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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS TOPIC

67. RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. B.M. No. 139
Beltran, JR. v. Abad
DATE: March 28, 1983
PONENTE: ABAD SANTOS, J:
DOCTRINE
FACTS

Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., charged Mr. Elmo Abad of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. Mr. Abad could not deny and had to admi
the practice. He gave the following explanation:

· paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00

· paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00

· paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

· on July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included the
respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request
dated July 23, 1979

· while waiting for his turn to take his Oath as a member of the Bar, he was made to sign the Lawyer's Oath by
one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant as he was called by the Chief Justice informing him that he
must answer to Mr. Jorge Uy’s Reply to his answer in Mr. Jorge Uy’s complaint, hence his oath taking was further
suspended,

· Believing that with his signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and his Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased)
Answer,the Honorable Supreme Court did not order for the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing,

· He was also included in the list of Qualified Voters in the Quezon City Chapter of the IBP.

ISSUE/S

WON Abad is guilty of contempt of court when he practiced law without his lawyer’s oath being administered and
without his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING

The Court Ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated
do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The proven charge
against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.) WHEREFORE, Mr.
Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice
failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

[SURNAME, FIRST NAME]

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS Duty to the Profession
68. Leda v. Tabang G.R. NO.
DATE
PONENTE
DOCTRINE
FACTS
1. Complainant Evangeline Leda assails Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character. She filed against him
Bar Matter No. 78 and the present petition for disbarment, Administrative Case No. 2505.
2. Leda and Tabang contracted marriage on October 3, 1976 in Iloilo. The marriage was performed under
Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character. The parties agreed to keep the marriage a secret
until respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977) and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981),
allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Leda admits they had not lived together as husband and wife.
3. Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that
he was “single.”
4. First Complaint: Leda blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting B.M. No. 78, claiming that Tabang
fraudulently filled out his application, thus showing lack of good moral character. She also alleged that after
Tabang’s law studies, he became aloof and abandoned her.
5. The Court required Tabang to answer. He admitted that he was “legally married” to Leda but that the
marriage was not yet declared public. He also said he and Leda had reconciled and he prayed for the
complaint to be dismissed. The Court dismissed B.M. No. 75 and allowed Tabang to take his Oath.
6. Present Complaint: Leda filed a petition for the disbarment of Tabang stating the following grounds:
(a) For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me, assuming that
our marriage is not valid and making a mockery of the marriage institution.
(b) For having misrepresented himself as single in his application.
(c) For being of not good moral character.
(d) For being guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of
desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss,
when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and
introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me
to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
7. Leda presented an unsigned and undated letter, allegedly written by Tabang, stating that he did not love her
anymore and only considered her a friend. Although the letter was unsigned, Tabang's initials appeared on
the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope. He asked her not to do anything more and that there is
nothing she can do to take him away from his goal as a full-pledge professional. Tabang denies he sent this
letter.
8. Their marriage was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code,
among them minimum cohabitation of 5 years, that parties must be at least 21 years old when they were only
20 years old at the time. It was respondent who told the court that their marriage was void from the beginning,
that it was the reason why they didn’t want to tell anyone they were married in the first place.

ISSUE/S
Whether Atty. Tabang lacks good moral and violated the canons of Code of Professional Responsibility – YES
RULING
YES. Atty. Tabang lacked good moral character for the following reasons:
1. His declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a
gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable
for violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar. That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from
taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
2. Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in the first
complaint and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable. In the first complaint, he admitted having been
"legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General in the second
complaint, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading. Again, while in said "Explanation"
 he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant, in this case, however, he denies the legality of the
marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to
allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kep
a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning." c ra l a w v i rtu a 1 a w l i b ra ry

As such, Respondent’s lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions
before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as
a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. As so
aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to
be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him

[ALIGA]
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
69. Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
PER CURIAM
DOCTRINE While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
FACTS
Complainant Guevarra first met respondent Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, also known as “Noli,” when his then-fiancee
Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, Guevarra noticed that Irene was frequently receiving intimate text messages from Atty.
Eala and that she habitually went home very late at night. Guevarra also saw his wife and Atty. Eala together on two
occasions. As a result, Irene abandoned the conjugal house. Later on, Guevarra went uninvited to Irene’s birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Following that incident, Irene
went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Guevarra later found in the master’s bedroom
a love letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Guevarra soon saw Atty. Eala’s car and that of
Irene constantly parked at the place where Irene was residing. Guevarra also discovered that Irene was pregnant and
that when Irene later gave birth, Irene named respondent as the father in the Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, Guevarra
filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eala for flaunting an adulterous relationship and violating the sanctity of
marriage as provided under the Constitution. In his defense, Atty. Eala denied that he flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene and that their relationship was, in fact, low profile as known only to the immediate members of
their respective families and that as far as the general public was concerned, he was still married to Mary Ann.
Respondent also contended that the marriage of Guevarra and Irene was subsequently declared null and void.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Atty. Eala engaged in grossly immoral conduct when he entered into a discreet relationship with a
married woman - YES
RULING
The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact
of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. Further, the contention that the marriage was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial
as the acts complained of took place before such declaration. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law.

In sum, Atty. Eala, by engaging in an illicit affair with Irene, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He
also violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Ultimately, Atty. Eala violated the lawyer’s oath,
particularly his oath in supporting the Constitution and obeying the laws. Hence, Atty. Eala should be disbarred.
ALVARO, JAMES KARL DANIEL
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
70. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan Celera A.C. No. 5581
DATE: January 14, 2014
PONENTE: Per Curiam
DOCTRINE The Court has consistently held that a Court's Resolutions is not to be construed as a mere request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondent’s obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court’s orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores
his disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a petition for disbarment against respondent for Gross Immoral Conduct alleging that respondent
contracted a second marriage with one Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba while his first marriage with Gracemarie Bunagan,
petitioner’s sister, was still valid. The Court required respondent to file a comment but failed to do so despite receipt
of such order. Thus, the court required respondent to (1st) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that failure of respondent to file his comment
is deemed as a waiver, and the case should be submitted for disposition. Respondent claimed that he did not know
the nature or cause of the complaint against him since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other
pleading or any processes of this Court, and that the said motion was merely to frighten him from pursuing a criminal
complaint against petitioner and his husband for falsification of public documents. The Court required petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the complaint and submit proof of service and for respondent to file his complaint.
Petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Mailing showing that the complaint was furnished to respondent at his given
address at Angeles City. Respondent failed to file again his comment, thus, the court issued another (2nd) show
cause order against him. Respondent claimed that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. The Court ordered
that he be furnished with a copy of the same. Petitioner filed a Manifestation that respondent was using dilatory tactics
to frustrate the actions of the Court and submitted another Affidavit of Mailing. The Court issued another (3rd) show
cause order against respondent. However, this order was left unserved to respondent and the Court required him to
present his correct address. Petitioner filed another Manifestation that respondent had consistently indicated the
Mayflower St. Ninoy Aquino Subd. Angeles City as his residential address. However, in a pending case before the
RTC, respondent entered his appearance with mailing address to Cubao, Quezon City. Due to the failure of
respondent to comply with the 3rd show cause order, the Court resolved to impose upon him a FINE of P1,000 or
imprisonment of 5years if not paid, and required him to comply with the order. Respondent again failed to comply,
thus, the Court ordered the arrest of respondent and referred the case to the IBP for investigation. However,
respondent was not arrested for the reason that he could not be located either at the Angeles City or Quezon City
addresses, the latter being a vacated lot with demolished building debris. The IBP reported that as per their records,
respondents address is at Taytay, Rizal. Respondent failed to appear in the IBP-CBD proceedings, which
recommended that he be suspended for a period of 2years from the practice of law.
ISSUE/S
WON respondent’s acts warranted disciplinary measures.
RULING
YES. This Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. Petitioner submitted as evidenced a xerox copy of the Certificate
of Marriage by the Civil Registry of Manila dated May 8, 1997 for the first marriage and a xerox copy of the Certificate
of Marriage by the Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila dated January 8, 1998 for the second marriage. The certified
xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best
evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Respondents act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent's defiant stance against the Court
as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This
case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest
he will just ignore. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the
complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent’s attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot,
however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have
easily obtained a copy had he wanted to. Clearly, respondent’s acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. The Court has consistently held that a Court's Resolutions is not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondent’s obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court’s orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect
of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Respondent is therefore guilty of GROSSLY
IMMORAL CONDUCT AND WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE OF LAWFUL ORDERS OF THE COURT, and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
[Aquino, Gem Edward]
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
71. NUEZCA V VILLA GARCIA A.C. No. 8210
DATE: August 8, 2016
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.
In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.
FACTS

The respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia sent a demand letter to the Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca which
also copy furnished to various offices and persons. The spouses claimed that the letter contained not only threatening
but also libelous utterances, thus, it seriously maligned and ridiculed them to its other recipients. Likewise, they
posited that several news clippings that were attached to the demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and
claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation.
Thus, petitioner filed an administrative case for the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia for grave misconduct,
consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.

Complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings and the notices sent to respondent were
returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus, the IBP directed the parties to
submit their respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.

IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for
defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court. The IBP
found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint. Moreover, despite repeated
notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file his pleadings, respondent
failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the process, purposely delayed the
resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not respondent violated the Rule 8.01 of the CPR, which provides that “A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper” when he sent a demand letter
containing threatening and libelous utterances.

RULING

The court ruled in the affirmative.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them to
settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character. It also
imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks and estafa.

Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of complainants to
his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against
them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a
court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in shame
and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been copy furnished with the
demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a
lawyer and an officer of the court.

[AYUNAYUN, KRISCEL S. ]
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY OF COURTESY TOWARDS FELLOW LAWYERS
72. Saberon v. Larong A.C. No. 6567
DATE 18 April 2008
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation and Alfredo Tan Bonpin,
whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank’s registration and
franchise. The Petition, he said,arose from the bank’s and/or Bonpin’s refusal to return various checks and land titles,
which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant’s) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and
interests. Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with
AffirmativeDefenses to the Petition stating, inter alia, that "this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by
plaintiff and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain." Respondent made statements of the same
tenor in his Rejoinder to complainant’s Reply. Finding the aforementioned statements to be “totally malicious, viscous
and bereft of any factual or legal basis,” complainant filed the present complaint.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Atty. Lerong should be disciplined for imputing blackmail remark on the complainants
RULING
YES. The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of
their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does notjustify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance nofact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged.In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
[SURNAME, FIRST NAME]
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY OF COURTESY TOWARDS FELLOW LAWYERS
73. JOY GIMENO v. ATTY. PAUL ZAIDE G.R. NO. A.C. No. 10303
DATE: April 22, 2015
PONENTE: Brion. J.
DOCTRINE
FACTS

Complainant Gimeno filed a complaint with IBP Commission on Bar Discipline charging Atty. Zaide, of use of
intemperate, offensive and abusive language, among others. (other charges are falsification; usurpation of a notary’s
public office; violation of lawyer-client trust)

Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a “notorious extortionist” in an administrative complaint filed against her
and in another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing
counsel as someone suffering from “serious mental incompetence” in one of his pleadings.

According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings. Atty. Zaide denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language in his pleadings.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended from practice of law for a period of three
months for the other charges and for another six months for employing abusive and insulting language.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommended penalty and imposed a one-year suspension from practice
of law.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated his duty under Rule 8.01 of Code of Professional responsibility which provides that
a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealing, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, when
he called the opposing counsel to be a public prosecutor suffering a serious mental incompetence as regard her
mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.

RULING

The Court ruled in the affirmative. As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman
case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the
following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:

“Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and
the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor
performance as a prosecutor. . . This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.“

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words — a conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified. Atty. Zaide is suspended from
practice of law for 1 year.

DISALO, AL-NOOR MAJEED B.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY OF COURTESY TOWARDS FELLOW LAWYERS
74. Noble v. Ailes AC 10628
July 1, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J
DOCTRINE A lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
FACTS
Atty. Ailes filed a complaint for damages against his own brother, Marcelo, whom Atty. Noble represented in a case.
Atty. Noble thereafter learned from his client, Marcelo, that he had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa
against his brother, Atty. Ailes. He discovered that, through text messages, Atty. Ailes had been maligning him an
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he
charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: “Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with
his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why
you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you],
x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."

Atty. Ailes even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Atty. Noble "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and
questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for
motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.

Atty. Noble filed this complaint against Atty. Ailes in violation of

1. Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession; and
2. Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

The IBP dismissed the case as did not find the violation so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Atty. Ailes, considering that the communication between him and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done
privately and not directly addressed to Atty. Noble nor intended to be published and known by third persons.

The separate case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo were downgraded to unjust vexation, to
which Atty. Ailes was convicted after having pleaded guilty of vexing Marcelo by "texting insulting,
threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x."
ISSUE/S
WON Atty. Ailes should be held administratively liable for the text messages he sent to his brother Marcelo, maligning
the latter’s lawyer, Atty. Noble.
RULING
YES. A lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when
dealing with fellow lawyers.

The tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and
annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that
Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague,
in violation of the CPR. Moreover, Atty. Ailes’ voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Atty. Noble - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
[ENDONA, GABRIELLE ANNE]
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS Duty of Courtesy towards fellow lawyers
75. Malabed v. De la Pena A.C. No. 7594
DATE: Feb 9, 2016
PONENTE Carpio, J
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Atty. Meljohn de la Peña is charged by complainant with the following: (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a
certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the
civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and
(3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his
dismissal as a judge.

For his part, Atty. De La Peña refutes the allegations against him he states that with regards to the non-submission of
certificate to file action is that what he used when he filed Case No. B-1118 for quieting title was the certification
issued on May 9, 2001. With regards to the “foul language” he used in a pleading, he stated that such language was
not foul but “a dissertation of the truth designed to debunk complainants and her counsel’s credibility in filing the
administrative case”. Lastly, regarding the reemployment issue, respondent stated that his employment as Assoc.
Dean and Professor of the NIT- UE college of Law which is a government institution is that it was only temporary and
had no fixed salary.

The IBP Commissioner recommended he be suspended from the practice of law for one year

ISSUE/S
WON - Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct - YES
RULING
Yes.

Based on the records of Civil case No. B-1118, it is apparent that the certificate of endorsement did not exist yet when
the complaint in said civil case was filed. In other words, there is no truth in respondents allegation. He violated Canon
10 of the CPR “A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.” The court also found him guilty of violating
Rule 8.01 of the CPR “a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings use language which is abusive, offensive, or
otherwise improper”. The SC noted that while respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with
vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. Lastly, with regards to his employment in UE,
the SC stated that his defense of temporary employment is untenable since the prohibition on reemployment does not
distinguish between permanent and temporary employment. Respondent knew full well the consequences of his
dismissal as aa judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The SC suspended Atty. De La Peña from the practice of law for 2 years

[Garcia, Feliz Anne T.]

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS DUTY TO BE FAIR TO FELLOW LAWYERS
76. Binay-an v. Addog A.C. No. 10449
July 28, 2014
PONENTE
DOCTRINE A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance
to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel
FACTS
The complainants are heirs of Barot Binay-an and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 for Annulment of
Documents filed with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), La Trinidad, Benguet, against the
defendants Angeline Damaso (Damaso) and the Cordillera Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. The
complainants are represented in said case by Atty. Jerome W. Selmo (Atty. Selmo), while Atty. Atanacio D. Addog
(respondent) represented the defendants.

According to the complainants, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot Binay-an, called
for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos (Paul) and Bienvenido Palos (Bienvenido), who are also heirs of
Barot Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were present in the meeting.
Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and Bienvenido to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance,
which were later notarized by the respondent. The respondent subsequently submitted the Affidavits of Desistance to
the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing Officer denied. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the
defendants. Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the respondent, which was filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

Atty. Addog’s Defense: He denied the complainants' charges and stated that: Paul and Bienvenido's Affidavits of
desistance were freely executed; he was not "lawyering'' for Paul and Bienvenido; and he submitted the Affidavits to
the NCIP in behalf of his clients and not in representation of the complainants, among others.

The IBP Board of Governors adopting with modification the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, recommended that the respondent be suspended for a period of 6 months.
ISSUE/S
Whether the respondent encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo when he prepared and notarized the
affidavit of desistance.
RULING
YES. The act of Atty. Addog violated Canon 8, Rule 8.02, and Canon 9 of the CPR which states that:

“A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.”

“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal
only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead
a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. “

In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were represented by counsel, Atty. Selmo. His act of
preparing the affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it was only the joint affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and
Romana which he drafted and notarized was true, nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo.
He even disclosed that the affidavits of desistance were executed by the affiants in exchange for a certain sum of
money. It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 to
execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo.

With the foregoing, he was suspended for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law.
GARCIA,MAY
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS Duty to prevent unauthorized practice of law
77. Tapay v. Bancolo A.C. 9604
March 20, 2013
Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE Rule 9.01 -- A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Thus, by affixing one’s
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and
give legal effect to the document. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court.
FACTS
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated October 14, 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file an counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in
the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint dated August 31, 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case
filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman.
1. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since ha had yet to meet Divinagracia in person.
2. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his
name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his.

Thus, Rustia convince Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest such fact. Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his
alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

The Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document and Dishonesty be
filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants. Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his
Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. An affidavit by Richar
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, was presented that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.

In a Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for
insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence
in a Decision. Thereafter, Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo’s law partner.
Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime Laboratory which concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by
one and the same person. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Thus, complainant maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and prosecute innocent people.

In its Answer, Atty. Bancolo admitted that, due to some minor lapses, permitted the pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office but denied Gentugao as their secretary.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo can be held administratively liable when the Complaint filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office thus violating Rule 9.01 and Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING
The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Canon 9. -- A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 -- A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that:
1. He has read the pleading;
2. To the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and
3. It is not interposed for delay.

Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to thes
matters and give legal effect to the document.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy.
1. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege
subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
2. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
3. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canon and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional service or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

[GRANADO, ZYMON ANGELO]

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS TOPIC
78. ANGELES VS. BAGGAY A.C. NO. 8103
December 3, 2014
Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE
FACTS
This case stemmed from the letter submitted by Atty. Aurelio Angeles, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon.
Remigio Escalada, Executive Judge of the RTC of Bataan against Atty. Renato Bagay for his alleged notarization of
18 documents at the time he was out of the country from Mach 13 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that
they were notarized while Bagay was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The
letter contained affidavits of persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement
that they did not see Bagay sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents came out of the office already signed. It was verified with the Bureau of Immigration that a certain Renato
Bagay departed from the country on March 13 and returned on April 8, 2008. The Certification issued by the Bureau
was attached to the letter.

The Executive Judge referred the matter to IBP Bataan Chapter and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National
Office for appropriate action. It was endorsed to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal required Atty. Angeles to formalize the complaint, and the latter replied that his Letter
was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather a “report on, and endorsement of public documents by Atty.
Bagay while he was out of the country,” and that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned
would be welcome.

Respondent claimed that he was ot aware that those documents were notarized using his name while he was out of
the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. Said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization act.
Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his
secretary from his office.

The Investigating Commissioner found out that the letter of Atty. Angeles Jr. was not verified, most of the attachments
were not authenticated photocopies, and the comment of the respondent was not verified. He also observed that the
respondent’s signature in his Comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most attachments which
he admitted were notarized in his absence by this secretary.

He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was
affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was
established that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and
records especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the
standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent's commission as notary
public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
ISSUE/S
WON the notarization of documents by the secretary of Bagay while he was out of the country constituted
negligence. YES.
RULING
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his
notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering
that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these
Rules. A notary public's secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary
public.

Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary's act which he did not authorize. He is
responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his
secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his
secretary could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent's Mimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious
act of what his secretary did.

Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any
blemish and this was his 8rst and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and
could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized
by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated
by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.

Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law . Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary
public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the
country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any
restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away,
were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be
converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere
sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
[IBAÑEZ, HOSEA]