Lehrstuhl für Digital Economics

Prof. Dr. Florian Hett

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Work on the subject

Self-Selection
Self-selection attitudes of consumers when choosing between CSR and non -CSR
Products in relation to third party punisher games

Submitted the 22. August 2018 by:

Maria Alejandra Villacis Jara

Matriculation number: 2719237

7. Semester

Subject of study: Economics

Jakob-Welder-Weg 4

55128 Mainz

E-mail: mvillacs@uni-mainz.de
Topic table

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 1: Definitions ................................................................................................................ 4

1.1 Self-selection ............................................................................................................... 4

1.2 Corporate social responsibility ......................................................................................... 4

1.3 Corporate reputation ......................................................................................................... 5

Chapter 2: Experiment ............................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Dictator game ................................................................................................................... 6

2.2 Third-party punishment game .......................................................................................... 6

2.3 Game choice explanation.................................................................................................. 6

Chapter 3: Method ...................................................................................................................... 7

Chapter 4: Results and comparison ............................................................................................ 8

4.1 First results ....................................................................................................................... 8

4.2 Observations ..................................................................................................................... 9

4.3 Detailed results ................................................................................................................. 9

4.4 Age relevance ................................................................................................................. 13

4.5 Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 5: Summary and conclusion ....................................................................................... 16

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 18

Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 19

Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung der Bachelorarbeit ........................................................ 20

Eidesstattliche Erklärung.......................................................................................................... 21
Introduction

Broadly seen, when talking about corporate social responsibility or CSR, it refers to the actions
and attitudes a company takes, in respect to its public or stakeholder obligations (Bhattacharya
& Sen, 2004). From clothes manufactures to big food chains, companies of all sizes and sorts
are constantly being pushed towards a socially responsible behavior. Wherever they may look,
workers, actioners, consumers or providers, they will all, in their own ways, push towards a
more socially responsible performance (Welford & Frost, 2006).

In the recent years, corporate social responsibility has become a priority for most organizations,
in fact companies nowadays are not only being pushed to being more consciously aware, many
themselves, are working hard to establish multiple strategies that can balance both profitability
and social responsibility given the fact that it creates a positive reputation. This is a trend that
has been all around the globe according to a CSR study realized by CONE Communications.
In countries like Germany, the USA, Japan or Brazil, consumers have high expectations and
companies show their support for CSR issues in hopes that benefits for society, the environment
or the community in general will follow (CONE, 2015).

In this work, my objective is to analyze consumer’s self-selection behaviors in relation to the

level of corporate social responsibility in Ecuador, as well as their self-selection behaviors
during a dictator game with a third-party punisher, to prove that consumers that punish more as
a third party during the game will prefer to buy the more socially responsible products. In order
to achieve that, I will first describe and define the concept of self-selection, corporate social
responsibility and corporate reputation, as well as the link between both of these. After
introducing the initial information in chapter 1, in chapter 2 I will explain the model of the
dictator game itself, the concept of a third party punishing game and of course the link between
the games and the relationship between consumer and companies when it comes to socially
responsible products. For this purpose, I have prepared a survey about buyer´s self-selection
that has been based in a dictator game with a third-party type of experiment and a survey about
a hypothetical dictator game, both will be described in chapter 3. On chapter 4, there will be a
comparison of all the results acquired as well as an analysis of the data. Finally, chapter 5
includes a summary from the results as well as a conclusion.

3
Chapter 1: Definitions

1.1 Self-selection
“Self-selecting” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as the action of selecting
something for oneself (def. 2).

The entire concept of self-selection is based in the Roy model. In this theory, the central concept
is adaptation, people are subjected to a stimulus, they scan the environment, develop a response
in relation to the stimuli and they adapt.

When given the choice, and after they have scanned the environment, humans´ response in
relation to the stimuli will be, for the most part, to self-select into the alternative that is most
advantageous or with the highest payoff for themselves (Kirkeboen, Leuven , & Mogstad ,
2016).

1.2 Corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility or CSR is a broad term usually used to define the efforts that
companies make regularly in order to induce a positive change in its own behaviors and those
of its suppliers (Shnayder, Van Rijnsoever, & Hekkert, 2015). It encircles everything from
philanthropic and ethical actions to social justice and sustainability-focused behaviors.

CSR is most commonly based on the triple bottom line framework (3BL), and it follows the
pattern of: People, planet and profit; care about the community and its people, take care of the
environment and still be able to make a profit for the company and at the same time to benefit
society, all this is the basis of the "sustainability" that companies are looking for (Shnayder,
Van Rijnsoever, & Hekkert, 2015).

The different types of CSR actions a company could take depend on the industry it belongs to
(Hillman & Keim, 2001), so for example companies in the pharmaceutical industry could be
asked to donate free medicaments and vaccines to third world countries while companies in the
oil and gas industry are encouraged to show more care for the environment.

In the recent years, corporate social responsibility has become a priority for most organizations,
and this is in large part due to the assumed link between CSR and Corporate reputations.

4
1.3 Corporate reputation
According to Professor Dowling, corporate reputation is an overall evaluation that reflects the
extent to which people see the firm as substantially “good” or “bad” (Dowling, 2004). She states
that companies with good reputations are better perceived and are easier for the consumer to
trust.

The identity of a company itself is obviously crucial, especially for the internal stakeholders,
for example the workers or the actioners, however the perception of a company is equally as
important when it comes to the external stakeholders as are the consumers. This is due the fact
that people make decisions not only based on reality, but also based on their perceptions
(Fomburn & Van Riel, 2004) and therefore reputations are so important, not only for people in
general but also for companies.

It is argued that there is a link between an organization´s good reputation and a high level of
corporate social responsibility (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2016), this link is created in relation to the
assumption that a company that is doing good deeds is a good company (Bhattacharya & Sen,
2004) with positive characteristics.

That said, it is also important to note that there has been evidence indicating that CSR activities
improve a firm´s reputation only when consumers can accredit these activities to sincere
motives. On the contrary, if the motives are observed to be fake or dishonest, the CSR activities
not only are ineffective, but they could end up hurting the company´s reputation (Yoon,
Giirhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006).

Currently, thanks to technology, information travels faster and is more available through the
internet therefore accessing information regarding a company´s activities is much simpler. This
has indisputable increased people´s awareness of how firms make and distribute their profits
and how they confront their social responsibilities.

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Chapter 2: Experiment

2.1 Dictator game

The way that a basic dictator game works is simple in nature. Two players (players 1 and 2) are
given a certain amount of money in order to play the game. As a rule, player 1 becomes “the
dictator” and decides how to split the endowment between the two of them, player 2 doesn’t
get a choice of how much he will receive.

2.2 Third-party punishment game

For purpose of this experiment, a third player will be needed, changing the game to a dictator
game with a third-party punisher.

The game doesn´t change in nature, the dictator game runs as previously explained. The only
difference is on the third player (player 3) that will act as an impartial judge. His role is to
observe the decision made by player 1 and then to decide whether player 1 is deserving of
punishment at a personal cost.

Since punishment is not obligatory and assigning punishment is costly to player 3, a purely self-
interested player 3 never punishes.

2.3 Game choice explanation

The reason why I have chosen this type of game is because I see several similarities
between the third-party self-selection attitudes and the self-selecting attitudes a consumer has
when deciding whether to buy or not to buy a CSR product.

In the CSR case the “game” begins with the allocation or “split” of the profits from a company
(which becomes player 1/the dictator) to a CSR cause like a charity for example (which takes
the role of player 2), the CSR cause cannot refuse the amount of money given.

Player 3 takes form in the consumer itself. He becomes a judge of sorts, he observes the game
and then decides whether to punish the company by not buying its products, or to not punish
the company by buying its products regardless of how much the product costs in relation to
other similar ones.

6
Chapter 3: Method

For this experiment, the method used was an online anonymous survey that was prepared and
then sent to be answered in Ecuador in order to get the perspective of a third world country.
The only personal information that was acquired was the age of the participants.

The survey was separated in two stages. The first scenario was the hypothetical dictator game
with a third-party punisher (TPPG), in which the participants decided whether certain attitudes
player 1 displayed were worthy of punishment. The second scenario was a CSR vs. Non-CSR
hypothetical game (CSR), in which the participants in the role of consumers observe the
allocation decisions made by a hypothetical CSR orientated organization and then have the
option to punish the company as a third party at a personal cost.

To make it as participant friendly as possible, both scenarios where explained in detail as well
as the definition of CSR itself. The questions were simple yes or no questions and similar for
the first and the second scenarios. An example for a question asked in the TPPG scenario would
be “Would you punish player 1 if player 1 shares 80% of the money with player 2 and keeps
20% to himself?”. In this case the answer “Yes” means punish and the answer “No” means not
punish. On the other hand, an example for a question asked in the CSR scenario would be
“Would you buy from company A if A is a socially responsible company and donates 80% of
its profits from this product to a charity?”. Contrary to the first scenario, the answer “Yes” now
means buy, which at the same time means not punish, while the answer “No” means not buy,
which would mean punish.

Lastly, since the survey was taken in Ecuador, it was translated to Spanish to reduce language
related errors.

An English version of the survey itself will be attached to the paper as part of the appendix.

7
Chapter 4: Results and comparison

4.1 First results

In order to simplify the outcome of the survey and for purpose of this essay, focus will be on
the “punish” selection for both parts of the survey. Out of the 25 answers received, the general
results are as follows:

Note that the questions with the same percentage shared and kept for both the first and the
second part of the survey have been denominated "Situations".

Table 1

Situation Give out/Keep (%) TPPG (%) CSR vs. Non-CSR (%)
Situation 1 80%/20% 24 20
Situation 2 50%/50% 20 20,83
Situation 3 20%/80% 68 28
Situation 4 0%/100% 84 96

This is the information observed at first glance:

Both the first and second situations have very similar answers for both parts of the survey, the
percentages diverging only slightly from each other.

In the third situation however, the divergence is quite high, jumping drastically from 20% in
situation 2 to 68% in situation 3 during the TPPG scenario while only augmenting from 20,83%
to 28% during the CSR scenario.

Lastly for the forth situation, the drastic raise happens on the CSR section of the survey, where
the percentage of participants that decide to punish jumps from 28% to 96%.

8
4.2 Observations
On the surface, these answers lead to believe that, for the first two situations (share 80% and
share 50%) it is true that consumers that self-select into punishing during the TPPG prefer to
buy the CSR product, regardless of whether the price was higher than by a similar, non-CSR
product.

On the other hand, the third situation (share 20%) discards the hypothesis, instead showing that
the CSR attitudes by themselves, independently of the percentage that is actually being shared,
decreases the consumers’ willingness to punish, making the percentage less of a factor in the
CSR segment than in the TPPG segment.

The forth situation (share 0%) shows a drastic raise in the CSR scenario furthering the evidence
of the CSR attitudes being of more importance than the percentage itself, since, once these
attitudes have been eliminated, the punishment willingness rises once more, and is harsher than
by the TPPG scenario of any of the alternatives before.

However, these percentages can be deceiving. The comparison made could be the result of a
coincidence and therefore, misleading, since these are all general percentages, and it is not
possible to know whether the individuals that decided to punish in the first scenario are the
same that decide to punish during the second scenario.

4.3 Detailed results

To be able to know this more detailed information, it is necessary to look to the specific surveys
individually and calculate the real percentage of participants that decide to punish in both cases.
We can see the results in the graphs that follow:

9
Situation 1: Decide to share 80% and to keep 20%

Graph 1

100%
Situation 1
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%
Amount Punished (%)
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
TPPG CSR Both

As we can see, the results now are different than they were at first glance.

As previously stated the percentages of people that decide to punish player 1 and company A
are 24% and 20% respectively, two percentages that hardly show any discrepancy between each
other. However, after observing the surveys one by one, it was possible to determine the
percentage of people that decides to punish, not only on one of the scenarios but on both. This
percentage is 8% and it is significantly lower than what was assumed at the beginning for both
of the scenarios.

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Situation 2: Decide to share 50% and keep 50%

Graph 2

100%
Situation 2
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%
Amount Punished (%)
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
TPPG CSR Both

Once again, the new percentage (that of the participants that decide to punish on both cases) is
much smaller than the ones shown for the individual scenarios. The comparison this time is
made between 20% for the TPPG scenario and 20, 83% for the CSR scenario.

From first glance the percentages on both scenarios are extremely similar to each other.
Nevertheless, once we look at the individual participants´ answers we can see that only 8% out
of the 25 participants, meaning roughly 2 people, make the decision to punish both player 1 and
to not buy from company A.

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Situation 3: Decide to share 20% and keep 80%

Graph 3

100%
Situation 3
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%
Amount Punished (%)
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
TPPG CSR Both

This discrepancy becomes even more marked once we make it to situation 3. As we can see,
the results being compared now are 68% for the TPPG scenario and less than half of that, only
28% for the CSR scenario. Already, and as previously stated, the divergence between the two
scenarios is quite easy to observe.

The third result now is 16% for the participants that decide to punish on both cases. The
percentage has now doubled; however, it is impossible to make a clear statement of a link
between the 16% and the particular, separate TPPG and CSR situations.

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Situation 4: Decide to share 0% and keep 100%

Graph 4

Situation 4
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
Amount Punished (%)
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
TPPG CSR Both

The results for situation 4 are the most enlightening ones, and the only ones that could even
hint that the hypothesis could be correct.

For the comparison of the results in situation 4, we have 84% of participants that decide that
player 1 is worthy of punishment during the TPPG section, while so much as 96% of the
participants make the decision that they would not buy from, therefore punishing, company A.
The third percentage shows an average of 84% of the participants would punish in both cases.
This makes it the closest one to the initial two out of all the situations.

This percentage is the most telling, since we can see how much of an impact the CSR attitudes
have on the consumer’s decision to buy/not buy from a company.

4.4 Age relevance

The last point that I have not touched on until now, is the importance of the age of the consumer.

The only personal information that was asked during the survey was the age range. It was done
this way so that it would be possible to compare the biggest ranges and determine whether age
was of any significance when deciding whether to punish player 1 and company A.

13
With 9 and 16 participants respectively, the two big groups to be compared are the participants
age range 18 to 40 and the participants age 41 and up.

The results are as follows:

Graph 5

Punished on both
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3 Situation 4

All participants Bellow 40 Above 40

From this graph there are two observations that can be made. First, the 8% divergence between
age range results that can be seen in both situation 2 and situation 4. Second, the nonexistent
divergence between age range results observed in situations 1 and 3.

An 8% divergence in this experiment is not more than 2 out of 25 participants, making it an

extremely small difference to make age a factor of relevance, leading to believe that age holds
barely if any significance when making the decision to punish both player 1 and company A
for consumers in Ecuador.

With this, it is possible to disregard the age influence on the consumers decision on the rest of
the analysis.

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4.5 Analysis
In this section of the thesis, I will analyze the results previously mentioned from both games to
be able to see the relationship between the TPPG and the self-selection attitudes a consumer
has when encountered with a CSR/Non-CSR product. This will prove/disprove the hypothesis.

First, we can dare to assume that the percentage has a bigger impact on the TPPG scenario than
in the CSR scenario, regardless of the situation. That is not to say that the percentage shared or
kept doesn’t affect the CSR scenario, it just doesn't have as big of an influence in the decision
making of the consumer.

It seems possible to assume that, just the CSR attitudes by themselves are what inclines the
consumers to make a CSR product purchase. We can see that, regardless of the percentage that
has been shared throughout the second part of the survey, the consumer is more inclined to
make a CSR, more expensive product purchase, making him more lenient with the company
than with player 1, since during the first part of the survey there is no such a thing.

We can also observe that once these CSR attitudes have been completely eliminated, the playing
field becomes more equal between the two scenarios and we can dare say that consumer
behaves more similarly during both parts of the survey.

However, it is because of this reason that we cannot conclude that the hypothesis is correct. It
seems inappropriate to compare the self-selection attitudes of the consumers in these two
scenarios to each other because of the reason that the CSR scenario has something that the
TPPG scenario does not have: the CSR involvement. It is necessary to eliminate that factor in
order to see the consumer behave according to the hypothesis, this can be clearly seen in
situation 4.

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Chapter 5: Summary and conclusion

It is possible to say that CSR related actions have become more attractive within many
companies in different industries. The link between these actions and company reputations has
been deeply researched and found throughout the years, however, the impact of this activities
on the self-selection process the stakeholders take has been not only supported but also opposed.

The purpose of this study was to see if a link between the self-selection attitudes of a consumer
when deciding to buy a CSR product and the self-selection attitudes shown during a dictator
game with a third-party punisher could be found. This was done by means of a survey that was
answered in Ecuador by twenty-five participants from different age ranges. The participants
answer questions based on two hypothetical scenarios, these answers were then compared and
analyzed.

The results of the experiment showed no direct link between these two self-selection attitudes.
It was shown that the percentage of donation or investment into any type of CSR activity had
no particular impact on the reaction of the consumers, while the percentage of donation made
during the third-party punisher game had a big impact on the willingness to punish the dictator
during the game.

The explanation for this is, as far as can be seen, that, the consumer values the CSR attitude
more than the percentage shared. The CSR scenario has two incentives for the consumer while
the third-party punisher game only has one. While both would fill the participants with a self-
satisfaction felling, only the CSR scenario has the ability make the consumer feel like they have
made a difference, and this is the other incentive.

Knowing the ages of the participants, the study group was divided into more specific segments.
The results of the age-related analysis showed that when deciding to punish on both scenarios,
there was no evidence age was a relevant factor.

Following the analysis of the collected data, the main conclusion becomes: the hypothesis has
been disproven. This means that the consumers that punish more as a third party during the
game do not necessarily prefer to buy the more socially responsible products in Ecuador.

This essay gives a better understanding of the self-selection process that consumers undertake
whenever deciding to make a purchase. Companies should be aware of the importance factors

16
like the percentage shared, the age or the CSR attitudes have, as well as the benefits that come
with the CSR attitudes and the repercussions that come with the lack of them.

The study group was composed of 25 participants, which is enough to achieve results and make
observations but not large enough to be representative of an entire country according to
common rules of thumbs about sample sizes. To get a more definite conclusion, it should have
been much larger and diverse. This should be kept in mind for the future, since this topic needs
to be further researched.

17
Bibliography

Bhattacharya, C., & Sen, S. (2004). Doing Better at Doing Good: When,Why,and How
Consumers Respond to Corporate Social Initiatives. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE
Publications Sage CA.

CONE. (2015). Global CSR Study. Boston, MA: Cone communications.

Dowling, G. R. (2004). Corporate reputations: Should you compete on yours? California

Management Review Vol. 46, 19-36.

Fomburn, C. J., & Van Riel, C. (2004). Fame & fortune: How successful companies build
winning reputations. New York: FT Prentice Hall.

Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social
issues: What's the bottom line? Strategic management journal, pp. 125-139.

Kirkeboen, L. J., Leuven , E., & Mogstad , M. (2016, May 03). Field of Study, Earnings, and
Self-Selection . The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 3, pp. 1057–
1111.

Lin-Hi, N., & Blumberg, I. (2016, april 19). The Link Between (Not) Practicing CSR and
Corporate Reputation: Psychological Foundations and Managerial Implications.
Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 1-14.

Shnayder, L., Van Rijnsoever, F., & Hekkert, M. (2015, March 20). Putting your money where
your mouth is: Why sustainability reporting based on the triple bottom line can be
misleading. PloS one , p. e0119036.

Turker, D. (2009). How Corporate Social Responsibility Influences Organizational

Commitment. Journal of Business Ethics, 198-201.

Welford, R., & Frost, S. (2006, February 1). Corporate Social Responsibility in Asian Supply
Chains. Wiley InterScience, pp. 166-176.

Yoon, Y., Giirhan-Canli, Z., & Schwarz, N. (2006). The effect of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) activities on companies with bad reputations. Journal of consumer psychology,
pp. 377--390.

18
Appendix

As previously mentioned, the method used for this bachelor essay was a simple yes or no survey
written in Spanish that was sent to Ecuador to be answered, this is the survey translated to
English:

In this hypothetical scenario, two people (player 1 and player 2) are offered $100 to divide
between the two of them.

Player 1 is the one who decides how the money will be divided, player 2 can’t refuse the offer.

You are a third party in this game and you are given $50. Your role in the game is to observe
the other players and punish player 1 if you deem it necessary. Every time you punish player 1
you will lose $1. For every $1 you spend on punishing player 1 he will lose $3.

Would you punish player 1 if:

1. Player 1 shares 80% ($80) with player 2 and keeps 20% to himself ($20).
2. Player 1 shares 50% ($50) with player 2 and keeps 50% to himself ($50).
3. Player 1 shares 20% ($20) with player 2 and keeps 80% to himself ($80).
4. Player 1 doesn’t share at all and keeps 100% to himself ($100).

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is all about how companies manage their businesses in
order to produce a positive impact on society. Broadly seen, it is about being a “good world
citizen”. Examples of CSR include supporting renewable power, funding community projects
or something simpler like a continuous donation or patronage to a certain charity.

In this next scenario you are a consumer. You have the alternative to buy the same product from
two different companies (A and B). Company A sells this product at a slightly more expensive
price than company B. Would you buy from A if:

1. A is a socially responsible company and donates 80% of its profits from this product to
a charity
2. A is a socially responsible company and donates 50% of its profits from this product to
a charity
3. A is a socially responsible company and donates 20% of its profits from this product to
a charity
4. A is NOT a socially responsible company and donates none of its profits
19
Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung der Bachelorarbeit

CSR-bezogene Verfahren sind in vielen Unternehmen verschiedener Branchen attraktiver

geworden. Die Verbindung zwischen diesen Aktionen und der Reputation des Unternehmens
wurde im Laufe der Jahre intensiv erforscht.

Der Zweck dieser Studie war es, einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Selbstselektion eines
Konsumenten zu finden, wenn er sich entschließ, ein CSR-Produkt zu kaufen und der
Selbstselektion, die während eines Diktator Spiels mit einer Drittpartei Bestrafer gezeigt
wurden. Der Grund, warum diese beiden Selbstauswahl-Einstellungen miteinander verglichen
wurden, lag darin, weil mehrere Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Szenarien gefunden
wurden: „die Firma“ als Spieler 1, „das CSR-Projekt“ als Spieler 2 und schließlich „der
Verbraucher“ als Spieler 3. Diese Studie wurde durchgeführt um aufzuzeigen, dass Teilnehmer,
welche während des Drittpartei-Strafspiels mehr bestrafen, bevorzugt sozial verantwortliche
Produkte kaufen; das war die Hypothese der Studie.

Dies geschah anhand einer Umfrage, an der in Ecuador 25 Personen aus verschiedenen
Altersgruppen teilnahmen. Die Teilnehmer beantworteten Ja oder Nein Fragen anhand von
zwei Szenarien: einmal ein hypothetisches Diktator Spiel mit einer Drittpartei Bestrafer
Szenario und einmal ein hypothetisches CSR vs. Nicht-CSR Szenario. Daraufhin wurden diese
verglichen und analysiert.

Es wurde auch untersucht, ob das Alter der Teilnehmer/innen einen Einfluss auf die Hypothese
hatte. Deswegen wurde die Studiengruppe in feinere Unterteilungen gegliedert. Die Ergebnisse
der altersbezogenen Analyse zeigten, dass bei der Entscheidung beide Szenarien zu bestrafen,
keine Beweise dafür vorliegen, dass das Alter ein relevanter Faktor ist.

Die Ergebnisse des Experiments zeigten keine direkte Verbindung zwischen dieser beiden
Selbstselektionen. Die hohe der Spende oder Investition in irgendeine Art von CSR-Aktivität
hatte keinen besonderen Einfluss auf die Reaktion der Konsumenten. Allerdings hatte die hohe
der Spende, die während des Drittpartei-Strafspiels gemacht wurde, einen großen Einfluss auf
die Bestrafungsbereitschaft der Teilnehmer.

Schließlich lautet die wichtigste Schlussfolgerung: Die Hypothese ist widerlegt, und weitere
Studien sind notwendig.

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Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Ich versichere, dass ich die Arbeit selbständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen
Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus Veröffentlichungen
oder anderen Quellen (auch Internet) entnommen sind, habe ich als solche eindeutig kenntlich
gemacht. Von der Ordnung zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis in Forschung und
Lehre und zum Verfahren zum Umgang mit wissenschaftlichem Fehlverhalten habe ich
Kenntnis genommen. Die Arbeit ist noch nicht veröffentlicht und noch nicht als Studienleistung
zur Anerkennung oder Bewertung vorgelegt worden. Mir ist bekannt, dass Verstöße gegen
diese Anforderungen zur Bewertung der Arbeit mit der Note „Nicht ausreichend“ führen sowie
die Nichterteilung des angestrebten Leistungsnachweises zur Folge haben.

Datum Unterschrift

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