EDNA DIAGO LHULLIER v. B RITISH AIRWAYS

J. Del Castillo  March 15, 2010 G.R No. 171092
Doctrine It is settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international
carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Summary Edna Lhuillier brought an action for damages against British Airways after she was allegedly treated poorly by its flight
attendants on a flight from London to Rome. The RTC dismissed the complaint upon Motion by the Airline, ruling that it had no
 jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention.
Convention. The SC agreed, applying the ruling in Santos III v. Northwest. Under Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention, Edna should have filed the complaint where British Airways was domiciled and did business (London)
or where the ticket was bought and where she was headed (Rome). The fact that the action was based on tort did not remove
the case from the application of thet he Warsaw Convention.
Facts   Edna Lhuillier boarded British Airways Flight 548, bound for Rome from London on February 28, 2005
 2005..
  Once on board, Edna asked one of the flight attendants, Julian Halliday, to help her with storing her baggage in the


overhead carrier. Halliday refused, and remarked sarcastically that if he were to

t o help all passengers in the plane he would
have ajust
  Later,

broken back
before landing, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan, singled her out among the business class
passengers to lecture her about flight safety. Edna claimed that Kerrigan made her appear uneducated, ignorant, and
stupid. Edna told Kerrigan that she was familiar
f amiliar with flight safety regulations since she was a frequent traveler. Kerrigan
allegedly said, “We don’t like your attitu de” a few centimeters from her face.
  Upon landing in Rome, Edna complained to the ground manager and demanded an apology. The manager said that the


attendants were only doing their jobs.

  Edna thus filed a complaint for damages against British Airways. Summons was served throug
 throughh the General Manager of
Euro-Philippine Airline Services, which was allegedly the agent of British Airways in the Philippines.
  British Airways: By way of special appearanc
 appearance e filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, claiming that
t he Warsaw Convention1, only the Courts of London, or Rome have jurisdiction over the case, since
under Art. 28(1) of the
British Airways was domiciled and did business in London, and since the ticket t icket was bought in Rome which also happened
to be the final destination. Further, summons was improperly served since Euro-Philippines was not its resident agent.
  Makati RTC: Granted British Airways’ Motion to Dismiss. The lower court agreed with the contention that under the


Warsaw Convention, the case should have been filed either in London or in Rome. Reference was made to the case of
Santos v. Northwest which had similar factual considerations. The Warsaw Convention was bind ing since the Philippines
was a signatory, and as such, as bound to follow the stipulations of the convention under the pacta sunt servanda rule.
  Lhuillier brought the ca
 case
se before the SC on a p pure
ure question of law
Ratio/Issues
I. Whether the Warsaw Conventio n Applies (YE
(YES)
S)
(1) The applicability of the Warsaw Convention was decided in the casecase of Santos III v. Northwest. There, the Court held
that the Philippines was a party to the Convention which was concurred in by the Senate on May 16, 1950, signed by
then President Quirino on October 13, and took
t ook effect on February 9, 1951. President Magsaysay later issued a
proclamation affirming the country’s formal adherence to the convention.
(2) Under Article 1 of the convention2; the convention applies to international carriage, which is
i s defined in the same
article. There is international carriage when the place of departure and the destination are situated in the territories of
the High Contracting Parties.
(3) In this case, the destina
destination
tion was Rome, and the place of departure
departure was London. Both Italy and the Un United
ited Kingdom
are signatories to the Warsaw Convention and are considered High Contracting Parties. Thus the fflight light Edna Lhuillier
was on was considered international carriage, as governed by the Warsaw
W arsaw Convention

II. Whether Philipp ine Courts have Juri sdict ion over Edna s complaint (NO)
’

(1) Applying the Warsaw Convention, Philippine courts would not have jurisdiction over Edna’s complaint. Article 28(1)
provides for the places where an action for damages under the convention can arise:
(1) The ccourt
ourt where the ca
carrier
rrier is domiciled;
(2) The court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
(3) The court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
(4) The ccourt
ourt of the place
place o
off destination
(2) British Airways is a company domiciled in Lond London,
on, where it also does its business.
business. Thus under the firs
firstt two rules under
 Article 28(1), an action may be brought in London. The ticket was bought through Jeepney Travel S.A.S in Rome,
which also happened to be Edna ’s destination. Thus under the last two jurisdictional rules, the case could be brought
in Rome.
(3) The Makati RTC, therefore, correctly ruled that that it had no jurisdiction ov
over
er the case

III. Whether the ruling in Santos III v. Northwest  applies (YES)

(1) Edna Lhuillier claims that the Santos ruling shouldn ’t control this case, since her action was based on tortious conduct
and not breach of contract as in Santos. 

1
 An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the C ourt having
 jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinaril
ordinarily
y resident, or has his principal place
place of business, or has an establishment
establishment by which the contract has been made or before the
Court having jurisdiction at the place of destination. 
2
 1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by
aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage"
carriage" means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place
of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place
between territories
territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the
purposes of this Convention.
 

(2) In Santos, the Court held that Philippine courts had no jurisdiction over an action for damages filed against Northwest
Orient Airlines for a flight with San Francisco as a final destination. (San Francisco-Tokyo-Manila-Tokyo-San
Francisco). The airline was domiciled and did business in San Francisco, where Santos also bought the ticket, thus
the Court ruled that applying the jurisdictional rules, the action should be brought in San Francisco.
Fra ncisco. 
(3) The Court also rea reaffirmed
ffirmed the jurisdictional character of Art. 28(1) as stated in Santos3. Jurisdiction takes on a dual
28(1)
concept if the matter is governed by the t he Warsaw Convention. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be
established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular
court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has
 jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken
taken up. This second question shall be governed
governed by the law of the
court to which the case is submitted  
(4) Contrary to Lhuillier ’s assertions, the Santos case applies squarely to her situation. Like Lhuillier, Santos also claimed
that the Warsaw Convention did not apply in cases of tortious conduct. The Court decided in Santos that “the
allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the comprehension of the
Warsaw Convention.” Lhullier argues that this pronouncement was obiter , the Court clarified that this was actually part
of the ratio disposing of the argument presented by Santos that the Warsaw Convention did not apply in cases of tort.  
(5) Two American ca cases
ses illustrate the applicability of the Warsaw convention in cases of tort. In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines ,
the U.S Court of Appeals (9th circuit) affirmed that the convention did not create an exception for injury suffered as a
result of intentional conduct. In Carey v. United Airlines, the same court held that the "passenger's action against the
airline carrier arising from alleged confrontational incident between passenger and flight attendant on international
flight was governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention, even though the incident allegedly involved intentional
misconduct by the flight attendant. ” 
(6) It is thus settled that allegations
allegations of tort ious conduc t commit ted against
against an airline passe
passenger
nger during the
course of t he international
international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Convention.

IV.
IV. [Procedural]
[Procedural] Whether British Airways volunt arily submitted it self to the Court s jur isdiction (NO
(NO))’

(1) The Special Appearan

Appearance
ce of British Airways to file a Motion to Dismiss could not be considered as a voluntary
voluntary
appearance.
(2) The Court cited
cited the case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court reiterated the ruling made in La Naval Drug
Corporation v. CA interpreting Section 20, Rule 14 of the t he Rules of Court. 4 
(3) “  A
A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction ofof the court over his person, together with other
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. W hat the ru rule
le on voluntary
appearance… means is that the t he voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case
he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons … 
a special appearance before the court ––  ––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if if
the movant invokes other grounds ––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
 jurisdiction over his person; and such
such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the court. ” 

Held Petition DENIED. Orders of the RTC AFFIRMED

Prepared by: Bian Villanueva [Transpo|Angeles]

3
 In Santos, the Court gave the following reasons for affirming the jurisdictional character of Art. 28(1): “First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places
where the action for damages "must" be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterizat
characterization
ion is consistent with one of the

objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain
any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only to
Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to
the will of the parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.” 
4
 Section 20.Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.