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Logics of
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY/168
Legitimacy
Three Traditions of
Public Administration Praxis
Margaret Stout
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Logics of
Legitimacy
Three Traditions of
Public Administration Praxis
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
A Comprehensive Publication Program
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM
Distinguished Professor of Public Administration
American University, Washington, DC
Founding Editor
JACK RABIN
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Logics of
Legitimacy
Three Traditions of
Public Administration Praxis
Margaret Stout
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CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
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Contents
List of Figures.................................................................................................xi
List of Tables................................................................................................ xiii
Preface............................................................................................................ xv
Acknowledgments........................................................................................xvii
About the Author..........................................................................................xix
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viii ◾ Contents
Richard Stillman...............................................................................28
Orion White......................................................................................29
David Farmer....................................................................................30
Jan Kooiman.....................................................................................31
Historical Eras and Schools of Thought.............................................32
The Founding Era.....................................................................32
An Orthodoxy Emerges............................................................35
The Refounding Era.................................................................37
The Reinventing Era.................................................................38
The Transformational Era.........................................................38
Summing Up............................................................................39
Tradition as a Framework Metaphor...........................................................39
4 How the Traditions Framework Was Created.......................................43
Introduction...............................................................................................43
Employing the Ideal-Type Method.............................................................43
Identify a Social Phenomenon of Interest.......................................... 44
Choose a Culturally Significant Frame of Reference......................... 46
Identify Essential Generic Elements.................................................. 46
Interpret Genetic Meanings...............................................................47
Construct the Ideal-Types..................................................................50
Contents ◾ ix
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x ◾ Contents
List of Figures
xi
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List of Tables
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Preface
The impetus that prompted the theoretical inquiry behind this book was a practi-
cal concern about differences in what is believed to be legitimate as expressed by
elected officials, public administrators, and engaged citizens in a variety of local
governance activities. By legitimate, I mean justifiable, proper, right, or good. My
observations of conflicting perspectives were made over the course of approxi-
mately fifteen years of practice in Tempe, Arizona (Stout, 2010b). Tempe is an
All-A merica City (2003, National Civic League) that was home to about 160,000
people (during my years there) at the heart of the Phoenix metropolitan area. Being
the only landlocked community in the state, Tempe is under tremendous pressure
to maintain economic growth to keep up with rising costs of quality of life with-
out geographic expansion or politically unpopular tax rate increases. As a result,
land use policy and development in Tempe changed dramatically over the last two
decades of the twentieth century. Rather than growing out, the city is growing
up through redevelopment and infill. This process creates conflicts around zoning
ordinance changes, intensification of land use, eminent domain, locating prob-
lematic or unwelcome uses, gentrification, historic preservation, and myriad other
related issues. Reactions to such conflicts vary in what might be considered predict-
able ways depending on the identity of the individual. The political actors involved
include elected officials, professional administrators, private developers (both for
profit and nonprofit), volunteer associations of various types, and individual citi-
zens and property owners.
My role during these years included neighborhood organizer; neighborhood
association and coalition founder; founder and executive director of a community
development corporation; subcontractor to the city of Tempe for various planning
and program implementation activities; and commissioner serving on a neighbor-
hood policy advisory body. Community development activities included policy
making, planning, and implementation of initiatives related to neighborhoods,
including citizen participation, land use and urban design, affordable housing, eco-
nomic development, transportation systems, and city facilities.
The attitudes about community development activities and the strategies pre-
ferred by various governance actors appear to represent differing philosophical
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xvi ◾ Preface
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank M.E. Sharpe, Inc. for allowing use of material adapted
from “A Samurai’s Lineage: Theoretical Traditions in Public Administration,”
Administrative Theory and Praxis, 28, 4 (December 2006): 618–630, and
from “Revisiting the (Lost) Art of Ideal-Typing in Public Administration,”
Administrative Theory and Praxis, 32, 4 (December 2010): 491–519. Used by per-
mission of M.E. Sharpe, Inc. I would also like to thank Sage Publications for
allowing use of material adapted from “Back to the Future: Toward a Political
Economy of Love and Abundance,” Administration & Society, 42, 1 (2010): 3–37;
the American Society for Public Administration for allowing use of material
adapted from “Competing Ontologies: A Primer for Public Administration,”
Public Administration Review (2012) 72(3), 388–398; the National Association
of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration for allowing use of material
adapted from “Enhancing Professional Socialization through the Metaphor
of Tradition,” Journal of Public Affairs Education, 15, 3 (2009): 289–316; and
Pracademics Press for allowing use of material adapted from “You Say You Want
a Revolution?” International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 12,
2 (2009): 291–309. And I thank HBO for its permission to draw on The Girl in
the Café, which was directed by David Yates and originally televised by the British
Broadcasting Corporation.
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This book is designed primarily for use in graduate-level courses that explore the
philosophical, historical, and intellectual foundations of public administration.
It can be used alone or as a companion to original readings (see Appendix for a
course outline). While the book in its entirety can be used for educational purposes,
each of its three parts may be of greater interest to certain audiences. Specifically,
Section I may be of greatest interest to professors and instructors of public
administration; Section II may be of greatest interest to students and practitioners
of public administration; and Section III may be of greatest interest to scholars of
public administration.
The basic purpose is to help students and practitioners of public administration
better understand (1) the meaning of legitimacy in democratic governance accord-
ing to various theoretical perspectives and (2) what these competing ideas mean for
the public administrator’s role in society. These differing interpretations of what
it means to be a legitimate public administrator are the basis for three simplified
groupings that may also offer scholars of public administration a fresh view of the
field. This novel organizing framework considers the legitimacy of public adminis-
tration from three distinct social perspectives: that of the elected representative, the
administrator, and the citizen. The perspective of each is developed as a sociological
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2 ◾ Why and How the Traditions Framework Was Created
ideal-t ype (Weber 1949) comprised of coherent sets of ideas referred to as Traditions
(Stout 2006).
Traditions are social and intellectual presuppositions about activities and inqui-
ries that evolve through time (MacIntyre 1988). This terminology fits the view
of the enterprise of public administration as a profession “characterized by an
interlocking set of values, not by rigid doctrine, certainly by nothing resembling
a scientific paradigm” (Waldo 1980, 77). The three distinct Traditions of public
administration presented here were developed through a study of the field’s theoret-
ical literature using the source of legitimacy as the categorizing characteristic (Stout
2007). Each of these Traditions promotes a unique ideation of the administrative
role and its normative commitments. They are respectively labeled: Constitutional,
Discretionary, and Collaborative.
Together, these Traditions provide an innovative framework for organizing and
analyzing public administration theories in a manner that helps students and prac-
titioners better navigate competing ideations of the administrative role. Of course,
the substantive content of public administration theory has been organized in a
variety of other ways, as discussed in Chapter 3. For example, organizing themes
are commonly historical in nature, referring to Orthodox public administration,
New Public Administration, New Public Management, New Public Service, and
the like. The Traditions framework offers a perspective based primarily on how dif-
ferent actors are empowered in the governance process.
The chapters in Section I tell the story of why and how the Traditions frame-
work was created. There are several reasons why this explanatory section is of value
to teaching in particular. First, it provides public administration faculty and stu-
dents a perspective on how theory is utilized in professional socialization. This is
particularly important given the field’s current emphasis on the development of a
public service ethic that is drawn primarily from normative principles. But, it is also
of value to students in developing a critical view on the “truths” they will be given
during the graduate program.
Second, this section helps students understand how theoretical frameworks are
used to make sense of the vast landscape of any academic field. Rather than pre-
senting the Traditions framework as the only or best approach, it is situated within
a variety of alternative approaches to the same endeavor. Conceptual and historical
frameworks are both prominent in the field, so examples of both types of frame-
work are provided.
Third, this section explains the method through which the Traditions frame-
work was generated to highlight the differences between analytical interpretation
of texts and scholarly literature review. This is particularly important for profes-
sors of public administration to recognize, or else they may be taken aback by the
source of quotations or assume ideas are taken out of context in a way inappropriate
to standard literature review. Such methodological understandings not only explain
how the Traditions were constructed, but also can be used to explain various types
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4 ◾ Why and How the Traditions Framework Was Created
Chapter 1
The question at hand addresses the problem of legitimacy within the political order,
meaning legitimate political authority or the rightful empowerment of various gov-
ernance actors to decide and to act. As a starting point, the U.S. Constitution calls
for a separation of powers in which the executive branch and its administrative
organizations are limited in regard to legislative and judicial functions. Similarly,
citizens are limited to the franchise of suffrage, the right to petition the govern-
ment, and vague references to powers not reserved by the branches of government.
Because the Constitution does not name and describe specific powers of adminis-
tration per se, its legitimate role in governance is a contested matter. One must look
to subsequent laws and precedent held within Supreme Court rulings to interpret
what degree of administrative discretion is appropriate. At its worst, this lack of
clarity leads to what has been called an identity crisis in the field—does public
administration have a legitimate role in governance?
While a few theories of public administration match this existing constitutional
order (see, for example, Lowi 1993), most contemporary theories challenge or
reinterpret the constitution by claiming powers given to the three branches. Other
theories claim a stronger role for citizens, to be facilitated by public administrators.
For these reasons, some scholars suggest that we should stop worrying about the
problem of administrative legitimacy (see, for example, McSwite 1997a; Spicer and
Terry 1993; Warren 1993; Wise 1993). Yet others extend the legitimacy crisis to
an intellectual crisis within the study of public administration (Ostrom 1989) “in
which the agreed-upon bases of theory fail to reflect or respond to the needs of
actors in the field—theorists, practitioners, and citizens” (Denhardt 2000, 158).
However, this debate is not limited to theory. For example, depending on their
roles (elected representatives, administrators, or citizens), actors in the governance
process appear to have differing ideas about who rightfully exercises political
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6 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
1990). However, when considering various logics for achieving legitimacy, scholars
often offer paradoxical or conflicting normative guidelines. For example, in some
role conceptualizations, administrators are charged with being both discretionary
based on their own expertise and obedient to external masters (e.g., managers, poli-
ticians, and law). These two characteristics are based on two different logics of legit-
imacy, and it is questionable whether they can be successfully integrated when they
conflict. Perhaps certain elements of various approaches to public administration
can be combined into one role conceptualization, while others cannot. But even to
begin to sort out these possibilities, the competing ideations require full explication
across associated theoretical dimensions. Only then can they be rigorously com-
pared normatively or tested empirically.
While it is reasonable to suggest no definitive answer to this question is possible
in a diverse democratic society, a better understanding of the competing logics being
used might help to improve thoughtful choice making among the roles. Toward
that end, the Traditions framework contends that logics of legitimacy (e.g., who
should be most empowered in governance) generate different role conceptualiza-
tions, and that when they are not in agreement their competition creates crises in
governance beyond disagreements about substantive issues. It follows that aligning
role conceptualizations will reduce those disagreements and facilitate social action.
Indeed, as sociologist Max Weber observes, “action, especially a social action which
involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legiti-
mate order” (1968, 31). Only a shared understanding of that order can ensure that
an administrator’s motivations, attitudes, and resulting actions will be deemed
“valuable or worthwhile for society” (Brewer and Selden 1998, 417). Indeed, the
capacity for the political system to claim legitimacy depends on perceptions of such
appropriateness (Schaar 1981).
Because social action is expressed by individual actors, investigation of the legit-
imacy problem is often pursued at the individual level of analysis (McSwite 1997a;
Stivers 2002b). Thus, there has been a corresponding emphasis in the field on prac-
tices such as managerial oversight, performance measurement, program evaluation,
and codes of ethics as means to ensure proper behavior in individual administrators.
Therefore, the crisis of legitimacy is often linked to evaluative concepts of account-
ability, responsibility, and responsiveness. Unfortunately, most of these discussions
do not explore specifically how these three criteria of proper behavior differ from
one another in terms of democratic legitimacy in either its representative or direct
forms: “Often missing in literature and discourse is recognition that reformers of
institutions and civic philosophies must show how the capacity to effect public pur-
poses and accountability to the polity will be enhanced in a manner that comports
with our Constitution and our republican institutions” (Lynn 2001, 155). While
Lynn refers here to one specific approach to legitimacy, the sentiment is applica-
ble more generally. Instead of explaining the meaning of legitimacy itself, theories
assume that if administrators can demonstrate the behavior described, then they
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8 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
In short: What is the position of public administration within the state and society;
why do we do what we do as practitioners; and why is there a perceived lack of
legitimacy when we do it?
Assuming a legitimacy crisis exists in government in the United States, these
questions cannot be ignored—administrative legitimacy simply is not a settled
matter theoretically or in practice. The academic field needs to develop theories
that articulate and explain legitimacy at the deepest levels possible—the underlying
political philosophies and assumptions about human nature. Toward this end, this
book identifies (1) differing logics of legitimacy grounded in different governance
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Chapter 2
Introduction
Addressing the process of professional socialization does not mean to suggest, tac-
itly or otherwise, that public administration is a profession per se, professional-
ism as popularly defined, or any one specific formula for professionalism. Indeed,
the three Traditions can be used to deconstruct the meaning of professionalism
to reveal conflicting understandings of legitimacy. In other words, each Tradition
promotes a different form of professionalism, so no one definition can be asserted
without question. These notions of professionalism are tied directly to role concep-
tualizations. So, the first task at hand is to understand this theoretical relationship.
Government has been described as a system that “cannot be understood except
in terms of the public employees themselves, their conceptions of their positions,
and the attitudes of the public about what is required in and from our civil servants”
(Appleby 1945, 3). If saying “I am a public administrator” brings to mind vary-
ing images and determinations of which image is “proper” is contested, students
and practitioners of public administration have a problem—which model do they
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perspective of those constructing the role (scholars), those taking the role (practitio-
ners), or those interacting with the role (elected representatives, other administra-
tors, and citizens). While internal role conceptions and externally prescribed role
conceptualizations are clearly interrelated, this book focuses on the latter and the
manner in which theory describes and promotes roles for the public administrator.
In other words, this book focuses on how role is conceptualized theoretically. It
seeks to describe the constitutive elements of unique role conceptualizations, how
they differ in terms of legitimacy logic, and how the field attempts to promote
them through pedagogy. Finally, the book explores ways theorists have combined,
integrated, or reconciled these role conceptualizations—or potentially could—ulti-
mately considering whether any of these approaches have promise for improving
democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context. Through these
explorations, students will have a better sense of their own professional role concep-
tualization and how it relates to logics of legitimacy.
The literature pertaining to the public administrator role tends to conflate con-
ceptualization and conception, or at least fails to differentiate between the two. The
nexus between externally imposed role conceptualization and internalized role con-
ception could be described by the notion of praxis—“thought emerging from deed
and deed evoking thought” (Hall 1990, 18). First, there is a link between ethos and
politics in the notion of praxis: “Ethics and politics as disciplines concerned with
praxis are aspects of a unified practical philosophy” (Bernstein 1991, 9). Praxis has
been further described as “a more theoretically informed practice, which, in turn,
is consciously reflected upon” (Warren 2001, 221). Such reflections have an impact
on future choices. Together, these ideas suggest that the ethical and political impli-
cations of role conception are intentionally and reflectively adopted, at least partly
due to theoretical conceptualizations of appropriate roles. The results of role perfor-
mance are then reflected on, possibly adjusting the interpretation or acceptance of
theory in an ongoing cycle. In short, praxis is the enactment of theory.
For example, stewardship is a theoretical role conceptualization that describes
an individual’s vocational role conception that “begins on the inside, governing the
way a person thinks, sees, and feels—including his or her motivation, and then it
ultimately works itself out into external physical structures, assets, and opportuni-
ties” (Graves and Addington 2003, 85). It is a theory that is internalized and then
acted on, causing effects in the social world. The social world then reacts to those
effects, in part through academic theorizing about how future actions should be
shaped through different role conceptualizations.
The literature’s common reference to a professional ethos that guides role con-
ception is captured in the notion of vocation, in the sense of calling. Indeed, a
“profession” refers to that which one professes or avows publicly (Neufeldt 1996).
This indicates a deeply affective element to professional identity. This interpretation
is evident in comments from a wide range of scholars in the field. Vocations are pro-
fessions that are imbued with a particular ethos, or “collective psychological con-
nection between people” (McSwite 2002, 20). “Acceptance of a professional identity
implies acceptance of the ethical principles associated with professional practice”
(Weidman, Twale, and Stein 2001, 51). Therefore, public service has been described
as a “calling” to become a “steward” (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003, 133).
Because of this widely shared sense of the importance of vocation in public
administration, significant efforts have been made to operationalize vocation as
public service motivation, or PSM (Brewer, Selden, and Facer 2000; Perry 1997;
Selden, Brewer, and Brudney 1999) so that it can be measured and studied. Three
of the five antecedents to PSM are religious socialization, professional identity, and
political ideology (Perry 1997). All three are linked to the framework in this book
as sources of the ontological, philosophical, political, and professional rationales
given for the legitimacy of various role conceptualizations.
It has been argued that identity is in large part an evaluation based on what a
person understands to be “Good” (Taylor 1989). Furthermore, notions of the Good
and associated cultural identities change across time and place (McSwite 2002). For
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16 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
example, it has been suggested that in the 1960s the ethos attached to the vocation
of public service was characterized by valuing human relationship, cooperation,
and collective action (McSwite 2002). However, that ethos has been in many ways
supplanted by one that values market exchange principles (McSwite 2002). Some
suggest that performance-related meanings of professionalism challenge those
based on serving the public interest. Thus, the very meaning of “professionalism” in
public administration has changed over time. This suggests that ongoing changes
in political and administrative theory will demand shifts to the professional iden-
tity of public administrators.
For example, there has been an invitation to the field itself to “foster a collabora-
tive approach to government, where experts are simply part of a cooperative process
in which they have no superior role” (McSwite 2002, 77). Similarly, the doctrine of
the New Public Service calls for a redefinition of the professional identity of public
administrators. We are called to “rediscover our desire to serve our fellow citizens
and to think about our public service work in a way that celebrates its ‘soul’ and
meaning” (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003, 173). This would engender yet another
ethos, a new type of vocation, and an alternative role. This new role conceptual-
ization is meant both to respond to the contemporary governance context and to
restructure it toward a more direct democratic ideal.
The notion that the ethos and corresponding role conception of public admin-
istrators can and perhaps should change suggests the need for each of us to make
informed choices. A better understanding of what comprises these role conceptions
should help us in this effort. Research on public service motivation is one approach
being used. This area of inquiry explores the question of what leads individuals to
adopt the role of public administrator and provides typological conceptualizations of
the role conceptions of individual administrators. Related literature about vocation
or calling also explores the motivation to enter the public service, assuming a role
conception related to some type of moral purpose. For example, public service has
been described as “a concept, an attitude, a sense of duty—yes, even a sense of public
morality” (Staats 1988). Yet, this role conception is linked to a democratic ethos as
opposed to a bureaucratic ethos, which warrants a different type of role conceptual-
ization (Pugh 1991). This suggests that competing role conceptualizations of “public
administrator” may draw different types of people to public service and produce
different types of public service results. This is particularly important given recent
calls to engender “public service values” through academic preparation (National
Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration [NASPAA] 2009).
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more accepted values of the discipline or profession” (Weidman, Twale, and Stein
2001, 18). Involvement is an element pertaining to practice that affects both techni-
cal skill and adoption of the profession’s ideology, motives, and attitudes through
the mechanism of role taking.
From what appears in a library database search, professional socialization dur-
ing the academic experience (as well as during work experience) is of great concern
in many professions, including nursing, social work, education, medicine, and law.
It also appears in business, management, accounting, and even public relations
literature. It would seem that those pursuing such degrees are being socialized into
a profession. Unfortunately, the topic of professional socialization receives little
attention in public administration (Stout 2009) despite the facts that the principal
degree in the field, the MPA, is described as a professional degree, and many of its
doctorates are the practice-oriented doctor of public administration (DPA) rather
than the doctor of philosophy (PhD).
Research, theory, and pedagogy are all used to plan and implement the pro-
fessional education and socialization process. A generic presentation of this itera-
tive process is offered in Figure 2.1, with a focus on the elements of professional
1.
Practitioner
acts as role-
taker
4. Pedagogy
transmits role Professional 2. Role is
performed
conceptuali-
zation
Socialization and assessed
3. Experience
impacts role
conceptuali-
zation
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20 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Opheim, and Tajalli 1999; Lowery and Whitaker 1994). Much of this socializa-
tion occurs through professional degree programs like the MPA (Heck 1995; King,
Feltey, and Susel 1998) in addition to doctoral programs (PhD and DPA) and grad-
uate certification programs like the certified public manager (CPM). On the one
hand, only a small percentage of public administrators receive degrees in the field,
even fewer during preservice years. So, one might suggest that professional social-
ization in the academy has a minimal impact on the field. On the other hand, a
very high percentage of public administrators in the upper echelons of government
agencies do acquire degrees in the field. These professionals model the identity of
the field, even if indirectly, because the status of a profession is judged by its most
skilled representatives (Moore and Rosenblum 1970).
Graduate programs carry legitimate power (French and Raven 1959) to pre-
scribe behavior and influence psychological change regarding a given social role or
position. Both the process of prescription and the prescribed attitudes and behav-
iors themselves carry a feeling of internalized “rightness.” Higher education in
general is imbued with cultural legitimacy, and the increasingly coveted MPA is
made even more authoritative by legitimizing practices like accreditation through
NASPAA. “Specialized & professional accrediting bodies in the United States oper-
ate to ensure that students in educational programs receive an education consistent
with standards for entry into practice or advanced practice in each of their respec-
tive fields or disciplines” (Association of Specialized and Professional Accreditors
[ASPA] 2006). “Accreditation fostered the impression that the practice of public
management could be boiled down into a generic core of knowledge; if so, this
‘essence’ could be imparted through education and assessed through examination”
(Hays and Duke 1996, 425). As a result of such efforts, MPA programs across the
country are fairly uniform in their admission requirements, curricula, and teaching
approaches (Denhardt 2001).
NASPAA’s peer review accreditation process ensures that MPA programs
are similar by employing a combination of standards, self-study, and site visits
(NASPAA 2006a). According to its code of good practice, each member organiza-
tion (educational institutions offering MPA degrees, for the most part) “focuses on
the preparation of students for professional careers in public service, emphasizing
both the values and ethics of public service, and the development of professional
skills and knowledge” (NASPAA 2006b, emphasis added). “What we offer as a
formal definition of professionalism should be supported by our curricula” (Cooper
1984, 148). For example, the University of Georgia describes its MPA curriculum
thus: “A socialization sequence and five core courses introduce the student to the
various fields of public administration and the economic foundations of public
policy” (2006, emphasis added).
The rationale for regulating admission to a profession in some way is “to pro-
tect the potentially gullible client from incompetent and unscrupulous ‘experts’”
(Moore and Rosenblum 1970, 111). This is particularly important in public admin-
istration because, as it stands, these professionals operate with the power of the state
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22 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
behind them. Thus, the pedagogical choices made in the reproduction of the field
represent important decisions in light of democratic legitimacy.
“Socialization in graduate school refers to the processes through which indi-
viduals gain the knowledge, skills, and values necessary for successful entry into a
professional career requiring an advanced level of specialized knowledge and skills”
(Weidman, Twale, and Stein 2001, iii). In other words, it has both cognitive and
affective dimensions. Socialization is a nonlinear process in which external sources
of evaluation and internal sources of reflection combine in an evolving develop-
mental cycle (Weidman, Twale, and Stein 2001). Of the four identified stages of
professional development, the graduate school experience has an impact on at least
the last three: (1) anticipatory, (2) formal, (3) informal, and (4) personal. The gradu-
ate program seeks to change students in specific ways in their preparation for post-
graduate careers. Throughout these overlapping stages, the professional internalizes
role expectations.
Professional socialization can occur through both implicit and explicit teaching
(Schein 1968; Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Faculty members in a variety of fields
describe their socializing role as both implicitly and explicitly transmitting the cul-
ture and values of their profession (du Tort 1995; Pescosolido and Hess 1996; Sachs
2001; Teschendorf and Nemshick 2001). “Although ethics may be relegated to the
hidden curriculum in graduate school, students learn to follow sound ethical judg-
ment in research, teaching, and clinical practice by observing role models and men-
tors” (Weidman, Twale, and Stein 2001, 51). In fact, professional socialization is
considered to be a formative experience that is significant to inculcation of public
service motivation (Perry 1997). For example, graduate programs in public admin-
istration have been found to instill the ethical standards of both the bureaucratic
ethos (efficiency, competence, expertise, loyalty, and accountability) and demo-
cratic ethos (public interest, social equity, constitutional values, and citizenship),
or what might be called teleological and deontological ethos (Heijka-Ekins 1988).
This developmental process of professional socialization is part of the develop-
ment of role identity and commitment (Thornton and Nardi 1975). “Professional
identity also comes from successfully negotiating the key rites of passage and
securing recognizable status symbols” (Weidman, Twale, and Stein 2001, 48). In
master’s programs, this includes specialized certifications and the coveted MPA
professional degree. In doctoral programs, this includes screening exams, compre-
hensive exams, advancement to candidacy, graduation, and publication of research.
Ongoing training and education can be important “rites of passage” used in the
socialization process for experienced professionals adjusting to change (Trice and
Beyer 1993). Further regulation of the profession comes in the form of codes of con-
duct and state licensure. All together, the professional socialization process ensures
an ongoing production and reproduction of the field.
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Chapter 3
Using Theoretical
Frameworks as
Interpretive Lenses
Introduction
As elegantly stated by Bolman and Deal in reference to their organizational theory
framework: “Frames are both windows on the world and lenses that bring the world
into focus” (1997, 12). Theoretical frameworks shape our attention and help us iden-
tify important details. This book is based on a desire to explore important elements
of administrative theory and practice in a way that reveals hidden assumptions about
legitimacy. Such a framework needs to be quite comprehensive. While the detailed
approach to inquiry used in developing the framework presented in this book is
explained in Chapter 4 and the elements of administration and practice are explained
in Chapter 5, this chapter provides a more general introduction to the use of theoretical
frameworks in public administration as sense-making tools. Such frameworks are cru-
cial to “make sense of this seemingly littered landscape of intellectual fragments that,
taken together, today calls itself ‘public administration theory’” (Stillman 1991, 174).
23
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24 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
(Ostrom 1999). They can be used as frameworks for interpretation and sense mak-
ing, to guide research, to define practices, or to provide normative rationales.
Ideally, theoretical frameworks should direct attention to critical features that have
general consistency with lived experience; provide a foundation for inquiry; specify
classes of variables and how they fit together in a coherent structure; and spec-
ify who or what motivates action (Schlager 1999). Many scholars offer similar crite-
ria for frameworks, theories, and models (see, for example, Dye 2002; Easton 1966;
Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951). Using these ideas as evaluative criteria, theoretical
frameworks should have a significant focus, organizing capacity, and coherency.
Significant Focus
Frameworks must decide which attributes of a topic are relevant and important. In
fact, the criterion of relevance is often deemed more important than rigorous data
collection and analysis—what has been referred to as “hyperfactualism” (Easton
1966, 3). More to the point of significance in a democratic context, paraphrasing
a leading planning text (Campbell and Fainstein 2003), a central theoretical ques-
tion might be what role public administration can play in the pursuit of the com-
mon good within the constraints of a capitalist economy and a democratic political
system. This suggests a need for both critical and democratic elements in a theory
of public administration.
Organizing Capacity
Concerning the study of public administration, theoretical frameworks can be use-
ful in trying to grasp the big picture of the field. Theories differ in what they seek
to explain as well as what they consider in so doing and can be classified accord-
ing to characteristics such as their scope, their function, or their level of analysis.
Regardless of the organizing strategy chosen, the classification “needs to be assessed
according to the purposes for which it is used” (Easton 1966, 12). Ideally, the
framework will establish a comparative basis from which various theories can be
clearly differentiated, but that also identifies a common denominator from which
to compare.
Devising an organizing dimension can be very tricky. “If the classification is
kept very simple, with only a few broad groupings, it will combine many elements
which are not very similar. Important distinctions of a more detailed sort will be
lost completely. On the other hand, if the classification preserves all distinctions
which may be of any significance, it will contain too many groups to be surveyed
and handled conveniently” (Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951, 157). This causes the
typologies to be rich in description but thin in analytic usefulness. The organizing
logic should create exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories if possible.
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Coherency
Coherency refers to the degree to which the variables or meanings attributed to
them tie together in a logical manner. For example, a framework that coherently
links normative principles, values, policies, and action would not have logical con-
tradictions among ideas (Dryzek 1990; Fischer 1995; Paris and Reynolds 1983).
Instead, “coherent sets” (Dryzek 1990) would describe the issue at hand in the
most comprehensive manner. This approach enables the identification of potential
disconnects between values and actions that may hinder the success of a given
approach. It also accommodates the problem of a plurality of incommensurable
principles (Paris and Reynolds 1983).
Dwight Waldo
Dwight Waldo is acknowledged as one of the most influential scholars of public
administration (Fry and Raadschelders 2008). His 1948 dissertation was designed
to explicate the (as in a singular) political theory implicit in American public admin-
istration. This work eventually became his book, The Administrative State (Waldo
1984). In his theoretical framework of a political theory of American public admin-
istration, he considered (1) the nature of the Good Life; (2) the criteria of action
or the bases of decision; (3) the question of who should rule; (4) the separation of
powers; and (5) centralization versus decentralization. Each element was deemed
necessary to achieve a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the actions of
public administrators and the structures of public administration, as well as causal
relationships in which they are involved.
The Good Life is assumed to be something to which government aspires.
However, political theories define this end differently. Waldo suggested that the
political theory of public administration defined the Good Life as something effi-
cient and productive, with a good measure of equality and peace. Society is planned
and nature is mastered with the leadership of expert administrators. The prominent
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26 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
David Rosenbloom
As a leading scholar in the field, David Rosenbloom offered a theoretical frame-
work in his foundational article, “Public Administration Theory and the Separation
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of Powers” (1983). He later expanded his ideas in the book, Public Administration:
Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in the Public Sector (Rosenbloom
2009), now in its eighth printing and used internationally as a principal textbook.
In both, Rosenbloom suggests that there are three distinctive approaches found
in public administration, in terms of both theoretical interpretation and practice:
Managerial, Political, and Legal.
The origins of the Managerial approach are in the civil service reform movement
of the 1870s to 1890s, which sought to empower administration to reduce political
corruption. It prioritizes the values of expertise, neutrality, effectiveness, efficiency,
and economy. The organizational structure tends toward centralized bureaucratic
hierarchy, based on its understanding of depersonalized individuals.
The origins of the Political approach are in the New Deal and World War II era,
in which administration became much more engaged in the policy-making process.
It seeks to empower political processes by valuing representativeness, responsive-
ness, and accountability to elected officials and to citizens through transparency and
direct participation. Therefore, the organizational structure accommodates decen-
tralized pluralism whereby group identities are formed by aggregating interests.
The origins of the Legal approach have been present since the founding of the
nation but have never been the primary focus of public administration theory. Its
focus is on procedural due process to ensure fairness, individual rights, and equitable
outcomes. This approach is best conducted through adversarial judicial organizational
structures such as regulatory commissions. With the focus on fairness, the Legal
approach views each individual as a unique person in a unique set of circumstances.
According to Rosenbloom, these three approaches pull theory in different
directions, in a fashion similar to the constitutional separation of powers. In this
sense, the Managerial approach is like the Executive; the Political approach is like
the Legislature; and the Legal approach is like the Judiciary. However, he links the
administrative styles to functions, as opposed to agencies. In both cases, interactions
are thought to be a zero-sum game—there is only so much power to go around, and
emphasizing one more than the others leads to imbalances. Furthermore, collaps-
ing all three separated powers into one administrative role eliminates the possibility
for checks and balances. Therefore, Rosenbloom recommends that the approaches
should not be integrated but rather should remain separate and in tension with one
another in a manner that maintains balance across the three powers and their asso-
ciated values. The approaches should be prioritized contextually (e.g., by agency,
policy arena, policy purpose, or administrative function). Such prioritization
should follow both political theory and the advice of practitioners who are engaged
in the process of balancing on an ongoing basis.
In sum, for each approach to public administration, Rosenbloom describes the
historical origins, values, organizational structures, and understanding of indi-
viduals adopted by the approach. In this way, it is a typological framework with
three types, each having a unique set of meanings. It has a significant focus on the
similarities between administrative approaches and the constitutional separation
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Richard Stillman
Richard Stillman (1996), another leading scholar, provides a useful heuristic based
on the different preferences of three United States founders: Alexander Hamilton,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. In brief, Hamilton saw administration as a
business. As the treasurer of the United States, this is not surprising. He believed in
strong centralized government to maximize administrative efficacy in the pursuit
of desirable outcomes. He believed this would be achieved through accountabil-
ity to the elected executive (the president), but primarily through professionalism
and expertise.
Jefferson viewed administration as a function of citizenship. He believed in
maximizing public accountability and limiting administration to the support of
self-governance. Therefore, he believed in decentralization, restricting administra-
tive discretion and span of control or influence, extensive citizen participation in
governance, bottom-up authority, and voluntary administrative and political service.
Madison viewed administration as part of the political system (legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches). He believed in maximizing and balancing interest group
demands and using government to control the evils of faction. Therefore, admin-
istrators would be responsive to the changing balance among competing interests
while acting as a vertical check and balance on the three branches of government.
Stillman asserts, “Americans have never made up their minds throughout their
two-hundred-year history as to which of the three normative models they prefer”
(1996, 366) because choosing one over the other represents value trade-offs. In
other words, these differing philosophical views on governance are fundamentally
different in a manner that is not easily integrated into a unified theory. Instead,
values exist in tension with one another, with priorities shifting and changing over
time. Indeed, it is possible to assess which view predominated in various histori-
cal periods. Stillman suggests that it may be that we are entering into another
Jeffersonian period in which active citizenship is reemerging as the standard.
The focus on competing values is significant, and the categories of business, citi-
zenship, and politics are robust in terms of organizing capacity. By offering direct
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Orion White
In a chapter from the famous edited volume, Refounding Public Administration,
Orion White (1990) presented a model for public administration based on the sig-
nificant issue of decision-making power. He explains his approach as a reframing
of the “authority/participation debate.” He suggests that there has been a generic
disagreement on this question in nearly all theoretical discourse about society and
political life, including public administration theory. This disagreement is often
expressed as a dialectical tension or competing opposing forces. In reframing the
problem as one that is really about authority and participation as expressions of
political power, he generated a framework that included three types based on dif-
ferent political theories: the Classical Conservative view; the Classical Liberal view;
and the Marxist Humanism view.
The Classical Conservative view suggests that the world is chaotic and unsafe.
Evil stems from selfish, irrational (and therefore unpredictable) individuals.
Therefore, we need a coercive authority to protect what has been gained, by both
individuals and the collective. In fact, the collective is prioritized over the indi-
vidual, and unity is represented by stable institutions that represent reality. Thus,
obedience to authority is good citizenship.
The Classical Liberal view agrees that the world is chaotic and unsafe but
believes that self-interest is rational. Therefore, individuals will voluntarily enter
into a social contract that ensures order and security. In other words, individuals
are willing to moderate their self-interest to participate in the benefits of collective
life and progress. While the individual is prioritized over the collective as the basis
of reality, unity is created through rational action. Authority is thus a necessary evil
to avoid the worst-case scenario. In fact, too much coercive action on the part of the
collective is evil and must be minimized.
The Marxist Humanism view believes that human nature is both nonrational
(relationship oriented) and rational (seeking self-actualization). Therefore, self-
interest and regard for others are simultaneous and mutually impacting. Human
potential can only be fulfilled through social action and human relationships, so
social action is voluntary, self-organizing, and self-regulating. The focus is not neces-
sarily on either competition or hierarchy but rather a certain quality of relationship.
Based on this framework, the traditional battle of wills between the Classical
Conservative and Liberal perspectives on political empowerment in decision mak-
ing can be eliminated by the Marxist Humanism alternative. Instead of focusing
on coercive authority, the focus turns to creating an approach to democratic
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30 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
participation. The logic is that human beings are intentional social actors, not just
behavioral reactors. Action is an expression of the individual, and a range of differ-
ences is “normal” and potentially complementary. Relationships among individuals
create synergy—an outcome greater than the sum of the parts. However, only a
particular quality of relation generates synergy—one that requires effective inter-
personal communication and adequate emotional maturity.
From this basis, authority would be redefined, focusing on creating processes
for effective communication and facilitating the dynamic of how people relate as
they mature. This would enable effective democratic collective action. This situ-
ation would also create a new role for public administration as a process facilita-
tor and arbiter of maturity. However, the discipline would also continue to be an
authoritative implementer of public policy based on this new source of participa-
tory decision making.
In sum, this framework uses a tripartite typology to show how one type offers
a solution to the dialectical opposition of the other two—namely, the problems of
authority and participation competing in Classical Conservative and Liberal tradi-
tions are resolved with the concepts of Marxist Humanism. It is a model that is
significant in focus on political power, holds robust organizing capacity in terms of
differing characteristics of the political ideologies, and is coherent in its organizing
principle of authority.
David Farmer
Similar to Waldo’s desire to explicate the political theory of public administration,
David Farmer’s goal in The Language of Public Administration was to “produce a
consistent and coherent account of the language of public administration” (1995,
26). Through hermeneutic interpretation, he explored “the recesses and inner logics
of the language of public administration” (Farmer 1995, 2). He suggests that public
administration is a project of modernity, which began with the Enlightenment.
Based on postmodern critique of such assumptions, he suggests that a “sea change
is necessary in our traditional modernist attitude toward … governing” (Farmer
1995, 4) through both deconstruction and reconstruction. Thus, he presents first
the language of public administration in a modernist context and then offers an
alternative language for public administration in a postmodern context.
Public administration as a modernist project includes characteristics of indi-
vidualism, specialization, and particularism; scientism, utilitarianism, and tech-
nologism; self-interest and the enterprise model; and modernist hermeneutics such
as reification of social constructions. He explores the limits of each set of ideas in
light of the contemporary context and postmodern theoretical critique, finding that
they create paradoxes and fatal blind spots for successful governing. Postmodernity,
on the other hand, negates all these assumptions and inserts ideas like imagination,
deconstruction, deterritoriality, and alterity. While many postmodern theorists
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are radically skeptical and deconstructive (as is Farmer’s book), others are more
constructive, seeking a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious ideas
(Rosenau 1992).
Farmer suggests that public administration would do better to “imaginize”
(1995, 158) rather than plan for rational control. He suggests that rather than
attempt grand narratives of an objective truth, public administration should recog-
nize that all ideas, values, and their meanings are socially constructed and therefore
challengeable, particularly in a democratic context. Deterritorialization refers to the
negation of assumptions about what is “appropriate” and “correct,” thereby open-
ing up and liberating thinking and eliminating disciplinary boundaries. Alterity
describes a new type of subjectivity—one in which the object becomes a “moral
other” who must be considered as an equal. Such a concept would radicalize the
democratic nature of public administration.
While the hermeneutic interpretation of the language of public administration
is a significant endeavor, perhaps its greatest drawback is in terms of coherency.
While the modern/postmodern categories are robust in their organizing capacity,
they collapse so much detail under their umbrellas that important differences are
lost. It is not clear what the organizing principle actually is because postmodernism
can be interpreted as an extension of modernism, as opposed to a fundamentally
different perspective when considering a particular foundational concept.
Jan Kooiman
With work most closely resembling the model presented in this book, Jan Kooiman
(2001, 2003) has developed a philosophical framework for three ideal-typical gover-
nance modes: hierarchy, market, and interactive (network). Each type is comprised
of different ontological (the nature of existence), epistemological (how knowl-
edge is acquired), and behavioral assumptions. Hierarchical governance is based
on structural ontology and positivist epistemology that undergird elitist, predict-
and-control approaches to governance. Market governance is based on an agen-
tial ontology and positivist epistemology, thereby leading to competitive pluralist
approaches to governance. Interactive (network) governance is based on a structural
ontology and hermeneutic epistemology, which form the foundation for delibera-
tive approaches to governance.
The inclusion of such fundamental characteristics makes the framework quite
compelling. The focus on governance modes is significant, encompassing ontol-
ogy, epistemology, and organizing style. This combination of substantively differ-
ent understandings of reality, knowledge formation, and structure has a very robust
organizing capacity due to the quite fundamental nature of the elements. The link-
ages between the three elements in each type are logically coherent, with the excep-
tion of the same ontology and same epistemology being present in two types.
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32 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
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*
Using Theoretical Frameworks as Interpretive Lenses ◾ 33
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34 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
their relatively small constituencies. Most civic needs were met through voluntary
exchange and collective action, as opposed to professionalized public service.
This assumed right and capacity to self-govern and the expectation of actually
doing so would reemerge during the revolutionary times. As the king responded
to the growing colonies with increased attempts at monetary, legal, and political
control, colonists accustomed to high levels of autonomy and participation bristled
and ultimately rebelled. As noted in the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That
whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends,
it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their safety and happiness.
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship
with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liber-
ties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist
each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or
any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other
pretense whatever.
To help build the centralized government required for this endeavor, Article II
of the Constitution delineates the executive powers of the President, including the
right to appoint
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Beyond this and a few other mentions of officers and civil officers (which can
refer to either elected or appointed offices) in Article II, the Constitution is silent
on the role or powers of professional public administration. However, there is a
clear assumption that hierarchical departments appointed by either the president or
Congress would be necessary to establish and run the government.
In essence, for the next 100 years, this is precisely what occurred. However,
the makeup of those administrative offices would range from elite professional to
patronage or spoils systems in which political winners would install their friends
to office to ensure responsiveness. These pendulum swings would be based on exec-
utive leadership at the national and state levels. However, these varying preferences
would also become evident at the local level, particularly in large cities in which
political parties became increasingly influential.
An Orthodoxy Emerges
Through the combined efforts and oversight of federal, state, and local governments,
the United States experienced rapid geographic expansion, population growth,
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36 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
and economic growth. More important for the field of public administration, such
reforms claimed “tenured, unelected managers have a legitimate part in democratic
governance, one based on managerial expertise rather than on political acumen”
(Stivers 2000, 15). It is this approach to public administration that is most com-
monly labeled “traditional” or “orthodox.”
However, almost as soon as the field of study was launched, it began to question
itself. Over the course of the following decades, many challenges and extensions
to these early texts were offered (see, for example, Appleby 1945, 1949, 1952; Dahl
1947; Dimock 1936b, 1937; Friedrich 1940; Herring 1936; Levitan 1943; Simon
1946, 1947; Waldo 1984). For example, should the field’s principal guiding theory
be law, political philosophy, or management science? If we focus too heavily on
running government like a business, will we lose sight of its democratic purpose?
If we build theory purely from practice—through so-called principles of admin-
istration—will we lose our opportunity to progress through science? How do we
link the study of administration with its practice? These and similar questions con-
tinue to haunt the field’s scholars. However, these questions and the scholars who
posed them generated camps within public administration theory—on one side
scholars concerned primarily with the technical and scientific aspects of the field
and on the other side scholars concerned primarily with the ethical and democratic
aspects of the field.
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38 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1997; Hart 1984; Rohr 1989; Terry 1995). This
emphasis was necessary if claiming an autonomous role released in large part from
hierarchical oversight from the executive and legislative branches; oversight must
come from within the field and the individual administrator.
role to become primarily one of facilitation, if permanent at all (see, for example,
Catlaw 2006b, 2007a, 2007b; Farmer 2005a; King and Zanetti 2005; Stout 2010a).
These scholars imagine a social order that would reflect democracy as a way of life
in all spheres of activity—economic, civic, and politic (King 2011). Following prag-
matist visions of an engaged citizenry collectively solving public problems (Dewey
1957, 1999; Follett 1918/1998, 1919, 1924), this school of thought calls for allowing
the situation and the process to dictate who should have authority.
Summing Up
Together, the historical timeline and schools of thought in public administration
are useful heuristic devices that connect theoretical changes to historical context
in a significant manner with fairly robust organizing capacity. However, both eras
and schools of thought can have nuanced overlaps that are problematic in terms of
coherency. It is difficult to find mutually exclusive categories based on a single orga-
nizing principle or characteristic when looking at moments in time and place or the
collective thinking of many scholars.
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40 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
authority. Respective of the governance roles noted, elected officials claim legitimate
authority granted by the Constitution. Administrators claim legitimate authority
based on expertise. Citizens claim legitimate authority based on their democratic
sovereignty. These ideas form the basis of “Traditions” of public administration that
are respectively labeled Constitutional, Discretionary, and Collaborative. In each
of these Traditions, public administrators act in a different manner: as Bureaucrats
accountable to elected representatives, as Entrepreneurs responsible for good out-
comes, and as Stewards responsive to the affected citizenry.
A note on the term Tradition is warranted as the usage in this book is uncon-
ventional to both public administration and everyday meanings. Rather than using
the term paradigms of public administration, which might imply scientific meth-
odologies; approaches, which might imply techniques; theories, which can be so
complex and idiosyncratic they are incomprehensible at a macro level; or doctrines,
which implies unchangeable rigidity, tradition refers to social and intellectual pre-
suppositions about activities and inquiries that are for the most part unchallenged
by those inhabiting the tradition but that evolve through time (MacIntyre 1988).
In short, a tradition is the repository of truth as it is understood (Bernstein 1991).
This fits an understanding of the enterprise of public administration as a profession
“characterized by an interlocking set of values, not by rigid doctrine, certainly by
nothing resembling a scientific paradigm” (Waldo 1980, 77). Public administration
traditions “provide a stable, structured, yet open context (because of their gen-
eral and symbolic nature) within which the ‘dialogue of governance’ can generate
new and legitimate responses to the ever evolving issues of social life” (White and
McSwain 1990, 26).
In common nomenclature, tradition generally refers to the way something has
been done for a long time. In public administration, theories labeled “traditionalist”
are described as rationalist, following the field’s founding (White and McSwain
1990), while the modern/postmodern dualism is presented as “traditional/post-ist”
(Farmer 1999). “The term post-ist is a neologism that refers to … descriptors such
as post-positivist, post-industrial, post-patriarchal, post-structural, post-modern,
post-Freudian, post-colonial, post-metaphysical and other post-ist terms” (Farmer
1999, 300). In short, some scholars believe traditional views are narrow and harm-
ful to individuals and society, while post views are broad, long term, and socially
beneficial (Farmer 1999). This dualism was later transformed into the traditional/
post-traditional branding, resulting in two journal symposiums coordinated by
David Farmer (2005b, 2006). He suggests that this terminology does not carry
the same baggage as the debate between modern and postmodern theory or as the
“culture wars” between liberal and conservative ideologies (Farmer 2005b).
In these two sets of articles, traditional public administration theory is depicted
in a quite negative light. In a blanket condemnation, our tradition makes no room
for spirituality, feminine perspective, multiple epistemologies, or diverse cultural
identities (Cunningham 2005; McGinn and Patterson 2005; Thadhani 2005).
The traditional views individuals in terms of social or professional role; adopts a
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42 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
claims under the banner of traditions, describing each one’s particular understand-
ing of justice and rationality, along with its originator. He argues that it may be
possible to resolve the competing claims of such traditions only “after a prior under-
standing of the nature of such traditions has been achieved” (MacIntyre 1988, 10).
By claiming liberalism to be a tradition competing with others, MacIntyre places it
on the same challengeable ground, effectively de-reifying it as the assumed “truth.”
Thus understood, the concept of tradition is applicable to public administration
theory. Based on differing understandings of the basis of legitimacy, each Tradition
has an identifiable “constellation of essential characteristics” (Witt 2006, 231) that
are manifested in an array of social actions and structures.* While the Constitution
of the United States may depict one approach to legitimacy, competing claims are
made for empowered administrators based on expertise or direct engagement of
citizens. To understand these competing approaches fully, we cannot simply accept
one Tradition’s interpretation of the Constitutional order and its approach to legiti-
macy as a given. We must place it on equally challengeable ground by depicting
competing claims in the same light. Thus, all approaches to legitimacy described in
public administration theory are considered to be components of a Tradition that
can be identified through its logical differences with other approaches to legiti-
macy. The details of this framework and the specific details it includes are fully
developed throughout this book. It is designed to meet all three criteria of signifi-
cance, organizing capacity, and logical coherence.
* To emphasize, this is not Adorno’s use of the term constellation as a “juxtaposed rather than
integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essen-
tial core, or generative first principle” (Jay 1984, 14–15).
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Chapter 4
Introduction
It is important to understand the specific manner in which the Traditions presented
in this book were developed. In other words, how can there be three Traditions of
public administration, and where is the proof? This chapter answers these ques-
tions, while explaining sociologist Max Weber’s (1949, 1994c) ideal-t ype method.
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44 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
issues. Last but not least, Weber suggests the ideal-t ype as the preferred method for
case study: “Only through ideal-t ypical concept-construction do the viewpoints
with which we are concerned in individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar
character is brought out by the confrontation of empirical reality with the ideal-
type” (Weber 1949, 110). Because case study is the most prominent type of research
in public administration (Adams and White 1994, 1995; Brewer et al. 1998; Cleary
1992, 2000; Neumann 1996; Perry and Kraemer 1986; Raadschelders 1999; White
1986; Yin 1994), the ideal-t ypes would likely be useful to future empirical study.
The following subsections detail the steps involved in the ideal-t ype method,
explaining how each was used to develop the Traditions framework.
public organizations managed and administered; (2) what are the sources of author-
ity, and how are decisions made; and (3) what constitutes knowledge and reality
(Denhardt 2000)? Organizational theory and behavior are important elements of
administrative theory because “it is widely assumed that the structural character-
istics of organizations … influence the behavior of individuals—whether clients
or bureaucrats—who interact with them” (Shafritz, Hyde, and Parkes 2004, 6).
Thus, these structures are important both internally to public organizations and
externally in the public environment. In particular, there are inherent contradic-
tions between bureaucratic organization and democracy that many scholars seek
to understand and alleviate (Lane 1999). Management theory is also important
because public organizations function in a trustee role that is similar in certain
characteristics to a corporate board of directors’ responsibility to its stockholders
(Cleveland 1913). Therefore, a theoretical model of public administration should
include concepts related to organizational structure and form.
Concepts pertaining to sources of authority in decision-making processes were
the other areas of focus in the Traditions framework—an approach taken by others
in the past (Waldo 1984). In fact, Appleby (1952) is emphatic that the study of pub-
lic administration should have at its core the pursuit of a theory of government, not
just administration, noting Wallace Sayre believed this to be the most significant
drive for students in the field. “In that theory [of public administration], political
responsibility must find new emphasis and refinement” (Appleby 1952, 254). This
approach fits with the study of public administration’s role of managing processes
through which societal values are defined and pursued (Denhardt 2000).
To cover both of these main areas of public administration theory, principal
texts from the very beginning of the field of study were read. Many of these texts
venture into related fields of political philosophy and economy, public policy, plan-
ning, organizational behavior, management theory, sociology, theology, and the
sociology of religion. This breadth is needed as public administration is one of those
“borderland problems” whereby mutual dependencies between social systems and
forms of philosophy, art, or science need be considered (Znaniecki 1940). Principal
texts were considered to be those widely used in graduate courses; frequently cited
in textbooks and articles; commonly described as “seminal,” “foundational,” or
“refounding” in nature or authored by those considered to be leading theorists in
the field.
This literature is not a novel data source for theoretical inquiry. The mean-
ing of these texts has been interpreted in The Administrative State: A Study of
the Political Theory of American Public Administration (Waldo 1984); The Language
of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, Modernity, and Postmodernity (Farmer 1995);
Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis (McSwite 1997a); Gender
Images in Public Administration: Legitimacy and the Administrative State (Stivers
2002b); and Fabricating the People: Politics and Administration in the Biopolitical
State (Catlaw 2007a). This inquiry interpreted much of the same literature to obtain
a firsthand understanding of the assumptions being made about the appropriate role
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46 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
McGuire 2001; Behn 1995; A. C. Brooks 2002; Callahan 2001; Cooper 2004;
Kirlin 1996, 2001; Neumann 1996; Raadschelders 1999; Rohr 2004). They include
many of the elements believed to define the forces of both bureaucracy and democ-
racy: ideas, emotions, philosophies, ideologies, myths, practices, procedures, insti-
tutions, technologies, and more (Waldo 1980).
Together, these elements are comprehensive enough to formulate a well-rounded
model of public administration theory to be used in empirical research as well as
pedagogy. Each element is deemed necessary to achieve a sufficient understand-
ing of the social actions of public administrators and the social structures of pub-
lic administration, as well as causal relationships in which they are involved. The
assumptions of each element rest on one another in a building block fashion that
formulates a coherent whole. Specifically, ontological assumptions about the nature
of existence and political philosophy frame the underlying meaning of legitimacy
being promoted by a given ideal-t ype. In turn, each unique political philosophy
prescribes how political authority should be distributed to government and the
appropriate scope of action delegated to administration. To ensure that neither
authority nor scope is being overstepped, each ideal-t ype prescribes a specific crite-
rion of proper behavior. These limitations on scope of action and evaluative criteria
further influence the type of decision-making rationality that should be used by
administrators. Furthermore, these combined elements shape the type of organiz-
ing style best suited for implementation. All together, these elements imply a spe-
cific social role conceptualization for public administration and administrators in
a democratic society, assuming a particular type of governance context. Given all
of these constraints, the action of the administrator is channeled into a specific role
pattern. Each element and its importance to public administration theory are fully
explicated in Chapter 5.
Given the comprehensive nature of these essential generic elements, an appro-
priate term was needed to describe the “ideal-t ype.” The type is more than a social
role and more than an institution—it is an overall philosophy of public administra-
tion—in other words, a Tradition. Indeed, these constellations of ideas about how
best to practice public administration have been described as “conflicting tradi-
tions” in the past (Balfour 1997, 459). They have also been referred to as competing
theories of the state. “Imbedded within each vision of the good state … are implicit
or explicit views of what constitutes the good administration essential to turn that
particular ideal state vision into reality” (Stillman 1991, 174).
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out of such mixed theories their component concepts and meanings. Rather than
trying to fit either historical periods or specific theories or scholars into various
Traditions of public administration, the reverse was done: important theories of
public administration offered since the inception of the field were deconstructed
and used to build descriptions of Traditions based on the shared meanings of core
concepts. Deconstruction in this sense refers to identification of the constitutive
elements to reveal their assumptions and rhetorical strategies (Barker 2000) rather
than a critical analytical approach to delegitimate them (Farmer 1995).
This means that the work of particular scholars (e.g., Simon, Waldo, or Farmer);
collected approaches (e.g., New Public Management, New Public Administration,
or New Public Service); and theories (e.g., managerialism or professionalism) were
all broken down into component parts to reconceptualize how important con-
cepts are related using a culturally significant frame of reference. These “parts” are
statements found within texts that pertain to administrative theory. While these
quotations were taken out of the context of a particular text, they were not taken
out of the cultural context of public administration theory. This method enables
disaggregation of ideas from preconceived labels such as author, doctrine, or histor-
ical period to reorganize them according to differing understandings of legitimacy.
More important, in a standard literature review, every time a scholar says, “Simon
thought … ” or “Waldo believed … ,” they are resolving ambiguities in those origi-
nal texts, thereby eliminating the alternative ideas that were in conflict with that
majority opinion. Disaggregation of original statements followed by a return to the
whole enables one to avoid missing those points and ultimately helps to identify
how a given scholar resolves those same ambiguities in his or her final conclusions.
In this way, specific authorship was not the focus in the initial interpretation
of texts. That said, like-minded scholars do tend to reference one another and
identify themselves with shared ideas in a manner that can even blur the bound-
aries between authorship, as noted in one deconstruction of Herbert Simon’s
Administrative Behavior (Farmer 1995). “Indeed, much of the vocabulary we use
in public administration acquires meaning only in the context of the particular
mental frameworks or categories of thought that we have come to use over time in
thinking about and making sense of government actions” (Spicer 2004, 354). Thus,
the language used to describe and prescribe was analyzed outside those previously
conceived categories.
The purpose of this method is akin to recommendations for “exploring the
possibilities and potentialities for ‘rearranging’ … an important hermeneutic activ-
ity that should be a guiding component of a reinvigorated public administration
theory” (Farmer 1995, 2). Another way to describe this might be bricolage, a term
from postmodern cultural studies that refers to “the rearrangement and juxtapo-
sition of previously unconnected signifying objects to produce new meanings in
fresh contexts. A process of re-signification by which cultural signs with established
meanings are reorganized into new codes of meaning” (Barker 2000, 381–382).
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50 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Once deconstructed, the implications for legitimacy are revealed, and a new tax-
onomy can be constructed that avoids gaps in logic (Lynn 2001).
As shown in Figure 4.1, the language analysis process included three distinct
phases: (1) deconstructing both homogeneous and heterogeneous theories; (2) iden-
tifying differing assertions about the identified generic elements; and (3) reconnect-
ing logical sets of ideas based on specific understandings of legitimacy.
the latter. Thus, there are potentially three opposing logics of legitimacy, at least
when governance actors disagree.
It should be noted that public administration theory is typically categorized in
a dichotomous manner. There is not one language of public administration (Farmer
1995) but two that can be characterized as simply modern versus postmodern; tra-
ditional versus post-ist; or traditional versus post-traditional (Farmer 1999, 2005a,
2005b, 2006). Alternatively, there are two approaches that can be characterized as
technical versus normative, orthodox scientific versus democratic and humanistic
challenge, traditional versus New Public Administration, hard-core rationalist ver-
sus soft-core rationalist, rationalist versus nonrationalist, or any other dichotomous
presentation commonly found in the literature (see, for example, Denhardt 2000;
Harmon 1995; King, Patterson, and Scott 2000; McSwite 1997a).
Of course, the notion of more than one approach to public administration is not
new—a heterodoxy of theories and approaches has been noted (Kass and Catron
1990; Lynn 2001). As described in Chapter 3, a number of theoretical frameworks
have three types (Kooiman 2001; Rosenbloom 1983; Stillman 1996; O. F. White
1990). In addition, White and McSwain (1990) differentiate between Classical,
Traditionalist, and Scientific approaches. Yet, these categories are nondiscrete, with
crossover characteristics and timelines that can be difficult to follow. Another tri-
chotomous model is related to three prescriptions for reform identified in public
administration rooted respectively in (1) public law, (2) market economics, and
(3) democratic politics (Olsen 2004). The notion of a trichotomous model is not
substantively different from the many dichotomies used in public administration
theory in that they can both be understood as ideal-t ypes (Rutgers 2001). However,
these particular trichotomies do not acknowledge the complexities of technical and
normative dimensions within each approach or base their categorization on the
problem of legitimacy.
When using the lens of legitimacy, the analysis of the theoretical literature found
three genetically different Traditions of public administration: (1) Constitutional
(classical bureaucracy); (2) Discretionary (autonomous professionalism); and
(3) Collaborative (facilitated self-governance). Respectively, these Traditions pro-
mote three distinct administrative role types that empower different political
actors: Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, and Steward.*
If starting with the field’s beginnings following Woodrow Wilson’s founding
essay, it is tempting to suggest that their order is chronological. However, a close
review of the literature shows seeds of all three Traditions being evident at the
founding of the nation and the field’s inception, but with varying prioritizations
along the historical timeline. This is not dissimilar to the notion that pretradi-
tional, traditional, and post-traditional thought coexist in terms of history (Farmer
* It must be noted that these labels are given unique definitions within the Traditions framework
than otherwise may be typical for the field, as described in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, respectively.
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52 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
THE TRADITIONS II
FRAMEWORK
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54 ◾ The Traditions Framework
these elements are likely overlapping and multidirectional—the elements are the
interacting variables of public administrative theory.
Analyzing the literature on these various elements using the lens of legitimacy
as a sorting logic produces three Traditions of public administration that promote
three different ideations of the administrative role. The specific meanings of these
elements are explicated in Chapters 6, 7, and 8—one chapter for each Tradition
and its associated role conceptualization. A widely available film is used to illustrate
each role type so that students might have easy access to the case study (Stout 2011).
Explanations of the Traditions are offered to become conversant in “the idiom of
each” and “in order to describe and evaluate the other or others by means of it”
(MacIntyre 1988, 398). Thus, we turn to the “language of public administration”
(Farmer 1995) as it has been presented in the field’s principal literature.
As a preview, the Traditions have three differing meanings and sources of
legitimacy: (1) elected representation, (2) expertise, and (3) democratic sovereignty.
In sketch, these bases of legitimacy ground three respective approaches to public
administration. The Constitutional Tradition (Chapter 6) promotes the role type
of Bureaucrat; actions are framed by the rules and procedures commanded by the
separated powers of representative government through the organizational hierar-
chy to ensure legitimacy. The Discretionary Tradition (Chapter 7) promotes the
role type of Entrepreneur; actions are framed by the independent pursuit of various
performance criteria as stand-ins for the legitimate public good. The Collaborative
Tradition (Chapter 8) promotes the role type of Steward; actions are framed by the
standards of direct democracy, answerable to the citizens impacted by the decision
or action.
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Chapter 5
Introduction
As noted in Chapter 4, the generic elements found to be significantly related to
legitimacy in public administration are (1) political ontology; (2) political authority
and scope of action; (3) criterion of proper behavior; (4) administrative decision-
making rationality; (5) organizing style; (6) the assumed governance context; and
(7) role conceptualization. This chapter explains why each of these issues is signifi-
cant to public administration theory, as well as how they relate to legitimacy and
to one another. Table 5.1 provides a summary of these generic elements and their
basic definitions.
Political Ontology
Political ontology is perhaps the least-familiar concept included in each Tradition
and therefore requires somewhat detailed explanation. Ontologies are theories of
existence that generally stem from philosophy, religion, and physics. To begin an
exploration of competing ontologies, it is helpful to employ the ideal-t ype method
(Weber 1949, 1994c) to draw out principal differences (Stout 2010c). For example,
differing “onto-stories” (Bennett 2001; Howe 2006) respectively claim that reality
is static versus dynamic; whole versus plural; transcendent versus immanent; and
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56 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Political authority Ideas about who should have the authority to decide
and scope of action and act on behalf of the group and the boundaries of
the scope of action allocated to administration
individualistic versus relational (Stout 2012a). Static means that reality simply is—
we can know its truth through various means. Dynamic means that reality is con-
tinually becoming, so understanding it is difficult beyond temporary “snapshots”
of its expression. Whole means that the source of existence is complete—it cannot
be broken apart in some way. Plural means that there are many sources of exis-
tence. Transcendent means that the source of being is beyond that which exists.
Immanent means the source of being is within that which exists—they are one and
the same. Individualistic means that being is contained within itself whether it is a
single unit or a plurality of singular units. Relational means that being is connected
with other beings in some way. Discussion of these opposing characteristics traces
back to the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers Parmenides and Heraclitus, who offer
differing conceptualizations of the nature of being and knowing (Graham 2002;
Heidegger 1992).
These concepts, in differing combinations, shape philosophical and value com-
mitments of all types. Identifying such fundamental assumptions helps in under-
standing how particular political forms are thought to be appropriate or even
logically necessary based on the nature of being. This is where the notion of political
ontology comes into play. Ontology and political theory are in a directional causal
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58 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
2002c; Stout 2007, 2010a, 2010d; Stout and Salm 2011; Wamsley 1996). Indeed,
this is a project Dwight Waldo began in his critique of the administrative state:
“Any political theory rests upon a metaphysic, a concept of the ultimate nature of
reality” (1984, 21). Competing claims among theories (e.g., public management vs.
public administration) are ontological struggles to prove administration’s “legiti-
mate role in the governance process” (Evans and Wamsley 1999, 123). Therefore,
Thayer (1981) asserts that we can no longer afford to accept the philosophical or
ontological assumptions of political theory as axiomatic. Instead, we must bring
such assumptions into the domain of public administration inquiry.
To do so, the Traditions framework makes use of several typologies. First, mod-
els for understanding identity are considered from anthropologist Mary Douglas
(1996) and public administration scholar Jeannine Love (2010). As fully explicated
by Love, differing meanings of the term individual “refer to very different ways of
being in the world and therefore represent … incompatible stories about reality”
(2010, 3). Douglas explains that dimensions of group characteristics (the boundary
around a community) and grid characteristics (the type of regulation used in the
group) combine to frame identity in particular ways.
Each model has four types. Institutional individualism (Love 2010) describes
human identity as centered (self-contained) and embedded in social structures, but
separate from one another. This corresponds to hierarchy (Douglas 1996) where
roles are ascribed to maintain social order. Atomistic individualism (Love 2010)
describes human identity as centered and isolated, which corresponds with indi-
vidualism (Douglas 1996), in which competition establishes social order. The
fragmented individual (Love 2010) describes the isolated and decentered (self and
socially constructed) postmodern state of human identity that results from the
breakdown of both institutional and atomistic individualism. This corresponds
with atomism (Douglas 1996), in which there is no group and thus no social order.
Finally, the integrated individual (Love 2010) is decentered but embedded in social
relations, which corresponds with egalitarianism (Douglas 1996), in which mem-
bers are bonded and self-organizing. Together, these typologies help us understand
the nature of human being and human being in society.
Next, the relationship between the individual and the state is explored through
the work of theologian H. Richard Niebuhr, which has been previously used in
public administration theory (Harmon 1995). His typology seeks to understand
the relative authority among humankind and God (Niebuhr 1963). In this frame-
work, human nature is realized in three distinct ethical stances: Man-the-Citizen,
who is answerable to the social order; Man-the-Maker, who determines the social
order; and Man-the-A nswerer, who is mutually obligated with others. Each type
has a unique way of being in the world that can be related to political philosophy as
well as ideations of the administrative role. This provides a new interpretation of the
Master/Servant metaphor, as well as the possibility of difference without domina-
tion or dialectical synthesis (Carr and Zanetti 1999).
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Finally, to tie these ontological concepts into more familiar ideas, each Tradition
considers which theories of political economy are most logically linked, including
Classical Liberalism, Conservatism, Modern Liberalism, Radicalism, and Anarchism
(Clark 1998). Orion White’s (1990) model helps in this effort, combining these theo-
ries into Classical Conservatism, Classical Liberalism, and Marxist Humanism.
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culture, whereby all claims to authority are held in suspicion. Indeed, the challenge
to authority has manifested itself in all social spheres at least since the civil rights
movement: “the family, the university, business, public and private associations,
politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the military services … authority based
on hierarchy, expertise, and wealth all, obviously, ran counter to the democratic and
egalitarian temper of the times, and during the 1960s, all three came under heavy
attack” (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975, 75). In short, we no longer have
agreement on the locus or source of legitimacy—who should hold the power?
In response to this crisis, it could be said that all theories of public administra-
tion seek to improve democracy by enhancing legitimacy, that they are “ardently
seeking a scheme to save it” (Waldo 1984, 75). Each Tradition proposes the best
way to allocate and limit political authority in hopes of finding social acceptance
and approval. However, these approaches differ in their specific prescriptions. There
is conflict and contradiction between legitimization strategies, each of which comes
from a different “tradition of theory and practice” (Stever 1988, 16). The debate is
essentially about whom in governance is trusted to determine what is Good and
how to achieve it.
Theory focuses predominantly on the relationship between politics and admin-
istration and the appropriate scope of action and authority legitimately held by
each function. There are concerns about the degree of administrative discretion
not directly overseen by elected representatives (Wilson 1975) as well as concerns
about undue political influence on policy implementation (Wilson 1887). In other
words, concerns about influence go both directions. To most theorists of public
administration, the telling feature of the “orthodox” approach to public adminis-
tration is its conscious and purposeful split between the political authority vested
in politics as opposed to administration (Denhardt 2000). This idea has been retro-
spectively labeled the “politics/administration dichotomy” (Sayre 1958). However,
in more contemporary discussions, the notion of blurred or shifting boundaries
among these complementary functions has become more common (Svara 1999).
In even more recent discussion, citizens are added into the mix of governance roles,
further complicating the relationship between politics and administration. These
theories suggest that only through direct democracy can political authority be kept
in its proper place—within citizens themselves. For example, “citizen governance”
is an idea that reformulates the scope of action and redistributes authority among
elected officials, practitioners, and citizens (Box 1998, 2004). Therefore, the problem
of political authority is opened up even further. Given these complexities, an excellent
argument has been made to abolish all assumptions about the politics/administration
dichotomy from public administration theory to expose its implications to democratic
legitimacy (Svara 1999). Instead of relying on conventions, we should look specifically
for who is given political authority in any prescription for practice.
At core, the purpose of establishing legitimate political authority and scope of
action is very pragmatic: “finding an effective relationship between the individual
and the society” (Denhardt 2000, 37). “When good government is in place, the
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relationship of the individual to the collective is resolved, and the aims of each
are rendered compatible” (McSwite 2002, xvi). Accordingly, one of the “big ques-
tions” for the field in the new millennium is to understand these complex rela-
tionships: “Understanding public administration requires a careful analysis of how
administrative behavior links with political institutions, as well as an analysis of
how civil society has become hard wired into the process of managing government
programs. What new faces will the policy-administration dichotomy present—
and how should public administration best resolve it?” (Kettl 2000a, 30). In other
words, what are the roles of administrators, politicians, and citizens in governance?
These roles and their differences are “not happenstance. There is an underlying
comprehensive logic to it” (Rosenbloom 2000a, 153). Therefore, if, where, and how
differences are drawn between political, administrative, and citizen authority and
scope of action are explored in each Tradition.
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the type that is delegated to the administrator, which allows for accountability to
principles, standards of performance or expertise, demographic characteristics, and
outcome measures. Popular authority relies on direct forms of democracy, through
either tools like elections and referenda or participatory deliberation.
Harmon (1990) notes that three types of responsibility are called for by various
camps within public administration theory: political, professional, and personal.
Each type embodies a different meaning of the virtue of responsibility: account-
ability, agency, and obligation (Harmon 1995). However, each formulation can
generate two pathologies in the absence of the others as countervailing forces.
Responsibility is paradoxical because it embodies opposing terms, entailing both
autonomy and answerability. Neither can have primacy and achieve democratic
legitimacy. Instead, they must exist in balanced combination to avoid dysfunc-
tions and achieve democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, important paradoxes must
be understood to grasp their purpose and value as creative dialectical tensions
(Harmon 1995). Indeed, he submits that the lack of such understanding is the true
source of the continuing crisis of legitimacy in government and administration.
Because we hold flawed conceptions of responsibility, our accountability systems
continually fail to meet expectations. Thus, we must understand how to achieve
legitimacy using a complete understanding of all its dialectical elements: account-
ability, agency, and obligation.
Romzek and her collaborators have focused attention on various formulations
and applications of accountability in public administration (Radin and Romzek
1996; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Romzek 1996; Romzek and Ingraham 2000).
The resulting categories pertain to issues such as level and source of control: hier-
archical, legal, professional, and political—each of which is associated with a dif-
ferent value emphasis. As noted by Koppell, this approach “seems to mix together
types of accountability that are substantively different” (2005, 96). He offers an
alternative typology of the dimensions of accountability, seeking to create mutually
exclusive conceptions of accountability that can be applied in singular or combined
formulations in a given context, including transparency, liability, controllability,
responsibility, and responsiveness. Transparency pertains to openness, access, and
revelation of important information about actions and decisions. Liability refers to
vulnerability to punishment or consequences to action. Controllability refers to the
capacity to be controlled by another party, as in the case of principal and agent.
Responsibility refers to answerability to a number of things, such as laws, rules,
and norms. Responsiveness refers to all types of external actors, including both
constituents and elected officials.
As will be explicated in the Traditions themselves, each of these criteria for
proper behavior suggests particular formulations of legitimacy, some of which
overlap. Perhaps this is the reason why administrators experience “Multiple
Accountabilities Disorder” (Koppell 2005)—to whom or to what are we answer-
able, particularly if they disagree? Scholars are as apt to place responsibility on the
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For more than a century we have been giving the government to the people
until the people have come to believe us; they think that they own it.
The public no longer identifies itself with the House of Representatives
and its special agency in the government, as it ought to in constitu-
tional theory. Americans now think that their title covers the whole
government, lock, stock and barrel, not merely a piece of it. … In other
words, they believe that they have a general power over the government as
a whole and not merely some power within the government. This is a pro-
foundly revolutionary change in the concept of power which cannot be
fitted into anything written in the Federalist Papers or in the literature
of constitutional law. (1960, 115–116)
Thus, how scholars perceive the issue of proper behavior is closely linked “back” to
associated theories of political authority and “forward” to assumptions about how
decisions are made for collective action.
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(McSwite 1997a). In fact, some say governance has become a “generally accepted
metaphor for describing the patterns of interaction of multiple-organizational sys-
tems or networks” (Frederickson 1997, 85). It refers to all the activities of collective
action, from forming ideas and decisions to implementation and evaluation, regard-
less of where the actors are located in terms of sector. It includes everyone involved
in creating and implementing public policy—“all those who act on behalf of the
public—on behalf of society in a legally mandated way—and those whose actions
have consequences for the members of society, singly or as a group” (Harmon and
Mayer 1986, 6). Pragmatically, what isn’t governance? One could reasonably assert
that in the contemporary context, anyone who is engaged in the work of creat-
ing public policy or pursuit of the common good can be conceived of as a “public
administrator” (Catlaw 2006b, 2007b; Stout 2007, 2009).
The term governance is popular because of this inclusiveness. “It describes a
wide range of types of organizations and institutions that are linked together and
engaged in public activities” (Frederickson 1997, 84). This is particularly conve-
nient given the difficulties in drawing boundaries and distinctions between organi-
zations and sectors in the contemporary social context. Increasingly over the course
of recent decades, and explosively since the shrinking and reinventing government
initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, public work has become a decision-making and
collective action process that extends across sectoral boundaries through privatiza-
tion efforts, policy networks, and other methods of coproduction. Some of these
arrangements are formal and legally sanctioned, while others are informal and out-
side the boundaries previously considered as “government.”
However, not all role conceptualizations in public administration theory are
fitted to this understanding of the contemporary governance context. Although the
evidence of these new practices is compelling, it must also be noted that previous
forms of governance coexist. There are still hierarchical government agencies at all
levels of jurisdiction, some very deep and authoritarian, others flatter and more
empowered. Furthermore, there are at least two very different types of networks
apparent in governance activities: those made up of organizational representatives
with formal or informal collaboration agreements (O’Leary and Bingham 2009)
and those made up of individuals representing themselves as citizens (Stivers 2008).
In fact, many theories describe, assume, or promote a very different gover-
nance context. For example, during the first 200 years in the United States, with
exception of contracts for simple services or products, many of the current tasks
of public administration were performed fully within the context of government
agencies. Thus, the role of public administrator was associated and even equated
with the public sector of the economy. This is the image of government codified in
the founding documents of the nation. However, others look to the founding senti-
ments of mutuality and how many collective needs were met through the work of
neighbors, charitable volunteers, and faith-based organizations, suggesting a return
to a greater reliance on civil society in self-governance.
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The other approach to PSM has considered its multifaceted dimensions, regard-
less of sector of employment. The first stream has failed to produce consistent
findings due to the fact that it may not be a sectorally linked concept. But more
important, earlier approaches failed to appreciate differing conceptualizations of
the term public service. Thus, the second stream of research has sought to clarify
these conceptualizations (Brewer, Selden, and Facer 2000; Rainey 1982). Initial
research on the dimensions of PSM first found that public service motives may be
rational, norm based, and affective (Perry and Wise 1990). Rational motives are
grounded in interest-based concepts of human and organizational behavior. Norm-
based motives are linked to a sense of patriotism, duty, and loyalty to the public
interest. Affective motives reflect the prosocial desire to help others based on feel-
ings of empathy, altruism, or moral conviction.
This theory of PSM was later operationalized in a measurement scale that
included attitudes about the attraction to public policy making, commitment to
the public interest, social justice, civic duty, compassion, and self-sacrifice, find-
ing that there are mixed bases for these motivations (Perry 1996). Application of
this measurement scale has provided evidence of the construct’s validity, as well as
identifying antecedents to PSM, which include parental and religious socialization
as well as professional identification (Perry 1997). Attitude surveys were then used
to fine-tune these findings (Brewer, Selden, and Facer 2000). The research found
that Perry’s approach fails to capture differences in individual conceptions of PSM
as well as the presence of mixed motives. Thus, a study was crafted to extend the
theory of PSM to provide a more systematic and comprehensive view of its various
components. In so doing, four distinct role conceptions based on PSM were identi-
fied: Samaritans, Communitarians, Patriots, and Humanitarians.
These findings are not completely dissimilar to another role typology of climb-
ers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen (Downs 1967). This typology was
not concerned with PSM but rather with how administrators behave. Another simi-
lar role typology was developed using a theoretical framework developed by Robert
Denhardt and Linda deLeon (1995). The construct considered types based on a grid
created by two attitude continua: managerial efficiency and social equity versus
political responsiveness and proactive administration (Selden, Brewer, and Brudney
1999). The resulting role types included stewards of the public interest; adapted
realists; businesslike utilitarians; resigned custodians; and practical idealists. Due
to the prevalence of the steward role conception, the findings recommended further
exploration of this particular role type from a normative perspective of improving
democratic accountability.
Yet another role typology is offered by Svara (2006b) based on a review of the
literature as well as empirical research on top appointed executives in Denmark:
the Guardian, the Autonomous Administrator, the Responsive Administrator,
and the Sparring Partner. He sees these models representing characteristics in two
dimensions of the relationship between politics and administration: (1) the nature
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Table 5.2 Three Traditions of Public Administration Praxis
Technical/Normative
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Element ↓ Technical Side Normative Side Technical Side Normative Side Synthesis
Discretionist,
Refounding,
Traditionalist or Managerialist or or Agential New Public Service or
Principal PA Orthodoxy or New Public New Public New Public Transformational
Theory Traditionalist Administration Management Administration Administration
Legitimacy Failure to follow Failure to comply Failure to perform Failure to act Failure to educate, empower,
problems hierarchical with institutional efficiently and ethically or and facilitate citizens in
(within orders with rules and effectively achieve equity self-governance
Tradition) neutral procedures
competence
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Technical/Normative
Element ↓ Technical Side Normative Side Technical Side Normative Side Synthesis
Organizing Deep bureaucratic hierarchy Flattened, empowered hierarchy Fluid relationship among
style (pyramid) (matrix); “network” of organizations individuals (network)
Key role Politically Conservator of Effective and Discretionary Facilitator of local value
characteristics neutral agency and efficient agent; virtuous formation; technical
competence in regime values as entrepreneur; administrator; advisor; social emancipator;
following interpreted by technician; trustee steward of citizen
orders legislature, intersectoral self-governance
judiciary, and innovator
executive
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Chapter 6
The Constitutional
Tradition—Bureaucratic
Accountability to the
Constitutional Order
Portrait of a Bureaucrat
In the film The Girl in the Café (Yates 2005), Bill Nighy portrays Lawrence, a senior
research analyst in the employ of the British chancellor of the exchequer. The plot
centers on preparations for and participation in the 2005 G8 summit (chaired by
the United Kingdom), for which Lawrence and his colleagues are focused on inter-
national economic policy—issues of debt, aid, and trade. Lawrence is every bit the
quiet, self-effacing civil servant who does the chancellor’s bidding effectively and
efficiently, following orders precisely, even down to lunch and coffee break sched-
ules: “My masters only give me tiny windows of freedom. … I’m already aggres-
sively late.” The other story line is a romance between Lawrence and a younger
Scottish woman, Gina (played by Kelly Macdonald), whom he meets by chance in
a café over tea and coffee.
Lawrence describes his job simply as “A lot of paper. A lot of pens.” He reads
policy reports while he brushes his teeth, eats breakfast, and eats lunch alone. To
him, bureaucrats are uninteresting: “Some of the dullest people in the world are
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in this room. There are gold medalists in the Boredom Olympics here.” Indeed,
being an administrator is not lucrative or exciting, like his fantasies of being a rock
star: “I’m not the man I dreamt I might be when I was young.” Nonetheless, he
is extremely dedicated. Even in his dreams, when offered a place in the Rolling
Stones, he turns it down: “I always refuse. I’m usually late for a departmental meet-
ing, so I make my excuses—‘Have to go.’” When Gina advises him not to work
too hard, he replies, “I’m afraid that’s what I do.” Although Lawrence appears to
belittle it, the importance of his work is recognized by the chancellor: “The welfare
of our cold and bitter country actually depends on him putting in a decent day’s
work once in a while.” In short, while not glamorous, bureaucrats are crucial to
government operations.
Lawrence has become so accustomed to this lifestyle and mode of interaction
that he finds it difficult to assert himself even with coworkers and in his private life:
“I know a lot about certain things … transport, development, but sod all about every-
thing else, including, obviously, real life.” But that will soon change—after their
initial meeting, Lawrence and Gina share a lunch and a dinner, then he impulsively
invites her to accompany him to Reykjavik, Iceland, while he works at the summit.
As events unfold, we learn how disillusioned Lawrence is with the governance
system. He feels that neither administrators nor politicians have the ability to stand
up to global economic forces: “You’d be surprised how little power politicians have
actually got these days, in the end.” But, he also acknowledges that the situation
could be different if political leaders stepped up: “Eight men in one room could lit-
erally save hundreds of millions of lives.” Unfortunately, in the political battle, the
bureaucrat holds little sway: “When it comes down to it, we’re just moneymen at
work. What it is, is a very big, but very quiet, very polite battle with too much at stake.
… There’ll be a deal. There always is a deal at the end of the day. It’s the civil servant’s
fate: the well-crafted compromise. … We make our announcements, acknowledge
who our enemies really are and the extent to which we have failed. Everyone licks
their wounds and heads for home.”
Further in the film, when Lawrence breaks his bureaucratic mold by allowing a
citizen (Gina) to have too much access to and too much influence on the political
process, he is severely chastised by his superiors. “What can I say, George? We have
a pair of unfortunate situations here. A man who has nothing in his life except his
work, that is unfortunate. And then by a stroke of bizarre chance he finds someone
who makes that not true for a day or two. But then suddenly it seems as though
the price that has to be paid for that ray of light is some kind of disgrace. It doesn’t
seem quite fair.”
Introduction
This chapter describes the Constitutional Tradition of public administration, which
is based on constitutional legitimacy and promotes the role type of Bureaucrat.
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Political Ontology
Generically, the term political ontology has been used to describe complex assump-
tions about the nature of human being, identity, and social life and the reflexive
relationship between ontology and the political (Catlaw 2007a; Howe 2006). The
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One
one one one one one
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authoritative role has been played by the church and royalty. Thinking generically,
suffice it to say that this ontological position lends itself to any form of authoritative
governance claiming sovereignty.
While it is true that the United States broke away from its monist (combined
political and religious system) beginnings during the Revolutionary War, it bor-
rows heavily from its ontology by separating church from state and then replac-
ing God with Nature (natural rights as opposed to divine right) and royalty with
elected representatives. This enables an analogous externalization of authority into
a conception of a sovereign state (Schmitt 1985). Taken to its extreme, this logic
supports the notion that the State exists separate from its citizens, pursuing its own
ends, as with Hegel’s idealized unity (Willoughby 1930). However, in the U.S.
context, it takes the moderate form of a social contract that empowers the state to
guide or control citizens to maintain social order. In this way, government repre-
sents what is right and good and is authorized to limit the bad. Thus, citizens are
willing to give power to the state—a sort of “lending” of sovereignty.
The result in the Constitutional Tradition’s formulation of the social contract
is the older premises of Classical, rather than Modern, Liberalism, in addition to
elements of Conservatism. Today, Conservatism is hardly distinguishable as a sepa-
rate perspective but rather a subset of Classical Liberalism as juxtaposed to Modern
Liberalism (Clark 1998). Therefore, Orion White (1990) uses the label Classical
Conservative[ism] to differentiate the ideas. This view suggests that the world is
chaotic and unsafe. Evil stems from selfish, irrational (and therefore unpredictable)
individuals. Therefore, we need a coercive authority to protect what has been gained,
both by individuals and the collective. In fact, the collective is prioritized over the
individual, and unity is represented by stable institutions that represent reality.
Thus, obedience to authority is good citizenship. This is a decidedly Hobbesian
ontology in which a complete disconnection and uniqueness sets individuals apart
with a belief that they are completely on their own in the state of nature and there-
fore at war with one another for scarce resources (Stivers 2008)—bonds must be
created and coerced through social mechanisms.
The architects of Classical Conservative Liberalism include philosophers such
as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), and Rene Descartes
(1596–1650) (Clark 1998). These thinkers shared the Enlightenment belief that
the world is an objective given, with humankind’s place in it guided by laws of
both nature and society. In other words, their shared ontology is positivist, with
universal claims to truth. The world simply is and displays a unity through natural
laws to which all things, including human beings, must answer.
Classical Liberals envision a fixed, highly rational, mechanistic world where
individuals are driven by self-interest. They believe in rational choice, the privileged
position of the individual, and the key importance of equal opportunity and prop-
erty rights. Individualism asserts that each person is sovereign by natural right and
autonomous in their thoughts, preferences, opinions, and choices. Political author-
ity is created only through a relinquishment of this autonomy whereby rational
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individuals enter into a voluntary “social contract” to protect their individual rights
and ensure the greatest personal benefit possible. Thus, the core liberal notions of
self-interested rationality, individualism, equality of political and property rights,
and social contract are forged. The centrality of these components within a free
market for economic exchange has imbued much of Western social and political
theory, making its way into the U.S. Constitution and its amendments.
Guaranteeing these natural rights is where elements of Conservatism enter, most
notably from the thinking of the Scottish philosophers David Hume (1711–1776)
and Adam Smith (1723–1790) (Solomon and Murphy 2000). In short, natural
rights must be guaranteed by the laws of society due to unavoidable problems of
human nature. In Leviathan, originally published in 1651, Hobbes asserts the natu-
ral state of humankind “is always war of every one against every one” (2000, 64).
This state of nature justifies the establishment of strong governments and laws to
ensure just conduct. Through voluntary agreement, individuals give some of their
political authority to society via the state in exchange for protection of rights and
the promise of better obtaining the good things of life. The Hobbesian view is quite
simple: It is only through fear that humankind’s self-interested behavior is cur-
tailed for certain. The state’s coercive power is the source of that fear. Slightly less
negatively, in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” Adam Smith asserted that market
inequalities must be mitigated by civil society in some manner to ensure appropri-
ate moral sentiments: “Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable
state without beneficence” (Smith 2000a, 147). For a good quality of life, a strong,
paternalistic state is needed.
This externalized secular source of authority over the individual is expressed in
what Niebuhr calls Man-the-Citizen: “This man lives as moral self in the presence
of the law first of all, not of other selves. What is over or against him as that which
limits and attracts him is a commandment, a demand, a requirement. His relation
to other selves is a relation under the law” (1963, 70–71). Rather than imagining
the individual citizen as sovereign, laws create rules of conduct that are deonto-
logical in nature—they are imbued with authority that demands acquiescence—as
parents often say, “Because I said so.” As noted by philosopher Isaiah Berlin, civil
association is a form of rule-based governance reflective of the constitutional order
(Spicer 2004). This creates a political reality that dictates what is possible. “We
come into being under the rules of the family, neighborhood, and nation, subject
to the regulation of our action by others” (Niebuhr 1963, 53). Thus, obedience to
authority reflects good citizenship.
In this view, the law represents the generalized Other (or the One) to which we
feel accountable. It is a demand that is anticipated in a predictable pattern, although
Niebuhr admits it is constantly amended through ongoing social interaction and
interpretation. Furthermore, the law represents an ultimate social cause, which
might be political ideology, religion, or both. Even in the United States, refer-
ences to a divine Creator are included in founding political documents. These
divinely endowed individuals choose their own representatives to formulate the
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rules by which we will live. Again drawing from Conservatism, these representa-
tives are chosen based on their “better” virtue and character and are guided toward
the public interest through a sense of noblesse oblige. As Jefferson suggests, “There
is a debt of service due from every man to his country, proportioned to the boun-
ties which nature and fortune have measured to him” (Caldwell 1988, 184–185).
Some of the key “elitist” concepts advocated in the Federalist Papers (Rossiter 1999)
include the following:
◾◾ It is natural and desirable for the elite classes to form the representative gov-
ernment (e.g., Nos. 35 and 36);
◾◾ A pure democracy is practically impossible and theoretically undesirable
because of poor outcomes (e.g., No. 10);
◾◾ Democracy must be constrained to ensure reason and to avoid both the tyr-
anny of the masses and the problems of faction (e.g., Nos. 10, 49, 55, and 59);
◾◾ A system of representative checks and balances is required for efficiency
(e.g., Nos. 9, 48, and 51); and
◾◾ A centralized government is good for the economy (e.g., Nos. 11, 12, 13, 34,
and 35).
In sketch, the masses are considered to be irrational and to protect society from
their tyranny, those who are more rational and able than others to interpret and
represent natural law should lead and act as arbiters of competing factions who do
not have the common good at heart.
From this perspective, government is meant to ensure stability, order, secu-
rity, and loyalty both within the organizations of government and society itself. As
Hamilton envisioned it, government would include a large, active public admin-
istration to support the political leaders’ vision of the nation’s economic growth
(Caldwell 1988; Stillman 1996). Therefore, how authority is further delegated to
these two components of government and the scope of action they legitimately
claim is the next element of concern.
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Politics Administration
Policy
Policy Making
Implementation
Thus, administrators not only must do the bidding of elected officials but also must
refuse to do so if those wishes may be in conflict with law. Given this complexity,
Goodnow (2003) identifies three types of authority involved in public administra-
tion: judicial; executive; and administrative. The judicial and executive authorities
reside with political expressions of the will of the state, while administrative author-
ity rests with the execution of that will.
Following this logic, Goodnow was the first proponent of what is now called
the “politics/administration dichotomy” (Sayre 1958). The idea is that function
must follow power: While politics has the authority and control over administra-
tion, administration needs to be in charge of “the scientific, technical, and, so to
speak, commercial activities of the government” (Goodnow 1900, 17). Similarly,
L. D. White suggests, “In the highest reaches the administrative art touches the
political, but it grows out of different soil” (1926, 8). In short, “administration lies
outside the proper sphere of politics” (Wilson 1887, 210).
Despite decreasing evidence of its contemporary implementation, many ves-
tiges of this ideal remain: “Not all students, or public officials, or citizens, accepted
the demise of the policy-administration dichotomy, nor have they today” (Mosher
1968, 84). One famous study of bureaucracy suggests that “political authority may
be gathered undesirably into bureaucratic hands: by the growth of an adminis-
trative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control” (Wilson 1975,
80). Even in refounding discussions that deeply empower administrators, there
have been calls to learn more about the distinctions of purpose and competen-
cies between roles in politics and administration within the governance process
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(Wamsley, Goodsell, et al. 1990, 42). More recently, it has been argued that there
is yet value to the mutual noninterference and subordination of administration
to political representatives ensured by the constitutional doctrine of the politics/
administration dichotomy (Overeem 2006).
In sum, the Constitutional Tradition honors the differing roles of politics and
administration within government, suggesting that the defining difference is the
making of policy versus its implementation, although the line of demarcation is
not always clear (Barzelay and Armajani 1992; Blau and Meyer 1999; Finer 1935;
Goodnow 1900; Gulick 1937b; White 1926; Willoughby 1927; Wilson 1887).
Because it cannot be reasonably implemented as a stark boundary, Appleby sug-
gests that the functional separation excluded administration from “any impor-
tant—policy-making functions” (1949, 3). As Overeem notes, the notion of the
dichotomy becomes a regulatory ideal (Overeem 2005, 2006). Political author-
ity must be limited within administration to ensure democratic legitimacy, while
politics must be limited to ensure that it does not influence administration in its
details and thus reduce fairness (i.e., lawfulness). In short, a functional separation
of politics and administration is thought to improve democratic legitimacy, and
both hierarchical accountability and due process are evidence of the appropriate
delegation of political authority and scope of action to administration.
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on the scientific claim that objective positions exist from which one can perceive the
truth. In this position, personal biases and subjectivity cannot interfere with judg-
ment. Thus, a neutral Bureaucrat can be guided purely by the directives and proce-
dures given to him or her rather than by a personal moral compass (Wilson 1975).
Efficiency can safely be used as proof of accountability because the end pursued is
assumed to be “right” in that it came from the legitimate constitutional order.
Ideas about achieving legitimacy through efficiency were quite prevalent among
the early thinkers in public administration. Efficiency is a measure of utilitarian
success. Therefore, authority in a legal-rational society is conferred to institutions
that are efficient (Weber 1954). Both during the revolutionary times (as listed in
the Declaration of Independence’s grievances) and during the Progressive Era,
reformers linked political corruption and abuses to waste, fraud, and other forms
of inefficiency (Stivers 2000). Legitimate government would not tolerate incom-
petence and inefficiency because that would not be in the public interest or fair
according to constitutional principles. Therefore, efficient government would be
legitimate government, and the scope of authority granted to administration would
be limited to efficient implementation of political mandates.
In sum, through principles of administration scientifically identified in the effi-
cient hierarchical organizational structures of business, the Federalists and the later
Bureau Men (Stivers 2000) and Men of Reason (McSwite 1997a) of the Progressive
reform movement sought to systematize, centralize, rationalize, and neutralize
administration. These were the techniques chosen to “gain and maintain control
over their bureaucracies so they function for the benefit of the commonweal” (Blau
and Meyer 1999, 4). However, they did not seek to remove administration from its
political oversight. Rather than challenging the political system directly, they were
using somewhat of a back door to political reform by sequestering the power of
execution in the hands of professional administrators while still formally answering
to the hierarchical political order.
This is the defining characteristic of the constitutional approach to neutral
competence: Expertise remains under the guidance and control of the organization,
which itself must answer to political masters. The foundation of legitimacy must be a
combination of the administration’s knowledge and responsibility to the legislators,
who are in turn responsible for making policy and answering to the sovereign peo-
ple (Wilson 1887). Subsequent laws, such as the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 and its amendments, which enable administrative rule making, adjudication,
and independent regulatory commissions as well as judicial rather than legislative
oversight, would fundamentally change the constitutional logic of legitimacy based
on direction and oversight from elected representatives.
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due process and fair treatment as well as constitutional rights guaranteed through
the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. This focus in large part mirrors the
neutral competence approach; accountability to the Constitution and regime values
is ensured through the hierarchical system of authority and control that answers
to the three powers of government. In what has been called a Burkean approach to
administration, after the eighteenth century political philosopher, Bureaucrats
must “accept that their discretion, like the discretion of citizens in general, be gov-
erned by rules and procedures and informed and constrained by a respect for past
practice and tradition” (Haque and Spicer 1997, 94).
In this way, the Constitutional Tradition envisions the institutions of govern-
ment themselves as embodying the nation’s regime values. “In their broader con-
text, the ends of administration are the ultimate objects of the state itself … in
short, the attainment of the good life” (White 1926, 5). One traditionalist working
principle is that if the agency is the nexus for public interest determination, then
“those in agencies could regard the well-being, even the growth, of their agency as
equivalent to the public weal” (White and McSwain 1990, 30). Thus, conserva-
tion of those institutions represents de facto political accountability. In conserv-
ing mission, administrative conservators are preserving the formative mandates of
the organization that have come from the constitutional masters (Terry 1995). In
essence, the institution itself holds political authority; thus, its agents are account-
able to the institution, and obedience or duty to that institution’s rules fulfills their
moral obligation (Harmon 1995).
Efficiency and facts “have no meaning in relation to the purely valuational ele-
ments in decision. A democratic state is committed to popular control over these
value elements, and the distinction of value from fact is of basic importance in
securing a proper relation between policy-making and administration” (Simon
1976, 197).
Because our focus is on administrative decision making, we focus on technical
and formal rationality. Weber (1994d) conceived the authority of the bureaucratic
state to be legal-rational in nature—a fusion of technical and formal rationality.
Together, technical and formal rationality pursue the “methodical attainment of a
definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of
adequate means” (Weber 1946b, 293). This is why law is one of the foundations
of public administration. Once value-based ends are determined, “their realiza-
tion is dependent upon detailed processes and arrangements” (Appleby 1952, 36).
Because of this notion of a definitely given end, decision making is formal and
linked to the legal authority of the Constitutional Tradition and its command-and-
control approach to political authority through agency rules and procedures.
However, because of the desire for neutral competence in achieving these pre-
determined ends, decision making is also technical. Keeping the focus on instru-
mental calculation prevents stepping beyond the administrative scope of action
by trying to establish substantive ends. Therefore, technical rationality assumes
a difference between facts and values and excludes all values but efficiency in its
analysis, simply accepting the substantive ends chosen by the political leaders at
the top of the hierarchical chain of command. The criterion of efficiency also gives
hierarchical supervisors a value comparison beyond adherence to rules.
To calculate effectively, technical rationality seeks a high degree of comprehen-
siveness and objectivity or value neutrality. A technically rational process would
have comprehensive knowledge of (1) all criteria that should govern the choice;
(2) all means of achieving those criteria; (3) all probable consequences of those
means; and (4) a choice of means that is made based on an acceptable level of
efficiency (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963). This comprehensive rational decision-
making approach is based on Descartes’s Discourse on Method (Forester 1989).
Technical rationality’s focus on facts instead of values provides an important
epistemological linkage to scientific knowledge. Indeed, while still in the academy,
Woodrow Wilson called for a science of administration to determine what govern-
ment can “properly and successfully do … with the utmost possible efficiency and
at the least possible cost either of money or energy” (1887, 197). His purpose was
clearly to “make its business less unbusinesslike” (Wilson 1887, 201). But, there
was also a preferred method of using science to do so. Many elements of what
constitutes knowledge and reality in “the orthodoxy” belong to the Constitutional
Tradition of public administration (Denhardt 2000). Specifically, there is an aspira-
tion toward positive knowledge that will enable certainty in the ability to describe,
predict, and control behavior within both administrative systems and society. The
scientific method is used to acquire factual knowledge, test theory, and design
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models. Inductive and deductive reasoning support such study, and instrumental
reasoning is a process that follows rules of deductive inference (J. D. White 1990).
There is an assumption that objectivity can be achieved by controlling subjective or
biased tendencies. The goal is to achieve the greatest degree of rationality within an
often-irrational political context (Simon 1976).
However, Wilson was equally concerned about the relationship between admin-
istration and constitutional law and its substantive values. The Constitutional
Tradition recognizes that just as the line between politics and administration is
unclear, so is the line between fact and value. Thus, one traditionalist working
principle is that administration should be pragmatic and experimental (White and
McSwain 1990). Administrative science must be pragmatic because it is question-
able “whether means can be divorced from the ends they serve” (Waldo 1984, 38).
Even the fiercest proponent of rational decision making notes the cascading nature
of means-ends chains, where one end becomes the means for another (Simon 1976).
Of course, rather than challenging his own fact-value split, Simon merely states
that one cannot equate means with facts and ends with values due to this inter-
relation. But, the point remains that these divisions are not clear-cut, if they are
possible at all.
Therefore, when in doubt, administrative decision-making rationality in the
Constitutional Tradition falls back on proven principles and authoritative agency
rules when technical knowledge is limited (Harmon and Mayer 1986; Ostrom
1976). These rules determine where administrative ends leave off and political ends
begin in order to maintain legitimacy in governance. This has been described as
an administrative logic of procedural law (Considine and Lewis 1999). Ostrom
suggests such “prescriptive propositions stated in a language of authority relation-
ships are used to allocate and control the exercise of decision-making capabilities”
(Ostrom 1976, 10). In other words, the decision rules of bureaucracy are based
on contractual requirements (Harmon and Mayer 1986). The ultimate ends are
given by the legislative or judicial arms of government to the executive, and from
the executive to the administrative hierarchy. Therefore, decisions are made only
in regard to the means and intermediary ends required to achieve the given goals.
The influence of formal rationality (politically given ends) on technical ratio-
nality (efficiency) creates a hybrid form of administrative rationality for gover-
nance. Herbert Simon described this as “bounded rationality” whereby rather than
acting as the ideal economic man, people in organizations tend to act as admin-
istrative man (Simon 1956, 1966). Specifically, rationality is limited not only by
human capacity but also by organizational controls and political considerations
(Lindblom 1965; Simon 1947, 1976). This process is described as a middle way or
moderate approach to instrumental rationality that lies somewhere between pure
economic or technical rationality and pure formal or legal rationality. Building off
this decision-making theory, Lindblom (1965) views public administration in a
place of tension between administrative and political goals. Rather than pursuing
the most technically efficient solution, the policy-making process more typically
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Organizing Style
Generically, the manner in which political authority is distributed, the scope of
action allowed, the method of ensuring proper administrative behavior, and the
appropriate decision-making rationality demand an organizing style that fits
these roles and processes. To support the meaning of each, the structure must
enable these characteristics in a “form-follows-function” manner. As discussed in
some detail in previous sections, the Constitutional Tradition assumes a hierarchi-
cal distribution of political authority to limit the scope of administrative action
and ensure accountability. Furthermore, to ensure that decision making is based
on either neutrally competent technical rationality or formal legal rationality,
oversight must be enabled that ultimately ends with the separated powers of the
constitutional order. Therefore, administration cannot achieve the Constitutional
Tradition’s interpretation of democratic legitimacy without a matching hierarchical
organizing style. In fact, the hierarchical form of the ideal-t ype bureaucratic agency
(Weber 1994b) is associated with “the orthodoxy” in public administration theory
(Denhardt 2000). Figure 6.3 illustrates this organizing style.
Bureaucracy emerged as the principal organizational design in public orga-
nizations because it accommodates the various principles associated with this
Tradition’s legitimacy logic. First, hierarchy was considered to be the most efficient
form of organization, thus facilitating the notion of accountability through com-
petence. However, to achieve its more Conservative political values, bureaucracy
provides the hierarchical mechanism through which to allocate political authority,
ensure responsibility, and demand accountability (Barzelay and Armajani 1992).
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Executive
Directors
Managers
“Street Level”
1. Fixed jurisdictional areas are established and ordered by rules, laws, or admin-
istrative regulations (division of labor; formal rules, policies, and procedures).
2. Authority is distributed in a hierarchical system of supervision (hierarchical
authority and control).
3. Management relies on written documents kept on file by the organization.
4. Managers are thoroughly trained experts.
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Government
Market Community
self-interested or an “irrational mass,” the state and its administrators must make
the right decisions on their behalf. Vigoda (2002) suggests that conceptualizations
of administrator-citizen interactions have changed over time. The view of citizens
as subjects and of government as the rulers or trustees creates a coercive tendency
in extreme. Similarly, in her summary of possible role pairs, Roberts (2004) identi-
fies three that are applicable to the Bureaucrat role conceptualization: (1) citizen as
subject in an authority system whereby administrators are accountable to the ruler;
(2) citizen as a voter in a representative system that replaces a ruler; and (3) citizen
as client who defers to an administrative state.
In terms of elected representatives, it has been suggested that the orthodox
approach to public administration takes a purely instrumental view, in which prac-
titioners are merely tools of the elected representatives to accomplish public goals
(Box 2004). They are value-free implementers who follow procedures as dictated
by elected officials (Box 1998). One of the role conceptualizations noted in the
Blacksburg Manifesto is that of servant, which implies both responsibility to the
Constitution and neutral competence (Wolf and Bacher 1990). Other metaphors
include (1) a functionary who is fully subordinate and instrumental to politically
defined ends and (2) a professional or expert who is a competent analyst and imple-
menter (Catron and Hammond 1990). In other words, Bureaucrats are passive public
servants (Reich 1990). To ensure this role conception, in bureaucratic organizations,
power, authority, and management techniques such as training and indoctrination
are used to ensure appropriate role taking on the part of administrators (Simon
1976). It should be noted that none of these descriptors necessitates a pejorative
connotation. From the perspective of the Constitutional Tradition, government of
the people (e.g., elected representatives) is precisely what the Constitution demands,
and passive, competent service is the proper administrative role.
Because the Bureaucrat’s role is in large part confined to the bureau itself,
much discussion of role in the Constitutional Tradition is focused on the admin-
istrator’s role within the organization rather than within society or the system of
governance. “The art of administration is the direction, coordination, and con-
trol of many persons to achieve some purpose or objective. … An administrator
is consequently one who directs, coordinates, and controls the activities of others”
(White 1926, 4). As might be predicted based on the bureaucratic organizing style,
Denhardt (1981a) uses Marxist historian Eugene Genovese’s Master/Slave relation-
ship as a metaphor for the dialectical tension created by relationships of power and
authority in bureaucratic organizations. When role is formulated within the insti-
tution itself, the hierarchical organizing style establishes a series of Master/Servant
relationships extending up through the organization to political overseers in the
three branches of government. Individuals within those organizations are Servants
to political Masters at the top.
The importance of the attitude of service as subordination is emphasized in
the early textbooks of the field. While public administrators should be substantive
experts capable of organizational diagnosis and recommendations for action, they
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should avoid deciding which values to pursue. These decisions should be left to the
political process because “a person primarily interested in doing a job efficiently may
make a recommendation different from that of a person interested in doing the job
so as to preserve democratic responsibility, and different again from a person inter-
ested in doing it in a manner that will interfere as little as possible with the property
or other rights of individuals” (Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson 1974, 21).
In sum, all the elements of the Constitutional Tradition combine to deem-
phasize the administrator’s role as an individual—“as ego or career oriented, as
objective rational decision maker, or as independent willful political actor” (White
and McSwain 1990, 35). Although in private life they are sovereign citizens, the
Constitutional Tradition creates a “freedom-responsibility dichotomy … because
administrators are not chosen by the electorate they are not free to act as advocates
of policies or to allow their personal values to influence significantly the manner in
which policies are implemented” (Harmon 1971, 176). Therefore, one traditionalist
working principle is that an appropriate sense of humility was a key skill for admin-
istrative action. Instead of an active role conception, the notion of the public inter-
est provides “a transcendent vocational symbol” (White and McSwain 1990, 34).
In the Constitutional Tradition, the elected leaders of the hierarchical system of
authority and organization are the ones to determine what is in the public interest.
Tradition Summary
Pulling together all elements of the Tradition as an ideal-t ype, the “genetic code” of
the Bureaucrat consists of the characteristics presented in Table 6.4.
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Chapter 7
The Discretionary
Tradition—Entrepreneurial
Responsibility for
Desirable Outcomes
Portraits of Entrepreneurs
In the film The Girl in the Café (Yates 2005), the British chancellor of the excheq
uer is working with his team of policy analysts, led by George with support from
Lawrence and his colleagues Robert and Sunita, to prepare and propose interna-
tional economic policy proposals at the 2005 G8 summit. The chancellor chal-
lenges his team to develop and stand firmly behind policies for debt, aid, and trade
that will eliminate or seriously mitigate extreme poverty, particularly in Africa
where 23 of the world’s 25 most impoverished nations are located. These policies
are meant to meet the challenge put forth by world leaders in 2000 in what were
called the Millennium Development Goals.
In most scenes in which these characters appear together, George, Sunita, and
Robert each take a very active and seemingly egalitarian role with the chancellor,
referring to him as “William” and interacting with him as peers in both formal
and informal conversations. (They are not meek and withdrawn like Lawrence,
who holds himself physically separate, speaks only when spoken to, and refers to
William always as “Chancellor.”) In fact, the chancellor appears to trust his team
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implicitly: “What do we think … .” While the chancellor has given broad direc-
tion on behalf of the prime minister to the team to develop proposals to meet
the Millennium Goals, the analysts lead discussions of specific policy issues, even
running down the positions and attitudes of each country in the G8 to guide the
chancellor’s political interactions with his peers. They know that they are headed
for an uphill battle, with the United States completely against their proposals, dubi-
ous support from the Germans, and full support from the French (who they later
find they should not have trusted). The chancellor relies on the experts to produce
a winning proposal: “But please, let’s go through these figures one more time. If
we have to go ahead with only four of our G8 partners, I need to be assured it’s not
such an embarrassingly small amount of money that it looks like a failure.”
Once at the summit, the chancellor sends the team into the discussions, offering
them political advice and strategy: “Right, big day. Without wanting to aggrandize
ourselves, I think we are fighting today for something as big as the abolition of slav-
ery. So, good luck. Hold the line. Debt and aid and trade. Push for everything. But
pretend you don’t know it’s everything.” The analysts are clearly acting in the stead
of the statesmen (“eight men in a room”)—at least until the final day of delibera-
tions. Indeed, they are referred to as “the British delegation.” As representatives, they
are empowered to negotiate with their peers from other nations. As one of the U.S.
analysts challenges them: “So, we’re gonna have to make some hard choices. Is it
gonna be aid? Is it gonna be debt? Is it gonna be trade? Because it can’t be all three.”
At first, George has to goad Lawrence into taking stands: “Lawrence will, of
course, be zealously guarding his Millennium Goals. Won’t you, Lawrence?” “Yes,
quite right.” Throughout much of the film, each time Lawrence is asked to stand
up for something, he fails miserably to make a convincing argument or plea. But,
Lawrence’s budding romance with Gina seems to embolden him both generally
and in his position as an analyst. Perhaps, as the nature program on his television
foreshadows, when he decides no longer to do up the top button on his Marks
and Spencer pajamas, he unleashes a lion—“the king of beasts.” First, he dares to
declare, “I’m moderately senior,” as he claims his right to bring along a significant
other on the Summit trip. Then, Gina’s responsiveness and interest in his work
seems to fire him up—to remind him of the purpose and passion behind his work.
Finally, once Gina has publicly shamed the G8 leaders, Lawrence finds the
courage to speak truth to power. While the other analysts have felt comfortable
doing so all along, they were largely in agreement with the chancellor and so not
at great risk. But, when George suggests accepting the compromise offered by the
other nations, Lawrence says: “It’s not a good deal. It’s a deal; it’s not a good deal.”
The chancellor replies that under the circumstances his opinion is not valued.
Nonetheless, Lawrence continues:
Introduction
Public administration emerged as a “self-aware” field of practice and academic study
in the midst of the late nineteenth century modern societal shift toward industri-
alization, professionalization, and political reform. In short, the Progressive Era
shaped the fundamental tenets of the Discretionary Tradition’s logic of legitimacy.
Waldo (1984) would likely say it is the political theory of public administration. As
the mainstream perspective of the field, it is based on the legitimacy of expertise
and promotes the role type of Entrepreneur in its most generic meaning, which
is explained further at the end of this chapter in discussion of the role conceptu-
alization. However, to assure skeptics it is necessary to explain here some initial
reasoning for selecting this label. Despite the reservations of others, the Traditions
framework challenges limited meanings of the term entrepreneurial, broaden-
ing it to mean an autonomous, discretionary, and consequential approach to public
administration. Indeed, social entrepreneurship (Dees 1998) has been described as
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108 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
“empowered rather than passive” action (McConachi and Simpson 2003, 59). The
social entrepreneur “exercises influence well beyond economics, helping to shape
political, social, environmental and cultural arenas” (Davis 2002, 1).
Such empowerment of the administrative arm of government is often called
managerial, but when this idea is linked to an efficiency focus alone, it loses the full
implications of the legitimacy logic shared with differing end goals. There are actually
a host of “discretionist” (Fox and Cochran 1990) views on the role of public admin-
istration that rely on a variety of performance criteria, including ethics and equity as
well as efficiency and effectiveness (Fox and Cochran 1990; Frederickson 1997; Lynn
1996; Ostrom 1989). Using political theorist Isaiah Berlin’s thinking about purposive
association as a basis for governance, this pursuit of substantive ends has been called
“teleocratic” in nature (Spicer 2004, 358). It has also been described as a new “‘results-
oriented ethics’” (Caron and Giauque 2006, 548). Indeed, it is possible to address all
democratic values in at least some manner through such a teleological approach.
This variety of values is the basis for the long-standing “dualisms” in public
administration of technical versus normative approaches as well as the fact/value
dichotomy. However, when considering the legitimacy logic being used, it becomes
evident that both are teleological in nature. Whether one uses technical or norma-
tive criteria to demonstrate legitimacy does not really matter through this analyti-
cal lens. The common denominators are the independent and consequential nature
of these criteria—public administration is freed to choose and pursue goals not
directly dictated or controlled by the political system. This commonality enables
the use of one term to accommodate both business/technical and social/normative
interpretations of the autonomous entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, there are two quite
different conceptualizations of entrepreneurism housed within one Tradition; one is
based largely on economic criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, while the other
relies on other criteria of the social good, including ethics and equity.
The following sections describe the genetic meaning of each element used to
define a Tradition in this book (political ontology; political authority and scope
of action; criterion of proper behavior; administrative decision-making rationality;
organizing style; and the assumed governance context) according to the legitimacy
logic of the Discretionary Tradition. The chapter concludes with a description of
the resulting role conceptualization for the Entrepreneur.
Political Ontology
Generically, the term political ontology has been used to describe complex assump-
tions about the nature of human being, identity, and social life and the reflexive
relationship between ontology and the political (Catlaw 2007a; Howe 2006). As
noted in the Constitutional Tradition, the mainstream Western ontology is some-
what dual in nature because it accepts both religious and scientific explanations
(Stout 2012a). Table 7.1 shows how the two compare on the dimensions of ontology
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One
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by the Constitutional Tradition acquires a new spin, transferring its emphasis from
the political to the administrative functions of the state. The Master role of politi-
cal representatives is in large part delegated to administrators. In a nutshell, the
Discretionary Tradition reflects Kaufman’s (1956) doctrine of executive leadership,
whereby public administration is released from the limitations of political neutral-
ity and political representativeness.
The driving belief behind the Discretionary Tradition of public administra-
tion is that the political process alone cannot be trusted to produce the Good,
nor are citizens capable of effective self-governance through direct democracy. In
short, politics fails to produce both efficiency and equity, so expert intervention
is required. A variety of reasons is offered—because politicians and citizens are
laypeople lacking expertise; because politics has been captured by special interests
or elitists; or because self-interest is likely to bias decision making (Bachrach 1967;
Buchanan and Tullock 1969; Jenkins-Smith 1990; Kaboolian 1998; Lindblom and
Woodhouse 1993; Lowi 1979; Willoughby 1927). An alternative view is that the
rule-bound nature of the constitutional bureaucracy has failed to deliver what citi-
zens want. Taken together, “the claim to administrative discretion is the claim to
power on the basis of technical, managerial, and moral expertise” (Stivers 2002b).
The shared sentiment is that the constitutional system of bureaucratic administra-
tion controlled by political oversight is a failure.
In response, the Discretionary Tradition calls for an administrative solution to
reclaiming governmental legitimacy—expertise is trusted to produce the Good, or at
least to improve governance (Pollitt 1990). “This is a pluralization and specification
of authority” (Warren 1996, 59). This was the fundamental thrust of the Progressive
Era’s call for the field of study itself (Stivers 2000). If politics is the greatest source
of government failure, then the legitimacy logic must essentially bypass this system
and place political authority with the administration through a variety of reforms.
Administrators can thus extend the fundamental logic of checks and balances by
becoming the check on the abuse of political power (Spicer and Terry 1993).
The logic of the Discretionary Tradition is Hamiltonianism in extreme, seek-
ing “to improve the capacity of the administrative machine while downplaying
the importance of politics” (Ott and Boonyarak 2001, 489). Despite what actu-
ally made it into the Constitution, a compelling argument has been made that
the Federalists envisioned a “democratic bureaucracy” for the United States with
a strong role for both elected representatives and their administrative assistants
(Ostrom 1989). In extreme, the political institutions of government are seen as bar-
riers to efficient and effective performance. The more that political authority can be
devolved into administrative structures to be exercised by experts, the better.
However, the problem of locating the actual limits of administrative authority
has been with the field since its founding: “This is not quite the distinction between
Will and answering Deed, because the administrator should have and does have a
will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and
ought not to be a mere passive instrument. The distinction is between general plans
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and special means” (Wilson 1887, 212). As noted in the Constitutional Tradition,
this functional difference is called the politics/administration dichotomy, so
administrative solutions to government failure often start by challenging this the-
ory (Appleby 1949; Dimock 1937; Waldo 1984). Some say the notion of functional
separation within a shared hierarchy was clearly part of the field’s founding theory
but was questioned in practice increasingly in the 1930s and abandoned altogether
by midcentury (Waldo 1984). Yet, because the Constitution does not directly state
what powers should be delegated to “Heads of Departments” and their subordi-
nates, the question remains unsettled.
In terms of practice, the dichotomy’s empirical accuracy is challenged by evi-
dence of functional integration in government (Denhardt 2000). Even if differenti-
ated functions are desirable, the line of demarcation has never been clear (Wilson
1887). It is not as simple as it appears to separate law making from law execu-
tion. Instead, what is found in practice are complex relationships of interdependent
“complementarity” (Svara 1999, 678) and varying degrees of differentiation and
distance between roles (Svara 2006b). As noted by Rosenbloom (2000a), adminis-
tration involves legislative functions in the form of delegated rule making that serve
as extensions of Congress in allocation of burdens and benefits. Over time, dis
cretion has flowed increasingly from the legislature to the judiciary to the admin-
istration (Dimock 1936b).
According to Dimock’s analysis, the most common level of administrative dis-
cretion occurs in routine duties. They are usually matters of common sense, con-
venience, or courtesy. The second type occurs in response to an emergency, when
there is no time to go through oversight channels. The third type of discretion
occurs in control or regulatory situations for which decisions regarding enforcement
are somewhat subjective. The last type is the most controversial because legislative
guidance is typically extremely vague, thus accentuating administrative discretion.
In sum, through discretion, public administrators define the public interest as a
regular part of their job (Herring 1936).
Ongoing empirical studies continue to show that discretion is delegated at ever-
lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, thus making independent administra-
tive discretion pervasive (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). These “street level
bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1983) are the public administrators through which most citi-
zens experience government.
Theory is generally ambiguous “as to what in fact is a political question, how
and where political answers should be reached, and the role of the public manager
in that process” (Khademian 1998, 272). However, normative claims are made
that administrative discretion is an expression of appropriate political authority
(Dimock 1937; Frederickson 1997; Friedrich 1940; Gulick 1933; Mosher 1968;
Redford 1956, 1969). Most traditionally, administrators are considered key players
who are empowered by the chief executive (White and McSwain 1990). However,
some claims challenge the legislative functional division; in extreme cases in an
“assault upon the politics-administration dichotomy” (Sayre 1958, 103).
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There are actually several opinions on this topic that share the Discretionary
Tradition’s legitimacy logic. The first simply ignores the dichotomy, wishing expert
administrators to have greater influence on policy making, even if it remains sym-
bolically decided by politicians (Simon 1976). In other words, once politics is
“correctly” removed from administration, public and private administration are
not different in any meaningful way, and private practices can be used to make
public administration more effective and efficient (Allison 1979). Others seek a del-
egation of policy-making authority to professionals without any acknowledgment
of the dichotomy (Barzelay 2001; Jenkins-Smith 1990). Others would like to abol-
ish the dichotomy formally to allow administration to take part in policy making
legitimately as part of the representative governance process (Appleby 1945; Waldo
1984). Given these differing opinions, a compelling argument has been made to do
away with all assumptions about the politics/administration dichotomy to study its
nuances and expose its implications for democratic legitimacy (Svara 1999).
From any of these perspectives, neither the social roles of politicians and admin-
istrators nor the functions of policy making are eliminated. Therefore, it might be
more accurate to view the Discretionary Tradition’s ideal as a shifting of the line of
demarcation between politics and administration, which places increased political
authority in the hands of administrators and broadens their scope of action. This
shifting balance of authority is illustrated in Figure 7.2.
At its most extreme, administrators are seen to be legitimately engaged in
all aspects of policy making short of actual partisan politics (Overeem 2005).
Politics Administration
Policy making
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(Rohr 1986, 1989, 1990). By “regime values,” he means the values of a polity that
guide its purpose and provide the normative foundation for the ethical standards
of public servants in that regime. In the United States, those values are described
in the Constitution, which all public officials take an oath to uphold. Rohr charges
administrators with interpreting constitutional values and applying them in their
decision making and actions. Similar to the judiciary forming an opinion, admin-
istrators must ultimately choose based on what “they find most appealing and
persuasive” (Rohr 1989, 84). He sees this as a pragmatic “middle way” between the
“low” ethical standards of bureaucratic rules and the unreasonably “high” ethical
standards of complex formulations of social equity like Rawlsian (2000b) justice.
Rohr defends this highly discretionary role with The Federalist Papers’ call
for a strong administration vital in maintaining the regime of liberty. He says
public administration can claim constitutional authority based on three points:
“(1) that administrative institutions are not inconsistent with the constitutional
principle of separation of powers; (2) that the higher reaches of the career civil
service fulfill the framers’ original intent for the Senate; (3) that the entire career
civil service provides a remedy for a serious defect in the Constitution—the inade
quate representation that so distressed the Anti-Federalists of 1787–1788” (Rohr
1990, 55). Thus, Rohr contends that administrative power is not only aligned with
the Constitution but also remedies one of its major defects.
A notable extension of Rohr’s theory is the Agency perspective (Wamsley
1990a). Wamsley (1990a) uses the term Agency to refer to both government bureaus
and the notion of discretionary authority and uses the term Agential to refer to
both an empowered and an answerable character. Therefore, in some ways, Agents
are conservators of the administrative organization as an embodiment of constitu-
tional values. However, at its core, the Agency perspective holds that administrative
authority serves to check and balance executive, legislative, and judicial powers.
Through this institutional power, political authority is delegated to individual
administrators as a duty of office. “Contrary to the views held by many scholars,
bureaucratic leaders do not pose a threat to democracy. … Administrative conser-
vatorship is statesmanship guided by a moral commitment to preserve the consti-
tutional balance of power in support of individual rights” (Terry 1995, 171, 183).
Associated with these constitutional reinterpretations is an even more fundamen-
tal claim: that administrative authority stems from citizenship as “a public office”
(Cooper 1991, 137). In a detailed explication of citizenship, Cooper highlights the
tradition of ethical citizenship—one that demands a particular set of civic virtues: a
devotion to fellow citizens; a sense of duty to participate in governance; a concern
for the common good; and an ideal of equality. In modern society, such citizens are
thought to be a disappearing breed (Pranger 1968). Therefore, substitutions are made.
In the Constitutional Tradition, elected representatives and the laws they make sup-
plant ethical citizenship. In the Discretionary Tradition, elected representatives are
replaced by “the virtuous administrator … employed by the citizenry to function on
its behalf in pursuing the common good” (Cooper 1991, 160, emphasis added).
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measures with which to assess administrative decisions: (1) efficiency and effec-
tiveness; (2) procedural adequacy and the rights of citizens; and (3) democratic
representation and the exercise of discretion. In the Traditions framework, these
values are simplified as the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics.
Because these criteria differ in terms of their measurement capacity, they are typi-
cally divided into “technical” versus “normative” categories that form the focus for
opposing “camps” within the Discretionary Tradition. However, it must be noted
that all such criteria, even efficiency, are values and are therefore normative.
As a result of this complexity, the Discretionary Tradition includes two prin-
cipal paths to legitimacy: technical expertise in the pursuit of instrumental values
(efficiency and effectiveness) and professional virtue in the ethical pursuit of social
equity. The key difference is that one focuses on a simplistic view of efficiency, while
the other believes “there is no true efficiency which is not also social efficiency”
(Dimock 1936a, 123). In other words, substantive values must be considered prior
to calculating efficiency. These two views often challenge one another’s rationales
for legitimacy and approaches to responsibility. However, their underlying logic
is the same—both claim legitimacy based on expertise (Harmon 1995; McSwite
1997a; Stever 1988), and both are consequential in nature. As long as legitimacy
hangs on the measurement of performance, the logic of legitimacy through exper-
tise holds. Nonetheless, both between and within camps, what connotes respon-
sibility is an ever-changing and contested notion. Generally, formulations are put
forth in schools of thought and reform movements. These proposals are explored in
the following sections.
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a strictly impartial attitude toward the individual with whom they have
dealings, and the provision of the most efficient possible administrative
organization. (Goodnow 2003, 85)
who care about the difference, it is considered fundamental (Allison 1979; Denhardt
2000; Waldo 1984). The intellectual founders of public management include Simon,
Smithburg, and Thompson; Barnard; Wildavsky; Moe; and Bozeman (Lynn 1996).
Public management focuses on: the organization itself, general management func-
tions, and instrumental and pragmatic concerns (Garson and Overman 1983). It
has extended scientific management through planning, programming, and budget-
ing systems (PPBSs); new institutional economics and its theories of public choice,
transaction cost, and principal-agent theory; and extensions of microeconomic
theory (Hood 1991; Levine 1978; Ostrom 1989; Schick 1966). It is also aligned
with policy analysis in seeking rational, systematic, scientific solutions to pub-
lic problems (Bozeman 1979). Public management shares the microeconomic
theories and technical approaches used in the policy sciences and policy analysis
(Weimer and Vining 1999).
In general, managerial approaches seek to improve the bureaucratic organiza-
tional structure and outcomes by applying business management and market prin-
ciples to public organizations (Denhardt 2000). Techniques such as total quality
management, quality circles, work teams, work redesign, and participative man-
agement, reinvention, customer-driven approaches, decentralized or flexible deci-
sion making, market mechanisms for social choice, and even privatization and
empowerment of citizens are all examples of strategies used to improve efficiency
and productivity (Barzelay and Armajani 1992; Lynn 1996; Osborne and Gaebler
1992). These ideas represent “the imposition of a new set of values, specifically a set
of values largely drawn from the private sector” (Denhardt 2000, 149). From these
principles, terms like customer, quality, service, results, value, incentives, innova-
tion, empowerment, and flexibility became a part of the public administration lexi-
con, defining a postbureaucratic paradigm (Barzelay and Armajani 1992).
Most recently, managerialism has evolved through a movement called New
Public Management (NPM)—an approach to government reform, change, and
adaptation through efficiency-oriented practices (Kettl 2000a; Lynn 2006). NPM
began in countries like New Zealand, Britain, and Germany and then later influ-
enced reforms in the United States (Kettl 2000a). The original idea behind NPM
was that government could be transformed into small, decentralized boards oversee-
ing private performance-based organizations that deliver public goods and services.
Actual provision of goods and services by the government would be minimized
while maintaining collective decision making at the lowest levels of political power
possible. Public goods theory is used to prescribe what type of collective action
should be public. If efficiency analysis shows that it does not, “load shedding” is
used to transfer that activity to the private sector. If analysis proves it to be a true
public good, efficiency analysis determines whether it should be paid for or actu-
ally produced by government (Donahue 1989; Moe 1987; Savas 2000). If it should
not be provided by government, it is contracted out to either for-profit or nonprofit
organizations through “privatization.” In this way, entrepreneurial government
replaces “competition for planning and contracts for hierarchies” (Considine and
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Lewis 1999, 470). As such, NPM is thought to represent “a new form of gover-
nance” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, xi).
The “doctrine” of NPM (Hood 1996) can be explained in seven principles,
most of which are present to one degree or another in all cases of implementa-
tion: (1) empowered, discretionary control by professional managers; (2) explicit
performance measures or standards; (3) an emphasis on results and output con-
trols; (4) disaggregation of activities through various means to improve efficiency;
(5) use of competition and contracting out; (6) private-sector management styles;
and (7) reduction in resource use through discipline and parsimony (Hood 1991).
In the United States, NPM was popularized during the “reinvention” movement
promoted by the Clinton administration through its National Performance Review
(NPR) (Riccucci 2001; Shafritz, Hyde, and Parkes 2004). However, it could be
argued that the congressional “Contract with America” (Huuinter 1994) was the
philosophical impetus behind the desire to shrink government through either load
shedding or privatization. While the former reduces both force and budget, the
latter only reduces the public workforce for certain, and efficiency arguments sug-
gest that it also serves to reduce the budget due to the greater efficiencies of private
organizations (Savas 1982, 1987, 2000; Sclar 2000). Accordingly, the principles
of government reinvention are (1) eliminate unnecessary regulation and control;
(2) put customers first; (3) empower employees to get results; and (4) reorganize
and reengineer for increased efficiency and effectiveness (Gore and Clinton 1993).
Although European and U.S. approaches to managerialism differ in important
ways, “they share a focus on economic, market-based thinking in government”
(Box et al. 2001, 611). Furthermore, both argue that “to achieve the performance
measures for which they are accountable … managers need to be liberated from
routines and regulation by the various administrative systems” (Kaboolian 1998,
190). These ideas can be found in the book Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (Osborne and Gaebler 1992)
in the form of a checklist of criteria through which to analyze any public organiza-
tion or social problem to identify action alternatives to a bureaucratic response. To
summarize Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) ten principles, other than the notion of
empowering citizens to achieve more effective results to collective action, the rein-
vention movement seeks a high level of discretion whereby government sets broad
direction and then charges administration to function in a competitive, mission-
driven, goal-oriented, efficient, action-oriented, market-like manner to meet the
expectations of individual citizens and effective stewardship of resources. These
characteristics suggest a very technically oriented, Discretionary administrator.
how best to achieve them. Again, these ideas are in large part forwarded through
schools of thought and reform movements: in this camp through the New Public
Administration (NPA) and “refounding” movements.
Barnard suggests responsibility is “the quality which gives dependability and
determination to human conduct, and foresight and ideality to purpose” (1968,
260). As such, it has inherent ethical dimensions. “For all its instrumental empha-
sis, public administration is also prone to embrace normative imperatives associated
with a constitutionally grounded concept of the public interest” (Lynn 1996, 52).
Even Herbert Simon admits that administrators must make value judgments, and
that to do so, “must be responsive to community values, far beyond those that are
explicitly enacted into law” (1976, 58). In other words, “legitimacy resting in stew-
ardship requires that efficiency and effectiveness be informed by, and subordinated
to, the ethical norms of justice and beneficence” (Kass 1990b, 114). However, even
from this moral perspective, the Discretionary Tradition is still result oriented:
“Effectiveness is a virtue only if you are effective at accomplishing something of
public value” (Reich 1990, 5). For example, effectiveness can be based on benevo-
lence, humanism, constitutional values, and equity (Morgan 1990).
Most of the scholars noted in the discussion of legitimacy through professional
virtue have been affiliated with NPA. A starting point for this set of ideas was
a conference sponsored by Syracuse University at the Minnowbrook Conference
Center in 1968 (Marini 1971; Stillman 1991). The “Minnowbrook perspective” can
be described as a shift “from improvements in technique and toward the examina-
tion of purpose” (Friedland 1971, 49). However, it has also been noted that this
new approach challenged the field to be “more normative; yet still be more scien-
tific” (Shafritz, Hyde, and Parkes 2004, 193). Nonetheless, many of the discussions
later falling under the NPA rubric were reactions against the technical approach to
legitimacy as well as calls to increase the consideration of values beyond efficiency
and effectiveness (Denhardt 2000).
Of particular interest to this group of scholars is the notion of equity (Frederickson
1997; Hart 1974). Equity embodies constitutional equality and fairness but also
gives form to the ambiguous notion of the public interest. Much argument is made
in political and justice theory about what constitutes equity, particularly whether
it is an issue of fair opportunity (Nozick 2000) or fair outcomes (Rawls 2000b). A
procedural approach fits within the technical camp’s focus on efficiency as an end
value. However, the focus on equitable social outcomes and the administrator’s
responsibility to help produce this social good stands on more substantive ground.
Equity is linked to the legitimacy crisis because an increasingly skewed income
distribution has been noted as a principal cause of the growing levels of distrust
and the perceived complicity or disregard on the part of government to this situa-
tion as noted in the “Evergreen Manifesto” (Adams et al. 1990) and similar sources
(Box 2008; Dolbeare and Hubbell 1996; King, Stivers, and collaborators 1998).
Therefore, attention to the regime value of equality and fairness through a con-
sequential interpretation of equity could be helpful in improving the status of
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124 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
government. Toward this end, Frederickson (1971) offers a quite detailed argument.
Because of its obvious contradictions with a free market economy, a commitment
to achieving social equity requires a strong administrative government—one that is
not unduly influenced by interest group demands.
color to the more formal institutional types” (White 1926, 602). The Discretionary
Tradition demands such attitudes through ethical systems that specify desirable
behaviors (Cooper 1991; Rohr 1989; Wamsley 1990a). For example, as a fiduciary,
administrators must not only have a mutual obligation to the common good, group
process, and egalitarian expertise but also responsibility for functional effectiveness
and “third level virtues, values, and principles” (Cooper 1991, 170). Therefore, a
specific code of ethics and “obligations to colleagues, politicians, and the law” are
typically employed (Cooper 1991, 170).
This focus on ethical or virtuous administration is a principal driver behind the
refounding movement that carries forward concerns from NPA. Following Rohr’s
theory of constitutional administrative authority, the well-k nown Blacksburg
Manifesto asserts that legitimacy is achieved through administrative responsibility
for a complex combination of normative standards founded in the Constitution,
law, regulations, history, agency culture, and commitment to a wide interpreta-
tion of the public interest (Stivers 1990b). At core, these scholars agree that “the
purpose of government is to extend the protection of regime values to all citizens”
(Frederickson 1997, 47). The art of governance should therefore be about the vir-
tuous pursuit of the public interest (Caldwell 1988). As noted in the discussion of
refounding political authority, if this is not ensured through the political system,
then administrative alternatives must be found to ensure compliance with these
regime values in terms of both process and outcomes:
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Summary
In sum, the Traditions framework argues that both technical and normative
approaches to discretionary responsibility share the same logic of legitimacy. This is
in stark contrast to those inhabiting either camp—each camp believes its approach
to be inherently different and better. However, despite the substantive differences,
the end result is the same: Legitimacy is ensured through administrative excellence
of some type. Public managers pursue efficiency and customer satisfaction, while
virtuous professionals pursue social good in other forms, but both are measured by
observable outcomes. Reinvention separates management from high-level policy
making, while discretionism absorbs much of policy making into the administra-
tive function. But, in both cases, many policy decisions are made by administrators
or their agents.
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Organizing Style
Generically, the manner in which political authority is distributed, the scope of
action allowed, the method of ensuring proper administrative behavior, and the
appropriate decision-making rationality all work together to imply an organizing
style that fits these roles and processes. The structure must enable these character-
istics in a “form-follows-function” manner. As noted in previous sections, privati-
zation moves functions out of government agencies into organizational networks
based on contractual relationships of various types. This discussion focuses on
the organizing style within public organizations themselves. However, it should
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be noted that organizational networks also require this form to support efficient
interorganizational cooperation.
The key principle of organization in the Discretionary Tradition is to create a
context for highly empowered professionals. Although many of the assumptions
embraced by two Discretionary camps represent conflicting ideologies (Denhardt
and deLeon 2000), “New public administration and reinventing government are
somewhat similar in substance regarding their approaches to management and
leadership” (Frederickson 1996, 267). Both embrace humanistic organizational
reforms that empower workers (Fox 1996). In fact, Paul Light (1997) refers to gov-
ernment reinvention as a “liberation management” approach.
From the humanistic perspective, authoritarian organization conflicts with the
ideals of democratic morality and must therefore be moderated through employee
organizing, humanistic management, or rules made through liberal constitution-
alism (Redford 1969). In the human relations approach, people are not viewed as
cogs in a machine (Denhardt 2000). Rather, people are active participants in devel-
oping the organization and its products or services, so their needs, intentions, and
self-esteem count (Addams 1964, 2004; Argyris 1957; Argyris and Schon 1978;
Barnard 1968; Follett 1995c, 1995d, 1995f; Golembiewski 1989; Golembiewski
and Eddy 1978). An underlying assumption is that people seek to be cooperative
because they come to realize that workers and managers rely on one another for
overall success (Taylor 1923), and that people work for reasons of self-expression
(Gulick 1937a). Therefore, theories argue for “injecting human values and indi-
vidual development into organizational activity” (Harmon and Mayer 1986, 198).
As organizations become less autocratic and more empowering, they invite a more
participative leadership style and increase personal growth. By releasing admin-
istrative discretion, employees become more creative, innovative, and productive
(Kelly 1998; Peters and Pierre 2000).
In sum, these strategies align individual and organizational objectives, increase
personal satisfaction, and improve productivity (Barnard 1968; Blake and Mouton
1964; Golembiewski and Eddy 1978; Maslow 1943; McGregor 1957; Trist and
Bamforth 2003). In other words, they have the dual effect of increasing efficiency
while democratizing and humanizing the workplace experience. These types of
management reforms began as early as the scientific management movement during
the Progressive Era with the work of Taylor, Fayol, and Weber and have continued
throughout classical management theory (e.g., Gulick, Follett, Barnard, Simon,
Selznick, Merton); the human relations movement (e.g., Maslow, McGregor, Mayo,
Roethlisberger); the organizational behavior movement (e.g., Herzberg, Argyris,
March, Mintzberg, Schein); and modern management theory (e.g., Ouichi, Kantor,
Peters, Senge, Drucker) (Ott, Parkes, and Simpson 2003; Shafritz and Ott 2001).
As one of the major streams of thought undergirding the field of public adminis-
tration, suffice it to say that a sufficient explanation of organizational theory and
organizational behavior are well beyond the scope of this book.
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130 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
For our purposes, we simply need to understand that the organizing form of
bureaucracy was designed for command-and-control functions, primarily based
on the political authority and scope of action that was deemed legitimate for
administration. At that time, it was also deemed to be the most efficient way to
organize collective action. However, as the inefficiencies of hierarchy became evi-
dent, managerial science began calling for a loosening of the hierarchical struc-
ture (Wilson 2000). This is precisely what management theory proceeded to do.
Ongoing study has led to ever-increasing efficiency through myriad organizational
reforms and new management approaches. In contemporary organization theory,
there is a plethora of organizing styles available to public organizations that reflect
these shifts in approach. These modified bureaucratic organizational forms include
decentralization, devolution, contracting out, and innovative organizational devel-
opment approaches (Frederickson 1971). In sum, these new structures support an
empowered administration (Denhardt 2000).
For example, Peters (1992) offers four models of governance: market govern-
ment, participatory government, flexible government, and deregulated government.
Market models are meant to address the problems of monopoly and therefore call
for decentralization and competition. Participative models seek to address the prob-
lems of hierarchy, so call for flatter organizations. Flexible government attempts to
address the static nature of hierarchy and thus calls for virtual organizations that
can easily change as needed. Deregulated government calls for greater manage-
rial discretion without addressing the hierarchy itself. Each has a distinct entre-
preneurial style; however, the ones that most clearly support both the technical
and normative approaches to discretion are the participative and deregulated mod-
els. Hierarchies are flattened, jobs are redesigned, and work teams become self-
directed. Flatter structures are more easily changed and responsive if not flexible
to the degree of virtual organizations. Through a matrix configuration, they enable
communication and action as easily horizontally as vertically. Experts at all levels
are able to engage in problem solving, thus improving organizational outcomes.
Figure 7.3 illustrates how bureaucracies have been flattened and empowered
while taking on a more functional or project-based view on relationships of author-
ity. This participatory model is somewhat of a middle way between hierarchy and
networks in terms of organizing style.
and implementation shifts. Policy-making activities that were once the purview
of elected officials are delegated to public administrators. In fact, governance has
become so complex that political functions have become vague and perhaps even
rhetorical in nature, with politicians depending more and more on the guidance
and expertise of administrators in the face of competing interests. Furthermore,
implementation of public policy is increasingly delegated to lower levels of gov-
ernment through devolution and to the private sector through privatization and
contracting out with both for-profit and nonprofit contractors. Through citizen
participation activities, boundaries are also blurring between government and civil
society. As a result, sectoral boundaries between all spheres of society are indistinct.
However, the overall emphasis on market delivery of the public good shifts the eco-
nomic sphere to the priority position—to the delight of some and dismay of others
in this Tradition. These new relationships are illustrated in Figure 7.4.
Market
Government Community
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In sum, while the Tradition admits its context as being the representative demo-
cratic system, its emphasis is on its administrative elements because of the empirical
realities and challenges of the pluralist political context—as Waldo (1984) claimed,
it is the Administrative State.
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134 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
based on unique claims for a special role in governance” (Wamsley 1990a, 115).
Public administrators have “a greater responsibility to understand the nature of
our society, democracy, and government than do most citizens” (Box 2004, 4). As
trustees, they are “competent to define the public interest on their own authority”
(Frederickson 1997, 210) and can safely act as “an effective and ethical agent in car-
rying out the republic’s business” (Kass 1990b, 113). In sum, “it appears that new
Public Administration is an alignment with good, or possibly God” (Frederickson
1971, 329).
At core, scholars of the Discretionary Tradition feel that if influence is to be
given to anyone in society, it would be best given to people who are most similar
to the populace, but with specialized training to be the very best citizens possible.
“This special calling to service distinguishes the motives of the professional from
the nonprofessional. In effect, the professional claims status by virtue of possess-
ing higher motives for action” (Stever 1988, 24). Just as the Guardians envisioned
by Plato, public administration “plans, it contrives, it philosophizes, it educates, it
builds for the community as a whole” (Dimock 1936a, 133).
Tradition Summary
Pulling together all elements of the Tradition as an ideal-t ype, the “genetic code” of
the Entrepreneur consists of the characteristics presented in Table 7.4.
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Chapter 8
The Collaborative
Tradition—Stewardship
Responsiveness to
the Citizenry
Portrait of a Steward
In the film The Girl in the Café (Yates 2005), one of the British chancellor of the
exchequer’s policy analysts, Lawrence, brings along a new girlfriend to the 2005 G8
summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. Having just met her in a café two weeks prior and
only having had a lunch and a dinner together since, Lawrence knows very little
about the young Scottish woman.
When they arrive in Reykjavik, they are greeted by hoards of angry protestors
banging on the caravan of dignitaries’ cars. Lawrence wryly observes, “We are not
alone.” This is the first indicator that some citizens reject the G8’s policies. On the
other hand, one of the hotel clerks is most proud of “the honor of the conference
being held here in Reykjavik.” It is unclear how Gina feels about it as she appears to
know nothing about the G8 or its work. It is over coffee that evening that Lawrence
finally begins to share the details and purpose of his Millennium Development
Goals policy analysis with Gina: “The goals were basically a universal promise to
halve extreme poverty—poverty that actually kills people. To halve the number of
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children who die before they’re five, which is shockingly high, or mothers who die
in childbirth, which is heartbreakingly high. You know, absolutely basic human
rights that pass by about half the world.” The importance of the summit begins to
dawn on Gina during the exchange: “And you can do something about that?” “Yes,
that’s the plan. The problem is this development stuff is all about the poor bastards
who don’t have any cash, so it’s likely to slip down the agenda.” “But you’ll fight
that.” “Well, yes …” “So, this is an important meeting.” “Yes. They always are.”
During the actual policy debates about these development goals, the British
team often turns the ball over to Lawrence, who simply does not have the style or
force to counter challenges. Time and again the other countries’ analysts roll right
over his data and call for support of the “dramatic and daring package of measures”
put forth by the British delegation. So, when he returns to Gina each evening duly
beaten down, she interprets his grievances as an invitation to come to his aid, as she
later explains: “I see you coming back after each meeting feeling you’ve failed the
people you don’t want to fail, and I feel I have to stick up for people who are being
bullied.” She begins reading Lawrence’s reports and queries him on the details. She
offers helpful suggestions to him for making a more compelling case using images
and stories to bring the facts alive.
However, what is more important to the plot is that Lawrence brings Gina
along to the various social events and meals. By giving her access to the political
leaders, he opens the gate to many uncomfortable exchanges. Gina begins by chal-
lenging the chancellor: “I hope you won’t let them actually push the Millennium
Development Goals right off the agenda.” The exchange continues at length, with
Gina refusing to drop the issue and finally angering the chancellor: “My goodness.
Lawrence didn’t tell us that you were a woman of such strong opinions. We’ve got
to go.” The next morning, she challenges him again, this time also angering his
counterpart from Germany: “And how is it going with the Millennium Goals now,
Chancellor?” “I think we’ll do all right.” “Is ‘all right’ good enough? Is ‘all right’
good enough for you, Mr. Gerhardt?” The German leader retorts, “Young lady,
I think it might be helpful for you to look at it the other way round. Thousands will
benefit from what we do today who otherwise would not have done so.” Finally, the
chancellor intervenes: “It’s a very complex issue, Gina. Lawrence and I have often
found in the course of our work that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.”
Gina does not miss a beat and replies: “I know. But then my dad, who maybe wasn’t
as educated as you two, used to say that a lot of knowledge can be dangerous, too.
It stopped you seeing the heart of things.”
At this point, the chancellor comes to suspect that Gina is a spy from an anti-
G8 faction who used Lawrence to get into the summit to cause disruption. He
orders Robert to deal with the situation, hoping to have Gina sent home imme-
diately. However, Lawrence is simply unable to ask her to leave. Not only is he
falling in love with her, but also she is giving voice to what he feels he cannot say:
“It certainly wouldn’t have been my modus operandi.” Even the revelation that she
has recently spent time in prison does not spur him to reject her.
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The final confrontation comes at the formal dinner, where all heads of state,
their teams, and their spouses come together, with welcoming remarks from the
summit chair, the British prime minister: “Let me start with the big thing. Five
years ago the world made a series of the most magnificent promises and we have
determined to use this conference seriously to indent the most extreme curses of
poverty in the world today. We shall not let them out of our sights even if we may
not yet have the power to fulfill them all.” Gina seizes her final opportunity to
try to make an impact. Playing on the sentiments of those gathered at the table
(particularly George’s wife, Ruth, because they recently lost a child), she challenges
the prime minister’s rhetorical commitment: “That’s not true.” “I’m sorry, madam,
but heckling isn’t really a tradition at these gatherings.” “What are the traditions,
then? Well-crafted compromise and just sort of ignoring the poor?” “Perhaps we
can talk about this later?” “I doubt it. I imagine I’ll be thrown out later, so it’s
probably got to be now. I don’t know how much the rest of you ladies know about
what’s going on, but my friend here tells me that while we are eating, 100 million
children are nearly starving. There’s just millions of kids who’d kill for the amount
of food that fat old me left on the side of my plate. Children who are then so weak,
they’ll die if a mosquito bites them. And so they do die … one every three seconds
… [snapping her fingers for emphasis]. … There they go … [snap] … and another
one. Anyone who has kids knows that every mother and father in Africa must love
their children as much as they do. And to watch your kids die … to watch them die
and then to die yourself in trying to protect them—that’s not right. And tomor-
row, eight of the men sitting ’round this table actually have the ability to sort this
out by making a few great decisions. And if they don’t, someday, someone else will.
And they’ll look back on us lot and say: ‘People were actually dying in the millions
unnecessarily—in front of you, on your TV screens. What were you thinking? You
knew what to do to stop it happening and you didn’t do those things. Shame on
you.’ So that’s what you have to do tomorrow. Be great instead of being ashamed. It
can’t be impossible. It must be possible.” At this point, Gina is removed by security.
As Lawrence bids farewell to Gina at the airport, he asks her once more why
she was in prison. She explains that she served time for hurting a man who killed
a child. Lawrence asks if it was her child, and she replies simply, “Does it matter
whose child?” Gina is a citizen of the world who feels a deep empathy and sense
of mutual responsibility for others, particularly those who are helpless. This is
the value that has driven her actions throughout the film, from loving a shy and
quite sad but caring man, to defending the women and children of Africa whom
she will never meet.
Introduction
This chapter describes elements comprising the Collaborative Tradition of public
administration, which promotes the ideal-t ype role conceptualization of Steward.
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140 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
feminist rereading of the field’s literature and history, these Progressive Era ideas
were in large part absorbed into the field of social work through the “Settlement
Women,” the predominantly female members and feminine cultural characteristics
of the settlement and charitable movement (Stivers 2000).
Therefore, many of the theorists promoting a “postmodern” approach to public
administration are committed, at least in part, to a new-yet-old Tradition (Stout
2010a). Indeed, these scholars are engaged in the developmental process depicted
by MacIntyre: “A tradition becomes mature just insofar as its adherents confront
and find a rational way through or around those encounters with radically differ-
ent and incompatible positions which pose the problems of incommensurability
and untranslatability” (1988, 327). In this emergent endeavor, there are a num-
ber of labels attached to the elements of the Collaborative Tradition as presented
here. For example, transformative administration serves democracy, citizen engage-
ment, and social and economic justice. It is “collaborative, humanistic, emancipa-
tory, inclusive and diverse” (King and Zanetti 2005, xi). The New Public Service
is based on organizational humanism; participative forms of democratic theory;
communitarian and social capital theory; and a synthesis of phenomenology, criti-
cal theory, and postmodernism (Denhardt 2000; Denhardt and Denhardt 2003).
Farmer describes his concept of antiadministration as radically imaginative, morally
reflective, and multiepistemological (Farmer 2005a). It is “truly human,” meaning
that “each and every individual is treated in her fullest human dimensions (psycho,
socio, bio, spiritual, and other dimensions)” (Farmer 2005a, xiv). It is evident in
social anarchist political theory, process philosophy and theology, ecological and
feminist discourses, deliberative democracy, and many other discursive practices.
It is also congruent with much (but not all) communitarian thinking about civil
society, volunteerism, trust, and citizen engagement.
In the Collaborative Tradition, the art and science of legitimate administra-
tion fuses all of the elements of practice included in the Traditions framework.
Therefore, the disaggregation of these topics to fit the ideal-t ype elements is mean-
ingfully artificial. However, to generate comparative understandings with the other
Traditions, these categories remain helpful heuristic devices. Therefore, the follow-
ing sections describe the genetic meaning of each element used to define a Tradition
in this book (political ontology; political authority and scope of action; criterion
of proper behavior; administrative decision-making rationality; organizing style;
and the assumed governance context) according to the legitimacy logic of the
Collaborative Tradition. The chapter concludes with a description of the resulting
role conceptualization for the Steward.
Political Ontology
Generically, the term political ontology has been used to describe complex assump-
tions about the nature of human being, identity, and social life and the reflexive
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142 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
relationship between ontology and the political (Catlaw 2007a; Howe 2006). The
Collaborative Tradition is grounded in an altogether different ontological position
than that of Liberalism (Stout 2012a). Some call for a new humanistic civic ideol-
ogy or civic religion that will open up democracy (Farmer 2005a). “Perhaps our
sorest lack is doctrine in the theological sense to govern the flow of cooperative
energies in a free commonwealth” (Morstein Marx 1946, 503). Others suggest we
must create “a reconfiguration of consciousness, one that produces a new and dif-
ferent sense of subjectivity” (McSwite 1997a, 14). This is more broadly labeled as
an alternative political ontology (Catlaw 2007a). Therefore, this section attempts to
describe a political ontology that enables the Collaborative ideal of free, coopera-
tive, mutual becoming.
Table 8.1 shows the applicable dimensions of ontology explained in Chapter 5.
The Collaborative Tradition draws from the differentiated perspective.
In the Undifferentiated Relational position, the source of being (One) is both
beyond and within all beings (one) (see Figure 8.1). Because of this, there is no actual
differentiation among what only appear to be the individual parts. In extreme,
“there is only self-in-and-through-others” (Follett 1918/1998, 8). This position does
not lend itself to any familiar notion of the individual, except for perhaps some-
thing like the Borg of Star Trek (Frakes 1996). It may be better conceptualized as
a complete unity of both divine and mundane elements in the universe, similar to
the Hindu understanding of Brahman or the Buddhist understanding of Tao Te
Ching (Brodd 2003). None of these perspectives are evident in public administra-
tion theory.
In the Differentiated Relational position, the source of being (One) is within all
beings, and all beings (one) are connected by virtue of this shared source and yet
are differentiated and unique in their expression (see Figure 8.2). Niebuhr (1963,
1970) describes this relationship as the One expressed through the Many, calling
the phenomenon “radical monotheism,” a universal force that imbues all and yet
is manifested in each uniquely: “I am one within myself as I encounter the One in
all that acts upon me” (Niebuhr 1963, 122). Thus, related beings are both One and
one (O/one). The individual is multidimensional and exists within a social context
and is therefore both influenced by and influencing the environment.
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One
one
One
O/one
O/one
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144 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
The logic behind this understanding is that human beings do not exist out-
side some form of social context. As the philosopher Martin Heidegger describes
it, we are born into a social context and because of our innate understanding of
one another as fellow human beings, forms of social interaction such as language
become possible (Hummel 1987). As explained by Stivers (2008), this principle of
being with is central to Heidegger’s ontology (Thiele 1995). If there is no presocial
state of pure independence that must be given up in exchange for social order and
its benefits, there is no point theorizing or “arguing from a condition contrary to
fact” (Waldo 1980, 19). Thus, the Collaborative Tradition accepts the human con-
dition as one of relationship among unique beings in mutual interdependence and
in a constant state of becoming—the individual and society are “forever a-making”
one another (Follett 1995f, 256). It is this condition that enables a “sense of com-
monality” (Stivers 2008, 100).
Many attempts have been made to name and understand this form of “new indi-
vidualism” (Dewey 1999; Follett 1918/1998, 73) in which “the fallacy of self-and-
others fades away” (Follett 1918/1998, 8). For example, “the situated self” is used to
describe the individual within society (Dudley 1996). It has also been described as
“the individual-in-herself in-her-difference in society” (Farmer 2005a, 187). Dimock
calls it “cultural individuality” (1937, 418)—a concept of the individual within com-
munity that reconciles liberty and equality. This type of “ensembled individualism”
(Sampson 1988, 16) is expressed in indigenous cultures and is also a way to interpret
de Tocqueville’s notion of self-interest rightly understood, when people “know how
to combine their own well-being with that of their fellow citizens” (2000, 501). “Such
a self would be autonomous yet social, individuated yet defined by nonconflicting
interests, rational but embodied in numerous different social relations, expressive
of individuality yet public in orientation” (Warren 1992, 13). Love (2010) calls this
type of self the integrated individual; the self is decentered and embedded in social
relations. Such individuals come together in a social arrangement of egalitarianism
(Douglas 1996) in which members are bonded and self-organizing.
In terms of representation, as shown in Table 8.2, the Differentiated Relational
ontology assumes the source of being is all of being, and it is in a constant state
of mutual becoming. Representation is not possible because of an ever-changing
identity and intersubjective influences, among other things (for more on this, see
Catlaw 2006a, 2007a, 2007b).
The Differentiated Relational position has been taken up by postmodern phi-
losophers, with the more skeptical (Rosenau 1992) denying the notion of any type
of innate connection, considering the Many as a multitude of universes in a dynamic
state of mutual influence (so not atomistic) but without some sort of fundamen-
tal bond. This is reflected in Love’s (2010) fragmented, decentered individual and
Douglas’s (1996) atomism, in which there is no group and thus no social order.
However, affirmative postmodern philosophers (Rosenau 1992) tend toward ideas
that acknowledge at least the capacity for connectedness, if not an innate social bond
in which all are mutually impacting. In this sense, the relational quality holds firm,
even in the context of differentiation, thus denying representation but explaining
the social bond.
Considering these assumptions about the self and the possibilities for represen-
tation in these ontological ideal-t ypes, Table 8.3 shows the associated political and
religious forms.
In the Differentiated Relational position, no one or thing has the right to repre-
sent the truth, right, or good. This sense of equality leads to some form of anarchism
in which social action is voluntary, self-organizing, and self-regulating (O. F. White
1990)—what Thayer calls “structured nonhierarchical social interaction” (Thayer
1981, A-38). If one assumes all things are equal and mutually impacting due to
social construction but are not connected (the skeptical or fragmented understand-
ing), then the political form of individual anarchism emerges. This can be likened to
polytheism, which imagines a plethora of divine beings without hierarchical order.
However, if it is instead assumed that all things are equal and mutually impact-
ing because they are connected (the affirmative or integrated understanding), then
the political form of social anarchism emerges. This can be linked to pantheism,
which imagines divinity as something integral to all beings, connecting them
(Christ 2003). The nonspiritual equivalent of this would be Marxist Humanism, as
explained by Orion White (1990). In this philosophy, human nature is thought to
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values and mutual impact guide interactions. For example, mutualism imagines
human beings as inherently engaging in free association and prone toward reciproc-
ity, but not through or under a social contract governed by a state (Carson 2006).
Radical thought also carries forward in critical theory, which seeks human eman-
cipation from all oppressive social structures, including both capitalist hierarchies
and socialist authoritarianism (Clark 1998). It is espoused by philosophers such
as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas
through the Frankfurt School’s Institute for Social Research in Germany. In sum,
these theorists seek solutions that transcend the dialectical tension between indi-
vidual freedom and social order. They do not believe that domination is an inherent
or necessary characteristic of society. Indeed, they “argue, to the contrary, that an
alternative scenario may be developed, one permitted by the fact that human insti-
tutions are socially constructed and, therefore, may be reconstituted by conscious
choice and effective action” (Denhardt 1981b, 630).
Such reconstitution would reflect neither the One nor the Many in the
Collaborative Tradition’s ideal. Instead, “we come together in public space as peo-
ple who share concerns and perspectives and as beings each of whom is unique.
[Political theorist Hannah] Arendt emphasizes uniqueness in order to offer a pic-
ture of the public world as a space that brings people together but does not allow
them to merge into a faceless One” (Stivers 2008, 99). Indeed, the logic of the
Collaborative Tradition transcends the objective of unity achieved through either
traditional authority or pluralist competition. It also rejects the Hegelian/Marxist
objective of unity produced by mutual dependence by assuming a dynamic state.
Follett (1918/1998) clearly differentiates between the unified state as an object versus
the unifying state as a process: A unified state is based on contract, while a unifying
state is created by an ongoing process of creative collaboration of the Many through
which the public will (the One) is generated and differences are synthesized. It is not
homogeneity meant to “absorb, melt, fuse, or to reconcile in the so-called Hegelian
sense” (Follett 1919, 576). Rather, it is a harmonization and integration through
what Follett (1918/1998) calls interpenetration: “the ceaseless interplay of the One
and the Many by which both are constantly making each other” (Follett 1919, 582).
The notion of society as a process of interdependent becoming is also illus-
trated by Dewey’s (1957) understanding of ideas like “the public,” “the state,” and
“society” as problems of ongoing reinterpretation. In other words, “the State must
always be rediscovered” (Dewey 1957, 34). Indeed, “no state can endure unless the
political bond is being forever forged anew” (Follett 1918/1998, 11).
This notion of the political bond leads to the last element of the political ontol-
ogy—the nature of the relationships among citizens. Hegel (1977/1807, 1821/2000)
believed that people can only understand themselves within social relationships.
While these relationships are often played out in power struggles between what
he called “lords and bondsmen,” those who appear to be in control are actually
dependent on those who serve. He used this argument to resolve the Master/Slave
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of one’s inner self” (Thayer 1981, A-9). This idea is present in the spiritual tenets of
many ancient and indigenous peoples, although with differing terms for the divine
source (Adler 1986; Christ 2003; Pulitano 2003; Raphael 2000; Stewart-Harawira
2005; Stone 1976; York 2003).
This is not such an outlandish idea even in Western culture. Such a divine
source of human dignity is claimed in our Declaration of Independence (Gray
2001). This divine endowment sanctions each individual as an equal political sov-
ereign. But, rather than aggregating sovereignty into a mass—the People or demos
that can be represented, the Collaborative Tradition calls for participatory self-
governance. In this way, the Tradition surreptitiously calls for a political anarchy,
meaning that no form of political coercion, including majoritarianism, can be ethi-
cally justified (Willoughby 1930). At core, anarchism is based on the view that the
individual human being is the only legitimate holder of sovereignty. This political
authority is a birthright, bestowed on each being by nature, humanity, or whatever
higher power is considered culturally appropriate.
Drawing from classical Greek political theory, Ramos (1981) and Orion White
(1990) call this approach to self-governance isonomy, which means equal (iso)
arrangement, distribution, or management (nomos). The suffix nomos indicates that
there is no ruler, as implied by archy or cracy—it is egalitarian and self-organizing
and enables its members to pursue self-actualization free from superimposed pre-
scriptions. Whether it is called isonomy, direct democracy, or social anarchy, the
bottom line is that sovereign individuals living in relationship with one another
decide together. In this way, legitimacy is earned and given by active consent
among sovereign individuals (Stivers 1990a). Therefore, political authority is gener-
ated through active citizenship.
Some consider direct citizen participation in governance to be an extension
of constitutional legitimacy (Stever 1988). However, prescriptions for direct par-
ticipation beyond the electoral process cannot be found in the Constitution itself.
More important, from the Collaborative perspective, participation is not meant
to be simply a control or check and balance on politicians or administrators.
Rather, active citizenship is central to a normative theory of governance. To be
legitimate, governance must be “inhabited by active citizens” (Stivers 1990a, 247).
Furthermore, activity is not measured in terms of quantity, but rather quality. “The
power of the people in a democracy depends on the importance of the decisions
made by the electorate, not on the number of decisions they make” (Schattschneider
1960, 140). This means authentic self-government beyond “mere governmental
contrivance” (Addams 1964, 221).
In sum, it is only through shared experience that a social ethic can be deter-
mined and that citizens can pursue “a common life for a noble end” (Addams 2004,
42). As shown in Figure 8.3, it is direct participation in the collaborative process
of governance that creates the political authority to determine the public interest
(Follett 1995a, 1995e; Forester 1999; Harmon 1995; Fox and Miller 1995).
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Adminis-
Politicians trators
Citizens
Co-creating
Policy and Implementation
Attempts to reform governance in this way have been made throughout the
history of the nation and the field, from participatory self-governance in the
Mayflower Compact (Stivers 2008) to contemporary calls for citizen participation
and direct democracy (Roberts 2004). The revolution itself rejected the notion of a
monarchy, claiming the right to both liberty and equality for all citizens. A philoso-
phy of active citizen engagement and delegate-style representation is evident in the
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution’s
Bill of Rights (McSwite 1997a). Subsequent attempts to craft an isonomy resulted
first in town meeting-style local governance with delegate-style county and state
assemblies. The ideals were then carried forward by the antifederalists during con-
stitutional debates (Storing 1981; O. F. White 1990), with some ideals making it
into the Bill of Rights amending the Constitution on ratification. Box (2004) sim-
plifies the antifederalist argument as calling for small, local, decentralized govern-
ment to protect individual liberty. This has also been called a Jeffersonian approach
to public administration, in which the best government governs the least, instead
empowering its citizenry to self-govern (Caldwell 1988; Stillman 1996).
The ongoing concern was to protect the individual’s right to participate in self-
governance. This is clearly expressed by Wilson as the question of how to accom-
modate direct democracy within a representative system: “How shall our series of
governments within governments be so administered that it shall always be to the
interest of the public officer to serve, not his superior alone but the community also,
with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of his conscience?” (Wilson
1887, 221, emphasis added). Thereafter, the political reforms of the Progressive Era
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dominance of all types (Farmer 2005a, 191). We must “break down the barriers”
and be proactive, emancipative facilitators of citizen self-governance (Box and
Sagen 1998, 159; Box 1998). In other words, a transitional hybrid model is recom-
mended at least to achieve “government with the people” if not “government by the
people” (King, Stivers, and collaborators 1998, 78; Timney 1998). Such a facilita-
tive role of public administration has been conceived as “legitimate to the extent
that it (a) decentralizes authority and responsibility to lay citizens; (b) interprets
the public interest in particular situations through determinative interaction with
affected stakeholders, including neglected groups and the public at large; and (c) is
practiced by self-conscious administrators who are critically aware of the political-
economic context” (Adams et al. 1990, 233).
Through this transformation, government becomes a “good and no place”
(Farmer 2005a, 189). Government becomes a convener—an institution that pro-
vides “the space and the process for working out understanding across lines of dif-
ference” (McSwite 2002, 113). The function of public administration becomes “the
generic name of the group of tactical-support” (Catlaw 2007a, 203) for democracy,
“if by democracy we mean something generic like self-governing or self-conducting
of conduct” (Catlaw 2007a, 15).
To understand this role better and how it differs from the conceptualizations
forwarded by the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions, it is helpful to dis-
cuss the transitional role conceptualization designed to achieve the Collaborative
ideal of egalitarian self-governance. Certainly, this is what is found in most pub-
lic administration literature. In this case, the various conceptual elements of public
administration can still be described in terms of coherence with the Collaborative
Tradition’s logic. In other words, if public administration continues as a social role for
the time being, we can explore its transitional characteristics. Therefore, the remain-
ing elements of this Tradition are described in a manner that suggests transforma-
tional moves toward the ideal. But, it must be noted that the legitimacy logic of the
Collaborative Tradition requires that these social functions could be performed by
anyone concerned as long as they exhibit the characteristics prescribed.
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collective causes, cultural principles, and social truths include “ideas of justice,
equality, happiness, democracy, property” (Horkheimer 1947, 20). Yet, what these
concepts mean must be determined in an ongoing, inclusive fashion. Indeed, “when
the idea of reason was conceived, it was intended to achieve more than the mere
regulation of the relation between means and ends: it was regarded as the instru-
ment for understanding the ends, for determining them” (Horkheimer 1947, 10).
Indeed, as noted by many critical theorists, discourse frames action (Bourdieu 1990;
Fischer 2003). Therefore, proper behavior in the Collaborative Tradition is ensured
through an inclusive, egalitarian process, as explained in the elements of decision-
making rationality and organizing style.
Measuring the responsiveness of a process is possible. For example, discourse
theory focuses on the manner in which people communicate through words, sym-
bols, and other cultural practices. Processes of public dialogue and deliberation
are of key interest. From this perspective, mutual responsibility is measured using
a set of warrants that ensure the quality of participation. This approach to gov-
ernance is most completely elucidated by critical theorist Jürgen Habermas as
“communicative action” (Erikson and Weigard 2003; Forester 1981, 1999). While
most of the explanation of its tenets will be described under decision-making
rationality, one pillar of its foundations rests on what is called “communicative
ethics.” As criteria for proper behavior, the warrants of the “ideal speech situation”
provide an analytically useful framework through which to assess action (Forester
1985b; Kemp 1985) and thereby to ensure the egalitarian political authority of
this Tradition.
Rather than prescribing outcome values, communicative ethics ensure rules of
social interaction based on cooperation; pursuit of the collective good; and fair,
inclusive, discursive practice (dialogue). Communication must occur in a coop-
erative manner that is not distorted by power, domineering ideologies, wealth, or
status (Heydebrand 1983; Schneider and Ingram 1997). It requires “that the partic-
ipants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the better argument and that rela-
tionships of power and social hierarchies recede in the background” (Risse 2004,
294). Communicative ethics are not dissimilar to Harmon’s definition of personal
responsibility: an “action that (a) is informed by self-reflexive understanding and
(b) emerges from a context of social relationships wherein personal commitments
are regarded as valid bases for moral action” (1995, 81). Obligations must be
actively created rather than passively accepted from external authority. Based on
the socially situated self, communicative ethics combines personal responsibility
with social obligation; making and answering are reunited in mutual responsibility
(Harmon 1990, 1995). Procedurally or ethically, communication that falls short
of these principles is considered to be distorted and therefore not legitimate. The
manner in which these communicative processes are used to make decisions is the
next issue of concern.
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158 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
ends, as well as the processes used to achieve them, are continually reevaluated and
transformed by cooperative activity.
Communicative action assumes that communicating and interacting individu-
als form mutual understanding and consensus for collective action using moral and
ethical reasoning (ethics) within a specific procedural context (rationality). Rather
than referring to the relationship between thought and action, the two are fused
within one process called praxis (Harmon and Mayer 1986)—thought informs
action, and action generates thought. Furthermore, multiple forms of epistemology
or ways of knowing are sought: Communicative action considers all arguments—
technical, strategic, formal, and practical. In fact, politics and administration are
integrated through a reconceptualization of the process of a “public … definition of
social reality” (White 1976, 68). This section describes how this complex form of
rationality is used in decision making.
Ramos (1981) notes that decision making in isonomy is inclusive, egalitarian,
and consensus oriented. Authority is assigned through deliberation and discovery
of the law of the situation (Follett 1995e). The communicative process is designed
to embody these characteristics and to lead to legitimate decisions about collective
action. One application of communicative action is called “collaborative planning”
(Healey 1997), which suggests if dialogue and deliberation are given sufficient time
among ethical participants, the results can be deemed legitimate. Therefore, consen-
sus decision rules are an important component of communicative ethics because they
give minorities power; by holding their ground, the minorities can force
the majority to move toward them or prevent a decision. Deliberation
may be aggressive, but it will be guided by reason. The end is a caring
agreement—no one is a loser, no one is defeated, and no one is shamed.
(Baum 2003, 282)
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the social process and are united through the social process” (Follett 1995g, 257).
Thus, “creative conflict” (Follett 1995b) is really a beneficial process of confronta-
tion and mutual adaptation (White 1971). “The test of our progress is neither our
likenesses nor our unlikenesses, but what we are going to do with our unlikenesses.
Shall I fight whatever is different from me or find the higher synthesis?” (Follett
1918/1998, 96).
A consensus-oriented process seeks a synthesis of ideas as opposed to compro-
mise. “When we achieve consensus, the only legitimate outcome, we have created
new knowledge of what we want to do” (Thayer 1981, 138, emphasis added). Follett
conceptualized this process of mutual influence as “the circular response” (1995i).
“The course of action decided upon is what we all together want, and I see that it is
better than what I had wanted alone. It is what I now want” (Follett 1918/1998, 25).
This type of consensus is also called “intersubjective understanding”: a condition in
which knowledge is created by agreements among social actors within specific envi-
ronments of culture, time, and place. This process is described by Farmer (2005a)
as “justice as seeking.” All are expressions of coming to public judgment (decision)
through shared, lived experience.
To ensure that this process is ethical, Fox and Miller offer a political discourse
model designed to replace the “representative democratic accountability feedback
loop model” (Fox and Miller 1995, 4). Discourse or discursive practice means authen-
tic dialogue: communication that comes from lived experience, rather than rhe-
torical symbols coming from the dominant culture. In what they call “few-talk”
situations, the powerful elite dominate or manipulate communication (Fox and
Miller 1995, 130). This is what is most common in representative government. In
“many-talk” situations, crowd-like debate ensues without focus or resolution (Fox
and Miller 1995, 130). This is evident in open town hall meetings where people
essentially come to vent opinions, whether or not they have anything to do with
the community issue at hand or authentic personal concerns. Inclusive and open
“some-talk” situations achieve a balance of self-interest and community interest
(Fox and Miller 1995, 130). In some-talk situations, certain warrants for discourse
must be met, following Habermas’s theory of communicative action: (1) sincere,
honest, earnest, and genuine (in other words, authentic); (2) situation specific with
intention about something contextually relevant; (3) voluntary and active partici-
pative; and (4) substantive, including professional expertise, experience, unique
understandings, and an articulation of all represented views (Fox and Miller 1995,
114–120). This process demands a particular organizing style that is inclusive and
flexible to accommodate all affected.
Organizing Style
Generically, the manner in which political authority is distributed, the scope of
action allowed, the method of ensuring proper administrative behavior, and the
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* This characteristic influenced the naming of this ideal-t ype element. Because organization
derives from the Greek organon, meaning tool or instrument, to move away from the notion of
organization as only a purposive means, new language is needed to accommodate Collaborative
action. We must be free to imagine creative ways to structure our collaborative thinking, dia-
logue, and action. The term imaginization has been offered (Morgan 1986). However, like
organization, this term suggests a fixedness that is incongruent with the Collaborative political
ontology. Therefore, I chose the active form of organizing to connote the fact that collective
action is an ongoing process of choice. This is more in keeping with Weick’s (1979) notion of
organization as a result of patterns of organizing behaviors.
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asserts that hierarchy must be “adjusted” to achieve a social, rather than individual-
istic, ethic. She suggests the industrial system needs amelioration to accommodate
democracy. Follett similarly suggests an organic theory of organizing that envisions
society as a unity of distinct but interdependent individual parts: “It is always in
unstable equilibrium, always shifting, varying and thereby changing the individual
at every moment. But it is always produced and maintained by the individual him-
self. No external force brings it forth” (1995f, 262).
Perhaps the most carefully explicated argument for a completely new organizing
style is presented by Thayer (1981) in his book, An End to Hierarchy and Competition:
Administration in the Post-Affluent World. He suggests that the organizing style of
both public organizations and the market must change to achieve full democracy.
Rather than being opposite poles on a continuum, the centralized authority of
hierarchy and the decentralized chaos of competition are actually interrelated in
that competition demands hierarchy as a solution to its undemocratic excesses.
Hierarchy in turn demands competition as a solution to its own inefficiencies. As
an alternative, Thayer seeks to replicate the cooperative human organizing strate-
gies of over 6,000 years ago, combining individual autonomy and interdependence,
which he calls “a formal theory of structured nonhierarchical social interaction”
(Thayer 1981, A-38). “When the organizational revolution has run its course, and
when societies have been transformed as they must be if we are to survive, the
world of organizations will be one of innumerable small face-to-face groups charac-
terized by openness, trust, and intensive interpersonal relations” (Thayer 1981, 5).
This type of networking organizing style supports collaborative processes
and outcomes both within the public organization and between the organization
and society. This approach to authority is not completely foreign to our experience
as institutional members. Recalling that Weber (1994a) suggests legitimacy comes
from the given type of social order, he found that authority in traditional societies
is based on custom and long-standing norms. This is similar to the Collaborative
organizing style in that it relies on norms in the form of communicative ethics.
However, it is very different from the traditional form of authority envisioned by
Weber in that neither custom nor any other external source may impose this ethic.
Even the democratic parameters themselves must be intentionally chosen and
shared. In terms of this type of voluntary participation, Barnard (1968) sought a
theory of cooperation even in formal organizations based on Follett’s notion of the
law of the situation and noneconomic forms of motivation. These ideas have been
described as a feminist approach to organizing based on empowerment, facilitation,
and collaboration (Stivers 1990b).
Taking both individual and societal characteristics together, the Collaborative
Tradition’s organizing style must accommodate fluidity and change within the law
of the situation, as well as provide a context for human relationship (isonomy)
rather than mere exchange (economy) (Ramos 1981). However, these new forms of
organizing can incorporate either competitive or egalitarian principles of democ-
racy. This choice is reflected in the differences between policy studies and political
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economy and organizational studies (Considine and Lewis 1999). In general, the
former focuses on the interest competition element of networks, while the latter
focuses more on trust and problem-solving activities (Agranoff 2003; Atkinson
and Coleman 1989; Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004; Berry et al. 2004; Blom-
Hansen 1997; Borzel 1998; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Provan and Milward 2001).
Based on these two different logics, the network model is meant to overcome either
the inefficiencies of hierarchical models of administration or the strategic and nega-
tive public implications of market models of administration. The former purpose is
aligned with the logic of the Discretionary Tradition, while the latter is the concern
of the Collaborative Tradition. Thus, while policy networks, world trade and finan-
cial organizations, global diplomacy groups, regional economic development asso-
ciations, and other examples of network governance are used as examples for theory
building, they may not fit within the Collaborative Tradition. The differentiating
feature is the attitudes held in regard to political-economic power.
For example, Lynn calls network governance “horizontal democracy” (2006,
152). In theory, once an organization is freed from controlling bureaucratic form by
an entrepreneurial form, it can evolve from competition into cooperation in a sort
of organizational “self-interest rightly understood” in the way New Zealand’s New
Public Management was originally a move promoted by labor parties to devolve
political authority to the most local level. This is perhaps one of the more impor-
tant emerging ideas in the Collaborative Tradition: How do we organize collab-
oratively for democratic purposes? We must be ever vigilant in this quest so that
theories based on the logic of direct democracy do not become conflated with or
coopted by a cleverly hidden competitive spirit. As noted in Hood’s (1991) typol-
ogy of administrative values, Collaborative organizing is based on trust. Trust is
not fostered through competition and in fact is diminished by the strategic ratio-
nality it employs. Indeed, many argue that “communication and trust distinguish
policy networks from other forms of non-hierarchical co-ordination and render
them more efficient” (Borzel 1998, 264). Furthermore, networks work well in the
public context only if both environmental and institutional norms support cooper-
ation and collaboration (Provan and Milward 2001). Therefore, Collaborative net-
works are fundamentally different from networks formed under the Discretionary
or Constitutional logics of legitimacy. In the latter logics, “network” is considered
a form of “organization,” as illustrated in Figure 8.4. However, it is more appropri-
ate to describe collaborative networking as a form of organizing—an ongoing and
dynamic process that resists capture in a two-dimensional representation.
separated among the market, government, and civil society, each with unique rules
of engagement (see Figure 6.4), or spheres that blur under primarily economic rules
of exchange (see Figure 7.4), social life is considered a cohesive whole that should
function under the same principles of democratic human relationship throughout
(see Figure 8.5). In other words, “democracy as a way of life” (Talisse 2003).
Theories of social integration are nothing new (Stout 2010a). Progressive era
pragmatist John Dewey “envisioned a future democracy in which the political and
economic spheres would be joined” (Box et al. 2001, 610). As noted in discus-
sions about equity in the Discretionary Tradition, the public good is impacted
by all sectors, particularly the market. However, the specific meaning of equity
“can be determined only through political dialogue within a political community”
(Frederickson 1997, 107). Thus, public administration pertains to all institutions
that have been formed as “instruments of action in pursuit of the public interest”
(Wamsley, Goodsell, et al. 1990, 37), including citizens and markets.
This perspective on political economy is a defining feature of the “Evergreen
Manifesto” (Adams et al. 1990). “When the world is understood in two separate
compartments, one politics and another economics, gross (economic) inequality
can be accommodated with supposed (political) equality and the achievements of
American democracy celebrated. This is what we call partial democracy” (Adams
et al. 1990, 221). For a fuller expression of democracy, all social activity must come
under its egalitarian principles of human relationship—an assumption that all
people have intrinsic moral worth and should have political, economic, and social
equality. All forms of relationship become a complex interwoven web of shared
experience, not just self-interested transaction. In this sense, social interactions have
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Government
Market
Social
Life
Community
intrinsic worth, not just instrumental purpose. Whether it is for civic, political, or
economic purposes, human interaction is based on this relatedness.
An example of what such a governance context would look like is Follett’s
(1918/1998) imagined New State—a self-governing system of association that cre-
ates a deeply nested and networked federalism growing out of local associations
at the neighborhood level, allowing for autonomy while unifying ever-larger net-
works of conjoined groups. This interlocking system creates a governance context of
myriad webs of relationship that are connected through “an infinite number of fila-
ments” that “cross and recross and connect all my various allegiances” (1918/1998,
312). Ideally, this participation occurs without proxy, but most scholars (including
Follett) admit that as long as everyone is able to participate in decision making and
those not present have a delegate that is not contested, the criterion of participation
can be reasonably met. In this arrangement, a modified form of fluid representa-
tion is necessary for simple feasibility, as well as to prevent a crowd mentality from
emerging from groups too large in scale for actual interaction. “There must be rep-
resentatives from the smallest units to the larger and larger, up to the federal state”
(Follett 1918/1998, 251).
Such representation “(a) ensures that all adults have a genuine opportunity to
participate in public discussions of issues that affect the conditions of their lives and
to exercise decisive judgment about public actions that may affect those conditions,
and (b) achieves outcomes that are consistent with choices the people collectively
make about the public conditions of their lives” (Adams et al. 1990, 229). Box
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(1998) offers similar principles for citizen governance. Practically, such active citi-
zenship requires time to participate; access to information needed; consensus based
on multiple views; agenda setting, framing, alternatives, decisions from discussions;
just outcomes; and fair procedures. Others suggest legitimacy is achieved as long
as sufficient representation exists, including descriptive, symbolic, and substantive
forms of representation (Kelly 1998).
Ultimately, the purpose of a deeply nested and networked federalism must not
be simply to protect individual liberty or to enable better oversight of representa-
tives. It must be to create legitimacy through collaborative human relationship. This
is based on a very different political ontology to the Liberalism underlying the other
Traditions of public administration.
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problems. According to the Settlement Women (Stivers 2000), the persona of pub-
lic administrators should be one of autonomous neighbor—meaning a person with
discretionary judgment guided by caring and participative relationships with fellow
citizens, rather than by administrative rules and guidelines. In this way, public
administrators use Addams’s method of “conduct as a means of propaganda” to
promote a new social ethic “based on responsibility to the whole of community”
(1964, xxi, xxvi).
Within the process of self-governing, each participant must submit to its author-
ity to honor their mutual obligation, but without externalizing their sovereignty by
giving it to another person in any form of subordination. This is a particularly
difficult point even to imagine because we have no language for it. We attempt to
capture this relationship with ideas like “servant leadership” and “stewardship” and
“authority reconceived” (Block 1993; Greenleaf 1982; Harmon 1990; Kouzes and
Posner 2002; O. F. White 1990). Yet, all of these conceptualizations are at risk of
becoming either elitist or dominating in some manner in that something beyond
egalitarianism is suggested. On the flip side, these metaphors are at risk of stripping
the democratic dignity of the holder of authority if it requires relinquishing one’s
own agency and moral authority. If leadership is to become a coherent concept
within the Collaborative Tradition, then it must be at once embodied alongside
followership (Follett 1995d). “Leadership is better seen as a capacity of the group,
a resource which resides in the group and which must be activated in order for the
group to fulfill its potential” (Denhardt 1981a, 130). In this way, any participant
in any group would hold equal authority to express leadership as needed and as
appropriate to the given situation (Follett 1995e).
In a genuine self-governance model, citizens participate equally in the decision-
making process, codesign its parameters, collectively articulate the policy, and
coproduce outcomes. Yet, coordination of collective effort is still needed. This func-
tional role is described here as Steward: One’s decisions and actions are answerable
to all impacted. But to be clear, all mature citizens would become Stewards of the
common good. Whether the situation calls for one’s facilitation and coordination
or substantive knowledge and technical expertise, all involved in the social process
are equal participants with equal authority and responsibility to the collective. All
functional roles must be temporary and fluid in nature, evolving as the situation
requires. In this scenario,
All citizens, regardless of the context or social function, become Stewards of self-
governance, and government becomes authentically by the people.
Taking the societal and individual levels of analysis together, governance is
clearly not administrative in the sense of managing and directing. In Farmer’s
(2005a) notion of antiadministration, governance as technical machine, the cult of
the heroic leader, the rhetoric of economics, and the ideal of control and efficiency
must be eliminated from practice. Instead, practice is art, most particularly an art
of love (Farmer 2005a). This is appropriate to the Collaborative Tradition if the
social bond itself is conceived of as a type of love (Catlaw 2006b). In this sense, love
does not refer to an affective tie but rather a sense of the common with others. But,
this is not to say that Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs do not share a sense of other-
regarding benevolence. The difference is that its expression in the Collaborative
Tradition is egalitarian in nature; it is not imbued with a form of political authority
beyond that of any other citizen or separated from citizens by other governance
actors or institutions. This type of shared political authority is not the same as the
constitutional notion of “equal under the law” insofar as the law is made by repre-
sentatives; rather, it is a mutual empowerment and answerability. Such a vocation of
public service demands a specific kind of ethos that prioritizes human relationship,
cooperation, and collective action (McSwite 2002).
One popular role conceptualization describes administrators as conveners of
communicative action: the deliberative practitioner who is at once a skilled facili-
tator and substantive expert (Forester 1999). The role of deliberative practitioner
is one of responsive participation: “Your relationship is deliberative in the sense
that you are honest and direct about your values and tentative goals, but you also
listen carefully to how the public responds to your agenda and are willing to make
adjustments accordingly” (Reich 1990, 7). Thus, the role is neither manipulative
(a risk for the Entrepreneur) nor passive (a risk for the Bureaucrat). Other expert
role conceptualizations have been offered from proponents of the Collaborative
Tradition, including mediator, negotiator, and teacher (White and McSwain 1990;
Wolf and Bacher 1990). However, in the Collaborative ideal, public administrators
must “foster a collaborative approach to government, where experts are simply part
of a cooperative process in which they have no superior role” (McSwite 2002, 77).
As such, the administrator’s role is “unique in its centrality, not in its elevation”
(Stivers 1990a, 270). In this sense, public administration is unique in its position to
foster a social bond grounded in our shared humanity (McSwite 2002). This idea
leads to the metaphor of midwife—public administration as a skilled facilitator of
bringing into being (Stivers 2002b).
Consideration of all these metaphors led to the choice of Steward as the label
for this role conceptualization. Stewardship is a fairly popular concept in a num-
ber of literatures. A simple search at the library or on the Internet will reveal the
term being used broadly across fields as diverse as theology, science and technol-
ogy policy, environmentalism, organizational management, economics, financial
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Tradition Summary
Pulling together all elements of the Tradition as an ideal-t ype, the “genetic code” of
the Steward consists of the characteristics presented in Table 8.4.
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Section III presents the various analyses used to assess the Traditions, including
both theoretical and empirical sources. The three Traditions promote different
public administrator role conceptualizations, each of which may or may not be
desirable from a variety of perspectives. While ideal-t ypes have value in description
and sense making, they are ultimately intended to be a means to develop and test
hypotheses about observed experience. Referring back to Weber’s method, once
the ideal-t ype is constructed, it provides a value-based structure that can be used to
make evaluative judgments of the possible consequences of its expression. Values
are reinserted into the analysis, and an ideal-t ype may be viewed as either utopian
or dystopian. That is, they are identified as “ideal” or not in the normative sense.
In this manner, “the ‘ideas’ are naturally no longer purely logical auxiliary devices,
no longer concepts with which reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evalu-
atively judged ” (Weber 1949, 98).
One evaluative approach is to engage in various “mental experiments” that
apply the question “What if?” to real or hypothetical scenarios (Sjoberg and Nett
1968, 250). These explorations enable the development of hypotheses for further
empirical research or prescriptions for practice. “For example, typologists may iden-
tify ideal types of organizational structures or strategies that do not currently exist,
but that, if reached, would improve organizational effectiveness. Further, if these
new ideal types are carefully described, practitioners can use the descriptions of
these new ideal types as design guidelines for new or existing organizations” (Doty
and Glick 1994, 245).
Ideal-t ypes also offer a platform for critical analysis. For example, if the Tradition
were to be fully realized, what would be its consequences? Completing this mental
experiment is meant to expose underlying presuppositions that are commonly taken
as self-evident within a given Tradition. Weber’s (1946a) own evaluative assessment
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incoherent with this context, what is the value or purpose of perpetuating the
associated role conceptualization? Ultimately, it may be that one Tradition is
most appropriate, or in this case legitimate, for the context of contemporary
democratic governance.
To complete this mental experiment, alternatives to the constitutional meaning
of legitimacy must be accommodated; therefore, the meaning of legitimacy used is
general: “To be legitimate is to be right, correct, good, or acceptable” (Stever 1988,
7) or “reasonable; logically correct; justifiable” (Neufeldt 1996, 772). It is specifi-
cally not meant to imply its legal meaning—“conforming to or in accordance with
established rules, standards, principles” (Neufeldt 1996, 772). Therefore, contextual
fit considers hypothetically what is most likely to be deemed reasonable and appro-
priate given the structural and normative demands of the contemporary governance
context. A description of this context is drawn from empirical studies exploring
network governance, globalization, policy networks, privatization, and the like. As
noted by Weber, these types of analysis are and must be normative in nature:
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Chapter 9
Mutual Critiques
among Traditions
Introduction
All theories of public administration seek to manifest a legitimate ethos. However,
because they are normative in nature, none can claim a necessarily “better” approach
than the others. They are simply different. These competing approaches have been
depicted as legitimacy logics grounded in differing sources of political authority
granted to the governance roles of elected representative, public administrator, and
citizen. These logics correspond respectively to the Constitutional, Discretionary,
and Collaborative Traditions of public administration and their respective role
conceptualizations of Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, and Steward. Scholars argue con-
vincingly for each of these logics based on normative preferences and empirical
evidence. In so doing, they critique one another’s thinking and perhaps even adjust
their own thinking accordingly. Indeed, MacIntyre suggests that traditions and
choices among traditions change based on their adherents’ confrontations with
competing traditions:
They may find themselves compelled to recognize that within this other
tradition it is possible to construct from the concepts and theories pecu-
liar to it what they were unable to provide from their own conceptual
and theoretical resources, a cogent and illuminating explanation—
cogent and illuminating, that is, by their own standards—of why their
own intellectual tradition had been unable to solve its problems or
restore its coherence. (1988, 364)
179
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Administrators fail to
follow orders or rules
This chapter presents common critiques within and among the three Traditions,
giving various reasons why they fail to achieve legitimacy and thereby highlighting
the lessons they stand to learn from one another.
On one hand, a Tradition can be evaluated in terms of its own assumptions—
that is, whether it achieves that which it promotes either theoretically or empirically
(MacIntyre 1988). For example, the bureaucracy promoted by the Constitutional
Tradition may be considered illegitimate because the mechanism of hierarchy fails
to achieve its control objectives. This is an internal failure of the Tradition on its
own terms. On the other hand, a Tradition can also be evaluated in terms of com-
peting assumptions—that is, whether what it promotes is considered legitimate by
other Traditions (MacIntyre 1988). For example, the Constitutional Tradition may
fail to achieve legitimacy because the citizenry demands direct participation rather
than representation by elected officials. This is a failure of the Tradition according
to external terms. The following sections describe both types of critique for each of
the three Traditions in the framework presented.
It must be noted in advance that in a triadic system, mutual critiques some-
times overlap. For example, the logics of both the Constitutional and Discretionary
Traditions underlie critiques of the Collaborative Tradition, while the Collaborative
logic applies similar critiques to both the Constitutional and the Discretionary log-
ics. This is due to the fundamental differences between representative and direct
democracy. Similarly, some critiques of the Discretionary and Collaborative logics
overlap because both conflict with the Constitutional logic of elected represen-
tation. Providing an overview of these fundamental assumptions in the form of
mutual critiques reveals the boundaries of agreement among competing Traditions.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide an overview of common critiques in each type.
Collaboration fails to
achieve the public
interest (because it is
only partial)
political order in the United States, the Constitutional approach to legitimacy is not
without its problems. Indeed, these problems are cited as the impetus behind the
formulation of alternate Traditions in the first place. The Constitutional Tradition
bases legitimacy on the constitutional order in which elected representatives have
control over governance and are held accountable for good outcomes through the
electoral process. Elected officials must remain responsive to their constituent citi-
zens and maintain adequate oversight of administrators. Failure to perform these
roles undermines the logic of legitimacy and thereby delegitimizes administrators
as well.
When elected officials are insufficiently responsive to citizens, their “repre-
sentativeness” is challenged. Hummel and Stivers suggest that the feeling that
“government isn’t us” is deeply rooted in this problem: “American representative
government does not require representatives to know their people, only to decide
for them” (1998, 33).
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described as “government of the people” (Timney 1998, 93). This structure creates
a paradox in governance when considering more than the relationship between
politicians and administrators. That is, there is a chain of responsiveness assumed,
from citizen to elected representative to administrator. Therefore, it is important
to consider the role conceptualization for all three governance actors in this logic
of legitimacy.
One such analysis is provided by Richard Box (1998) in his notion of citizen
governance. He presents an extensive discussion of role types observed in practice
among practitioners, elected officials, and citizens. In his model, the degree to
which governance actors are empowered characterizes the role type. According
to the Constitutional Tradition, elected representatives can function like trustees
who take it on themselves to make policy decisions. In turn, administrators func-
tion merely as implementers of public policy. They are value-free actors who fol-
low procedures as dictated by their hierarchical superiors, ultimately answering to
elected officials. As a result, Bureaucrats have what has been called a universalistic
view on people: everyone should be treated the same. Universal decision rules are
designed to produce just and fair results (Melchior and Melchior 2001). However,
this procedural approach often results in people being treated as objects (Lofquist
1989). The focus on rights rather than responsibilities encourages citizens to func-
tion as “free riders” who fulfill only the minimal responsibilities of citizenship.
In this set of role relationships, elected officials are the group most fully embrac-
ing agency as democratic sovereigns. While this is certainly a worst-case scenario,
this combination of roles can easily be found in practice. The problem with this
dynamic is that rather than representing citizens, government is controlling or even
alienating them; therefore, citizens are not expressing their full set of rights and
responsibilities. If the elected representatives fail actually to represent the citizens’
interests, then this logic of legitimacy fails.
direction but have too little feedback, too much administrative discretion can foil
legitimacy. Bureaucrats must often interpret vague policy direction that seeks com-
promise among competing political interests, without actually determining how to
do so. Therefore, administrators may be faced with dilemmas for which there is no
one right answer to ensure responsibility (Harmon 1995). There is a concern that
neither efficiency nor social justice are guaranteed by neutrality and competently
following the rules handed down from political/legal realm. Therefore, public
administration cannot ensure the Good if its political rulers fail to do so.
The Friedrich/Finer debate is frequently cited as the most informative on the
basic problems of administrative discretion. In a nutshell, Friedrich (1940) notes
the need for internal sources of control to augment those extant in the hierar-
chy because of the ubiquitous problem of discretion. Finer (1941), on the other
hand, believes internal sources of control are too unpredictable, so he favors a strict
hierarchical order and system of oversight and control. This perspective is a more
pure Constitutional approach: Failures in legitimacy are caused by either the indi-
vidual administrator not following hierarchical orders competently (the technical
concern) or when those rules and procedures fail to reflect political regime values
and the authority they hold (the normative concern).
Some empirical studies show that political oversight and the bureaucratic hier-
archy simply fail to achieve the control desired by Finer. This evidence underlies
Lowi’s (1979, 1987) abiding concern about the political consequences of delegated
power. In his view, delegation of power is necessary for any form of representation,
but there are consequences that have constitutional importance in America. While
power is given to government to enable action, it is also limited through various
checks and balances to fulfill the social contract with democratic citizens. Powers
are separated, the rule of law is enacted, and due process is ensured. However, he
believes that administrative professionalism has become “deranged” because it is no
longer controlled by legislative bodies and the substantive values embedded in law
(Lowi 1987, 297). Therefore, “these specialists have no right to ask for, and must
not be given freedom from supervisory control” (Gulick 2004, 96). Such congres-
sional oversight has indeed been on the rise since the 1970s according to empirical
studies (Aberbach 1991).
Some scholars favor giving only technical discretion to administrators, while
subordinating it to the normative wisdom of political statesmen. In this approach,
democratic values trump economic or scientific values by virtue of political control.
Lynn (2001) convincingly argues that, in actuality, the Constitutional Tradition
(“bureaucratic tradition” in his words) better addresses legitimacy within our sys-
tem of governance than either managerial or direct citizen participation formula-
tions. He believes that it is the only approach that duly addresses the concerns of
Constitutional values, law, and the republican political system. Perhaps the inviola-
bility of this constitutional order is what perpetuates the legitimacy question itself.
Even Friedrich (1940), a staunch proponent of administrative discretion, also insists
on the importance of obeying all laws, policies, and directions from superiors in
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the other with failing to identify appropriately and achieve what is in the public
interest. In essence, the gender analysis of Bureau Men and Settlement Women
offered by Stivers (1990b) illustrates this pattern of opposing worldviews within
public administration.
On the technical side of the argument, government should pursue efficiency
and effectiveness like a business serving its clients or customers. Liberty and equal-
ity of opportunity must be ensured to enable social progress in the form of material
advancement. This approach is widely used in practice and is integral to popular
theories of managerialism, reinvention, and New Public Management. There are
many reasons cited for the reliance on technique, science, and facts rather than
virtue, norms, and values. For example, facts are used in courts of law to determine
responsibility. Also, to avoid political disfavor, it is easier to point to “the facts”
as responsible for a decision, rather than substantive judgment. Facts are deemed
objective and therefore inherently fair.
However, critics believe that relying on technical outcomes alone is a trun-
cated view of legitimacy (Terry 1995). The scholars in the normative camp of the
Discretionary Tradition claim that if efficiency is pursued without criteria of equity
or direct participation by those affected, the risk of inequitable outcomes is exac-
erbated. They fear that efficiency will override democratic values if released from
political oversight from either representatives or active citizens (not customers).
This is because the approach is at risk of a particular pattern that produces techni-
cism: (1) Efficiency becomes a symbol that replaces substantive end values, thus
transforming a means to an end to an end in and of itself; (2) the focus on effi-
ciency heightens concerns over technique, (3) which is exacerbated by the shunting
off of political deliberation from administration; and (4) eventually, paradoxically,
the focus on technique becomes an end in itself, creating inefficiency through
procedural compliance and lack of innovation (Waldo 1955, 1984). Thus, “public
entrepreneurs of the neo-managerialist persuasion pose a threat to democratic
governance” (Terry 1998, 194) not only from a normative perspective but also from
an efficiency perspective (Downs 1967; Wilson 2000).
Perhaps due to such issues, ambivalence about discretion can be found within
the technical camp as well. Early theorists of public administration believed that
democracy could safely adopt the administrative methods of autocracy to become
more efficient and effective (White 1926; Wilson 1887). Kept within the context
of the political system, this may have been an accurate assumption. However, the
Discretionary Tradition in large part releases administration from that system of
control. Therefore, some in the technical camp turn back to the countervailing
force of the constitutional order, “We believe deeply in government” (Osborne and
Gaebler 1992, xviii), or to active citizenship: “To complement the efficiency and
effectiveness of market mechanisms, we need the warmth and caring of families
and neighborhoods and communities. As entrepreneurial governments move away
from administrative bureaucracies, they need to embrace both markets and com-
munity” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, 309).
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Through the lens of democratic legitimacy, there are several problems with these
dualistic debates between technical expertise and normative wisdom: (1) They fail
to recognize their shared logic of legitimacy through administrative discretion;
(2) they fail to acknowledge two distinct approaches to democratic legitimacy (rep-
resentative and direct); (3) they fail to acknowledge that both classical conservative
and modern forms of liberalism have staunch support in the political culture; and
(4) as a result, definitions of professionalism and prescriptions for discretionary
practice assume they are more different than they actually are. As noted elsewhere:
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is “founded both on fear of others and fears of the government” (Catlaw 2007c).
“Fear, not faith, suspicion not trust, were the foundation of our early government”
(Follett 1918/1998, 165). Thus, we create institutions of control designed to miti-
gate our fears of a self-interested and competitive human nature.
Unfortunately, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, the fears and mistrust embedded
in our founding institutions have exacerbated the very self-interest meant to be
controlled (Denhardt 1981a; Harmon and Mayer 1986; Reich 1988b; Will 1983).
“Basing society on a contract rather than on relationship makes it function like a
crowd” (McSwite 2007). In short, we have unlearned how to collaborate, so when
we try, we are quite likely to fail. For example, nascent attempts at implementation
are criticized for not producing agreement where there is deep structural conflict
and difference (Fainstein 2003). Another study shows collaborative approaches are
unlikely to work when (1) there are deep differences of values and worldviews;
(2) the majority of participants do not trust that the process will be fair; and
(3) some participants are focused on substantive issues, while others are focused
only on symbolic significance (Pollitt 1999).
Such scenarios reveal long-term patterns in institutions of indoctrination based
on fear. Our society simply is not socialized toward participation, and associational
activity levels and experience vary greatly based on socioeconomic differences.
Inequalities of information, education, and socialization converge to hinder politi-
cal participation. However, some firmly believe “people participate if taught to
believe it matters, if helped to acquire verbal and other skills of citizenship, if indoc-
trinated with aspirations and expectations that stimulate rather than paralyze, and
if taught to see themselves as members of the political community” (Lindblom
and Woodhouse 1993, 109). In fact, this has been an outcome of required citizen
participation programs in the past (Marston 1993). Therefore, critiques contending
that Americans or human beings in general are not ready for self-governance are
countered with a challenge to government to lead the way in preparing them. This
has been described in the Collaborative Tradition as the educative and emanci-
pative role of public administration. In sum, the critique that collaboration fails
to achieve the public good is countered with the claim that it does so because of
its context [see “Collaboration Fails to Achieve the Public Interest (Because It Is
Only Partial)”].
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to calls for the flattened and empowered organizations that support discretion-
ary administrative responsibility, which is considered more effective and efficient
(Friedrich 1940).
On the other side of democratic theory, the Collaborative Tradition claims that
direct democracy is possible through a deeply nested and widely networked form of
federalism (Follett 1918/1998; Thayer 1981). Tocqueville (2000) claimed that where
self-interest was rightly understood, voluntary associations at the local level could
expand out through federalism to a true self-governance at the national level. Weber
(1954) describes such “democratic administration” as (1) an egalitarian assumption
that everyone is qualified to participate in public affairs; (2) the scope of power
of command is minimized; and (3) all important decisions are made by common
resolution in assemblies or collegial bodies of representatives. The problem he sees
with this approach is that its effectiveness is limited to small groups.
Similarly, in On Democracy Dahl (1998) provides a succinct and eloquent dis-
cussion of the inherent tensions between political equality versus guardianship,
democracy by assembly versus representation, democracy versus republic, and mar-
ket economies versus democracy. Dahl goes into some detail on the institutions
that produce democracy at various jurisdictional levels, in addition to the societal
conditions that either foster or hinder its success. While greatly appreciative of the
ideal of direct democracy, he believes that it represents an infeasible approach to
governing a large and complex society. What he refers to as “assembly democracy”
is only feasible in very small jurisdictions where all affected stakeholders can actu-
ally participate in deliberation.
However, concerns about feasibility extend beyond scale to the problem of how
to “maintain a satisfactory degree of political equality, and yet rely on experts and
expert knowledge in making public decisions” (Dahl 1998, p. 79). Therefore, even if
direct democracy became possible through technology, for example, the Founders’
concern that policy would be made irrational remains. In the case of Discretionary
approaches, collaboration replaces professional standards of performance with
potentially irrational and immoral citizens, disempowering the “rightful” holders
of political authority—the expert administrators. Thus, results will be ineffective.
These critiques are countered with the fact that it is often found that partici-
patory practices are “cost-effective through cost avoidance” (Thayer 1981, 39). In
other words, greater up-front investment in participatory decision making heads
off the need for future adjustments made necessary by unforeseen or unintended
consequences. As Follett notes (1918/1998), true synthesis is infinitely more stable
than compromise or aggregated majority rules. Therefore, even if collaboration is
inefficient it may be the most effective choice. “Expensive and time-consuming
as it is, building synergistic and collaborative frameworks will become essential.
The problems that confront us are too complex and diversified for one man or one
discipline” (Bennis 1967, 16). This point also refutes the critique that effectiveness
is reduced due to an insufficient reliance on expertise. On the contrary, as noted
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192 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
and Collaborative logics, politicians and citizens really do not care if administra-
tors present themselves as in control because they are more technically proficient or
more virtuous and wise. Either type of attitude is rejected and deemed illegitimate
when the other actors feel they are the legitimate holders of political authority.
As noted, Box (1998) presents an extensive analysis of role types that considers
the societal roles of practitioners, elected officials, and citizens. In the Traditions
framework, the degree to which the actors are empowered in the governance pro-
cess characterizes the role type. In the Discretionary Tradition, elected representa-
tives function like “delegates” who seek to know and represent their constituents’
preferences. The principal problems with this approach are the difficulties presented
by a pluralist society and the degree to which the political process can be cap-
tured by special interests. To respond to these problems, representatives turn to
administrators to make decisions based on expertise. Administrators thus function
as “controllers” of policy, using their expertise to determine what is correct, usurp-
ing the policy-making role of elected representatives. As a result of this shift, citi-
zens tend to function as “watchdogs;” self-interested constituents or customers who
deal directly with administrators on matters of personal import.
When citizens function like self-interested watchdogs, it reinforces their treat-
ment as recipients of government services rather than citizens (Lofquist 1989). In
extreme, technical approaches to discretion consider citizens as customers, while
the virtue-oriented discretionism treats them like clients in need of expert service or
representation. In both cases, citizens are less than equals as governance actors. As
long as citizens submit to expertise, the risk of superiority or domination remains.
This one-directional flow has been called a “‘patronage’ position toward citizens”
(Vigoda and Golembiewski 2001, 278). In this set of role relationships, adminis-
trators are the only group fully embracing agency. As representatives of the entire
organization’s power and prestige, domineering attitudes are of concern. An overly
developed esprit de corps may lead public administrators to defend their own pro-
fessional opinions (Merton 1940).
This is the effect of Rohr’s (1986, 1990) theory of a discretionary role for admin-
istrators answerable to the People by being responsible for pursuing the regime values
depicted in their Constitution. He believes that this approach succeeds as a formu-
lation of democratic legitimacy: “By suggesting a theory of Public Administration
that combines constitutional subordination and autonomy, I hope to preserve the
enduring insight of the venerable dichotomy without succumbing to its naïve view
of administration as apolitical. Administration is political; but, like the judiciary, it
has its own style of politics and its distinctive functions within the constitutional
order” (Rohr 1990, 82). In this, Rohr refers to the politics of rule making in which
administrators autonomously interpret the meaning of the Constitution and its
regime values. However, by embracing administrative discretion in interpreting
legislative and judicial mandates, Rohr releases the administrator from traditional
hierarchical supervision and control even if acknowledging that discretionary
action is ultimately subject to adjudication.
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194 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Representation Is Problematic
In all cases of representation, the affected citizens are not involved in the delibera-
tions and actions of governance. Representation can come in the form of people as
well as ideas. In the Constitutional Tradition, representation is granted to people
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through election and to ideas through law. In the Discretionary Tradition, repre-
sentation is granted to administrators through demographic similarity or expertise
and to ideas through interests or competing values. Therefore, critiques of repre-
sentation may focus on any one of these types. For example, the problem of elected
officials being insufficiently representative was discussed (see “Elected Officials Fail
to Represent or Control”). In this case, both their policy directives and the laws
they create are suspect. The problem of administrators representing citizens was
also discussed above (see “Administrative Discretion Is Undemocratic”).
However, the most fundamental external critique of both the Constitutional
and Discretionary Traditions challenges the notion of representative government
altogether, in the form of both representation by people through election and repre-
sentation by ideas through administrative law as well as performance criteria. Such
critiques are based on complex ontological concerns and theories of the self (Catlaw
2006a; Follett 1918/1998; Hummel and Stivers 1998; McSwite 1997a). All forms of
governance that place political authority in the hands of representatives ultimately
share a political ontology that is less than self-governing. For example, Catlaw
(2007a) argues that all attempts to resolve the legitimacy question in public admin-
istration are theories of sovereignty. He finds three approaches to sovereignty, all
of which ultimately answer to a notion of “The People” that is meaningless due to
the impossibility of representation. In the first, politicians and their mandates rep-
resent The People, holding sovereignty and directing the actions of administration.
In the second, all forms of rationality represent The People through the actions
of a unified political-administrative state that holds sovereignty. In the third, The
People are represented by a rationality that is held in dialectical tension with that
which it excludes. Whoever shares the included rationality of The People retains
authority. Thus, while the idea of answerability to The People remains, the loca-
tion of representation is unclear. Furthermore, representation impedes the act of
collaboration that is desired. Therefore, he contends that until the notion of repre-
sentational sovereignty is successfully challenged or escaped, democracy is in grave
danger. The accepted political ontology must be displaced, eliminating all attempts
at representation.
Unfortunately, this problem of representation is not widely addressed as a prob-
lem of democratic political theory, let alone as a problem of public administration.
To challenge representation is to challenge the republican constitutional order as
well as pluralism and majority rule. In fact, even when representation is noted
as problematic, it is often skipped over as something either too complicated to
address or outside the scope of administrative theory:
Despite the claim that representation is outside the scope of public administra-
tion theory, political theories of elitism abound, describing the many reasons why
citizens do not feel represented by elected or appointed officials (see, for example,
Bachrach 1967; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992; Mills 1957). The “collaborative
pragmatists” present throughout the last century and reemerging in increasing
numbers today share the critique of the Constitutional Tradition’s theory of the
state as a mechanism of control directed by elite leaders holding the authority to
represent the citizenry. As noted in the explication of the Collaborative Tradition,
these ideas are linked historically to the antifederalists and the ancient philosophies
of direct democracy they espoused. Even when a theory aligns perfectly with the
Constitution and its republican form of government, “the still unanswered ques-
tion is whether the American people and their elected leaders will agree that this is
the kind of government they want and need” (Balfour 1997, 462).
From this perspective, the logic of the Collaborative Tradition challenges both
the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions based on the problem of politi-
cal authority. For example, McSwite (1997a) sees the key opposition within public
administration not of scientific elite versus political elite, but rather as an opposi-
tion between an elite of either type of leadership versus collaborative action. The
Collaborative Tradition’s proponents believe the crux of governance problems is
the fact that the political system has erroneously attempted to organize people
expecting self-government under a legal structure based on an assumed author-
itative relationship of state over subject. To rediscover “substantive democracy,”
both the republican and prevailing pluralist views must be transcended or replaced
with a collaborative model of public practice (Box et al. 2001). The Collaborative
Tradition trusts neither politicians nor administrators to produce the Good because
no one group of citizens or sector of social activity can be given authority to act on
another’s behalf. Given a truly egalitarian and democratic governance context, all
mature individuals are trusted to produce the Good together. Only this approach
fully escapes the problem of representation.
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reform and Progressive Era, administrators have aligned themselves with business-
led community “boosterism,” particularly in high-growth areas like southwestern
states (Bridges 1997). In short, “professionalism in government is good for business”
(Stout 2009a, 299). Administrators help civic and business leaders influence policy
making toward their benefit.
Therefore, rather than trusting administrators to sort out the problem of
political self-interest or market capture, those associated with the Collaborative
Tradition seek direct responsiveness to the citizens affected, ensuring that their
interpretation of social equity is what guides decision making. But, as noted (see
“Collaboration Fails to Produce the Public Good”), direct participation from citi-
zens stands to reflect the same self-interest of corrupt politicians. Therefore, the
Collaborative ideal is deemed utopian or illusory.
Because of the actual or perceived pervasiveness of material self-interest and
market influence in governance today, some scholars call for a renewed attention to
political economy as the basis for theory building (see, for example, Adams et al.
1990; Box 2007, 2008; Catlaw 2006b; Klingner 2004; McSwite 2006; Ramos
1981; Stout 2009a, 2010a; Thayer 1981). This is discussed further in Chapter 11.
With popular reaction to things like the Supreme Court decision upholding the
notion of corporate personhood (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
2010), these concerns are not likely to subside.
Collaboration Is Unconstitutional
Some suggest that direct democracy is a constitutional ideal (McSwite 2007; Stever
1988) or that it is undemocratic or unresponsive not to collaborate directly with
citizens (Denhardt and deLeon 2000). As has been noted, “Empowerment is a
positive idea, and permitting individuals and governments to control more of the
things that matter to them cannot be easily denigrated as an abstract idea about
democracy” (Peters and Pierre 2000, 25). However, this view may require a reinter
pretation of the doctrine of equality to mean actual participation rather than oppor-
tunity to participate, drawing in the thinking of the antifederalists that was in large
part left out of the Constitution itself. By denying any form of representation, the
Collaborative perspective flies in the face of both Constitutional and Discretionary
approaches to legitimacy.
Unfortunately, as noted, since the word democracy does not actually appear
in the Constitution, it is fair to assume the founders did not intend to establish
a democracy (Waldo 1980, 54). Therefore, most scholars appear to agree that direct
democracy is not the formal political order of governance in the United States. For
example, Lowi (1979) and Lynn (2001) are quick to point out that proponents of the
Collaborative Tradition’s approach to direct democracy ignore the role of political
and judicial institutions. Thus, just as administrative discretion is deemed undemo-
cratic, direct citizen participation is deemed unconstitutional. Indeed, for direct
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Its strength derives from its potential for an enhanced and ennobled
public motivated by a shared concern for the common good. Its weak-
ness is in its failure to recognize the complexity of public issues, the
critical need for expertise and leadership, and the problems of motivat-
ing the public to participate. (1997, 43)
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On the one hand, the actual center of authority and decision may be
shifted or made more inclusive, with or without any public recognition
of the change; on the other hand, public responsibility for and partici-
pation in the exercise of authority may be shared with new elements,
with or without the actual redistribution of power itself. (Selznick 1949,
259–260)
Summing Up
Governance actors commonly reflect these and other mutual critiques (see, for
example, Box 1998; Stout 2010b). Strong politicians follow the Constitutional
logic, typically amending their thinking and actions only based on case-by-case
necessity to garner support from either administrators or citizens. Strong admin-
istrators follow the Discretionary logic, submitting to politicians only when their
hand is forced, and then with as little substantive action as feasible or with the
alternative response of whistle-blowing or leaving the agency. Strong citizens fol-
low the Collaborative logic, accepting only grudgingly the control of elected lead-
ers or administrators who do not represent their interests, being willing to amend
ideas only on an equal ground of deliberation. These competing attitudes are what
gave rise to this inquiry itself. Clearly, one cannot simply say, “In order to conduct
public administration in a legitimate manner, one must … ” and fill in the end
with a prescription from only one Tradition. There is at least one substantively
different position that will challenge claims made from the perspective of any one
Tradition. There are even critiques that claim all three ontological, epistemologi-
cal, and behavioral types are fatally flawed (Dixon and Dogan 2002). Because of
such pervasive disagreement about achieving legitimacy in governance, many pub-
lic administration scholars prescribe methods for simultaneously utilizing multiple
logics. These prescriptions are the subject of the next critical analysis.
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Chapter 10
Integrations, Conciliations,
and Dialectical Syntheses
Introduction
This chapter analyzes how key scholars combine multiple logics of legitimacy in
one theory of public administration and offers an analysis of the Traditions using
the dialectic approach. The first analysis ensures that important prescriptions for
achieving legitimacy offered in the field thus far are considered prior to offering a
new approach. By way of a reminder regarding the deconstruction and reconstruc-
tion process used to generate ideal-t ype Traditions, at this stage, the sentiments
of authors are returned to their whole form to consider how individual scholars
blend ideas from what have been described here as differing logics of legitimacy.
Therefore, rather than taking a specific quotation as illustrative of a concept, the
overall message of a body of work is considered.
The second analysis explores the possibility that the Traditions represent a dia-
lectical developmental path or synthesis. Dialectical critique of logical sets of ideas
can serve to highlight true paradoxes, rather than characteristics of irony, ambigu-
ity, or conflict (Harmon 1995). However, a dialectical analysis of three such logical
sets enables an understanding of the whole as a pattern of dialectical thesis, antith-
esis, and synthesis. Therefore, the possibility of dialectical relationship is considered
both within the traditions (as dialectical tension) as well as among traditions (as
dialectical synthesis).
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Integrationist Approaches
Integrationist approaches combine or blend legitimacy logics into one role concep-
tualization. Paul Appleby integrates what he sees as the best of all three Traditions
in his “pattern of administrative responsibility,” which is meant “to nurture moral
values peculiar to, and unfolded by, political democracy” (1952, 218). This pat-
tern exists within social, political, and constitutional structures and procedures.
Of concern to him are (1) popular control; (2) humane practice; (3) pluralist toler-
ance; and (4) responsible and unifying leadership. To ensure all of these elements,
the pattern of responsibility must begin with the moral performance of individual
administrators in those tasks delegated to them (Discretionary Tradition). Loyalty
must be given upward in a hierarchy that ultimately ends with the popular level
of citizens (Constitutional Tradition). However, responsibility downward demands
that multiple points of view are considered in decision making (Discretionary
Tradition). Furthermore, responsibility must be directed to the citizens outside the
organizational hierarchy itself, particularly those publics who are most affected by
the decisions or activities at hand (Collaborative Tradition). Administrators must
also be responsible to the authority vested in laws as well as hierarchical oversight
(Constitutional Tradition). In the end, democratic public administration is “a pro-
cess in which facilities of appeal and levels of review are more numerous, various,
and open than in any other action-laden process yet devised” (Appleby 1952, 251).
In other words, it is a practice that answers to many masters.
Vincent Ostrom’s (1989) response to the intellectual crisis in public adminis-
tration is another example of an integration of all three Traditions. His ideas are
clearly aligned with the Constitutional Tradition in that he is a federalist and a
constitutionalist who believes that administration should be fully answerable to the
representative political process. However, his use of public choice, economic, and
institutional theory (Discretionary Tradition) along with a service attitude toward a
somewhat associational view of politics (Collaborative Tradition) presents a diverse
mix of logics. Even Herbert Simon (1976), who is typically held up as the exemplar of
Discretionary legitimacy through efficiency and technical rationality, vacillates con-
tinuously with references to political oversight, organizational control, and the dem-
ocratic need for purely value-based premises for decision (Constitutional Tradition).
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* This conflation of utilitarian and teleological ethos obscures the shared legitimacy logic of
both technical and normative teleological approaches. Just because a value is not utilitarian
or technical does not necessarily mean it is deontological. Rule-based ethics are deontological
because behavior is based on duty to a principle or law coming from a higher power. Indeed,
“deontology does not look beyond the act itself to weigh it against a purpose or aim; it simply
regards the act itself as duty, regardless of the imputed consequences” (Woller 1998, 90).
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210 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Conciliatory Approaches
Conciliation is a notion that allows fundamentally different ideas to be reconciled
in a constructive tension or at least brought into a stable state of agreeing to dis-
agree. Rather than being integrated, they coexist in a separate but related manner.
This has been described in the case of the forms of rationality promoted in varying
approaches to public administration. Snellen (2002) offers a conciliation of four
core decision-making approaches: (1) legal-procedural, (2) political, (3) economic,
and (4) scientific. These four approaches correspond to four aspects of social life,
respectively: legal, political, economic, and professional. The first two aspects
correspond to the Constitutional Tradition, while the last two correspond to the
Discretionary Tradition. He argues that because of the various limitations of each
in the contemporary context, a multirational approach to public administration
is best, creating “a more balanced role” (Snellen 2002, 339). This role for public
administrators necessitates familiarity with multiple forms of rationality, an ability
to think critically about the tensions between them, and the capacity to use each of
them effectively. Thus, conciliation is a sort of mutually respectful condition.
Following this perspective, three competing Traditions of public administration
have been present since the field’s inception, each jockeying for position through
ongoing adjustments. In fact, a close reading of Wilson’s famous essay shows that
he promotes ideas representative of all three perspectives—he is a genuine founder
in this sense. But, even if the three Traditions are considered in chronological devel-
opment, new formulations do not overcome prior views, but rather complement and
compete with them (Mosher 1968). This notion of complementarity and competi-
tion shows conciliation to be a positive state of dialectical tension in which neither
side of a dualism is allowed to dominate the other (Carr and Zanetti 1999).
From this perspective, dualisms of mostly opposing elements work together
through some shared principle. In the Taoist concept of T’ai Chi T’u (see
Figure 10.1), two components of universal energy (yin and yang) are unified into
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212 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
a complementary whole (yin/yang), each having the seed of the other within itself
(Capra 1975/1999). The two elements are engaged in a symmetrical rotation in
which they alternate in primacy only until an imbalance is realized, in which
case the “seed” of the other within the primary element, represented as the alter-
nate color dot, engages rotational movement until balance is restored through its
increased presence. This motion is ongoing in nature, ensuring that all situations
are in an ongoing pursuit of balance. Thus, the dichotomous elements are mutu-
ally necessary, interdependent, and opposing, but not contradictory or hierarchical.
This symbolic relationship can be likened to politics and administration func-
tioning in different but complementary ways that together form the whole of
government or values and facts combining to form the whole of decision-making
criteria. This is quite reflective of the notion of politics and administration as creat-
ing governance through complementarity (Svara 1999). In fact, complementarity is
a concept that has been associated with dialectic in the past (Gurvitch 1962). The
dominance of one-half of a dichotomy is not the nature of dichotomy, but rather a
social practice attached to dichotomizing (Rutgers 2001). However, some feel it is
more apt to portray an alternating pattern of dominance and submission (Carr and
Zanetti 1999), similar to Kaufman’s (1985) notion of the pendulum sway in public
administration between a focus on private interests and concerns and public action.
Each conciliatory theory of public administration unifies at least two of the
three role conceptualizations described in the Traditions framework while main-
taining their distinct characteristics. This often plays out as an argument between
technical and normative perspectives. As Kaufman (1956) argues, public admin-
istration continually seeks to maximize the attainment of mutually incompatible
values. From this perspective, we get ideas like a requisite trade-off between effi-
ciency and equality (Okun 1975). Along these lines, Bellone and Goerl (1992) ini-
tiated an interesting conversation about reconciling public entrepreneurship with
democracy. Essentially, their argument is that as long as the autonomy, personal
vision, secrecy, and risk-taking behavior of entrepreneurism are moderated by stew-
ardship or a strong theory of citizenship, the two can coexist to the benefit of
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* Due to this framework’s specific use of the term stewardship, it must be noted that in their use,
stewardship means “concern for the long-term public good” (Bellone and Goerl 1992, 131).
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education is deemed necessary because “this mixing of social classes and races is
extremely important in a democracy; without it, we lose our capacity to under-
stand and empathize with those who are different from us. When that happens,
it is not long before our society loses its ability to care for those who need help.
We become a collection of individuals, not a community” (Osborne and Gaebler
1992, 101). Therefore, the largely transactional approach to entrepreneurial gov-
ernance (Discretionary Tradition) must be matched by a relational civil society
(Collaborative Tradition).
It has also been persuasively argued that multiple bases for democratic legiti-
macy are necessary, including constitutional rule of law (Constitutional Tradition);
efficient and effective organizational and managerial structure (Discretionary
Tradition); and socially constructed notions of legitimacy (Collaborative Tradition)
(Terry 1995). Each approach may be considered more relevant and appropriate in
differing contexts, including agencies, functions, and policy areas. The choice must
be left to the practical wisdom of practitioners, who must embody all three value
systems at various times (Rosenbloom 1983). This can be conceived as a contin-
gency approach, recommending the use of different approaches for specific purposes
(Peters 1992).
Rather than a contingency approach, Harmon recommends prioritizing per-
sonal and relational sources of accountability with the caveats “within constraints
imposed by political authority” and “assertion of professional detachment, knowl-
edge, and expertise” (Harmon 1995, 187). However, he does not see this as a concil-
iatory solution, but rather a dialectical synthesis. “This reformulation of the relation
of politics and administration does not entail as much a formal or structural altera-
tion of government as a changed understanding of what is appropriate and possible
within it. Moreover, it is flexible enough to accommodate two different conceptions
of accountability relevant to public servants” (Harmon 1995, 194). Thus, politics
still creates authoritative constraints yet calls on public servants to take on a new
functional role as enablers of citizens’ social practices, in addition to substantive
expertise and professionalism. Harmon believes this combination meets the expecta-
tions of the rationalists (Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs here) as well as the critiques
of rationalist dichotomies (Stewards here). So, the reformulation merges thought
and action as well as technical expertise and externalized political authority into a
facilitative role. In the end, the dialectic remains, and the solution is that potential
abuses of political authority are moderated by professional responsibility, and prob-
lematic administrative discretion is addressed through direct public involvement
in dialogue and deliberation. Thus, Harmon offers a conciliatory solution to the
dialectic (Bureaucrat/Entrepreneur) and its potential synthesis (Steward).
Summation
In the end, theorists associated principally with all three Traditions of public
administration as well as those fully straddling the interstices seek to achieve the
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If, however, these individuals begin to confront others who are also
empowered and have to bargain and fight for their rights, just as they
had previously, then empowerment is likely to be alienating and disil-
lusioning. Indeed, both clients and workers may perceive themselves
being worse off after empowerment than before, simply because they
will believe that they were deceived about the brave new world of
empowerment that they were entering. (Peters and Pierre 2000, 23)
philosophically, in a manner not grounded in time and place. The following critical
analysis attempts to develop such a rationale.
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Synthesis
Thesis Antithesis
* I suggest it is more accurate to depict this as the Citizen/Maker dialectic, which is resolved
by the Answerer given Niebuhr’s (1963) own interpretation of his triadic model. However,
Harmon only employs two of Niebuhr’s three types.
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‘synthesis.’ Once attained, the synthesis may in turn become the first step of a
new dialectic triad” (Popper 1940, 404). In other words, the opposition of two
halves of a whole creates an alternative that transcends both, creating a new totality
that is better than either dialectical position. Many feel this understanding is the
true purpose of dialectic: “It implies interaction leading to an improved synthesis”
(Stever 1988, 82). In this way, dialectic is useful in catalyzing emancipatory change
(Carr 2000).
To complicate matters further, there are at least two main conceptualizations
of this type of transformational dialectic: one that is historical and another that is
systematic in nature (Arthur 1998). The historical interpretation views the process
as developmental in nature, suggesting that the conflict produces the resolution in
the same manner a cause produces an effect. A systematic view suggests that a given
whole, or synthesis, reproduces itself through a mutually interdependent dialectic
of thesis and antithesis, regardless of chronological events. The focus in this view is
on the interconnectedness of elements within the whole and the manner in which
they necessitate one another in a logical sequence that can be understood both
forward and backward. Thus, both approaches conceive of synthesis as being in
some manner the developmental outcome of dialectic, and that dialectic is a force
of ongoing change. Indeed, “dialectic is in favour of a revolutionary rather than of
a conservative and apologetic political theory” (Popper 1940, 426). Therefore, it has
been suggested that public administration theory is “a dialectic among competing
models, ideas, and concepts that ultimately turns on the questions: What is the
ideal state? the good society? the purpose of community?” (Stillman 1991, 222).
In the Traditions framework, developmental dialectic is possible both within
and among Traditions due to the split of technical and normative camps within
the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions. Both possibilities are considered
in the critical analyses because any constellation may have tension or contradiction
within it (Padgett 2002). Dialectic between the technical and normative camps
within Traditions appears to function more to catalyze enlightenment by pointing
out the drawbacks of each prioritization. Even while sharing a logic of legitimacy,
nuanced disagreements exist about how best to pursue it. For example, those who
share the logic of autonomous professionalism in the Discretionary Tradition may
disagree regarding the specific nature of that professionalism (e.g., technical vs.
normative). Such ongoing iterative moves and attempts at integration or concilia-
tion have been made by the technical and normative sides of the Constitutional and
Discretionary Traditions, serving to advance theory within both.
Dialectic among Traditions appears to function more to catalyze emancipatory
change in a somewhat historical sense. To clarify the term developmental, it means
an evolutionary path that responds to both intention and uncontrollable environ-
mental or unconscious factors. In other words, it is neither a purely programmed
action (Bendor 1976) nor a purely accidental process (Waldo 1980). As presented in
the overview table in Chapter 5, the developmental path moves generally from left
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act predominantly based on their expertise and experience. Those in the technical
camp ask administrators to achieve their objectives efficiently and effectively, using
the best means available to them to do so. Those in the virtue camp demand that
they act in a manner that is equitable, using means that are the most ethical and
moral according to our societal values. Therefore, in the Discretionary Tradition,
technique and virtue achieve dialectical balance in the form of agency in Harmon’s
(1995) terms or responsibility in mine.
The dialectical approach employed here thus considers the manner in which
opposing emphases work together to create a whole in which knowledge of the
tension is beneficial. In either case, the normative path may be more advanced
in philosophical development but rather useless without its technical partner in
terms of getting things done. This is illustrated by Kaufman’s (1985) notion of the
cyclical relationship in public administration between a focus on private interests
and concerns and public action. It takes both to maintain governance, but when
one becomes too dominant, it spurs the evolution and reassertion of its opposite,
improving the capacity of the whole. This process then repeats when the reasserted
position becomes too dominant, spurring the evolution and reassertion of the origi-
nal. As shown in Figure 10.3, the developmental path within a Tradition would
therefore look like a spiral in which the tensions between technical and normative
emphases move the Tradition toward an evolving expression of its logic through
each iterative cycle. From this perspective, it could be conceived that New Public
Management was in some sense a response to New Public Administration, while
both largely coexist within the Discretionary Tradition.
This opposition of technical and normative theory is typically what public
administration scholars are considering when they speak of dialectical tensions in
public administration: the opposition of concepts like science and virtue, efficiency
Accountability Responsibility
6 6
5 5
4 4
2 2
1 1
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and equity, fact and value, politics and administration, and normative and per-
formative. However, analyses that pit what have been called technical, scientific,
orthodox, traditional, and hard-core rationalist theories against normative, human-
istic, democratic, new, and soft-core rationalist theories obfuscate the overarching
issue of democratic legitimacy and theories of public administration that call for a
reformulation of its very nature from representative forms to a direct form. If we
merely consider critical and postmodern theories as extensions of the humanistic
and democratic challenges to its partnered orthodox scientific approach with its
entrepreneurial extensions, we fail to grasp the fundamental differences in political
ontology being posed by the Collaborative Tradition.
To make matters worse, theories that focus on administrative accountability
and responsibility, decision-making rationality, organizing style, or role concep-
tualizations alone miss the overarching question of democratic legitimacy as well.
They merely assume a governance context of liberal representative government and,
as Appleby (1952) notes, simply move on to matters of practice. Thus, most explo-
rations of public administration theory do not reveal the larger pattern of political
sovereignty in which the dialectical conflict of governance is between State (repre-
sentative democracy) and Citizen (direct democracy). Yet, as assumed here, these
are the genuine poles of concern to democratic public administration. In other
words, “The problem of contemporary public administration theory is that dia-
lectical interchange occurs within but not between axes” (Stever 1988, 82). From
the vantage of the logics of legitimacy, the axes are not technical versus norma-
tive emphases but rather between representative and direct theories of democracy.
Mutual critiques of technical and normative approaches are within the axis of rep-
resentative democracy.
Stever (1988) calls for conversation across axes so that dialectics can more suc-
cessfully move toward synthesis. While the axes may differ from the Traditions
framework, developing coherent sets across axial dimensions may help illuminate
the larger dialectical pattern within which these smaller dialectical tensions exist.
In this way, we might hope to transcend the representational “bar of sovereignty”
Catlaw (2007a) describes, achieving a new form of democracy. In fact, such trans-
formation is the fundamental logic of the Collaborative Tradition. It attempts a
synthesis of the dialectical dualisms within the other two Traditions by melding
technical and normative elements in all its functional aspects to achieve egalitarian
democratic legitimacy. It seeks transcendence of the split technical/normative whole
to one that is paradoxically neither and both. For example, in the Collaborative
Tradition, the dialectical wholes of accountability and agency (responsibility) them-
selves achieve dialectical synthesis in the form of mutual responsibility, or obliga-
tion in Harmon’s (1995) terms, responsiveness in mine. This gives a hint toward the
manner in which the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions themselves stand
in a dialectical tension for which the Collaborative Tradition seeks synthesis—the
next analysis to consider.
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224 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
alike, if such labels even perpetuate. But, because of our existing constitutional
political order, the “official” winner must always be the Constitutional Tradition.
Citizens must subordinate themselves to majority rules and the elected officials
chosen to represent them. Administrators must ultimately subordinate themselves
to their political masters. And yet, because of the failure of this system to achieve
legitimacy in the eyes of at least a significant portion of the populace, practices
continue to empower administrators and citizens alike, seeking the blend that
will be, as the fictional Baby Bear’s chair, porridge, and bed were for Goldilocks,
“just right.”
Therefore, this analysis rejects attempts at integration and conciliation as nec-
essary failures, considering the preferable possibility of a true dialectical synthesis
across Traditions. Following Follett’s lead, dialectical synthesis means the unification
of parts into a new whole, resulting in progress. This is exemplified by accountability
and responsibility uniting in mutual answerability, which has both characteristics
simultaneously, thus transcending the dualism and achieving a new wholeness.
From this perspective, the three Traditions of public administration theory can
be considered a developmental path toward a new social form, but only with an
important caveat: The use of this metaphor must not imply a historically or hier-
archically deterministic view. Rather, the notion of development implied is one of
evolution as fitting to the context. This concept is quite difficult to communicate
beyond a political ontology of unity because it must imply an undetermined activ-
ity that allows for movement in any direction without implying a “better” state than
any preceding state of being by virtue of a predetermined criterion. Unfortunately,
we do not have sufficient language to describe ideas like development, maturation,
or progress, which do not imply judgment in a manner that can be misused as a
rationale for “objective” prescription.
With this warning in mind, a developmental view of the Traditions of public
administration seeks to address the problem of allowing evolution to fit the needs
of humankind. “Perhaps the task we face is one of building a new, and truly dif-
ferent, form of human community, a form consistent with the level of conscious-
ness and individualism that has come to characterize the human race” (White and
McSwain 1990, 57). In more familiar terms, this evolutionary process might be
compared to Kohlberg’s (1981) scheme for moral development, whereby moral
maturation is observed to move from preconventional to conventional and then
postconventional levels of development. While the representative logics used in
the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions might be characterized as conven-
tional, the emerging direct democratic logic of the Collaborative Tradition might
be considered postconventional, considering a much broader range of implications
in decision making and action. It could also be likened to a Maslowian (1943) evo-
lution in which political forms change in design to meet expanding human needs,
imagining a target rather than pyramidal arrangement. Using this metaphor, if
governance under the Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions succeeds only
in partially fulfilling physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization
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needs, the Collaborative Tradition seeks to create more enabling conditions for
human development and expression.
Using this idea of development in a large-frame dialectical lens, the
Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions stand in dialectical tension with
one another (thesis/antithesis). The field is seeking some form of transcendent
synthesis of these two Traditions through the emerging Collaborative Tradition.
Specifically, the Discretionary Tradition’s Master role is an antithetical response to
the Constitutional Tradition’s Servant role thesis, while the Collaborative Tradition
seeks to transcend both through a Co-Creator role—it is neither Master nor
Servant. As practitioners, we desire to be neither Servants nor Masters but rather
equal Co-Creators. This desire goes back to the Progressive Era when combined
reform activities and regulatory innovations “offered no less than the potential for
synthesizing the dialectic of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist themes into a new
mode of governance” (McSwite 1997a, 124). This macro-level approach to analysis
exposes the problems of democratic legitimacy inherent in both the Constitutional
and Discretionary Traditions of public administration and the difficulties in estab-
lishing integrated wholes among incoherent prescriptions for practice that call for
both Servant and Master characteristics.
In keeping the contradictions of Master and Servant in the form of external-
ized political authority (e.g., representation by politicians or administrators), we are
allowing ourselves merely to perpetuate the alternating positions of our ambiva-
lence as a field of practice. In other words, we are not reaching a new understanding
and acceptance of a necessary duality within a whole by letting the contradiction
stand (King and Zanetti 2005). Nor is the dialectic reaching needed resolution for
the field to progress and achieve legitimacy (Stever 1988). Therefore, perhaps we
should be seeking to integrate contradictions within a synthesis that creates a new
totality that actually transcends the ideas that created the contradictions in the first
place. As noted in the study of ethics, sometimes an ethical dilemma produces a
third way out—a “highly creative course of action that comes to light in the heat of
the struggle for resolution” (Kidder 1995, 186). As discussed in Chapter 9, the third
way of the Collaborative Tradition has not yet been attempted on a large scale.
Following Niebuhr’s (1963) argument, Man-the-A nswerer represents an evo-
lutionary transcendence of the dialectic between Man-the-Citizen and Man-the-
Maker. While he makes this claim based on the primacy of the divine being only
fully and properly present in the notion of Man-the-A nswerer, the logic holds true
to the Traditions of public administration as presented here. It may be that the
Collaborative Tradition could not have been formed without the contradictions
of dualisms revealing themselves as derivative of a common root of instrumental
rationality that is strategic in nature, whether expressed as a competition of ideas
or a competition among men (Harmon 1995). No such rationalist solution can
unify the objective and the subjective (Harmon 1995). Similarly, no culturally male
view of individualism can develop a political understanding of interconnectedness
(Stivers 1990b). No system that maintains objective representation can achieve
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legitimacy for subjective humans (Catlaw 2007a). McSwite (1997a) suggests that a
closer look at the discourse on legitimacy reveals a fundamental view of legitimacy
as objective (rational) or principled (rule bound). Neither the Constitutional nor
the Discretionary Traditions escape this trap of pitting control against autonomy.
Therefore, it has been suggested that achieving a more fully democratic, “anti-
administrative” (Farmer 2005a) form of governance requires “a political philoso-
phy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the
problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King’s head; in political
theory that has still to be done” (Foucault 1980, 121). This desire to “kill the king”
(Farmer 2005a) is based on the notion of the sovereignty of the state as conceived by
liberalism (in both its classical and its modern forms) rather than as a characteristic
held by the socially embedded self. That is, externalized sovereignty, or the giving
over of political authority to an external person, institution, or idea, is the target.
Reclaiming sovereignty within the socially situated self would provide the basis for
a political theory that transcends the problems created by externalizing sovereignty
in all forms of representational governance.
To understand better how the Collaborative Tradition may ultimately achieve
the elimination of the external political sovereign or ruler, the manner in which
its elements represent dialectical synthesis of the other two can be explored. First,
some Collaborative theorists are attempting to resolve the overall dialectical ten-
sions between the technical and normative camps within the other two Traditions.
Rather than considering either politicians or administrators the legitimate deter-
miners of collective action, some believe that it must be the citizens themselves who
make such decisions, noting that the meaning of this label is transformed in the
absence of “politicians” and “administrators.” Rather than action guided by rules,
techniques, or norms, the law of the situation must guide thought and deed. This is
neither a deontological nor a teleological approach to responsibility. Instead, it is a
phenomenological understanding garnered through social interaction: “The respon-
sible self is driven as it were by the movement of the social process to respond and
be accountable in nothing less than a universal community” (Niebuhr 1963, 88).
Thus, the state is fully democratic, fully participatory, and self-governing, rather
than either a political or administrative representative republic. Its form of radical-
ism seeks cocreation of the Many and the One, rather than the One demanded
of the Many through either elite authority or pluralist competition and major-
ity rule. “Administrators” in such a “state” must necessarily be Co-Creators rather
than either Servants or Masters, as would be all citizens with the society. This role
abolishes the assignment of political authority to any given function of the state—
neither politics nor administration is empowered. To accommodate this highly
egalitarian context, decisions must be made collaboratively using a combination of
technical and normative forms of rationality, envisioned by Hegel (1807/1977) as
intersubjective agreement and by Follett (1918/1998) as interpenetration. This type
of process can only be accommodated by a fluid form of networking that allows
all those concerned to participate and the law of the situation to rule. Networks
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are meant to transcend hierarchy in all its forms, without resorting to anarchistic
pluralism and competition.
But, it must be noted that these syntheses must occur at a fundamental level of
intent or praxis—at the level of political ontology rather than as a matter of mere
technique. For example, it was noted in the Collaborative Tradition discussion that
in some cases Traditions can share idealized visions of particular elements, but for
fundamentally different reasons. For example, the Discretionary and Collaborative
Traditions share a critique of hierarchy, calling for more flexible forms of orga-
nizing. However, the Discretionary Tradition calls for this based on desires to
create more efficient outcomes or a more humanitarian environment for workers
within the organization, not to create a more egalitarian society for citizens. The
Collaborative Tradition critiques hierarchy based on the desire to transform or even
eliminate the role of government and to attain egalitarian self-governance within
organizations as well as society. It is quite easy to focus on organizational theory
and its alternative structural forms, without ever questioning associated assump-
tions of political ontology or theories of legitimacy. While this may enable broader
agreement at a superficial level, such agreements do not represent a true synthe-
sis, which is much more desirable than the compromise and concessions of trans-
actional bargaining. Agreements based on the latter will never last long because
the original difference emerges in some other form at a later time. “Nothing will
ever truly settle differences but synthesis” (Follett 1918/1998, 114). Therefore,
rather than settling differences through authoritative dictate (Constitutional) or
competition and compromise (Discretionary), the process will produce an inte-
grated solution (Collaborative) for any element of public administration.
As an example of what this means in practice, I was once the cochair of the
human resources development team within the Arizona Strategic Partnership for
Economic Development. This was an outgrowth of the noted Phoenix Futures
Forum (Fox and Miller 1995, 142). Our consultants were the acclaimed team
behind similar efforts in San Jose, California—Collaborative Economics (Henton,
Melville, and Walesh 1997). After several years of activity, it was taken over by
the governor’s office and placed within the purview of the Arizona Department
of Commerce, becoming the Governor’s Strategic Partnership for Economic
Development. While this case would make a great study on cooptation, the point
is to highlight that while it may have appeared to be a cross-sector, egalitarian net-
work of civic entrepreneurs seeking to improve the quality of life for all Arizonans,
its form belied its underlying political ontology. On the surface, it appeared to
be equally concerned about the quality of the environment, culture, education,
and community life, alongside more traditional economic concerns. Taken at face
value, it appeared to be a truly collaborative network.
In truth, the network was primarily designed to improve the economy through
what we fondly called “coopetition”—collaboration to compete better nationally
and internationally as a region. All of the quality-of-life foundation groups (such
as education, culture, and environment) were designed to be in service of that
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Chapter 11
Assessing Contextual
Fit of the Traditions—
A Mental Experiment
Introduction
To summarize the path traversed thus far, we have drawn broadly from an array of
literature in public administration and management, public policy, organization
behavior, sociology, political theory, philosophy, and theology. Using a discourse
analysis, we have analyzed the fundamental assumptions and rationalities of three
role conceptualizations for the public administrator: Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur,
and Steward. We have explored a comparative typology that aims to advance our
understanding of what it means to be a “good” public administrator as well as the
“proper” role of public administration in society. We have described a variety of
critiques that challenge the legitimacy logic of each Tradition based on both its own
internal expectations and according to competing logics. This analysis clarified the
boundaries of agreement and disagreement among the Traditions. We analyzed
how key scholars seek either to integrate or to conciliate the logics to improve legiti-
macy. Finally, we explored dialectical analyses to understand developmental pro-
cesses both within Traditions and among Traditions, suggesting that theoretically,
the Collaborative Tradition represents a dialectical synthesis of the Constitutional
and Discretionary Traditions of governance.
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In the new forms of governance, one of the most basic questions is the degree to
which processes are democratic. As noted long ago, “An important distinction is to
be made between the locus of decision and the mode of calculation” (Wildavsky 1979,
123). As the sector becomes less important, how decisions are made becomes more
important. For example, citizens of European nations are not so upset about the idea
of the European Union making international policy decisions; they are concerned that
these decisions are in the hands of appointed experts rather than political decision-
making processes (Kettl 2000b). Thus, scholars urge politicians to “play a key role in
efforts to ensure the democratic anchorage of governance networks” (Sørensen and
Torfing 2005). In short, governance demands a reframing of democracy, civic agency,
and politics (Boyte 2005). Indeed, in her vision of public administration in 2020,
Nabatchi predicts that “the field will have taken significant and meaningful steps
toward the rediscovery of the public in public administration—that is, attention to
the political theory of administration, in which citizens are sovereigns” (2010, S309).
The notion that authority must be invested in the public to be considered
authentic participation was in large part pioneered by Sherry Arnstein in her lad-
der of participation model: “Participation of the governed in their government is,
in theory, the cornerstone of democracy” (1969, 216). In pointing to the issue of
decision-making power, she revealed “the central issue of the participation debate”
(Fagence 1977, 122). Empirical studies support this claim (see, for example,
Kathlene and Martin 1991; Stout 2010b). Participation efforts must represent a
“genuine devolution of authority to local communities” (Carley and Smith 2001,
198). Therefore, coproduction cannot be repressive or reflect the inauthentic char-
acteristics of cooptation (Selznick 1949).
Participatory practices enable governance as a function of both moral and
instrumental choice. It is this mode of governance that “provides the link between
theories of communicative action, deliberative democracy, and new forms of global
governance” (Risse 2004, 293). These approaches can help us determine “how
to design and manage the immensely complex collaborative systems” (Salamon
2005, 10–11). Postmodern public administration theory must accommodate cul-
tural diversity, nonrational human behavior, and demands for inclusive citizenship
beyond mere consumer choice (Kelly 1998). It must also reach into theories of
political economy as its new paradigm to address “big issues” like democratization,
societal equity, and ethics (Klingner 2004).
These normative issues become critical in our postmodern, globalizing context
in which borders are rapidly disappearing. Philosophies, theories, and practices
based on discreet individual subjects and objects; clearly divided public and pri-
vate organizations; separate political, economic, and civil spheres; and indepen-
dent governments simply do not work anymore. We are environmentally, socially,
and economically interconnected, and our politics and administrations have yet to
catch up.
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Critical Discussion
The following discussion considers both empirical and theoretical claims about the
contemporary governance context to draw conclusions about which Tradition of
public administration is most likely to achieve legitimacy. Comparing descriptions
of the context to the characteristics attributed to each of the three Traditions of
public administration reveals structural fit or logical feasibility based on empiri-
cal evidence. Also, considering the analyses provided in Chapters 9 and 10, con-
clusions are then drawn about the normative fit or value-based desirability of the
Tradition that has the best structural fit.
Structural Fit
MacIntyre (1988) notes that choices among traditions and traditions themselves
change due to confrontation with new situations that reveal the tradition’s limi-
tations. This may result in “rejection, emendation, and reformulation of beliefs,
the revaluation of authorities, the reinterpretation of texts, the emergence of new
forms of authority, and the production of new texts” (MacIntyre 1988, 355).
Empirically, the emerging contemporary governance context appears to be more
logically aligned with the Collaborative Tradition of public administration than
either the Constitutional or Discretionary Traditions. To illustrate, let us consider
the various elements of the ideal types in light of the description: criterion of proper
behavior; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations
of responsibility and accountability; associated decision-making rationality; associ-
ated organizing style; and assumed governance context.
The Constitutional and Discretionary Traditions share the political ontology of
liberalism, albeit with differing emphases. As MacIntyre points out:
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In summary, the structural fit between the three Traditions and the emerging
contemporary governance context shows the Collaborative Tradition in the lead,
followed by the Discretionary Tradition. This pattern reflects the developmental
path discussed in the dialectical synthesis analysis in Chapter 10.
Normative Fit
In the spirit of the Eastern understanding of chaos, the highly unstable and rela-
tivistic qualities of the postmodern, globalizing context lead at once to a high level
of anxiety and the opportunity for transformation (King and Zanetti 2005). There
are two main propositions for such transformation: (1) a restoration of the liberal
ideal and “completion” of modernity’s project and (2) an evolution toward self-
governance. Both can be considered what Cornel West (1991) refers to as “fecund
criticism” in which the primary aim is to discern possibilities in the existing order
or an affirmation of an altogether alternative approach to order.
Taking a lead in the first approach, theorists like Habermas (1975), Ramos
(1981), and Walzer (1984) claim we should fight the collapse of social spheres and
reassert a firm separation among them. If the polity can be reclaimed from the
economy, hindrances to democracy and social justice can be overcome. In other
words, “if we can oust the colonizing economic attitudes from civil and politi-
cal society, citizens can reclaim control over a market economy run amok” (Stout
2010a, 7). We would delimit the market (while leaving it unchanged) and thereby
reclaim spaces for political and personal life. We could then revitalize the public
sphere by restructuring interactions according to communicative ethics and action
in substantive relationship. Ultimately, these activities would restore the proper
governance context envisioned by the Constitutional Tradition in which political,
economic, and civil spheres are properly separated, with the civil sphere in proper
relation with the political sphere, and the political sphere properly ordering both
economic and civil interactions. In sum, this would “revitalize and rehabilitate the
project of modernity” (Zanetti 2004, 140), in large part by reintroducing substan-
tive values into existing procedural political deliberation.
Reforming the system as it stands is also the purpose of various integrations and
conciliations of the Traditions’ logics. Yet, as noted in the analysis in Chapter 10,
these attempts seem to fail, some self-admittedly (see, for example, Rohr 1989;
Harmon 1995). As another illustration, assuming that the ideals of overhead
democracy are no longer realistic in contemporary governance, Redford suggests
that administration can be “most fully legitimized if by all the processes of social control
it conforms as fully as man can make it conform with the tenets of democratic morality”
(1969, 196). He calls this “workable democracy”—a pragmatic ideal in which
This particular passage clearly illustrates the difficulty with which these com-
peting logics combine. It sounds quite convoluted to conciliate representation of
interests with meaningful participation and organizations with individuals. Within
this “workable democracy” we attempt, we cannot seem to finesse our way out of
the problem of democratic legitimacy through combinations of internal and exter-
nal responsibility and accountability.
Finally, as noted in the critique of the Collaborative Tradition in Chapter 9,
many of its proponents equivocate on making structural changes to the liberal
system. Public participation and deliberation are seen only as “important supple-
ments to representational democracy” (Nabatchi 2010, S310, emphasis added). In
fact, it could be argued that Discretionary administrators use citizen engagement
only as a way to legitimate their actions in the face of constitutional oversight.
Citizens remain hierarchically under the sovereign representation of the “politico-
administrative” (Maor 1999, 15) system.
In the end, whether the arguments made are characterized as diagnostic and
descriptive in nature or normative in nature, our attempts to reform the gover-
nance context through reclaiming the public sphere, compromise integrations
of legitimacy logics, or conciliatory dialectical tension fail to achieve democratic
legitimacy in at least someone’s eyes. For a growing number of U.S. citizens, the
only legitimate democratic political authority resides within each equal indi-
vidual (Schattschneider 1960). The bottom line is that the Constitutional and
Discretionary Traditions appear to have proven ineffective in the emerging context.
Box asks, “Is it possible to be an important actor in the creation and implementa-
tion of public policy without straying outside the legislative mandate or becoming
dominating, self-serving, and causing restriction of public access and freedom to
act?” (Box 1999, 40). Based on the analyses of the Constitutional and Discretionary
Traditions here, the answer would be an emphatic “No.” Even this moderate sug-
gestion is revolutionary in that it reinterprets either the administrator’s or the citi-
zen’s place in the constitutional order (Stout 2009a). However, these and even more
directly revolutionary suggestions are part of the Collaborative Tradition that chal-
lenges the notions of representative governance altogether.
Some scholars suggest that efforts to reestablish firm barriers between spheres
of social action, types of human relationship, and the ontological commitments
on which they are based are futile. Rather, as noted by Progressive Era scholar
Mary Follett, “It is the system which must be changed” (1918/1998, 167). As
noted by radical or Second Wave feminists, “To engage in reform is to accept the
present structure and risk being co-opted by it, thereby preventing in the future
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fundamental change in the structure” (Denhardt and Perkins 1976, 381). This is
the project of the Collaborative Tradition as conceived here: To develop an admin-
istration based on “process-consciousness” (Denhardt and Perkins 1976, 381)—a
new way of relating to each other and the world around them in which power is
shared in fluid, temporary structures designed for shared responsibility and leader-
ship, consensual decision making, self-actualization, and creative collective action.
While the more skeptical theorists focus on the difficulties of such evolution
given postmodern fragmentation, the more affirmative theorists focus on the oppor-
tunities to create a new form of social life based on relationship: “What needs to
be transcended is an entire mode of producing and maintaining social reality and
social relationship” (Catlaw 2006b, 199). Indeed, Bernstein suggests that the emerg-
ing ethical-political dialectic between modernity and postmodernity “compels us to
confront anew the classic Socratic question, ‘How one should live’” (1991, 11). Thus,
as the foundations of liberalism are rejected, a new ethical-political foundation is
sought that is fluid and able to accommodate globalizing pluralism and its result-
ing ambiguity and uncertainty, while acknowledging the possibility of attaining
ongoing intersubjective agreement through egalitarian process. This new founda-
tion shifts the focus to our mode of relating rather than its content (Catlaw 2006b).
To sum up the argument of Section III, the analyses presented suggest that
the emerging Collaborative Tradition provides a fitting role conceptualization
for the contemporary governance context and a path toward a paradigmatic trans-
formation of both theory and practice. Normatively, it attempts to reframe the
legitimacy issue itself according to the principles of direct democracy. Indeed,
McSwite suggests that “if we want to find a truly legitimate place for the public
administrator, we must find an alternative image of governance itself, an image that
derives from a different model of society, one grounded in community” (McSwite
1997a, 50). Without such a transformation, we may be stuck in a holding pattern
whereby our understanding is limited to oppositional trade-offs between things
like hierarchy and competition, Master and Servant, efficiency and equity, self-
interest and public interest, politics and administration, or fact and value. Instead,
public administration must face head on and reconcile “the central contradiction
posed to human beings by collective life: the dual, conflicting necessities of control
and freedom” (McSwite 2002, 96). We must become the Co-Creators that we wish
to be. Otherwise, we doom ourselves to an “existential posture” that is character-
ized by “a commitment to a permanent sense of irresolvable problem and a willingness
to live with the inevitable interpersonal distress that this sense of intractable problem
generates” (McSwite 1997a, 6).
Looking to the future of public administration theory, dialectical synthesis is
recommended as opposed to more common claims for the “one best formulation”
to achieve democratic legitimacy through some type of integration, conciliation, or
complementarity of the three Traditions. To recapitulate, the reason that dialectical
synthesis is needed is because any combination of the three Traditions ultimately
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fails the test of democratic legitimacy because there is always some degree of sover-
eignty given away to public administrators, to elected representatives, or through
them, to the Constitution and its legal structure. This characteristic will always
be contested because we each challenge the right of any other person or institu-
tion to wield authority over us as sovereign individuals (Ortega Y Gasset 1932).
Therefore, a way must be found to escape this barrier. Rather than trying to tweak
the system to make it more democratic and more effective in pursuing the collective
interest, we must transform the foundational assumptions underneath these failed
approaches to democratic legitimacy.
Barriers to (R)Evolution
The principal barriers to fundamental transformation are both economic and polit-
ical in nature. Indeed, no governmental reform effort will ever be successful “unless
it can be shown to be part of a coherent model of political economy” (Lynn 1996,
24). We are reticent to recommend an alternative political philosophy because it
challenges our economy as well. Instead, we attempt to reconcile our democratic
ideal with our political and economic reality—an inherently questionable endeavor
(Sandel 1988).
While this book has not included analysis of the capitalist market economy
linked to American governance, it is worth mentioning it as a barrier to politi-
cal change. As noted elsewhere (Stout 2010a), market capitalism assumes either a
Hobbesian (1968) or a Lockean (2000) utilitarian human nature that causes self-
interested, atomistic individuals to compete in an effort to maximize their own
benefits while minimizing their own costs, with little or no regard for the impli-
cations to others. The complementary economic theory is based on an assump-
tion of scarcity that necessitates, perpetuates, and increases this competitive spirit.
Paradoxically, through the drive to produce excess capital, consumption of those
resources continues unabated in what is known as the “tragedy of the commons”
unless checked (Hardin 1968). Through these forces, social progress and the wealth
of nations are made (Smith 2000b). Therefore, the market desires a very limited role
for government, one that simply steps in to moderate undesirable market outcomes,
mitigating greed and quelling conflict.
The constitutional order is designed to support this form of economy and is in
a constant state of flux in regard to how much control it will exert over the market.
However, the inequities generated by that system have implications for political
power as well. As noted in the Evergreen Manifesto, “When the world is under-
stood in two separate compartments, one politics and another economics, gross
(economic) inequality can be accommodated with supposed (political) equality and
the achievements of American democracy celebrated. This is what we call partial
democracy” (Adams et al. 1990, 221).
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Thus, Dahl (1998) asserts there is an inherent tension between capitalist mar-
ket economies and democracy. The assumption is that the unequal distribution of
wealth and privilege are hindrances to the desired democratic social state (George
1929). Similarly, Addams suggests industry reveals the tensions between the demo-
cratic ideal and capitalism: “It is in reality a clash between … socialized form and
individualistic ends” (1964, 139). Capitalism hinders the deepening of democracy
beyond polyarchy (rule by the few), causing a thinning of democracy even as it
spreads to more countries through the globalizing economy (Dahl 1998). Therefore,
the late capitalist market is one in which owners of the means of production beyond
labor in large measure control the economic outcomes for all in a manner that
degrades democratic politics.
In response, scholars seek “an antidote to consumption-based (consumer) citi-
zenship and the ever-increasing power of corporations and the inequities of our
current economy” (King and Zanetti 2005, 12). More than government regula-
tion of private allocation is needed because an undemocratized capitalist economy
is under constant threat of insufficient regulation. Fear of both competition for
scarce resources and overregulation by government is actually the source of greed
and corruption (George 1929), which in turn manifest scarcity through excessive
competition (Thayer 1981) and poverty through unequal distributions of wealth
and privilege (George 1929). Thus, attempted government control of markets is a
negative, self-perpetuating spiral. Something must be altered at a more fundamen-
tal level.
An alternative economic philosophy must be developed for a complete theory
of political economy aligned with the Collaborative Tradition. To achieve political
and social justice, we must have sufficient economic justice. To achieve economic
justice, we need an alternative to the capitalist market system protected by a lib-
eral government (Adams et al. 1990; Box 2007, 2008; Catlaw 2006b; McSwite
2006; Ramos 1981; Thayer 1981). The economic theory must include foundational
assumptions about the meaning of individualism, democracy, and markets in terms
of both ideology and its manifestations (McSwite 2007). For congruence with the
Collaborative logic, it would be based on generative principles that replace fear
with love and the trust it engenders; the assumption of scarcity with an expecta-
tion of abundance; self-interest with mutual interest; and dialectical competition/
hierarchy with collaboration. This is indeed revolutionary in nature and will not
easily be adopted by those whom the economy currently serves quite well. As schol-
ars, “we must ‘speak truth to power’ (American Friends Service Committee [AFSC]
1955; Forester 1989; Wildavsky 1979) and advocate for constitutional and eco-
nomic changes that support the practice recommendations we are making” (Stout
2009a, 302).
Politically, we are in a similar position. We remain within a constitutional order
that holds sovereign prerogative within the state because it empowers the very rep-
resentatives and administrators who make up the state and control its laws (Ostrom
1989). Sovereignty represents political power—the power to decide and to act not
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only for oneself but also in a manner that affects others. The sovereign is “above
or superior to all others; chief; greatest; supreme … supreme in power, rank, or
authority … holding the position of ruler; royal; reigning … independent of all
others” (Neufeldt 1996, 1283). When those with authority to act on behalf of the
government are for all intents and purposes the principal authority for the jurisdic-
tion, the jurisdictional members are denied their full sovereignty.
Clearly, this is the meaning of sovereignty that public administration cannot
seem to escape, which is why it is deemed problematic. By establishing a representa-
tive system of government, we have retained symbolic sovereignty within the inde-
pendent individual while imbuing institutions of the state with functional political
authority through the supposedly voluntary will of an abstraction called The People
(Catlaw 2007a). Without going into the details of suffrage over time, through this
system all those who are considered citizens are able to choose their representatives
and temporarily lend their sovereignty to them until the next election. This political
authority is then delegated at least in some part to public administrators, who are
made answerable through various mechanisms. For the citizen, this condition is
similar to when a person accepts employment and in so doing gives away some level
of authority over his or her actions in performance of the job.
This approach relies on the notion that one can take at least part of one’s sover-
eignty and hand it over to another person. This creates a Master/Servant quality to
the relationship between the individual and the state (few Masters, many Servants)
and a relationship among individuals in which no one can take a position of author-
ity (all Masters, no Servants). Neither situation reflects the rhetoric of a unified
yet free and equal People described in our Declaration of Independence. So, the
political challenge confronting us is the same one that has been with us since the
founding of our country: the dialectical tension between the rhetorically sover-
eign individual and a functionally sovereign representative state or, as Orion White
(1990) reframed it, between participation and authority.
In essence, theorists have been struggling to find just the right balance
of Master/Servant to ensure that individuals give away the right amount of
authority to government to get things done without allowing it to run amok.
Constitutionally, government agents are answerable through the complex system
of checks and balances and hierarchical control over accountability to each form of
political power—legislative, judicial, and executive. According to the Discretionary
Tradition, administrators are answerable through various criteria for desired out-
comes—they are responsible when they achieve … (efficiency, effectiveness, equity,
ethical outcomes, etc.). But, according to the Collaborative Tradition, everyone
shares a mutual obligation to one another in which answerability must be open and
ongoing among all concerned. There can never be an unchallengeable decision or
action on the part of anyone within the society.
To enable an egalitarian social process, sovereignty cannot be placed outside the
individual, representation of all types must be challengeable on an ongoing basis,
and permanent authoritative roles based on either expertise or political wisdom
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must be eliminated along with all hierarchical and competitive forms of organiza-
tion. The only authority that can “control” a sovereign participant is the “law of
the situation”—that which participants agree is needed in the particular time and
place to achieve the collective purpose. To move authority into such an egalitarian
process, the institutions that currently hold sovereignty would need to relinquish
it. This is much more than a matter of administrators engaging citizens in delib-
erations or coproduction. It is a matter of becoming mutually answerable among
peers with equal political authority. These characteristics literally wipe the slate
clean from reality as we know it. As McSwite (1997a, 2002) points out, when such
fundamental assumptions are challenged, the stakes are as high as they can possibly
get. Any attempt at such radical cultural transformation will be difficult because it
represents “extremely different fundamental beliefs about the role of government”
(Peters 1992). As such, it is a substantive barrier to evolutionary change.
Nonetheless, it could be argued that this transformation is ontologically neces-
sary. When we try fixing the problem of legitimacy with strategies grounded in a
representative ontology, we may merely be treating the symptoms rather than the
actual illness. Thayer (1981) points out that ancient religions conceived of one’s
connection to the divine source of all biological and social power to be integral to
one’s being. This is an egalitarian conception of related yet unique beings. However,
in seeking social control, contemporary religions moved this divine source outside
oneself, thus creating the first duality of Master/Servant. Cocreation and stew-
ardship theologies synthesize the Master/Servant dialectic with the notion of the
Steward. This role assumes that sovereignty cannot be externalized or exchanged,
even in a voluntary manner, and it is not ultimate in authority because it demands
equivalent responsibility. In Niebuhr’s (1963) terms, because humankind is made in
the image of God and has been given responsibility for Earth, humankind is there-
fore a Maker, but one who still Answers to (1) God as the source of power to create;
(2) all of humankind as cocreators; and (3) in the eyes of many, all of creation as our
shared responsibility. Thus, stewardship demands a high level of responsibility and
discretion, yet never assumes the authority of a sovereign—everyone is simultane-
ously autonomous and answerable.
clear the nature and skills of participating in a social movement” (Stout 2009a,
292). Such skills include “organizing, capacity-building, process facilitation, inter-
personal communication and relationship, effective dialogue and deliberation, and
co-production” (Stout 2009a, 303).
This new role can be conceived of as midwifery at both the small and the
large scale. In specific situations, the midwife helps deliver agreement and collec-
tive action among those impacted by a given issue or decision. As Catlaw (2006c)
notes, public administrators become “good for nothing” in that they merely facili-
tate rather than direct toward a specific goal. Writ large, this role ushers in a new
approach to self-governance among sovereign individuals. In this way, public
administration becomes “a good and no place” (Farmer 2005a, 189). Expertise is
transformed from technical or normative content to facilitation and relationship
skills. Public administration becomes simply a place where “tactical-support” can
be found (Catlaw 2007a, 201).
However, it must be noted that even this transitional role conceptualization is
fraught with challenges. Indeed, emancipatory goals are always difficult to achieve
(Bernstein 1976). First, being “good for nothing” takes away the facilitator’s capac-
ity to be substantively involved as a sovereign and perpetuating the neutrality pro-
scription of personal perspective. Therefore, this role conceptualization is at risk of
simply dressing the Servant in a different mantle. Thus, a specific approach to facili-
tation must be used—one that allows for equal participatory action as a legitimate
role function. It is probably best to look to action theory and critical theory rather
than simply to facilitation technique.
Second, there is a vestige of special status remaining in the transformative and
emancipatory role conception. The function remains at risk of creeping back into
the Master logic of the Discretionary Tradition. For example, public administra-
tors have been conceptualized as transformational social critics who monitor social
and political processes on behalf of the citizens (Catron and Hammond 1990) and
catalysts or transformative agents (King and Zanetti 2005) “bringing about or has-
tening a result” (Neufeldt 1996). Gramsci’s conception of the intellectual provides
a similar metaphor for the administrator as a bridge between state and civil soci-
ety (King and Zanetti 2005). Part of this difficulty is that our language itself is
imbued with Master/Servant assumptions (Stout 2012). It is difficult to imagine
roles beyond this duality. The role label of Steward is intended to indicate the need
for vigilance on this point.
As noted in Chapter 8, the concept of stewardship has suffered from trunca-
tions of meaning in administrative theory. But, in its broader meaning, stewardship
is a connecting concept between public theology and a social perspective on politi-
cal economy (Stackhouse 1987). It is a felt responsibility toward humanity, Earth,
and a shared moral purpose (Hall 1990). Stewardship assumes an attitude of service,
but not servitude. It assumes power with, but not power over. The shared moral
purpose of the community holds the authoritative position, very similar to Follett’s
(1995e) law of the situation and Addam’s (1964) social ethic developed through
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248 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
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250 ◾ Logics of Legitimacy
Summation
After giving long thought to what metaphor might be most appropriate for this
Collaborative governance, the best available seems to be isonomy—egalitarian
arrangement and management. If there is to be a social role in the process of col-
lective action, it must be one that is temporarily taken on by all participants in a
given scenario, reflecting an egalitarian and mutually responsible relationship. Such
a role might be possible in an egalitarian division of society into functions that do
not impart more or less political or moral authority, but rather enable coordinated
action (Ellwood 1918). The term Steward has been chosen to describe this role.
These are terms that carry hope of achieving an ideal that manifests individual sov-
ereignty and equality within the human collective. The Steward carries both rights
and responsibilities and the law of the situation. How these principles form a system
of collaborative governance may be largely unforeseeable to us. However, the deeply
nested and broadly networked federalism proposed by the Collaborative Tradition
is perhaps the best vision we have.
As noted in the Preface, I came to the study of public administration after a
first career in community development. As a community activist, I was skeptical of
the legitimacy of both political representatives and expert administrators. Truth be
told, I came into the field with an aim to transform it. Since then, my exploration
of the field’s literature has been made in constant reflection on practice, always in
search of the theoretical explanations that resonated with experience and with my
community-oriented ethos. It is clear to me now that the Collaborative Tradition is
what works in community building, conflict resolution, egalitarian organizing, and
cross-sector collaborations. Its provisions for a facilitative, coordinating support
function encapsulates just what people need in deliberating and acting together.
Its inclusion of all forms of expertise and knowledge in that process is what makes
coproduction work effectively. Its equal-opportunity role conceptualization inspires
and encourages engagement. Its invitation to cocreate is exciting.
Perhaps what really holds public administration back from embracing this
transformed purpose is that we risk losing differentiation as a field of practice as
well as academic study. We desperately cling to our place in the world as we have
known it, fearing loss of everything. We legitimize this attitude with the notion
that government exists “precisely for the reason that there is a need to have special
persons in society charged with the function of promoting and protecting the pub-
lic interest” (Appleby 1945, 5). We fear the chaos that might ensue should no one
be “minding the store.” But, as philosophers such as Lau Tzu and Nietzsche remind
us, there is great opportunity in chaos. As a potentially emancipatory academic
discipline, we have the opportunity to become a central location for understanding
what it means to be Stewards of the world; how to become effective in collective
visioning, deciding, and acting; and how to live in a manner that is more fully
democratic in all “sectors.” In short, we can lead the way in learning “how to live
together” (Follett 1918/1998, 3).
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Appendix: Foundations
Course Outline
Class 2: What are the various ideations of public administration, and why
are they important to professional socialization?
Read: Introduction to Section I, Chapters 1 and 2
Selected readings
Class 3: Thinking about governance roles: Who should have the final say in
policy decisions? Why do we love to hate government?
Read: Selected readings
View: The Girl in the Café
287
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288 ◾ Appendix: Foundations Course Outline
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Public Administration & Public Policy
K14845
ISBN: 978-1-4665-1161-3
90000
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