ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. and ROBERT KUAN, Chairman v.

ESTRELITO
NOTARIO (G.R. No. 152166, 20 October 2010, J. Peralta)

FACTS:

St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (St. Luke’s) employed Estrelito Notario (Notario) as In-
House Security Guard. Nimaya Electro Corporation installed a closed-circuit television (CCTV)
system in the premises of petitioner hospital to enhance its security measures and conducted an
orientation seminar for the in-house security personnel on the proper way of monitoring video
cameras, subject to certain guidelines.

On December 30, 1996, Notario was on duty from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. of the following
day. In the evening of the same day, Justin Tibon, a foreigner from Majuro, Marshall Island, then
attending to his 3- year-old daughter, Andanie De Brum at Room 257, reported to the
management of petitioner hospital about the loss of his mint green traveling bag, which was
placed inside the cabinet. Acting on the complaint of Tibon, the Security Department of
petitioner hospital conducted an investigation. When the tapes of video camera recorder (VCR)
no. 3 covering the subject period were reviewed, it was shown that the cameras failed to record
any incident of theft at room 257. St. Luke’s issued a Memorandum to Notario, the CCTV
monitoring staff on duty, directing him to explain in writing, within 24 hours upon receipt
thereof, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating the normal
rotation/sequencing process of the VCR and, consequently, failed to capture the theft of Tibon's
traveling bag at room 257. Notario explained that on the subject dates, he was the only personnel
on duty as nobody wanted to assist him. Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the
Old and New Maternity Units, as these two units have high incidence of crime.

Finding the explanation unreasonable, St. Luke’s served on Notario a copy of the Notice
of Termination dismissing him on the ground of gross negligence/inefficiency. Notario filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against St. Luke’s and its Chairman Robert Kuan (Kuan). The
Labor Arbiter dismissed Notario’s complaint for illegal dismissal against St. Luke’s and Kuan.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the said ruling. St. Luke’s and Kuan filed a petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of Notario is valid.

RULING:

To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the Labor Code has
set twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article
282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and
defend himself. This first requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect, while the second is
deemed as the procedural aspect. An employer can terminate the services of an employee only
for valid and just causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The
employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause.
 A perusal of St. Luke’s CCTV Monitoring Guidelines, disseminated to all in-house
security personnel, reveals that that there is no categorical provision requiring in-house security
personnel to observe a rotation sequence procedure in focusing the cameras so that the security
monitoring would cover as many areas as possible.

Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee for
gross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both
gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending
upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for
the dismissal of the employee. Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised his best
judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security within the hospital
premises. Verily, assuming arguendo that Notario was negligent, although this Court finds
otherwise, the lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of negligence
that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a just cause for his dismissal.

St. Luke’s anchor on the postulate that even a single or isolated act of negligence by
respondent constitutes a just cause for his dismissal as it engendered the possibility of a legal
action that may be taken against them by the owner of the lost items. This is purely speculative.
The Certification, dated July 8, 1999, issued by Renato Politud Valebia, Police Superintendent,
Station Commander of Galas Police Station (Station II), stated that no incident of theft was
reported by the management of petitioner hospital or any of its authorized representatives
involving the loss of the plane tickets and other personal belongings of Justin Tibon and Andanie
De Brum. Even the supposed complainant, Tibon, did not institute any complaint against St.
Luke’s.

Therefore, it cannot be said that St. Luke’s and Kuan incurred actual loss or pecuniary
damage. St. Luke’s and Kuan question the findings of the CA that there was no compliance with
the twin-notice rule and hearing, while Notario maintains that they violated his right to due
process.1avvphi1 The employee must be furnished two written notices: the first notice apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and the second
is a subsequent notice, which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
The CA found that St. Luke’s failed to comply with the rule on twin notice and hearing as it
merely required respondent to give his written explanation within 24 hours and, thereafter,
ordered his dismissal.
TALIDANO VS FALCOM MARITIME AND ALLIED
G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by private respondent and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corp which is based in
Korea. His one-year contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the
monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of$270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and maltreated
the vessel’s Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge
of the International Transport Federation in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by
the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21January 1997.

He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October 1999.Private respondent

countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been warned
several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and
insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner’s incompetence
wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of
petitioner who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax
message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due to
petitioner’s neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued
by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.

On 5 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner’s

complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of duties. The Labor Arbiter
relied on the fax messages presented by private respondent. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter and declared the dismissal as illegal. The NLRC held that the fax
messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no
probative value and are self-serving. It added that the ship’s logbook should have been submitted
in evidence as it is the repository of all the activities on board the vessel, especially those
affecting the performance or attitude of the officers and crewmembers, and, more importantly,
the procedures preparatory to the discharge of a crew member.

The NLRC also noted that private respondent failed to comply with due process in
terminating petitioner’s employment. The Court of Appeals, again reinstated the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter. The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly
after petitioner had committed a serious neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages
constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of the logbook, it stated that three
years had already passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of private
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fax messages in question constitute res gestae.

RULING:

NO. To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.

Assuming that petitioner’s negligence which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its
course is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax
messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation.
Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res
gestae of the first kind. Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its
admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal
act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the
statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless
not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made
simultaneously with the purported equivocal act. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax
messages are unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship
master, who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as
double hearsay.
TOP FORM MFG. CO. v. NLRC
GR No. 65706, DECEMBER 11, 1992

FACTS:

Malubay began her employment with petitioner as Plant Supervisor. She was initially
assigned to supervise a factory line of sixty machine operators. One month thereafter, she was
given one more factory line, also with sixty workers, to supervise. She was given a salary
adjustment and in the following year, another increment in salary was received by her... she was
promoted to the position of Over-All Quality Supervisor in the first shift.

As such Head Supervisor, she had control and... supervision over the entire first shift
consisting of 120 machine operators and some six line-in-charge. She was also responsible not
only for the production and output but also for the quality of products. In addition to her
functions, she was likewise given the task of... training newly-hired factory workers and of
supervising the repair group composed of several employees.

Private respondent and her co-supervisors were called to a meeting at the conference room by
Dickson Chan, Production Manager. During the conference, Dickson Chan reviewed and
examined as usual the production report for the day and he declared that he was not satisfied
with the production output, berating private respondent and the other supervisors. Thereafter, he
crumpled the production report and again threw invectives at private respondent and her co-
supervisors. Not satisfied and contended with what he had said. Dickson Chan picked up the
stapler on his desk and, but for some better impulse, would have thrown the same at private
respondent and her companions who, frightened, as they were, dispersed.

As a result of this unfortunate incident, private respondent told and instructed her co-
supervisors, "Huwag pumasok sa lunes para matauhan si Dickson." Thus, on the next working
day, they absented themselves from work she and her companions reported for work. Petitioner
filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of private respondent on the ground of
"Loss of Management Confidence". Private respondent was placed under preventive suspension
leading to her termination

ISSUES:

Whether or not private respondent's services may be terminated or loss of trust and
confidence.

RULING:

The employer has a distinct prerogative to dismiss an employee if the former has ample
reason to distrust the latter or if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee has been
guilty of breach of trust. This authority of the employer to dismiss an employee cannot... be
denied whenever acts of violation are noted by the employer. The law does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct before the employer can invoke such
justification.

It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the... employer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and that the
nature of the employee's action renders the employee unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded of the position. It is an inherent right of the employer to dismiss an employee for loss
of confidence. We have a plethora of decisions that supports and recognizes this authority of the
employer to cut its relationship with the employee. In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact that...
private respondent is an employee occupying a high managerial position which entails great
responsibility

Thus, petitioner was justified in terminating the employment of the private respondent
when she committed acts inimical to her employer's interest. We shall not belabor the... time-
honored tenet that while the law protects the rights of the employee, it cannot authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
ALUAG v BIR MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE
G.R. No. 228449 - 6 December 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Aluag was hired by Respondent as cashier since 1994 until she was terminated
on 2013. Her job includes receiving remittances and payments deposit all collections and
perform other duties as the general manager (GM) may assign to her. She alleged that she was
tasked to give verbal reports on Respondent until she was required to put them in writing. She
alleged that her task to make verbal reports was later on required to be in writing, and so when
the Respondent’s loan processor accepted post-dated checks with prior approval of the GM, she
submitted a report of bounced checks and deposited the remaining checks in her possession.

Thereafter she was preventively suspended before she gave birth. Then she filed a
complaint in the NLRC alleging that she was illegally suspended, but later changed it to illegal
dismissed. The Respondent averred that Aluag was dismissed for loss of trust and confidence
due to her violations of the BIRMPC’s bylaws, rules and regulations. It added that the external
auditor reported that the cashier failed to regularly report post-dated checks and did not observe
monitoring.

The LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, but the NLRC ruled otherwise. The
CA reversed, and reinstated the LA ruling. It held that the BIRMPC observed the 2-notice rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, and accordingly
held that BIRMPC had just cause to terminate Aluag's employment.

RULING:

Yes. The SC found that BIRMPC sufficiently observed the standards of procedural
process in dismissing Aluag by (a) issuing a written notice specifying her infractions; (b)
granting her ample opportunity to be heard or explain her side when she was required to submit
an explanation; and (c) serving a written notice of termination after verifying the infraction
committed.

There is a different approach in reviewing the CA’s decision in a labor case. In a Rule 45
review which is limited to questions of law, the Court examines the correctness of the CA's
Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65 which is resorted to
determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision. Moreover,
in labor case, grave abuse may be imputed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are
not supported by substantial evidence. The SC found agrees with the NLRC that the cashier
failed to regularly report Post-Dated Checks (PDC) received and did not observe proper
monitoring of checks due to be deposited. There are checks which were not deposited at all. It
also held that procedural due process is met even without an actual hearing as long as the
employee is accorded a chance to explain her side of the controversy, as what happened here.
 

COSMOS BOTTLING CORP., Petitioner, v. WILSON FERMIN, Respondent; WILSON

B. FERMIN,Petitioner, v. COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION and CECILIA
BAUTISTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193676: June 20, 2012

FACTS:

Wilson B. Fermin (Fermin) was a forklift operator at Cosmos Bottling Corporation

(COSMOS), where he started his employment on 27 August 1976.On 16 December 2002, he was
accused of stealing the cellphone of his fellow employee, Luis Braga (Braga). Fermin was then
given a Show Cause Memorandum, requiring him to explain why the cellphone was found inside
his locker.In compliance therewith, he submitted an affidavit the following day, explaining that
he only hid the phone as a practical joke and had every intention of returning it to Braga.

After conducting an investigation, COSMOS found Fermin guilty of stealing Bragas

phone in violation of company rules and regulations. Consequently, on 2 October 2003, the
company terminated Fermin from employment after 27 years of service, effective on 6 October
2003. Following the dismissal of Fermin from employment, Braga executed an affidavit, which
stated the belief that the former had merely pulled a prank without any intention of stealing the
cellphone, and withdrew from COSMOS his complaint against Fermin.

Meanwhile, Fermin filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that the act of taking a fellow employees cellphone
amounted to gross misconduct.Further, the LA likewise took into consideration Fermins other
infractions, namely: (a) committing acts of disrespect to a superior officer, and (b) sleeping on
duty and abandonment of duty. Fermin filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the ruling of the LA and denied Fermins subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, Fermin filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the rulings of the LA and the NLRC and awarded him his full retirement benefits.
Although the CA accorded with finality the factual findings of the lower tribunals as regards
Fermins commission of theft, it nevertheless held that the penalty of dismissal from service was
improper on the ground that the said violation did not amount to serious misconduct or willful
disobedience. COSMOS and Fermin moved for reconsideration, but the CA likewise denied their
motions. Thus, both parties filed the present Petitions for Review.

ISSUE:

Whether the imposition of the penalty of dismissal was appropriate.

HELD:

Theft committed against a co-employee is considered as a case analogous to serious

misconduct, for which the penalty of dismissal from service may be meted out to the erring
employee, viz:

Article 282 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 282. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:

(a)Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or his representatives in connection with his work;

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Misconduct involves the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal,
it must be:

1. of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and

2. connected with the work of the employee.

In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that the latter
stole and used Yusecos credit cards. But since the theft was not committed against petitioner
itself but against one of its employees,respondent's misconduct was not work-related and
therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct.

Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those
which are susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail.For an employee
to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must
involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.

A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission

attesting to an employee’s moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a person
other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious
misconduct.

In this case, the LA has already made a factual finding, which was affirmed by both the
NLRC and the CA, that Fermin had committed theft when he took Bragas cellphone. Thus, this
act is deemed analogous to serious misconduct, rendering Fermins dismissal from service just
and valid.
 Further, the CA was correct in ruling that previous infractions may be cited as
justification for dismissing an employee only if they are related to the subsequent offense.
However, it must be noted that such a discussion was unnecessary since the theft, taken in
isolation from Fermins other violations, was in itself a valid cause for the termination of his
employment.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the award of financial compensation or assistance to

an employee validly dismissed from service has no basis in law. Therefore, considering that
Fermins act of taking the cellphone of his co-employee is a case analogous to serious
misconduct, this Court is constrained to reverse the CAs ruling as regards the payment of his full
retirement benefits. In the same breath, neither can this Court grant his prayer for backwages.
HEAVYLIFT MANILA v. CA
GR NO. 154410, October 20, 2005

FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner Heavylift, a maritime agency, thru a letter signed by
petitioner Josephine Evangelio, Administrative and Finance Manager of Heavylift, informed
respondent Ma. Dottie Galay, Heavylift Insurance and Provisions Assistant, of her low
performance... rating and the negative feedback from her team members regarding her work
attitude. The letter also notified her that she was being relieved of her other functions except the
development of the new Access program. Subsequently, on August 16, 1999, Galay was
terminated for alleged loss of confidence. Thereafter, she filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal

Before the labor arbiter, petitioners alleged that Galay had an attitude problem and did
not get along with her co-employees for which she was constantly warned to improve.
Petitioners aver that Galay's attitude resulted to the decline in the company's efficiency and...
productivity.

The Labor Arbiter found that Galay was illegally terminated for petitioners' failure to
prove that she violated any company regulation, and for failure to give the proper notice as
required by law.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The latter, however, denied the appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner elevated the case by certiorari to the
Court of Appeals. But, petitioners failed to: state the full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners; attach the copies of all pleadings and supporting documents; properly verify the
petition; and certify... against forum-shopping. For these procedural lapses, the petition was
dismissed.

Petitioners assert that it terminated Galay because she had an attitude problem. This
situation, according to petitioners, is analogous to loss of trust and confidence. They aver that
respondent did not deny the strained and irreconcilable relationship between them, in effect,...
admitting the same. Further, petitioners aver that having lost their trust and confidence on Galay,
they could no longer make her in-charge of the confidential Crew Information System which
accounts for the personnel, management and professional records of all the employees of... and
seamen connected with the company. Lastly, petitioners maintain that because of Galay's
attitude, the company's work atmosphere had become very strained and had gravely affected the
workers and their outputs. Galay's dismissal, according to petitioners, was merely an act of...
self-preservation.
 Petitioners explained that they sent Galay a letter of notice dated February 23, 1999,
apprising her of her low performance and her attitude problem, before the letter of her
termination dated August 16, 1999. Petitioners claim that the company waited for six months, to
give

Galay a chance to undergo counseling before dismissing her from the service. Galay
counters that petitioners failed to show a just and valid cause for her termination, and that letters
of notice and termination did not comply with the twin requirement of notice and hearing. Galay
argues that the letter dated February 23, 1999 neither informed her of her... infraction of any
company rule that warrants disciplinary action; nor required her to submit an explanation.

ISSUES:

Is attitude problem a valid ground for the termination of an employee? If in the

affirmative, was this sufficiently proved?

RULING:

An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is detrimental to the company
for he can upset and strain the working environment. Without the necessary teamwork and
synergy, the organization cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to take the
necessary... action to correct the situation and protect its organization. When personal differences
between employees and management affect the work environment, the peace of the company is
affected. Thus, an employee's attitude problem is a valid ground for his termination. It is a
situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that must be duly proved by the employer.

However, we are not convinced that in the present case, petitioners have shown
sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to justify Galay's termination. Though they are correct
in saying that in this case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still there must be...
substantial evidence to support the termination on the ground of attitude. The mere mention of
negative feedback from her team members, and the letter dated February 23, 1999, are not proof
of her attitude problem. Likewise, her failure to refute... petitioners' allegations of her negative
attitude does not amount to admission. Technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor
cases. Besides, the burden of proof is not on the employee but on the employer who must
affirmatively show adequate... evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause.

In our view, neither does the February 23, 1999 letter constitute the required notice. The
letter did not inform her of the specific acts complained of and their corresponding penalty. The
law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed two written notices before...
terminating his employment, namely, a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

Additionally, the letter never gave respondent Galay an opportunity to explain herself,
hence denying her due process. In sum, we find that Galay was illegally dismissed, because
petitioners failed to show adequately that a valid cause for terminating respondent exists, and
because petitioners failed to comply with the twin requirement of notice and hearing.

ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.

A.C. No. 5900: April 10, 2019

FACTS:

On May 14, 2002, an anonymous complaint was made against Atty. Cresencio P. Co
Untian, Jr., alleging that he has sexually harassed three (3) of his students in Xavier University.
Co Untian lamented the complaints and claimed that the students were only making such
allegations because they failed his subject for the 2001-2002 school year. He further claimed that
his lewd actions are without malice and are only “jokes”. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to disbar Co Untian on the grounds of gross immoral
conduct, but the later moved for reconsideration.

In its 2017 Extended Resolution, Director Ramon S. Esguerra explained that respondent is not
guilty of sexual harassment as defined in RA 7877, and that Co-Untian should only be penalized
with a two-year suspension.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Co Untian committed sexual harassment against his students.

RULING:

Yes, there was sexual harassment.

The Supreme Court ruled that it is not necessary that there was an offer for sex for there
to be sexual harassment as a superior’s conduct with sexual underpinnings, which offends the
victim or creates a hostile environment, would suffice. Further, it is clear based on CSC
Resolution No. 01-0940 that the respondent’s actions towards the students concerned definitely
constitute sexual harassment.

Finally, it can also be noted that a reading of the respondent’s answers would show that
he substantially admitted the accusations against him, although providing a justification for each
of them. Wherefore, Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian has been suspended from the practice of law
for
five (5) years, and ten (10) years from teaching law in any school.
UNITED POLYRESINS v. MARCELINO PINUELA
GR No. 209555, Jul 31, 2017

FACTS:

Pinuela was the President of Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA). Petitioners
gave 300k loan to the union. The CBA contained a union security clause wherein employees who
cease to be PORFA members shall not be retained in the employ of UPI. Petitioners told
respondent that until the P300k is returned, it will not discuss a new CBA. Pinuela filed a
complaint in (NCMB), claiming that petitioners refused to bargain. Union members accused
Pinuela of mismanagement. Special elections were held, and a new President Was elected.

The union expelled Pinuela. Petitioners issued a letter of termination to take effect
immediately. The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement of the union's
Constitution which specifically prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and
give ground for the impeachment and recall of union officers.

ISSUE:

1. Was the basis/ ground to expel him from the union proper?

2. Did the grant of loan constitute ULP?

RULING:

1. No. Pinuela's expulsion is grounded on the provisions of the union's Constitution.

2. Yes. Such a contribution by petitioners to PORFA constitutes ULP.

Pinuela's expulsion is grounded on the provisions of the union's Constitution. But these
provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not expulsion from union
membership, hence not a just cause. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and petitioners
to terminate respondent's employment. Such aground does not constitute just cause for
termination.
 Thus, for what he is charged with, respondent may not be penalized with expulsion from
the union, since this is not authorized and provided for under PORFA's Constitution. This could
be an opportune time for the union to consider amending its Constitution in order to provide for
specific rules on the discipline of its members, not just its officers. After all, it is given the right
under the Labor Code, "to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership." But it may not insist on expelling respondent from PORFA and assist in his
dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions
under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members.
"The matter of Pinuela's alleged failure to return petitioners' P300K which was lent to PORFA is
immaterial as well. It may not be used as a ground to terminate his employment; such a
contribution by petitioners to PORFA constitutes ULP.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Virgilio Pino, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 149552: March 10, 2010

FACTS:

The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu
City.On November 30, 1991, IBM-Local 31, through its officers and board members entered into
a CBA with GMC.The effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.

Casio,et al.were regular employees of GMC with daily earnings ranging fromP173.75
toP201.50, and length of service varying from eight to 25 years. Casio was elected IBM-Local 31
President for a three-year term in June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop stewards.

Rodolfo Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, furnished
Casio,et al. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot,
charging Casio,et al. with acts inimical to the interest of the union.Through the same letter,
Gabiana gave Casio,et al. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their answers or
counter-affidavits.However, Casio,et al. refused to acknowledge receipt of Gabianas letter.

Subsequently, on February 29, 1992, Pino,et al., as officers and members of the IBM-
Local 31, issued a Resolutionexpelling Casio,et al. from the union. Gabiana then informed the
company of the expulsion of Casio,et al. from the union of IBM-Local 31 officers and board
members.Gabiana likewise requested that Casio,et al. be immediately dismissed from their work
for the interest of industrial peace in the plant. Gabiana reiterated the demand of IBM-Local 31
that GMC dismiss Casio,et al., with the warning that failure of GMC to do so would constitute
gross violation of the existing CBA and constrain the union to file a case for unfair labor practice
against GMC.

Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice, GMC acceded to
Gabianas request to terminate the employment of Casio,et al.GMC terminated the employment
of Casio,et al. effective April 24, 1992 and placing the latter under preventive suspension for the
meantime. On March 27, 1992, Casio,et al., in the name of IBM-Local 31, filed a Notice of
Strike and alleged as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of union officers and members,
discrimination, coercion, and union busting. Casio,et al.filed before NLRC a complaint against
GMC and Pino,et al. for unfair labor practice.

Finding that NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-08-0639-92 did not undergo voluntary
arbitration, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but endorsed the same to
the NCMB-RO.Prior to undergoing voluntary arbitration before the NCMB-RO, however, the
parties agreed to first submit the case to the grievance machinery of IBM-Local 31.On
September 7, 1994, Casio,et al. filed their Complaint with Pino, the Acting President of IBM-
Local 31.Pino acknowledged receipt of the Complaint and assured Casio,et al. that they would be
seasonably notified of whatever decision and/or action the Board may have in the instant case.
When the IBM-Local 31 Board failed to hold grievance proceedings on the Complaint of
Casio,et al., NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator Canonoy-Morada assumed jurisdiction over the same.
VA Canonoy-Morada dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, but granted separation pay and
attorney’s fees to Casio,et al.

On appeal, the CA granted the writ ofcertiorariand set aside the Voluntary Arbitration
Award.The appellate court ruled that while the dismissal of Casio,et al., was made by GMC
pursuant to a valid closed shop provision under the CBA, the company, however, failed due
process in implementing the said dismissal. The Motion for Reconsideration of GMC was denied
by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Casio, et al. was illegally dismissed?

HELD:

The petition is denied.

There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor
Code: one is substantive whether the termination of employment was based on the provision of
the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural the
manner in which the dismissal was effected.

In the case at bar, the dismissal of Casio, et al. was indeed illegal, having been done
without just cause and the observance of procedural due process.

Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248(e)of the
Labor Code. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with
management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to
individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed
stipulations for union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support
the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interestvis-visthe employer.

Moreover, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal
import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law
between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy
to give protection to labor.

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause,

the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from
the union.T hese requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union
security provision of the CBA.

There is no question that in the present case, the CBA between GMC and IBM-Local 31
included a maintenance of membership and closed shop clause as can be gleaned from Sections 3
and 6 of Article II.IBM-Local 31, by written request, can ask GMC to terminate the employment
of the employee/worker who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member.

It is similarly undisputed that IBM-Local 31, through Gabiana, the IBM Regional
Director for Visayas and Mindanao, twice requested GMC, in the letters dated March 10 and 19,
1992, to terminate the employment of Casio,et al. as a necessary consequence of their expulsion
from the union.

It is the third requisite that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-
Local 31 to expel Casio,et al. which appears to be lacking in this case.

Records show that GMC terminated the employment of Casio,et al. relying upon the
Resolution dated February 29, 1992 of Pino,et al. expelling Casio,et al. from IBM-Local 31;
Gabianas Letters dated March 10 and 19, 1992 demanding that GMC terminate the employment
of Casio,et al. on the basis of the closed shop clause in the CBA; and the threat of being sued by
IBM-Local 31 for unfair labor practice.The letter made no mention at all of the evidence
supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio,et al. from the union.GMC never alleged
nor attempted to prove that the company actually looked into the evidence of IBM-Local 31 for
expelling Casio,et al. and made a determination on the sufficiency thereof.Without such a
determination, GMC cannot claim that it had terminated the employment of Casio,et al. for just
cause.

The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting

the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio,et al. is a direct consequence of the non-observance
by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees.

The records of this case are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate
the bare allegation of GMC that Casio,et al. were accorded due process by IBM-Local 31.There
is nothing on record that would indicate that IBM-Local 31 actually notified Casio,et al. of the
charges against them or that they were given the chance to explain their side. It was not
established that said letter-complaint charging Casio,et al. with acts inimical to the interest of the
union was properly served upon Casio, that Casio willfully refused to accept the said letter-
notice, or that Casio had the authority to receive the same letter-notice on behalf of the other
employees similarly accused.
 In the case at bar, Casio,et al. did not receive any other communication from GMC,
except the written notice of termination dated March 24, 1992.GMC, by its own admission, did
not conduct a separate and independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the expulsion of Casio,et al. by IBP-Local 31.It straight away acceded to the demand
of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio,et al.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. JOEY B. TEVES (G.R.

No. 143511, 15 November 2010, J. Peralta)

FACTS:

Joey Teves (Teves) was employed by petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) in 1981 as Clerk II until his termination from service on June 1, 1992. PLDT
terminated Teves through an Inter-Office Memorandum dated May 29, 1992 on account of his
three (3) unauthorized leaves of absence committed within three (3) years in violation of
petitioner’s rules and regulations.

Teves’ first absent was from August 23 to September 3, 1990 as his wife gave birth on
August 25 but was only discharged from the hospital on September 2 due to complications.
Teves called through a third party to inform PLDT that he will go on an extended leave. His
second absent was from May 39 to June 12, 1991. Teves, upon reporting back to work, explained
that his absences were due to the fact that his eldest and youngest daughters were sick and had to
be confined. The third absence occurred after eight months when Teves availed of a seven-day
leave of absence and extended such leave to complete his annual vacation leave, which was on
February 11, 1992. However, Teves failed to report for work from February 11 to 19, 1992. In an
Inter-Office Memorandum, Teves was terminated from service.

Teves filed a complaint for, among others, illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled that the dismissal is lega. Teves appealed to the NLRC and the NLRC reversed the LA’s
ruling. PLDT filed a petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the illegality of
Teves’ dismissal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether sufficient grounds exists for Teves’ dismissal from service

RULING:

The petition is partly granted.

 Notably, the alleged two prior incidents of Teves’ unauthorized absences were due to a
family emergency or sickness. Teves’ explanations should have been given a kind consideration
by PLDT. An employee cannot anticipate when sickness or emergencies in the family may
happen, thus, he may not be able to give prior notice or seek prior approval of his absence, but
could only do so after the occurrence of the incident.

However, Teves had shown that he had given petitioner prior notice of his absences from
August 23 to September 3, 1990. As the NLRC found, petitioner admitted that "on August 23,
1990, Teves called up through a third party to inform PLDT that he would go on an extended
leave." Such admission was even reiterated in PLDT’s petition for certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court. Notably, when Teves returned for work on September 4, 1990, he immediately
submitted a letter to petitioner explaining his absence and attaching a medical certificate thereto
to attest to the reason of his absence. Thus, the suspension imposed on him was not proper. As to
Teves’ second unauthorized absence, while he had relayed his inability to report for work on
May 29, 1991 to a co-employee, who unfortunately did not also report for work, he was
negligent in not verifying whether his notice of absence had reached petitioner, and the duration
of his absence. While respondent offered a justifiable reason for his absences from May 29 to
June 12, 1990, i.e., his two daughters were sick and confined at a nearby clinic, however, the
court finds that he failed to give PLDT prior notice of his absence, thus, such absence was
properly considered as unauthorized.

Thus, Teves’ absence from February 11 to 19, 1991 which was made to prolong payment
of his demandable financial obligations in the office, and which absence was found by both the
NLRC and the CA to be unjustified, was Teves’ second unauthorized absence. The court finds
that Teves’ termination for committing three unauthorized absences within a three-year period
had no basis; thus, there was no valid cause for respondent's dismissal.

Even assuming that Teves’ absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such offense
does not warrant respondent's dismissal. Not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a
reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.

PLDT's claim that the alleged previous infractions may be used as supporting
justification to a subsequent similar offense, which would merit dismissal, finds no application in
this case. Teves’ absence from August 23 to September 3, 1990 was justified and not
unauthorized as there was prior notice. His absence from May 29 to June 12, 1991, although
found to be unauthorized, was not at all unjustified. Thus, his absence during the period from
February 11 to 19, 1991, being the only unauthorized and unjustified absence and his second
unauthorized absence, should not merit the penalty of dismissal.

While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and regulations, however,
such management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws and valid agreements. The Court is wont to reiterate that while an
employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a
just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an employee must be exercised without abuse of
discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding. The
employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not
only the employee’s position, but his very livelihood, his very breadbasket.

Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Even where a worker
has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive may suffice, whatever missteps maybe
committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. This is not only the
law’s concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his or her family to consider.
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows upon those dependent on the wage-earner.