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Various Proposals On
The Resolution Of
Kashmir Issue
Submitted to:
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 Introduction:
This paper examines the current state of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India.
Kashmir remains the longest-running and most contentious unresolved issue between India and
Pakistan. The Kashmir issue has remained a thorn in the side of both countries since the
partition of British India. While the dispute has been relegated to the back burner by the United
States and deemed unsolvable, it could be resolved if the United States invested the resources
and energy required. Both countries would have to agree to postpone final resolution of the
status of Kashmir, while demobilizing armed forces, ending terrorism, establishing a credible
human rights regime, and opening the Line of Control to enable free contact by Kashmiris.

In a 1999 bilateral effort to address this issue, Prime Minister Vajpayee accepted Prime Minister
Sharif’s invitation and traveled to Pakistan on February 20, on the inaugural run of the first
passenger bus service between Delhi and Lahore since independence. The two leaders then
hammered out the details of three documents designed to turn their countries toward greater
cooperation. To sustain the process begun in Lahore, Prime Minister Sharif accepted Prime
Minister Vajpayee’s invitation for a return visit to India. The two countries also agreed that their
foreign ministers would meet periodically in addition to regular rounds of foreign secretary-
level talks. The subsequent hostilities at Kargil torpedoed these efforts, which have not yet
been revived.

 Basic Proposals:

They can be divided into two general categories:

a) Those calling for the permanent division of Kashmir, usually along the current line of
control.
b) Those calling for the reunification of Kashmir, followed by its independence or
permanent absorption into India or Pakistan.

For example,
The Track II proposal and a proposal put forward by the Track III
 Would reunite the divided state.
And a proposal put forward by Jammu and Kashmir State Autonomy Committee (Track I)
 Would permanently divide it.

These absolutist approaches are too intimidating to both governments. A “middle way” may be
required to get recalcitrant India and Pakistan to move off of square one. However rather than
attempting to devise a proposal from scratch, it would be better to examine a peace proposal
that has already brought a measure of peace to an area with a seemingly intractable dispute
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bearing many similarities to that of Kashmir. For example the Northern Ireland Peace
settlement, meets a number of these criteria. It succeeded in jump-starting a stalled peace
process, and provides a ready example of how a protracted and bitter internecine dispute can
be set on the way to resolution through international mediation.

 Track I - The J & K Government Initiative:

On April 13, 1999, the State Autonomy Committee of the government of Jammu
and Kashmir released its report. It outlines how Kashmir’s long-denied autonomy could
be restored. In late April Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah stated publicly that in
his view the issue could be permanently resolved if the Indian government adopted this
autonomy proposal and India and Pakistan agreed to convert the current line of control
(LOC) into the international border. He further stated that Pakistan should renounce all
claims to the territory encompassed by the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. In
return, he hinted that India, in the interests of peace, might be convinced to drop all
claims to Kashmiri territory now controlled by Pakistan.

 The Track II Proposal:

Track II advocates a group of prominent Indians and Pakistanis, including Kashmiris from both
sides of the LOC. Although it would presumably include retired government diplomatic and
military personnel, it would have no governmental association. The group would conduct a new
study/discussion of the problem, and likely concur with Abdullah that the only viable solution is
to make the LOC the international border. The group would then urge the governments of India
and Pakistan to open talks aimed at realizing this objective. The Track II proposal, does not
envision reuniting Kashmir. It also tracks closely with the already expressed wishes of Farooq
and
many both within and outside the Indian government. The Pakistan government has
flatly rejected all such proposals in the past, sticking to its insistence that the Kashmir
dispute be resolved through international mediation and an internationally supervised
plebiscite. Farooq would like to see the governments of India and Pakistan open bilateral
negotiations based on his government’s proposal.

 Plusses and Minuses:

The position of the Indian government regarding a negotiated settlement remains
murky. The Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress manifesto calls for the creation of a united
India
(Akhand Bharat) which incorporates all of Kashmir. Both parties have repeatedly stated that
not only the area currently incorporated into Pakistan’s “Azad Kashmir”, but all of the
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Northern Areas as well, belong to India. Despite this, few outside the parties seriously
entertain any prospect of recovering “Azad Kashmir” and the Northern Areas and
integrating them into the Indian Union. Pakistan, driven by its internal dynamic, and the
concept of jihad which Islamic militant groups adopted to describe the fighting in Kashmir,
would have
considerable difficulty backtracking on its previous positions. Both governments have
largely ignored Track II efforts in the past, and there is no indication they would treat a
new one any differently. This said, there is no reason why India and Pakistan in a postwar
scenario, should not sit down together for serious talks on the Kashmir dispute, India seems to
be losing ground, and the dramatic events associated with the war on terrorism may compel
India to look at Pakistan’s repeated insistence on the need for some form of international
mediation in a new light, and it may grow much closer to accepting international mediation.

 The Track III Proposal:

The proposal recommends that:
 “A portion” of Jammu and Kashmir be reunited as a “sovereign entity”.
Guaranteed by India, Pakistan and “international bodies” with its own citizenship,
passport, and legislature.
 India and Pakistan would be responsible for foreign relations and defense.
 Those areas of Jammu and Kashmir that join the new entity would be determined
through an internationally supervised plebiscite.
 The new mini-state would be given free access to India and Pakistan.
 It would have a secular, democratic constitution.
 All Pakistani and Indian forces would be withdrawn and internal security
provided by a Kashmiri police force.
 Displaced persons, including Kashmiri Pundits (Hindus), would be invited to
return.

 Problems:
This proposal contains an underlying assumption that the Muslim majority areas of Azad
Kashmir, and the Valley of Kashmir, would join the new entity. Jammu and Ladakh (Hindu and
Buddhist) would opt to remain permanently in India, while the Northern Areas (Muslim, but not
Kashmiri) would opt to remain permanently in Pakistan.

The insistence on a secular Kashmir would not long survive under such an arrangement.
Pakistan and the Muslim parties opting to join the state would insist that it be openly Islamic.
Likewise, there is almost no prospect that Hindus, Buddhist, and Sikhs would play any role in
the new mini-state. This would touch off a major relocation of these communities to India. The
Kashmiri Pundits would never return to an Islamic Kashmir and would demand resettlement
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within India. Many Indians would also likely object to this proposal, arguing that carving out the
last remaining Muslim majority area is an admission of failure of the secular state, and places
the Muslim community within India in an awkward position. Few in Pakistan would publicly
support a proposal calling for Kashmiri independence, even if thinly disguised by an
“association” with Pakistan.

 Track IV Proposal:

This plan, first suggested in the 1960s, would see Kashmir divided along the line of the River
Chenab. This would give the vast majority of land to Pakistan and, as such, a clear victory in its
longstanding dispute with India. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population would be
brought within Pakistan's borders, as well as the majority Muslim areas of Jammu.

 The Northern Ireland Proposal:

There are a number of striking parallels between the situation in Northern Ireland
and that in Kashmir.
 Northern Ireland, like Kashmir, is part of a divided state, straddling two countries
that claim it.
 In both instances, members of a religious community, which claims it has been
denied basic civil rights, want to join with a neighboring country of the same
religion.
 The minority religious community wants to maintain the status quo and remain
part of the country in which they are a majority.
 Insurgents seek sanctuary in the neighboring country, where they are supported by
co-religionists.
 Pro and anti-government paramilitaries battle each other.
 The “rebels” have a military wing and a political wing and maintain a polite
fiction that they are not mutually supportive.
 There is implacable hatred between the various groups and communities, and between
the “rebels” and the government.
For decades, the consensus was that the dispute in Northern Ireland would never
be resolved. Despite the nay sayers, a settlement was adopted on April 10, 1998
following protracted negotiations involving all parties and mediated by former Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell. On May 22, 1998 voters in Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland approved the accord, and elections to a new Northern Ireland
Assembly took place on June 25. The basis of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement was
concessions by both the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
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 Applicable Clauses:
Because of the similarities in the two cases, a number of clauses in the Northern Ireland Peace
Agreement can be adopted in the case of Kashmir, with little or no modification. This would
make the negotiation process much simpler, as the essential elements would already be laid
out. Such clauses, taken verbatim from the Agreement, demonstrate how the Northern Ireland
Peace Agreement could be directly applicable to the situation in Kashmir. I have taken
individual clauses of the agreement and substituted the words India, and Pakistan, and Kashmir,
for UK, Ireland, and Northern Ireland. I would argue that the governments of India and
Pakistan in future negotiations to settle the dispute could potentially adopt sections of this
agreement verbatim.
 Constitutional Issues – “Change in the status of Kashmir can only come about
with the consent of a majority of its people. Both the governments of India and Pakistan have a
binding obligation to bring about whatever the wish of the
people is.” All claims by India and Pakistan to “jurisdiction over all of Kashmir is to be repealed.”
 Democratic Institutions – “The accord provides for an Assembly with executive and
legislative powers. All Ministers must affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office, which includes a
commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means.”
 Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity – “The incorporation of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights into Kashmir law will be completed. A new Kashmir
Human Rights Commission will be established. The Pakistani and Indian governments will take
comparable steps to strengthen human rights protection.”
 Decommissioning-- “All parties are committed to work with the Decommissioning
Commission for total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations within two years. The Indian
government is committed to reducing the numbers and role of the security forces.
 Policing, Justice, and Prisoners – “Kashmir would establish an independent commission
to make recommendations for future policing arrangements for the state by a set date. The
Indian government would pledge to carry out a review of the Kashmir criminal justice system.
Both India and Pakistan would “put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated program
of prisoner releases with the intention of releasing all qualifying prisoners within
two years.”
 India and Pakistan’s Post-Agreement Economic Strategy would include: an Investment
Fund of an agreed amount “concentrating on capital investment in roads, education, housing
and other infrastructure projects. An employment and Skills Fund to provide additional
opportunities for Kashmir’s long-term unemployed – an Enterprise Fund funding a new
provision that every rupee invested in plant and machinery in Kashmir in the coming four years
will be completely tax deductible.”
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 Kashmir Specific Provisions:

The Government of India, unlike that of the UK in the case of Northern Ireland, has long
declared that the status of Kashmir is non-negotiable, that there is no scope for multilateral
talks or international mediation, and that a referendum/plebiscite is out of the question. For
the Irish model to succeed, India may have to give ground on all these points. Pakistan has long
claimed that international mediation is absolutely essential for a resolution of the dispute. If
bilateral talks fail to progress, India would have to come around to the same position in order
to get the process moving. This does not imply that the U.S. should play this role. Any mutually
agreed mediator, whether a nation state, the UN, or a personality such as Nelson Mandela,
could play that role.

While recognizing that an internationally administered referendum on the status of Kashmir is

the ultimate goal of the process, it could be deferred for a set time period, for example 20
years. The insurgents and pro-government paramilitaries would sign a cease-fire to remain in
effect throughout the period. The cease-fire would be followed by a timetable for disarmament
of all combatants. Both India and Pakistan would agree not to support insurgency and accept
international inspection to verify the absence of training camps and infiltration.

All parties would agree to use the “time out” period to negotiate the final status of Kashmir.
During this period, the Indian State of Kashmir would remain autonomous within the Indian
Union. Azad Kashmir would remain autonomous within Pakistan, and cooperation between the
two entities on a variety of common interests would be vastly increased. All options would be
considered, including the possibility of joining with Pakistan or independence. India would
agree to allow the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to participate in the talks, the political
process and the administration of the state. The APHC would agree to represent the disarmed
militants and guarantee their continued good behavior. Both countries would open talks to set
a schedule for withdrawal of their armed forces, first from the line of control, and then from all
of Kashmir. The LOC would be reduced to little more than a district boundary, manned by a
joint Kashmiri police force. It would be open to commerce and family visitation. All Kashmiris
would be issued identity cards allowing them to travel anywhere in Kashmir at will.
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 Finally Seven Scenarios In The Light Of The Above

Proposals:

 Scenario 1

The status quo

India would like to formalize this status quo and make the Line of Control - the accepted
international boundary.
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 Scenario 2

Kashmir joins Pakistan

Pakistan has consistently favoured this as the best solution to the dispute.
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 Scenario 3

Kashmir joins India

Such a solution would be unlikely to bring stability to the region as the Muslim
inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir, have never shown any desire
to become part of India.
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 Scenario 4

Independent Kashmir

The difficulty of adopting this as a potential solution is that it requires India and Pakistan
to give up territory, which they are not willing to do.
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 Scenario 5

A smaller independent Kashmir

An independent Kashmir could be created from the Kashmir Valley - currently under Indian
administration - and the narrow strip of land which Pakistan calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

 Scenario 6
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Independent Kashmir Valley

 Scenario 7

The Chenab formula

 Conclusion:
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The events of September 11 and the war on terrorism have changed foreign policy parameters
on a number of issues, including India/Pakistan relations and the Kashmir dispute. India and
Pakistan could emerge from the war having worked together as allies perhaps will learn to look
at their relationship in a new light. This in turn might result in the long snubbed demands of
poor Kashmiris to be listened and perhaps solved. My proposals are the main ways which both
India and Pakistan can adopt to solve the dispute for good.

 References:
i New York Times (New York) October 17, 2001

ii 1947-1997 The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting Paths to Peace: The Kashmir Study Group,
1997

iii Yasmeen, Samina, and Aabha Dixit, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: The Henry L.
Stimson
Center, 1995

iv Report of the State Autonomy Committee: The Government of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, April 13,1999

v 1947-1997 The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty

vi The Northern Ireland Political Agreement: The Government of the United Kingdom, April 10,
1998

vii http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/kashmir/kashmir.html

viii www.google.com