Arturo M.

De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)

G.R No. 191149, March17,2010. 618 SCRA 639

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members
of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16
refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.