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to present
documentary proof of such negotiation and/or arrangements
but respondent failed to do so.
At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an
arrangement between FLC and complainant that
respondent's professional fees shall be paid by the
complainant, which will be later on deducted from whatever
the latter will pay FLC for the settlement of his loan obligation,
respondent's act of accepting such payments from the
complainant and appropriating the same for his professional
fees is still reprehensible. The said payments from the
complainant are still considered FLC's money; as such,
respondent should have accounted the same for his
client. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner,
there is nothing on record, aside from respondent's bare and
self-serving allegations, that would show that respondent
made such accounting or disclosure to his client. Such acts
are in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR above-
cited.
Payments from the Capinpin are still considered FLC's
money. Thus, Cesa should have accounted for the same for
his client.
Atty GCC: With all due respect, written consent is
required from all concerned, not “from any of the
parties”
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
DUTY TO ACCOUNT:
1. Note the words of the CPR - account for all money
COLLECTED or RECEIVED FOR or FROM the client
– so this may include rent collected by a lawyer from
a tenant, filing fees for filing of an initiatory pleading in
Court.
2. SC calls this Rule 16 of the CPR as the “rule on the
accounting of monies and properties received by
lawyers from clients as well as their return upon

demand” (referring to Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02
and 16.03 of the CPR) [Mariano v. Laki; Yoshimura
v. Panagsagan)
3. Note Capinpin v. Cesa - the fees paid by the adverse
party were considered client’s money and so the
lawyer has the duty to account
4. Note also that receipt by the lawyer of the
downpayment for the property and applied it as his
share in the property violates Canon 16 of the CPR
(Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan)
5. Note further that money received by a lawyer on
behalf of his client should be accounted for (Huang v.
Zambrano)
Q: When should a lawyer account?
The word used by SC is “promptly” (HDI Holdings).
Q: Where should a lawyer put the client’s funds?
a. Not in personal safe deposit vault (Palencia v.
Linsangan)
b. The funds should be deposited in a separate trust
account in a bank or trust company of good repute for
safekeeping (Palencia v. Linsangan)
Q: Does the penalty of an erring lawyer for violation
of Rule 16.01 and 16.03 depend on the amount of
money involved?
Atty GCC:
1. SC said penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the CPR
may result to disbarment depending on the amount
involved and the severity of the lawyer’s
misconduct. So will note that in that opinion of the
SC, there is an additional requirement aside from the
amount involved, and that is, the severity of the
misconduct. (Palencia v. Linsangan)
2. I am not aware of an SC case where the penalty for
violation of Canon 16 of the CPR depends on the
amount.
Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan
Facts on p. 2 (Module 6)
Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself
to sell the property because complainants were unfamiliar
with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from
liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is incumbent upon
Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the complainants that he
was acting in such capacity and not as their lawyer. But even
this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.
Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the
downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty. Linsangan
does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the
reason that he applied said payment as his share in the
property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan determined all by
himself that the downpayment accrues to him and
immediately appropriated the same, without the knowledge
and consent of the complainants. Such act constitutes a
breach of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 16 of the
CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere
fact that the client owes him attorneys fees. The failure of
an attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 16
own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality,
as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money
belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action.
Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has
consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good
faith and fairness in all his relationship with his client.
Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell
short and had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that
of his clients. Considering the foregoing violations of his
lawyer's oath, Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02,
Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR.
-SUSPENDED for 6 months
Isalos v. Cristal
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of
C Five Holdings, Management & Consultancy, Inc. (C Five).
Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal
Counsel who handled its incorporation and registration with
the SEC.
When C Five was exploring investment options, respondent
recommended the purchase of a resort in Laguna, with the
assurances that the title covering the property was "clean"
and the taxes were fully paid. Relying on respondent's
recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and
completed the payment of the purchase price.
Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the
transfer and registration of the title of the property in C Five's
name.
The complainant then personally handed the sum of
P1,200,000.00 to respondent at her office in Makati City, as
evidenced by OR No. 1038.
More than a year, however, no title was transferred in C Five's
name. It was then discovered that the title covering the
property is a Free Patent issued in 2009, rendering any sale,
assignment, or transfer thereof within a period of 5 years from
issuance of the title null and void.
Formal demand was made upon respondent to return the
P1,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which
remained unheeded, prompting C Five to file a criminal
complaint for Estafa as well as the present case for
disbarment.
Respondent’s contention:
1. That she paid the BIR registration, Mayor's Permit,
business licenses, documentation, and other expenses using
the money entrusted to her
2. That she was ready to turn over the balance of the
P1,200,000 however, C Five refused to receive the balance
insisting that the entire amount should be returned
3. That since the criminal case for Estafa filed against her had
already been dismissed for lack of probable cause, the
disbarment case against her should also be likewise
dismissed for lack of merit.

Commission on Bar Discipline – IBP: Found respondent
administratively liable and thereby, recommending her
suspension from the legal profession for a period of 3 years.
It was also found out that respondent offered a Statement
of Expenses with "feigned expenditures" in an attempt to
prove that a portion of the money had already been
spent.
IBP Board of Governors: Adopted and approved with
modification the CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation
Eventually, in order to buy peace, respondent delivered the
amount of P1,200,000.00 to Atty. Anselmo Sinjian III, counsel
for complainant, as evidenced by an Acknowledgment
Receipt
As a consequence, complainant filed a Withdrawal of
Complaint for Disbarment before the IBP.
Issue:
WON Atty. Cristal may be held administratively liable.
YES.
Ruling:
The CPR, particularly Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16,
provides:
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such
as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used
for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the
amount of P1,200,000.00 from complainant to be used to
cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject
property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted having
received the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion
of it for various expenses, such as documentation, permits,
and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the Statement
of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has been
established that the registration of the property in C Five's
name could not have materialized, as the subject property
was covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009
which, consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or
transferred within a period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus,
and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined, there was no longer
any reason for respondent to retain the money. Furthermore,
the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of Expenses,
except for the documentation and notarization fees for which
no receipts were attached, do not relate to the purposes for
which the money was given, i.e., the documentation and
registration of the subject property. As such, even if official
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 17
receipts had been duly attached for the other purposes —
which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do despite the
opportunity given — the expenditures are not legitimate ones.
Hence, the Court finds respondent to have violated the
above-cited rules, to the detriment and prejudice of
complainant.
Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case
should be dismissed, in view of the return of the full amount
to complainant and the latter's withdrawal of the complaint
against her is specious. Such are not ample grounds to
completely exonerate the administrative liability of
respondent. It is settled that a case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, the latter not being a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter
to the attention of the Court. A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. "The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct x x x has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice." The real
question for determination in these proceedings is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
of a member of the bar.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Palencia v. Linsangan
FACTS:
This case involves a seaman who was injured abroad and
was later treated in the Philippines. He was visited frequently
by paralegals of the respondent lawyer. After several visits
from the paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan,
complainant executed (1) an Attorney-Client Contract, and
(2) a Special Power of Attorney, where he engaged the legal
services of respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based
in Singapore, and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35% of any
recovery or settlement obtained for both. They then filed a
case for torts against the ship owner before the high court in
Singapore. Gurbani & Co. remitted to respondents the
amount of US$59,608.40. From this amount, respondents
deducted: (l) US$5,000.00 as payment to Justice Gancayco;
(2) their attorney's fees equivalent to 35%; and (3) other
expenses, leaving the net amount of US$18,132.43 for
complainant. Complainant refused to accept the amount. He
filed a complaint with the IBP-CBD against the respondents
for alleged unethical acts:
1. Refusing to remit the $95k from the Singapore case,
offering only $20k
2. Depositing the money in their own account
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent committed the foregoing acts
thus violating the fiduciary trust given to him by the client?
Ruling:
YES.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary. This relationship holds a lawyer to a great degree
of fidelity and good faith especially in handling money or
property of his clients. Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind
a lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession; (2) deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon demand subject
to his retaining lien; and (3) account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client.
Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in
favor of his client constitutes trust funds and must be
immediately paid over to the client. As he holds such funds
as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver the same to
the client after demand constitutes conversion. Thus,
whenever a lawyer collects money as a result of a favorable
judgment, he must promptly report and account the money
collected to his client.
It is improper for the lawyer to put his client's funds in
his personal safe deposit vault.
Funds belonging to the client should be deposited in a
separate trust account in a bank or trust company of
good repute for safekeeping and not in personal deposit
vault.
-SUSPENDED for 2 years
Yoshimura v. Panagsagan
In the instant case, it is, thus, beyond dispute that Atty.
Panagsagan manifested not just disregard of his duties as a
lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in
general, the public. For taking advantage of the trust and
confidence of his clients, for his dishonest and deceitful
conduct and fraudulent acts for personal gain, for his violation
of the notarial law and disrespecting the IBP due to non-
compliance of its directive to file comment, his acts constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney.
His propensity to defraud his client, and the public in general,
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
him as a member of the Bar. Atty. Panagsagan deserves no
less than the penalty of disbarment.
We also deem it appropriate to order the return of the monies
which Atty. Panagsagan received as attorney. True, in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. In such cases, the Court's
only concern is the determination of respondent's
administrative liability; it should not involve his civil liability for
money received from his client in a transaction separate,
distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. However, in this case, it appeared that
Yoshimura and Bernadette gave monies to Atty. Panagsagan
to assist them in the documentation of their business
operation by virtue of the latter's legal expertise, and was not
by virtue of a personal transaction.
-DISBARRED, PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION as notary
Mariano v. Laki
Mariano filed a disbarment complaint against Laki, alleging
that Mariano paid Laki sums of money to file a petition for
annulment of marriage. Laki promised a favorable result
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 18
since the judge was friendly. The petition was never filed.
When Mariano demanded a refund, Laki failed to do so.
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Laki violated his sworn
duties under the CPR. Not only did he fail to file the petition
for annulment of marriage despite receipt of the acceptance
fee in the amount of P150,000.00, he also failed to account
for the money he received. He also failed to keep his client
abreast with the developments and status of the case as he
actually never provided Mariano a copy of the petition despite
demand. Worse, after receiving his acceptance fee, Atty. Laki
also made it difficult for his client to contact him, as in fact
Mariano felt that he was being avoided.
Having received payment for services which were not
rendered, Atty. Laki was unjustified in keeping Mariano's
money. His obligation was to immediately return the said
amount. His refusal to do so despite repeated demands
constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to
delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with
good fidelity to his clients. His failure to return the money, also
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of, the trust
reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics, as it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession.
It must be emphasized anew that the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. When a lawyer
collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose, he should promptly account to the client how the
money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
Atty. Laki's failure to render an accounting, and to return the
money if the intended purpose thereof did not materialize,
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
But what we find more deplorable was Atty. Laki's act of
giving assurance to Mariano that he can secure a favorable
decision without the latter's personal appearance because
the petition will be filed in the RTC of Tarlac, which is
allegedly presided by a "friendly" judge who is receptive to
annulment cases. Atty. Laki's deceitful assurances give the
implication that a favorable decision can be obtained by being
in cahoots with a "friendly" judge. It gives a negative
impression that decisions of the courts can be decided merely
on the basis of close ties with the judge and not necessarily
on the merits. Without doubt, Atty. Laki's statements cast
doubts on the integrity of the courts in the eyes of the public.
By making false representation to his client, Atty. Laki not only
betrayed his client's trust but he also undermined the trust
and faith of the public in the legal profession.
-DISBARRED, PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION as notary
Huang v. Zambrano
There is no law or jurisprudence which requires the
formal dismissal of the case before the lawyer yields
possession of his client's money. In advising Huang of the
same, Atty. Zambrano had acted deceitfully — willfully
misleading Huang and abusing the trust and confidence his
client reposed in him. This is in contravention of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR which bids lawyers not to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

The foregoing likewise renders highly doubtful Atty.
Zambrano's claims of heavy workload and family problems as
additional excuses for failing to remit the settlement money to
Huang, which were seemingly meant only to further thwart
Huang's efforts to get his money. Even assuming that Atty.
Zambrano's claims were true, these do not absolve him from
complying with his professional obligations as a lawyer. It
would not have taken much time or effort for him to transfer
the settlement money to Huang especially given the different
remote and online options now available for fund transfers.
It bears to note that after all this time, Atty. Zambrano still has
not made any effort to remit the settlement money which
rightfully belongs to Huang. Being undisputed, the
presumption that he had appropriated Huang's settlement
money for his own use becomes conclusive.
Worse, Atty. Zambrano exhibited disrespect to the IBP by
disregarding the orders of the CBD-IBP as an investigating
body and failing to participate in much of the investigation
proceedings. He neither proffered any explanation nor
expressed any remorse for his disreputable actions not only
towards Huang, but also towards the IBP.
-DISBARRED
Spouses Vargas v. Oriño
Canon 18 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence, while Rule 18.03
thereof explicitly decrees that a lawyer ought not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Verily, Rule 18.03 of the CPR is a basic postulate in legal
ethics. In Vda. de Enriquez v. San Jose, the Court said:
[W]hen a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in
him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Until the
lawyer's withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to
do his or her best for the interest of the client. (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client
relationship was created when respondent lawyer agreed
to accept the complainants' case and, in consideration
thereof, received from complainants payment in cash
and in kind.
The case of Samonte v. Jumamil teaches "that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his
agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money
representing legal fees from the latter." Once a member of
the Bar agrees to provide his legal services to a client, but
does not perform or deliver as promised, then he reneges
upon the oath he took as a lawyer. Moreover, it has been
held that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the
obligations due to his client is considered per se a
violation of the lawyer's oath. Indeed, lawyers are duty
bound to attend to their client's cause with diligence, care and
devotion, whether they accept it for a fee or for free, so much
so that a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 19
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to serve
complainants with industry and diligence. He neglected the
legal matter entrusted to him. Respondent lawyer claimed
that he decided to withdraw from the aforesaid ejectment
case, because, in his view, the case was unmeritorious.
However, he admitted that he failed to formally withdraw as
counsel for complainants allegedly due to his hectic schedule
during the 2010 elections. He also admitted that he failed to
file the aforesaid position paper with the MCTC. After the
MCTC rendered a decision adverse to complainants,
respondent lawyer filed a notice of appeal, however, he failed
to file the memorandum of appeal before the RTC for
complainants. Consequently, the RTC dismissed
complainants' appeal. Respondent lawyer clearly fell short of
the circumspection and diligence required of those privileged
to practice law. He attributed his shortcomings as a lawyer
to his being a politician. The Court finds such reason
unacceptable, if not a display of insolence and
arrogance.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Atty GCC: a lawyer is bound to serve the client with
competence and diligence whether the acceptance is
FOR A FEE or FOR FREE
TN: of the methods of withdrawal
1. By notice
2. By motion
The decision to withdraw from the case due to a view
that the case is unmeritorious IS NOT AN EXCUSE
because no formal withdrawal of counsel was made.
SELF-REPRESENTATION
Pro se practice / in proprio persona
RULE 138, SEC. 34 By whom litigation conducted.
– In the court of a justice of the peace (MTC), a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
• This kind of representation is also known as “in propria
persona” (Maderada v. Mediodea) or "pro se"
representation or practice;
• Based on Santos v. Lacurom and Cruz v. Mijares,
Sec. 34 of Rule 138 applies in the RTC. Besides, said
Rule provides that in “… any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.” Note the word “or” used
under the rule;
 Note, according to SC (Cruz v. Mijares), the said rule
applies in a civil case and not in a criminal case,
citing People v. Holgado, which speaks of the
constitutional right of an accused to be heard by
HIMSELF and OF COUNSEL [Constitution, Art. III,
Sec. 14 (2)] and during the trial, the right to counsel
cannot be waived (Flores v. Ruiz).

Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level
court may — without having to resign from their posts —
conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for
and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants.
However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
subjects the employee to administrative liability.
Maderada v. Mediodea
Synopsis
Complainant charged the respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct for
failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure relative to her action for forcible entry with a prayer
for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order and
damages before the MCTC-Br. 12 of Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo. Complainant, clerk of court in the aforesaid sala,
appeared as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-
plaintiff.
The Court reprimanded the complainant for appearing as
counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the Court, persons who are not lawyers by
profession are allowed by law to litigate their own case
in court. Here, the right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her. However,
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects her
to administrative liability.
SYLLABUS:
Person Appearing On His Own Behalf In Court Not
Considered To Be In The Practice Of Law
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private
vocation or profession when she appeared on her own behalf
in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party's right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court provides: . . . . This provision means that
in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress - from its commencement to its termination. When
they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted
to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be
unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been
permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own
actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to
be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by
acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by
rendering first aid to himself."
Respondent was not in Private Practice when she
appeared for herself
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,
involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity
and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows: ". . . .
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring
to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General
from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public,
as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . . .
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 20
" Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment
for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
Persons Who Are Not Lawyers By Profession Are
Allowed To Litigate Their Own Case In Court. — Black's
Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as
referring to "the members of such a vocation." In turn,
vocation is defined as "a person's regular calling or business;
one's occupation or profession." The law allows persons
who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own
case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an
employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the
right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-
representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right
cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not
go into a discussion of the Court's ruling in Cayetano v.
Monsod regarding the extent of the practice of law.
Litigants Are Allowed To Represent Themselves In
Court; Rule Will Not Apply When A Person Appears For
Another Party; — However, it was also clearly established
that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in
the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely
exonerated. Representing oneself is different from
appearing on behalf of someone else. The raison d'etre for
allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not
apply when a person is already appearing for another party.
Obviously, because she was already defending the rights
of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff,
it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated
will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The
undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two
distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the
efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter
without permission from this Court.
-REPRIMANDED
Santos v. Lacurom
On a Party's Right to Self-Representation
The Rules recognize the right of an individual to represent
himself in any case in which he is a party. The Rules state
that a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and that his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the progress of the
action from commencement to the termination of the
litigation. A party's representation on his own behalf is not
considered to be a practice of law as "one does not practice
law by acting for himself, any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the cases
personally. Santos is not engaged in the practice of law if he
represents himself in cases in which he is a party. By
conducting the litigation of his own cases, Santos acts not as
a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself. Certainly, Santos does not become a
counsel or lawyer by exercising such right.

The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive word
"or" under the Rules, signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated, to mean that a party must choose between
self-representation or being represented by a member of
the bar. During the course of the proceedings, a party should
not be allowed to shift from one form of representation to
another. Otherwise, this would lead to confusion, not only for
the other party, but for the court as well. If a party, originally
represented by counsel, would later decide to represent
himself, the prudent course of action is to dispense with the
services of counsel and prosecute or defend the case
personally.
For the orderly administration of justice, respondent
judge should not have allowed Santos to litigate
personally because Santos was already represented by
counsel. Respondent judge should have required Santos to
choose between self-representation or being represented by
counsel.
Moreover, respondent judge should not have recognized
Santos as lead counsel. The "lead counsel" is the lawyer on
either side of a litigated action who is charged with the
principal management and direction of the party's case, as
distinguished from his collaborating counsels or
subordinates. In recognizing Santos as "lead counsel",
respondent judge made it appear that Santos was a
counsel or lawyer when he is not. To repeat, when a party
represents himself in his own case, he does so not as a
counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right of
self-representation.
-Judge found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, his
P10,000 withheld from retirement benefits was forfeited.
Cruz v. Mijares
Facts:
Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance
for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay
City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement
of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his
claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a
non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his
litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required the petitioner to
secure a written permission from the Court Administrator
before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself,
a party-litigant. Atty. Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge
Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama 'yung marunong
pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending
Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,
praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. It asserts
that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served.
Judge Mijares denied (with finality) the motion for inhibition
stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based
on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 21
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start
of pre-trial.
RTC: for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised
document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied.
Petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not
Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that
the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different
circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same,
still invoking Rule 138-A
Issue:
WON the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and
when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
Ruling:
The contention of the petitioner is with merit.
RULE 138-A - LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. — A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for
himself and on his behalf because of his failure to prove on record
that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education
program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his
appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
The former rule provides for conditions when a law student
may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The Rules recognizes the right of an individual to
represent himself in any case to which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation
personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly
authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings
from commencement to the termination of the litigation.
Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer

himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of
his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case
No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or
lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released
the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was
intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-
lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the
Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
BUT, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Judge.
RTC is DIRECTED TO ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner as party-litigant.
REPRESENTATION BY NON-LAWYER
People v. Tulin
Appellants were charged with qualified piracy in connection
with the seizure of M/T Tabangao in Batangas where the
officers and crew were forced to sail to Singapore and
transfer its loaded petroleum products to another Vessel Navi
Pride off the coast of Singapore. Appellants pleaded not guilty
with appellant Hiong claiming that he merely followed the
orders of his superiors to buy bunker fuel. However, it was
disclosed that he connived, through falsification of
documents, to prevent the Singapore ports authority to detect
the sale, the amount of the sale was less than one-half of the
amount of the cargo transferred, that there was no evidence
of the sale, with receipts not issued and the sale was made
66 nautical miles away in the dead of the night. The officers
and crew of M/T Tabangao with whom the appellants were
with for more than a month, positively identified appellants as
the seajackers. Appellants, except Hiong, were represented
by Tomas Posadas who was later found to be a non-lawyer.
They were, however, assisted by Atty. Abdul Basar who
manifested that they were adopting the evidence adduced by
Posadas. Their extrajudicial statements obtained without
assistance of counsel were introduced as evidence for the
prosecution. The trial court found all appellants except Hiong
to have acted in conspiracy. According to the trial court,
Hiong's act was not indispensable in the attack and seizure
of the vessel. He was found guilty as a mere accomplice.
Hence, this appeal.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT EVERY STAGE OF
PROCEEDING WAS WAIVED
An accused is entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings since an ordinary layman is not versed on
the technicalities of trial. In this case, appellants'
representative, Mr. Posadas, knew the technical rules of
procedure, coupled with their manifestation that they adopted
the evidence adduced by him constitute waiver, and with the
full assistance of a bonafide lawyer, Atty. Basar and cannot
serve as a basis for a claim of denial of due process.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 22
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and
Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were
adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented
by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a
categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were
apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently
executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court. It is true that an
accused person shall be entitled to be present and to
defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not
versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also
provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right
recognized by law. (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion,
the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person
when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By
analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the
rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical
rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial, considering that it was unequivocally, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants shall be absolved due
to the fact that a non-lawyer had represented them during the
custodial investigation and trial
Ruling: No.
SC held:
a) That an accused shall be entitled to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (citing Rule
115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
b) That under the same Rule 115, upon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect
his rights without the assistance of counsel. In this case, the
rights of the accused were sufficiently protected by the
appearance of Mr. Posadas because he knew the technical
rules of procedure
c) That the said right of the accused can be waived (citing Art.
6 of the Civil Code of the Phils.)
d) In this case, there was a waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial because the Manifestation by
said accused were made with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer (Atty. Basar).
The said Manifestation stated the following:
1. That the accused were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation;

2. That the accused voluntarily and intelligently executed the
same; and
3. That the accused affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court
Atty GCC: In a criminal case, an accused shall be
entitled to be present and to defend himself in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
citing Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. So a denial of due process can be
successfully invoked if a non-lawyer represents the
accused during trial. This is subject however to waiver,
citing Art. 6, Civil Code and Art. III of the Constitution
(during custodial investigation)
Atty GCC: (EXC. to Tulin doctrine) In Cruz v. Mijares,
citing People v. Holgado, that the right to counsel during
a trial cannot be waived. In Holgado, the accused,
unaided by counsel, entered a qualified plea to
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and the judge did
not comply with 4 important duties when an accused
appears without an attorney:
1. Inform the accused that it is his right to have an attorney
before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court
must assign attorney de oficio; and
4. If the court desires to procure an attorney of his own,
the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor) – this
is denial of fair hearing in violation of due process clause
in the Constitution.
APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY
The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter's
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of
court.
Que v. Revilla, Jr.,
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan's finding
that the respondent twice represented parties without proper
authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment;
and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent
filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49
individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15
individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent's
off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of
the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary
authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable
that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a
seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged
in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received
rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the
University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two
law firms with which he was previously associated. As
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondent's explanation of compliance with the rule on the
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 23
certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real
charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization
of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second
complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that
only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic
of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land.
Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without
its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the
Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended
complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs — his clients and the
Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer
may not represent a litigant without authority from the
latter or from the latter's representative or, in the
absence thereof, without leave of court. The willful
unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given
case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants
disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for
professional misconduct.
Villahermosa, Sr. v. Caracol
This is a case involving a lawyer (Atty. Caracol) who allegedly
represented a dead client in a case filed with DARAB but
complainant alleges that the lawyer is representing the
interest of another person.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Caracol had authority to
represent the dead client.
Ruling: NO
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for
a presumption of a lawyer's appearance on behalf of his
client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is
retained by a client, an attorney-client relationship terminates
upon death of either client or the lawyer.
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he
appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The records
are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa
in fact questioned his authority during the course of the
proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already
passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance

of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an
honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have
informed the Court of his client's passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the client's successors-in-
interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.
-SUSPENDED for 1 year
Atty GCC: while a lawyer is presumed to have authority
when he appeared before DARAB, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or the
lawyer.
Sec. 21 of Rule 138 provides for a presumption of a
lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client and while a
lawyer is not required to present proof of his
representation, when a court requires that he show such
authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to
act. Also, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon
death of either client or the lawyer.
RESPONSIBLE AND PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR
On his dealings with the opposing litigant
A lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic. It
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. (Beunviaje v. Magdamo)
On the opposing litigant’s counsel
Be guided by the following:
a. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness,
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. (Canon 8)
b. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and
offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract
from the dignity of the legal profession but also
constitute HIGHLY UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
subject to disciplinary action. (Roque v. Balbin)
c. Canons 7, 9, 22, 24, 25, and 41 of the Code of
Professional Ethics
Spouses Jacinto v. Bangot, Jr.
A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in
dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair and
reasonable fees for his legal services. He should not
excessively estimate the value of his professional services.
In drawing up the terms of his professional engagement,
he should not practice deceit. The clients are entitled to
rescind the written agreement on his professional fees if
the terms thereof contravened the true agreement of the
parties.
Although the complainants appeared to have initially bound
themselves to give a part of their land as the respondent's
professional fees, they did so apparently because he had
misrepresented to them the gravity and extent of their legal
matter. His misrepresentation was undeniably calculated to
make them part with their valuable asset in lieu of cash. He
did not thereafter render any worthy professional legal
service in their favor. Verily, as the cliché goes, they did not
get their money's worth from him. Even if this charge was his
first infraction, the grossness of his violations of the Lawyer's
Oath and the various relevant canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted earlier absolutely
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 24
warranted his suspension from the practice of law for five
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with warning
of sterner sanctions should he hereafter commit a similar
offense.
DUTY TO A COLLEAGUE
Camacho v. Pangulayan
This is a case where the lawyer directly communicated with
the opposing party to negotiate with them without
communicating first to the lawyer of the opposing party.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 9 of the
Canon of Professional Ethics? YES
Ruling: Yes. Canon 9 provides that: “A lawyer should not in
any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake
to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead
a party not represented by counsel, and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law”
Negotiation With Opposite Party Should Be Done
Through Counsel; Non-Compliance Therewith An
Inexcusable Violation Of The Canons Of Professional
Ethics And In Utter Disregard Of A Duty Owing To A
Colleague. — It would appear that when the individual letters
of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized,
complainant was by then already the retained counsel for
plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan
had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney
proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to
their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record
in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent,
whether by design or because of oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of professional
ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of
him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
-SUSPENDED for 3 months
Atty GCC: Lawyers were found liable for violation of
Canon 9 of the Canon of Professional Ethics as they
negotiated with the students and their parents without
communicating the matter to their lawyer Please note that
under the CPE, mere communication is a violation.
Cabalida v. Lobrido
A case involving a lawyer who entered into a series of
agreements directly with the opposing party without the
assistance/presence of the lawyer of the opposing party.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the Canon of
Professional Ethics? YES.
Ruling:
Yes. SC said Atty. Pondevilla “SHOULD HAVE, AT THE
VERY LEAST, GIVEN NOTICE to Atty. Lobrido prior to the
submission of the Memorandum of Agreement to court”.
(Emphasis made)
 PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 25

In Cabalida, SC cited Binay-an v. Addog saying “…six months

suspension on a lawyer who issued an affidavit of desistance
with opposing parties BUT WITHOUT INFORMING THEIR
COUNSEL.” (Emphasis made)
SC JUSTIFICATIONS:
1) Canon 8.02 of the CPR – when Atty. Pondevilla negotiated
with Cabalida without consulting Atty. Lobrido;
2) CPE, citing Camacho v. Pangulayan.
ATTY GCC: W/ due respect to SC
1) Rule 8.02 (instead of Canon 8.02, with due respect)
cannot apply because this rule is a prohibition against
professional competition or “stealing another’s client” and
there is nothing in Cabalida case about this; Canon 8
applies though because it is very encompassing;
2) I agree on the application of CPR, citing Camacho.

Module 8
IBP & Disciplinary Proceedings (Part 1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
• It is composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court (Sec 1, Rule 139-A).
• The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall
be to elevate the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively. (Sec. 2)
• A chapter shall be organized in every province and every
city shall be considered as part of the province except as
otherwise provided under Section 4.
SECTION 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar
shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow
provided, every city shall be considered part of the province
within which it is geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the
following political subdivisions or areas;
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del
Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and
(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area
where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more
than one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as
provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board
of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the
provisions of Section 19 of this rule notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region shall hold regional
conventions on matters and problems of common concern.
• House of Delegates of not more than 120 members who
shall be apportioned among all chapters as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective members,
each chapter shall have at least one Delegate.
Transfer of IBP Chapter Membership
IBP BY-LAWS
Section 19. Registration. Xxx Every change after
registration in respect to any matters above specified shall be
reported within 60 days to the Chapter Secretary who shall in
turn promptly report the change to the national office. Unless
he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area
where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence
is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more
than one Chapter.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 26
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all
members registered in its membership roll. Each member
shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated
on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another
Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided
that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
• A lawyer may not necessarily be a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area
where his office/residence is located.
• The only condition required under the transfer to another
Chapter is that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
Transfer of IBP Chapter, Qualifications of a
Candidate, Standing to Sue
Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052
Facts:
Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and
Tony Velez filed a petition seeking the disqualification of
respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being elected
Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.
Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP
Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past
president and the incumbent President, respectively, of the
Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners contended that
respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a
brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of
the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern
Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the region
qualified and willing to serve the IBP. Petitioners also
submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral
aptitude for the position. According to petitioners, respondent
De Vera was previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for
irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during
the deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that
respondent De Vera could have been disbarred in the United
States for misappropriating his client's funds had he not
surrendered his California license to practice law.
Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the present controversy contending that the election of
the officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws
and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Respondent also averred that an IBP member is entitled to
select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter
membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2,
Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the right
to transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-
A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first
of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Jurisdiction
On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear
and decide the present controversy. Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP and implicit in the

constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities
of the IBP, including the election of its officers. The power of
supervision over the IBP has been demonstrated in the past
when it looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989
elections of the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise
amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.
As to change or transfer of membership
The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that
a member of the IBP is entitled to select, change or transfer
his chapter membership.
A Member May Transfer His Membership To Another
Chapter Provided That The Transfer Is Made Not Less
Than Three Months Immediately Preceding Any Chapter
Election; Respondent's Transfer Is Valid As It Was Done
More Than Three Months Ahead Of The Scheduled
Chapter Elections.
Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change
his chapter membership, subject only to the condition that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes
to transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer
to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held
on February 27, 2003.
It is clearly stated in Section 19 Article II of the By-Laws that
it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the
chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He
has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where
he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not
register his preference that he will become a member of the
Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office.
As to Qualifications of a Candidate
There Is Nothing In The IBP By-Laws Which Explicitly
Provides That One Must Be Morally Fit Before He Can
Run For IBP Governorship; The Disqualification Of A
Candidate Involving Lack Of Moral Fitness Should
Emanate From His Disbarment Or Suspension From The
Practice Of Law Or Conviction By Final Judgment Of An
Offense Which Involves Moral Turpitude.
As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic
qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for
a particular region are:
(1) He is a member in good standing of the IBP;
(2) He is included in the voter's list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he
belongs;
(3) He does not belong to a chapter from which a regional
governor has already been elected, unless the election is the
start of a new season or cycle; and
(4) He is not in the government service.
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that
one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment
of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on
each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate
and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the
basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 27
Respondent’s previous administrative case cannot serve
as a basis to consider respondent as immoral; the act for
which he was found guilty of – indirect contempt, does
not involve moral turpitude.
In addition, petitioner have not shown how the
administrative complaint abroad affects respondent’s
moral fitness to run for IBP Governor; Bare Allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
As to Standing to Sue
Petitioners, Who Are Not Even Qualified To Be
Nominated At The Scheduled Election, Are Not The
Proper Parties To Bring The Present Suit; Section 40 Of
The By-Laws Provides That Only Nominees Can File A
Written Protest
The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties
to bring the suit under Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that only nominees can file a written protest
setting forth the ground therefor. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera
and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP and are not
qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern Mindanao
pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sections 37 and
38 of the IBP By-Laws.
Instant Petition is Premature
The Court also held that the instant petition was premature
as no nomination of candidates has been made by the
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao,
and assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he
can always opt to decline the nomination.
IBP Dues
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court
Sec. 9. Membership Dues. – Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. – Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment of 1 year shall be a ground for removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
• Default for 6 months = warrant suspension of
membership
• Default for 1 year = ground for removal from Roll of
Attorneys
Q: Is a lawyer who is a senior citizen exempt from the
payment of IBP dues? No, as the law (RA 7432, as
amended) only grants tax exemptions, not exemption
from payment of IBP dues.
Exemption from payment of IBP Dues
Q: Is a lawyer who was inactive in the practice of law
exempt from payment of dues? NO.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership and no one is exempt, regardless of lack of

practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged
in.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
He maintains that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the
years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since
the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession
while in government service, and neither can he be assessed
for the years when he was working in the USA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption
from payment of his dues during the time that he
was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he
was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003 NO
2. Whether or not the enforcement of the penalty of
removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and infringes on his
constitutional rights NO
RULING:
1. NO, he is not entitled to exemption
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar — which power
required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are,
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 28
to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble
objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with
it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from
his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice,
the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption
from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary
of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he
left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the
IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the
situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
2. NO. It does not amount to deprivation of
property without due process
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which
is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any
of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move.
-request for exemption DENIED
Integrated Bar v. Bar Associations
Integrated Bar Associations
Compulsory Voluntary
Membership is sine qua It is not sine qua non.
non (a condition) for
practicing lawyers

Violation of rules on Not a sufficient cause
membership is sufficient
cause of disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer
from practice
Nature and Functions of IBP Commissioner
IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private
practitioners performing public functions delegated to
them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional
power to regulate the practice of law
Tabuzo v. Gomos
An administrative complaint was filed by Atty Tabuzo
(complainant) against Atty. Gomos (respondent) who was
then a Commissioner of the IBP, for allegedly violating the
law and Constitution.
The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint
filed by Lucille G. Sillo (Sillo) against complainant before the
IBP. The case was assigned to respondent for investigation
and report. The respondent issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that complainant be
reprimanded. The report and recommendation were adopted
and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Complainant
alleged that respondent violated the law and Constitution
when he failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch and for
issuing his report and recommendation 174 days from the
submission of the last pleading. Respondent countered that
it was complainant who caused the delay of the resolution of
the case because of the numerous motions and pleadings
she filed. Also, the report and recommendation was based on
facts, law and jurisprudence which was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board.
Issue: Whether respondent may be held administratively
liable in the same manner as judges and other government
officials NO. IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions
as IBP officers — not as government officials
Ruling:
IBP is a sui generis public institution deliberately
organized, by both the legislative and judicial branches of the
government for the advancement of the legal profession. At
this juncture, the Court needs to determine whether the IBP's
officers, especially the IBP Commissioners, are considered
as public officers under the purview of the law.
IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers coming
from both the public and private sectors who are authorized
to practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 4 of the
IBP's By-Laws allows only private practitioners to
occupy any position in its organization. This means that
only individuals engaged in the private practice are
authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for
and in behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners,
being officers of the IBP, are private practitioners
performing public functions delegated to them by this
Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law. IBP Commissioners cannot be
held administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance in the framework of administrative law because
they cannot strictly be considered as being "employed" with
the government or of any subdivision, agency or
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 29
instrumentality including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other
IBP officers may be held administratively liable for
violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative
to the integrated bar and to the practice of law. Even if
they are not "public officers" in the context of their
employment relationship with the government, they are still
"officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who are
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others. Most
importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed
them under the Court's administrative supervision.
Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions
as IBP officers not as government officials.
Final Note
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the
legal profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with
utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the
primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings
against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent
the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by
unscrupulous practices — not to shelter or nurse a wounded
ego. Such is the reason why lawyers should always set a
good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons
or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it
degrades the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes
its integrity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court
AGREES with the Report and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Committee on Bar Discipline
adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of
Governors, and DISMISSES the administrative complaint
filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.
Atty GCC: IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions as
IBP officers (Tabuzo v. Gomos); they cannot be
disciplined like public officers as they are not public
officers; they are under the administrative supervision of
SC and governed by the rules promulgated by SC relative
to the IBP and to the practice of law.
Magsino v. Vinluan, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC & A.C. No. 8292
(In the Matter of Brewing Controversies)
This resolves the above matter involving the leadership
controversy at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
the administrative case that was filed against some of the
high-ranking officers of the IBP on account thereof.
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver
as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field
or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated
candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election
conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected
unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence.
Such is not the case here.
Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in
harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of
the electorate as expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty.
Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his
electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is not a

rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional
and compelling circumstances.
If only to stress, compared to the case of Atty. Fortunato
whose Romblon Chapter invoked the "rotation rule," no
chapter in the Western Mindanao Region which was next in
the rotation invoked the said rule.
Further, in its report, the Committee declared that "the high-
handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and
his group of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio
Barandon Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado,
which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in
the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter
disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the
Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional
misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to
discourage its repetition in the future."
The Committee, however, fell short of determining and
recommending the appropriate penalty for the grave
professional misconduct found to have been committed by
Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors. Still, with the above
firm and unequivocal findings and declarations of the
Committee against Atty. Vinluan and his group that included
Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado as
"unprofessional" members of the IBP Board of Governors
(2007-2009 term) they certainly do not deserve to hold such
esteemed positions.
It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that "(a) lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a)
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession." In the case at bar, such canons find
application.
In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court
agrees, that "(t)he actuations of Atty. Vinluan's Group in
defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to
Atty. Vinluan's overweening desire to propel his fraternity
brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the
IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned
and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar
Integration Rule." Indeed, said actuations of Atty. Vinluan and
his group of former IBP Governors Estrada, Barandon, Jr.,
Escalon and Mercado were grossly inimical to the interest of
the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as lawyers.
After all, what they did served only to benefit the apparently
selfish goals of defeated candidate Atty. Elpidio Soriano to be
elected as IBP EVP and be the next IBP President for the
2011-2013 term by hook or by crook.
Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada,
Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado conspired to do was
truly "high-handed and divisive" that must not pass
unsanctioned. Otherwise, future leaders of the IBP,
Governors at that, might be similarly inclined to do what they
did, much to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership.
Surely, this should be addressed without much delay so as to
nip in the bud such gross misconduct and unprofessionalism.
They all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well
the trust bestowed on them for the high positions that they
previously held.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 30
The Resolution of the Court in the case of Re: 1989 Elections
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines already declared that
unethical practices of lawyers during IBP elections cannot but
result in the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession being
diminished. As held therein, "(r)espect for law is gravely
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated
for their observance." Indeed, the said strong and vigorous
declaration of this Court on the 1989 IBP Election scandal is
relevant here.
While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of
their positions in the IBP, this can no longer be done as their
terms as Governors already expired, specially on the part of
Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado.
However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan, as former EVP of
the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the
presidency for the term 2009-2011 but now should not be
allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the
Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to
hold the said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus
declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President. To the
Court, if Atty. Vinluan cannot be fit to become a Governor and
EVP of the IBP then he is not entitled to succeed as its
President for the 2009-2011 term.
Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed
to run as national officers to prevent such similar irregularity
from happening again. Thus, in subsequent elections of the
IBP, they are disqualified to run as candidates.
Rotation Rule
As has been interpreted and applied by the Court in the
past, the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as
amended, of the IBP By-Laws actually consists of two
underlying directives.
First is the directive for the mandatory and strict
implementation of the rotation rule. The rule mandates
that the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as
many terms as there may be chapters in the region. This
serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance
to represent the region in the IBP BOG.
Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict
implementation of the rotation rule. This exception would
allow a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order,
subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time
before the rotation is completed. Thus, as the Court held
in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the
Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, "[t]he
rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when
the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or
nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose." (Maglana v.
Opinion)
Maglana v. Opinion
Facts:
On May 25, 2013, delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas
Region gathered to elect the Governor of their region.

Outgoing Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. called and presided
the election for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Atty. Maglana — the incumbent President of IBP Samar
Chapter — was nominated for the position of Governor. Atty.
Maglana then moved that Governor Enage declare that
only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon
for the position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to
the exclusion of all the other 8 chapters citing the
rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since
1989 or the start of the implementation of the rotation rule,
only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP
Eastern Visayas.
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar
Chapter, thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before
he decided to run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the
IBP if he was still qualified to run considering that he also ran
for Governor and lost in the immediately preceding term. In
an Opinion from Gov. Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive
Committee informed Atty. Opinion that he could still run.
Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional
Elections for IBP Eastern Visayas, the representative of
IBP Samar Chapter, Judge Amanzar, waived the votes as
he cannot pursue an election at that time. Instead, Atty.
Opinion was "asked to run." The Chapter President of Samar
in 2011, however, categorically denied the waiver and said, "I
did not pursue my intentions, although I had one at that time
to run for governor, because I was financially handicapped
but I did not categorically waive our right to the governorship,
because I believe that waiver should not be implied. I
categorically say that I did not waive my right, or the right of
the chapter to run for governor."
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon, the delegate from Biliran,
meanwhile pointed out that Governor Joyas as Chairman of
the IBP Executive Committee had no authority to make the
above-cited pronouncement; it is only the Supreme Court that
has the authority to determine the qualified chapters in the
region.
After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the
rotation rule to the present case, Governor Enage eventually
ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the
position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. Governor
Enage counted the votes, with 6 votes in favor of Atty.
Opinion considered as stray votes and 4 votes in favor of Atty.
Maglana. He then proceeded to proclaim Atty. Maglana as
the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of
the disqualification of the other nominee, Atty. Opinion.
IBP BOG Decision: The IBP BOG granted the election
protest of Atty. Opinion and declared him the duly elected
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Issues:
1. WON the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas, since
the implementation of Bar Matter No. 491, has been
completed;
2. WON IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation
order so that it can no longer claim its right to the
governorship position for the 2013-2015 term;
3. WON IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to
field a candidate for governor in IBP Eastern Visayas for the
2013-2015 term; and
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 31
4. WON Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Held:
We affirm the IBP BOG decision and declare Atty.
Opinion the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
The Rotation Rule
The logical starting point in resolving the present matter
before us is Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, as
amended by Bar Matter No. 491. This provision established
the rotation rule in the IBP. The provision states:
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. — At least one
(1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the
region.
In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586, the Court decreed
without amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws
that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented "so that
all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned
with or considered in determining who should be the governor
to be selected from the different chapters to represent the
region in the Board of Governors."
Despite the call for strict implementation of the rotation rule
under Bar Matter No. 586 in 1991, the Court amended
Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws only in 2010 in In
the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines by mandating the
mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule,
as well as recognizing that the rotation rule is subject to
waivers by the chapters of the regions. The provision, as
further amended, now reads:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. — At least
one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from
each region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be
chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly
implemented among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter
waives its turn in the rotation order, its place shall redound to the next
Chapter in the line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to
the Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed;
otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same
place that it had in the round completed.
Broken down into its components, Section 39, Article VI,
as amended, of the IBP By-Laws contains the following
elements: (Elements of Rotation Rule)
a. Delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region who shall be chosen by rotation;
b. Rotation of the governorship of each region shall be
mandatory and to be strictly implemented;
c. A chapter may waive its turn in the rotation order which
shall redound to the next chapter in the line; and
d. The chapter that waived its turn may reclaim its right
to the governorship at any time before the rotation is
completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in
the next round, in the same place that it had in the round
completed.
Elements a, c and d are key elements that are decisive in
resolving the present controversy. As far as element (a) is
concerned, the problem relates to the element of rotation

where the manner of implementation is the disputed issue.
Elements (c) and (d) also assume significance because of the
assertion of waiver on the part of IBP Samar Chapter of its
right to the governorship.
Pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491, the delegates for the 1989-
1991 term elected Atty. Benedict Alo of Cebu Province as
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. This development ushered
in the implementation of the rotation system for the
governorship of IBP Eastern Visayas. Thus, the rotational
cycle should be counted from the time of Bar Matter No.
491, when the Court provided for the rotation system.
1. The first rotation cycle has been completed in
2007
Counting from the governorship of Atty. Alo of IBP
Cebu Province Chapter, the first rotation cycle of
governors, consisting of 9 governorship terms from
1989 to 2007.
Pursuant to the rotational rule, the governorship of a
region shall rotate once in as many terms as there
may be chapters in the region, to give every chapter
a chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG.
However, not every chapter was represented in
the first rotational cycle. As the IBP BOG noted,
there were instances when the Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas came from the same chapter.
The dissent, however, emphasizes that the
preferred policy as mandated in Section 39, Article
VI, as amended of the IBP By-Laws, is the
mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation
by exclusion rule. The dissent posits that unless and
until IBP Samar Chapter had actually been given the
opportunity to seat as Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas, the first rotation cycle for the position of IBP
Eastern Visayas cannot be considered complete.
The dissent's reliance on the mandatory and
strict implementation of the rotation by
exclusion rule, as mandated by Section 39, as
amended, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, is
inaccurate.
Despite the amendment of Section 39, Article VI
of the IBP By-Laws mandating the strict
implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule,
the Court cannot ignore the reality that prior to
the present amendment (i.e., from the 1989-1991
term until December 2010), the prevailing
rotation rule was not mandatory; the choice of
governor should only be rotated as much as
possible among the chapters of the region.
Note that this rule even prevailed after the first
rotation cycle of governors, consisting of nine
governorship terms from 1989 to 2007. Thus, the
dissent cannot simply apply Section 39, Article
VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws in the
present case because this amendment calling
for the strict implementation of the rotation rule
cannot be interpreted retroactively, but only
prospectively, so that it would only take effect in
the 2011-2013 term.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 32
As previously emphasized, not every chapter was
represented in the first rotation cycle; there were
three instances when the Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas came from the same Chapter, such as the
case of Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu
City.
These aberrant developments can only be justified
under the "as much as possible" qualifier cited
above. Based on these considerations and from a
practical perspective, we can reasonably conclude
that the first rotation cycle has been completed in
2007 despite the non-participation of Samar, Leyte
and Southern Leyte
2. IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first
rotation cycle.
As mentioned, the rotation rule under Section 39,
Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws is not
absolute as it is subject to a waiver, as when a
chapter in the order of rotation opts not to field or
nominate its candidate for governor during the
election regularly called for the purpose.
As the IBP BOG noted, not all the 9 chapters of
Eastern Visayas were able to field a governor for the
first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007 since three
chapters were represented twice. IBP Eastern
Samar Chapter, to which Atty. Opinion belongs, was
represented once while IBP Samar Chapter, which
Atty. Maglana represents, was not represented at
all. The IBP BOG also established that some
chapters were represented twice during the first
rotation cycle because Samar Chapter either did not
field any candidate for governor from 1989 to 2007
or it did not invoke the rotation rule to challenge the
nominations of those candidates whose chapters
had already been previously represented in the
rotation cycle. Based on these considerations and
pursuant to the Court's December 14, 2010 ruling,
we conclude that IBP Eastern Samar effectively
waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
3. IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified
chapter to field a candidate for governor for the
2013-2015 term.
With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the
second rotation cycle and with governors from
Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters having
served the region as starting points, Atty. Maglana's
position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only
remaining chapter qualified to field a candidate for
governor in the 2013-2015 term clearly fails. The
rotation by exclusion rule provides that "once a
member of a chapter is elected as Governor, his [or
her] chapter would be excluded in the next turn until
all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once
a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle
commences, all the chapters in the region are once
again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on
rotation by exclusion." As such, it is clear that both
IBP Eastern Samar and IBP Samar, along with
Cebu Province, Cebu City, Biliran and Northern
Samar Chapters, are qualified to field their
candidates in the May 25, 2013 regional elections in
the IBP Eastern Visayas region.

4. Atty. Opinion is the duly elected Governor for
IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Gov. Enage seriously erred in disqualifying Atty.
Opinion as a candidate and in declaring the 6 votes
he garnered as stray. The election of Atty. Opinion
is well-settled. He did not only come from the
chapter which is entitled to be elected for the
position but also got the majority of 6 votes, as
opposed to the 4 votes garnered by Atty. Maglana.
Disciplinary Proceedings
Power to Suspend or Disbar
ART. VIII, SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
RULE 138 SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Grounds
a. Violation of Lawyer’s Oath
b. Statutory grounds in Sec. 27, Rule 138 of ROC which
are:
1. Deceit
2. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
3. Grossly immoral conduct
c. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)
d. Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE)
Nature of Proceeding
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. They belong to
a class of their and are distinct from that of civil or criminal
actions. (Tan v. IBP)
Tan v. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
Issues:
1. Can the IBP-CBD make a ruling on matters (perjury,
conspiracy to commit estafa, etc.) already pending in the
regular courts? NO.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 33
2. Did petitioner breach the rule on confidentiality of
proceedings against attorneys? YES.
Ruling:
1. No. Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to
resolve matters which are pending resolution by the regular
courts to which jurisdiction properly pertains. The IBP-CBD
is merely tasked to investigate and make
recommendations on complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular
court and thus is not endowed with the power to
investigate and resolve judicial matters pending before
the regular courts.
In the proposed Amended/Supplemental Complaint,
petitioners seek to hold respondent administratively liable for
his "untruthful and perjurious" statements in his Verified
Answer in the administrative case. Precisely, however, the
truth or falsity of said statements are still to be litigated in the
civil case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a
class of their own, and are distinct from that of civil or criminal
actions. To be sure, a finding of liability in a civil case or a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a
member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding.
However, in the instant case, the civil and criminal cases
involving the acts referred to in the proposed
amended/supplemental complaint are still pending
adjudication before the regular courts. Prudence dictates that
the action of the Commission related to the proposed
amended/supplemental complaint in the administrative case
be sustained in order to avoid contradictory findings in that
case and in the court cases.
The call for judiciousness stems from the need to ensure the
smooth and orderly disposition of the related cases pending
before the courts and the Commission and avert conflict in
the rulings in the bar discipline case and in the judicial cases.
Preemption of the regular courts by an administrative case is
a worrisome spectacle.
2. YES. A review of the records disclose that petitioners lifted
and cited most of the amendatory averments in respondent’s
Verified Answer in the administrative case as the core of their
Amended Complaint in the civil case. In fact, petitioners even
identified the Verified Answer and the disbarment
proceedings itself as the sources of the averments in the
Amended Complaint before the trial court.
Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and
confidential until its final determination. The confidential
nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit:
(i) to enable the court and the investigator to make
the investigation free from any extraneous
influence or interference;
(ii) to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys from baseless charges
of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible
persons or clients by prohibiting the publication
of such charges pending their resolution; and
(iii) to deter the press from publishing the charges
or proceedings based thereon.
Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending
disbarment case against respondent. Not only did they
disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also divulged most, if
not all of the contents of respondent's Verified Answer.

Clearly, petitioners' acts impinged on the confidential nature
of the disbarment proceedings against Atty. Soriano.
-Petition DISMISSED
Cambaliza v. Cristal – Tenorio
Notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, the
disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. Xxx
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving course of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Agno v. Cagatan
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno
against respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The record shows that respondent was the President of
International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a
corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for
overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRC's recruitment
license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and
subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned
from participating in overseas recruitment.
On September 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the
DOLE's cancellation of ISRC's license with the Office of the
President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in
respondent's favor in the Resolution dated March 30, 1993
which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both
the DOLE and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject to
the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the
amount required by law.
Since ISRC's recruitment license had already expired on
September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12, 1994, an
application for renewal of its recruitment license with the
POEA.
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal
with the Office of the President, particularly on August 9,
1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr.
Khalifa H. Juma, the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia
A. Agno.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 34
On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years
after the execution of the aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-
Affidavit for disbarment was filed with this Court by the
complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter
used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her
husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount
of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent received
the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her
inquiries with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply
with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. The
complainant found out that the said Memorandum of
Agreement could not be validated without the approval of the
Board of Directors of ISRC.
While respondent even had the complainant sign an affidavit
stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her
appointment as Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The
records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors,
officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and
her name and that of her husband did not appear as officers
and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other
hand, the complainant learned that ISRC's recruitment
license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that the respondent used for his
own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that she and her
husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that
respondent return the said sum of money, respondent issued
a bank check dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the
complainant in the amount of P500,000.00 which was
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
Despite repeated demands by complainant, the respondent
failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent. An information
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal,
charging the respondent with the said offense and a warrant
of arrest was issued against the respondent after the latter
failed several times to attend his arraignment. The
complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for
issuing a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in
assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of
Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and
officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in said
corporation the amount of P500,000.00.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held several hearings,
the last of which was on November 13, 2003. Eventually, on
October 12, 2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her
Report and Recommendation.
Thus, the Commissioner's recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent
manifested lack of candor, when he knowingly failed to
provide the complainant with accurate and complete
information due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and
to return the money received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-102 adopting and
approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and
recommendation of the investigating commissioner.
 PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 35

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred from the
practice of law. (In this case, suspension lang kay first
violation.)

Ruling:

At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondent's

challenge as to complainant's personality to file this
complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation
of October 12, 2004, respondent contends that
complainant, not being a party-in-interest in the
agreement between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,
has no legal standing to file the instant complaint.

Respondent's argument lacks merit.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court explicitly

provides that proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified
complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro
v. Meneses III, as reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, that:

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal

personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a
disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public
interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof
of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the
Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and
recommended sanctions. (Emphasis ours)

Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether

or not complainant herein was a party to the subject
transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-
interest thereto because she is mentioned as the treasurer of
ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement; as well as one of
the assignees in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC
stocks which respondent alleged to have executed; and as
the payee in the bank check issued by the respondent for the
amount of P500,000.00.

Module 9
Disciplinary Proceedings (Part 2)
Grounds for discipline
a. Violation of Lawyer’s Oath
b. Statutory grounds in Sec. 27, Rule 138 of ROC which
are:
1. Deceit
2. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
3. Grossly immoral conduct
c. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)
d. Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE)
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Procedure for Disbarment
RULE 139-B
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported
by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service; Provided, however, that all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them,
shall be filed with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, that
charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapters
who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
Officers Authorized to Investigate Disbarment Cases
(a) Supreme Court
(b) IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 36
Where to File Complaint for Disbarment
A complaint for disbarment may be filed directly in the
Supreme Court, the IBP National Office or in any IBP
Chapter Offices in the country.
Automatic Conversion
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices, Judges and Certain Court Officials as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them, A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, [September
17, 2002])
Gentlemen :
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court
En Banc dated September 17, 2002
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC Re: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and
Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and
court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also
be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a
member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated
in one decision or resolution.
This Resolution shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
shall take effect on the first day of October 2002. It shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
This Resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
De la Cruz v. Atty Luna
FACTS:
These involved cases filed against respondent Atty. Anna
Liza M. Luna, clerk of court, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty for falsifying court documents and for her failure
to properly account for court collections amounting to over
P12 million.
ISSUES:
1. Respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty?
2. Is dismissal from service and disbarment the applicable
penalty?
RULING:
1. Yes, Respondent is guilty of Misconduct and Dishonesty.
Respondent improperly and brazenly clothed herself with
judicial authority by issuing a fake court judgment and order.
There is a clear usurpation of a judicial function when a
person who is not a judge performs an act the authority for
which has been vested only upon a judge. Without doubt,
respondent's actuation constituted grave misconduct
because the act complained of was inspired by an intention

to violate the law or constituted flagrant disregard of well-
known legal rules.
She was also guilty of dishonesty, meaning "a disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray." Moreover, in falsifying court documents to
favor litigants for a fee, she likewise behaved like an
extortionist. Respondent deserves no place in the judiciary.
Respondent should have known that her office did not only
require competence or efficiency but also integrity, honesty
and uprightness.
This Court finds that the cash shortage was respondent's
accountability. As designated custodian of court funds and
properties, she was liable for any loss or shortage thereof.
Clerks of courts are the chief administrative officers of their
respective courts. With of legal fees, they perform a delicate
function as judicial officers entrusted with the correct and
effective implementation of regulations. As such, respondent
was duty-bound to use skill and diligence in the performance
of her officially designated functions. She was the
accountable officer vested with the serious responsibility of
regard to the collection collecting and depositing the money
belonging to the Court.
ITCAB, In the OCA audit report, respondent not only failed to
collect required legal fees such as ling fees on extra- judicial
foreclosure cases, advertising fees (including cost of
publication, for foreclosure sales), sheriff's commissions and
entry fees on 91 extra-judicial foreclosure cases, but also did
not remit or immediately deposit the sheriffs' fees and posting
fees she collected. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 50-95,
respondent should have deposited all her collections within
24 hours with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
2. Yes, she is dismissed from service and also disbarred
The penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment
in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, ought to be imposed.
AUTOMATIC CONVERSION:
In addition, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02- SC, we deemed
these administrative cases as disciplinary proceedings for
disbarment as well. Respondent, as an attorney and as an
officer of the court, may be disbarred (or suspended) not only
for violation of her lawyer's oath but also on the statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, namely (1) deceit; (2) malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office and (3) grossly immoral conduct.
Under the same rule, respondent "may forthwith be required
to comment on the complaint and show cause why (she)
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." Considering,
however, that said comment is not mandatory, that
respondent has categorically admitted that she falsified a
court decision/order and that the investigation of Justice
Quimbo showed her guilt beyond the shadow of doubt, we
are constrained to disbar her.
Samson v. Judge Virgilio Caballero
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and
falsification of a public document against respondent Judge
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 37
Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
Facts:
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC
interviews (to be appointed as judge), deliberately
concealed the fact that he had pending administrative
charges against him.
In his comment, respondent admitted that complainant had
lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the
Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already
dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and
executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman.
Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him
during his interviews in the JBC from February to August
2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his
nomination to and assumption of the position of judge.
However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said
cases.
The complainant filed a reply, stating that the March 24, 2004
decision of the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory
as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for review filed
on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition was even
granted.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against
respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of
Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator
(OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division. According to her,
respondent categorically denied ever having been charged
formally with any infraction.
Issue:
Is the mere checking of the box “No” to the question "Have
you ever been formally charged?" in his March 21, 2006 PDS
filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel enough to disbar the
respondent on the ground of moral unfitness? YES.
Ruling:
Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during
his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty
when he checked the box indicating "No" to the question
"Have you ever been formally charged?" in his March 21,
2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.
Respondent’s act of making an obviously false statement in
his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere
inadvertence on his part when he answered "No" to that very
simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the
question called for and what it meant, and that he was
committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it
anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle
his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges
against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative
answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges
were already dismissed was immaterial, given the
phraseology of the question "Have you ever been formally
charged?," meaning, charged at anytime in the past or
present.
This administrative case against respondent
shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance
with A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled "Re:

Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts;
and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar", provides:
Some administrative cases
against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the
court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds
for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing
instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a character is of much greater import, as far as the general
disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision
or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of
the court were treated separately. However,
pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case
against a judge of a regular court based on grounds
which are also grounds for the disciplinary action
against members of the Bar shall be automatically
considered as disciplinary proceedings against
such judge as a member of the Bar.
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,
we deemed respondent Judge Suerte's administrative
case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well,
and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the same rule, a respondent "may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as
member of the Bar." The rule does not make it
mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a
member of the bar, that respondent be required to
comment on and show cause why he should not be
disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the
order for him to comment on why he should not be held
administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other
words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order
to give an explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench
but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and
reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 38
administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This
will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to
avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of
actions by treating an administrative complaint filed
against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of
the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member
of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax
Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.
|
It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only
affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character
in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not
only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice
of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its
basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the
Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit
members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition
of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to
the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of
integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than
that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives
them the right to judge.
Confidentiality Rule
RULE 139-B, SECTION 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings
against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like
its decisions in other cases.
• The Confidentiality Rule only requires that proceedings
against attorneys be kept private and confidential.
• Distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press
is not allowed.
• However, the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
actions is not covered by the said rule.
Three Fold Purpose (Sec. 18, Rule 193-B of the Rules
of Court)
1. To enable the court and the investigator to make
the investigation free from any extraneous
influence or interference;
2. To protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons
or clients by prohibiting the publication of such
charges pending their resolution; and
3. To deter the press from publishing the charges or
proceedings based thereon.
ATTY GCC: when confronted in the future of a question
about confidentiality and there is no jurisprudence yet on

the matter that can be applied, please consider its 3-fold
purpose (court and investigator – freedom from any
extraneous influence or interference; attorney – protection
from baseless charges; press – prevention from
publication) in resolving it.
Roque, Jr. v. Catapang
Respondents were sued by petitioner for publicly announcing
in a conference at Camp Aguinaldo that a disbarment
complaint had been filed against petitioner and for distributing
a press statement about the filing of such disbarment
complaint.
SC held that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for
lawyers is not absolute and is not to be applied under any
circumstances to all disclosures of any nature. The Rule was
not applied because it involved public interest and the
announcement that a complaint had been filed did not violate
the said rule.
Formal Investigation as mandatory requirement
In complaints for disbarment, formal investigation is
mandatory.
Ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.
Tabang v. Gacott
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not
be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons. Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of
investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of
the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate
speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the
power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent
shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses
on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon
reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3)
months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for
good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order
issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt
of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator
before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged
contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary,
in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings
before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of
fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of
penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated
the formal investigation by conducting a mandatory
conference between the complainants and the respondent
after both parties have filed their complaint and answer,
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 39
respectively. The mandatory conference was supposedly
held for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the
parties to stipulate facts. However, no definitive result was
reached during the conference as respondent continued to
deny all the allegations of the complainants. After the
mandatory conference was held, no further hearings were
conducted. Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely
required the parties to submit their respective position
papers, including all the necessary documents and duly
verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the
pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents attached
thereto, the Investigating Commissioner submitted her
Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the
respondent and the imposition of the penalty of disbarment
being prayed for by complainants, the Investigating
Commissioner should not have simply relied on the parties'
position papers and the pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by them. She should have proceeded with the
investigation by conducting formal hearings and calling
upon the parties to present additional evidence to
support their respective contentions. In the case of the
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should have
required the presentation of the persons who allegedly
executed the affidavits presented in evidence to prove the
veracity of the allegations contained in said affidavits, at the
same time affording respondent the opportunity to cross-
examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the
complainants to move for the presentation of the persons
alleged to have executed the subject affidavits does not
render the IBP powerless to conduct further investigation,
considering its power to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should
have compelled the persons named by the respondent as the
original owners as well as the buyers of the subject properties
to appear before her. The appearance of these witnesses
could have easily been facilitated considering that the
residence and office addresses of the three of the supposed
buyers are all located in Makati while the residence of three
of the original owners are located within Manila and the
remaining four are residing in the province of Cavite which is
very near Metro Manila. To repeat, under the above-quoted
Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is authorized to issue
subpoena to compel the appearance of persons and
witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence
presented by complainants and respondent consists of
affidavits and photocopies of documents. Not one of the
persons who executed these affidavits and instruments was
presented or subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify
their affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to
confront the witnesses in a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and
squarely on the issues raised in the subject administrative
matter.
-Case REMANDED
Burden of proof and proceedings as sui generis
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon
the complainant and this Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case
by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.

Arienda v. Aguila
2005 case – preponderance of evidence
From the record and evidence before us, we agree in the
Commissioner's conclusion that respondent cannot be found
guilty of the charges against him. It is clearly shown that
herein respondent, Atty. Porfirio Aguila, is the legal counsel
of Elisa Menes-Arienda. As such, Atty. Aguila, as his client's
advocate has the right, nay, the duty, to file an opposition to
the petition for letters of administration filed by complainant in
order to safeguard his client's interest.
With respect to the alleged use of falsified document,
particularly the attachment of the marriage contract between
the decedent and respondent's client in the Opposition she
filed to complainant's Petition, we find no compelling reason
to deflect from the findings of the IBP Commissioner that
complainant has likewise failed to substantiate such naked
claim. A study of the document on which the complaint is
anchored shows that the photocopy is not a certified true
copy. Neither was it testified on by any witness who is in a
position to establish the authenticity of the document.
Moreover, whether or not the marriage contract was falsified
is a matter within the appreciation of the trial judge in the
special proceeding case in which the subject document was
adduced in evidence. Finally, respondent has adequately
explained in his Comment that said document was submitted
merely to prove his client's contention that the decedent
represented himself to be single and that believing that the
latter was single, she contracted marriage with him, which
union produced an offspring in the person of her daughter,
Ernessa Arienda.
Further, we find that apart from the allegations she made in
various pleadings, complainant has not proffered any proof
tending to show that respondent deliberately applied deceitful
means to warrant any administrative sanction. It is one thing
to allege deceit, misconduct, and another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting the same. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. In this regard, we
find that complainant failed to meet the required standard.
Thus, absent a showing of clear preponderant evidence to
sustain the charge against respondent, the complaint must
be dismissed.
We are not unmindful of the principle that disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis, in that they are
neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of its officers. However, although
these proceedings are not, in the strict sense, ordinary
actions where trials are held and the rules of procedure apply,
the rules on evidence cannot be shunted aside considering
that the exercise of one's profession is at stake.
Presumption, Quantum of Proof, Weight of Evidence,
and Best Evidence Rule
The prevailing proper evidentiary threshold in disciplinary
proceedings is SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant.
Goopio v. Maglalang (2018)
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 40
However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, we
have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his
complaint through substantial evidence. A complainant's
failure to dispense the same standard of proof requires no
other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court
from meting out a disbarment or suspension order.
Under the facts and the evidence presented, we hold that
complainant Goopio failed to discharge this burden of proof.
First. To prove their lawyer-client relationship, Goopio
presented before the IBP photocopies of the General Power
of Attorney she allegedly issued in Atty. Maglalang's favor, as
well as acknowledgement receipts issued by the latter for the
amounts he allegedly received. We note, however, that what
were submitted into evidence were mere photocopies, in
violation of the Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. (But because of the amendment on the Rules
on Evidence effective 2020, photocopies can now be
considered as originals, also Best Evidene Rule is changed
to Original Document Rule)
Atty GCC: Take note of the Supreme Court’s reason: “…
is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and
essential considerations attending to these types of
cases” as disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers.”
Concerned Citizen v. Divina, 2011
The issue to be resolved now is whether or not Divina is guilty
of the charges hurled against her. In this regard, the Court
determines that the findings of the OCA in its September 14,
2010 Memorandum, are well-taken.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or
such evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
the complaint.
In the present case, there is no sufficient, clear and
convincing evidence to hold Divina administratively liable for
Gross Misconduct as charged in the undated anonymous
letter. As found during the investigation, apart from the
allegation of the "Concerned Citizen," not a scintilla of
evidence was proffered to establish that she demanded and
solicited the amount of P20,000.00 from a party in a pending
case before the RTC in exchange for the prompt preparation
of the TSN. It bears to point out that the author of the undated
anonymous letter never came out in the open to testify before
the Investigating Judge to support his claim that Divina had
engaged in an illegal activity to make money out of a case
pending before the RTC.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. This brings to fore
the application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for mere allegation
is not evidence. Reliance on mere allegation, conjectures and
suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no

leg to stand on. The allegation of "Concerned Citizen" that
Divina attempted to extort P20,000.00 has remained as such
and, thus, cannot be admitted as evidence, let alone given
evidentiary weight. As it stands, this charge of attempted
extortion has remained unsubstantiated and, hence, should
be dismissed.
Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, [December 14,
2011
The Issue:
The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De
Guzman should be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint.
Ruling:
Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence
Section 3 (a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This
Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until
the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he
is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with
his oath.
Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1
of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given
fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for
the party on the judge trying the case.
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by
clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of
evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.
Considering the serious consequences of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 41
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party
with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise
doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent.
Basis for reduction of penalty imposed
Quiambao v. Bamba
-facts on p. 13
FOR THE REDUCTION OF PENALTY IMPOSED SHOULD
BE PROPERLY EXPLAINED; VIOLATION IN CASE AT
BAR.
As to the recommendation that the penalty be
reduced from a suspension of one year to a stern warning,
we find the same to be without basis. We are disturbed by the
reduction made by the IBP Board of Governors of the penalty
recommended by the investigating commissioner without
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and reasons on which
that reduction is based.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court reads in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Review and decision
by the Board of Governors. —
(a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based.
We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors as a memorandum decision adopting by
reference the report of the investigating commissioner.
However, we look with disfavor the change in the
recommended penalty without any explanation therefor.
Again, we remind the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its
legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the
reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what is
required of the decisions of courts of record. The reasons
for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any
other portion of the ratio.
Appropriate Sanction to be imposed
It is the discretion of the Court to impose the appropriate
sanction for as long as it is neither arbitrary and despotic
nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice.

Advincula v. Macabata
When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court
must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who
carry out this important function to be competent, honorable
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. While it is discretionary upon the Court to
impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper
against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary
and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer
strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with
great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only
on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of
moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while
those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character
of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they
are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation
which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out.
The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended
the commission of the offense should also be considered.
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act
of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some
minor infraction of the lawyer's duty to the court or the client.
In the Matter of Darell Adams, a lawyer was publicly
reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and
raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law.
-Respondent is REPRIMANDED
Failure to Answer in Administrative Proceeding
The sanction of one’s failure to answer in an
administrative proceeding would depend on the peculiar
circumstances of a case.
A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio
It is the wanton disregard of IBP’s and Court orders in the
course of proceedings that would merit a sanction. SC noted
that in Lao v. Medel (deliberate failure to pay just debts and
issuance of worthless checks constituting gross misconduct)
and Rangwani v. Dino (gross misconduct for issuing bad
checks in payment of a piece of property), a lawyer was
sanctioned of 1 year suspension, 2-year suspension was
considered reasonable for issuing worthless checks and
failing to pay debts and for wanton disregard of IBP’s and
Court orders in the course of proceedings.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 42
Note also the following factors considered by the SC in
A-1:
1. Respondent failed to answer the complaint;
2. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary
hearings set by IBP;
3. She also ignored the proceedings before the court – failed
to answer the complaint against her and appear during the
arraignment despite orders and notices form the court;
4. The court considered the justification of the respondent’s
mother as unmeritorious that her daughter is suffering from a
health condition as the mother failed to prove the contents of
the certificate or present the physician who issued it.
ATTY GCC NOTES:
a. Aggravating circumstance:
In my opinion, I believe that the deliberate failure to
answer a complaint in disciplinary proceedings is an
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the
appropriate sanction against a lawyer. Note that in A-1
Financial Services, SC emphasized that such conduct of
the lawyer runs counter to the precepts of the CPR as well
as the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR and violates the lawyer’s oath which
imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. I believe also that this is
aside from the nature of the offense itself.
b. Indirect contempt:
Further, please note though that a willful failure or refusal
to obey a lawful order issued by an Investigator of the IBP
handling the disciplinary proceeding constitutes indirect
contempt (see Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 139-B
of the ROC) subject to compliance with the rules provided.
c. Fine as penalty:
Note further, that in Sps. Regulto v. Teoxon (AC 10301,
April 3, 2019), SC adopted the BOG’s recommendation to
impose a fine of P5,000 for failure to comply with CBD’s
directive to file a comment to the disbarment complaint.
Failure to Comply Order
Sebastian v. Bajar
Respondent's failure to comply with the Court's directive to
file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the
part of the person concerned in the administration of justice
which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional
purpose."
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez, the Court held that failure to
comply with the Court's directive to comment on a letter-
complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination,
or disrespect. In Cuizon v. Macalino, a lawyer's failure to
comply with the Court's Resolutions requiring him to file his
comment was one of the infractions that merited his
disbarment.
Silence as Implied Admission
HDI Holdings Philippines, Inc. v. Cruz

However, in the instant case, Atty. Cruz has chosen to
remain silent despite the severity of the allegations
against him. He was given several opportunities to comment
on the charges yet no comment came. The natural instinct of
man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature to
just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. Silence in such cases is almost always
construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.
Consequently, we are left with no choice but to deduce his
implicit admission of the charges levelled against him. Qui
tacet consentive videtur. Silence gives consent.
Can the members of the Board of Governors of the
IBP be held liable in damages for prematurely
recommending disbarment of a lawyer based on
position papers and affidavits of witnesses of the
parties? NO.
Cadiz v. Presiding Judge, Br. 48, RTC-Puerto Princesa
Ruling of the Court
Atty. Gacott states in his complaint for damages before the
RTC that Supreme Court's remand of his case to the IBP
Board is an affirmation of the latter's arbitrary abuse of its
investigatory power. The IBP Board recommended his
disbarment based on the Commissioner's report rendered to
it without the benefit of exhaustive hearing. This made its
members personally liable for actual, moral, and corrective
damages. Essentially, therefore, Atty. Gacott anchored his
complaint for damages on the result of the Court's
assessment of the IBP Board's report and recommendation
and its remand of the case against him for further
proceedings.
The petitioner IBP Board members are correct in
claiming that Atty. Gacott's complaint states no cause of
action. The IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors in
this case merely exercised delegated powers to
investigate the complaint against Atty. Gacott and
submit their report and recommendation to the Court.
They cannot be charged for honest errors committed in the
performance of their quasi-judicial function. And that was
what it was in the absence of any allegation of specific factual
circumstances indicating that they acted maliciously or upon
illicit consideration. If the rule were otherwise, a great number
of lower court justices and judges whose acts the appellate
courts have annulled on ground of grave abuse of discretion
would be open targets for damage suits.
Parenthetically, Atty. Gacott submitted the disbarment case
against him for resolution based on the position papers that
he and the complainants presented, without reservation, to
the IBP along with the affidavits of their witnesses. The IBP
Board prepared its report and recommendation to the Court
based on these papers and documents.
Filing of motion for reconsideration
Gerona v. Datingaling
Complainant filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against the respondent for allegedly falsifying a document
entitled "Consent to Quarry" and notarizing it afterwards.
Complainant contended that despite knowledge of the falsity
of the document, respondent notarized it. Complainant further
alleged that she, together with her siblings, did not appear
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 43
before the respondent on July 2, 1997 and did not sign each
and every page of the document as stated by the respondent
in his acknowledgment. Respondent denied the allegations
against him and insisted that he had no participation in the
transaction. He claimed that he merely notarized the
document on the representation of the persons who
appeared before him.
The Supreme Court found that the respondent violated
Section 1 (a) of Act No. 2103. It held that respondent, as a
notary public, had a duty to require the persons claiming to
have executed the document to appear personally before him
and to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated in
the document. If the parties were represented by other
persons, their representatives' names should appear in the
said documents as the one who had executed the same and
the latter should be required to affirm their acts. Respondent
failed to do this. Respondent should have known that the
acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a
private document is converted into a public document,
making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. No less than the public faith in the integrity of
public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.
Thus, for his infraction, the Court suspended the respondent
from his commission as a notary public for a period of one
year.
REVIEW AND DECISION BY THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS; A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY
BE FILED BY A PARTY WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM NOTICE.
—
Rule 139-B, § 12(b) provides:
Section 12. — Review and decision by the Board of
Governors. . . .
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue
a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations
which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for
reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v.
Villanueva that although Rule 139-B, § 12(c) does not
mention motions for reconsideration, there is nothing in its
text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion.
A motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors may be filed within 15 days from notice to a
party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion before the
Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this
Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.
Be that as it may and considering that the motion for
reconsideration was filed after the records of this case had
been forwarded to this Court, we have decided to treat the
motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of
Rule 139-B, §12.
DEFENSES
Effect of desistance
• Reliance on Affidavit of Desistance to secure
exoneration is misplaced because:

1. the Affidavit, while filed with the trial court, was
not filed in the administrative case;
2. Court has consistently frowned upon the
desistance because of legal (Rule 139-B, Sec. 5)
and jurisprudential injunction (Rangwani v. Dino,
citing Bolivar v. Simbol) (Wilkie v. Limos)
Wilkie v. Limos
Respondent, however, to secure her exoneration from the
consequence of her act in issuing worthless checks, heavily
relies on the complainant's Affidavit of Desistance dated
August 24, 2005. But such reliance is misplaced because
while the complainant filed his affidavit with the trial court, he
did not do the same thing in this case. Notably, at the time of
the mandatory conference/hearing before the CBD on March
29, 2006, complainant did not even inform the Commissioner
that he already desisted in prosecuting the criminal cases he
filed with the MTC against the respondent and that such
desistance resulted in the dismissal of said cases. In any
event, the Court has consistently frowned upon the
desistance of complainants because of legal and
jurisprudential injunction.
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides in part:
Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
Pertinently in Rangwani v. Dino, citing Bolivar v. Simbol, the
Court ruled that the discipline of lawyers cannot be cut
short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges. We
ratiocinated, thus:
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this
settlement operated as an absolution and remission of his
offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the
exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil
remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his
profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an
attorney at the bar, and without " good fidelity" to his client.
The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus settle
or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.
Effect of Pardon
Tiong v. Florendo
• by the legal spouse on the charge of gross immorality (akin
to an affidavit of desistance)
- cannot abate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer
It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is
sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as
in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of
respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of
the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to
an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating
the instant proceedings.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 44
• Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 581) – executive pardon by President
operates to wipe out the conviction as well as the offense
itself, the grant thereof in favor of a lawyer is a bar to a
proceeding.
However, the same does not apply to:
1. Does not automatically entitle the disbarred lawyer to
reinstatement
2. Disciplinary action that is based not solely on the
lawyer’s commission of the offense but on a transaction
involved or related therein which culminated in his
conviction
Effect of pending criminal charges
Pending criminal cases against a lawyer is not an obstacle
to an administrative proceeding citing Gatchalian where a
finding of guilt in criminal case will not necessarily result
in finding of liability in admin case and that conversely the
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. (Bayonla v. Reyes)
Bayonla v. Reyes
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent
The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against
Bayonla and of the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty.
Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of Atty. Reyes to
render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla.
Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative
matter from proceeding on its due course. It is indisputable
that the pendency of any criminal charges between the
lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative
proceedings against the lawyer. We explained why in
Suzuki v. Tiamson, to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two
will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. In this light, we
refer to this Court's ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing In re
Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui genesis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination
of respondent's administrative liability and our findings herein
should not in any way be treated as having any material bearing
on any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. [emphasis supplied]
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza that —
 PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 45

. . . a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not

necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent's acquittal
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In
the same vein, the trial court's finding of civil liability against
the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in
the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a
favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer.

It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous

pendency of an administrative case and a judicial proceeding
related to the cause of the administrative case, even if the
charges and the evidence to be adduced in such cases are
similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness, or
prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the parties in either
of the cases.

Difference between criminal case and administrative

case

Freeman v. Reyes

A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and

each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case. Section 5, in relation to Sections 1
and 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the
dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the
continuance of a separate and independent action for
administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary
to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence.
Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa
against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An
administrative case can proceed independently, even if there
was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and
defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the
prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed. More so,
in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court
granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information
and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence.

Prescription
• 2-year prescription under Rule VIII of CBD Rules in
Isenhardt v. Real is no longer found under 2012 CBD
Rules)
• Bar discipline cases do not prescribe (Heirs of
Alilano v. Examen)

Module 10
Judicial Conduct
Observance of law and compliance with court’s
order or process
A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC, effective June 1, 2004
ADOPTING THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
WHEREAS, at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices
held at the Peace Palace. The Hague, on 25–26 November
2002, at which the Philippine Supreme Court was
represented by the Chief Justice and Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno, the Bangalore Draft of the Code of Judicial
Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening
Judicial Integrity was deliberated upon and approved after
incorporating therein several amendments;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft, as amended, is intended to
be the Universal Declaration of Judicial Standards applicable
in all judiciaries;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft is founded upon a universal
recognition that a competent, independent and impartial
judiciary is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in
upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law; that public
confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority
and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost importance in a
modem democratic society; and, that it is essential that
judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor
judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and
maintain confidence in the judicial system;
WHEREAS, the adoption of the universal declaration of
standards for ethical conduct of judges embodied in the
Bangalore Draft as revised at the Round Table Conference
of Chief Justices at The Hague is imperative not only to
update and correlate the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted for the Philippines, but also
to stress the Philippines' solidarity with the universal clamor
for a universal code of judicial ethics.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts this New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Rule Banning Employment of Spouses of Justices in
the Supreme Court, CA, Sandiganbayan, and CTA as
Co-terminous Employees, A.M. No. 07-3-02-CA, [March
6, 2006]
IN RE : Rule Banning the Employment of Spouses of Justices
in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and
Court of Tax Appeals as Co-Terminus Employees
WHEREAS, one of the objectives of the Judicial Reform
Program is to have a judiciary steeped and strict in ethics;
WHEREAS, to implement its Judicial Reform Program, the
Supreme Court adopted on April 27, 2004, the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary in A.M. No. 03-
05-01-SC;
WHEREAS, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary is premised, among others, on the fact
that ". . . public confidence in the judicial system and in the
moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 46
importance in a modern democratic society; and . . . it is
essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect
and honor judicial office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system";
WHEREAS, to enforce the letter and the spirit of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary calling
for an ethical judiciary that is above suspicion, it is necessary
to control and regulate the employment of spouses of
Justices in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals as coterminous
employees;
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the employment of spouses of
Justices in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals as
coterminous employees is prohibited. Spouses presently
employed and covered by this rule shall be deemed resigned
as of March 31, 2007 at the close of office hours.
Reminder on the Rule Regarding Gambling and
Casinos, OCA Circular No. 231-15, [October 12, 2015]
TO : All Judges and Court Personnel
SUBJECT : Reminder on the Rule Regarding
Gambling and Casinos
Considering that the Annual Convention of the Philippine
Judges Association on 14-16 October 2015 will be held at the
Marriott Hotel, which is within the Newport City Complex,
Pasay City, which also houses a casino, all judges and
court personnel are strictly REMINDED of the prohibition
against gambling or being seen in casinos.
Section 14 (4) (a), Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended, prohibits government officials from playing in
casinos.
The Supreme Court, in Circular No. 4, dated 27 August 1980,
ruled that "judges of inferior courts and court personnel
are enjoined from playing in or being present in gambling
casinos," and cited par. 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
decrees that "a judge's official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not
only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
Section 1, Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, also mandates that "judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities."
Proper Use of Social Media, OCA Circular No. 173-17,
[August 17, 2017]
TO : All Judges and Court Personnel of First
and Second Level Courts
SUBJECT : Proper Use of Social Media
It has been observed that some judges and court personnel
have been taking active part in social networking sites by
sharing personal photographs and updates, and posting their
views and comments on certain issues and current events.
While judges and court personnel are not prohibited from
engaging in social media, they are reminded that when they

do, "they do not thereby shed off their status as members of
the judiciary." Using a social networking site, e.g., Facebook,
Twitter, and Instagram, is an exercise of freedom of
expression; however, there are restrictions upon a judge's
conduct inherent in the office.
Photographs and commentaries, including "sharing" and
"liking" posts, that are otherwise acceptable for the general
public may be considered inappropriate for members of the
judiciary due to the higher standard of integrity, candor and
fairness reposed on them. Accordingly, "in communicating
and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in
mind that what they communicate — regardless of whether it
is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties —
creates and contributes to the people's opinion not just of the
judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part.
This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but
by acquaintances and the general public."
As the visible personification of law and justice, judges and
court employees have a higher standard of conduct. The
standard of conduct expected from members of judiciary is
much higher than an ordinary man. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in the exercise
of their freedom of expression, "they shall always conduct
themselves in a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary."
Thus, judges and court personnel are reminded to conduct
themselves in a way that would not call into question the
dignity of the Judiciary. Judges and court personnel, like
Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. "[T]hey must exhibit
the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint." They must avoid "impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety" in all of their activities, whether these be in the
course of their duty or in their personal lives. They are also
reminded that as public officials, they "must at all times be
accountable and lead modest lives."
All told, judges and court personnel who participate in social
media are enjoined to be cautious and circumspect in posting
photographs, liking posts and making comments in public on
social networking sites, for "public confidence in the judiciary
(may be) eroded by their irresponsible or improper conduct."
Conflict of Interest
Maddela III v. Pamintuan
Respondent violated the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary by engaging
in conflict-of-interest activities.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that "[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge." Further, Section 1 of Canon 4 provides that "[j]udges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities."
Meanwhile, Section 4 of Canon 1 states that "[j]udges shall
not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 47
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge."
Respondent admitted that he engaged in the following
activities: (1) the organization of the Freddie Aguilar concert
and solicitation of donations therefor; (2) the celebration of
the 60th birthday of his wife in a venue owned by a person
who apparently has a pending case for trafficking in the RTC
of Olongapo City; and (3) the organization of a shooting event
in his name and request of donations therefor.
The Court finds that his participation in the above
activities, while not directly related to his judicial
functions, duties, and responsibilities, nonetheless
constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. As previously stated,
judges are mandated to avoid the appearance of impropriety
in their activities. Further, judges shall not allow others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence him. By engaging in such activities that impart a
sense of impropriety, respondent violated provisions of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. It
also conveys the impression that he may be influenced by
certain people involved in the said activities.
With regard to the following imputations: (1) that respondent
personally followed up on the case of a friend pending before
the court of Judge David; and (2) that he established, ran, and
promoted a surety bonding company with the assistance of
Ms. Tulio, the Court finds that these deserve scant
consideration. The imputations are unsupported by any
competent proof.
The allegation that he followed up on a case pending before
Judge David's court is a bare assertion. Judge David merely
stated in her January 28, 2015 Affidavit that she received
reports from her staff that respondent came to her office to
follow up on the case of People of the Philippines v.
Evangeline Kim, in which Park Tae Min is the private
complainant. She further stated that she learned from her
clerk of court and interpreter that Park Tae Min is
respondent's friend who accompanied him to Korea. Clearly,
these statements are mere hearsay and cannot be given any
weight.
As to the allegation that respondent established, ran, and
promoted a surety bonding company with the assistance of
Ms. Tulio, the Court rules that the evidence on record does
not support such a finding. As observed by Investigating
Justice Inting, "the documents submitted to substantiate
respondent Judge Pamintuan's alleged involvement in a
surety bonding company, i.e., calling card, flyer and
Certification of Accreditation and Authority, provide no clear
indication that he is connected to and responsible for the
company's operations."
On the activities he admitted participating in, respondent is
held administratively liable for violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Administer justice impartially and without delay
Puyo v. Go
Is the respondent also guilty of undue delay in resolving
the complainant's motions? YES.

The answer is in the affirmative. The respondent was guilty
of undue delay and should be accordingly sanctioned.
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires every
judge to administer justice impartially and without delay.
The Code of Judicial Conduct also mandates every judge to
dispose of his court's business promptly and to decide cases
within the required periods. The precepts on promptness
imposed the duty to dispose of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied. This
duty is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary demanding of
judges to perform all their judicial duties efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.
The respondent was tasked to resolve the complainant's
motion for contempt filed on November 25, 2004, and motion
to dismiss filed on January 13, 2005. In addition, he was
expected to act on the complainant's communication dated
July 25, 2005 entitled Follow Up on the Status of the Case.
There is no question that the respondent did not act on
both motions, and did not also respond to the inquiry on
the status of the pending motions. His inactions
constituted gross dereliction of duty. The failure to decide
a case or to resolve a motion within the reglementary period
amounted to gross inefficiency and warranted the imposition
of administrative sanctions against him.
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution expressly proclaims
that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." Such provision accentuates the reality
that any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives the litigant of his right to the speedy disposition
of his case, and underscores that the delay not only magnifies
the cost of access to justice but as well undermines the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary, thereby
lowering its standards and bringing it to disrepute.
Compounding the respondent's sins was his failure to
explain the delay despite the directive of the Court
Administrator. His failure should be construed as his
lack of suitable and acceptable explanations for the
inaction on the complainant's motions and inquiry. He
thereby showed that he had no explanation, and was not
interested in clearing his name. As such, he should be taken
to task because every respondent in administrative
proceedings should respond to all accusations or allegations
of misconduct made against him because his foremost
obligation was to preserve the integrity of the Judiciary. His
silence was an admission of the charge of negligence.
We approve the recommendation of the Court Administrator,
and find and hold that the respondent's inaction constituted
undue delay in resolving the motions. Section 9 (1), Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Matter
No. 01-8-10-SC (Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges)
classifies the respondent's undue delay as a less serious
offense. Under Section 11 (B) of Rule 140, the offense is
punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three
months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
It is relevant to note that the respondent had been dismissed
from the Judiciary effective on April 10, 2012 for his failure to
comply with the directives of the Court in connection with the
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 48
performance of his official duties, and all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, had been declared
forfeited. Also, he was banned from reemployment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government,
including government-owned or government-controlled
corporations.
Given all the foregoing observations, we consider the Court
Administrator's recommended penalty of P11,000.00 fine
proper, the same to be paid by the respondent directly, or to
be deducted from the balance of his accrued leave credits, if
any.
Gross/Serious Misconduct
Office of the Court Administrator v. Salise
Consequently, the Court finds Judge Salise guilty of serious
misconduct.
Indeed, it is settled that, unless the acts were committed with
fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may
not be administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance
of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of
judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases. However, when the inefficiency springs from a failure
to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or
principle, the judge is either too incompetent or undeserving
of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious
that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission in
bad faith and in grave abuse of authority. Here, the attendant
circumstances would reveal that Judge Salise's acts
contradict any claim of good faith.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary
actions for every erroneous order or decision he issues, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive
and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. If
judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the
law, there will be, not only confusion in the administration of
justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements under the law and established rules. For
repeatedly and deliberately committing irregularities in the
disposition of his cases, thereby manifesting corrupt
inclinations, Judge Salise can be said to have misused said
powers.
Indubitably, Judge Salise violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct ordering judges to ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in
the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. He simply
used oversight, inadvertence, and honest mistake as
convenient excuses. He acted with conscious indifference to
the possible undesirable consequences to the parties
involved.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be
grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not
a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties

of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
To hold a judge administratively liable for serious misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the
exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that
his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption,
malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice. The Court has repeatedly and consistently held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them impartial justice.
They must trust the judge; otherwise, they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness; otherwise,
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice
they expect. Judge Salise's acts indubitably violated said trust
and confidence, seriously impairing the image of the judiciary
to which he owes the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep it
at all times above reproach and worthy of the people's trust.
Judicial temperament
Antiporda v. Ante
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that
would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and
exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient, and
courteous, both in conduct and in language.
In this case, the OCA, affirming the findings of Judge
Balloguing, found that respondent's behavior towards
complainant amounted to a conduct that the Court cannot
countenance. Apart from being a display of arrogance,
respondent's demeanor and actuations, which resulted in
physical injuries to complainant, are in direct contravention of
the virtues of patience, sobriety, and self-restraint so
espoused by the Court and highly expected of a member of
the judiciary. Regardless of the reason for the incident,
respondent, being a magistrate, should have observed
judicial temperament which requires him to be always
temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.
Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave
misconduct, which the Court defines as "a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law, or a disregard of established rules, which must be proven
by substantial evidence, as in this case.
Immorality
Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala
Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 49
We also agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Dagala is
guilty of immorality. In his Comment, Judge Dagala has
admitted "without any remorse" that he "was able to
impregnate" three different women. This is an admission that
he is the father of "B's" son, who was born on March 24, 2008,
while his marriage with "A" was subsisting.
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of judges
and justices under the Rules of Court. The New Canon of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges
to avoid "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
their activities."
The Court unequivocally reminds justices and judges that
until the Congress grants absolute divorce, or unless they
have secured a court annulment of their marriage or a
judgment of nullity, a failed marriage does not justify acts of
immorality.
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr. (Castillo), we laid down the
doctrine of no dichotomy of morality. We explained why
judges as public officials are also judged by their private
morals:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality:
a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety
at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life
[cannot] simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public
service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance
of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Thus, in Castillo, we dismissed a judge from service for siring
a child outside of wedlock and for engaging in an extramarital
affair. The absence of a public and private dichotomy when it
comes to the ethical standards expected of judges and
justices has since become an unyielding doctrine as
consistently applied by the Court in subsequent cases.
Delay in rendering decisions or inefficiency
Re: Mario O. Trinidad, A.M. No. 20-07-96-RTC
(Resolution), [September 1, 2020]
After a perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the
findings and recommendations of the OCA.
The foregoing are undisputed facts as they are based court
records. The irregularities speak for themselves and require
no in-depth discussion. In effect, the evidence against Judge
Trinidad, speaks of his infractions as to justify the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
This is not the first time that the principle has been applied in
administrative cases. In a number of cases, the Court applies
the res ipsa loquitur principle in removing judicial officers and
personnel from office. As can be gathered from the cases
decided in this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur has been

defined as the "the thing speaks for itself" and "the fact
speaks for itself." It is even asserted that there is no more
need for any further investigation."
On the charge of Undue Delay in Rendering Decisions
and Resolutions of Pending Incidents,
and Gross Inefficiency.
The Constitution expressly provides that all lower courts
should decide or resolve cases or matters within three
months from the date of submission. Section 5, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides:
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.
Accordingly, this Court has laid down certain guidelines to
ensure the compliance with this mandate. More particularly,
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed
by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted
in their courts.
Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are
given a period of three months to do so.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-88 further
states:
6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all
motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Sub judice Rule
Given the foregoing rules, the Court cannot overstress its
policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in
the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue
delay. Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly
adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition of cases and
observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases, which is three months from the filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts. To
further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has
issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999) that would ensure the speedy disposition
of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously
observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.
In the instant case, we have considered the justifications and
explanations proffered by Judge Trinidad, however, while
they may be recognized as true and reasonable, they are not
sufficient to exonerate him from liability. Indeed, as the OCA
noted, Judge Trinidad's explanations cannot exculpate him
from his administrative liability for undue delay in deciding the
two (2) cases and in resolving the pending incidents for
resolution in forty-six (46) cases. The inordinate delay was
not just in terms of days or months, but delay in terms of
years. Aside from the said undecided cases and unresolved
incidents, there were, as of the date of the judicial audit,
eighty-four (84) pending incidents that remained to be
resolved; forty-one (41) cases which were considered as
dormant, there being no further action and/or further setting
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 50
thereon; and the absence of hearings in some criminal cases
for one (1) to two (2) years.
We are also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts, as
well as the different circumstances or situations that judges
may encounter during trial, thus, the Court has allowed
reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but
such extensions must first be requested from the Court.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he
has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension
of time to resolve it. However, there is no showing that
Judge Trinidad requested for any extension of time
within which to decide the said civil cases and the said
pending incidents for resolution. A judge cannot by himself
choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law.
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay.
Failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate. Judges must decide cases
and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the
administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a
speedy disposition of their case and undermines the people's
faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied.
Delay in rendering decisions and resolutions of pending
incidents already submitted for resolution is a serious
violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and a
blatant violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, which require judge to dispose of
court businesses promptly.
Re: Republic v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, [July 17,
2018])
Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or
before a judge or court; or matters under judicial
consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts
comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial
proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and
witnesses, the public in general, and most especially to
members of the Bar and the Bench.
Historically, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to
insulate members of the jury from being influenced by
prejudicial publicity. It was aimed to prevent comment and
debate from exerting any influence on juries and prejudicing
the positions of parties and witnesses in court proceedings.
Relatedly, in 2010, the late Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, in filing Senate Bill No. 1852, also known as the
Judicial Right to Know Act, explained that sub judice is a
foreign legal concept, which originated and is applicable to
countries who have adopted a trial by jury system. She
emphasized the difference between a jury system and the
Philippine court system, implying the inapplicability of the
concept in our jurisdiction.
Acknowledging the fact that sub judice is a foreign concept,
Justice Arturo Brion noted in a Separate Opinion that in our
jurisdiction, the Rules of Court does not contain a specific
provision imposing the sub judice rule. He, however, opined
that "the fact that the jury system is not adopted in this
jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the

sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from
members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive
effects of media." In fact, sub judice rule finds support in the
provision on indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
— x x x, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section
1 of this Rule;
d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx.
As can be observed, discussions regarding sub judice often
relates to contempt of court. In this regard, respondent
correctly pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule
should be applied in determining whether, in a particular
situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised to
maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or
the Constitutionally-protected freedom of speech should be
upheld. Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al.,
the Court explained:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in
nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really
appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of
a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them
to conduct their business unhampered by publications and
comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the
maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule
may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional
boundary between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be
punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the
utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech
should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt
of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 51
a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must
constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat. (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing
that there must exist a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice for statements or utterances covered
by the sub judice rule to be considered punishable under the
rules of contempt.
The case at bar, however, is not a contempt proceeding.
The Court, in this case is not geared towards protecting itself
from such prejudicial comments outside of court by the
exercise of its inherent contempt power. Rather, in this
administrative matter, the Court is discharging its
Constitutionally-mandated duty to discipline members of
the Bar and judicial officers.
As We have stated in Our decision in the quo warranto case,
actions in violation of the sub judice rule may be dealt
with not only through contempt proceedings but also
through administrative actions. This is because a lawyer
speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant
reasons: one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the
judicial process; and two, the significant dangers that a
lawyer's speech poses to the trial process. Hence, the Court
En Banc resolved to treat this matter in this separate
administrative action. Indeed, this Court has the plenary
power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceeding, aimed to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the Bar and to preserve the nobility and honor of
the legal profession.
Thus, contrary to respondent's argument, the "clear and
present danger" rule does not find application in this case.
What applies in this administrative matter is the CPR and
NCJC, which mandate the strict observance of the sub judice
rule both upon members of the Bar and the Bench,
specifically:
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE
MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Rule 13.02 — A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE
PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
CANON 1 — INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and
a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore
uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
any court or administrative agency.
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards
for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and

enhance the institutional and operational independence of
the judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards
of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in
the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.
Besides, as We have stated in the quo warranto case
decision, the Court takes judicial notice of the undeniably
manifest detrimental effect of this open and blatant disregard
of the sub judice rule, which is a clear manifestation of the evil
sought to be prevented by the said rule, i.e., "to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice." In the said decision, We cited the
May 2, 2018 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, wherein
certain individuals from different sectors of the society,
lawyers included, not only pre-judged the case but worse,
accused certain Members of the Court of being unable to act
with justice, and threatening that the people will not accept
any decision of such Members of the Court as the same is
tainted by gross injustice. To be sure, these statements do
not only "tend to" but categorically force and attempt to
influence the deliberative and decision-making process of this
Court.
Albeit advancing explanations of her actions, respondent
undoubtedly violated the above-cited provisions of the CPR
and the NCJC.
Henceforth, respondent is expected to be more circumspect,
discerning, and respectful to the Court in all her utterances
and actions. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law
is neither a natural right nor a Constitutional right demandable
or enforceable by law. It is a mere privilege granted by this
Court premised on continuing good behavior and ethical
conduct, which privilege can be revoked or cancelled by this
Court for just cause.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno is found guilty of violating CANON 13,
Rule 13.02, and CANON 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON 1, Sections 1
and 2 of CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4 of CANON 3, and
Sections 2 and 6 of CANON 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Thereby, after deep
reflection and deliberation, in lieu of suspension, respondent
is meted the penalty of REPRIMAND with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense or any offense
violative of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility shall merit a heavier penalty of a fine and/or
suspension or disbarment.
Separate penalties for every offense
Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, A.M.
No. RTJ-18-2520, [October 9, 2018]
The Court finds it opportune to herein settle the conflict by
resolving that henceforth, in administrative cases involving
judges and justices of the lower courts, the respondent
shall be charged and penalized under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, and accordingly, separate penalties shall be
imposed for every offense. The penalty provisions under the
RRACCS shall not apply in such cases. To avoid any
confusion, the underlying considerations therefor shall be
explicated below.
PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 52
Anchored on constitutional mandates, the Court issued two
(2) separate body of rules to govern judicial discipline cases,
to wit:
(a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court to apply to judges and
justices of lower courts; and
(b) The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (CCCP),
which incorporates the RRACCS, to apply to all judiciary
personnel "who are not justices or judges."
Hence, in resolving administrative cases against judges or
justices of the lower courts, reference need only be made
to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as regards the charges, as
well as the imposable penalties. If the respondent judge or
justice is found liable for two (2) or more charges, separate
penalties shall be imposed on him/her such that Section
50 of the RRACCS shall have no application in imposing
sanctions.
Consistent with these cases, the Court resolves that in
administrative cases wherein the respondent court
personnel commits multiple administrative infractions, the
Court, adopting Section 50 of the RRACCS, shall impose the
penalty corresponding to the most serious charge, and
consider the rest as aggravating circumstances.
Thus, to summarize the foregoing discussion,
the following guidelines shall be observed:
(a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall
exclusively govern administrative
cases involving judges or justices of
the lower courts. If the respondent
judge or justice of the lower court is
found guilty of multiple offenses under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the
Court shall impose separate
penalties for each violation; and
(b) The administrative liability of court
personnel (who are not judges or
justices of the lower courts) shall be
governed by the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, which incorporates,
among others, the civil service laws
and rules. If the respondent court
personnel is found guilty of multiple
administrative offenses, the Court
shall impose the penalty
corresponding to the most serious
charge, and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating
circumstances.
The multiplicity of penalties to be imposed on
judges and justices is consistent with the higher level of
decorum expected from them. Nevertheless, it must be
pointed out that the guidelines herein set forth are based
on the prevailing legal framework in judicial discipline
cases, which the Court may, in its discretion, eventually
revise through the proper administrative issuance. After
all, the power of supervision over all judiciary personnel
is exclusively vested in the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Candelario
V. Gonzalez, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 is hereby
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of
P30,000.00. Likewise, he is found GUILTY of Undue
 PALE Finals Notes 2021 by Louis Belarma 53

Delay in Rendering an Order and accordingly, meted the

penalty of FINE in the amount of P11,000.00. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.