Aquinas On Mind Kretzzaman

University of Arkansas Press
Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind

Author(s): Norman Kretzmann
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 20, No. 2, Medieval Philosophy (FALL 1992), pp. 77-101
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
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PHILOSOPHICALTOPICS
VOL.
20 NO.
2, FALL
1992
Aquinas' s Philosophy of Mind
Norman Kretzmann
Cornell
University
My purposesin thisarticleareprimarily I am concernedwith

expository.1
Aquinas's accountofwhatthemindis andhowitrelatestothebodyandthen
withhisaccountofwhattheminddoes andhowitdoes it- themetaphysi-
cal andthepsychologicalsidesofhisphilosophyofmind.2
1. SOUL AS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF LIFE
The centralsubjectofAquinas's philosophy ofmindis whathe calls ratio-

nalsoul(animarationalistfarmoreoftenthanhe calls itmind(mens).This
apparentlytrivialfactabouthis terminology has theoreticalimplications.3
Aquinas'sphilosophy ofmindcan be understood onlyin thecontextofhis
moregeneraltheory ofsoul,whichnaturallymakesuse ofmanyfeatures of
hismetaphysics.
Obviously,Aquinasis nota materialist.God- subsistent beingitself,
theabsolutelyfundamentalelement ofAquinas'smetaphysics - is,ofcourse,
in no way material.But even some creaturesare entirely independent of
matter,whichAquinas thinksof as exclusivelycorporeal.4The funda-
mentaldivisionin his broadclassification
of createdthingsis betweenthe
- e.g.,stars,trees,andcats- andtheincorporeal
corporeal -
(or spiritual)
77
e.g., angels.(Aquinassometimescalls spiritualcreatures "separatedsub-
stances"becauseoftheirincorporeality.) Butthisexhaustive divisionseems
to be notperfectly exclusive,just because human beingsmust be classified
notonlyas corporealbutalso as spiritual ina certain respect.Theyhavethis
uniquelyproblematic status among creatures in virtueofthepeculiarchar-
acterofthehumansoul.
Simplyhavinga soul is notenoughto givea creature a spiritual com-
ponent, since Aquinas uses 'soul' in
generically way a thatevenmanymate-
rialistscouldtolerate. Nobodyobjectstodividing physical
things intoanimate
and inanimate things, andAquinas'sgenericuse of 4anima"treatstheterm
as ifitweremerelya nounofconvenience associatedwith'animate'{ani-
mata): "In order to inquire into the nature of the[human]soul,we haveto
presuppose that 'soul' (anima) is what we call thefirst
principle of lifein
things thatliveamongus; forwe call livingthings'animate'[or'ensouled'],
but thingsthatare devoid of life 'inanimate'[or 'not ensouled']" (ST
1.75.lc).5So treesandcats,nolessthanwe,havesouls,although inAquinas's
viewneither plants nor nonhuman animals are in anyrespectspiritual crea-
tures.Still,he emphatically deniesthateventhemerelynutritive soul of a
plantorthenutritive + sensorysoulofa beastcan be identified withanyof
thelivingthing'sbodilyparts.He findsa basisforrulingoutthatpossibility
inwhathe usesas soul's defining formula: "thefirst principleoflife".
FromAristotle, Aquinas learned of presocratic materialists who had
simplyidentified souls as bodies- bodilypartsof livingbodies.He sees
thosephilosophers as havingbegun,quiteproperly, byconsidering whatis
mostapparent aboutlife:thepresenceinlivingthingsofcertaindistinctive
activitieswhich,becausetheynaturally implylife(vita)at some levelor
other, are called "vital" - e.g.,growth cognition.But in his viewthose
or
ancientreductive materialists, "claiming thatbodiesalonearerealthings, and
thatwhatis nota bodyis nothing at all" (ST 1.75.lc), confusedtheshorter-
rangeprojectof identifying materialsourcesor partialexplanations (prin-
cipia) of one or another particular vitalactivity withthesearchforthesoul
behindall ofthem,thefirstprinciple, theultimate intrinsic
sourceorexpla-
nationofall ofan animatething'svitalactivities anditsmodeofexistence.
The confusion inpresocratic materialism can be showninmanyways,
Aquinas thinks. In Summa contra gentiles (SCG) 11.65heoffers severalargu-
mentswiththataim,butnoneof thoseis as strongas theanti-reductionist
argument he presents later,inST 1.75.lc, againstthepossibility ofreducing
an animatebeing'ssoulto anyofitsbodilyparts.
Inthisargument he invitesus toconsidera particular vitalactivity, such
as visualperception. Ofcourse,eyesmustbe includedina correct explana-
tionof vision- and,he mighthave said,skinin theexplanation of touch,
rootsor stomachsin explanations of growth, etc. That is, vitalactivities
typically do have bodies among their principles. Andsincea principle ofa
78
particular vitalactivity mayindeedbe considered a principle oflife(though
only in that particular respect and to an appropriately restrictedextent),it
be
may granted that some bodies- a
e.g., livinganimal's normal eyes- are
principles of life.It is in thatspecial, limited sense that thepresocratic mate-
rialistswereon therighttrack.Butno one,Aquinasthinks, wouldcall an
eye(ora root,ora stomach)a soul.So, hesays,someprinciples oflifeclearly
arebodies,butthosethatarearen'tsouls.
Of course,thereareotherkindsof bodies- stones,forinstance - that
arenotonlynotprinciples oflifebutevennaturally lifeless,andso no body
considered justas a bodyhas lifeessentially. Buta firstintrinsic principle
oflife(whichimbueseverything elseinananimate bodywithlife)musthave
lifeessentially. If itdidn't,itshavinglifewouldbe explainedon thebasis
ofsomething else intrinsic tothatlivingbody,anditwouldn'tbe thatbody's
firstprinciple oflife.Therefore, no soul,nofirstprinciple oflife,is a body.
If a soul is in anyrespectcorporeal - in itsessentialdependenceon some
bodilyorgan,forinstance - itwillnotbe in virtueofitscorporeality thatit
animatesthethingwhosesoulitis.
Furthermore, anyvegetableor animalbodyhas thelifeithas onlyin
virtueofbeinga bodyorganizedin a waythatconferson itnaturalpoten-
tialitiesforbeinginparticular sortsofstates.Anda bodyis organizedinthis
orthatwayandhastheseorthosenatural potentialitiesonlybecauseofa cer-
tainprinciplewhichis called thebody's actus, thesubstantial formthat
makesitactuallybe sucha vegetableor animalbody.6Therefore, thefirst
principle oflifein a livingbody,itssoul,is no bodilypartofthatbodybut
rather itsform,one ofthetwometaphysical partsofthecompositeofmat-
terandformthatabsolutely everybodyis.
Thisargument, whichAquinasappliesto theexplanation oflifeinany
andeverylivingcorporealthing, is noteffective againsteverysortofmate-
rialism.Materialists whotolerateAquinas's sortofgenericconceptofsoul
at all, andwhounderstand soul notsimplyas a bodybutas a function ofa
body or as the effect of a of
configurationphysicalcomponents, can also tol-
eratethecriticallinetakeninthisanti-reductionist argument, however they
reactto itsconclusionidentifying soul withform.It is onlywhenAquinas
presents hisaccountofthehumansoulinparticular thathe takesa position
entirely incompatible with materialist theoriesof livingthings.
2. THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE HUMAN SOUL
In a theory
thatrecognizesthesoulofa plantas a merelynutritivefirst
intrin-
sic principle
oflife,andthesoulofa nonhuman + sen-
animalas a nutritive
soryprinciple ofthatsort,itcomesas no surprise thatthesoul ofa human
79
beingis to be analyzedas nutritive + sensory+ rational.Aquinasthinksof
thehumansoulnotas threenested,cooperating substantial forms, however,
butas thesingleformthatgivesa humanbeingitsspecifically humanmode
ofexistence, including andfunctions,
potentialities fromitsgeneticmakeup
on up to itsmostcreativetalents.7 Andso he willoftensimplyidentify the
humansoulas therationalsoul,an identification madeentirely appropriate
bythefactthatrationalis thedifferentia ofthehumanspeciesinthegenus
animal.A consequenceof thisidentification is hisfrequent designation of
theentiresubstantial formof a humanbeingby its distinctive aspect of
as in thispassage:"It is necessaryto saythatthatwhichis the
rationality,8
principle ofintellective whatwe call thesoulofa humanbeing,is
activity,
an incorporeal, subsistent principle"9(ST 1.75.2c). Herehe revealsnotonly
whatdistinguishes humanbeingsfromall otheranimalsbutalso whatmakes
thehumansoulpeculiar:itsstatusas "subsistent", a necessary condition for
itsexistingapartfromthebodywhoseformitis.
We havealreadyseenAquinasarguingthatno soul,consideredas the
ultimate (orfirst)intrinsicprincipleofa corporealcreature's vitalactivities,
can be identified withanything corporeal.And since he hereexpressly
identifiesthesoul of a humanbeingwiththeprincipleof thedistinctively
humanvitalactivity ofintellection,we couldhaveanticipated hisclaimthat
thatprinciple mustbe incorporeal. Butnowheis concerned notmerelywith
whatsucha principle couldnotbe butalso with"thatwhichis theprinciple".
He is goingbeyondtheprimarily negativeconclusionof his genericanti-
reductionistargument tomakea further, affirmative claimaboutthenature
oftheformthatis tobe identified as thehumansoul;andboththenegative
andtheaffirmative partsofthisthesisaretheoretically dictated("It is nec-
essarytosay").Thehumansoul,justbecauseitis distinctively theprinciple
ofintellectiveactivity,notonlymustnotbe describedas corporeal;itmust,
furthermore, be described as subsistent.Forthatreasonhecannotsimplyrely
ontheresultoftheanti-reductionist argument, whichhastodo generally with
anycorporeal being'sfirst principleoflifeandwhichentailsnothing regard-
ingsucha principle'ssubsistence.
His specialargument forthepeculiarstatusof thedistinctively intel-
lectivehumansoul restson two highlytheoretical claims: (A) "through
intellectthehumanbeingcan havecognition of thenaturesof all bodies";
(B) "any[faculty] thatcan havecognition ofcertainthingscannothaveany
ofthosethingsin itsownnature"(ST I.75.2c).
Claim(A) hasan implausible ringtoit,buttheimplausibility is reduced
bya carefulreading,whichshowsthatAquinasintendsitas a claimabout
a generalhumancapacityinrespectofthenaturesofall bodies.10 Although
thereseemsto be no possibilityof proving(A),11theplausibility of its
universality has certainlybeen enhancedsince Aquinas's day by the
80
spectacular development of thenaturalsciences,theparadigms of system-
aticintellective cognition of the natures of bodies.
Claim(B) meanssomething likethis:to be a cognitive faculty is to be
essentially in a state of receptivepotentiality relativeto certain typesof
the
things, faculty's -
properobjects e.g.,sounds, forthe of
faculty hearing.
So ifthefaculty itselfhas something ofthattypeinitactually - e.g.,a ring-
ing in theears - it forfeits
at least some of the naturalreceptive potentiality
thatmadeita cognitive inthefirst 12 someone'stongue
faculty place. Injecting
withsomething bitterwill diminishand distorthersense of taste;13 just
becauseitis a corporealorganofcognition, thetonguecan be madeto for-
feita cognitional potentialityin thiswayas a consequenceof acquiringan
accidentalphysicalquality."So iftheintellective principle had in itselfthe
nature ofanybody,itwouldnotbe capableofcognizing all bodies.Butevery
bodyhas somedeterminate nature, and so itis impossiblethattheintellec-
tiveprinciple be a body"(ST 1.75.2c).14Moreover, evena normal, unaltered
tongue,simplyinvirtueofbeinga bodyitself, lacksthepowerofcognizing
atleastonebodythatmightotherwise be includedamongitsproperobjects:
itcan'ttasteitself.On theotherhand,as theveryexistenceofphilosophical
psychology shows,"ourintellect does havecognition ofitself".15
Sinceanynormalcorporealorganof(sensory)cognition must,simply
as corporeal, be incapableofcognizingsomecorporealobjectsandcan,as
a consequenceofphysicalalteration, be rendered incapableofcognizing still
more,it follows,giventheuniversality of claim(A), thattheintellective
principle notonlycannotbe butalso cannotdirectly useanycorporeal organ
inperforming itsdistinctive operation. Ofcourse,ourcognition ofanypar-
ticularbodyitselfis sensory,and so ourcognitionof anything associated
withbodies,including theirnatures, dependsultimately on sensorycogni-
tion.So one's intellect does dependforitsdata on theoperation ofthecor-
porealorgansof one's otherfaculties;butin processing thosedataitdoes
notuse anybodyatall thewayvisualcognition usestheeye- "as theorgan
bymeansofwhichthatsortofactivity is carriedout"(ST 1.75.2,ad 3).16
According toAquinas,thesubsistence ofthehumansoulfollowsfrom
thisstrong thesisofitsincorporeality. The vitalactivity ofintellective cog-
nition,whichdistinguishes thehumansoul fromall otherterrestrial souls,
is onethatitperforms "onitsown(perse), inwhichthebodydoesnotshare",
notevento theextentof supplying an organfortheactivity.17 Butnothing
can operateon itsownin thisstrongsenseunlessitis something "thatsub-
sistson itsown".A glowingcoal, whichdoes subsiston itsown,can warm
something else; butheat,an accidentalformwhoserealexistenceis utterly
dependent on itsoccurring in somematter, is justforthatreasonincapable
ofwarming anything on itsown.The humansoul,therefore, is "something
incorporeal and subsistent" (ST 1.75.2c).
81
3. THE HUMAN SOUL AS BOTH A SUBSISTENT ENTITY
AND A SUBSTANTIAL FORM
Aquinas'ssubsistence thesis,whichclearlyis incompatible withmaterial-

ismofanysort,brings withitbothanadvantage anda difficulty
forhistheory
of thesoul. On thepositiveside, it establishesa necessaryconditionof
immortality: ifthedistinctively humanaspectofthehumananimalis some-
and
thingincorporeal subsistent, biologicaldeathneednotbe thedeathof
theperson.The humansoul's subsistence on itsown is thephilosophical
basisfora reasonedaccountofpersonalimmortality.18 Thedifficultythesub-
sistencethesisposes forAquinas'stheoryis itsthreatto theunityof the
humanbeing.A humanbeingis definedas a rationalanimal,an animalis
definedas a living,sensitive,corporealbeing,and thesedefinitions are
essential toAquinas'sgeneral, fundamentally Aristotelian,accountofnature.
Aristotle himselfinsuresthecoherenceofthisportionoftheaccountin his
explanation of thehumansoul as thesubstantial formof thehumanbody,
an explanation thatAquinaswholeheartedly adopts,as we have seen.The
subsistence thesis,however,especiallyas employedin supportof immor-
tality,threatens to leave thehumanbeingidentified withthehumansoul,
lookinglikean incorporeal, subsistent entitythatis temporarilyandrather
casuallyassociatedwitha body- lookinglikePlato'srather thanAristotle's
humanbeing.19
In orderto avoid thisoutcome,Aquinas mustoffera moreprecise
accountofthesoul's subsistence, attempting tomakeitcompatible withthe
accountofthesoulas a form.He takesupthischallengerepeatedly,20 some-
timesexplicitly addressing theissueofthecompatibility ofthetwoclaims
that(E) thesoulis a subsistent entity andthat(F) thesoulis a form.
Perhapsthefullestdiscussionof thissortis in thefirst questionof his
DisputedQuestionsontheSoul (QDA): "Can thehumansoulbe botha form
"
anda realparticular (hocaliquid)! The eighteen openingarguments ofthe
questionsupport a negativereplyon thebasisofa verycreditable arrayof
considerations againstAquinas'saffirmative position.21
Aquinas'sopeningmovein dispellingtheapparent incompatibilityof
(E) and(F) is hisintroduction ofa distinctionregarding theAristotelian
tech-
nicalnotionofa realparticular (hocaliquid), a notionmorepreciseandeven
morefamiliar tohiscontemporaries thanthatofa subsistent "
entity.Strictly
' '
he says, hocaliquid appliesto"an individual inthecategory of
speaking,"
substance", i.e.,"a primary substance". Something is anindividualinthecat-
egoryofsubstance, strictlyspeaking, ifandonlyif(1) itis "notinsomething
else as itssubject"(thewayheatis intheglowingcoal) andso "can subsist
on itsown";and(2) itis "something completeinsomespeciesandgenusof
substance", something thatoccupiesa place of itsownin thenaturalorder
82
ofthings. A humanbeing'shand,forinstance, belongstohernotas hercolor
does butas a partbelongsto a whole,and so it can subsiston its own
(although unnaturally, andas a handonlyina mannerofspeaking).But,of
it
course, onlyis the whole humanbeingthatis completein thegenusani-
malandthespeciesrationalanimal.Sincea humanhandhasno placeofits
ownin thegeneraand speciesof substance, itsatisfies(1) butnot(2), and
so countsas a hoc aliquidonlybroadlyspeaking.
Havingsetthestagewiththisdistinction, followedbyrejections ofvar-
iouslyunsatisfactory ancient theoriesof thesoul,Aquinaspresents own
his
view.Likethehumanhand,thehumansoulis inthehumanbeingnotas heat
is in a coal butas a partis in a whole,andso itis "capableofsubsisting on
itsown"- i.e.,itsatisfies (1). As for(2), thesoul's status
is subtler
and loftier
thanthehand's.Like thehand,thesoul on itsowncannotsatisfy (2). But,
quiteunlikethehandor anyotherbodilypartof therationalanimal,the
humansoul "as the[substantial] formof thebodyhas theroleoí fulfilling
or completing (perficiens)the human species"- i.e.,thesoulis notonlythe
but
rationality also,indeed, the fullrational animality ofthatbody.Without
thesoul,thatbodyis a corpse,whichcanbe calleda humanbodyonlyequiv-
ocally.Although thesoul itselfhas no place of itsown amongindividuals
sortedoutinthespeciesandgeneraofsubstance, itis whatgivesthehuman
beingitsuniqueplaceinthatsystem, whatenablesthisorthathumanbeing
tosatisfy (2); andso itis morenearlya hocaliquidthananybodilypartcould
be.22However,we canbestappreciate thepeculiarstatusAquinasestablishes
forthehumansoul notbyfocusingon itsclaimsto thedesignation ofhoc
aliquidbutrather byseeingjusthowhe combines(E) and(F): byshowing
thatneither ofthoseapparently conflicting claimsregarding thehumansoul
can be correctly understood without takingtheotherone intoaccount.
Beginningwithwhatis mostaccessibleto us, as he prefers alwaysto
do, Aquinasreasonsfromthevitalactivities ofa humanbeingto thepecu-
liarcharacter ofthefirst principle ofitslifeanditsmodeofexistence:
Andso we can in thiswaycometo knowthehumansoul's
modeofexistence, onthebasisofitsactivity. Forinsofar as it
hasanactivity [viz.,intellective
cognition] thattranscends mate-
rialthings, itsexistence,too,is raisedabovethebodyanddoes
notdependon it.On theotherhand,insofar as itis naturally
suited toacquire immaterial cognitionfrom whatismaterial, the
fulfilment ofitsnature clearlycannot occurwithout unionwith
thebody;forsomething is complete initsnature onlyifithas
[initself] thethings thatarerequired fortheactivity thatis
proper toitsnature. Therefore,sincethehuman soulinsofar as
itis united tothebodyas a form alsohasitsexistence raised
abovethebodyanddoesnotdepend onit,itisclearthat thesoul
isestablished ontheborderline between corporeal andseparate
substances.
[i.e.,spiritual] (QDA lc)23
83
The"borderline" statusofthehumansoulis notmerely picturesque.The
distinctivelyhuman vitalactivity is and
intellective thus rather
spiritual than
corporeal, sinceintellectneither is nordirectly uses a corporealorgan.But
intellectioninvolvessensation, whichis necessarily corporealin itsorgans
andoperations; and 'involves'heremeansmorethanmerely'is addedto'
oreven'dependson'. For,as we've seen,theproper objectsofintellectcome
to itonlyvia thesenses,butthehumansensorysoul,properly understood,
isjustan aspectoftherationalsoul.Andso thesoul's involvement withthe
body is nota case of a spiritualcreature's a
using body, as a personmight
use a lamp.The unionofsoulandbodymaymoreaccurately be thought of
as a humansoul'sconstituting some matteras a livinghuman being,in some-
thinglikethewaya quantity ofelectricity (whichneedsno bulbor wireto
exist)constitutessomematter as a lightedlamp.
4. INTELLECT- PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT
Aquinas's accountof whattheminddoes and how itdoes itdividesnatu-

rallyintohis theoriesof intellect and of will,thecognitiveand appetitive
facultiesoftherationalsoul.I beginbyfocusingon intellect.24
Aquinas'sphilosophy ofmindis likemostotherpartsofhisworkinits
of
interweaving philosophical andtheologicalstrands. Amongthefounda-
tionsofhistheory ofhumancognition area fewbasictheological doctrines
(which he elucidates and supports with philosophicalanalysis and argu-
mentation25): God, thecreator,is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly
good; andpartofGod's purposeincreating is themanifestation ofhimself
torationalcreatures. Aquinas's theism is so thoroughly informed byreason
thatwhenhe combinessuchdoctrines withtheories, he seemsalwaystobe
guidedbytheexpectation thatthetheology andthephilosophy willturnout
tobe mutually confirming, neither the
overriding other, as inthis character-
isticaccountofbodyandmind:"Theimmediate purpose of the human body
soulanditsoperations,
is therational sincematter is forthesakeoftheform,
andinstruments areforthesakeoftheagent'sactivities. I maintain, there-
fore,thatGod designed the human body in thepattern best suited to that
form
andthoseactivities" 1.9
(ST 1.3c).
Sensorycognitionis, as we've seen,indispensableto thecognitive
activitydistinctiveoftherationalsoul;andso thesenses,too,he says,"have
beengivento humanbeingsnotonlyin orderto getthenecessitiesof life,
butalso to acquirecognition" (ST 1.91.3,ad 3).26Consequently, thehuman
animal, unlike all theothers, is called not sensory but rather rational sub-
stance, "because sensation is less than [rationality],which is properto a
84
humanbeing".Still,justbecauseof sensation'sindispensable contribution
to intellect'soperations, sensing "is more excellently suited to a human
being than to other animals" 1.
(ST 108.5c).27 Afterall,itis the rational soul
thatis identified as a humanbeing'ssinglesubstantial form,informing all
itsfaculties. Theological considerations again fallinto place: since it is the
humanintellect , notthehumanbodyoritssenses,inrespectofwhichhuman
beingsaremadeintheimageofGod,28 reasonablethatitscog-
itis entirely
nitivefaculty inparticular shouldmanifest specialexcellence;andsincethe
humanintellect on
depends the human senses,thecreatorwho leaveshis
in
image theintellect can hardlyleave thesensesless thansuperbly suited
forcognitiveserviceto intellect.29
Pickingup thephilosophical strand,evenAquinas's comments on "All
humanbeingsdesireto know" and the restof the openingpassage of
Aristotle's Metaphysics containall theelements neededforan argument on
natural grounds thatwould,inturn, confirm histheological observations. For
example,"theproperactivity ofa humanbeingconsidered justas a human
beingis to thinkandunderstand, foritis in thisrespectthata humanbeing
differsfromall others.That is whya humanbeing's desireis naturally
inclinedto thinking andunderstanding and,as a consequence,to acquiring
organizedknowledge.. . . [But] a naturaldesirecannotoccurin vain"
(Commentary on Aristotle s Metaphysics (In M) I.1.3-4).30Therefore, we
mightfairly conclude,nature, including humancognitive faculties, mustbe
organizedin sucha wayas to enablehumanbeingsto satisfy theirnatural
desireto know(allowingforwideindividual, accidentaldifferences). And
sincetheobjectof a thing'snaturaldesireis thatthing'snaturalgood,itis
notsurprising to findAquinasoftenalludingtotheAristotelian observation
thattruth is intellect'snaturalgood,31 theverythingtowhicha perfectly good
God wouldguarantee intellect'saccess generally.32
5. INTELLECT- AQUINAS'S DIRECT REALISM
The guaranteedaccess is utterlydirect,to the pointof formalidentity

betweentheextra-mental objectandtheactuallycognizing faculty initscog-
nizing of that s
object(althoughAquinas' terminology can be initiallymis-
leading on thisscore):"What is cognizedintellectively is in the one who has
theintellectivecognition bymeans ofitslikeness. And it is inthis sense that
we saythatwhatis actuallycognizedintellectively is theintellect actualized
( intellectum
in actu estintellectus
inactu ), insofar
as a likeness of thething
thatis cognizedis [onsuchan occasion]theformoftheintellect, intheway
thata likenessofthesense-percepible thingis theformofa senseactualized
[on an occasion ofsense-perception]" (ST 1.85.2,ad l).33Thefactthatthese
85
strongclaimsofformal identity areexpressedinterms of"likenesses" might
suggest that the foundations of s
Aquinas' theory of intellection containa
dubiousmixture of directrealismandrepresentationalism. Dispellingthat
impression on
depends getting a clearer view of Aquinas' accountof the
s
dataofcognition, theirtransmission, andtheirtransformation.
"Intellect'soperationarises fromsensation"(ST Ia.78.4, ad 4).34
Corporealthings makephysicalimpressions onthecorporealorgansof"the
external senses", which have both "properobjects"(colorsforsight,sounds
forhearing, etc.) and "common objects"(shapesforsightandtouch,etc.).
The internalized sensoryimpressions, the"sensoryspecies",35 aretransmit-
tedto "internal senses", which store the sensoryspecies and processthem
invariousways.36 Myprincipal concern with the internal senses hereis with
one oftherolesoftheone Aquinascalls "phantasia"37: producing andpre-
the
serving sensory data that are indispensable for intellect's use,"the phan-
tasms".38 In intellect itselfAquinasdistinguishes twoAristotelian "powers":
" activeor productive] whichactson the
agent[i.e.,essentially intellect",
phantasms ina waythatproduces"intelligible species", which constitute the
contents in "
ofthemind,stored possible[i.e.,essentially
primary receptive]
intellect".39
The likenessesthatare identified as sensoryspeciesand phantasms
maybe literally -
"likenesses",images realizations of thematerialforms
(colors,sounds,textures, etc.)of external objects in different matter, themat-
teroftheexternal/internal sensoryapparatus of the human body.40 And,in
keepingwiththeformal-identity the
theory, sensory species, least, like-
at are
nessesthatlosenoneofthedetailpresent in the external sensesthemselves41
in
(which,ofcourse,vary sensitivity among individuals andfromone time
to anotherin thesameindividual): "A sense organ is affected by a sense-
perceptible thing, because to sense is to undergosomething. thatreason
For
thesense-perceptible thing, which is the agent[in sensation],makesthe
organbe actually as the sense-perceptible thingis,sincetheorganis ina state
ofpotentiality to this [result]"(In DA 11.23.547).The likenessessentialto
sensory cognition, then, in no waycompromises directrealism;atthislevel
therelationship is simplycausal,rather thanrepresentational ina distinctive,
stronger sense.42
It is naturalforus to havecognitionof complex,hylomorphic things,
Aquinasthinks, "in virtueofthefactthatoursoul,through whichwe have
cognition, is theformof somematter[i.e.,is itselfa component in a hylo-
morphic composite]. But the soul has two cognitivepowers. One is theact
ofa corporeal organ, and itis naturalfor itto have of
cognition things as they
existin individuating matter, which is why sense has cognition of individ-
ualsonly.Butthesoul's othercognitivepoweris intellect, whichis notthe
actofanycorporeal organ. And so through intellect itis naturalforus tohave
cognition of natures. of
Natures, course, do not have existence exceptin
86
individuating matter.43
It is naturalforus to havecognition of them,how-
ever,not as they arein individuating matterbut as theyare abstracted
from
itbyintellect's consideration.Thusinintellection we canhavecognition of
such thingsin universality, whichis beyondthe facultyof sense" (ST
1.12.4c).Itis easytoreadthisaccountas ifitleftintellective cognition
quite
detached fromextra-mental but,as we'll see,intellect,
reality, too,hasaccess
to individuals.
6. INTELLECT- THE ROLES OF PHANTASMS AND

INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES
Phantasms arelikenessesofparticular materialthingsre-realized in physi-

cal configurations of theorganof phantasia, whichAquinaslocatedin the
brain.44Although theformspresented in thephantasms havebeenstripped
oftheiroriginalmatter, thephantasm-likeness is particularized byitsdetails,
theexternalobject'soriginalindividuating matter being"represented" by
features ofthephantasm. Phantasms themselves, then,arenotproper objects
ofintellective cognition, thoughtheyareindispensable to it.
Intellectcanhavecognition ofthenatures ofcorporeal things,whichare
amongitsproperobjects,onlyafterit performs an abstraction whoseraw
material is phantasms andwhoseproduct is "intelligible species".45Aquinas
sees thisabstraction oftheuniversalfromitsparticular(s) as required byan
Aristotelian principlehe accepts:"Thingshave to do withintellect to the
extent towhichtheycanbe separated frommatter" {De animaIII 4, 429b21);
andtheextenttowhichphantasia' s phantasms areseparated fromtheexter-
nal object'soriginalmatter byno meansexhaustsourcapacityforabstrac-
tion.But,of course,nothingcould provideintellective cognitionof the
natureof a materialthingunless,evenin thedegreeof abstraction appro-
priateto intellection, itincludedtheabstracted conceptofthething'smate-
rialcomponent.46 So, sincetherealcomplexsubstances outsidethemindare
themselves concrete hylomorphic individuals, tohave cognition thatdepends
on"abstracting theformfromtheindividuating matter, whichthephantasms
represent, is to havecognition of thatwhichis in individuating matter, but
notas itis in suchmatter" (ST 1.85.lc).47
Nevertheless, abstractiondoesnotentailanydecreaseinveridicality: "if
we consider a coloranditscharacteristics without atall considering theapple
thathasthecolor,oreven[ifwe] expressverbally whatwe haveintellective
cognition of in that way, therewill be no falsity opinionorofspeech.For
of
theapplehas no partin thenature{ratio)ofthecolor,and so nothing pre-
ventsourhavingintellective cognition ofthecolorwithout anysuchcogni-
tionoftheapple Forthereis no falsity inthefactthattheintellect's way
87
ofhavingintellective cognition [ofa thing]is different fromthething'sway
ofexisting"(ST 1.85.1,ad l).48
Justas theapple'scolorcanbe cognitively considered veridically inde-
of
pendently any consideration of the apple, so "those that
things pertain to
thespecificnature(ratiospeciei)of anymaterialthing - a stone,a man,a
horse- can be considered[veridically] without theindividuating principles
thathave no partin thespecificnature.And thatis whatabstracting the
universalfroma particular, or the intelligiblespecies fromphantasms,
amountsto- viz.,considering thespecificnature(naturaspeciei) without
the
considering individuating principles thatarerepresented byphantasms"
The
(ibid.).49 intelligible species are purelyconceptual,non-eidetic, thor-
oughly abstract entities
occurring in
only possible intellect- like one's con-
of
cept triangularity or one's understanding of the Pythagorean theorem
ratherthanlikeevenabstract geometric imagery.50
But,itis important to see,theseintelligible speciesthemselves arenot
properobjectsofintellective cognition anymorethanphantasms are;direct
realismcouldhardlybe sustainedifeitherof thoseentities internal to the
humanbeingwereidentified as a proper objectofordinary, nonreflexive cog-
nition.Aquinasdoes recognize,however,thatintelligible speciesserveas
theimmediate objectsof a kindof abstract thinking he seemsto call 'con-
sidering'51: "Ourintellectbothabstracts intelligiblespeciesfromphantasms,
insofar as itconsidersthenatures ofthings universally, andyetalso hasintel-
lectivecognition ofthem[i.e.,thosenatures]in thephantasms, sincewith-
outattending tothephantasms itcannothaveintellective cognition ofeven
thosethings whose[intelligible] speciesitabstracts" (ST 1.85.1, ad 5). Intan-
demwithphantasms, intelligible speciesare intellect'smeansof access to
theproperobjectsofintellective cognition.52 Andintellect's properobjects
includethecorporeal natures themselves, whichexistonlyoutsidethemind,
inmaterialindividuals.53
Theabstractedness, theuniversality, ofintelligible speciesmaysuggest
thatforAquinasintellective cognition takesplaceinan ivorytower,walled
offfromconcernwithor evenaccess to realconcreteparticulars. Andhis
talkof intellect'sneedto "attendto" thephantasms54 in orderto haveany
cognitionat all maysoundlikeenjoiningintellect to look outthewindow
occasionally,to get in touchwithreality.55 But his identification of the
properobjectofintellection as "thequiddity ornatureexisting incorporeal
matter "56showsthat abstraction does removethenaturefromthe
although
particularizing circumstances thatstillaccompanyit in thephantasm, and
althoughcertainsortsof abstract thinking areperformed on itonlyin that
stripped-down condition, still,usingtheintelligible speciesin intellective
cognition of theexternal world requiresexamining corporealnaturein
the
its naturalsetting.Attending the phantasms,then,is not something
to
intellecthas to do overandoveragainbutis, rather, itsessentialcognitive
88
A physicist
orientation. can'tunderstand heatwithout abstracting itsnature
fromindividuating conditions, but neithercan she understand heat without
being aware thatwhat she has acquiredunderstanding of is a feature of
external,individuated,corporeal matter.As foractualindividualinstances,
can anyonehave intellective cognitionof thisveryheatin thisparticular
glowingcoal? Yes andno. The uniquelyindividuated heatnowemanating
fromitcanbe an objectonlyofsensorycognition, butintellectcanknowan
individualthrough itsnature, can knowthatwhatis beingfelthereandnow
is intense
heat,thatwhatis beingseenhereandnowis red-orange , etc.Only
sense(assistedby"thememorative power",an internalsense)canrecognize
Socrates,butonlyintellect (orientatedvia phantasms) can describehim.57
7. INTELLECT- ITS OBJECTS, OPERATIONS, AND RANGE
The properobjectof intellect underconsideration hereAquinassometimes

designates bytermsmoretechnical than'nature'- mostimportantly, 'what-
4
it-is-to-be-such-a-thing'{'quodquidest' hisversionofAristotle'stotiestť)
andthecloselyrelated'quiddity'(orwhatness) ofa thing.58Understandably,
hecountsintellect's cognition ofitsproper objectas thefirst
operation ofintel-
lect59eventhough, as we've seen,agentintellect's abstractingofintelligible
speciesis a necessary precondition ofthecognition ofthequiddities ofthings.
Apparently, then,intellect's"firstoperation" consistsin theformation
(byagentintellect inpossibleintellect) ofconceptsofexternal objects- just
whatmight havebeenexpected.Butsincetheproper objectsofthefirst oper-
ationare identified as thequiddities,theessentialnatures,of things,this
accountis especiallyliableto misinterpretation. Forthescienceof nature,
no matterhow highlydeveloped,also has thequidditiesof thingsas its
objects,andAquinasis underno illusionsaboutthedifficulty ofachieving
scientificknowledge.60 His accountofintellect's first operationdependson
ourrecognizing thata child'sfirstacquisitionofthe concept stardiffers
of a
in
only degree from the most recondite advance in astronomy's under-
standing of the nature of a star.61 the
Quiddities, properobjects of intellect's
firstoperation and, injustthesamerespect,theobjectsof theculminating
cognition ofnaturemayhelpfully be thoughtof,then,as properobjectsof
bothinchoateandculminating, alpha and omega,intellective cognition.
Aquinas' s account is to
open misinterpretation herein partbecauseof
an ambiguity inhischaracterizations ofthefirstoperation.62Sometimes he
describesitin termsoftheproperobjectgenerally, leadingone to thinkof
itsimplyas anycognition ofquiddities, the
deserving designation in
"first"
virtueoftheprimacyof itsobject.In thissense'thefirst operation' covers
thewholerangeofthecognition ofquiddities,
fromalphatoomegaandfrom
89
abstract consideration toconcrete cognition. ButAquinasalso describesthe
firstoperation in terms of only the initial stageof thecognitionof quiddi-
ties,the first
acquisition(and not also the deepeningand refining) of the
answerto 'What'sthat?',thepre-theoretic alphacognition. This narrower
description ofthefirst operation providesa clearcontrast withhisstandard
of intellect's"second as the
description operation" makingof (affirmative
andnegative) judgments, affirming bypropositionally "compounding" with
each otherconceptsacquiredin thefirst operation, denyingby "dividing"
themfromeachother.Butthecognition ofquiddities ateverystagepastini-
tialacquisitionwillpartially depend on thissecond operation, and on rea-
soning as well63: "the human intellect does not immediately, in its first
apprehension, a
acquire completecognition of the thing.Instead,it first
apprehends something about -
it its
viz., quiddity, which andproper
is a first
of
object intellect; and then it acquires intellective cognition ofthe proper-
ties,accidents, anddispositions associatedwiththething'sessence.In doing
so it has to compoundone apprehended aspectwith,or divideone from,
another andproceedfromone composition ordivisionto another, whichis
reasoning"(ST 1.85.5c).64 The resultant full-blown intellective cognition
maybe eithertheoretical orapplied.
8. APPETITIVE POWERS GENERALLY IN

AQUINAS' S PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy ofmindis obviouslyrelevanttoepistemology in itsaccountof

intellectand just as obviouslyrelevantto ethicsin its accountof will.
Aquinas's epistemology is foundmostlywithinhis accountof intellect,
especially in the part he devotes to actsof intellect.He was farmorecon-
cernedwithmoralthanwithepistemological issues,however, andhisethics
is so fullydevelopedthathe integrates his extended,systematic treatment
ofactsofwillintoitrather thanincluding itinhisphilosophy ofmind.65For
thatreasonI say less hereaboutAquinas's theoryof will thanabouthis
theory ofintellect.
As a faculty ofterrestrialcreatures,will,theotherfaculty oftherational
soul, is as distinctivelyhuman as intellectand is,Aquinasargues,a necessary
concomitant ofintellect.66Butwill'smetaphysical provenance is muchmore
primitive than intellect'sand utterly universal. Absolutelyeveryform,
has some sortof tendency or "inclination "
Aquinasmaintains, essentially
associated withit:"onthebasisofitsform, forinstance,
fire, toward
is inclined
a higher place, and toward generating itslike" (ST 1.80.
lc); and so everyhylo-
morphic thing, evenifinanimate, has atleastonenaturalinclination.
Inclination is thegenusofappetite. Animatethingsthatlackcognitive
90
faculties, and even inanimate things,have necessitated, one-track inclina-
tions,sometimescalled "naturalappetites"(e.g., gravitational attraction).
Livingbeingswithmerelynutritive soulshaveno cognition at all,butthey
do have naturalappetitesbeyondthoseassociatedwithinanimate bodies
in
(e.g.,phototropismgreenplants). At the levelof animallifethere is sen-
sorycognition, and with cognition come accidentalgoals, dependent on
whathappenstobe presented totheanimal'ssensesas desirable, orgoodfor
it:"an animalcan seek(appetere ) thingsitapprehends, notonlythethings
itis inclinedtowardon thebasisofitsnaturalform"(ST 1.80.lc). Ithasnot
onlynaturalbutalso sensoryappetite, whichAquinasoftencalls "sensual-
ity", "the that
appetite followssensorycognition" (ST 1.81.1c).
naturally
Appetite is the genusof will.The human soulofcourseinvolves natural
appetites (e.g.,for food ofsome sort), butitssensory andintellectivemodes
ofcognition bring withthem or
sensoryappetites, passions(e.g., for food of
thissort)andrationalappetite, orvolition(e.g.,forfoodlowincholesterol).67
9. SENSUALITY AND RATIONAL CONTROL
Theappetitive powerassociatedwithsensory cognition is onewe sharewith

nonhuman animals- a clusterofinclinations to
(passions) whichwe aresub-
ject(passive)by nature.In twentieth-century Englishwe wouldprobably label
theminstincts, urges,drives, emotions. Aquinas,following an Aristotelian
line,thinksofsensuality as sortedintotwocomplementary appetites orpow-
ers:the"concupiscible "-
i.e., theinclinationgenerally to seek the suitable
andfleetheharmful - and the "irascible "-
(pursuit/avoidance instincts) i.e.,
theinclinationgenerally toresistandovercomewhatever detersone's access
to thesuitableor promotestheharmful(competition/aggression/defense
Distinctsetsofemotions,
instincts). orpassions,areassociatedwitheachof
thesepowers.Concupiscible:joy and sadness,love and hate,desireand
repugnance; irascible:daringandfear,hopeanddespair,anger.68
Forphilosophy of mindand forethicstheimportant issueis theman-
nerandextentoftherationalfaculties'controlofsensuality, a controlwith-
out which the unityof the humansoul is threatened and Aquinas's
virtue-centered morality is impossible.We can see thatwillexercisessome
controloftherelevantsort,becausea humanbeing,as longas he or she is
notaberrantly behaving likea nonrational animal,"is notimmediately moved
inaccordancewiththeirascibleandconcupiscible appetite but waits forthe
command ofwill,whichis thehigher appetite"(ST 1.81.3c). The kind of con-
trolexercised a
by cognitive rationalfaculty(standardly identified in this role
as practicalreason,strictly speaking, rather than intellect), is less obvious
and particularly interesting in view of Aquinas's accountof intellective
91
cognition.Some aspectsof thesensorysoul are beyondreason'scontrol.
Sincereasonitselfhas no controloverthepresenceor absenceofexternal
things, itcannotcompletely controltheexternalsenses,at leastas regards
initialsensations.On theotherhand,sensuality andtheinternalsensesare
notimmediately dependent on externalthings, "and so they subjectto
are
reason'scommand"(ST 1.81.3,ad 3). As anyonecan findoutbyintrospec-
tion,passionscan be stirred up or calmeddownby applyingcertainintel-
lectivelycognized universal considerations to theparticularoccasionsor
objects ofthe and
passions, itisjustthatsort ofcontrol that
reason exercises.
But becausein orderto do so reasonmustdeal withsensoryfaculties, its
mediumofcontrolis phantasms, whichitmanipulates andevencreatesby
controlling theimaginative power.69 Broadlyspeaking,then,rationalcon-
trolreversestheflowchartassociatedwithintellective cognition.
Morality wouldbe a loteasierthanitis ifthatwerethewholestory, but,
as everyoneknows,passionsare rebellious.Elaboratingan Aristotelian
theme{Politics12), Aquinasobservesthatthesoul's ruleoverthe(normal)
bodyis "despotic":ina normalbody,anybodilypartthatcan be movedby
an actof willis movedimmediately whenandas willcommands.By con-
therational
trast, rulesensuality
faculties "politically".Thepowersandpas-
sionsthataretheintended subjectsofthisrational governancearemovedby
imagination andsenseas well,andso areno slavestoreason."Thatis why
we experiencetheirascibleor theconcupisciblefighting againstreason
whenwe senseorimaginesomething pleasantthatreasonforbids, orsome-
thingunpleasant thatreasoncommands"(ST 1.81.3,ad 2).
10. VOLITION AND CHOICE, NECESSITATION

AND FREEDOM
Likeeveryotherform, formofthehumanbeinghasanessen-
thesubstantial
tialinclination.Rationalanimalsseektheirwell-being, orhappiness(beat-
itudo), as naturallyand necessarilyas flamesrise up. And so, Aquinas
maintains, willnecessarily seekshappiness.The moralimplicationsofthat
claimandhis reasonsformakingit arenotat issuehere,norcan we thor-
oughlyexaminehisaccountofhumanfreedom.70 Butsomeconsideration of
theirrelevance tohisconceptions betweenwill
ofwillandoftherelationship
andintellect does fallwithinthescopeofthisexposition.71
In an attempt to injectsomeprecisionintohis accountoftherelation-
ship between necessitationandvolition, fourkindsof
Aquinasdistinguishes
necessitation corresponding to theAristotelian
causes,acknowledging that
one kind,butonlyone kind,is entirelyincompatible withwilling- the
necessitationofcoercion(corresponding toefficient or"violence,
causation),
whichis contrary tothething'sinclination".Andsincecoercionis theonly
92
sortofnecessitation entirelyabsentfromwill'sorientation towardhappiness,
of
anyappearance incompatibility between that naturalhuman inclinationand
theexerciseofgenuinevolitionbyhumanbeingscanintheory be explained
away(ST 1.82.lc). But,sinceAquinastakesthefamiliar viewthat"we are
incontrol ofouractionstotheextenttowhichwe canchoosethisoneorthat
one,"he followsAristotle72 inacknowledging thatour"seekingtheultimate
endis notoneofthethingswe areincontrol of' (ST 1.82.1, ad 3). Moreover,
sinceourhappinessis thenaturally necessitated ultimateend,considerations
ofitgovernall volition, as intellect's of first
grasp necessary principles gov-
ernsall cognition.73 Ouronlychoicesconcernwaysandmeansofachieving
ourhappiness, since"thereareparticulargoodsthatdo nothavea necessary
connection withhappiness"(ST I.82.2c);butwhenwe do choose,we always
choosewhatstrikes us as somehowcontributing to ourhappiness.
Do we,then,makefreechoices?Arewe reallyincontrol ofouractions?
Aquinasanswersthosequestionsaffirmatively andemphatically: "Thevery
factthatthehumanbeingis rationalnecessitates itsbeingcharacterized by
freedecision(liberum arbitrium )"74(ST 1.83.lc). Andyettherearegrounds
foruncertainty abouthisunderstanding ofhumanfreedom, amongwhichis
an apparent changeinhisdistinction betweensensuality andwill.
As we've seen,senseapprehends particulars and intellect apprehends
universais, butthatdifference betweenthetwomodesof humancognition
seemsoffhand notto marka significant difference betweentheirassociated
appetitive faculties, sensuality and will. Manywouldbase thedistinction
betweenthemon theperception thatwill,unlikesensuality, is characterized
by self-determination. As Aquinashimselfsays,rather earlyin his career,
"Willis distinguished fromsensoryappetite notdirectly on thebasisoffol-
lowingtheone sortof apprehension or theotherbutrather on thebasisof
determining itsowninclination orhavingitsinclination determined bysome-
thingelse" (DV 22.4,ad 1). Later,however,Aquinasappearsto dropself-
determination as thedifferentia, withtheresultthathismorematuretheory
of willcan look likea versionof compatibilism, acceptiveof will's being
other-determined: "An appetitive poweris a passivepowerthatis naturally
suitedtobe movedbywhatis apprehended" (ST I.80.2c),and"intellectively
cognizedgoodmoveswill"(ST 1.82.3,ad 2). He explainsthatanapprehended
thingthatmovesan appetitive poweris "an unmovedmover"(becauseit
movesbyfinalcausation), whiletheappetitive poweritmoves(will,let'ssay)
is "a movedmover" - e.g., will,movedby theintellectively apprehended
goodthing, movesthepersontowardit.75 Andinthatsamecontext hisonly
explicitbasis for distinguishing between the sensory and rational appetites
is,indeed,justthedifference betweentheirobjectsofapprehension.76
Aquinas's apparent abandonment ofself-determination as thedifferentia
ofwillis a significant change, but itdoes not bring determinism orcompat-
ibilismwithit. The pertinent difference betweensensoryand intellective
apprehensionis thatsense, as cognizantof particularsonly,presents
93
sensuality withoneobject,whichmovesit"determinately"; rationalcogni-
tion, on the other hand,cognizant of universais, "gathersseveralthings
thus
together", presenting will with an of
array particular goodsofone sort,
"andso theintellective appetite, will,can be moved bymanythingsandnot
[just]byone,necessitatedly" ad
(ST 1.82.2, 3).77Moreover, sincewhatintel-
lectapprehends as good itpresents to willas an end(subordinate to happi-
ness),moving will only in the manner of a finalcause, intellect does not
coercewill's choice.Will,on theotherhand,naturally orientated toward
whatis goodfora humanbeing,"movesintellect andall thepowersofthe
soul"coercively , inthemanner ofan efficient cause,justas "a kingwhoaims
at thewholekingdom'scommongood movesthevariousgovernors ofthe
provinces by his command" (ST I.82.4c).
So will's choiceregarding particulargoodscollectively presented to it
by intellect is free in a sense Aquinas takes to be both necessaryand
sufficient and
forhistheoretical practical purposes, and itsfreedom is greatly
enhancedbyitscoercivepoweroverintellect, enablingitto direct intellect's
attention tootherthingsortootheraspectsoftheobjectintellect presents to
it.ButthefactthatAquinas's accountofchoicepresents as
choice essentially
andextensively involving thecognitiveas wellas theappetitive faculty of
therationalsoul leadshimto ascribechoiceto bothreasonandwillin dif-
ferent respects:"theact [ofchoice]by whichwilltendstowardsomething
proposed[toitbyreason]as good is materially an actof willbutformally
an act of reasonbecause it is directedtowardits end by reason" (ST
I- II. 13.lc). Because"choiceis completed ina kindofmovement ofthesoul
towardthegoodthatis chosen,"andbecausewillis theagentofmovement
ofthatkind,choice"is clearlyan actoftheappetitive power"(ibid.).78
NOTES
1. Another versionofthisarticle appears as chapter5,"PhilosophyofMind," inThe
Cambridge Companion toAquinas, ed.Norman Kretzmann andEleonore Stump
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1993).
2. Aquinas baseshisphilosophy ofmind onAristotle's,ofwhichT.H.Irwin providesan
excellent,concise, account
critical in"Aristotle'sPhilosophyofMind," chapter 4
(56-83)inSteven Everson,ed.,Companions toAncientThought, Vol.II: Psychology
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1991).
3. InAquinas's relatively
infrequentusesof'mind' a synonym
itistypically for'intellect'
),which
(intellectus ishisname forjustthecognitive oftherational
faculty soulandnot
alsoitsappetitive
faculty,will.See,e.g.,Summa (ST)I.75.2c,
theologiae where hesays
thatthisprincipleofintellection"iscalledmind, But,likemost
orintellect". other
hesometimes
philosophers, alsousesthese termsvery - e.g.,"the
broadly human soul,
which iscalled ormind"
intellect, (ibid.).Cf.n.8 below.
4. Inthisrespecthediffers from
significantly many ofhismedieval predecessorsandcon-
temporaries,whowere universalhylomorphists, allcreatures
analyzing ascomposites
ofmatter andform, attheexpense ofaccepting matter
spiritual andthedoctrine ofthe
94
plurality ofsubstantial forms. These issues andmany others relevant tothesubjects of
thisarticle areexplained inwell-documented discussions inAnton C.Pegis, St.Thomas
andtheProblem oftheSoulintheThirteenth Century (Toronto: Pontifical Institue of
Mediaeval Studies, 1934;repr. 1983).
5. Notice that heintends hisclaim tocover only terrestrial,
biologically living beings, those
"that liveamong us",notevery being that canbesaidtobeliving - e.g.,God,orangels.
Andhemust intend toemphasize the'in'when hedescribes soulasthefirst principle
oflife interrestrial beings, since heofcourse takes Godtobeunconditionally (andextrin-
sically) thefirst principle oflifefor creatures.
6. 4Actusisanimportant technical term forAquinas andother medieval philosophers. It
means both 'action' and'actuality', ina waythat may beclarified bysuch observations
asthese: Athing actsonly ifandonly totheextent towhich itactually andnot justpoten-
tiallyexists andisa thing ofsuch andsuch a sort. Consequently, whatever itisinvirtue
ofwhich thethings actsina certain way= that invirtue ofwhich itactually isa thing
ofthat certain (appropriate) sort.Therefore, that invirtue ofwhich primarily thething
acts(theprimary intrinsicsource orfirst principle ofitscharacteristic action) = thesub-
stantialform ofthething. Cf.ST1.76. lc andn.7 below.
7. Among Aquinas's statements ofopposition tothedoctrine oftheplurality ofsubstan-
tialforms, this oneisperhaps hisfullest succinct presentation:"Thedifference between
a substantial form andaccidental form isthat anaccidental form doesnotbring about
anactual being considered absolutely (non facitensactusimpliciter), butrather its
being actually such, orsomuch - e.g.,large, white, orsomething elseofthat sort- while
a substantial form comes nottoa subject thatisalready anactual being, buttoonethat
issoonly potentially - viz.,toprime matter. Itisclear onthis basisthat itisimpossible
forthere tobemore than onesubstantial form ofonething, since thefirst [such form]
would bring about thething's being actual considered absolutely, andalltheothers would
cometoa subject that isalready actual. Thatiswhy they would cometoa subject that
isalready actual: forthey would notbring about itsactualbeing considered absolutely
but[only itsbeing] ina certain respect" (Commentary onAristotle's Deanima [InDA]
II.1.224). Forhisapplication ofthis position tothecaseofthehuman soulinparticular,
see,e.g.,ST1.76.3; 76.4;77.6.
8. Many ofAquinas's 643usesoftheterm "anima rationalis"occur indiscussions ofthe
distinctively rational faculties of intellectandwill, buthevery often alsousesthat des-
ignation for thehuman soulinallitsaspects. (Fortheprecise number ofthese uses, each
presented with identifying context, seeR. Busa'sIndex Thomisticus [Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1974-80]).
9. Ofcourse a human being's soulistheprinciple ofsuch vitalactivitiesasdigestion and
sensation, too,butitisinitsroleastheprinciple ofintellectionthat werecognize itas
"the soulofa human being", anditisinthat respect that Aquinas needs toconsider the
soulinorder toconstruct hisargument forincorporeal subsistence.
10. Thenatures ofcorporeal things arenottheonly objects proper tointellective cognition,
among which Aquinas includes also,e.g.,mathematical entities.
Butcorporeal natures
constitute theoverwhelming majority ofintellect's proper objects, andfor thepurposes
ofthis investigation itwillbeconvenient tofocus exclusivelyonthem. Their importance
isreflected inthefact thatAquinas develops hismost detailed account ofintellection in
connection with thecognition ofcorporeal natures.
11. ForAquinas's arguments supporting claim (A)see,e.g.,ST1.84.
12. Cf.ST1.75.1, ad2.Aquinas's favoriteexample insupport of(B)isthepupil oftheeye,
which lacks allcolor. Butthepupil oftheeyeastheorgan ofvision isreceptive ofshapes
aswellasofcolors, despite itshaving a precise shape.Similarly, theskin neither lacks
texture norisinsensitive toitsowntexture, andyet texturesareamong itsproper objects.
13. Aquinas saysthat sucha person willbeunable totaste anything sweet; everything will
tastebitter toher.Shouldn't hehavesaidthat shewillbeuanble totaste anything bit-
ter- that things that tastebittertopeople whose tongues arefunctioning normally will
betasteless (sensorily uncognizable) toher?Developing theexample along that line
95
seems notonly more accurate butalsomore precisely supportive ofthepoint hewants
tomake. (Asfor sweet things,itseems heought tohavesaidthat they might tasteatleast
differently bittertothesubject.)
14. Although thereisa sense inwhich bodies areobjects ofintellective cognition, itisimpor-
tanttonotice that itsimmediate, proper objects arenotbodies themselves but"the
natures ofbodies" or,asAquinas often puts it,their quiddities (oressences) (see,e.g.,
STI.84.7c). Astheproper objects ofintellect these naturesofquiddities ofbodies must
beabstracted from thedatasupplied bythesenses. Corporeal (material) organs are,
simply invirtue oftheir materiality,receptors ofmaterial dataonly andsorestricted to
particular material objects. Materiality itself, inthefaculty orinitsobjects, isassuch
anobstacle tointellectivecognition. Cf.,e.g.,De ente etessentia (DEE)4; SCG11.51.
15. ST1.87. le;seealso%1.2-A. Aquinas insists that philosophy ofmind must stem from a
consideration ofwhat wehavedirect access to,theactivity ofintellection: wehaveuni-
versal cognition ofourintellect "insofar asweconsider thenature ofthehuman mind
onthebasisofintellect's " (ibid).
activity
16. Cf.theparallel discussion inInDAIII.7.680 ff.: "ourintellect isnaturally suitedtohave
intellectivecognition ofallsense objects. . . . [I]tiscapable ofcognizing notonly one
kind ofsense objects (likesight orhearing), oronly onekind ofcommon orproper acci-
dental sensible qualities,but,instead,universally, of[cognizing] sensible nature entirely.
Thus, justassight isdevoid ofa certain kind ofsense object,sointellect must bedevoid
ofsensible nature entirely."
17. Theplausibility ofthis argument for thehuman soul'sstatus asa subsistent entityobvi-
ously depends onthestrength oftheclaim that initsdistinctive operation itmust actalto-
gether independently. Inthis argument Aquinas, following Aristotle's lead{Deanima
II4,429a24-27), claims only itsindependence from corporeal things, leaving openthe
theoretical possibility thatitmight beoperationally dependent onsomespiritual crea-
tureother than itself.Avicenna andAverroës hadputforward different theoriesofthe
human soulthat presented itasdependent injustthat way.Aquinas's many attackson
theirtheories were motivated expressly byvarious other considerations, butthepreser-
vation ofhisargument forsubsistence would byitself havecalled fortheir refutation.
(ForAvicenna's andAverroës' theories andAquinas's attacks onthem see,e.g.,SCG
11.59-62; 73;75;78;ST1.76.2; Despiritualibus creaturis (DSC)9; 10;Quaestiones de
anima (QDA)3;De unitate intellectus(DUI)passim. Fora helpful account ofthecon-
troversy seeFernand vanSteenberghen, Thomas Aquinas andRadical Aristotelianism
[Washington: Catholic University ofAmerica Press, 1980]).
18. ForAquinas's arguments fortheincorruptibility ofthehuman soulsee,e.g.,SCGII
79-81;Quaestiones quodlibetales (QQ)10.3.2; ST1.75.2; 6;QDA14.Herbert McCabe
helpfully relatestheissue ofimmortality totherest ofAquinas's philosophy ofmind in
hisarticle "TheImmortality oftheSoul:TheTraditional Argument" (inAnthony Kenny,
ed.,Aquinas : ACollection ofCritical Essays [Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday- Anchor
Books, 1969], 297-306), where hepresents anexposition oftheargument developed in
STandQDA.
19. Aquinas often argues expressly against what hetakes tobePlato's conception ofthe
human being. See,e.g.,DEE2;SCG11.57; QDA1;ST1.75.4; DSC2.
20. E.g.,Commentary ontheSentences (InSent)II.1.2.4;17.2.1; SCG11.56-59; 68-70;
Quaestiones depotentia (DP)3.9;3.11; ST1.76. 1; DCS2;QDA1; 2; 14;DUI3;InDA
III.7;Compendium theologiae (CT)80;87.
21. These arguments, the"Objections", maybesorted into, the'If(E),not(F)' type,
first,
which includes Objs.1,3-7,9,and10.Thesecond typeconcludes 'If(F),not(E)' and
includes onlyObj.12;thethird concludes more broadly 'Notboth (E) and(F)' and
includes Objs.2,8,and18.So these firstthree types areallarguments fortheincom-
patibility of(E) and(F),without clearlyfavoring eitherastheaccount ofthesoul;but
theremaining objections doseemtobeaffirming ordenying (E) or(F)inonewayor
another. Thefourth type concludes 'Not(E)':Obj.11;thefifth, 'Not(F)':Obj.15.The
sixth,a stronger form ofthefirst type, concludes 'Since(E),not(F)' oruses(E) asa
premiss toconclude 'Not(F)'andsomight becharacterized asPlatonist; itincludes Objs.
96
13,14,16,and17.Butthetwoarguments sedcontra immediately following theeigh-
teen Objections aredesigned toshow ina preliminary waythat there are,nevertheless,
compelling reasons forthinking that thetruth must be(E) and(F).Thefirst ofthem
argues along this line.Athing belongs toa certain species invirtue ofthething's "proper
form", anda thing belongs tothehuman species invirtue ofitsrational soul,so(F)the
rational soulistheproper form ofa human being. Butintellection isthespecifying activ-
ityoftherational soul,anditiscarried outbythehuman soulonitsown. Andwhatever
operates entirely onitsownmust be(E) anentity that subsistsonitsown.So,(E) the
human soulisa subsistent entity.Therefore, (E)and(F).
22. ST1.75.2, ad1,presents a weaker, lessdetailed version ofthisargument.
23. Cf.themore detailed parallelargument inDSC2.
24. Fora fuller butstill succinct exposition andappraisal ofthis partofAquinas' s philoso-
phyofmind, seeAnthony Kenny's chapter 3,"Mind," Aquinas (NewYork: Hilland
Wang, 1980), 61-81.
25. See,e.g.,ST1.2-26 onGod'sexistence andnature, and44-46onGod'sproduction of
creatures.
26. SeealsoSTI-II.31.6c;III.11.2,ad3.
27. SeealsoST1.91.3, ad3;InDAII.6.301; Quaestiones demalo(DM)5.5;QDA8.
28. See,e.g.,ST1.3.1,ad2;93.2c;93.6c.
29. Furthermore, thebeatific vision,thetranscendent culmination ofcognition andthecre-
ator's intended perfection ofhuman existence, is defined as anactoftheperfected
human intellect,released from itsterrestrial
dependence onthesenses (see,e.g.,ST1.12,
esp.a.l; I-II.3.8c; Suppl. 92.1c[InSentIV.49.2.1]; SCGIII.51).
30. I use'think andunderstand' here totranslate 'intelligere',which I translatemore often
as 'haveintellective cognition'; andI use"toacquiring organized knowledge" here to
translate 4adsciendum' .
31. "[J]ust astrue isintellect's good, sofalseiswhat isbadforit,asissaidinEthics VI[2,
1139a27- 31]"(STI.94.4c). SeealsoCommentary onAristotle' s Physics (InPh)1.3.7;
Commentary onAristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (InNE)VI.2.1130;InMVI.4.1231; ST
II-II.60.4, ad2.
32. I discuss theepistemological implications ofthis "theisticreliabilism" in"Infallibility,
Error,andIgonorance," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, Supp. vol.17(1992):159-94.
SeealsoJohn Jenkins, "Aquinas ontheVeracity oftheIntellect," TheJournal of
Philosophy 88(1991):623-32.
33. SeeGeach's stimulating account ofthis direct realism inG.E.M.Anscombe andP.T.
Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1963), 94-97.
34. Aquinas finds this principleinAristotle, Metaphysics I 1andPosterior Analytics II 19,
100a3-14; cf.ST1.84.6, s.c.
35. Although sensory species themselves arerealized intheanatomical matter oftheper-
cipient'ssensory apparatus, theinternalization process ofsensory cognition detaches the
corresponding sense-perceptible aspects ofexternal things from their originalmatter: "a
form perceptible bysense isinthething outside thesoulinoneway, anditisinanother
wayinthesoul,which takes uptheforms ofsense-perceptible things without themat-
ter- e.g.,thecolor ofgoldwithout thegold"(ST1.84. lc).
36. Ontheinternal senses see,e.g.,ST1.78.4.
37. Aquinas sometimes usestheLatin word 4 ' forthis butheseems to
imaginatio faculty,
prefer Aristotle's Greek word'phantasia , atleastwhen heis discussing cognition.
Sincetheinternal sense inquestion isinseveral respects more broadly conceived than
imagination aswetend tothink ofimagination, itseems bettertofollow Aquinas' s lead
andretain theforeign word asa technical term. ForAquinas's account ofphantasia see
e.g.,ST1.84.6c;7;85.1,s.c.;ad3;SCG11.80 & 81.1618.
38. See,e.g.,STI.84.6c; ad2;84.7c; ad2;85.1. TheAristotelian source ofthis roleforphan-
tasiaisDeanima III3,427al6-429a9; seeAquinas's commentary (InDA)adloc.
97
39. Onthis distinction ofintellective powers see,e.g.,Quaestiones deventate (DV)10.6c:
"[W]hen ourmind isconsidered inrelation tosense-perceptible things that existoutside
thesoul, itisfound toberelated tothem intwoways. [1] Itisrelated tothem inoneway
asactuality topotentiality - insofar asthings outsidethesoularepotentially intelligible
andthemind itself isactually intelligible. Itisinthisrespect that wesaythat inthemind
thereisagent intellect, which makes things actuallyintelligible. [2]Itisrelated tothem
intheother wayaspotentiality toactuality - insofar asthedeterminate forms ofthings,
which exist actually inthings outside thesoul,areinourmind only potentially. Itisin
thisrespect that wesaythat inoursoulthere ispossible intellect, which hasthefunction
ofreceiving theforms abstracted from sense-perceptible things andmade actually intel-
ligiblebythelight ofagent intellect." AlsoDV 10.6,ad7: "Inthereception inwhich
possibleintellect acquires [abstracted, intelligible] species ofthings from phantasms, the
phantasms playtheroleofa secondary, instrumental agent, while agent intellectplays
theroleoftheprimary, principal agent. Andsotheeffect oftheaction isleftinpossible
inaccordance
intellect with thecondition ofboth agents andnotinaccordance withthe
condition ofoneortheother alone. That iswhy possible intellect receives forms nsactu-
allyintelligible invirtue ofagent intellect, butaslikenesses ofdeterminate things onthe
basisofa cognition ofthephantasms. Andsotheactually intelligibleforms exist nei-
therinthemselves, norinphantasia, norinagent intellect, butonly inpossible intellect."
40. Although Aquinas expresses himself inways that
atleast permit theinterpretation ofthe
sensory species as literally images (visual, aural,etc.),aninterpretation ofthem as
encodings ofsome sort, involving noiconic resemblance, isalsopossible andseems not
only more plausible butalsoinsome respects bettersuited tohisaccount generally.
41. Full-fledged formal and its
identity consequent veridicality donotextend tophantasia
(anditsphantasms) because itisnotpurely passive,eventhough itisclassified asan
internal
sense: "Twooperations arefound inthesensory part ofthesoul.Oneoccurs only
bywayofa change effected initbya sense-perceptible thing. Theother operation isfor-
mation, which occurs when theimaginative power [phantasia] forms foritself animage
(idolum) ofa thing that isabsent, oreven ofa thingthat hasnever been seen" (ST1.85.2,
ad3).Forpurpose ofthis expositon I willignore difficulties associated with nonveridi-
calphantasms.
42. Ofcourse, effects arebytheir very nature potentially representative oftheir causes. Sense
itself
hasnocognition ofthenature oftherelationship orthedegree ofconformity
between sensory species andexternal objects: "Foralthough sight hasthelikeness ofthe
visiblething, ithasnocognition oftherelationship there isbetween thething seenand
thesense's apprehension ofit"(ST1.16.2c).
43. Aquinas takes this tobethesingle most important respect inwhich Aristotelianism dif-
fersfrom Platonism andalludes toitvery often;hence the"ofcourse".
44. See,e.g.,inMV.14.693. Anthony Kenny's article
"Intellect andImagination inAquinas"
(inAquinas: ACollection ofCritical Essays [seen.18above], 273-96) ishelpful insort-
ingoutthese matters.
45. See,e.g.,ST1.13.9c; 57.1,ad3;57.2,ad1;andesp.85.1passim.
46. "Natural entities, however, areintellectively cognized onthebasisofabstraction from
individuating matter", representations ofwhich arecomponents ofphantasms, "but not
from sense-perceptible matter entirely. Fora human being isintellectively cognized as
composed offlesh andbones, butonthebasisofanabstraction from this flesh andthese
bones.Andthat iswhy itisnotintellect, butsense, orimagination, that hasdirect cog-
nitionofindividuals" (InDAIII.8.716).
47. Seealso,e.g.,ST1.85. 1,s.c.;Commentary onBoethius's Detrinitate (InBDT)5;6;and
esp.InDAIII.8.716, quoted inn.46above.
48. Seealso,e.g.,ST1.13.12c;50.2c; Commentary onDionysius' sDedivinis nominibus (In
DDN)7.3.724: "allcognition isinaccord with themode [ofexistence andoperation] of
thatbywhich something iscognized. . . ."
49. Seeaslo,e.g.,InDAIII.8.717; 10.731.
98
50. Intelligible
species may beeither concepts (of)orthoughts (that). See,e.g.,STI-11.55. lc.
Onthenon-eidetic character ofintelligible species see,e.g.,ST1.85. 1,ad3:"Butbythe
power ofagent intellecta kind oflikeness results inpossible intellectasa result ofagent
intellect's
converting [i.e.,abstracting] operation onthephantasms. Thislikeness [the
intelligiblespecies] isindeed representative ofthethings ofwhich those arethephan-
tasms, butrepresentative ofthem only as regards theirspecific nature. Anditisinthis
waythat intelligible species aresaidtobeabstracted from phatasms, notinsuch a way
thatsomeform, numerically oneandthesameastheform thatwasinthephantasms
before,occurs inpossible intellect later (asa physical object istaken from oneplaceand
carried toanother)."
51. Notice theprominence oftheverb 'consider' inthetwopassages quoted justabove. On
"consideration" (considerado ) see,e.g.,STII-II.53.4;180.4.
52. See,e.g.,STI.85.2c; ad2.
53. Aquinas thinks thisfeature ofintellective cognition isapparent evenetymologically:
"Thename 'intellect' derives from thefact that ithascognition oftheintimate charac-
teristicsofa thing; for'intelligere' [tohaveintellective cognition] isbywayofsaying
'intus '
legere[toread penetratingly]. Sense andimagination havecognition ofexternal
accidents only; intellectalonesucceds inreaching a thing's essence" (DV1.12c).
54. TheLatin is'convertere sead',with theeasily misinterpreted literal
sense of'turn itself
back toward', 'turn around to'.That literalsense hasa kind ofdiagrammatic correctness,
ifwethink ofa flow chart for thetransmission ofdatafrom external senses through phan-
tasiatointellect; butitalsosuggests aneffortful deviation onintellect's part, andthat is
precisely wrong.
55. Aquinas's insistent claimthat "when ourintellect hasintellective cognition itmust
always attend tophantasms" (ST1.84.7c)iseasily misinterpreted. Hisprincipal theo-
reticalevidence foritisbrought out, I think,inhismany observations that ( 1) intellect
canconsider onlyabstract universal natures, but(2) universal natures as theproper
objectsofintellective cognition exist only incorporeal particulars,and(3)corporeal par-
ticularsarepresented tointellect onlyinphatasms. See,e.g.,ST1.84.7c, n.57below.
Thisevidence isobscured ifthetwoobservations hepresents near thebeginning ofST
I.84.7casreadily accessible indications (indices ) ofintellect's dependence onphantasms
aregiven theimplausible status ofAquinas's "twoproofs ofthisthesis" (Kenny,
"IntellectandImagination . . ." [seen.44above], 289).
56. STI.84.7c; seealso,e.g.,84.8c;85.1c;85.5c& ad3;85.6c;85.8c;86.2c;87.3c;88.1c;
88.3c.
57. "Nowitbelongs totheessence {ratio) ofthis nature [i.e.,theproper object ofintellec-
tivecognition] thatitexist insome individual, which isnotwithout corporeal matter -
e.g.,itbelongs totheessence ofthenature ofstone that itbeinthis [orthat] stone, and
totheessence ofthenature ofhorse that itbeinthis[orthat] horse,andsoon.That is
why thenature ofstone, orofanymaterial thing whatever, cannot becognized com-
pletelyandtruly except insofar asitiscognized asexisting ina particular. Aparticular,
however, weapprehend through sense andimagination. Andsoinorder for intellect to
haveactual intellective cognition ofitsproper object itisnecessary that itattend tothe
phantasms sothat itmayobserve (speculetur ) theuniversal nature existing inthepar-
ticular"(ST1.84.7c).
58. Forsome details ontheterminology seemy"Infallibility . . ."(n.32above). InInDA
III.8.705-06 and712-13 Aquinas offers some helpful introductory remarks: "the quid-
ditiesofthings areother than thethings only peraccidens. Forexample, thequiddity of
a white manis notthesameas a white man, because thequiddity ofa white man
contains within itself
only what pertains tothespecies human being, butwhat I calla
white manhaswithin itself more than what pertains tothehuman species. . . . [I]ncon-
nection with allthings that havea form inmatter thething anditswhat-it-is-to-be-such-
a-thing arenotentirely thesame:Socrates is nothishumanness. . . . [intellect has
cognition ofboth [theuniversal andtheindividual], butindifferent ways. Forithascog-
nitionofthenature ofthespecies, orofwhat-it-is-to-be-such-a-thing, bydirectly extend-
99
ingitself intoit;ithascognition oftheindividual itself,however, bya kind ofreflection,
insofar asitattends tothephantasms from which theintelligible species areabstracted."
59. See,e.g.,InSent 1.19.5.7, ad7.
60. See,e.g.,InDA1.1.15: "the essential principles ofthings areunknown tous";Insym-
bolům apostolorum, preface: "our cognition issofeeble that nophilosopher hasever been
abletoinvestigate completely thenature ofa fly"; alsoDV4.1,ad8;6.1,ad8; 10.1&
ad6; DSC 11,ad3; SCG1.3.18; ST II-II.8.lc; Commentary onAristotle's Posterior
Analytics (InPoA)1.4.43; 11.13.533.
61. See,e.g.,InDAIII.8.7 18:"what intellect hascognition ofisthequiddity thatisinthings.
. . . Foritisobvious that thesciences areabout thethings intellect
hascognition of. . .";
SCGIII.56.2328: "Theproper object ofintellectiswhat-it-is-to-be-such-a-thing, thesub-
stance ofa thing. . . . Therefore, whatever isina thing that cannot becognized through
thecognition ofitssubstance must beunknown tointellect."
62. Another source ofmisinterpretation isAquinas's apparent claim ofinfallibility for intel-
lection: "Intellection regarding thequiddity ofa thing isalways true, asina sensation
regarding itsproper object"; see,e.g.,STI.58.5c; 85.6c;Commentary onAristotle's De
interpretatione (InPH)1.2.20; 3.31. Thisissue, which hasmore todowith epistemology
than with philosophy ofmind, isconsidered atlength inmy"Infallibility . . ." (n.32
above).
63. Asabstraction precedes thefirst operation, soreasoning, theuseofthesecond opera-
tion's propositions ininferences, follows thesecond. Inatleastoneplace,Aquinas
expressly identifies reasoning (ratiocinatio ) asthethird operation - notoftheintellect,
butofreason, which may sometimes bethought ofasintellect inmotion (InPoA1.1.4).
Seealso,e.g.,Commentary ontheGospel ofJohn (InJoh)1.1.26; InSent III.23.1.2.
64. Seealso,e.g.,InSent III.35.2.2ac; SCGIII.58.2836; ST1.14.6c; 58.5c;75.5c;85.3c&
ad3;85.4,ad3.
65. InSTAquinas's discussion ofactsofintellect isconcentrated in1.84-89, partofhistrea-
tiseonthenature ofa human being (1.75-102), while hisdiscussion ofactsofwill, only
adumbrated in1.82-83, constitutes a large andimportant part(I-II.6-21) ofhisextended
treatment ofmorality (I-IIandII-II).InQDA,oneofthemost important sources for his
philosophy ofmind, willisnotdiscussed atall.
66. See,e.g.,ST1.19.1c.
67. Thissummary ofAquinas's concept ofwillisbased mainly onST1.80.1; fora similar
account, different insome important respects, seetheearlier DV22.4.
68. Foranintroduction tothis material, see,e.g.,ST1.81.2.Likeother features ofAquinas's
account ofappetitive powers, histheory ofthepassions isdeveloped aspart ofhistrea-
tiseonethics: STI-11.22- 48.
69. See,e.g.,ST1.81.3, ad3;andDV25.4c:"since oneandthesamething canbeconsid-
eredunder various conditions, being made[thereby] either attractive orrepulsive, by
means ofimagination reason presents a thing tosensuality under theguise oftheplea-
surable orthepainful, inaccord with thewayitseems toreason"; alsoDV25.4,ad4
andad5.
70. Bernard J.Lonergan's GraceandFreedom: Operative GraceintheThought ofSt.
Thomas Aquinas, ed.J.P.Burns (NewYork: Herder andHerder, 1971)contains a very
well-informed, stimulating study ofthese matters.
71. Fora very helpfuldiscussion of relevant issues seeEleonore Stump, "Intellect,Will, and
thePrinciple ofAlternate Possibilities" inMichael Beaty, ed.,Christian Theism andthe
Problems ofPhilosophy (Notre Dame, Ind.:University ofNotre DamePress, 1990),
254-85.
72. Nicomachean Ethics III3,111lb26-29; 6,1113al5.
73. ST1.82. lc;82.2c;following Aristotle, Physics II 9,200a15-34.
74. Aquinas's standard term for choice inhisanalysis ofhuman action (inSTI-II.6-17)is
'electio' . When hediscusses what seems closest toa twentieth-century conception offree
100
choice,heusestheterm 4liberum arbitrium' . Butfor more than onereason itseemsworth
the difference 'arbitrium ' inthiscontextas
preservingterminological bytranslating
'decision'.
See,e.g.,ST1.83.3, ad2:"Judgment (iudicium ) is,sotospeak, theconclu-
sionanddetermination ofdeliberation. But,ofcourse, deliberation isdeterminedpri-
marily byreason'spronouncement (sententia ) andsecondarily byappetite's acceptance
[ofthatpronouncement]. That iswhy thePhilosopher saysinEthics III[5,1113a9-12]
that'judgingonthebasis ofdeliberation, wedesire inaccordance with And
deliberation'.
inthis waychoice (electio ) itselfiscalled a kind ofjudgment, onthebasisofwhich it
isnamed free decision(liberum arbitrium )."Thisassimilation ofchoice tojudgment via
decisionisanindication oftheintimate relationship between willandreason onwhich
Aquinas's conceptionoffreedom isbased. Seealson.77below.
75. InthisconnectionAquinas citesAristotle: Deanima III10,433a13-26; MetaphysicsXII
7,1072a26-30.
76. "Therefore,because what isapprehended byintellect isdifferent inkind from what is
apprehended bysense, itfollows that theintellective appetite isa power different
from
thesensory (ST1.80.2c).
appetite" Notnearly allthedifficulties inAquinas 'sapparently
evolvingtheory ofwillcanbeeven mentioned inthisbrief account. Hismost complete,
unifieddiscussionofrelevant topics isprobably thesingle articleofDM6.
77. SeealsoSTI-II.17.1,ad2:"Theroot offreedom considered asthesubject [offreedom]
iswill;consideredasitscause, however, [the root offreedom] isreason. Forwillcan
beled{ferri tovarious
) freely things justbecause reason canhavevarious conceptions
ofwhat isgood. Andsophilosophers define free decision {liberum arbitrium) asthefree
judgment ofreason {liberum deratione iudicium ),asif[toindicate that]reasonisfree-
dom's cause."
78. I amgrateful toScottMacDonald andEleonore Stump forhelpful comments onanear-
lierdraft
ofthis andtoClaudia
article, Eisen for editorialandbibliographical help.
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University of Arkansas Press

Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind

Aquinas' s Philosophy of Mind

My purposesin thisarticleareprimarily I am concernedwith

1. SOUL AS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF LIFE

The centralsubjectofAquinas's philosophy ofmindis whathe calls ratio-

2. THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Aquinas'ssubsistence thesis,whichclearlyis incompatible withmaterial-

4. INTELLECT- PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL

Aquinas's accountof whattheminddoes and how itdoes itdividesnatu-

5. INTELLECT- AQUINAS'S DIRECT REALISM

The guaranteedaccess is utterlydirect,to the pointof formalidentity

6. INTELLECT- THE ROLES OF PHANTASMS AND

Phantasms arelikenessesofparticular materialthingsre-realized in physi-

7. INTELLECT- ITS OBJECTS, OPERATIONS, AND RANGE

The properobjectof intellect underconsideration hereAquinassometimes

8. APPETITIVE POWERS GENERALLY IN

Philosophy ofmindis obviouslyrelevanttoepistemology in itsaccountof

9. SENSUALITY AND RATIONAL CONTROL

Theappetitive powerassociatedwithsensory cognition is onewe sharewith

10. VOLITION AND CHOICE, NECESSITATION

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