Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Cebu City

EIGHTEENTH (18th) DIVISION

JONAS CABALUNA Y ASIDERA CA-G.R. SP No. 13282

alias “NAS”,
Members:
INGLES, G. T., Chairperson,
Petitioner,
MONTEJO-GONZAGA, D.P. ,
CORPIN, JR., B.G., JJ.
- versus -

HON. PRESIDING JUDGE

LOLITA R. MERCADO OF RTC, Promulgated: April 23, 2021
Branch 34, Tacloban City, 8th
Judicial Region and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

DECISION

MONTEJO-GONZAGA, J.:

The Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 filed before this Court
seeks to set aside the following:

1 Rollo, pp. 3-23.

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1. Order2 dated April 8, 2019, which denied the

petitioner's Motion for Plea Bargaining; and
2. Order3 dated September 16, 2019, which denied
the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The assailed Order4 reads, thus:

“ When this case was called for the re-taking of

the testimony of the first prosecution's witness,
accused who is a detained prisoner was in Court.

Be it noted that on September 28, 2018, a Joint

Motion to Allow Accused to Plea Bargain was filed by
accused thru counsel, however, considering the
issuance of NOTICE dated October 16, 2018 by the
Supreme Court, the same can no longer be acted upon
by this Court as the same is prohibited as herein case
was filed before June 27, 2018, the Plea Bargaining
Framework of the Supreme Court being a procedural
matter, hence no retroactive effect and the herein
Motion is hereby DENIED.

Continue the re-taking of the direct testimony

of the first prosecution's witness on September 16,
2019 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

Issue subpoena to PDEA Agent Reymund

Gidal of the PDEA Regional Office 8, Candahug,
Palo, Leyte for him to appear and testify before this
Court on the next scheduled hearing. FAIL NOT
UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

Issue another subpoena to IO1 Ryan Galindo of

the PDEA Regional Office 8, Candahug, Palo, Leyte
for him to appear and testify before this Court on the
next scheduled hearing. FAIL NOT UNDER
PENALTY OF LAW.

xxx

No postponement shall be allowed.

2 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Lolita R. Mercado, Id., p.33.

3 Id., p. 40
4 Supra. Note 2.
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SO ORDERED. “

THE ANTECEDENTS

Petitioner Jonas Cabaluna y Asidera alias “Nas” (Cabaluna)

was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
9165 (R.A. 9165)5 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

Criminal Case No. 2013-01-31

“ That on or about the 1 st day of October 2012,
in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without any lawful authority did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver or distribute one (1) piece medium heat
sealed plastic sachet containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride locally known as shabu weighing
0.041 gram, to Intelligence Officer 1 Ryan F. Galindo,
a member of PDEA, for one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) a dangerous drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”6

Further, petitioner Cabaluna was also charged by the Office of

the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with a violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 91657. The Information contained the following
averments:

5 Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions. xxx
6 Id., p. 27.
7 SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxx
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Criminal Case No. 2013-01-33

“That on or about the 1st day of October , 2012,

in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any lawful authority did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and control one (1) heatsealed [sic] plastic
sachet containing 0.028 gram methamphetamine
hydrochloride locally known as shabu, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”8

On September 28, 2018, before the re-taking of the testimony of

the first prosecution witness, the petitioner filed a Joint Motion to
Allow Accused to Plea Bargain.9 The petitioner proposed to plead guilty
to the lesser offense of a violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165
from the original charge of violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A.9165. Likewise, he also proposed to plead guilty to a violation of
Section 12, instead of Section 11 of Article II of R.A. 9165.

However, respondent judge denied the Joint Motion and cited

that the NOTICE dated October 16, 2018 of the Supreme Court, the
Joint Motion can no longer be acted upon by the RTC because the
subject case was filed before June 27, 2018. Further, the court a quo
ruled that the plea bargaining framework of the Supreme Court,
being procedural, has no retroactive effect.

Herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10on April 11,

2019 which was denied by the public respondent in an Order11 dated
September 16, 2019.

8 Id., p. 28.
9 Id., pp. 29-32.
10 Rollo, pp. 34-39.
11 Supra. Note 3.
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Not satisfied by the adverse Orders of the lower court,

petitioner now seeks recourse before Us via the instant Petition for
Certiorari.

ISSUES

In seeking a reversal of the appealed Order, petitioner assigns

the following errors :

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE
OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE
II, R.A. NO. 9165 FROM THE ORIGINAL
CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE II, R.A. NO. 9165;
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE
OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE
II, R.A. NO. 9165 FROM THE ORIGINAL
CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11,
ARTICLE II, R.A. NO. 9165;12

12 Id., p. 9.
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THIS COURT'S RULING

The Petition is impressed with merit.

There is Grave Abuse

of Discretion

In Pascua v People13, grave abuse of discretion connotes a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law. Verily, case law instructs that
there is grave abuse of discretion when an act: (a) is done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias;
or (b) manifestly disregards basic rules or procedures.

With the above considerations in place, We find that the court a

quo committed an error in denying the plea bargaining Joint Motion of
the petitioner.

This Court rules that the public respondent clearly

misinterpreted the SC En Banc Resolution dated October 16, 2018
which states:

Please take notice that the Court en banc

issued a Resolution dated OCTOBER 16, 2018 which
reads as follows:

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC (Re: Letter of Associate

Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea
Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippines
Judges Association). Plea bargaining is generally
allowed during the arraignment and pre-trial, or
before the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution. There is, however, an exception where
plea bargaining may take place even when the
13 G.R. No. 250578, September 7, 2020.
CA-GR SP No. 13282 Page 7 of 14
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prosecution has already rested its case. This

exception will only apply when at the time of the
prosecution has rested its case, or even before it
rests its case, the crime to which the accused
pleads is for a lesser offense proven during the
trial, which is necessarily included in the crime
charged in the Information. For example, if the
accused is charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide, and what was proven during the trial
is attempted homicide, the accused can plead
guilty to the latter offense. It is only in this
instance that plea for a lesser offense may be
allowed. Considering that the circumstances in
the letter request do not fall under this
exception, then the same must be denied.
Besides, plea bargaining is merely procedural,
hence, it has no retroactive effect on those who
are already convicted by final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Request to Allow Plea

Bargaining for Individuals Charged and Accused of
Violation of R.A. No. 9165 Prior to the Case of
Salvador Estipona v. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo. Dated
June 27, 2017 is DENIED.

From the above-mentioned Resolution, it is noted that the non-

retroactive application of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC refers only to those
accused who have already been convicted by final judgment.
Further, the Resolution also does not prescribe for a period in time
when plea bargaining in drugs cases may only be allowed in
particular.

Plea-bargaining in
Criminal Cases

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a

process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
CA-GR SP No. 13282 Page 8 of 14
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bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution

and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 14
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules
on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.15

The Supreme Court, in Tan, Jr. v. CA,16 thoroughly explained

the retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz:

The general rule that statutes are prospective

and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive
law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates
a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes
or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes." The general rule against giving
statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested
rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away
vested rights. A new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively applicable to all
actions — those which have accrued or are
pending.

14 Salvador v Estipona, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017.

15 Supra.
16 G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.|
CA-GR SP No. 13282 Page 9 of 14
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Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts

will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."

The plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, being

procedural in nature, can be given retroactive effect on the
petitioner's criminal cases which are still pending before the court a
quo. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge when she denied the petitioner's Joint Motion to
plea bargain on the sole ground that plea bargaining in drugs cases
cannot be allowed in cases filed prior to June 27, 2018.

Plea-bargaining in
Drug Cases

The State is the offended party in drug cases simply because

“[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.” 17
Accordingly, “the consent of the offended party [in a plea bargain],
i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in
behalf of the government.” 18

17 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5.

18 Rules of Court, Rule 116, Section 2.
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To emphasize, there is no offended party in drug cases. Instead,

the State as the “guardian of the rights of the people,” is the offended
party. 19 The “pernicious effect [of dangerous drugs] is felt not only
by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result,
society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is
the ultimate victim of the drug menace.” 20

Notably, Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court uses the word
may which implies that the trial court exercises discretion on whether
it will allow the plea bargain. 21 Still, courts are “exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.” 22 In addition, the
trial court’s exercise of discretion should neither be arbitrary nor
should it be capricious and whimsical. 23

It is also crucial to note that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of

Court, also uses the word allowed which indicates that the trial
court’s exercise of discretion only operates after the offended party
and prosecutor express their consent to the plea bargain; hence, it is
the plea-bargaining agreement that is subject to the court’s approval. In
other words, the trial court acts upon a plea bargain that has the
prior consent from the offended party and the prosecutor. Sans
consent, there is no plea bargaining that is made subject to the court’s
approval.

When Accused Can

Plea-bargain

The Supreme Court in Estipona v Lobrigo24, struck down

Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, which prohibits plea bargaining in drug cases, for
violating the constitutionally conferred power of the Supreme Court
to issue rules of pleading, practice and procedure. Consequently, the
19 People v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992.
20 Id.
21 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, citing People v. Besonia, 266 Phil.
822 (2004).
22 Id., citing People v. Judge Kayanan, 172 Phil. 728 (1978).
23 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008.
24 Supra. Note 14.
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Supreme Court issued Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC to

provide guidelines to courts for plea-bargaining agreements in drug
cases. Furthermore, the Highest Tribunal held that plea bargaining is
a rule of procedure and is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-
trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its
case.

The prosecution, in its Comment25 to the Petition for Certiorari,

argued that while public respondent misinterpreted A.M. No. 18-03-
26-SC, the denial of the Motion was still proper as the stage in which
the petitioner filed his Motion was at the stage where plea-bargaining
is not allowed.

However, in Daan v Sandiganbayan26, the Highest Court made

additional pronouncements on when an accused may plea bargain, to
wit:

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the

pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea
bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference,viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all

criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;

25 Id., pp. 62-73.

26 Supra. Note 21.
CA-GR SP No. 13282 Page 12 of 14
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(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of

evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the
accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or

admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by
the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused. The agreements covering
the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall
be approved by the court.
But it may also be made during the trial proper and
even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has
held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was
not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses. (Emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding, as can be gleaned from the assailed Order,

the denial of the respondent judge was based solely on the non-
retroactivity of the Supreme Court's plea bargaining framework.

This Court notes that the records do not show that the
prosecutor filed a comment to the petitioner's Joint Motion to Plea
Bargain. Sans any Comment from the Prosecution, there is no plea
bargaining that is to be made subject to the public respondent's
approval.

Considering that the denial of the Joint Motion was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, We grant the petitioner's prayer for the
respondent judge to halt further proceedings, pending the
prosecutor's comment on the petitioner's Joint Motion to plea bargain,
if appropriate.
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for

Certiorari is GRANTED. The Order dated April 8, 2019, and the
Order27 dated September 16, 2019 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 34, in Criminal Case Nos.
2013-01-31 and 2013-01-33 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to take the appropriate

steps to determine whether the petitioner's plea bargaining proposal
in the criminal cases should be granted or denied, after affording the
prosecution the opportunity to evaluate or assess the same.

SO ORDERED.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
DOROTHY P. MONTEJO-GONZAGA
Associate Justice

27 Id., p. 40
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WE CONCUR:

ORIGINAL SIGNED ORIGINAL SIGNED

GABRIEL T. INGLES BAUTISTA GLER CORPIN, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
GABRIEL T. INGLES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Eighteenth Division

Original sign