Donglayan, Ben A.

JD1-Local Government

RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

J. Leonardo-de Castro

The Case:

This is petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court which essentially prays the for the issuance of writ of certiorari annulling and setting
aside the decision of the Commission on Elections for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; with petition for intervention filed by the
defeated mayoralty candidate, wherein he prays to be declared as the winning candidate for
mayor in the City of Manila in view of Private Respondent Estrada’s disqualification to run for any
public office.

Facts:
Former president Estrada was convicted to the crime of plunder in September 2007 with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period
of sentence and absolute disqualification to hold public office. Following from his conviction,
President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon and restoring his civil and
political rights which accepted and signed by the former.
In 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and received
three (3) oppositions in the office of the COMELEC; however, he did not win. In 2012, he filed a
COC vying for the position for Mayor in the City of Manila. Risos-Vidal filed a petition for
disqualification against Estrada.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Eventually, Estrada won the election and
defeated candidate Lim filed a motion for intervention in the disqualification case. Risos-Vidal
then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an offense
involving moral turpitude. And for failing to consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for
in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

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Donglayan, Ben A.
JD1-Local Government

Ruling/Doctrine:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. – A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. – The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights” as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

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