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Posted on January 30, 2008

The End of the 'American Century' Is Here

By Conn Hallinan, Foreign Policy in Focus

Rather than the "American Century" the Bush administration neo-conservatives

predicted, it is increasingly a world where regional alliances and trade associations in
Europe and South America have risen to challenge Washington's once undisputed
domination.
When Argentina thumbed its nose at the U.S.-dominated World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, it had the powerful Mercosur trade association to back
it up. When the United States tried to muscle Europe into ending agricultural
subsidies (while keeping its own) the European Union refused to back down.
And now India, China, and Russia are drifting toward a partnership -- alliance is too
strong a word -- that could transform global relations and shift the power axis from
Washington to New Delhi, Beijing, and Moscow. It is a consortium of convenience, as
the interests of the three countries hardly coincide on all things.
Partners in Energy
In security matters, for instance, the Chinese look east toward Taiwan, the Indians
north to Pakistan, and the Russians west at an encroaching North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). There are still tensions between China and India over their
1962 border war, and bad feelings between Russia and China go all the way back to
the Vietnam War.
But growing trade, convergent security concerns, and an almost insatiable hunger for
energy have brought the three together in what Russian President Vladimir Putin
calls a "trilateral" relationship.
The initial glue was a common interest in the gas and oil supplies of Central Asia.
In 2001, China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to challenge U.S.
moves to corner Central Asia's gas and oil reserves and to counter the growing
presence of NATO in the Pacific Basin. SCO has since added India and given observer
status to Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan.
Access to energy is almost an existential issue for China and India. China imports half
its oil, and energy shortages could derail the highflying Chinese economy. India
imports 70 percent of its oil, and, unlike China, has no strategic reserves. Both
nations have made energy a foreign policy cornerstone. China is pumping billions of
dollars into developing Caspian Sea oil and gas fields and building pipelines, while
India is busy negotiating a pipeline deal with Iran.
The India-Iran deal has come under considerable pressure from Washington. Nicholas
Burns, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, told the Council on Foreign
Relations that Washington hoped "very much that India will not conclude any long-
term oil and gas agreements with Iran."
However, Indian Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram says, "We should do it --
Iran has the gas and we need the gas." India is estimated to have up to $40 billion in
gas and oil interests in Iran, and the pipeline is projected to cost $10 billion.
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To much unhappiness in Washington, China just inked a $2 billion deal to develop

Iran's Yadavaran gas and oil field.
The International Energy Agency predicts that energy needs will be 50 percent higher
in 2030 than they are today, and that developing countries will soak up 74 percent of
that rise. China and India will account for 45 percent of those energy needs, and by
sometime after 2010, China will be the largest energy user in the world.
Ties of Security and Trade
Trade is increasing among China, India, and Russia. For instance, trade between India
and China was $24 billion in 2007, the same as trade between India and the U.S., and
is projected to jump to $40 billion by 2010. Both nations have agreed to reopen an
overland route through the Himalayas that has been closed for 44 years. In 1992
India launched its "Look East" policy, and Asia now constitutes 45 percent of India's
trade. India is the third largest economy in the region, followed by China and Japan.
India desperately needs up to $500 billion in investments to upgrade its
infrastructure. South Korea and Singapore are already major investors, and the
Russians have shown interest as well. India would love a piece of Russia's $1 trillion
in foreign exchange reserves.
There are growing security ties as well. This past October, the nations which border
the Caspian Sea -- Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan -- jointly
declared that they "will not allow other countries to use their territories for acts of
aggression or other military operations against any party." The declaration was
directly aimed at U.S. bases in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
Some of these security relations have a down side: increased arms trade. China is
relying on Russia for many of its new weapons, including the high-performance SU-33
fighter, which can be adapted for use on aircraft carriers. The Chinese government
says it plans to build several carriers, which would allow it to challenge the current
U.S. domination of the Taiwan Straits.
India has just concluded an agreement to buy and jointly assemble Russia's new
fighter, the SU-30, which in recent war games outmaneuvered and outfought the U.S.
F-16. New Delhi will buy Russia's fifth generation fighter, the Future Tactical Aviation
Concept, rather than the U.S. F-22 or the European F-35. Russia is also modernizing
India's Vikramaditya aircraft carrier and has agreed to a joint production agreement
to build the new Russian tank, the T-90.
While none of the three countries' military budgets approach U.S. military spending,
never-the-less, tens of billions of dollars are being funneled into armaments at a time
of growing economic inequity in all three nations.
Terrorism and Unipolarism
Another troubling side to this increasing trilateral cooperation is that the three
countries have agreed to support one another on the issue of "terrorism" and
"separatism." In practice, that may give China a free hand in its largely Muslim
Xinjiang Province, and in Tibet. It might mute criticism of Moscow's war in Chechnya,
and give cover for India to step up its military actions against Maoist "Naxilites" and
put the clamps on restive minorities on its northwest border.
The relationship among the three countries can hardly be called an "alliance." The
Indian military regularly takes part in joint military maneuvers with the United States
and, so far, military cooperation among India, China, and Russia is low level. But all
have common interests in securing energy resources and, if not confronting the
United States, at least not allowing Washington to dictate to them on international
and internal issues.
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Such a trilateral relationship might have some immediate impacts.

First, it might put a crimp into Washington's anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), which
the United States has been selling in Asia as a defense against "rogue states" like
Iran and North Korea. Australia, India, and Japan have all signed on to take part in the
project. China, however, views the ABM as a direct threat to its modest ICBM
deterrent, and sees it, along with the expansion of NATO into the Pacific, and U.S.
bases in South and Central Asia, as an effort to encircle China.
In a choice between annoying the United States or China over the ABM, New Delhi
may decide the neighbor next door trumps distant Washington. Before arriving in
Bejing on January 15, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made it clear that India has no
intention of joining any alliances that would aim at containing China, and said that
"there is enough space for both India and China to grow and prosper while
strengthening our cooperative engagement."
In addition, the United States may find that the new Labor government in Australia
begins to hedge its bets on deploying a U.S. ABM, particularly since China is now
Canberra's number one trading partner.
The United States will also find it harder to isolate Iran. New Delhi is already pushing
for a pipeline that will bring gas to India's expanding economy, and China and Russia
are helping to develop Iran's hydrocarbon industry. Iran's enormous oil and gas
reserves are simply too important to be held hostage to Washington's jihad against
Teheran.
The United States is still the big dog on the block, but it can no longer just bark to get
its way.

Conn Hallinan is a Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org) columnist