P7WEd NOTA BENE “A very good and faithful translatio Joseph J. Koc mans, Pennsylvania State University “A nuanced under- standing of the philo- sophical issues in the text twill be an important event within Heidegger scholarship.” Thomas Sheehan, Loyola University, Chicago “A fine, careful, and exacting translation.” Charles Scott, Pennsylvania State University, MMM 80501 Owe INTRODUCTION TO Pee alo mh DeLeeMARTIN HEIDEGGER Introduction to Metaphysics ‘New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt YALE NOTA BENE Yale University Press New Haven & Londonnay bn aang de Sea by Mar Nenee Veg. Ting, blhedars Ye Now Bene book nso, opp ar by ac Unt ‘Alighscced ‘Tirbok maynot be poi win orn par eager tayfom (hyod tt oping perinedby Secarasy andes cr cS Copygh Law and exepby ero fort pb pen) woe es perm fom epee erinfomazon both nd ote Tle Unieiy Pe pubetons pee contr Sofie ls pence Buope oer alee Designed by Rete Git Sin Galland ype by Kye oe PanalindeUntedsatetaaene bey ofCogre Cali in Peon Da edge Ma togp Pp co Includes bibliographical ferences and index. ISBN o-soo-u8s27-0 (Hardcover: alk. paper) —ISBN 0300-08328 (pbk.) Ee Meuphysic. 1 Tide BDir1 Ha 2000 node sosters “Netalopue econ fortis books aval rom the Beis ibeary \ wetressaa fe : 32797 3 HAZ ‘Translators’ Introduction vii Outline of Introduction to Metaphysics xx Introduction to Metaphysics Prefatory Note xxix ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics ‘On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word “Being” ss CHAPTER THREE ‘The Question ofthe Essence of Being 79‘CHAPTER FouR ‘The Restriction of Being 98 1. Being and Becoming 100 2. Being and Seeming 103 3. Being and Thinking 122 4. Being and the Ought 2r0 German-English Glossary 223, Acknowledgments 246 Index 247 IN 1953, im the preface to the seventh edition of his masterwork, Being and Time, Martin Heidegger suggested that for an elucida- tion of the question of Being raised by this text, “the reader may refer to my Einfubung in die Metaplysit, which is appearing si- ‘multancously with this reprinting”: Heidegger had originally pre- sented this Intreduction to Metaphysics asa lecture course at the Uni- versity of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1935. It attests to the 1. Beng and Tne tas, John Macquarie and Edward Robiason (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 17. The 1953 edition of Eifurang ine Maple ‘vas published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tbingen). Niemeyer has continued {o publish te book, and tha alo been published in the series of Heidegger's collected works a8 Gewmtangyate, vol 40, ed. Pea Jaeger (Fankfare Vie torio Klostermana, 1983). The Gesimcnugabe ection notes the Niemeyer ‘edon’s pagination, and in our translation, we have also noted ths pagina ‘ton for the reader's convenience. Inciting the Introduction to Metapsi, we ‘ill us the abbreviation IM, followed by a page reference according 0 the ‘Niemeyer edition, which will llow the reader 0 fnd the passage in both our ‘ranlton andthe rwo German editions. vivil + Transiators Introduction importance he attached to this work that Heidegger chose this course, from among the dozens of manuscripts of lecture courses hheld over the decades of his teaching caree, as the first to present for general publication, and that he saw fit to present this Intro- duction 28 a companion — indeed, as a rightful heir—to Being and ‘Tims, the book that established him as ore of the preeminent phi- losophers of the twentieth century. Although this text consists of a series of classroom lectures it is composed with great care, Heideg- ‘Ber writes in an intricate, nuanced style. Nearly every paragraph contains a series of plays on words that exploit the sounds and senses of German, and often of Greek, in order to bring us closer to 4 genuine experience of primordial phenomena —Being, truth, and ‘Dasein (human beings insofar as they relat to Being). Inthe English-speaking world, the importance of Introduction to Metaphysics was in par established by the fact that in 1959 it became the first book length work by Heidegger to be translated into En- slish, three years before a translation of Being and Time itself ap- eared.” In effect, the Introduction to Metaplynics introduced Hei- porality of Being:here, Nevertheless, the question about Being as such is misconstrued as coinciding with the question about beings 4s such; this misconstrual thrusts itself upon us above all because the essential provenance of the question about beings as such, and with it the essence of metaphysics, lies in obscurity. This drags into indeterminacy all questioning that concerns Being in any way. ‘The “introduction to metaphysics” atterspted here keeps in view this confused condition of the “question of Being” According to the usual interpretation, the “question of Being” ‘means asking about beings as such (metaphysics). But if we think along the lines of Being and Tim, the “question of Being” means asking about Being as such. This meaning of the expression is also appropriate both in terms of the matter at stake and in terms of language; for the “question of Being” in the sense of the metaphys- Jcal question about beings as such precisely does not ask themat- ically about Being, Being remains forgotten. But this talk of the “oblivion of Being” is just as ambiguous as the expression “question of Being” One protests quite rightfully ‘that metaphysics does indeed ask about the Being of beings, and that therefore it is manifest foolishness to charge metaphysics with an oblivion of Being, ‘Butif we think the question of Being inthe sense of the question, about Being as such, them it becomes clear to everyone who accom panies us in thinking that it is precisely Being as such that remains ‘concealed, remains in oblivion —and so decisively thatthe oblivion of Being, an oblivion that itself fils into oblivion, isthe unrecog- nized yet enduring impulse for metaphysical questioning. fone chooses the designation “metaphysics” for the treatmeiit of the “question of Being” in an indefinite sense, then the title Of this lecture course remains ambiguous. For at frst it seems as The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics + ar though the questioning held itself within the purview of beings as such, whereas already with the first sentence it strives to depart this zone in otder to bring another domain into view with ts questions. ‘The title ofthe course is thus delieracely ambiguous. ‘The fundamental question of the lecture course is ofa different kind than the guiding question of metaphysics. Taking Being and ‘Time as its point of departure, the lecture course asks about the “iclosednes of Being” (Being and Time, pp. 21. and 371). Dis- c. “Erschlossenhit besag: Aufgeschlossent dessen, was dic ‘les Seins verschlieSe und verbirge” This could also mean: “... of what closes Of and conceals the oblivion of Being” 18. Thronghout this passage, Heidegger plays on the connection between, ing, “introduction, and fibre, “to lead” Exymologiclly, Einfubming, "ans “leading ito as do the Latin ots ofthe English intcoduction””22 + The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics also belongs, and even necessarily belongs, to philosophy and has today been lost. Bur the best professioral ability will never replace the authentic strength of seeing and questioning and saying. “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” That is th question. To pronounce the interrogative sentence, even in a ques tioning tone, is not yet to question. We can already sce this in. face that even if we repeat the interrogative sentence several cover and over, this does not necessarily make the questioning tude any livelier; on the contrary, reciting the sentence may wel blunt the questioning. ‘Although the interrogatve sentence thus is not the question an is not questioning, neither should it be taken as a mere form of communication, as if the sentence were only a statem “about” a question. If I say to you, “Why are there beings at instead of nothing?” then the intent of my asking and saying is ‘to communicate to you that a process of questioning is now ‘on inside me. Certainly the spoken interrogative sentence can be taken this way, but then one is precisely not hearing the ques and self questioning, It awakens nothing in the way ofa quest ing attitude, or even a questioning disposition. For this consists in illing-to-know. Willing —thiss not just wishing and trying. ever wishes to know also seems to question; but he does not beyond saying the question, he stops short precisely where ‘question begins. Questioning is willing-to-know. Whoever wil ‘hot lays his whole Dasein into a wil resolute. Resoluteness delays nothing, does not shirk, but acs from the moment and ‘without fail. Open resoluteness is no mere resolution to act; its th cise inception of action that reaches ahead of and through all action. To willis to be resolute. [The essence of willing i back here to open resoluteness. But the essence of open reso ness (Ent-schlasembeit) lies in the de-concealment (Ent-borgenteit) of ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics + 23 hhaman Dasein for the clearing of Being and by no means in an accumulation of energy for “actvity® Cf Betyg and Time $44 and ‘$60. But the relation to Being is letting, That all willing should be grounded in leting strikes the understanding as strange. See the Jecture “On the Essence of Truth? 1930."] But to know means to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the ‘openness of beings. To know is accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings, to stand up to it. Merely to have infor- ‘mation, however wide-ranging it may be, is not to know. Even if this information is focused on what is practically most important through courses of study and examination requirements, itis not knowledge. Even if this information, cut back to the most compel- ling needs, s “lose to life? its possession is not knowledge. One ‘who carries such information around with him and has added afew practical ticks to it will still be ata loss and will necessarily bungle in the face of real reality, which is always diferent from what the philistine understands by closeness to life and closeness to reality. ‘Why? Because he has no knowledge, since to know means tobe able relearn, Ofcourse, everyday understanding believes that one has know!- ‘edge when one needs to learn nothing more, because one has fin- ished learning, No. The only one who knows is the one who un- drstands that he must always learn again, and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought himself to the point ‘where he continually ean lea. This is far harder than possessing information. ‘Being able to learn presupposes being able to question. Ques- ‘doning is the willing to-know that we discussed earlier: the open ‘esoluteness to be able to stand in the openness of beings. Because We are concemed with asking the question that is frst in rank, 19. This essay s avallable in Pashmarts.‘24 + The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics clearly the willing as well a the knowing are of a very special kind. ‘All the less will the sntermygative sentence exhaustively reproduce the question, even if itis genuinely said in a questioning way and heard {in a partnership of questioning. The question that docs indeed resonate in the interrogative sentence, but nevertheless remains closed off and enveloped there, must first be developed. In this ‘way the questioning attitude must clarify and secure itself establish itself through exercise. (Our next task consists in unfolding the question “Why are there. ‘beings at all instead of nothing?” In what direction can we unfold it? To begin with, the question is accessible in the interrogative sentence. The sentence takes a stab, as it were, at the question, ‘Hence its linguistic formulation must be correspondingly broad and loose. Let us consider our interrogative sentence in this respect. cludes: 1) the definite indication of what is put info question, what {is inerrgated; 2) the indication ofthat with regards to which what is interrogated is interrogated —what is asked about. For what is interrogated is indicated unequivocally: namely, beings. What is asked about, what is asked, isthe Why —that is, the ground. What follows inthe imterrogative sentence — “instead of nothing?” —is an cmbellshing flourish; i is ust an appendix that insets itself, a if ‘nits own, for the sake of an initially loose and introductory way of speaking, as an additional turn of phrase that says nothing more | about what is interrogated and what is asked about. In fact, the ‘question is far more unequivocal and decisive wisboue the appended ‘tur of phrase, which just comes from the saperfluiy of imprecise talk. “Why are there beings at all?” But the addition “instead of ‘nothing?” is invalidated not just because we are striving for a pre~ cise formulation of the question, but even more because it says ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics * 25 nothing at all. For what more are we supposed to ask about Noth- ing? Nothing is simply nothing, Questioning has nothing more to seek here. Above all, by bringing up Nothing we do not gain the slightest thing for the knowledge of beings.” ‘Whoever talks about Nothing does not know what he is doing. In speaking about Nothing, he makes it into a something. By speak- ing this way, he speaks against what he means. He contra-dicts himself, But sel contradictory speech is an offense against the fun- damental rule of speech (lage), against “logic” Talking about Noth- {ngs illogical. Whoever talks and thinks illogically is an unscientific person. Now whoever goes so far as to talk about Nothing within philosophy, which after all is the home of logic, deserves all the ‘more to be accused of offending against the fundamental rule of all thinking, Such talk about Nothing consists in utterly senseless propositions. Moreover, whoever takes Nothing seriously takes the side of nullity. He obviously promotes the spirit of negation and serves disintegration, Talking about Nothing is not only completely contrary to thought, but it undermines all culture and all faith. 2. Compare Heinrich Rickert, Di Lap de Prada nd das Probe der Onlpe Hedberg: Carl Winters Univessabachendng) 193,295 (Heidegger's noe; peesen nly nthe Gesamte edition, Ricker wits “th the help ofthe reatine Noting, we at bes reach acne alterna ‘eto the word whose epitemie meaning does not sem to be eset for ®he Being ofthe world. On the one eof thi alemative we have the, te ‘ord that ints tori; onthe ther side, in conta, we have only Nothing asthe noe Being ofthe word, Whit does his alemative tll ws "ards ume of he word? One wll wat to answer simpy: nothing, and ®ething eer han jo nothing! The word remain racy whet wa end ‘hat sf we oppose Nothing to ts not the word? Rickert gocs om 0 “that there ae however, ipoan® logical poins o be explored rear te concepeof Nothing Heconcides his bok (226-236) with an anal "SSof Heidegger “Whats Meaphyscs?”in which he denis Fieger’ ; Nothing” with “the Ozher ofthe knowable world” (229). In Rickert’ read ing of Ncidegger, “the Nothing is the something for which we Ise no predicates” (ay)26 + The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics ‘Whatever both disregards the fundamental law of thinking and: destroys faith and the will to construct is pure nihilism. Given such considerations, we will do well to strike from interrogative sentence the superfluous turn of phrase “instead ‘nothing? and restrict the sentence to the simple and precise “Why are there beings at all?” Nothing would stand in the way of this, if. ifn the fo tion of our question, if in the asking of this question altogether, hhad as much license as it may have seemed up to now. But in the question we stand within a tradition. For philosophy has stantly and always asked about the ground of beings. With th question it had its inception, in this question it will find its end provided that it comes to an end in greatness and not in a powedle decline. The question about what is not and about Nothing. gone side by side with the question of what is, since its ‘But it does not do so superficially, as an accompanying ‘non; instead, the question about Nothing takes shape in dance with the breadth, depth, and originality with which the ques tion about beings is asked on each occasion, and conversely ‘manner of asking about Nothing can serve as a gauge and a cr rion for the manner of asking about beings. If we think about this, then the interrogative sentence pro nounced at the start, “Why are there beings at all instead of ‘ng?” appears far more suitable to express the question about beings than the abbreviated version after all. Our introduction of about Nothing here isnot a careless and overly enthusiastic ‘of speaking, nor our own invention, but merely strict respect for originary tradition regarding the sense ofthe fundamental ques Stil, this talk of Nothing remains contrary to thought in «ral, and leads to disintegration in particular. But what if both ‘concern for the proper respect for the fundamental rules of thinkin as well as the fear of nihilism, which would both lke to ad ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics + 27 against talk of Nothing, rested on a misunderstanding? This is in {act the case. OF course, the misunderstanding that is being played. cout here is not accidental. Its ground isa lack of understanding that has long ruled the question about beings. But this lack of under- standing stems from an oivon of Being that is getting increasingly rigid. For it cannot be decided so readily whether logic and its funda- mental rules can provide any measure forthe question about beings assuch, Itcould be the other way around, that the whole logic that ‘we know and that we treat ikea gift from heaven is grounded in a very definite answer to the question about beings, and that conse- «quently any thinking that simply follows the laws of thought of ‘stablished logic is intrinsically incapable of even beginning to un- derstand the question about beings, much ess of actually unfolding itand leading it toward an answer. In truth, i is only an illasion of ‘igor and scientificity when one appeals to the principle of contra- diction, and to logic in general, in order to prove that all thinking and talk about Nothing is contradictory and therefore senseless. “Logic” is then taken as a tribunal, secure for all eternity, and ic {Boes without saying that no rational human being will call into doubt its authority as the first and last court of appeal. Whoever Speaks against logic is suspected, implicitly or explicitly, of arbitrari- ess, This mere suspicion already counts as an argument and an ‘objection, and one takes oneself to be exempted from further, au- ‘thentic reflection. One cannot, in fact, tak about and deal with Nothing as if it \erea thing, such asthe rain out there, oa mountain, orany object ‘tall Nothing remains in principle inaccessible to all science. Who- ver truly want to talk of Nothing must necessarily become unsci- ‘ntific, But this is a great misfortune only if one believes that scien- ‘ic thinking alone is the authentic, rigorous thinking, that it alone ‘an and must be made the measure even of philosophical thinking,28 + The Fundamental Question of Metphysis But the reverse is the case. All scientific thinking is just a deri and rigidified form of philosophical thinking. Philosophy arises from or through science. Philosophy can never belong to th ‘same order as the sciences. It belongs to a higher order, and not} “logically? as it were, or in a table of the system of sciences. phy stands in a completely different domain and rank of spi Dasein. Only poetry is of the same order as philosophical thin ing, although thinking and poetry are not identical. Talking ‘Nothing remains forever an abomination and an absurdity for sei cence. But aside from the philosopher, the poet can also talk ‘Nothing —and not because the procedure of poetry, in the opinioy of everyday understanding, is less rigorous, but because, in com parison to all mere science, an essential superiority of the spi holds sway in poetry (only genuine and great poetry is mean Because ofthis superiority, the poet always speaks as if beings expressed and addressed for the first time. In the poetry of the po and in the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much space to spare that each and every thing—a tree, a mountain, house, the call of a bird—completely loses its indifference familiarity. True talk of Nothing always remains unfamiliar. Tt does allow itself to be made common. It dissolves, to be sure, if on places it in the cheap acid of a merely logical cleverness. This is ‘we cannot begin to speak about Nothing immediately, as we can describing a picture, for example. But the possibility of such: about Nothing can be indicated. Consider a passage from one the atest works of the poet Knut Hamsun, he Koad Leads On, 19 translation, p. 464. The work belongs together with The Way and August" The Road Leads On depicts the last years and the en ax. Heidegger refers to thee novels by the tides oftheir German ‘Hamsun’ “August” tilogy begins with Landaryiee (1927), translated ‘The Fundamental Question of Meaphytics * 29 of this man August, who embodies the uprooted, universal know- how of today’s humanity, but in the form of a Dasein that cannot lose its ties to the unfamiliar, because in its despairing powerless- ness it remains genuine and superior. In his last days, this August is alone in the high mountains. The poet says: “He sits here between his ears and hears true emptiness. Quite amusing, a fancy. On the ‘ocean (earlier, August often went to sea)* something stirred (at least), and there, there was a soxind, something audible, a water chorus. Here— nothing meets nothing and is not there, there is not «ven a hole, One can only shake one’s head in resignation?” So there is, after all, something peculiar about Nothing. Thus ‘we want to take up our interrogative sentence again and question through i, and see whether this “instead of nothing?” simply repre- sents a turn of phrase that says nothing and i arbitrarily appended, ‘or whether even in the preliminary expression of the question ithas an essential sens. ‘To this end, let us stick at first to the abbreviated, apparently simpler and supposedly more rigorous question: “Why are there beings a all?” If we ask in this way, we star out from beings. They are, They are given to us, they are infront of us and can thus be German as Landarechr by J.Sandmeier and S. Ungermana (Munich: Albet angen, 1928); Heidegger incorrectly calls the novel Der Landarec inthe Sigal The mos recent English ransation is Wayfarens by JW. MeFalane (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 19). The second novel is Ange (2930), translated as Agua Welewmoglerby J. Sandmeier and S. Ungermann (Munich: Alber Langen, 1930) and as August by Eugene Gay-Tit (New York: CowardAlcCann, 1931). The conchision ofthe logy, Men Live Taser (1933), was wansated as Nac jor wd Tag by J. Sandmeier and S. Unger ‘ann (Munich: Albert Langen/Georg Miller, 1934) and 38 The Road Leads (On by Eugene Gay Tt (New York: Coward McCann, 1934); the pasige in ‘question appears on p. 508 ofthe Gay Tift ranslation. We have translated it hee from the German. 22, This and the following parenthetical interpolation are by Heidegger. He also inserts the dash afte “here at the bepining ofthe next sentence.[23] 30 + The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics ‘toward a ground. Such a method just broadens and enlarges, a it ‘were, a procedure that is practiced every day. Somewhere in vineyard, for example, an infestation turns up, something pputably present at hand. One asks: where does this come fi Where and what is its ground? Similarly, asa whole, beings present at hand. One asks: where and what i the ground? This ‘of questioning is represented in the simple formula: Why are t beings? Where and what is their ground? Tacitly one is asking aft to beings as a whole and as such, ‘But now if we ask the question in the form of our initial inte rogative sentence —“Why are there beings at all instead of n ing?—then the addition prevents us, in our questioning, beginning directly with beings as unquestionably given, and having, hardly begun, already moving on to the ground we are ‘which is also in being. Instead, these beings are held out in a ques tioning manner into the possiblity of not-Being. In this way, th ‘Why gains a completely different power and urgency of questi ing. Why are beings tom from the possibility ofnot Being? Why they not fall back into it constantly with no further ado? Beings ‘now no longer what just happens to be present at hand: they begin to waver, regardless of whether we know beings with all certainty, regardless of whether we grasp them in their full scope or not, | From now on, beings as such waver, insofar as we put them into be shown with the infinitive of that Greek word whose question- ableness is the occasion for our discussion. “To be” is einai in Greek. ‘We know that a standardized language unfolds from the speech of Is]