CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

Overview
In this chapter, the student will learn and understand the fundamental concepts and principles
of Human Rights in the Philippines. Likewise, the student will also have knowledge of the
Philippine laws that safeguards human rights of the Filipinos and forbids abuse of the vast
powers of the government.
Learning Outcomes
To be able to have basic knowledge of the fundamental concepts and principles of Human
Rights in the Philippines and to identify what laws are in place to safeguard the human rights of
every Filipino.
Pre-Test
Answer the following questions:
1. What is Human Rights?
2. Is there a specific Human Rights Law in the Philippines?
3. What are the laws that embody human rights in the Philippines?
4. Does the 1987 Philippine Constitution provide protection to the human rights
against the abuse of the vast powers of the government?
5. Read and memorize the Sections 1 to 5, Article III, of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
LESSON 1: Introduction to Human Rights Education
Human Rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of nationality, place of
birth or residence, sex, color, religion, language, and status in life. Human rights provide
protection to every individual against the abuse of the vast powers of the government.
There is no specific Human Rights Law in the Philippines that embodies all the human
rights of every Filipino. Legal provisions that safeguard human rights are scattered into several
laws and statutes. The fundamental law in the Philippines that safeguards human rights is the
1987 Philippine Constitution. All other laws, including Republic Act No. 7438 or the Rights of the
Accused Under Custodial Investigation, are already patterned from the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Lesson 2: The Bill of Rights (Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Bill of Rights under the Constitution cannot
be invoked against acts of private individuals. It can only be invoked against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. In other words, for violations committed by
a private individual to another private individual, the Bill of Rights is not applicable. This
conclusion finds support from the case of People vs. Marti wherein the Supreme Court held:
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject
to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his
sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he
himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder.
However, in the case of Zulueta v. Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, the Supreme
Court applied Section 3(1), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution against the violation of the right
to privacy committed by the wife against the husband – two (2) private individuals. In the said
case, the Supreme Court held that:
 The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution
is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
LESSON 2: Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 1, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution can be divided into two (2) clauses: (a) the
Due Process Clause; and (b) the Equal Protection Clause.
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”.
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness
on the part of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the
Judiciary.
If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied
the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable
requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due
process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is
considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial
involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of
the law itself.
Person
The Due Process Clause protects all persons, whether natural or artificial (e.g.
corporations, associations, partnerships, et.). However, artificial persons are only covered by the
protection only insofar as their property is concerned.
Deprivation
To deprive is to take away forcibly, to prevent from possessing, enjoying or using
something.1
It is clear from the Due Process Clause that not all kinds deprivation is per se
unconstitutional. Only those deprivations without the observance of the due process of law are
prohibited. Thus, one’s life, liberty, or property, may be deprived as long as due process of law
is observed prior to deprivation.
Life, Liberty and Property

1
Webster’s New World Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 395.
 Life as understood under the due process clause connotes the integrity of the physical
person. Liberty is synonymous to freedom or independence. Property covers anything that can
come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
“...nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
According to a catena of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, equal
protection of the laws simply means “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed”. In other words, similar subjects
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against the others.
Persons Protected
Just like the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause is likewise available to all
persons, whether natural or artificial. But again, artificial persons are only covered by the
protection only insofar as their property is concerned.
Classification
The Equal Protection Clause does not require the universal application of all laws, that is,
that it operate on all persons and property without distinction. What it merely requires is equality
among equals. For a universal application of all laws might in fact result in unequal protection.
Take for example is the prohibition for minors to buy alcoholic liquors and cigarettes. If
we would universally apply the said prohibition to all persons, then no person can then be
allowed to buy liquors and cigarettes.
For this reason, classification is allowed under the Equal Protection Clause as long as the
said classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. The classification, to be reasonable, must
comply with the following requirements:
(a) It must be based upon substantial distinction;
(b) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(d) It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASE(S) TO READ FOR LESSON NO. 2:
1. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG (G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR

OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After
three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the
NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times
and flunked it as many times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected
his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held
that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through
an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a

measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially
proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether

there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school
on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps
most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed
courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading
is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
 We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests
in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the
Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than
our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and
said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar.
The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be
gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the
three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated
or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however
appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him,
have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which,
for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while
belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While
his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a
person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any
work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled
to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent
talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never
have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined
by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the
words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are
a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated
January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.
LESSON 3: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizure are available to all persons, including
aliens (foreigners), whether accused of a crime or not. Artificial persons, like corporations, are
likewise entitled to the guaranty.2
However, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, does not forbid all kinds of
searches and seizure. It only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizure. Accordingly,
reasonable searches and seizure are allowed under the Constitution.
The question now is when is search and seizure reasonable?
A search and seizure is reasonable when the same is made: (a) by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or a search warrant; and (b) in cases of valid warrantless arrest and search.
Requisites of a Valid Warrant
(1) It must be based upon probable cause;
(2) The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
(4) It must particularly state the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized;
Probable Cause
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.3
Properties Subject to Seizure
Under Rule 126, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, the following are the subject of search
and seizure:

2
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383.
3
Burgos v. Chief of Staff. 133 SCRA 800.
 (1) Subject of the offense;
(2) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(3) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Validity of a Warrant of Arrest and a Search Warrant

It must always be borne in mind, specially by future law enforcers like you, that a Warrant
of Arrest does not expire. In other words, a warrant of arrest remains valid through time until
recalled or cancelled by the judge who issued the same.
On the other hand, a Search Warrant remains valid only for ten (10) days after it has been
issued by a judge. After the said period, the Search Warrant is deemed cancelled and therefore,
can no longer be implemented. Thus, a Search Warrant issued on January 1, 2021 can only be
executed until January 11, 2021.
Further, a Warrant of Arrest can be executed or implemented at any time of the day or
night. A Search Warrant, on the other hand, can only be implemented during day time (from
sunrise to sunset), except when the Search Warrant itself provides that it can also be
implemented during night time (from sunset to sunrise).
Instances of a Valid Warrantless Arrest
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued as
previously discussed, or if there was a lawful warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer
must have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer
must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense.
Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is
substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
Instances of a Valid Warrantless Search
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and. seizure violates the Constitution. Any evidence resulting
from it "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
However, the constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, which
are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in

which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle.
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
SUPREME COURT DECIDED CASE(S) TO READ FOR LESSON NO. 3:
1. PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 210 SCRA 174
2. PEOPLE VS. ANITA CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 646
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on

the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his
warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of
the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly
received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that
was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.

The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police
District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw
two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-
appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in
the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted
in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos
were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:

The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of

Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
 That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:

one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing

Serial No. 8720-T

without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.

Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from
him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote
as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the
articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to
prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead
that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and
C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was
the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was
sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the
arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The
defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is

inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article
III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.

We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree
with the prosecution.

Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a
penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining
the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of
the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence.

The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary
as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting
officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could
possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if
at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour
and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the
morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows
but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on
that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.

On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why
his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone
call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who
were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why
he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.

In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of
the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the
arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish.
In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before
him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers'
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch
of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down
a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers.
He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense
in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short,
there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed
with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not
been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and
neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only
later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the
robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal
possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he
was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let
alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was
involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.

In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough

that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
 committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised
Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People
v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched
just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-
ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where
order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer
may be justified in the name of security.

There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling
we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm
taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important
exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based
on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to him.

We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-
appellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but
did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was
acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her
representation even more commendable.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it
happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their
disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible
the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.

This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very
cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of
the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed
to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained
for other offenses. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00,
and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried
leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from
Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
prosecution's evidence as follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following
document and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for
Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately
1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana
contained in the plastic container; "B-1-a"—another plastic container; "C"—
Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for marijuana;
"D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat.
Daniel Obiña and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—Victory
Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt.
Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field
Test dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and
the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong;
Pat. Daniel Obiño, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt.
Leoncio Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a

resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a
request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25,
1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen
consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops
wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store"
(Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After

her examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July
29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations;
microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the
confirmatory examination of thin layer chromatographic test. The said
specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a representative
of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years old,
married, policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo
City. Obiña testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up
to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division
as operative. His job then was among other things to follow up reports in
their office, recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981,
he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on
that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on
the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita
Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting
a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obiña. The bag
placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind
Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous.
With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he
was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag
located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic
woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of
plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of
marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS
Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was
marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo
City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus,
policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself
as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion
that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him,
"Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not
heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded
a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with
her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in

the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt.
Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic
containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could
detect marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of one
year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was taken
from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused and
the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obiña and that of
Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown to
him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise
shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B,"
"B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused
and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the
date and time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be
soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana

from Baguio City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket
No. 684977 which was confiscated from the accused and for Identification
purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at
the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself,
he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as a policeman, he used
his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July

15,1981 and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was
given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about
five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21,
1981, witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was
in Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he took. When the
accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed the bag right
behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat.
Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The
bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of
his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed
his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was
invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to which he refused.
Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag
behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his
medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right
hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached
the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this
incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise
Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East
Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon
of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police
Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day, Pat. Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police
Station with a woman and Identified her in the courtroom as Anita Claudio.
Pat. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the
Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana
leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a
plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white.
Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the
markings of Pat. Obiña which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers
210781 representing the date which was placed by Pat. Obiña after Cpl.
Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.

After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obiña and reduced his statements in
writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña (Exh. "G"). He
also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the
Investigation room seated on a chair. After appraising her of her
constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was willing to give
her written statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements
were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the investigation
room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified by
Pat. Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that
of Pat. Obiña and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and
Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street,
East Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a
policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City,
Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the CANU
General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22, 1981, he reported for work at
the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected
marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field
test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by
a request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").

In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he

prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The
Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol
(THC), an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana, a
prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received
from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the Evidence
Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.

The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old,
married, residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a
policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been
a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July, 1981, he was then
assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper
from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using
a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he saw Pat. Obiña alighted
from the Victory Liner bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus.
When he heard Pat. Obiña he approached him and asked him what was
happening. Pat. Obiña told him he apprehended a certain woman
possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat.
Obiña then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing
with her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the
tricycle while Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver. He then followed in his
motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the
Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there when Pat.
Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing
marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the Investigation
Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obiña in the
presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and
himself. Policeman Bagang Identified the accused in open Court. When
asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the
bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from the
 marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas, Witness
Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the
accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obiña, (Exh.
"B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.

While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's

answer to Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the
marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long at the investigation
Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused
to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the
police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already
marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands
for Daniel Obiña. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER

IF ONE OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE
ABSENT.

II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A.

6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.

III

APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A.

6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE
OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
(Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art.
II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.

The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of

Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the
 victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited
drugs. Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is
not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution
and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of
marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the
possessor is unknown.

This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1
kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo,
(140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags
of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited
drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and
deliver said marijuana.

The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as
unlawful.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested

may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not
need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano,
147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of
marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not
deny having had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she
should just be guilty of possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said
brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana
allegedly found in her possession was only planted.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the
trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of

testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We
also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their
testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147
SCRA 500).

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather
she was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña
for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the
accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony
(People v. De La Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.